Chapter 3 Vocabulary & Cases PDF

Chapter 3 Vocabulary: ​ judicial restraint - An accepted, customary policy of courts to restrict themselves to consideration of the questions presented to them and to restrain from legislating or interfering unduly with the executive or legislative branches. The principle also refers to th...

Chapter 3 Vocabulary: ​ judicial restraint - An accepted, customary policy of courts to restrict themselves to consideration of the questions presented to them and to restrain from legislating or interfering unduly with the executive or legislative branches. The principle also refers to the cus-tomary restraint federal courts exercise to leave questions of state law to state courts. ​ supremacy clause - Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, which provides: “This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be supreme law of the land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitu- tion or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” ​ common law - Judge-made law. ​ judges interpret/make law - the power to interpret the law inevitably leads to making the law. Every time a judge is called upon to interpret the law, lawmaking occurs. ​ binding precedent - A precedent is considered binding on the court that sets it and all lower courts within its jurisdic- tion. In a typical state court system, decisions can be rendered at three levels: trial court (lowest), court of appeals (intermediate appellate), and state supreme court (highest). Decisions of the highest state court are binding on all state courts. ​ doctrine of stare decisis - dictates that in making decisions judges should follow prior precedents. In practice, this means that disputes involving similar fact situations should be decided by similar rules. It means to “stand by a decision.” The conventional translation is “Let the decision stand.” ​ case of first impression - A case presenting a fact situation that has never been decided before by that court. ​ adjudication - The formal act of decid- ing disputes by a court or tribunal. ​ legislation - The act of giving, making, or enacting laws; preparation and enactment of laws; lawmaking, ordinarily the prerogative of legislatures or legislative bodies. ​ Dictum - Latin word meaning “said” or “stated.” ​ obiter dictum - means “by the way” or “incidentally.” means something stated inci- dentally and not necessary to the discussion, usually shortened to dictum or its plural dicta. In law, it refers to a part of a judicial deci- sion that goes beyond the scope of the issues and is considered mere opinion and not binding precedent. ​ non binding authority (persuasive authority) - Authority that carries great weight even though not qualifying as precedent; for example, decisions of other state courts. ​ secondary sources - Authoritative statements of law other than statutes and cases, such as law review articles, treatises, and the Restatements. ​ treatises - In the legal context, scholarly books about the law, usually cover- ing one of the basic fields of law, such as torts or contracts, or a significant subfield of the law, such as work- ers’ compensation. ​ Restatements of the Law - Compilations of general interpretations of major fields of common law, sponsored and published by the American Law Institute (founded in 1923). ​ intestate - A person who dies without a will. ​ community property - A regime in which the earnings of husband and wife during marriage are owned equally by both; eight states borrowing from French (Louisiana) or Spanish (Texas west to California) law incorporated the concept of community property into marital law. ​ law from sister states - When binding authority is absent, the court often looks to nonbinding authority from other states. An issue unique in one state may very well have been decided in another.  Chapter 3 Cases: United States v. Zhang Issue: Whether digital files, stolen and transmitted in an intangible form, constitute “goods, wares, or merchandise” under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA). Who: Plaintiff: United States of America Defendant: Yijia Zhang. Where: United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. When: Indictment filed on September 13, 2012 Memorandum Order issued on January 17, 2014. Facts: ​ Zhang worked as a computer systems manager for “Company A” until July 6, 2010. ​ Before resigning, Zhang copied thousands of confidential files from Company A’s internal network onto his desktop computer. ​ He transferred some of these files to a company server and then to Internet storage sites in Sweden and Germany. ​ Zhang deleted files from the server to cover his tracks, which prevented the server from functioning as intended. ​ The government indicted Zhang under the NSPA for transporting stolen property in interstate or foreign commerce. ​ Zhang filed a motion to dismiss Count II (NSPA charge), arguing that digital files do not constitute tangible goods under the NSPA. Holdings:  ​ The court granted Zhang’s motion to dismiss Count II. ​ It ruled that the NSPA does not cover the theft and international transmission of purely intangible digital files. Reasoning: ​ The NSPA criminalizes transporting “goods, wares, or merchandise” stolen, converted, or taken by fraud. ​ The Third Circuit, like other courts, interprets these terms as requiring a tangible form. ​ The Supreme Court in Dowling v. United States (1985) held that copyright infringement does not fall under the NSPA because nothing tangible is taken. ​ The Second Circuit ruled in Aleynikov that stealing and transmitting intangible computer code is not covered by the NSPA, but in Agrawal, physical printouts of stolen code were covered. ​ Because Zhang transmitted digital files purely in intangible form, the court found that they do not qualify as “goods, wares, or merchandise” under the NSPA. ​ The court acknowledged the moral culpability of digital theft but emphasized that defining crimes and punishments is Congress’s role. ​ Since criminal statutes must be construed in favor of defendants when ambiguous, Zhang’s motion was granted. Li v. Yellow Cab Company of California Issue: Whether the California Supreme Court should judicially abolish the doctrine of contributory negligence, which completely bars a plaintiff’s recovery if they are even partially at fault, and replace it with a system of pure comparative negligence that apportions liability based on fault. Who: Plaintiff: Li Defendants and Respondents: Yellow Cab Company of California et al. Judicial Authority: California Supreme Court Where: California When: 1975 Facts: ​ The case questions the fairness of the contributory negligence doctrine, which bars a plaintiff from any recovery if they share any fault in causing their injury. ​ Many legal scholars and courts have criticized this doctrine as inequitable because it does not distribute responsibility proportionally to fault. ​ By 1973, 25 states had moved away from contributory negligence, replacing it with comparative negligence systems, including Florida, which made the change through judicial decision. ​ The California Supreme Court was asked to determine whether it should follow this trend by replacing contributory negligence with a system of pure comparative negligence. Holdings: ​ The California Supreme Court ruled that the traditional “all-or-nothing” rule of contributory negligence should be abolished. ​ The court replaced it with a system of “pure” comparative negligence, where liability for damages is apportioned in direct proportion to each party’s fault. ​ The judgment was reversed. Reasoning: ​ The court found that contributory negligence was outdated and unjust because it failed to allocate responsibility fairly. ​ Many states had already abandoned the doctrine in favor of comparative negligence, which more equitably assigns liability based on fault.  ​ Although some argued that such a change should be left to the legislature, the court noted that contributory negligence itself was a judicially created doctrine. ​ The majority believed that practical experience, logic, and fundamental justice required the adoption of comparative negligence. ​ In his dissent, Justice Clark argued that the Legislature was better suited to decide on the proper negligence standard, citing the complexity of the issue and the court’s limited ability to weigh all competing systems fairly. The Li case is an example of a court overruling a well-established precedent and thus substituting a new rule. Colby v. Carney Hospital Issue: Whether the defense of charitable immunity, asserted by the defendant hospital, violates constitutional rights under the U.S. Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Who: Plaintiff: Edwin A. Colby, Administrator of the deceased’s estate. Defendant: Carney Hospital. Where: Massachusetts (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts). When: Decision issued in 1969. Facts: ​ The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Carney Hospital for wrongful death and conscious suffering. ​ The hospital asserted the defense of charitable immunity, which historically protected charitable institutions from liability.  ​ The plaintiff demurred (objected) to this defense, arguing it was unconstitutional under both the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the U.S. Constitution. ​ The Superior Court judge overruled the demurrer, and the plaintiff appealed. Holdings: ​ The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, allowing the defense of charitable immunity to stand in this case. ​ However, the court disagreed with it and warned that in future cases, it intended to abolish the charitable immunity doctrine. Reasoning: ​ The court found no constitutional provision invalidating the doctrine of charitable immunity. ​ The doctrine had been upheld in past Massachusetts cases, including McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital and Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital. ​ While most states had abandoned charitable immunity, the Massachusetts court previously deferred to the legislature to change the rule. ​ Since legislative action was unlikely, the court declared its intention to abolish the doctrine in future cases but upheld it in this instance. Higgins v. Emerson Hospital Issue: Whether the doctrine of charitable immunity applies to an injury that occurred after the court’s decision in Colby v. Carney Hospital (December 23, 1969) but before the effective date of the statute abolishing the doctrine (September 16, 1971). Who: Plaintiff: John Higgins Defendant: Emerson Hospital Where: Massachusetts When: Injury occurred on June 17, 1970 Trial took place on June 20, 1974 Facts: ​ Higgins was an inpatient at Emerson Hospital when he sustained injuries. ​ He filed a lawsuit in tort and contract against the hospital. ​ The hospital was stipulated to be operated exclusively for charitable purposes. ​ The trial judge directed verdicts in favor of the hospital, applying the doctrine of charitable immunity. ​ Higgins argued that the Colby decision signaled the end of charitable immunity, and entities had notice that the doctrine would no longer be applicable to cases arising after that decision. ​ The court disagreed, stating that Colby only suggested prospective abolition through legislative action, not judicial abolition. Holdings: ​ The doctrine of charitable immunity applies, and the directed verdicts for the hospital were proper. ​ The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Emerson Hospital. Reasoning: ​ The Colby decision did not abolish charitable immunity; it merely suggested that any change should be made prospectively by the legislature. ​ The Massachusetts legislature subsequently enacted a statute abolishing charitable immunity, but it was not retroactive. ​ Since Higgins’ injury occurred before the effective date of the statute, he could not benefit from its provisions. ​ The court rejected the argument that Colby effectively abolished the doctrine before legislative action. State v. Iowa Dist. Court for Dubuque County Issue: Whether the district court was correct in granting the motion for recusal or disqualification of Assistant County Attorney Brigit M. Barnes due to threats made against her by the defendant, Koreen Erickson. Who: ​ Plaintiff: State of Iowa ​ Defendant: Iowa District Court for Dubuque County ​ Koreen Erickson: Defendant charged with attempting to disarm a peace officer. ​ Brigit M. Barnes: Assistant County Attorney prosecuting Erickson. ​ Officer Jason Pace & Officer Chad Leitzen: Officers involved in Erickson’s arrest. ​ James Evilsizer: Erickson’s boyfriend, whom she visited in jail. Where: Dubuque County, Iowa, Iowa Supreme Court When: ​ Incident occurred on June 21, 2011. ​ Erickson was charged on June 24, 2011. ​ The bond review hearing took place on May 30, 2011. ​ Competency evaluations and hearings spanned from August to October 2011. ​ Motion for recusal was filed on October 24, 2011. ​ The Iowa Supreme Court decision was issued on October 23, 2015. Facts: ​ Erickson was arrested after attempting to grab a police officer’s gun while making suicidal threats. ​ She was charged with attempting to disarm a peace officer and released on pretrial supervision. ​ Erickson later made threatening statements about Assistant County Attorney Barnes while visiting her boyfriend in jail.  ​ Based on these statements, the prosecution moved to revoke Erickson’s bond, which was granted. ​ After further competency evaluations, Erickson was deemed fit to stand trial. ​ Erickson moved to disqualify Barnes and the Dubuque County Attorney’s Office, arguing bias. ​ The district court granted the motion to recuse Barnes, leading to the State’s appeal. Holdings: ​ The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s disqualification order, holding that Barnes could continue prosecuting Erickson. The court found the disqualification order was not based on substantial evidence and remanded the case for further proceedings. ​ The trial court abused its discretion when it disqualified te prosecuting attorney from her continued prosecution of the defendant Reasoning: ​ Lack of Conflict of Interest: There was no evidence that Barnes prosecuted Erickson out of personal bias or vengeance. ​ Precedent from Other Jurisdictions: Courts generally do not find threats against a prosecutor to be a sufficient reason for recusal unless an actual conflict is demonstrated. ​ Prosecutorial Ethics & Standards: The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct and ABA standards do not establish that threats alone create a conflict. ​ Erroneous Legal Basis: The district court did not clearly justify its decision or provide legal authority supporting disqualification. ​ Adversarial System Expectation: Negative feelings toward a prosecutor are common in criminal cases and do not inherently impair their ability to act impartially.  Chapter 4 Vocabulary: ​ legislative discussion and debate - The hallmark of the legislative process is discussion & debate. Passage of a bill into law ultimately requires open debate with the leg. body or quite brief concerning laws on which there is general consensus or lack of interest. ​ bicameral - Refers to a legislature with two bodies, such as a House of Representatives and a Senate; only Nebraska has a single, or unicameral, legislature. ​ effect of enactment into law - A public record and serves as a notice to the public of the requirements of the law. ​ affidavit - A statement in writing sworn to before a person who is authorized to administer an oath. ​ judicial invalidation of legislation - When a court strikes down legislation. ​ because of defective procedure - The passage of the law may have been procedurally defective as measured by state law. ​ because of unconstitutionality - The law itself may violate principles of state or federal constitutions. Statutes may also be declared unconstitutional in substance rather than procedure. A statute may be unconstitutional “on its face,” meaning that a careful reading of the statute reveals that it violates some constitutional prohibition; or a statute may be unconstitutional in its effects or applications, which is more difficult to establish. ​ ordinance - Legislation at the local level, typically created or passed by city councils or county commissions. ​ legislative intent - That which the legislature wanted or intended to achieve when it enacted a statute; the determina- tion of which is the goal of the court when the language of a statute is in question, ambiguous, or called into doubt. ​ preamble - Introduction section stating the general purposes of the statue collected under its heading ​ definition section - Definitions from the case to help better understand ​ strict construction - Narrow interpretation by a very literal reading. Criminal statutes and derogation of the common law.  Chapter 4 Cases: Ponder v. Graham Issue: Did the Florida Legislative Council have the power to grant Mary Graham a divorce from her first husband, Solomon Canady, allowing her to lawfully marry Archibald Graham and claim her dower rights? Who: Appellant: William G. Ponder, Executor of Archibald Graham’s estate Appellee: Mary Graham Where: Florida Supreme Court When: 1851 Facts: ​ In 1820, Mary Graham (then Mary Buccles) married Solomon Canady in South Carolina. ​ They later moved to Georgia but separated due to domestic issues. ​ Mary then lived with Archibald Graham in a relationship that could be considered adulterous. ​ In 1832, the Florida Legislative Council passed a special act declaring Mary divorced from Solomon, without any formal petition, proof, or notice to Solomon. ​ In 1834, Mary and Archibald Graham went through a marriage ceremony and lived together as husband and wife until Archibald’s death in 1848. ​ Archibald provided for Mary in his will, but she was not satisfied and claimed her dower right (one-third of his estate).  ​ William Ponder, the executor, challenged her claim, arguing that her marriage to Archibald was not valid because her previous divorce was not legally granted. ​ The jury ruled in Mary’s favor, awarding her one-third of Archibald’s real estate. Holdings: The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, ruling that the Florida Legislative Council did not have the power to grant Mary’s divorce and that the act was unconstitutional. Reasoning: ​ The court ruled that legislative bodies do not have the authority to dissolve marriages, as this is a judicial function. ​ The divorce granted to Mary was unconstitutional because: It was passed by the legislature in just one day, without any judicial process. It lacked due process—there was no petition, affidavit, proof, or notice given to Solomon. Other states like Georgia and South Carolina would not recognize the divorce. ​ The court referenced English law, stating that even the English Parliament required judicial involvement before approving divorces. ​ Since the divorce was invalid, Mary’s marriage to Archibald was also invalid, meaning she had no legal claim to a dower right in his estate. Big John’s Billiards, Inc., v. State Issue: Whether the exemptions for tobacco retail outlets and cigar bars in the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act constitute unconstitutional special legislation, violating the Nebraska Constitution. Who: Plaintiff: Big John’s Billiards, Inc. Defendants: State of Nebraska et al. Appellee: Douglas County Health Department Where: Nebraska Supreme Court When: August 29, 2014 Facts: ​ The Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act (the Act) prohibits smoking in public places and places of employment but allows certain exemptions. ​ The 2008 amendment to the Act defined public places as indoor areas where the public is invited or permitted. ​ Three original exemptions were included in the 2008 law: 1.​ Guestrooms and suites in hotels (up to 20% of rooms could allow smoking). 2.​ Research laboratories conducting smoking-related studies. 3.​ Tobacco retail outlets (stores selling only tobacco products). ​ In 2009, a fourth exemption was added for cigar bars, which are businesses holding a Class C liquor license, earning at least 10% of revenue from cigars, and prohibiting cigarette smoking. ​ Big John’s Billiards, Inc., an Omaha billiards hall, filed a lawsuit in 2009 challenging the Act as unconstitutional special legislation, arguing that these exemptions unfairly favored certain businesses over others. Holdings: ​ The guestroom exemption is constitutional because it is similar to private residences. ​ The exemptions for tobacco retail outlets and cigar bars are unconstitutional special legislation because they unfairly classify businesses without a reasonable distinction related to the purpose of the law.  ​ The unconstitutional exemptions can be severed from the Act, meaning the rest of the law remains valid and enforceable. Reasoning: ​ Nebraska’s Constitution prohibits special legislation that grants exclusive privileges to certain groups without a reasonable justification. ​ To be constitutional, exemptions must be based on real differences between businesses and must be reasonably related to the purpose of the law. ​ The Act’s purpose is to protect public health by reducing exposure to secondhand smoke. ​ Cigar bars and tobacco retail outlets do not have any substantial differences from other public places that justify allowing smoking inside. ​ The guestroom exemption is valid because guestrooms are similar to private residences, where smoking bans would not typically apply. ​ Since the invalid exemptions can be removed without affecting the rest of the law, the Act remains enforceable. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville Issue: Is the Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance unconstitutional because it is too vague and allows for arbitrary arrests? Who: Petitioners: Margaret Papachristou, Calloway, Melton, Johnson, Heath, and others. Respondent: City of Jacksonville Where: U.S. Supreme Court When: 1972 Facts: ​ Papachristou, Calloway, Melton, and Johnson were arrested while driving in Jacksonville. ​ The police claimed they were “prowling by auto” near a used-car lot that had previously been broken into, though there was no evidence of a crime. ​ None of them had serious criminal records. ​ Other petitioners in companion cases were arrested under Jacksonville’s vague vagrancy laws for conduct that was not clearly criminal (e.g., being a “common thief” based on reputation, “loitering” at police command). ​ The Jacksonville ordinance criminalized ordinary behavior such as “nightwalking,” being unemployed, or standing in certain places. Holdings: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions, ruling that the Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional due to vagueness. Reasoning: ​ Lack of Clear Notice: The law failed to provide ordinary people with fair warning about what conduct was illegal. ​ Encouraged Arbitrary Arrests: Police had too much discretion to arrest people based on vague and subjective criteria. ​ Criminalized Innocent Behavior: The ordinance made common activities illegal, such as walking at night or being unemployed. ​ Violation of Due Process: Laws must be clear enough that people understand what is prohibited and to prevent discriminatory enforcement. State v. Nicoletto Issue: Whether a person holding only a coaching authorization, rather than a professional teaching license, qualifies as a “licensed professional” under Iowa Code section 709.15, which criminalizes sexual exploitation by a school employee. Who: Appellee: State of Iowa. Appellant: Patrick Ryan Nicoletto, a high school basketball coach. Where: Iowa Supreme Court When: April 11, 2014 Facts: ​ Nicoletto was an assistant girls’ basketball coach for Davis County Community School District during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 seasons. ​ He did not hold a teaching license but had a coaching authorization. ​ He engaged in a sexual relationship with S.L., a 16-year-old varsity basketball player. ​ Their relationship included frequent sexual encounters and efforts to keep it secret. ​ The school principal became suspicious, but S.L. initially denied any relationship. ​ Nicoletto was charged with sexual exploitation by a school employee under Iowa law. ​ A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to five years in prison plus a ten-year special sentence. Holdings: The Iowa Supreme Court ruled that a person holding a coaching authorization under Iowa Code section 272.31 does not qualify as a “licensed professional” under section 709.15. Therefore, Nicoletto’s conviction was overturned. Reasoning:  ​ The court focused on statutory interpretation, emphasizing that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. ​ The phrase “licensed professional” does not ordinarily include someone with only a coaching authorization. ​ Coaches can be as young as 18, lack secondary education, and work part-time for minimal pay. ​ Since unpaid volunteers can also coach, holding a coaching authorization does not grant “exclusive authority” to perform coaching functions, unlike licensed professionals in other fields. ​ Based on these factors, the court determined that Nicoletto did not meet the legal definition required for conviction under the statute. Shepard v. State Issue: Whether an automobile can be considered a “weapon” under Florida’s reclassification statute (§ 775.087(1)), which enhances a defendant’s sentence when a weapon is used in committing a felony. Who: Petitioner: Adam Lloyd Shepard Respondent: State of Florida Where: Supreme Court of Florida When: Incident occurred: January 22, 2011 Decision Date: November 1, 2018 Facts:  ​ Shepard and the victim were drinking at a bar and got into an altercation. ​ Shepard was removed from the bar but later waited in his car near the victim’s apartment. ​ When the victim arrived, Shepard used his car to strike him, causing fatal injuries. ​ Shepard fled the scene and was later arrested in Chicago. ​ Shepard was convicted of manslaughter with a weapon (where the “weapon” was the car) and leaving the scene of a fatal crash. ​ His manslaughter charge was reclassified from a second-degree to a first-degree felony due to the use of a “weapon.” Holdings: ​ The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that an automobile can be classified as a “weapon” under the reclassification statute. ​ The Court disapproved of the conflicting decision in Gonzalez v. State, which held that a car could not be a weapon. Reasoning: ​ The statute does not define “weapon,” so the Court applied its plain and ordinary meaning. ​ Previous Florida cases have recognized that objects not originally designed as weapons can still be considered weapons if used to cause harm. ​ Dictionaries and past court rulings support defining “weapon” broadly to include anything used to injure or defeat an opponent. ​ Shepard deliberately used the car as a means to harm the victim, making it function as a weapon in this case.