Heywood Chapter 4: Democracy and Legitimacy PDF

CHAPTER 4 Democracy and Legitimacy ‘Democracy is the worst form of government except all the other forms that have been tried from time to time.’ WINSTON CHURCHILL, Speech, UK House of Commons (11 November 1947) PREVIEW Al...

CHAPTER 4 Democracy and Legitimacy ‘Democracy is the worst form of government except all the other forms that have been tried from time to time.’ WINSTON CHURCHILL, Speech, UK House of Commons (11 November 1947) PREVIEW Although states may enjoy a monopoly of coercive power, they seldom remain in existence through the exercise of force alone. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau put it, ‘The strongest is never strong enough unless he turns might into right and obedience into duty’. This is why all systems of rule seek legitimacy or ‘rightfulness’, allowing them to demand compliance from their citizens or subjects. Legitimacy is thus the key to political stability; it is nothing less than the source of a regime’s survival and success. In modern politics, debates about legitimacy are dominated by the issue of democracy, so much so that ‘democratic legitimacy’ is sometimes viewed as the only meaningful form of legitimacy. However, the link between legitimacy and democracy is both a relatively new idea and one that is culturally specific. Until well into the nineteenth century, the term ‘democracy’ continued to have pejorative implications, suggesting a form of ‘mob rule’; and, in parts of the developing world, democracy promotion continues to be associated with ‘Westernization’. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which we are all now democrats. Liberals, conservatives, socialists, communists, anarchists and even fascists are eager to proclaim the virtues of democracy and to demonstrate their own democratic credentials. Indeed, as the major ideological systems have faltered or collapsed since the late twentieth century, the flame of democracy has appeared to 159  burn yet more strongly. As the attractions of socialism have faded, and the merits of capitalism have been called into question, democracy has emerged as perhaps the only stable and enduring principle in the postmodern political landscape. KEY ISSUES How do states maintain legitimacy? Are modern societies facing a crisis of legitimation? Why is political legitimacy so often linked to the claim to be democratic? What are the core features of democratic rule? What models of democratic rule have been advanced? How do democratic systems operate in practice? LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL STABILITY The issue of legitimacy, the rightfulness of a regime or system of rule, is linked to the oldest and one of the most fundamental of political debates, the problem of political obligation. Why should citizens feel obliged to acknowledge the authority of government? Do they have a duty to respect the state and obey its laws? In modern political debate, however, legitimacy is usually understood less in terms of moral obligations, and more in terms of political behaviour and beliefs. In other words, it addresses not the question of why people should obey the state, in an abstract sense, but the question of why they do obey a particular state or system of rule. What are the conditions or processes that encourage people to see authority as rightful, and, therefore, underpin the stability of a regime? This reflects a shift from philosophy to sociology, but it also highlights the contested nature of the concept of legitimacy. CONCEPT Legitimacy Legitimacy (from the Latin legitimare, meaning ‘to declare lawful’) broadly means ‘rightfulness’. Legitimacy therefore confers on an order or command an authoritative or binding character, thus transforming power (see p. 5) into authority (see p. 4). Political philosophers treat legitimacy as a moral or rational principle; that is, as the grounds on which governments may demand obedience from citizens. The claim to legitimacy is thus more important than the fact of obedience. Political scientists, however, usually see legitimacy in sociological terms; that is, as a willingness to comply with a system of rule regardless of how this is achieved. 160 Legitimizing power The classic contribution to the understanding of legitimacy as a sociological phenomenon was provided by Max Weber (see p. 81). Weber was concerned to categorize particular ‘systems of domination’, and to identify in each case the basis on which legitimacy was established. He did this by constructing three ideal types (see p. 18), or conceptual models, which he hoped would help to make sense of the highly complex nature of political rule. These ideal types amount to three kinds of authority: traditional authority charismatic authority legal–rational authority. Each of these is characterized by a particular source of political legitimacy and, thus, different reasons that people may have for obeying a regime. In the process, Weber sought to understand the transformation of society itself, contrasting the systems of domination found in relatively simple traditional societies with those typically found in industrial and highly bureaucratic ones. KEY THINKER MAX WEBER (1864–1920) Source: Getty Images/Hulton Archive German political economist and sociologist. Following a breakdown in 1898, Weber withdrew from academic teaching, but he continued to write and research until the end of his life. He was one of the founders of modern sociology, and he championed a scientific and value-free approach to scholarship. He also highlighted the importance to social action of meaning and consciousness. Weber’s interests ranged from social stratification, law, power and organization to religion. He is best known for the thesis that the Protestant ethic encourages the development of capitalism, and for his analysis of bureaucracy. Weber’s most influential works include The Protestant Ethic and 161  the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), The Sociology of Religion (1920) and Economy and Society (1922). CONCEPT Tradition Tradition may refer to anything that is handed down or transmitted from the past to the present (long-standing customs and practices, institutions, social or political systems, values and beliefs, and so on). Tradition thus denotes continuity with the past. This continuity is usually understood to link the generations, although the line between the traditional and the merely fashionable is often indistinct. ‘Traditional’ societies are often contrasted with‘modern’ ones, the former being structured on the basis of status (see p. 173) and by supposedly organic hierarchies, and the latter on the basis of contractual agreement and by democratic processes. Weber’s first type of political legitimacy is based on long-established customs and traditions (see p. 81). In effect, traditional authority is regarded as legitimate because it has ‘always existed’: it has been sanctified by history because earlier generations have accepted it. Typically, it operates according to a body of concrete rules: that is, fixed and unquestioned customs that do not need to be justified because they reflect the way things have always been. The most obvious examples of traditional authority are found amongst tribes or small groups in the form of patriarchalism (the domination of the father within the family, or the ‘master’ over his servants) and gerontocracy (the rule of the aged, normally reflected in the authority of village ‘elders’). Traditional authority is closely linked to hereditary systems of power and privilege, as reflected, for example, in the survival of dynastic rule in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Morocco. Although it is of marginal significance in advanced industrial societies, the survival of monarchy (see p. 324), albeit in a constitutional form, in the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, for example, helps to shape political culture by keeping alive values such as deference, respect and duty. Weber’s second form of legitimate domination is charismatic authority. This form of authority is based on the power of an individual’s personality; that is, on his or her ‘charisma’ (see p. 82). Owing nothing to a person’s status, social position or office, charismatic authority operates entirely through the capacity of a leader to make a direct and personal appeal to 162 followers as a kind of hero or saint. Although modern political leaders such as de Gaulle, Kennedy and Thatcher undoubtedly extended their authority through their personal qualities and capacity to inspire loyalty, this did not amount to charismatic legitimacy, because their authority was essentially based on the formal powers of the offices they held. Napoleon, Mussolini, Hitler (see p. 46), Ayatollah Khomeini (see p. 191), Fidel Castro and Colonel Gaddafi are more appropriate examples. However, charismatic authority is not simply a gift or a natural propensity; systems of personal rule are invariably underpinned by ‘cults of personality’ (see p. 335), the undoubted purpose of which is to ‘manufacture’ charisma (see p. 82). Nevertheless, when legitimacy is constructed largely, or entirely, through the power of a leader’s personality, there are usually two consequences. The first is that, as charismatic authority is not based on formal rules or procedures, it often has no limits. The leader is a Messiah, who is infallible and unquestionable; the masses become followers or disciples, who are required only to submit and obey. Second, so closely is authority linked to a specific individual, that it is difficult for a system of personal rule to outlive its founding figure. This certainly applied in the case of the regimes of Napoleon, Mussolini and Hitler. Weber’s third type of political legitimacy, legal–rational authority, links authority to a clearly and legally defined set of rules. In Weber’s view, legal–rational authority is the typical form of authority operating in most modern states. The power of a president, prime minister or government official is determined in the final analysis by formal, constitutional rules, which constrain or limit what an office holder is able to do. The advantage of this form of authority over both traditional and charismatic authority is that, as it is attached to an office rather than a person, it is far less likely to be abused or to give rise to injustice. Legal–rational authority, therefore, maintains limited government and, in addition, promotes efficiency through a rational division of labour. However, Weber also recognized a darker side to this type of political legitimacy. The price of greater efficiency would, he feared, be a more depersonalized and inhuman social environment typified by the relentless spread of bureaucratic (see p. 374) forms of organization. CONCEPT Charisma Charisma was originally a theological term meaning the ‘gift of grace’. This was supposedly the source of the power that Jesus 163  exerted over his disciples. As a sociopolitical phenomenon, charisma refers to charm or personal power: the capacity to establish leadership (see p. 332) through psychological control over others. Charismatic authority therefore includes the ability to inspire loyalty, emotional dependence, and even devotion. Although it is usually seen as a ‘natural’ capacity, all political leaders cultivate their charismatic qualities through propaganda, practised oratory, and honed presentational skills. Although Weber’s classification of types of legitimacy is still seen as relevant, it also has its limitations. One of these is that, in focusing on the legitimacy of a political regime or system of rule, it tells us little about the circumstances in which political authority is challenged as a result of unpopular policies, or a discredited leader or government. More significantly, as Beetham (2013) pointed out, to see legitimacy, as Weber did, as nothing more than a ‘belief in legitimacy’ is to ignore how it is brought about. This may leave the determination of legitimacy largely in the hands of the powerful, who may be able to ‘manufacture’ rightfulness through public-relations campaigns and the like. Beetham suggested that power can only be said to be legitimate if three conditions are fulfilled. First, power must be exercised according to established rules, whether these are embodied in formal legal codes or in informal conventions. Second, these rules must be justified in terms of the shared beliefs of the government and the governed. Third, legitimacy must be demonstrated by an expression of consent on the part of the governed. This highlights two key features of the legitimation process. The first is the existence of elections and party competition, a system through which popular consent can be exercised (as discussed below in connection with democratic legitimacy). The second is the existence of constitutional rules that broadly reflect how people feel they should be governed (which are examined in Chapter 13). Legitimation crises and revolutions An alternative to the Weberian approach to legitimacy has been developed by neo-Marxist (see p. 64) theorists. While orthodox Marxists were inclined to dismiss legitimacy as bogus, seeing it as nothing more than a bourgeois myth, modern Marxists, following Gramsci (see p. 198), have acknowledged that capitalism is in part upheld by its ability to secure political support. Neo-Marxists such as Jürgen Habermas (see p. 83) and Claus Offe (1984) have therefore focused attention not merely on the class system, but also on the machinery through which legitimacy is maintained (the democratic process, party competition, welfare and social reform, and 164 so on). Nevertheless, they have also highlighted what they see as the inherent difficulty of legitimizing a political system that is based on unequal class power. In Legitimation Crisis (1973), Habermas identified a series of ‘crisis tendencies’ within capitalist societies that make it difficult for them to maintain political stability through consent alone. At the heart of this tension, he argued, lie contradictions and conflicts between the logic of capitalist accumulation, on the one hand, and the popular pressures that democratic politics unleashes, on the other. From this perspective, capitalist economies are seen to be bent on remorseless expansion, dictated by the pursuit of profit. However, the extension of political and social rights in an attempt to build legitimacy within such systems has stimulated countervailing pressures. In particular, the democratic process has led to escalating demands for social welfare, as well as for increased popular participation and social equality. The resulting expansion of the state’s responsibilities into economic and social life, and the inexorable rise of taxation and public spending, nevertheless constrain capitalist accumulation by restricting profit levels and discouraging enterprise. In Habermas’ view, capitalist democracies cannot permanently satisfy both popular demands for social security and welfare rights, and the requirements of a market economy based on private profit. Forced either to resist popular pressures or to risk economic collapse, such societies would find it increasingly difficult, and eventually impossible, to maintain legitimacy. (The implications for political stability of economic and financial crises are discussed in Chapter 7.) KEY THINKER JÜRGEN HABERMAS (born 1929) Source: Getty Images/Raphael Gaillarde German philosopher and social theorist. After growing up during the Nazi period, Habermas was politicized by the Nuremberg trials and the growing awareness after the war of the concentration and death camps. Drawn to study with Adorno 165  (1903–69) and Horkheimer (1895–1973), he became the leading exponent of the ‘second generation’ of the Frankfurt School of critical theory. Habermas’ work ranges over epistemology, the dynamics of advanced capitalism, the nature of rationality, and the relationship between social science and philosophy. During the 1970s, he developed critical theory into what became a theory of ‘communicative action’. Habermas’ main works include Towards a Rational Society (1970), Theory and Practice (1974) and The Theory of Communicative Competence (1984, 1988). A very similar problem has been identified since the 1970s in the form of what is called government ‘overload’. Writers such as Anthony King (1975) and Richard Rose (1980) argued that governments were finding it increasingly difficult to govern because they were subject to over-demand. This had come about both because politicians and political parties were encouraged to outbid one another in the attempt to get into power, and because pressure groups were able to besiege government with unrelenting and incompatible demands. Government’s capacity to deliver was further undermined by a general drift towards corporatism (see p. 276) that created growing interdependence between government agencies and organized groups. However, whereas neo-Marxists believed that the ‘crisis tendencies’ identified in the 1970s were beyond the capacity of capitalist democracies to control, overload theorists tended to call for a significant shift of political and ideological priorities in the form of the abandonment of a ‘big’ government approach. In many ways, the rise of the New Right since the 1980s can be seen as a response to this legitimation, or overload, crisis. Influenced by concerns about a growing fiscal crisis of the welfare state, the New Right attempted to challenge and displace the theories and values that had previously legitimized the progressive expansion of the state’s responsibilities. In this sense, the New Right amounted to a ‘hegemonic project’ that tried to establish a rival set of pro-individual and pro-market values and theories. This constituted a public philosophy that extolled rugged individualism, and denigrated the ‘nanny state’. The success of this project is demonstrated by the fact that socialist parties in states as different as the UK, France, Spain, Australia and New Zealand have accommodated themselves to broadly similar goals and values. As this happened, a political culture that once emphasized social justice, welfare rights and public responsibilities gave way to one in which choice, enterprise, competition and individual responsibility are given prominence. 166 FOCUS ON... WHY DO REVOLUTIONS OCCUR? Why do regimes collapse? Should revolutions be understood primarily in political terms, or are they more a reflection of deeper economic or social developments? Contrasting theories of revolution have been advanced by Marxists and non-Marxists. In Marxist theory, revolution emerges out of contradictions that exist at a socio-economic level. Marx (see p. 40) believed that revolution marks the point at which the class struggle develops into open conflict, leading one class to overthrow and displace another. Just as the French Revolution was interpreted as a ‘bourgeois’ revolution, the Russian Revolution was later seen as a ‘proletarian’ revolution that set in motion a process that would culminate in the establishment of socialism and, eventually, full communism. However, revolutions have not come about as Marx forecast. Not only have they tended to occur in relatively backward societies, not (as he predicted) in the advanced capitalist countries, but Marxist revolutions were often coup d’états rather than popular revolutions. A variety of non-Marxist theories of revolution have been advanced. Systems theorists have argued that revolution results from ‘disequilibrium’ in the political system, brought about by economic, social, cultural or international changes to which the system itself is incapable of responding – the ‘outputs’ of government become structurally out of line with the ‘inputs’. The idea of a ‘revolution of rising expectations’ suggests that revolutions occur when a period of economic and social development is abruptly reversed, creating a widening gap between popular expectations and the capabilities of government. The classic statement of this theory is found in Ted Gurr’s Why Men Rebel (1970), which links rebellion to ‘relative deprivation’. The social-structural theory of revolution implies that regimes usually succumb to revolution when, through international weakness and/or domestic ineffectiveness, they lose their ability, or the political will, to maintain control through the exercise of coercive power. Theda Skocpol (1979) explained the outbreak of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions in these terms, but they could equally be applied to the swift and largely bloodless 167  collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes in the autumn and winter of 1989. Fiscal crisis of the welfare state: The crisis in state finances that occurs when expanding social expenditure coincides with recession and declining tax revenues. However, legitimation crises may have more dramatic consequences. When faltering support for a regime can no longer be managed by adjustments in public policy or a change in leadership, legitimacy may collapse altogether, leading either to a resort to repression, or to revolution. While evolutionary change is usually thought of as reform, revolution involves root-and-branch change. Revolutions recast the political order entirely, typically bringing about an abrupt and often violent break with the past. Although there is considerable debate about the causes of revolution, there is little doubt that revolution has played a crucial role in shaping the modern world. The American Revolution (1776) led to the creation of a constitutional republic independent from Britain and gave practical expression to the principle of representation. The French Revolution (1789) set out to destroy the old order under the banner of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’, advancing democratic ideals and sparking an ‘age of revolution’ in early nineteenth-century Europe. The Russian Revolution (1917), the first ‘communist’ revolution, provided a model for subsequent twentieth-century revolutions, including the Chinese Revolution (1949), the Cuban Revolution (1959), the Vietnamese Revolution (1975) and the Nicaraguan Revolution (1979). The Eastern European Revolutions (1989–91) nevertheless re-established the link between revolution and the pursuit of political democracy. Nevertheless, the ideological character of a revolutionary upheaval may be significantly out of step with subsequent developments. This can be seen in the case of the Arab Spring (2011) (see p. 87). Revolution: A popular uprising, involving extra-legal mass action, which brings about fundamental change (a change in the political system itself) as opposed to merely a change of policy or governing elite. Reform: Change brought about within a system, usually by peaceful and incremental measures; reform implies improvement. 168 Source: Getty Images/Popperfoto George Washington en route to the Battle of Trenton (1776) during the American War of Independence that led to the creation of a constitutional republic. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY Modern discussions about legitimacy are dominated by its relationship to democracy, so much so that democratic legitimacy is now widely accepted as the only meaningful form of legitimacy. The claim that a political organization is legitimate may therefore be intrinsically linked to its claim to be democratic. The next main section examines competing models of democratic rule and debates how democracy operates in practice, but this section considers how, and how reliably, democracy is linked to legitimacy. Democracy can be seen to promote legitimacy in at least three ways. In the first place, it does so through consent. Although citizens do not explicitly give their consent to be governed, thereby investing political authority with a formal ‘right to rule’, they do so implicitly each time they participate in the political process. In this respect, democracy underpins legitimacy by expanding the opportunities for political participation, most importantly through the act of voting, but also through activities such as joining a political party or interest group or by engaging in protests or demonstrations. Political participation, in this sense, binds government and the people, encouraging the latter to view the rules of the political game as rightful and so to accept that they have an obligation to respect and obey those in authority. 169 Consent: Assent or permission; in politics, usually an agreement to be governed or ruled. Second, the essence of democratic governance is a process of compromise, conciliation and negotiation, through which rival interests and groups find a way of living together in relative peace, rather than resorting to force and the use of naked power. The mechanisms through which this non-violent conflict resolution takes place, notably elections, assembly debates, party competition, and so forth, thus tend to enjoy broad popular support as they ensure that power is widely dispersed, each group having a political voice of some kind or other. Third, democracy operates as a feedback system that tends towards long-term political stability, as it brings the ‘outputs’ of government into line with the ‘inputs’ or pressures placed upon it. As democracy provides a mechanism through which governments can be removed and public policy changed, it tends to keep ‘disequilibrium’ in the political system to a minimum, enabling legitimation crises to be managed effectively and substantially undermining the potential for civil strife, rebellion or revolution. Nevertheless, the notion of an intrinsic link between legitimacy and democracy has also been questioned. Some, for example, argue that the high levels of political stability and low incidence of civic strife and popular rebellion in democratic societies can be explained more persuasively by factors other than democracy. These include the fact that, having in the main advanced capitalist economies, democratic societies tend to enjoy widespread prosperity and are effective in ‘delivering the goods’. This is known as performance legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy may therefore be less significant than ‘capitalist legitimacy’. A further factor is that democratic societies tend to be liberal as well as democratic, liberal democracy (see p. 89) being the dominant form of democracy worldwide. Liberal societies offer wide opportunities for personal freedom, self-expression and social mobility, and these may be as important, or perhaps more important, in maintaining legitimacy than the opportunities that democracy offers for political participation. Performance legitimacy: The capacity of a regime to generate public acceptance and a sense of rightfulness through the delivery of favourable economic and social outcomes. Is democracy failing to deliver? Even if democracy is accepted as the principal mechanism through which legitimacy is promoted, there are reasons for thinking that its effectiveness in this respect may be faltering. In particular, a growing number of mature democratic societies appear to be afflicted by a sense of political 170 disenchantment and disaffection. This ‘democratic malaise’, seen by some as a crisis in democracy, has been expressed in two main ways. First, there has been a trend towards popular disengagement with established political processes, reflected in the decline in levels of political participation. Many mature democracies have thus experienced falls in electoral turnout, as well as falls in the membership and activist base of mainstream political parties. (This development is examined in greater detail in Chapter 11.) Second, new political forces have emerged to threaten, or at least sit uneasily with, conventional democratic structures. This has been evident in the rise of political ‘outsiders’, such as Donald Trump, and the advance, especially across much of Europe, of populist or anti-establishment parties and movements. The relationship between populism (see p. 53) and democracy is nevertheless both complex and contested (see p. 88). POLITICS IN ACTION... THE ARAB SPRING: REVOLUTION REVERSED? Event: The ‘Arab Spring’ was a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that swept through North Africa and parts of the Middle East during 2011, toppling four dictators. The process was initiated by Tunisia’s ‘Jasmine’ revolution, in which a growing wave of anti-government rallies in early January turned into a nationwide revolt due to incidences of police repression. On 14 January, President Ben Ali fled the country, bringing an end to his 23-year rule. Inspired by events in Tunisia, Egyptian demonstrators took to the streets on 25 January, calling for the removal of President Hosni Mubarak, Tahir Square in Cairo becoming the centre of protests. Under growing pressure from the Egyptian military and after 18 days of protests, Mubarak resigned on 11 February. In Libya, the 42-year rule of President Muammar Gadaffi was brought to an end by an 8-month civil war in which rebel forces were supported by NATO aerial attacks. Gaddafi’s death on 22 October signalled the final collapse of his regime. Other significant popular uprisings in the Arab world occurred in Yemen (where President Saleh was forced from power in November 2011), in Syria (against President Assad) and in Bahrain. Significance: The Arab Spring provided a dramatic demonstration of the unpredictability of revolutions, in that it may take years before the full consequences of a revolution become 171 clear. The dominant initial interpretation of the Arab Spring, at least among Western commentators, was that it constituted the first stage in the transition of the wider region from autocratic to democratic rule. Democracy, in short, was coming to the Arab world. Certainly, the key demands of the overwhelmingly secular protesters were the introduction of Western-style democratic reform, notably freeing elections, the rule of law and protection for civil liberties. Furthermore, where regimes collapsed, this was usually accompanied by a promise to hold free elections, as duly occurred in October 2011 in Tunisia and during November– December of the same year in Egypt. Indeed, although its future remains uncertain in view of continuing popular discontent over corruption and economic stagnation, Tunisia has come closest to realizing the expectation of a democratic transition. In 2014, for example, a new Tunisian constitution, which increased human rights and gender equality and laid the basis for a new parliamentary system of government, came into force. Elections, which were also held later in the year, were widely deemed to be relatively free and fair. Source: Getty Images/Monique Jaques However, the nascent democratic revolution quickly went into reverse in other countries. In Egypt, for example, Mubarak’s overthrow gave rise to an increasingly brutal struggle for power between the Muslim Brotherhood and resurgent armed forces, previously the linchpin of the Mubarak regime. This struggle was eventually resolved in 2014 when Mohamed Morsi, who had been elected president in June 2012 with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, was overthrown in a military coup. The installation of General el-Sisi as the new president marked the effective end of the Arab Spring in Egypt. In the case of Libya, the ousting of 172 Gaddafi was followed by a descent into post-revolutionary chaos and confusion, in which local warlords, foreign terrorist groups and elements from the Gaddafi regime vied for power. The most profound and disturbing consequences of the Arab Spring were felt in Syria, however. The conflict in Syria escalated quickly after the Syrian army was deployed to suppress demonstrations against the Assad regime, within months developing into a highly complex and seemingly intractable civil war in which hundreds of thousands of people have died. These events demonstrate the long-term resilience of authoritarianism, when popular demonstrations fail to dislodge the institutional props of the ‘old’ regime, especially the military, and when foreign powers are prepared to intervene to safeguard an unpopular government, as occurred in Syria in the case of Iran and Russia. FOCUS ON... IS POPULISM A DEMOCRATIC FORCE? The relationship between populism and democracy has been surrounded by debate and controversy. From one perspective, populism has an essentially democratic character, reflected in the fact that both populism and democracy endorse the principles of popular sovereignty and majority rule. Some, indeed, argue that populism operates as a corrective to democracy, in that it serves as a mouthpiece for groups that feel excluded from the collective decision-making process. This is why populist upsurges typically occur in the context of flawed or dysfunctional democratic systems that are failing, for whatever reason, to give a political voice to significant sections of the public. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that populism is at odds with the dominant liberal model of democracy. This is because the populist assertion that the instincts and wishes of the people constitute the sole legitimate guide to political action implies that nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of the popular will. Populists are therefore likely to show little respect for the ‘liberal’ aspects of liberal democracy; those that are designed to uphold limited government, such as protections for individual and minority rights, media freedom, the rule of law, and institutional checks and balances. Finally, populism has simply been viewed as a threat to 173  democracy. The undemocratic side of populism derives from its monistic nature, ‘the (pure) people’ being conceived of as a single, homogeneous entity. This means that populists always oppose pluralism, and so are inclined to deny the legitimacy of their opponents. Moreover, populists are, at best, bogus democrats, in that, rather than leaving the people to speak for themselves, they typically rely on personal leadership to construe and articulate the people’s ‘true’ interests. This both creates the danger that populist leaders may, in effect, substitute themselves for the people, and highlights parallels between populism and the fascist ‘leader principle’ (discussed in Chapter 14). How and why have mature democratic societies succumbed to this upsurge in populism? Democracy’s traditional success in generating legitimacy was linked to its ability, as a mechanism for dispersing power, to ensure that all individuals and groups had a political voice, even if this extended little beyond having the right to vote. Democracy, as an essentially egalitarian force, thus tended to counteract capitalism’s inherent tendency towards inequality. This, in practice, was achieved through the construction of systems of social protection, aimed at alleviating poverty and other forms of hardship. However, in a process that started in the final decades of the twentieth century, but which has become more acute since the global financial crisis of 2007–09, democracy’s ability to generate legitimacy has been compromised by developments that have left growing sections of society feeling politically excluded. People therefore believe that the conventional democratic system does not ‘work’ for them. Chief among the developments have been the trend towards neoliberalism (see p. 163) and the advance of globalization (see p. 161). Neoliberalism has had challenging implications for democracy, in that the shift it seeks to foster – away from the state and in favour of the market – has typically led to a widening gap between the rich and the poor. While tax cuts and financial deregulation have mainly benefited people who are well-off, the ‘rolling back’ of welfare provision has tended to disadvantage people who are less well-off. The advent of neoliberalism, from the 1980s onwards, thus reversed the general post-1945 trend towards greater equality. CONCEPT Liberal democracy A liberal democracy is a political regime in which a ‘liberal’ 174  commitment to limited government is blended with a ‘democratic’ belief in popular rule. Its key features are: (1) the right to rule is gained through success in regular and competitive elections, based on universal adult suffrage; (2) constraints on government imposed by a constitution, institutional checks and balances, and protections for individual and minority rights; and (3) a vigorous civil society including a private enterprise economy, independent trade unions, and a free press. The terms liberal democracy and pluralist democracy (see p. 102) are often used interchangeably. As far as globalization is concerned, its tendency to destabilize the democratic system derives, in part, from the markedly reduced capacity of governments to control their ‘borderless’ economies. However, at least as significant has been the generation, especially in mature democratic societies, of new social cleavages, in the form of tensions between the winners and losers of the globalization process. The problem for democracy is that those that have lost out in the new world of intensified foreign competition, transnational production, increased migratory flows and, sometimes, global slumps are difficult to reach because they tend to believe that conventional political processes are biased in favour of elite or establishment interests. This, then, makes them susceptible to the appeal of other political messages and other political voices. Non-democratic legitimacy If democracy is taken to be the only genuine basis for legitimacy, this implies that non-democratic regimes are, by their nature, illegitimate. Nevertheless, some authoritarian regimes survive for many decades with relatively little evidence of mass political disaffection, still less concerted opposition. Clearly, this can very largely be explained through the use of coercion and repression, fear rather than consent being the principal means through which citizens are encouraged to obey the state. However, non- democratic regimes rarely seek to consolidate their hold on power through coercion alone. They typically adopt a two-pronged approach in which political control is exercised alongside claims to legitimacy. But, in the absence of democracy, what means of legitimation are available to such regimes? Three key forms of non-democratic legitimation have been used. First, elections, albeit one-party, sometimes non-competitive or ‘rigged’, have been used to give a regime a democratic façade, helping both to create the impression of popular support and to draw people into a ritualized acceptance of the regime. This legitimation device was used in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and has also been used in African one-party 175 states and communist regimes. Second, non-democratic regimes have sought to compensate for their lack of political rights by performance legitimation, based on their ability to deliver, amongst other things, rising living standards, public order, improved education and health care, and so forth. Communist regimes thus emphasize the delivery of a package of socio-economic benefits to their citizens, a strategy that continues to be practised by China through its capacity to generate high and sustained levels of economic growth. Indeed, some have argued that non-democratic regimes may enjoy advantages over democratic ones in this respect, not least because of their ability to undertake major projects of economic restructuring, resisting the pressures generated by short-term unpopularity in the hope of giving long-term rewards. Third, ideological legitimation has been used, either in an attempt to uphold the leader’s, military’s or party’s right to rule, or to establish broader goals and principles that invest the larger regime with a sense of rightfulness. Examples of the former include Gamal Abdel Nasser’s portrayal of the Egyptian military as the ‘vanguard of the revolution’ after its 1952 coup, and Colonel Gaddafi’s proclamation of a ‘Green revolution’ after seizing power in Libya in 1969. Examples of the latter include the emphasis on Marxism-Leninism in communist states and the use of Wahhabism to support monarchical rule in Saudi Arabia. However, when such strategies fail, all semblance of legitimation evaporates and non- democratic regimes are forced either to resort to progressively more draconian means of survival, or else they collapse in the face of popular uprisings. DEMOCRACY Understanding democracy Debates about democracy extend well beyond its relationship to legitimacy. These stem, most basically, from confusion over the nature of democracy. The origins of the term ‘democracy’ can be traced back to Ancient Greece. Like other words ending in ‘cracy’ (for example, autocracy, aristocracy and bureaucracy), democracy is derived from the Greek word kratos, meaning power, or rule. Democracy thus means ‘rule by the demos’ (the demos referring to ‘the people’, although the Greeks originally used this to mean ‘the poor’ or ‘the many’). However, the simple notion of ‘rule by the people’ does not get us very far. The problem with democracy has been its very popularity, a popularity that has threatened the term’s undoing as a meaningful political concept. In being almost universally regarded as a ‘good thing’, democracy has come to be used as little more than a ‘hurrah! word’, implying approval of a particular 176 set of ideas or system of rule. In Bernard Crick’s (2000) words, ‘democracy is perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of public affairs’. A term that can mean anything to anyone is in danger of meaning nothing at all. Amongst the meanings that have been attached to the word ‘democracy’ are the following: a system of rule by the poor and disadvantaged a form of government in which the people rule themselves directly and continuously, without the need for professional politicians or public officials a society based on equal opportunity and individual merit, rather than hierarchy and privilege a system of welfare and redistribution aimed at narrowing social inequalities a system of decision-making based on the principle of majority rule a system of rule that secures the rights and interests of minorities by placing checks upon the power of the majority a means of filling public offices through a competitive struggle for the popular vote a system of government that serves the interests of the people regardless of their participation in political life. Perhaps a more helpful starting point from which to consider the nature of democracy is Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address (1863). Lincoln extolled the virtues of what he called ‘government of the people, by the people, and for the people’. What this makes clear is that democracy links government to the people, but that this link can be forged in a number of ways: government of, by and for the people. This section explores the implications of these links by considering three questions. Who are the people? In what sense should the people rule? And how far should popular rule extend? Who are the people? One of the core features of democracy is the principle of political equality, the notion that political power should be distributed as widely and as evenly as possible. However, within what body or group should this power be distributed? In short, who constitutes ‘the people’? On the face of it, the answer is simple: ‘the demos’, or ‘the people’, surely refers to all the people; that is, the entire population of the country. In practice, however, every democratic system has restricted political participation, sometimes severely. CONCEPT 177  Political equality Political equality means, broadly, an equal distribution of political power and influence. Political equality can thus be thought of as the core principle of democracy, in that it ensures that, however ‘the people’ is defined, each individual member carries the same weight: all voices are equally loud. This can be understood in two ways. In liberal-democratic theory, political equality implies an equal distribution of political rights: the right to vote, the right to stand for election, and so on. In contrast, socialists, amongst others, link political influence to factors such as the control of economic resources and access to the means of mass communication. As noted, early Greek writers usually used demos to refer to ‘the many’: that is, the disadvantaged and usually propertyless masses. Democracy therefore implied not political equality, but a bias towards the poor. In Greek city-states, political participation was restricted to a tiny proportion of the population, male citizens over the age of 20, thereby excluding all women, slaves and foreigners. Strict restrictions on voting also existed in most Western states until well into the twentieth century, usually in the form of a property qualification or the exclusion of women. Universal suffrage was not established in the UK until 1928, when women gained full voting rights. In the USA, it was not achieved until the early 1960s, when African-American people in many Southern states were able to vote for the first time, and in Switzerland universal suffrage was established in 1971 when women were eventually enfranchised. Nevertheless, an important restriction continues to be practised in all democratic systems in the form of the exclusion of children from political participation, although the age of majority ranges from 21 down to as low as 15 (as in Iranian presidential elections up to 2007). Technical restrictions are also often placed on, for example, the certifiably insane and imprisoned criminals. Although ‘the people’ is now accepted as meaning virtually all adult citizens, the term can be construed in a number of different ways. The people, for instance, can be viewed as a single, cohesive body, bound together by a common or collective interest: in this sense, the people are one and indivisible. Such a view tends to generate a model of democracy that, like Rousseau’s (see p. 98) theory, examined in the next main section, focuses upon the ‘general will’ or collective will, rather than the ‘private will’ of each individual. Alternatively, as division and disagreement exist within all communities, ‘the people’ may in practice be taken to mean ‘the majority’. In this case, democracy comes to mean the strict application of 178 the principle of majority rule. This can, nevertheless, mean that democracy degenerates into the ‘tyranny of the majority’. Finally, there is the issue of the body of people within which democratic politics should operate. Where should be the location or ‘site’ of democracy? Although, thanks to the potency of political nationalism, the definition ‘the people’ is usually understood in national terms, the ideas of local democracy and, in the light of globalization (see p. 161), cosmopolitan democracy (discussed in the final section of the chapter) have also been advanced. Majority rule: The rule that the will of the majority, or numerically strongest, overrides the will of the minority, implying that the latter should accept the views of the former. Cosmopolitan democracy: A form of democracy that operates at supranational levels of governance and is based on the idea of transnational or global citizenship. How should the people rule? Most conceptions of democracy are based on the principle of ‘government by the people’. This implies that, in effect, people govern themselves – that they participate in making the crucial decisions that structure their lives and determine the fate of their society. This participation can take a number of forms, however. In the case of direct democracy, popular participation entails direct and continuous involvement in decision- making, through devices such as referendums (see p. 223), mass meetings, or even interactive television. The alternative and more common form of democratic participation is the act of voting, which is the central feature of what is usually called ‘representative democracy’. When citizens vote, they do not so much make the decisions that structure their own lives as choose who will make those decisions on their behalf. What gives voting its democratic character, however, is that, provided that the election is competitive, it empowers the public to ‘kick the rascals out’, and thus makes politicians publicly accountable. There are also models of democracy that are built on the principle of ‘government for the people’, and that allow little scope for public participation of any kind, direct or indirect. The most grotesque example of this was found in the so-called ‘totalitarian democracies’ that developed under fascist dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler. The democratic credentials of such regimes were based on the claim that the ‘leader’, and the leader alone, articulated the genuine interests of the people, thus implying that a ‘true’ democracy can be equated with an absolute dictatorship. In such cases, popular rule meant nothing more than ritualized submission to the will of an all-powerful leader, orchestrated 179 through rallies, marches and demonstrations. This was sometimes portrayed as plebiscitary democracy. Although totalitarian democracies have proved to be a travesty of the conventional notion of democratic rule, they demonstrate the tension that can exist between ‘government by the people’ (or popular participation), and ‘government for the people’ (rule in the public interest). Advocates of representative democracy, for example, have wished to confine popular participation in politics to the act of voting, precisely because they fear that the general public lack the wisdom, education and experience to rule wisely on their own behalf. Totalitarian democracy: An absolute dictatorship that masquerades as a democracy, typically based on the leader’s claim to a monopoly of ideological wisdom. How far should popular rule extend? Now that we have decided who ‘the people’ are, and how they should rule, it is necessary to consider how far their rule should extend. What is the proper realm of democracy? What issues is it right for the people to decide, and what should be left to individual citizens? In many respects, such questions reopen the debate about the proper relationship between the public realm and the private realm that was discussed in Chapter 1. Models of democracy that have been constructed on the basis of liberal individualism have usually proposed that democracy be restricted to political life, with politics being narrowly defined. From this perspective, the purpose of democracy is to establish, through some process of popular participation, a framework of laws within which individuals can conduct their own affairs and pursue their private interests. Democratic solutions, then, are appropriate only for matters that specifically relate to the community; used in other circumstances, democracy amounts to an infringement of liberty. Not uncommonly, this fear of democracy is most acute in the case of direct or participatory democracy (see p. 93). However, an alternative view of democracy is often developed by, for example, socialists and radical democrats. In radical democracy, democracy is seen not as a means of laying down a framework within which individuals can go about their own business but, rather, as a general principle that is applicable to all areas of social existence. People are seen as having a basic right to participate in the making of any decisions that affect their lives, with democracy simply being the collective process through which this is done. This position is evident in socialist demands for the collectivization of wealth and the introduction of workers’ self- management, both of which are seen as ways of democratizing economic life. Instead of endorsing mere political democracy, socialists have 180 therefore called for ‘social democracy’ or ‘economic democracy’. Feminists, similarly, have demanded the democratization of family life, understood as the right of all to participate in the making of decisions in the domestic or private sphere. From this perspective, democracy is regarded as a friend of liberty, not as its enemy. Only when such principles are ignored can oppression and exploitation flourish. Radical democracy: A form of democracy that favours decentralization and participation, the widest possible dispersal of political power. Economic democracy: A broad term that covers attempts to apply democratic principles to the workplace, ranging from profit-sharing and the use of workers’ councils to full workers’ self-management. FOCUS ON... DIRECT DEMOCRACY OR REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY? Direct democracy (sometimes ‘classical’, ‘participatory’ or ‘radical’ democracy) is based on the direct, unmediated and continuous participation of citizens in the tasks of government. Direct democracy thus obliterates the distinction between government and the governed, and between the state and civil society; it is a system of popular self-government. It was achieved in ancient Athens through a form of government by mass meeting; its most common modern manifestation is the use of the referendum (see p. 223). The merits of direct democracy include the following: It heightens the control that citizens can exercise over their own destinies, as it is the only pure form of democracy. It creates a better-informed and more politically sophisticated citizenry, and thus it has educational benefits. It enables the public to express their own views and interests without having to rely on self-serving politicians. It ensures that rule is legitimate, in the sense that people are more likely to accept decisions that they have made themselves. Representative democracy is a limited and indirect form of democracy. It is limited in that popular participation in government is infrequent and brief, being restricted to the act of voting every few years. It is indirect in that the public do not exercise power themselves; they merely select those who will rule on their behalf. This form of rule is democratic only insofar as representation (see p. 219) establishes a reliable and effective link between the 181  government and the governed. This is sometimes expressed in the notion of an electoral mandate (see p. 222). The strengths of representative democracy include the following: It offers a practicable form of democracy (direct popular participation is achievable only in small communities). It relieves ordinary citizens of the burden of decision-making, thus making possible a division of labour in politics. It allows government to be placed in the hands of those with better education, expert knowledge, and greater experience. It maintains stability by distancing ordinary citizens from politics, thereby encouraging them to accept compromise. CONCEPT Plebiscitary democracy Plebiscitary democracy is a form of democratic rule that operates through an unmediated link between the rulers and the ruled, established by plebiscites (or referendums). These allow the public to express their views on political issues directly. However, this type of democracy is often criticized because of the scope it offers for demagoguery (rule by political leaders who manipulate the masses through oratory, and appeal to their prejudices and passions). This type of democracy may amount to little more than a system of mass acclamation that gives dictatorship a populist (see p. 53) gloss. Models of democracy All too frequently, democracy is treated as a single, unambiguous phenomenon. It is often assumed that what passes for democracy in most Western societies (a system of regular and competitive elections based on a universal franchise) is the only, or the only legitimate, form of democracy. Sometimes this notion of democracy is qualified by the addition of the term ‘liberal’, turning it into liberal democracy. In reality, however, there are a number of rival theories or models of democracy, each offering its own version of popular rule. This highlights not merely the variety of democratic forms and mechanisms, but also, more fundamentally, the very different grounds on which democratic rule can be justified. Even liberal democracy is a misleading term, as competing liberal views of democratic organization can be identified. Four contrasting models of democracy can be identified as follows: classical democracy 182  limited or ‘protective’ democracy developmental democracy people’s or ‘socialist’ democracy. Classical democracy The classical model of democracy is based on the polis, or city-state, of Ancient Greece, and particularly on the system of rule that developed in the largest and most powerful Greek city-state, Athens. The form of direct democracy that operated in Athens during the fourth and fifth centuries BCE is often portrayed as the only pure or ideal system of popular participation. Nevertheless, although the model had considerable impact on later thinkers such as Rousseau and Marx (see p. 40), Athenian democracy (see p. 96) developed a very particular kind of direct popular rule, one that has only a very limited application in the modern world. Athenian democracy amounted to a form of government by mass meeting. What made Athenian democracy so remarkable was the level of political activity of its citizens. Not only did they participate in regular meetings of the Assembly, but they were also, in large numbers, prepared to shoulder the responsibility of public office and decision-making. The most influential contemporaneous critic of this form of democracy was the philosopher Plato (see p. 13). Plato attacked the principle of political equality on the grounds that the mass of the people possess neither the wisdom nor the experience to rule wisely on their own behalf. His solution, advanced in The Republic, was that government be placed in the hands of a class of philosopher kings, Guardians, whose rule would amount to a kind of enlightened dictatorship. On a practical level, however, the principal drawback of Athenian democracy was that it could operate only by excluding the mass of the population from political activity. Participation was restricted to Athenian-born males who were over 20 years of age. Slaves (the majority of the population), women and foreigners had no political rights whatsoever. Indeed, Athenian citizens were able to devote so much of their lives to politics only because slavery relieved them of the need to engage in arduous labour, and the confinement of women to the private realm freed men from domestic responsibilities. Nevertheless, the classical model of direct and continuous popular participation in political life has been kept alive in, for instance, the township meetings of New England in the USA, the communal assemblies that operate in the smaller Swiss cantons, and in the wider use of referendums. DEBATING... 183 IS DEMOCRACY ALWAYS THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT? In modern politics, democracy has come to be so widely accepted that it appears to be almost politically incorrect to question it. The ‘right’ solution to a political problem is thus the democratic solution; that is, one made either by the people themselves or, more commonly, by politicians who are accountable to the people. But why is democracy so widely revered? And are there circumstances in which democratic rule is inappropriate or undesirable? YES NO The disharmony of The highest form of politics. democracy. Far from being a The unique strength of guarantee of stability, democracy is that it is able to democracy is biased in favour address the central challenge of of conflict and disharmony. This politics – the existence of rival is because democracy sets up views and interests within the an ongoing electoral battle same society – while containing between opponents who are the tendency towards encouraged to condemn one bloodshed and violence. In another, exaggerating their short, democratic societies are faults and denying their stable and peaceful. This occurs achievements. Democratic because democracy relies on politics is often, as a result, open debate, persuasion and noisy and unedifying. While the compromise. People with rival disharmony of democracy is views or competing interests are unlikely to threaten structural encouraged to find a way of breakdown in mature and living together in relative relatively prosperous societies, harmony because each has a democracy in the developing political voice. Democracy is world may make things worse therefore a kind of political rather than better (Hawksley, safety valve, democratic 2009). ‘Democratization’ may participation preventing the therefore deepen tribal, regional build-up of anger and frustration or ethnic tensions, and and, thereby, containing political strengthen the tendency extremism. towards charismatic leadership, thereby breeding Democracy as a universal 184 value. It is now widely argued authoritarianism. that democracy is a human Democracy as right: a fundamental and Westernization. Rather than absolute right that belongs to all being universally applicable, people, regardless of democracy is based on values nationality, religion, gender and and assumptions that betray the other differences. Rights of cultural biases of its Western political participation and access heartland. Democracy is rooted to power, especially the right to in ideas such as individualism, vote, are universally applicable notably through the principle of because they stem from the equal citizenship and ‘one basic entitlement to shape the person, one vote’, and notions decisions that affect one’s own of pluralism and competition life – the right to self-rule. that are intrinsically liberal in Indeed, an equal access to character. The dominant form of power and the right to political democracy is therefore participation could be viewed Western-style democracy, and not simply as virtues in their its spread, sometimes imposed own right, but as preconditions and always encouraged, to the for the maintenance of all other non-Western world can rights and freedoms. therefore be viewed as a form Keeping tyranny at bay. All of cultural imperialism. systems of rule are apt to Good government not become tyrannies against the popular government. people, reflecting the fact that Democratic solutions to those in power (and, for that problems are often neither wise matter, all people) are inclined nor sensible. The problem with to place self-interest before the democracy is that the dictates interests of others. of wisdom and experience tend Governments and leaders to be ignored because the therefore need to be checked or views of the well-educated constrained, and there is no minority are swamped by those more effective constraint on of the less well-educated power than democracy. This is majority. Being committed to the because democratic rule principle of political equality, operates through a mechanism democracy cannot cope with of accountability, which the fact that the majority is not ultimately allows the public to always right. This is a particular ‘kick the rascals out’. concern for economic policy, 185 Democratic societies are where options, such as raising therefore not only the most taxes or cutting government stable societies in the world, but spending, which may best also the societies in which promote long-term economic citizens enjoy the widest realm development, may be ruled out of freedom. simply because they are unpopular. CONCEPT Athenian democracy Athenian democracy is characterized by the high level of citizen involvement in the affairs of the city-state. Major decisions were made by the Assembly, or Ecclesia, to which all citizens belonged. When full-time public officials were needed, they were chosen on a basis of lot or rota to ensure that they constituted a microcosm of the larger citizenry. A Council, consisting of 500 citizens, acted as the executive or steering committee of the Assembly, and a 50-strong Committee, in turn, made proposals to the Council. The President of the Committee held office for only a single day, and no Athenian could hold this honour more than once in his lifetime. Limited or ‘protective’ democracy When democratic ideas were revived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they appeared in a form that was very different from the classical democracy of Ancient Greece. In particular, democracy was seen less as a mechanism through which the public could participate in political life, and more as a device through which citizens could protect themselves from the encroachments of government, hence ‘protective democracy’. This view appealed particularly to early liberal thinkers whose concern was, above all, to create the widest realm of individual liberty. The desire to protect the individual from over-mighty government was expressed in perhaps the earliest of all democratic sentiments, Aristotle’s response to Plato: ‘who will guard the Guardians?’ This same concern with unchecked power was taken up in the seventeenth century by John Locke (see p. 30), who argued that the right to vote was based on the existence of natural rights and, in particular, on the right to property. If government, through taxation, possessed the power to expropriate property, citizens were entitled to protect themselves by controlling the composition of the tax-setting body: the legislature. In 186 other words, democracy came to mean a system of ‘government by consent’ operating through a representative assembly. However, Locke himself was not a democrat by modern standards, as he believed that only property owners should vote, on the basis that only they had natural rights that could be infringed by government. The more radical notion of universal suffrage was advanced from the late eighteenth century onwards by utilitarian theorists such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill (1773– 1836). The utilitarian (see p. 366) case for democracy is also based on the need to protect or advance individual interests. Bentham came to believe that, since all individuals seek pleasure and the avoidance of pain, a universal franchise (conceived in his day as manhood suffrage) was the only way of promoting ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’. Natural rights: God-given rights that are fundamental to human beings and are therefore inalienable (they cannot be taken away). However, to justify democracy on protective grounds is to provide only a qualified endorsement of democratic rule. In short, protective democracy is but a limited and indirect form of democracy. In practice, the consent of the governed is exercised through voting in regular and competitive elections. This thereby ensures the accountability of those who govern. Political equality is thus understood in strictly technical terms to mean equal voting rights. Moreover, this is, above all, a system of constitutional democracy that operates within a set of formal or informal rules that check the exercise of government power. If the right to vote is a means of defending individual liberty, liberty must also be guaranteed by a strictly enforced separation of powers via the creation of a separate executive, legislature and judiciary, and by the maintenance of basic rights and freedoms, such as freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. Ultimately, protective democracy aims to give citizens the widest possible scope to live their lives as they choose. It is therefore compatible with laissez-faire capitalism (see p. 154) and the belief that individuals should be entirely responsible for their economic and social circumstances. Protective democracy has therefore particularly appealed to classical liberals and, in modern politics, to supporters of the New Right. KEY THINKER JEREMY BENTHAM (1748–1832) 187  Source: Wellcome Collection UK philosopher, legal reformer and founder of utilitarianism. Bentham developed a moral and philosophical system that was based on the idea that human beings are rationally self-interested creatures or utility maximizers, which he believed provided a scientific basis for legal and political reforms. Using the ‘greatest happiness’ principle, his followers, the Philosophic Radicals, were responsible for many of the reforms in social administration, law, government and economics in the UK in the nineteenth century. A supporter of laissez-faire economics, in later life Bentham also became a firm advocate of political democracy. His utilitarian creed was developed in Fragments on Government ( 1948), and more fully in Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). Developmental democracy Although early democratic theory focused on the need to protect individual rights and interests, it soon developed an alternative focus: a concern with the development of the human individual and the community. This gave rise to quite new models of democratic rule that can broadly be referred to as systems of developmental democracy. The most novel, and radical, such model was developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In many respects, Rousseau’s ideas mark a departure from the dominant, liberal conception of democracy, and they came to have an impact on the Marxist and anarchist traditions as well as, later, on the New Left. For Rousseau, democracy was ultimately a means through which human beings could achieve freedom (see p. 302) or autonomy, in the sense of ‘obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself’. In other words, citizens are ‘free’ only when they participate directly and continuously in shaping the life of their community. This is an idea that moves well beyond the conventional notion of electoral democracy and offers support for the more radical ideal of direct democracy. Indeed, Rousseau was a strenuous critic of the practice of elections used in England, arguing in The Social Contract 188 ( 1913) as follows: The English people believes itself to be free, it is gravely mistaken; it is only free when it elects its member of parliament; as soon as they are elected, the people are enslaved; it is nothing. In the brief moment of its freedom, the English people makes such use of its freedom that it deserves to lose it. However, what gives Rousseau’s model its novel character is his insistence that freedom ultimately means obedience to the general will. Rousseau believed the general will to be the ‘true’ will of each citizen, in contrast to his or her ‘private’ or selfish will. By obeying the general will, citizens are therefore doing nothing more than obeying their own ‘true’ natures, the general will being what individuals would will if they were to act selflessly. In Rousseau’s view, such a system of radical developmental democracy required not merely political equality, but a relatively high level of economic equality. Although not a supporter of common ownership, Rousseau nevertheless proposed that ‘no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself’ ( 1913). General will: The genuine interests of a collective body, equivalent to the common good; the will of all, provided each person acts selflessly. KEY THINKER JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU (1712–78) Source: SUPERSTOCK Geneva-born French moral and political philosopher, perhaps the principal intellectual influence upon the French Revolution. Rousseau was entirely self-taught. He moved to Paris in 1742, and became an intimate of leading members of the French Enlightenment, especially Diderot. His writings, ranging over education, the arts, science, literature and philosophy, reflect a deep belief in the goodness of ‘natural man’ and the corruption of 189  ‘social man’. Rousseau’s political teaching, summarized in Émile (1762) and developed in The Social Contract ( 1913), advocates a radical form of democracy that has influenced liberal, socialist, anarchist and, some would argue, fascist thought. His autobiography, Confessions (1770), examines his life with remarkable candour and demonstrates a willingness to expose weaknesses. Rousseau’s theories have helped to shape the modern idea of participatory democracy taken up by New Left thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s. This extols the virtues of a ‘participatory society’, a society in which each and every citizen is able to achieve self-development by participating in the decisions that shape his or her life. This goal can be achieved only through the promotion of openness, accountability and decentralization within all the key institutions of society: within the family, the workplace and the local community just as much as within ‘political’ institutions such as parties, interest groups and legislative bodies. At the heart of this model is the notion of ‘grass-roots democracy’; that is, the belief that political power should be exercised at the lowest possible level. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s own theories have been criticized for distinguishing between citizens’ ‘true’ wills and their ‘felt’ or subjective wills. The danger of this is that, if the general will cannot be established by simply asking citizens what they want (because they may be blinded by selfishness), there is scope for the general will to be defined from above, perhaps by a dictator claiming to act in the ‘true’ interests of society. Rousseau is therefore sometimes seen as the architect of so-called ‘totalitarian democracy’ (Talmon, 1952). Accountability: Answerability; a duty to explain one’s conduct and be open to criticism by others. However, a more modest form of developmental democracy has also been advanced that is compatible with the liberal model of representative government. This view of developmental democracy is rooted in the writings of John Stuart Mill (see p. 220). For Mill, the central virtue of democracy is that it promotes the ‘highest and harmonious’ development of individual capacities. By participating in political life, citizens enhance their understanding, strengthen their sensibilities, and achieve a higher level of personal development. In short, democracy is essentially an educational experience. As a result, Mill proposed the broadening of popular participation, arguing that the franchise should be extended to all but those who are illiterate. In the process, he suggested (radically, for his time) that suffrage should also be extended to women. In addition, he 190 advocated strong and independent local authorities in the belief that this would broaden the opportunities available for holding public office. On the other hand, Mill, in common with all liberals, was also aware of the dangers of democracy. Indeed, Mill’s views are out of step with mainstream liberal thought in that he rejected the idea of formal political equality. Following Plato, Mill did not believe that all political opinions are of equal value. Consequently, he proposed a system of plural voting: unskilled workers would have a single vote, skilled workers two votes, and graduates and members of the learned professions five or six votes. However, his principal reservation about democracy was derived from the more typical liberal fear of what Alexis de Tocqueville (see p. 271) famously described as ‘the tyranny of the majority’. In other words, democracy always contains the threat that individual liberty and minority rights may be crushed in the name of the people. Mill’s particular concern was that democracy would undermine debate, criticism and intellectual life in general by encouraging people to accept the will of the majority, thereby promoting uniformity and dull conformism. Quite simply, the majority is not always right; wisdom cannot be determined by the simple device of a show of hands. Mill’s ideas therefore support the idea of deliberative democracy or parliamentary democracy. Deliberative democracy: A form of democracy that emphasizes the need for reasoned discussion and debate to help to formulate legitimate political outcomes. CONCEPT Parliamentary democracy Parliamentary democracy is a form of democratic rule that operates through a popularly elected deliberative assembly, which mediates between government and the people. Democracy, in this sense, means responsible and representative government. Parliamentary democracy thus balances popular participation against elite rule: government is accountable not directly to the public but to the public’s elected representatives. The alleged strength of such a system is that representatives are, by virtue of their education and experience, better able than citizens themselves to define their best interests. Deliberation, or reasoned discussion, may take place on either a micro or a macro level. Micro deliberation occurs at a set time and place and usually involves face-to-face interaction, with examples including parliamentary debates, committee meetings, town hall gatherings, and so on. Macro 191 deliberation is deliberation that takes place in the wider public sphere; it is an ongoing and disaggregated process that comprises, for instance, public debate, the free media, ministerial statements and interest group lobbying. However, deliberation can only be said to have a democratic character if it involves all citizens who are substantially affected by the issue or question under consideration, and their participation is both free and meets at least minimal standards of equality (Chappell, 2012). Among the arguments advanced in favour of deliberative democracy are that engagement in reasoned and reciprocal debate encourages citizens to better appreciate the viewpoints and preferences of others, so fostering consensus, if not unanimity, and that the ‘power of the best argument’ helps to bring policy- making in line with the public interest. Critics of deliberative democracy nevertheless claim, among other things, that, as deliberation typically favours the views of better-educated citizens who are skilled in the arts of persuasion, it tends to promote exclusion and inequality in practice. People’s or ‘socialist’ democracy The term ‘people’s democracy’ is derived from the orthodox communist regimes that sprang up on the Soviet model in the aftermath of World War II. It is here used, however, to refer broadly to the various democratic models that the Marxist tradition has generated. Although they differ, these models offer a clear contrast to the more familiar liberal democratic ones. Marxists have tended to be dismissive of liberal or parliamentary democracy, seeing it as a form of ‘bourgeois’ or ‘capitalist’ democracy. Nevertheless, Marxists were drawn to the concept or ideal of democracy because of its clear egalitarian implications. The term was used, in particular, to designate the goal of social equality brought about through the common ownership of wealth (‘social democracy’ in its original sense), in contrast to ‘political’ democracy, which establishes only a façade of equality. Marx believed that the overthrow of capitalism would be a trigger that would allow genuine democracy to flourish. In his view, a fully communist society would come into existence only after a transitionary period characterized by ‘the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat’. In effect, a system of ‘bourgeois’ democracy would be replaced by a very different system of ‘proletarian’ democracy. Although Marx refused to describe in detail how this transitionary society would be organized, its broad shape can be discerned from his admiration for the Paris Commune of 1871, which was a short-lived experiment in what approximated to direct democracy. 192 KEY THINKER ROSA LUXEMBURG (1871–1919) Source: Getty Images/Universal Images Group A Polish-born socialist and exponent of revolutionary Marxism, Luxemburg advanced the first Marxist critique of the Bolshevik tradition from the point of view of democracy. Emphasizing the benefits of a broadly based democratic organization, she condemned Lenin’s conception of a tightly centralized vanguard party as an attempt to exert political control over the working class. By associating vanguardism with the rise of despotism, she predicted the subsequent course of Russian communism. In her most important theoretical work, The Accumulation of Capital (1913), Luxemburg examined the intrinsic connections between capitalism, nationalism, militarism and imperialism. In Social Reform or Revolution (1899), she condemned the revisionism of Eduard Bernstein and others for denying the objective foundations of the socialist project. The form of democracy that was developed in twentieth-century communist states, however, owed more to the ideas of V. I. Lenin than it did to those of Marx. Although Lenin’s 1917 slogan ‘All power to the Soviets’ (the workers’ and soldiers’ and sailors’ councils) had kept alive the notion of commune democracy, in reality power in Soviet Russia quickly fell into the hands of the Bolshevik party (soon renamed the ‘Communist Party’). In Lenin’s view, this party was nothing less than ‘the vanguard of the working class’. Armed with Marxism, the party claimed that it was able to perceive the genuine interests of the proletariat and thus guide it to the realization of its revolutionary potential. This theory became the cornerstone of ‘Leninist democracy’, and it was accepted by all other orthodox communist regimes as one of the core features of Marxism– Leninism. However, Leninist thinking about democracy has by no means commanded universal support within Marxism. For example, Rosa 193 Luxemburg associated the notion of the vanguard party with the problem of ‘substitutionism’, in which a ruling partysubstitutes itself for the proletariat and, eventually, a supreme leader substitutes himself or herself for the party. Leninist democracy: A form of democracy in which the communist party, organized on the basis of ‘democratic centralism’, articulates the interest of the proletariat. KEY THINKER VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN (1870–1924) Source: Unsplash/Jim Manchester Russian Marxist theorist and active revolutionary. As leader of the Bolsheviks, Lenin masterminded the 1917 Russian Bolshevik Revolution, and became the first leader of the USSR. His contributions to Marxism were his theory of the revolutionary (or vanguard) party, outlined in What is to be Done? ( 1968); his analysis of colonialism as an economic phenomenon, described in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism ( 1970); and his firm commitment to the ‘insurrectionary road to socialism’, developed in State and Revolution (1917). Lenin’s reputation is inevitably tied up with the subsequent course of Soviet history; he is seen by some as the father of Stalinist oppression, but by others as a critic of bureaucracy and a defender of debate and argument. Democracy in practice: rival views Although there continues to be controversy about which is the most desirable form of democracy, much of contemporary debate revolves around how democracy works in practice and what ‘democratization’ (see p. 120) implies. This reflects the fact that there is broad, even worldwide, acceptance of a particular model of democracy, generally termed liberal democracy. Despite the existence of competing tendencies within this broad category, certain central features are clear: 194 CONCEPT Pluralism In its broad sense, pluralism is a belief in, or a commitment to, diversity or multiplicity (the existence of many things). As a descriptive term, pluralism may be used to denote the existence of party competition (political pluralism), a multiplicity of moral values (ethical pluralism), or a variety of cultural norms (cultural pluralism). As a normative term, it suggests that diversity is healthy and desirable, usually because it safeguards individual liberty and promotes debate, argument and understanding. More narrowly, pluralism is a theory of the distribution of political power. It holds that power is widely and evenly dispersed in society. Liberal democracy is an indirect and representative form of democracy, in that political office is gained through success in regular elections that are conducted on the basis of formal political equality. It is based on competition and electoral choice. These are achieved through political pluralism, tolerance of a wide range of contending beliefs, and the existence of conflicting social philosophies and rival political movements and parties. It is characterized by a clear distinction between the state and civil society. This is maintained through the existence of autonomous groups and interests, and the market or capitalist organization of economic life. It provides protection for minorities and individuals, particularly through the allocation of basic rights that safeguard them from the will of the majority. Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of disagreement about the meaning and significance of liberal democracy. Does it, for instance, ensure a genuine and healthy dispersal of political power? Do democratic processes genuinely promote long-term benefits, or are they self- defeating? Can political equality coexist with economic inequality? In short, this form of democracy is interpreted in different ways by different theorists. The most important of these interpretations are advanced by: pluralism elitism corporatism the New Right Marxism. Pluralist view 195 Pluralist ideas can be traced back to early liberal political philosophy, and notably to the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu (see p. 344). Their first systematic development, however, is found in the contributions of James Madison (see p. 351) to The Federalist Papers (Hamilton et al., [1787–89] 1961). In considering the transformation of America from a loose confederation of states into the federal USA, Madison’s particular fear was the ‘problem of factions’. In common with most liberals, Madison argued that unchecked democratic rule might simply lead to majoritarianism, to the crushing of individual rights and to the expropriation of property in the name of the people. What made Madison’s work notable, however, was his stress upon the multiplicity of interests and groups in society, and his insistence that, unless each such group possessed a political voice, stability and order would be impossible. He therefore proposed a system of divided government based on the separation of powers (see p. 345), bicameralism and federalism (see p. 397), that offered a variety of access points to competing groups and interests. The resulting system of rule by multiple minorities is often referred to as ‘Madisonian democracy’. Insofar as it recognizes both the existence of diversity or multiplicity in society, and the fact that such multiplicity is desirable, Madison’s model is the first developed statement of pluralist principles. Madisonian democracy: A form of democracy that incorporates constitutional protections for minorities that enable them to resist majority rule. CONCEPT Pluralist democracy The term pluralist democracy is sometimes used interchangeably with liberal democracy. More specifically, it refers to a form of democracy that operates through the capacity of organized groups and interests to articulate popular demands and ensure responsive government. The conditions for a healthy pluralist democracy include: (1) a wide dispersal of political power amongst competing groups; (2) a high degree of internal responsiveness, group leaders being accountable to members; and (3) a neutral governmental machine that is sufficiently fragmented to offer groups a number of points of access. The most influential modern exponent of pluralist theory is Robert Dahl (see p. 275). As described in Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (1961), Dahl carried out an empirical study of the distribution of power in New Haven, Connecticut, USA. He concluded 196 that, although the politically privileged and economically powerful exerted greater power than ordinary citizens, no ruling or permanent elite was able to dominate the political process. His conclusion was that ‘New Haven is an example of a democratic system, warts and all’. Dahl recognized that modern democratic systems differ markedly from the classical democracies of Ancient Greece. With Charles Lindblom, he coined the term ‘polyarchy’ (see p. 117) to mean rule by the many, as distinct from rule by all citizens. The key feature of such a system of pluralist democracy is that competition between parties at election time, and the ability of interest or pressure groups to articulate their views freely, establishes a reliable link between the government and the governed, and creates a channel of communication between the two. While this may fall a long way short of the ideal of popular self-government, its supporters nevertheless argue that it ensures a sufficient level of accountability and popular responsiveness for it to be regarded as democratic. However, the relationship between pluralism and democracy may not be a secure one. For instance, one of the purposes of the Madisonian system was, arguably, to constrain democracy in the hope of safeguarding property. In other words, the system of rule by multiple minorities may simply have been a device to prevent the majority (the propertyless masses) from exercising political power. A further problem is the danger of what has been called ‘pluralist stagnation’. This occurs as organized groups and economic interests become so powerful that they create a log jam, resulting in the problem of government ‘overload’. In such circumstances, a pluralist system may simply become ungovernable. Finally, there is the problem identified by Dahl in later works, such as A Preface to Economic Democracy (1985); notably, that the unequal ownership of economic resources tends to concentrate political power in the hands of the few, and deprive the many of it. This line of argument runs parallel to the conventional Marxist critique of pluralist democracy, and has given rise to neopluralism (see p. 63). Elitist view Elitism (see p. 104) developed as a critique of egalitarian ideas such as democracy and socialism. It draws attention to the fact of elite rule, either as an inevitable and desirable feature of social existence, or as a remediable and regrettable one. Classical elitists, such as Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Gaetano Mosca (1857–1941) and Robert Michels (1876– 1936), tended to take the former position. For them, democracy was no more than a foolish delusion, because political power is always exercised by a privileged minority: an elite. For example, in The Ruling Class 197 ( 1939), Mosca proclaimed that, in all societies, ‘two classes of people appear – a class that rules and a class that is ruled’. In his view, the resources or attributes that are necessary for rule are always unequally distributed, and, further, a cohesive minority will always be able to manipulate and control the masses, even in a parliamentary democracy. Pareto suggested that the qualities needed to rule conform to one of two psychological types: ‘foxes’ (who rule by cunning and are able to manipulate the consent of the masses), and ‘lions’ (whose domination is typically achieved through coercion and violence). Michels developed an alternative line of argument based on the tendency within all organizations, however democratic they might appear, for power to be concentrated in the hands of a small group of dominant figures who can organize and make decisions. He termed this ‘the iron law of oligarchy’ (see p. 256). Whereas classical elitists strove to prove that democracy was always a myth, modern elitist theorists have tended to highlight how far particular political systems fall short of the democratic ideal. An example of this can be found in C. Wright Mills’ influential account of the power structure in the USA. In contrast to the pluralist notion of a wide and broadly democratic dispersal of power, Mills, in The Power Elite (1956), offered a portrait of a USA dominated by a nexus of leading groups. In his view, this ‘power elite’ comprised a triumvirate of big business (particularly defence- related industries), the US military and political cliques surrounding the President. Drawing on a combination of economic power, bureaucratic control, and access to the highest levels of the executive branch of government, the power elite is able to shape key ‘history-making’ decisions, especially in the fields of defence and foreign policy, as well as strategic economic policy. The power-elite model suggests that liberal democracy in the USA is largely a sham. Elitists have, moreover, argued that empirical studies have supported pluralist conclusions only because Dahl and others have ignored the importance of non-decision-making as a manifestation of power (see p. 9). Certain elite theorists have nevertheless argued that a measure of democratic accountability is consistent with elite rule. Whereas the power- elite model portrays the elite as a cohesive body, bound together by common or overlapping interests, competitive elitism (sometimes called ‘democratic elitism’) highlights the significance of elite rivalry (see Figure 4.1). In other words, the elite, consisting of the leading figures from a number of competing groups and interests, is fractured. This view is often associated with Joseph Schumpeter’s (see p. 224) ‘realistic’ model of 198 democracy outlined in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942): The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. The electorate can decide which elite rules, but cannot change the fact that power is always exercised by an elite. This model of competitive elitism was developed by Anthony Downs (1957) into the ‘economic theory of democracy’. In effect, electoral competition creates a political market in which politicians act as entrepreneurs bent upon achieving government power, and individual voters behave like consumers, voting for the party with the policies that most closely reflect their own preferences. Downs argued that a system of open and competitive elections guarantees democratic rule because it places government in the hands of the party whose philosophy, values, and policies correspond most closely to the preferences of the largest group of voters. As Schumpeter put it, ‘democracy is the rule of the politician’. As a model of democratic politics, competitive elitism at least has the virtue that it corresponds closely to the workings of the liberal-democratic political system. Indeed, it emerged more as an attempt to describe how the democratic process works than through a desire to prescribe certain values and principles – political equality, popular participation, freedom, or whatever. CONCEPT Elitism Elite originally meant, and can still mean, ‘the highest’, ‘the best’ or ‘the excellent’. Used in an empirical sense, it refers to a minority in whose hands power, wealth or privilege is concentrated. Elitism is a belief in, or practice of, rule by an elite or minority. Normative elitism suggests that political power should be vested in the hands of a wise or enlightened minority. Classical elitism claims to be empirical (although normative beli