Interest Groups PDF

CHAPTER 11 I N T E R E S T G R OU P S TRACY RO OF 1 Introduction James Madison (1787) famously argued that competition among numerous interests in a large, diverse democracy like the United States woul...

CHAPTER 11 I N T E R E S T G R OU P S TRACY RO OF 1 Introduction James Madison (1787) famously argued that competition among numerous interests in a large, diverse democracy like the United States would control the “mischiefs of faction” by checking the power of any particular group, including one representing the majority. In contrast, many contemporary observers fear groups provide too much protection for organized minorities at the expense of the unorganized majority and the public interest (Hacker and Pierson 2010). The competition of interest groups, combined with a fragmented political system and historically weak but increasingly polarized political parties, encourages gridlock and limits the reach and redistribution of the American welfare state. But the social welfare policies that are adopted typically reflect both concessions to powerful, affluent interests and the influence of a diverse array of groups, including those that look out for the disadvantaged and the mid- dle class. In exploring these themes, this chapter first examines the study of interest groups in American politics and comparative welfare state development, then reviews the role of various types of groups in shaping social welfare policy in the United States. 2 The Study of Groups in American Politics Scholars have long debated the degree to which U.S. policy-making is shaped by a broad range of interests that reflect the needs and desires of the American people or by the interests of a privileged few who undermine American democracy. In the 1950s and 1960s several scholars developed the perspective of pluralism, which placed groups at the center of American democracy. Challenging the theory of elitism, which held that 188   Tracy Roof political power in the United States was concentrated in an exclusive group of deci- sion makers, pluralists such as David Truman (1951) and Robert Dahl (1961) reasserted Madison’s claim that the competition among groups prevented any one from domi- nating. The political system was democratic and responsive because all interests could organize, and politicians were inclined to consider the interests of unorganized groups that might coalesce if their concerns went unaddressed. This permeable pluralist system fostered stability and incremental policy change as the balance of power among group forces shifted to absorb new groups’ demands. In response, a range of scholars challenged many of the pluralists’ assumptions by emphasizing sources of bias in the interest group system. E. E. Schattschneider famously observed, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” (1960, 35). Economist Mancur Olson (1965) outlined a “logic of col- lective action” in which it was irrational for ordinary people to sacrifice their time and resources to join in pursuit of collective goods that would be widely shared. Business groups are more likely to organize because in small groups formed around narrow eco- nomic interests, each member gets a substantial share of the benefits of collective action. Since it is also irrational for citizens to dedicate considerable time to following and par- ticipating in policy debates, paid corporate lobbyists have substantial advantages in shaping outcomes. Moreover, as Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962) argued, cor- porate and affluent interests work to narrow the range of issues that are actively debated and to keep many issues—such as significant income distribution or the sanctity of pri- vate property—off the political agenda altogether. Scholars investigating the claims of Olson and other critics of pluralism found sources of countervailing power against elites and business dominance. Collective action prob- lems can be overcome by social movements; policy entrepreneurs; and patrons such as wealthy individuals, foundations, and even the federal government, which sponsor groups demanding collective goods or benefits for the disadvantaged (McAdam 1982; Salisbury 1969; Walker 1991). As a result, open, fluid policy networks of diverse contend- ing interests, including many of the public interest groups born in the 1960s and 1970s, replaced closed policy-making systems in many areas where they once existed (Heclo 1978). Moreover, elites are often divided and may check each other. In the last few decades the field of interest group research, once characterized as theory rich and data poor (Arnold 1982, 97), has generated a lot of data, but no over- arching theory to replace pluralism (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). Efforts to catalog the groups active in national politics find significant diversity in the interest group universe, but affluent and corporate interests dominate (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Dozens of studies on the impact of lobbying and political action committee (PAC) contributions to candidates have produced conflict- ing results, with some suggesting that groups have little influence in the policy process and others finding that groups, particularly those with significant resources, dictate policy outcomes (for reviews see Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 288–311). In the most comprehensive study of group influence on legisla- tive outcomes to date, designed to address the methodological weaknesses of previous research, Baumgartner and colleagues (2009) find a strong status quo bias, with any  Interest Groups   189 group defending existing policy likely to prevail and a very weak relationship between group resources and success. Most issues pit diverse coalitions of the strong and the weak—such as pharmaceutical firms and patient advocacy groups—against each other, such that group efforts tend to cancel each other out. But when stalemate occasionally breaks, policy change is likely to be significant rather than incremental. Baumgartner and his colleagues caution that their study does not prove resources are unimportant, but rather that they are likely built into the status quo. They note that few issues deal- ing with the economic security of the poor or the working class even appeared on the agenda, although this finding may be skewed because their study was conducted over successive Republican-controlled Congresses. Some scholars argue that recent research, though not generating an elegant theory, reflects a new “neo-pluralist” perspective that stresses the uncertain and context-specific nature of interest group influence (Lowery and Gray 2004; McFarland 2004). 3 Comparative Theories of Welfare State Development The role of organized interests has also figured prominently in another literature focused on explaining differences in the generosity and reach of welfare states in wealthy democ- racies. Business interests that control capital and the means of production are in a privi- leged position relative to laborers in any society, but in a capitalist democracy members of the working class can secure redistributive policies by leveraging the power of their greater numbers through mass organization. Building on this premise, power resource theorists argue that much of the variation in welfare state spending and entitlements across industrialized democracies can be explained by the relative strength of unions and leftist parties allied with labor that demand programs fostering greater economic security and equality (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985). Power resource theorists thus argue that the low level of social welfare spending in the United States is a consequence of the comparative weakness of organized labor and the absence of an influential social- ist, social democratic, or labor party, which has allowed corporate and affluent interests more sway over public policy. Other comparative scholars have emphasized the importance of countries’ political institutions in explaining the variation in the power of interest groups and the gener- osity of welfare states (for a detailed review, see the chapter on political institutions in this volume). Unlike both pluralists and power resource theorists, institutionalists stress that government policy is not a direct reflection of the balance of class forces or interests in society, because groups’ influence is mediated by government structures and electoral rules (Immergut 1992). Organized interests face tremendous challenges in passing com- prehensive welfare state programs because the American government, based on feder- alism and checks and balances, is very fragmented. Especially prior to the New Deal in the 1930s, social reformers’ efforts were often targeted at the state and local levels, which 190   Tracy Roof inhibited the formation of strong national organizations and universal policies (Skocpol 1992). On the national level, there are multiple “veto points” in the House, the Senate, the executive branch, and the courts at which the passage or implementation of legisla- tive proposals can be obstructed. Interest groups are thought to be both numerous and powerful in the American policy-making process because the fragmented political system offers so many points of access. But groups such as labor that favor an activist government are at a disadvantage, because they must push legislation through every point in the policy gauntlet, whereas groups that favor limited government must only succeed at one veto point (Roof 2011). Fragmentation does not always work against the welfare state. Once programs like Social Security are established, beneficiaries and supportive groups are often able to fend off efforts to cut or eliminate them (Pierson 1995), and groups advocating for the disadvan- taged have been able to expand programs for the poor and disabled through the courts and administrative rule-making processes when the elected branches were less receptive (Berry 1984; Melnick 1994; Erkulwater 2006). However, political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson argue that over time legislative gridlock has produced “policy drift,” as affluent interests in the United States have taken advantage of institutional veto points to stop legislation that would update social welfare policies to meet changing societal prob- lems such as the rise in income inequality (Hacker and Pierson 2010). The fragmented political system also makes it almost impossible to have corporatism, an institutionalized pattern of policy-making found in some European countries like Sweden, in which a highly centralized government negotiates policies with centralized “peak” organizations representing labor, business, or other major stakeholders. There is no centralized government capable of brokering and upholding compromises in the United States, and multiple groups typically claim to speak for major societal interests (Salisbury 1979). Rather than developing the type of coordinated economy typically associated with corporatism, the United States developed a liberal market economy (LME) that fosters business hostility to organized labor and welfare state programs (Iversen and Soskice 2009). Iversen and Soskice find that LMEs are also associated with majoritarian political systems, which discourage successful coalitions of interests sup- portive of redistributive policies. 3.1 The Relationship between Parties and Groups in the United States Unlike the proportional representation systems common in many parliamentary governments, the plurality-based, majoritarian electoral system in the United States encourages the dominance of two parties (Duverger 1964), which shapes interest group behavior. Interests like labor and environmentalists, which have formed parties in other countries, instead mobilize as interest groups. The United States has also historically been characterized by the competition of a wide diversity of groups articulating con- cerns not well-represented by the two dominant parties.  Interest Groups   191 Party discipline is also not as strong in Congress as in most parliamentary systems, which allows groups to lobby individual politicians away from the party line (Maioni 1998). Thus Democratic presidents and congressional leaders committed to party posi- tions on health-care reform have faced the reluctance of many Democrats to challenge the interests of employers, insurers, and health-care providers (Starr 2011). Likewise, President George W. Bush’s proposal to create private investment accounts in Social Security failed in part because many congressional Republicans were intimidated by the campaign of the AARP (formerly known as the American Association of Retired Persons) against it (Lynch 2011). While interest groups often try to undermine party discipline, they have also contrib- uted to growing ideological unity within parties, and polarization between them, in recent decades. Groups supporting an activist government have tried to pull the Democratic Party to the left, while antigovernment groups, such as those associated with the Tea Party movement, have pushed the Republican Party to the right. Wayward incumbents face the threat that a group such as the conservative Club for Growth or the liberal Moveon.org will fund primary challengers. While moderate Republicans once voted for programs like Medicare, only one Republican voted for the 2010 health-care law, in part because of the strident opposition of conservative groups. Deficit reduction and entitlement reform have been difficult to address because almost all congressional Republicans have signed a pledge not to raise taxes, under pressure from the influential leader of Americans for Tax Reform, Grover Norquist, while Democrats resist substantial cuts in social spending under pressure from liberal groups. Thus groups can constrain party leaders’ ability to negotiate bipartisan compromises. But influence works both ways. Given limited formal tools to enforce party discipline, leaders often utilize allied groups to secure votes in Congress. A striking example is the K-Street Project, an effort initiated by Republican congressional leaders to pressure business and trade associa- tions to hire former Republican members of Congress and staffers. In addition to funnel- ing business resources to Republican candidates, these close ties facilitated coordination on legislative strategy. The narrow passage of the Bush administration’s Medicare pre- scription drug benefit in 2003 was made possible by the lobbying of business groups associated with the project—both with and without a direct interest in the legisla- tion—of conservative Republicans reluctant to support a new entitlement (Morgan and Campbell 2011, 137). Groups make such useful allies for party leaders because of the range of tactics they can employ. 4 Tactics Jeffrey Berry (1977) identified four overarching categories of interest group tactics: 1) law, which includes involvement in litigation and administrative implementation; 2) con- frontation, which includes protests and shareholders’ actions; 3) information, such 192   Tracy Roof as testimony before agency or congressional hearings, policy research, public rela- tions campaigns, and direct lobbyist contacts; and 4) constituency influence, such as letter-writing campaigns, issue advertising, and electoral efforts including campaign contributions and voter mobilization. Groups choose tactics based on the issue; the stage in the policy process, from agenda-setting to implementation; the larger politi- cal context, including the partisan balance in Congress; and their own resources and strengths (for a review see Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 146–167). Some groups have close relationships with congressional leaders and work quietly behind closed doors, writing legislative language, while other groups with resources but few congressional allies may run major media campaigns to influence voters. Groups with few resources or allies, or those trying to call attention to a neglected issue, may resort to demonstrations. All of these tactics have been used by groups to shape American social policy. The next sections look at major categories of interest groups and their participation in the policy process. 5 Business Business interests have exerted significant influence over the development of the wel- fare state. Charles Lindblom (1977) famously argued that business has a privileged position relative to other interests because the fortunes of politicians and government officials are tied to economic strength, and officials are likely to accommodate business concerns for fear that business will refuse to invest. Prior to the New Deal, when many social welfare issues were handled by the states, states were leery of policies that might increase business costs or reduce business autonomy and encourage businesses to move to another state (Hacker and Pierson 2002). Many scholars argue that globalization and capital mobility have shifted this threat to the national level in the last few decades, and that this threat has had more influence on policy-making in liberal market economies like that of the United States (Swank 2002). Lindblom and others emphasize that struc- tural business power is heightened by extensive financial and organizational resources deployed to influence politicians and public opinion. The American business commu- nity is considered one of the most antistatist among capitalist democracies, and it has used its advantages to promote laissez faire ideology and oppose social welfare policies that would strengthen workers’ position in labor markets, interfere with management prerogatives, or raise business costs. But despite its advantages, business’s political influence has fluctuated. Powerful monopolies developed in the late 1800s and plowed money into politics. Protected by the federal courts and Republicans, northeastern corporate interests largely weathered challenges by the Populist and Progressive movements from the late 1890s through 1932. But business was thrown on the defensive during the Great Depression, when sizeable Democratic congressional majorities pushed through the New Deal, which included  Interest Groups   193 policies that empowered organized labor, regulated business practices, and established the foundations of the modern welfare state. Although some scholars argue that the sup- port of progressive business interests made passage of New Deal programs like Social Security possible (Swenson 2004), most business groups opposed public pensions, unemployment compensation, and numerous other New Deal programs (Hacker and Pierson 2002). Many scholars argue that big businesses, particularly in unionized sec- tors, accepted a social contract of collective bargaining and fair pay with benefits in exchange for workers’ deference to managerial prerogatives in the postwar period, but conservative business interests continued to fight unions and the welfare state, helping to gut effective full employment planning legislation and pass anti-union provisions (Lichtenstein 2002). Business was again thrown on the defensive in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the environmental and consumer protection movements successfully pushed a wave of regulatory legislation over corporate opposition. But these defeats led to a rein- vigoration of organized business (Vogel 1989; Hacker and Pierson 2010). Trade asso- ciations and business PACs proliferated. Business groups sought greater unity and coordination of their activities. Corporate and conservative interests also funded think tanks like the Heritage Foundation to popularize and give intellectual cred- ibility to the merits of smaller government and market-based policies (Rich 2004). Business groups typically contribute to both Democratic and Republican incum- bents to guarantee access, but these groups eventually became more strategic by shift- ing resources to more reflexively probusiness Republican challengers, which helped Republicans take control of both houses of Congress in the 1994 elections for the first time in 42 years. In the last three decades business interests have secured numer- ous favorable policies, including curtailment of union power under Republican presidents and tax cuts and deregulation under presidents of both parties. New wel- fare state programs also increasingly came to rely on private sector intermediaries (Mettler 2011; Morgan and Campbell 2011). For example, both Bush’s Medicare pre- scription drug benefit and Obama’s health-care reform law subsidize the purchase of private health insurance. Despite efforts at coordination, one of the biggest constraints on business power remains fragmentation. Both in the past and today, the business community is divided by region, industry, size, labor force composition, and executives’ ideological com- mitments. There are hundreds of organizations—including umbrella groups like the Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce, and the National Federation of Independent Business, as well as industry-specific groups such as the American Beverage Association—that spent millions fighting the addition of a tax on high-calorie drinks to the 2010 health reform legislation. Most large businesses also hire lobbying firms and maintain their own offices in Washington to protect their particular inter- ests. Businesses are often pitted against each other in policy struggles, and the umbrella organizations may fail to achieve enough consensus to actively lobby. Large businesses, which are less likely to oppose social welfare policies like universal health care or pub- lic investments in education and worker training, are typically less effective than the 194   Tracy Roof organizations of small business that are ideologically unified in opposition to pro- grams that might increase taxes or regulatory burdens. Political scientist Cathie Jo Martin argues that while large companies often dominate regulatory politics, they do not actively participate in some of the major social policy debates (Martin 1999, 6). In contrast, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), made up of small businesses from every congressional district, has gained a reputation as one of the most powerful players in Washington. Business has also influenced social welfare policy by offering benefits that work- ers might otherwise receive from government. Prior to the New Deal, some employ- ers endorsed “welfare capitalism,” in which businesses either directly provided their workers with services like education, housing, and health care or offered group insur- ance policies covering accidents and sickness. Welfare capitalists were always a small minority of employers, and by the onset of the Great Depression most reformers had abandoned the idea in favor of government insurance programs. However, in the 1940s and 1950s more employers began to offer pensions and health insurance under pres- sure from unions and the need to attract workers, induced by favorable changes in the tax code (Gottschalk 2000; Hacker 2002; Klein 2003). The spread of these benefits produced powerful “feedback effects” shaping the context for future reform. Social Security evolved as a complement to rather than a substitute for private pensions, and employer-sponsored health insurance reduced the demand for government health insurance (Hacker 2002). Health-care providers and insurers also gained a stake in the private insurance system, making the adoption of national health insurance less likely in the future. As a result, no president since Harry Truman has endorsed a program of universal government-provided health insurance in office. Recent struggles over health-care reform reflect the divisions among business groups around social policy and the constraints of past policy choices. Most major business organizations entered negotiations with the Clinton administration as it formulated its universal health reform proposal built around the existing system of private insurance, but over time they came to oppose the reform. Associations representing large insur- ers, which stood to gain business, offered lukewarm support. But the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), a group representing small insurers that risked losing business, came out against it and ran an influential series of ads featuring Harry and Louise, a middle-class couple, discussing the dangers of Clinton’s plan over their kitchen table. Fearing a loss of revenue for their members, the American Hospital Association and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) also fought the proposal. After securing an exemption for small businesses from a cost-sharing mandate, the NFIB joined the opposition and became a leader in the fight. Although many large employers burdened by high health-care costs that undermined their com- petitiveness supported reform in general, the National Association of Manufacturers and Business Roundtable eventually came out against Clinton’s proposal. On the verge of endorsing the bill, the Chamber of Commerce was “cross-lobbied” by the NFIB and “reverse-lobbied” by conservative Republicans to withhold its support (Skocpol 1997, 158–160). After months of negotiations, the bill went down to defeat as the “losers”  Interest Groups   195 under health-care reform fought the bill, but the groups representing businesses that would benefit did not actively support it (Starr 2011, 117). Eager to avoid a repeat of Clinton’s defeat, the Obama administration sought to secure prominent industry support early in negotiations over its proposal. In a deal with PhRMA, administration and Senate leaders agreed not to include Democratic propos- als allowing Medicare to negotiate lower drug prices directly with manufacturers and permitting the importation of cheaper drugs from abroad in exchange for the industry’s agreement to offer drug discounts in the Medicaid and Medicare programs and to bank- roll a proreform advertising campaign (Starr 2011, 205). The hospital associations also backed the bill and agreed to accept reduced Medicare payments with the understand- ing that hospitals would gain more patients among the newly insured. Although insur- ers would also gain new customers, negotiators failed to reach a deal with America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP, formed by a merger of the HIAA and other insurer groups) because of divisions within the industry (Starr 2011, 218–219). Some of the larg- est for-profit insurers ultimately funneled money through the AHIP to the Chamber of Commerce to help fund an antireform ad campaign. The AHIP did not come out against the bill, instead choosing to remain in the negotiations and fight proposals like the pub- lic option, which would have offered a government-run insurance plan to compete with private plans. The Chamber and the NFIB actively fought the bill, while other employer groups did not. The fracturing of the business community made it difficult for oppo- nents to stop the bill while the Democrats briefly held the sixty Senate seats necessary to overcome a filibuster. 6 Labor Scholars have often pointed to the weakness of the labor movement in explaining the overall weakness of the Left and the limited welfare state in the United States. In trying to mobilize workers, unions have faced the hostility of employers; a strong strain of individ- ualism in American culture; a belief in upward mobility; and divisions among workers based on skill level, race, and ethnicity (Greenstone 1977). In trying to mobilize politi- cally, unions have confronted barriers to third parties; workers’ attachments to one of the two parties based on local or ethnic ties; the historic hostility of the courts; and the frag- mented, super-majoritarian features of the government. Organized labor is not nearly as influential in the United States as in other wealthy democracies with more centralized governments and more favorable rules governing organizing and collective bargaining, yet it has still played an important role in shaping the contemporary welfare state. Prior to the 1930s labor was not very active in the policy-making process. The Knights of Labor, the first large, national labor organization, which rose to prominence in the 1880s, was largely unsuccessful in achieving policy goals such as the eight-hour day and prohibition of child labor. By the 1890s the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had 196   Tracy Roof replaced the Knights as the dominant national organization, a position it has maintained despite fleeting challenges from more radical movements like the Industrial Workers of the World. The AFL focused on collective bargaining for better wages and working con- ditions, rather than political mobilization as advocated by Socialist elements within the labor movement. Leaders like the AFL’s long-serving president Samuel Gompers came to view political action as futile because of the courts’ hostility to government regulation of working conditions (Forbath 1991; Hattam 1993). The courts even interpreted anti- trust laws, originally written to restrain corporate monopolies, as restraints on workers’ collective action, which threatened the very existence of unions. Although it occasion- ally supported state-level reforms, the AFL opposed many of the national welfare state programs advocated by social democratic labor movements in other countries at the time and focused on obtaining legal protections for unions’ collective action. The AFL initially even opposed policies like a minimum wage, fearing it would become a ceiling rather than a floor. But the AFL’s position slowly changed, and organized labor became the strongest advocate of welfare state programs such as unemployment compensation, public pensions, and national health insurance (Harrington 1972; Greenstone 1977). Several factors encouraged the growth and politicization of the labor movement. First was the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935, which recognized workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively. In accepting the NLRA’s constitu- tionality two years later, the Supreme Court signaled a growing openness to regulation of social and working conditions, which opened up possibilities for labor’s political action. After passage of the NLRA, dissidents within the AFL, who advocated large-scale organizing of unskilled industrial workers over the AFL’s focus on skilled craftsmen, created a rival federation—the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)—that was very politically active. The CIO became a key supporter of the New Deal and Fair Deal agendas of Democratic presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman (Plotke 1996). Competition between the two federations, favorable government policies, and a tight labor market during World War II resulted in a surge in union membership to over a third of the nonagricultural workforce. Eager to rein in unions’ growing economic and political power, conservative and corporate interests pushed the antilabor Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. This setback, as well as the failure to pass programs like national health insur- ance, encouraged the two federations to merge as the AFL-CIO in 1955 to strengthen labor’s political muscle. Member unions, such as the United Auto Workers and the American Federation of Teachers, also engage in politics, but the AFL-CIO, despite peri- ods of division, has historically taken the lead in coordinating labor’s political activity, with very limited influence over organizing and collective bargaining. Labor’s new role in advocating expansion of the welfare state was limited by a number of factors (Roof 2011). While union membership in many states in the North, industrial Midwest, and Pacific Coast was on a par with that of more highly unionized Western countries after World War II, unionization rates were much lower in the South and western states with low levels of industrialization. Over half of all union members were located in just a handful of states. The political impact of this geographic imbalance was exaggerated by equal state representation in the Senate, the filibuster, and the role of seniority in Congress, with the latter awarding powerful committee chairmanships  Interest Groups   197 to conservative Southern Democrats, who often allied with Republicans to obstruct or water down legislation benefiting organized labor, the working class, and the poor. Given congressional resistance to policies like universal health care, unions sought these benefits through collective bargaining (Hacker 2002; Klein 2003). Despite these limitations, labor remained active on public policy and helped secure the expansion of New Deal programs like the minimum wage and Social Security, as well as the creation of new programs—although these were often more incremental or targeted than the broad, universal programs labor favored. The AFL-CIO put the issue of Medicare on the congressional agenda and funded an influential new organization, the National Council of Senior Citizens, to build grassroots pressure (Marmor 1973). The AFL-CIO also worked closely with Democratic president Lyndon Johnson to pass other Great Society programs in the 1960s, including antipoverty measures, federal aid to education, and civil rights legislation. Organized labor’s membership and economic power declined considerably from the 1970s onward, but it remains an important player in national politics and policy-making (Dark 2001). Unionization has been reduced to a third of its 1950s peak, just 11.3 percent of the workforce and only 6.7 percent in the private sector in 2013 (BLS News Release 2014). But with 14.8 million members, labor still has more clout than many groups, although unlike business, labor’s influence is largely limited to Democrats. Throughout the period of conservative dominance from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush, labor worked with groups like the AARP to defend social welfare programs such as Medicare and Social Security from cuts, fundamental restructuring, and privatization. Labor also helped pass major new initiatives such as the 2010 health-care reform law, by both work- ing behind the scenes and mobilizing grassroots support (Roof 2011). Labor’s ability to maintain its policy influence into the future faces many challenges. Largely because of the Senate filibuster, labor has been unable to secure laws making it easier to organize new workers in the face of intense employer opposition (Roof 2011). Tight government budgets amid the economic downturn starting in 2008 spurred con- servative efforts in the states to weaken public sector unions, which have been one of the few growing sectors of the labor movement and now represent over half of union members. Membership is likely to continue to decline, which restricts the resources unions can commit to politics. Workers are also in a weakened position to demand bet- ter wages and the employer-provided benefits that are such an important part of the American social safety net. Thus, the decline of unions contributes to rising inequality in the United States (Hacker and Pierson 2010). 7 Agricultural Groups Agricultural interests were also influential in the early development of many social wel- fare policies. The Populist movement attempted to build a coalition of small farmers and laborers favoring greater government regulation of the economy and working conditions, 198   Tracy Roof but it failed to gain control of the national government. However, the coalition’s push for progressive taxation culminated in ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, which permitted a federal income tax (Morgan and Prasad 2009). Farmers and labor again joined in the New Deal electoral coalition, but the representatives of south- ern farmers, who depended on a pliable, poor, and largely black labor force, demanded exemptions for agricultural labor from New Deal programs like Social Security and the minimum wage (Finegold 1988). By the late 1930s and throughout the postwar period, conservative Southern Democrats and Republican representatives of midwestern agri- cultural interests often found common cause in fighting expansion of the welfare state. Agricultural groups also shaped nutritional assistance programs. The first school lunch and Food Stamps programs were originally created to dispose of agricultural sur- pluses during the New Deal. While the Food Stamps program was terminated because of declining farm support as surpluses all but disappeared during World War II, many farm groups joined children’s advocates in supporting the National School Lunch Program in 1946 (Levine 2008, 74). The continued distribution of surplus commodi- ties after the war proved inadequate in addressing the problem of hunger highlighted by politicians, the media, and civil rights and public interest groups. Yet farm interests feared that pilot food stamp programs created early in the Kennedy administration might threaten assistance to farmers and cloud the Department of Agriculture’s mission (King 2000, 48). In a classic example of logroll politics, congressional representatives of agricultural interests agreed to support a national food stamp program in exchange for the support of urban representatives and nutritional advocates for legislation assist- ing tobacco, wheat, and cotton farmers. Farm groups were repeatedly party to similar logrolls as the program was expanded, and nutritional assistance and farm subsidies are often bundled together in legislation (King 2000; Finegold 1988). When Aid to Families with Dependent Children was converted to a block grant to the states in 1995, a similar effort on nutritional assistance was defeated in part because of the opposition of agricul- tural groups that feared reduced farm incomes (King 2000, 209). Farmers are represented by two main umbrella organizations, the more progressive National Farmers’ Union (NFU), dominated by small farmers, and the larger and more conservative American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF). The NFU has typically allied with labor and other groups on the left in support of programs like Social Security and Medicare, whereas the AFBF has allied with conservative corporate interests to oppose the growth of the welfare state. There are also dozens of groups focused on particular crops. 8 Professional Associations While business, labor, and agriculture are the classic economic groups, a number of professional associations are also active in social welfare issues. The American Medical  Interest Groups   199 Association (AMA), the largest group representing doctors, with influential members in every congressional district, has played a key role in health-care reform. Franklin Roosevelt’s administration decided not to include health insurance in the Social Security Act for fear the AMA’s opposition would kill the entire bill (Starr 2011, 38). The group also took the lead in defeating President Truman’s national health insurance plan in the 1940s, launching a major public relations campaign warning about the dangers of socialized medicine (Poen 1979). It continued to fight any proposal it felt might involve government in the practice of medicine, including the addition of disability coverage to Social Security and Medicare. But after years of stalemate, both of these programs passed over the AMA’s opposition, proving the group was not invincible (Quadagno 2005). However, to curb the vehemence of doctors’ opposition, the Medicare legislation included no cost controls, which led to a windfall for doctors and soaring program costs. Over time the AMA lost its reputation as the voice of doctors as groups represent- ing specialists became more active, and rivals such as the much smaller Physicians for a National Health Program emerged. Although not as hostile to health-care reform as it once had been, the AMA did not join the American College of Physicians; groups repre- senting specialists like pediatricians, neurologists, and family doctors; and other profes- sional organizations such as the American Nursing Association in endorsing Clinton’s health reform plan (Starr 2011, 114). The medical professions were more unified during Obama’s health reform effort, and the AMA ultimately joined a broad range of provider groups in endorsing the legislation, which contributed to the momentum behind the bill. Although they vary in influence, other professional organizations are active on a range of social policies. The National Education Association (NEA), the largest group representing teachers that operates as both a union and professional organization, lob- bies on issues affecting children such as nutritional assistance. While not as powerful as the AMA or NEA, organizations of government and nonprofit professionals, such as the National Association of Social Workers, lobby on health, education, and antipoverty issues affecting their clients (Hays 2001). Even groups representing trial lawyers try to influence policies such as workers’ compensation and disability insurance. 9 Intergovernmental Organizations Intergovernmental groups representing states, cities, and counties engage in policy debates and provide critical information to Congress about how legislation and policy implementation affect other levels of government. These groups include generalist orga- nizations based on the level of government, such as the League of Cities and the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL); groups focused on a particular policy area, such as the American Public Welfare Association and the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials; and individual units of government that maintain offices in 200   Tracy Roof Washington or hire their own lobbyists (Cammisa 1995; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Intergovernmental groups became active lobbyists in the 1930s with the growth of joint federal-state programs, such as unemployment insurance, and programs that relied on implementation by localities, such as public assistance. Their activities increased in the 1960s and 1970s as subnational governments sought greater control over growing federal streams of funding for programs such as Medicaid, elementary and secondary education, and workforce training (Cammisa 1995). In the last few decades intergovern- mental groups have been influential in debates over devolving responsibility from the federal government to states and localities. The National Governors Association (NGA) helped put welfare reform on the national agenda and played a prominent role in shap- ing the 1988 Family Support Act and the 1996 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) legislation, which converted welfare to a block grant that gave states significant latitude in administering the program (Haskins 2008). While intergovernmental groups almost always gain the ear of policy makers, the diversity of interests can compromise their effectiveness. Disputes between states and localities over control of federal funding limited their influence over affordable hous- ing legislation passed in 1990 (Cammisa 1995). Splits between governors over the block-granting of Medicaid have limited the NGA’s ability to press the issue. Deep par- tisan divisions over health-care reform during the Obama administration also made it impossible for the NGA and NCSL to reach consensus (Dinan 2011). As a result, partisan organizations like the Republican Governors Association and individual states and gov- ernors played a prominent role in fighting the legislation, while the Obama administra- tion convinced the Democratic Governors Association not to raise concerns publicly. Although they did not get everything they wanted, states gained concessions on federal funding for the expansion of Medicaid coverage included in the law. Intergovernmental groups also convinced policy makers to retain a substantial state role in regulating insur- ers and setting up insurance exchanges, because they were more unified on these issues, and members of Congress recognized state expertise in these areas. 10 Citizens’ Groups Citizens’ groups, with membership based on common interests and concerns rather than economic or occupational ties, have played an important role in social policy development throughout American history. They include public interest groups that pursue collective goods such as public health or a safe food supply; groups that repre- sent demographic categories such as the elderly or disabled; groups organized around an ideology or common policy goals, such as the American Conservative Union or civil rights groups; single-issue groups such as pro-life and pro-choice organizations; and groups that advocate for those without much political power, such as the poor and chil- dren. During the Progressive Era (1890s–1920s), reformers used citizens’ groups to work  Interest Groups   201 around the two entrenched, patronage-oriented political parties that were hostile to their policy demands at both the state and national levels (Skocpol 1992). In her ground- breaking study, Theda Skocpol (1992) found that women’s organizations helped create a “maternalist” welfare state in the early 1900s by securing policies such as mothers’ pen- sions that provided for the welfare of mothers and children, while policies protecting male wage earners faced heavier political resistance. The number of citizens’ groups grew considerably in the last half of the twentieth cen- tury. Growth in government programs from the New Deal through the Great Society mobilized previously quiescent beneficiaries like the elderly into powerful political con- stituencies, represented by groups such as the AARP (Campbell 2005). Groups associ- ated with the civil rights and women’s rights movements in the mid-twentieth century demanded not only legal equality but—less successfully—programs to address eco- nomic inequality. These movements were followed by a surge in public interest groups in the 1960s and 1970s (Berry 1977). Most of these public interest groups focused on the “new liberal” interests shared by their upper-middle-class supporters, such as the environment and consumer protection (Berry 1999). But some focused on redis- tributive issues like expanding the Food Stamp Program (Berry 1984). Public Interest Research Groups (PIRGs), a network of state groups that formed on college campuses in the 1970s, lobby on a range of issues and recently joined with the United States Student Association to push an overhaul of government-subsidized college loans (Mettler 2011). Families USA has provided both research and grassroots mobilization in favor of uni- versal health care for three decades. Another influential category of citizens’ groups has been Christian conservative organizations that first mobilized in the 1980s. While much of their agenda focuses on cultural issues like abortion, they typically support candidates with conservative social welfare positions, and their concerns bring them into the debate on policies such as wel- fare and health-care reform. They also supported the creation of the Child Tax Credit, which is one of the biggest government programs assisting families with children (Howard 2007, 87). While citizens’ groups typically do not have the financial resources of business or even organized labor, some have substantial memberships, and others offer expertise and information valued by policy makers. 11 Conclusion Competition among diverse interest groups adds even greater complexity and uncer- tainty to the fragmented and decentralized policy-making process. Although affluent groups often do get their wishes, they also often do not. However, interest group pres- sures make policy consensus more difficult and government action less likely, which on balance benefits the groups and interests opposed to an activist government. When new policies are adopted, both supporters and opponents typically shape them, and no side 202   Tracy Roof gets everything it wants. But accommodating various interests tends to make policies less coherent and efficient, and the deal-making itself often feeds public distrust in gov- ernment—which in turn discourages government action. Disentangling the effects of interest groups on public policy is difficult, and there is still a lot to be learned. Many factors contribute to outcomes, such as the partisan bal- ance in government, the preferences of politicians and government officials, the lega- cies of previous policies, crises or other events, and public opinion. The body of interest group research suggests that this political context shapes which groups have the most influence in a policy battle and how much influence they have. The level of group partic- ipation and influence also varies with the stage of the policy process. While many groups become involved once an issue is actively debated in Congress, fewer groups work to put the issue on the agenda or shape its implementation. There is unlikely to be another grand theory like pluralism, but researchers should focus on developing more general principles based on the circumstances that determine groups’ impact through both case studies and large-N studies, hopefully over an extended time horizon. References *Indicates recommended reading. Arnold, Douglas. 1982. “Overfilled and Undertilled Fields in American Politics.” Political Science Quarterly 97:91–103. 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