Thomas' Nagel's Moral Luck Exam Prep PDF

EXAM PREP Thomas’ Nagel's Moral Luck 1. People are morally accessible (IE. Blameworthy) for what they do [Assumption of our ordinary moral practices] 2. People cannot be morally assessed for what is due to factors beyond their control. 3. Ultimately, nothing or almost nothing about what a...

EXAM PREP Thomas’ Nagel's Moral Luck 1. People are morally accessible (IE. Blameworthy) for what they do [Assumption of our ordinary moral practices] 2. People cannot be morally assessed for what is due to factors beyond their control. 3. Ultimately, nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control. With an Inconsistent triad, normally we decide which of the three Nagel we must live with all three being true. We must live with moral luck. Living with what he calls Moral Luck “Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck.” Our ordinary moral judgments simply assume that people are morally assessable for their behavior. Moral Accessibility (3) Ultimately, nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control. Why? Due to the four kinds of luck that result in moral luck. Control Principle: “People cannot be morally assessed for…what is due to factors beyond their control” Corollary to the Control Principle: Two people ought not be morally assessed differently if the only other differences between them are due to factors beyond their control. Types of luck (a) Resultant luck (b) Constitutive luck (c) Circumstantial luck (d) Causal luck Resultant Luck: Resultant luck is a concept that refers to how the outcomes of actions, rather than the intentions behind them, influence how those actions are judged. Constitutive luck: Luck in the kind of person you are - your inclinations, capacities and temperament. Circumstantial Luck: Circumstances that one finds themselves in life. IE. Those who were citizens of Germany during the Nazi Regime Causal Luck (More relevant to the free will debate; similar to consequence argument) Luck in how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. Refers to the role of chance in determining the causal chain of events that leads to a person’s actions or decisions. IE. A person commits a crime, but their behavior is heavily influenced by an abusive upbringing and systemic factors they could not control. Why not reject the control principle? “People cannot be morally assessed for…what is due to factors beyond their control” The erosion of moral judgment emerges not as the absurd consequence of an over-simple theory, but as a natural consequence of the ordinary idea of moral assessment.. - Just live with Moral Luck What is Free Will? The ability of persons to control their behaviour/actions in the strongest manner necessary for responsibility. Leeway views: the ability to do otherwise The emphasis is on the choices available to a person at the moment of decision. "Could the person have acted differently?" Sourcehood views: the ability to be the source of one’s actions (even if no leeway freedom) Free will is about being the origin or source of your actions, not necessarily about having alternative choices. The emphasis is on where the action comes from—whether it comes from the person in a ,.mnbmeaningful way (like their intentions, values, or character). "Did the action originate from the person in a way that makes them responsible?" Different kinds of responsibility: Causal Responsibility Causal responsibility means that someone or something played a part in causing something to happen, whether or not they meant to or are to blame for it. It’s just about whether their action or involvement led to the result. Being part of the cause-and-effect chain that leads to a particular event or outcome. Responsibility as Obligation v. (ie.) blameworthiness “You’re morally responsible for your children’s welfare!” (you have an obligation) “You’re morally responsible for failing to take care of your children!” (blameworthy)  Legal & Moral responsibility “What distinguishes...[these]... is a matter of the evaluative dimension of an agent’s actions (moral, rather than legal...), and then an assessment of her exercising her agency along that dimension.” Accountability Moral Responsibility If you’re morally responsible in this sense, others in the moral community are entitled to treat you in certain ways, e.g., I might blame you. Connection to reactive attitudes (How we blame others) Moral emotions that are responses to a morally responsible agent, e.g., moral anger, indignation, etc. This is partly how we typically blame others Normative basis for the entitlement to blame. (or feel moral anger) Agent deserves moral praise or blame just because she has intentionally performed a morally good or bad action, and not (say) primarily due to consequentialist / contractarian considerations. - “Why we think it is fair to hold someone accountable for their actions.” How is free will related to moral responsibility? Free will is an ability that is a requirement for being morally responsible in the accountability sense, and thus for being (e.g.) blameworthy in the basic desert sense, or for being legitimately subject to various negative reactive attitudes. Determinism Causal Definition: For each event E, the laws of nature and some set of events that occurred prior to E are such that these events cause E to occur with probability 1. Entailment definition: The conjunction of a complete statement of the (non-relational) facts of the world at a time, t, with a complete statement of the laws of nature, entails all other (non-relational) facts about the world at times other than t, including facts about future human decisions and actions. - What Peter Van InWagen relies on. In either case: At any instant of time, exactly one future is physically possible. Compatibility / Compatibilism Inconsistent Triad of claims 1. Determinism is true 2. We have free will; and 3. Free will is incompatible with determinism. [Modern Compatbalists will not agree with this.] Modern compatibilists believe that we can have free will and be responsible for our actions, even if everything happens because of prior causes (determinism). Modern compatibilists - assert (2) and deny (3), - are agnostic about (1). Three Compatbalist Philosophers: Susan Wolf Harry Frankfurt Peter Van InWagen “If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.” - Peter Van Inwagen Frankfurt’s claim that the ability to do otherwise is not required. Same Compatibility argument EXAMPLE: Gohan is fighting Cell during the Cell Games. He has the power to destroy Cell and save the Earth, but Cell secretly manipulates things so that if Gohan chooses to finish the fight quickly, Cell will immediately destroy the earth. Gohan decides to hold back and fight Cell a little longer: Even though he knows he could end the fight, Gohan chooses not to. Frankfurt's explanation: Even though Gohan couldn’t have chosen to finish the fight immediately (because Cell would destroy everyone if Gohan did), Gohan is still responsible for his decision to hold back, because it came from his own values and reasoning. Frankfurts analysis is that the PAP (Principle of Alternative Possibilities) is false; if compatibilism and libertarianism rely on PAP, they too are false. The Principle of Alternative Possibilities states that a person is only morally responsible for their actions if they could have done otherwise—in other words, if they had the ability to choose between different possible actions. The control required for MR doesn’t require the ATDO Peter Strawson’s Compatibalist claim Freedom and responsibility are not threatened by the possibility that determinism is true. A kind of sourcehood view. (If determinism is true… our actions are what determine our free will regardless of ATDO) He wants to look at the practice of Moral Responsibility as it actually occurs. “[B]eing blameworthy is just a matter of a sane adult person acting with ill will or a lack of a sufficient degree of goodwill” (M&P, p. 133), and our emotional reactions toward such people. And that’s not threatened by determinism.” These reactions are what he calls: Reactive Attitudes: A distinctive kind of emotion, which is a reaction to an attitude of another. (or to an attitude of one's own) Paradigm case: Emotional reaction to an attitude of ill will revealed by another in their wrong action. What role does reactive attitudes play in moral psychology? Participant Stance: The stance we adopt toward other members of our moral community–sane adults with whom we have to get along. Objective Stance: The stance we typically adopt toward non-persons. As well as those who are not full f;eged members of our moral community (Very young children or people who have certain kinds of impairments; taken up by doctors, surgeons, therapists.) 3 Arguments: Determinism is meant to be a global excuse or exemption for blame, but it can't be. 1. Rationalism Excuses work by showing that someone who is normally an apt target of blame isn’t blameworthy on this occasion. A guy on the subway stands on your foot by accident—no bad quality of will/ lack of regard. Determinism can’t be a “global” excuse, since then there’d be no distinction to mark between actions for which people are blameworthy and those for which they’re not. Rationalism, according to Peter Strawson, is the idea that people are morally responsible for their actions because they are rational agents—they can think, reason, and make decisions intentionally. For Strawson, holding someone responsible isn’t just about whether they could have chosen differently, but also about how we emotionally react to their actions. Our responses, like anger or gratitude, are part of how we judge if someone is responsible, and these judgments are connected to our understanding of them as rational, thinking beings Exemptions work by showing that someone is exempt from blame, because they’re not fully-fledged members of the moral community (e.g., young children, people with certain mental disabilities, etc.). Determinism can’t be an exemption, since it doesn’t show that it’s unreasonable to expect sane adult members of the moral community to behave with sufficient good will toward us. Incompatbalist: Truth of determinism would require us to take the objective attitude universally. TLDR: Treat everyone as an object. When we adopt the objective attitude, it’s never as the result of a theoretical commitment (like belief in determinism), but because of a plea of exemption, or temporarily “to relieve the ‘strains of involvement’.” The truth of determinism wouldn’t entail an excuse or an exemption. So agents can be blameworthy ISSUE WITH STRAWSONS CLAIM: Gary Watson: The problem is not that the theory is incomplete, but that what might be necessary to complete it will undermine the theory. Reactive attitudes are sensitive not only to the quality of others' wills, but depend as well upon a background of beliefs about the objects of those attitudes. Reactive attitudes change when you consider circumstances. “... many of the exemption conditions involve explanations of why the individuals display qualities to which the reactive attitudes are otherwise sensitive.” Real Self views of free will Frankfurt & Susan Wolf Frankfurt: “A person acts of her own free will if and only if her action issues from the will with which she identifies by means of a higher-order volition.” TLDR; You act of your own free will if and only if your actions issue from your real self. The Deep Self. 1st-order desire: a desire to do something. 2nd-order desire: a desire regarding one or more of your 1st-order desires. Your “will” is identical with one or more of your 1st-order desires, but not with 1st order desires that merely incline you in a particular way. Your will is an “effective” desire, i.e., a desire that would actually move you to action. You have a 2nd-order desire when (i) you want to have a certain 1st-order desire. What about when, additionally, (ii) you want that desire to be your will? In the case of (ii) a 2nd-order desire is a “2nd-order volition.” You act of your own free will if and only if your action issues from the will you identify with by means of a 2nd-order (or higher) volition. ( IE.) First-order desire: You want to skip work and watch TV. Second-order desire: You want to be more productive and work instead. Second-order volition: You want your desire to be productive (from your second-order desire) to actually control your actions, so you decide to work instead of watching TV. Freedom to reflect on/ change our desires. Maybe necessary, but like freedom of action, a deep self is insufficient for free will. Susan Wolf The Sane Deep Self view “[N]ot all the things necessary for freedom and responsibility must be types of power and control. We may simply need to be a certain way, even though it is not within our power to determine whether we are that way or not.” S is morally responsible for some action if and only if (a) S is able to govern that action by her desires and to govern her desires by her deep self, and (b) S’s deep self is sane. Required for free action and moral responsibility: Sanity (the ability to conform our behavior to morals) and Normative Competence (the ability to engage in normative deliberation). Refers to the process of thinking through what ought to be done—deciding on the right or morally acceptable course of action based on standards, values, or norms. We must be capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons. Two elements of Wolf’s account of Sanity: 1. Our beliefs must be controlled by perceptions and reasoning that give an accurate picture of the world. 2. Our values must be controlled by an accurate conception of the world. In either case, Wolf admits, “accurate” is justified in terms of “widespread intersubjective agreement.” Sanity is a “minimally sufficient ability to cognitively and normatively recognize and appreciate the world for what it is.” The meaning argument: Kadri Vivhevilin 1. We have free will only if we can choose otherwise. 2. We can choose otherwise only if we can choose otherwise, given the laws and the past until just before our choice. 3. If determinism is true, we can never choose otherwise, given the laws and the past until just before our choice. 4. Therefore, if determinism is true, we can never choose otherwise. 5. Therefore, if determinism is true, we have no free will. “Since the key premise (2) is based on a claim about the meaning of ‘can,’ I will call this the ‘Meaning Argument’ for incompatibilism.” She rejects premise 2 Revised conditional analysis of abilities. The statement is trying to explain what it means for someone to have the ability to do something (like the ability to jump, run, or solve a problem) at a certain time. The Revised Conditional Analysis says that a person has the ability to do something if, at a certain time, they have the right qualities (like strength or skill), and if they decide to do it, and keep those qualities, those factors together will cause them to successfully do it later. “S has the ability at time t to do X iff, for some intrinsic property or set of properties B that S has at t, for some time t′ after t, if S chose (decided, intended, or tried) at t to do X, and S were to retain B until t′, S’s choosing (deciding, intending, or trying) to do X and S’s having of B would jointly be an S-complete cause of S’s doing X.” Supposed to deal with these thinking cases; Add a condition, retaining properties at some time. You only have the ATDO if you have certain properties and you retain these properties at a certain time. ** Note; Kadri’s views are Compatibalist Robert Kane & Incompatibilism Solutions: (1) Determinism is true; (2) We have free will; and (3) Free will is incompatible with determinism. All three cannot be true Libertarians are incompatibilists who deny (1) and assert (2 & 3) - Determinism is true - We have free will; and - Free will is incompatible with determinism. “[I]f a choice occurred by virtue of a quantum jump or other undetermined event in one’s brain, it would seem a fluke or accident rather than a responsible choice.” Ultimate responsibility (UR): To be ultimately responsible for an action, an agent must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient cause or motive for that action occurring. Indeterminism (ID) is not required for every action done of our own free will. It’s only required for “self-forming actions” (SFAs), which are required for UR. In moments of crucial choice—what Kane calls Self-Forming Actions (SFAs)—a person faces a conflict between competing desires or values. These moments are marked by instability or indeterminacy, and the choice that the person makes at that time is not fully determined by their past or external factors. These moments are chaotic in the sense that small changes in internal states or external conditions could lead to different outcomes, allowing for true free will. Competing motivations stir up chaos in the brain, making it sensitive to micro-indeterminacies at the neuronal level. Assume indeterminacy at the quantum level. How could such indeterminacy get “amplified” to the neural level? Chaos theory: Some complex systems have high sensitivity to small changes in initial conditions. Chaos might amplify quantum indeterminacies in the firing of individual neurons so that they would have large-scale effects on the activity of neural networks in the brain as a whole. Chaos Theory (or complexity theory) Kane uses chaos theory to explain how small, unpredictable factors can influence big decisions. In the same way that a tiny change in a complex system (like the flap of a butterfly's wings) can lead to large, unpredictable changes (the "butterfly effect"), small, chaotic factors in a person's mind can affect their decisions in ways that are not fully predictable. Kane’s chaos theory suggests that at key moments in life, when a person faces a tough decision, small, unpredictable influences can come into play, leading them to make choices that aren't fully determined by their past. These moments, which are chaotic and open-ended, are when people exercise their true free will. Case of the business woman. - Chaos being stirred in the brain. Peter Van Inwagen (1) There are (only) three general positions that one can adopt about free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, and free-will denialism. (2) Each of these three positions is mysterious. (3) Therefore, there is no non-mysterious position to adopt about free will. “No Choice Principle” Determinism (D): [state of the world at a time] + [laws of nature] entails [all other truths about the world] If [things were thus-and-so ten million years ago], then [I am eating cake right now]. So if D is true, neither I nor anyone else ever had a choice about whether I am eating cake now. Compatibilists’ Mystery Assume determinism (D) is true: Everything that happens, including you eating cake, is determined by prior events. This means S (you) can’t choose whether things happened a certain way in the past, like the state of the world 10 million years ago (that’s something we can’t change now). This means if something in the past (p) led to a certain result (like you eating cake now, q), you also don’t have a choice about that connection either. If you can’t change the past (p) or the connection between the past and present (if p, then q), then it seems like you don’t have a choice about eating cake now (q). Since compatibilism says you can have free will even if determinism is true, but this argument suggests otherwise, the argument says compatibilism might be false or at least mysterious because it doesn’t fully explain how we can still have a real choice if everything seems determined. Consequence argument: Libertarianism is mysterious (Event Causal) Event-Causal Libertarianism says that for you to have free will, something in your brain needs to happen randomly (indeterminacy). However, if that randomness is purely by chance, it doesn’t seem like you’re actually making a choice—it’s just luck. So this view of free will is seen as mysterious or unsatisfying because chance doesn’t give you real control. Not having a choice no matter what u choose even if it's different. Agent causing choices. Libertarianism (Agent Causation) Agent causation is the idea that you cause your own actions—you are the origin of your decisions, not just influenced by the world around you. This idea gives you real control over your behavior, which is a key part of libertarian free will. He does not understand how an individual could be the cause of a change, as opposed to simply being the subject of a change. In regular causation (like event causation), something happening to an individual (a change in them) is the cause of what happens next. But with agent causation, it’s as if the individual is causing the change themselves. Explaining a mystery with a mystery. Too hard to understand and makes the concept unclear. No free will Mystery To deliberate; we need to believe we have an open future. The argument says that free-will denialism doesn’t make sense because we think we have choices (we deliberate about things), and you can’t really deliberate if you believe you have no choice at all. This contradiction makes free-will denialism hard to believe, or mysterious. Free will denialism cannot be believed.