Contract Law 2024 Topic 6 Formal and Evidentiary Requirements PDF

**1. Required Reading** ======================= - Introduction ============ Generally, a contract does not need to be reduced to a written document in order for it to be enforceable. An oral contract is perfectly valid, provided that the usual criteria already examined (such as consideration a...

**1. Required Reading** ======================= - Introduction ============ Generally, a contract does not need to be reduced to a written document in order for it to be enforceable. An oral contract is perfectly valid, provided that the usual criteria already examined (such as consideration and intention to create legal relations) are present. In Pernod Ricard & Comrie plc v. FII (Fyffes) plc (Unreported, High Court, 21 October 1988) an oral agreement for a multi-million pound take-over was sought to be enforced. Costello J, who was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court, applied the general rule: However, the law requires that certain contracts be set out in writing before they can be enforced by way of an action. McDermott and McDermott lists \[at 5.02\] the main sources of such writing requirements: \(i) The Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695; \(ii) The Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828; \(iii) The Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 \(iv) The Arbitration Act 2010 \(v) The Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 \(iii) Consumer legislation. Kötz identifies the primary motivations behind such requirements: i. To reduce evidential disputes as to what was actually agreed. ii. To put the parties on notice of the obligations they are about to enter into. iii. To mark the transition from negotiation to contract. iv. To protect the weaker party, usually a consumer.[^1^](#fn1){#fnref1.footnote-ref} **3. Contracts required to be evidenced in writing pursuant to Section 2 Statute of Frauds (Ireland) Act 1695** =============================================================================================================== Section 2 of the Statute of Frauds (Ireland) Act 1695 stipulated that: This has now been overtaken by Section 51 Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009, which provides: **3.1 Contracts to Pay for the Debt of Another** ------------------------------------------------ The rule here can be expressed simply by way of example: X loans money to Y. Z agrees to pay Y's debts should Y default. Y does indeed default. Can X sue Z? Answer: Only if the agreement is in writing. It is important to differentiate here between contracts of indemnity and contracts of guarantee. McDermott explains the distinction thus: In Kirkham v. Marter (1819) 2 B & Ald 613 the plaintiff suffered loss as a result of X's negligence. X's father had agreed orally to compensate the plaintiff for this loss, but when the plaintiff sued upon that agreement the action failed for non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds. The court said: In *Fennell v. Mulcahy* (1845) 8 Ir LR 434, a tenant of the plaintiff landlord had fallen into arrears on their rent and the plaintiff seized his tenant's goods. The defendant stepped in and agreed to pay off the tenant's debts if the landlord returned the goods and still was not paid. The tenant never came good on the arrears and so the plaintiff landlord sued the defendant on his agreement to cover the tenant's debt. The court found that the agreement here was a contract of guarantee which had not been evidenced in writing and was therefore automatically void under the statute. To illustrate the contrast with contracts of indemnity, take the case of Mountstephen v. Lakeman (1871) LR 7 QB 196; affd (1874) LR 7 HL 17. There, a builder was asked to perform certain construction works by the Chairman of a Board of Health in England. The builder asked how he would be paid and the Chairman replied "I will see you paid". The builder duly performed the works and invoiced the Board of Health, which sought to avoid paying the builder as it had never concluded any agreement with him, directly or indirectly. The builder therefore went after the Chairman who had said he would see him paid, but the Chairman protested that his agreement with the builder had never been reduced to writing and so was void under the Statute of Frauds. The question for the court was whether the defendant Chairman had agreed to guarantee the debts of his Health Board (in which case the Statute required a written agreement), or whether the Chairman had himself assumed an original liability (in which case it was an oral contract of indemnity and no writing was needed). The court found the latter construction applicable on the facts of the case and accordingly held the Chairman liable under contract. The court found that the Chairman could not be guaranteeing the Health Board's debt because the Board had not ordered the work to be done and so could not be described as a debtor. The sole debtor here was the Chairman. In the recent case of *Pitts v. Jones* \[2008\] 1 All ER 941, the English Court of Appeal embraced the view that if contractual negotiations can be taken as one transaction and the obligation on X to pay stems from a "central object" of the contract or transaction, that obligation to pay is likely to be an indemnity rather than a guarantee. If the obligation to pay is itself, however, the "central object" of the contract, it is likely to be a guarantee. Clark comments that "\[t\]his rather opaque test is a difficult one to understand as well as apply", and is given as an illustration of how awkwardly the law can function in this area. Similarly, the Law Reform Committee of South Australia has called the indemnity/guarantee distinction "a disgrace to the law and a trap for the unwary"[^2^](#fn2){#fnref2.footnote-ref}. **3.2 Contracts Made in Consideration of Marriage** --------------------------------------------------- A marriage is a contract, and does not have to be in writing. However, where somebody (e.g. a family relative) agrees to transfer property or a sum of money to an engaged couple, on the basis that they are getting married, that agreement must be in writing before it can be enforced. The leading Irish instance is the probate case of *In re* The Goods of Leslie Good, Deceased (Unreported, High Court, 14 July 1986), where the applicant sought letters of administration over her deceased father's estate so that she could sue her stepmother to enforce an agreement made between the stepmother and her father. The applicant alleged that her stepmother had contracted with her father, when he was still alive, that certain property would pass to their children of previous marriages on their respective deaths. Otherwise, the property would have been administered pursuant to statutory intestacy provisions (s 67 Succession Act 1965). Hamilton P found that the applicant was seeking to enforce a verbal agreement made in consideration of marriage. As this agreement was not evidence in writing, the claim had to fail. Since the applicant did not allege that the agreement was in writing, or evidenced by a memorandum, her claim must fail. English law has seen the repeal of this provision, and the Law Reform Commissions for such other common law jurisdictions as Ontario, Manitoba and South Australia have recommended repeal as well. **3.3 Contracts for the Sale of Land (or Interest in Land)** ------------------------------------------------------------ Unlike the category just considered above, this category has an obviously broad applicability today. Conveyances of freehold and leasehold interests in land are always required to be in writing, but the same goes for grants of incorporeal hereditaments such as rights of way. And that the sale of things "attached to the land" fall within the ambit of s 2 is clear from the relatively recent Irish case of *Mackie v. Wilde (No. 2)* \[1998\] 2 IR 578, where an alleged arrangement to transfer fishing rights in a river was considered to come under the Statute of Frauds. It seems that a sale of what constitutes "goods" rather than land or an interest in land will not be subject to the Statute. Section 62 Sale of Goods Act 1893 defines "goods" as: And in *Scully v. Corboy* \[1950\] IR 140 it was held that a letting of a meadowing, although on first glance related to land, is a contract for the sale of goods within s 62. Gavan Duffy P stated: **3.4 Contracts not to be Performed within 1 Year** --------------------------------------------------- The policy behind this latest category is located in the fear that oral testimony based on memories stretching back more than a year may prove unreliable, when a verbal contract is sought to be enforced or denied. A good example of the operation of the rule to this category of contracts is found in *Tierney v. Marshall* (1857) 7 ICLR 308, where the parties were in the double-relationship of tenant/landlord *and* employee/employer. The parties allegedly agreed that rents payable by the plaintiff tenant to the defendant landlord (£17 per annum) would instead be set off against monies due by the defendant to the plaintiff in the form of unpaid salary (£100+). Because of the figures involved, it was clear that the rent agreement would have to run for several years before the wages due to the plaintiff were cleared. The High Court found that this placed the agreement in the category of contracts not to be performed within 1 year and, because it was not in writing, it was unenforceable. Crampton J said: In *Naughton v. Limestone Land Co* \[1952\] Ir Jur Rep 19, the defendant orally promised the plaintiff that if the plaintiff studied in London for 3 months, he would employ him on his return to Ireland for 4 years. The plaintiff duly followed this plan and sued on the contract when the defendant reneged. The court held that, since the contract was intended to be performed over a period of 4 years and 3 months, it was unenforceable without a written memorandum. The requirement of a written memorandum only applies to contracts where the performance of the obligation in question is intended to be in more than one year's time: contracts, where performance is delayed and was never originally intended to be pushed out so late in time, are not covered. This principle is well illustrated by the case of *Hynes v. Hynes* (Unreported, High Court, 21 December 1984), where two brothers agreed that one would transfer land to the other, and although it was intended that this transfer would be effected in one year, it ended up taking longer. Barrington J found that the intention of the parties was for the immediate implementation of the contract and that completion would take place as soon as possible. This brought the contract outside the scope of the Statute. However, it should be noted that simply because a contract *may* be performed within 1 year is not usually enough to satisfy a court that the Statute is inapplicable: it has to be intended or contemplated by the parties that performance will be effected within 1 year. This is shown by the case of *Farrington v. Donoghue* (1866) IR 1 CL 675, where the defendant verbally promised to maintain a child until the child could look after itself. The defendant argued that this contract was theoretically performable within 1 year, giving the example of the child dying, in which scenario the obligation on him would have been completed within 1 year. The court rejected this hypothesis and found the Statute to be applicable. **3.5 Contracts for the Sale of Goods in Excess of £10**[^3^](#fn3){#fnref3.footnote-ref} {#contracts-for-the-sale-of-goods-in-excess-of-10} ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Section 13 of the Statute of Frauds required that these contracts were unenforceable unless the buyer: i. accepts and receives part of the goods sold; or ii. gives something in earnest to bind the bargain; or iii. the buyer makes part-payment of the price. or, again, unless a written memorandum had been created. Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 has been treated as effectively repealing s of the 13 Statute of Frauds, without expressly doing so[^4^](#fn4){#fnref4.footnote-ref}. It now provides: 1. A contract for the sale of any goods of the value of ten pounds or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract be made and signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf. 2. The provisions of this section apply to every such contract, notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to be delivered at some future time, or may not at the time of such contract be actually made, procured or provided, or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for delivery. 3. There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this section when the buyer does any act in relation to the goods which recognises a pre-existing contract of sale whether there be an acceptance in performance of the contract or not. ### 3.5.1 Acceptance/Receipt of Part of the Goods The operation of the first exception was seen in Tradax (Ireland) Ltd v. Irish Grain Board Ltd \[1984\] IR 1, where the acceptance by the buyer of 1,871 tonnes of grain out of total of 25,000 tonnes due to be sold under the alleged contract was enough to take the deal outside the ambit of s.4 Sale of Goods Act 1893. Henchy J said: ### 3.5.2 "Something in Earnest" What is "something in earnest"? Clark surmises that where a buyer gives over his business card as a gesture of good faith, he is giving something in earnest and can therefore be held liable.[^5^](#fn5){#fnref5.footnote-ref} Clark[^6^](#fn6){#fnref6.footnote-ref} and McDermott[^7^](#fn7){#fnref7.footnote-ref} seem to agree that giving a credit card number over the phone/Internet would probably count as giving something in earnest as well. In Farr, Smith & Co v. Messers Ltd \[1928\] 1 KB 397 Wright J gave the following useful exposition on the topic: However, the "something in earnest" must be accepted by the seller: *Kirwan v. Price* \[1958\] Ir Jur Rep 56. ### 3.5.3 Part Payment Part payment of the contract price must be both made and accepted. Clark notes that an uncashed cheque returned to the writer thereof does not qualify as giving something in earnest because it is never accepted by the person on the other side of the bargain.[^8^](#fn8){#fnref8.footnote-ref} **4. The Requirements of the Statute of Frauds** ================================================ **4.1 The Memorandum** ---------------------- Letters drafted by solicitors or estate agents can qualify as a memorandum for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds even where the drafters did not intend their creation to count as such. The same goes for auctioneer's sale books, deposit cheques and receipts. An ironic result was produced in *Tradax* (*supra*) where the Supreme Court confirmed that a letter written by the defendant's agent, in which he repudiated the contract, could qualify as a memorandum as it outlined all the material terms of the verbal agreement. The primary criterion for the memorandum is that it must come into being prior to the commencement of the action which seeks to enforce the contract. A letter of offer may constitute a valid memorandum even though, obviously, it does not evidence the existence of a contract because acceptance is yet to be confirmed. In the case of *J Pereira Fernandes v. Mehta* \[2006\] 1 All ER (Comm) 885, the appellant asked a staff member to send an e-mail in which the appellant offered to satisfy the debts of a company of which he was a director. The *quid pro quo* for this was that the respondent would agree to adjourn legal proceedings it had initiated in respect of the debts. The respondent accepted this offer verbally and this was held by the court to transform the written offer into the requisite memorandum for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds. The Irish Supreme Court has adopted the same approach: in *Boyle & Boyle v. Lee & Goyns* \[1992\] ILRM 65, O'Flaherty J said: Recently, it has been confirmed that there is no objection in principle to reference being made to a sequence of negotiating e-mails for the purposes of s 4 of the Statute of Frauds, which must be construed in a manner accommodating of contemporary business practice: *Golden Ocean v. Salgaocar* \[2012\] 2 All ER (Comm) 978. **4.2 Contents of the Memorandum** ---------------------------------- The memorandum must contain the "3 P's": a. parties; b. property; and c. price, as well as any other term which the parties considered essential to the contract. It is important to note that the full consideration in the contract must be cited. It is not enough simply to quote the balance of the purchase price, as occurred in *Black v. Grealy* (Unreported, High Court, 10 November 1977), where Costello J explained the problem succinctly: McDermott and McDermott have condensed \[at 5.68\] the task of the courts when presented with a question of compliance with the Statute of Frauds into a "three-stage process": **4.3 Signature** ----------------- The memorandum must be signed by the person to be charged (or his agent). Signature is not restrictively interpreted, and stamps, typed words and so on may constitute a valid signature. In *Casey v. Irish Continental Bank* \[1979\] IR 364 the Supreme Court found a valid signature for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds where a solicitor had instructed his secretary to type a letter on the firm's headed notepaper, which letter set out all the material terms of the agreement. In *Orton v. Collins* \[2007\] 3 All ER 863, a solicitor had sent an e-mail giving the terms of an acceptance. At the end was put "yours faithfully" and "Putsmans" (the name of the firm). The court said: Similarly in *Gordon James Ramsay v Gary Love* \[2015\] EWHC 65 (Ch), it was held that the application of the claimant's signature by mechanical means to a guarantee with his knowledge, by a person who had a long-standing arrangement to look after the claimant's commercial affairs acting within the scope of his actual authority, amounted to a valid and binding signature. **4.4 Joinder of Documents** ---------------------------- There is no problem with a memorandum being composed of a number of documents. However, the signature must authenticate the entire memorandum and the Irish courts have held that this means that it must expressly or impliedly refer to the other documents comprising the memorandum: *Kelly v. Ross & Ross* (Unreported, High Court, 26 June 1986, McWilliam J). Logically, this requires the signature to be contained in the last document in time, as a signature presumably cannot cover documents not yet in existence. **4.5 "Subject to Contract"** ----------------------------- Often where negotiations are in train and documents containing putative contractual terms are being traded back and forth, such documents will be headed "subject to contract". The Supreme Court has held that this cannot be consistent with a contract having been concluded, and so such a document cannot act as a memorandum for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds because the purpose of the Statute's requirement is to ensure that an oral contract has been concluded. In *Boyle v. Lee* \[1992\] 1 IR 555 (*supra*), Finlay CJ stated: However, where at the conclusion of oral negotiations during which the phrase "subject to contract" has not been used and a solicitor adds the formula "subject to contract" in correspondence, a court may nonetheless find an oral contract to have been validly entered into and that the letter headed "subject to contract" may constitute a valid memorandum: *Kelly v. Park Hall Schools* \[1979\] IR 340. Clark notes that some members of the Supreme Court in *Boyle v. Lee* wished to confine *Park Hall* to its own facts and that others considered that it should not be followed. Conversely, where "subject to contract" is used at the outset of negotiations, it will not lightly be considered to have been abandoned. In Joanne Properties Ltd. v. Moneything Capital Ltd. \[2020\] EWCA Civ 1541, the England and Wales Court of Appeal reversed a lower court's finding that a binding settlement agreement had been reached in correspondence between solicitors where the label "subject to contract" had been used:. The Court considered that, once parties have started to negotiate "subject to contract", they will not be considered to have dispensed with that proviso unless they have agreed to do so expressly or that is the necessary implication of their words or actions. **5. Equitable Means of Enforcement** ===================================== Where a contract does not comply with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the court may, nevertheless, exercise its equitable jurisdiction to achieve enforcement of the agreement. **5.1 Part Performance** ------------------------ Andrews LJ in the Northern Irish case of Lowry v. Reid \[1927\] NI 142 explained the motivation and operation of the equitable doctrine of part performance in the following terms: In *Lowry* the plaintiff's mother was supposed to leave her property to her son (the plaintiff) if he gave his own farm plus £200 to his brother. The plaintiff followed the terms of this agreement and went to live with his mother. The mother initially made a will in accordance with the terms of the agreement (leaving her property to the plaintiff) but she later revoked it to give him only a life interest in the property. No note or memorandum of the agreement existed and the contract seemed to be unenforceable for non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds. However, the plaintiff had partly performed the contract and was considered to have raised an equity sufficient to obtain specific performance of the agreement. The traditional test (for determining whether part performance can validate a contract otherwise invalid for non-compliance with the Statute) saw the courts focus only on the acts of alleged part performance to see whether they were explicable only by reference to a contract such as the one alleged. However, after *Mackie v. Wilde (No. 2)* \[1998\] 2 IR 578, it is now permissible to look at the alleged contract to gain a context in which to assess acts of alleged part performance. The Supreme Court in *Mackie* held: The Supreme Court fashioned a 4-part test in *Mackie* with the following criteria: 1. There must have been a concluded oral contract; 2. The plaintiff must have acted in such a way as to evince an intention to perform the contract; 3. The defendant must have induced such acts or acquiesced in such acts while they were being performed; and 4. It must be unconscionable and in bad faith to allow the defendant to rely upon the Statute's prescription of a written memorandum in order to defeat the contract. It follows from the above that only the plaintiff's actions can establish part performance; actions of the defendant cannot amount to part performance such as to raise an equity in favour of the plaintiff. We have seen from *Lowry* that entry into land can amount to part performance. The payment of money can also, in certain circumstances, qualify as part performance of a contract. The *locus classicus* is *Steadman v. Steadman* \[1976\] AC 536, where a husband and wife, whose marriage had dissolved, were negotiating a settlement of the wife's interest in the family home. The husband was in arrears in respect of maintenance to the tune of £194 and sought a variation of the maintenance order from the courts. A meeting took place on the steps of the court where it was agreed that the wife would relinquish her interest in the family home for £1,500, the maintenance order would be discharged and the arrears remitted except for £100. The husband paid over the £100 and his solicitors sent a deed of transfer to the wife for her to surrender her interest in the house. She subsequently refused to follow through with the deal and the House of Lords decided that the husband had shown sufficient acts of part performance. *Steadman* has been followed in Ireland. In *Howlin v. Power* (Unreported, High Court, 5 May 1978, McWilliam J) the defendant verbally agreed to surrender a leasehold interest to the plaintiff, who paid £200 as part of the purchase price. The defendant subsequently refused to complete and tried to repay the plaintiff his £200. Without a written memorandum, the plaintiff was forced to seek specific performance on two grounds: (a) he had shown part performance by negotiating a new tenancy; (b) he had shown part performance by paying over the £200. McWilliam J rejected (a) on the basis that the plaintiff had not prejudiced himself in that he had simply consulted estate agents and said that "apart from causing him disappointment at the loss of his bargain, I cannot see that there is, on these facts, any special equity to take the case out of the statute". But with (b) the court was prepared to follow *Steadman*. The court said, however, that the plaintiff would still have to show that the defendant had acted unconscionably: However, on the particular facts of the case no prejudice had accrued to the plaintiff because: \(i) The sum of money paid over was relatively small. \(ii) The sum of money was tendered in repayment to the plaintiff. Howlin was mentioned in Keena v. Coughlan \[2019\] IEHC 12 where it was argued that part performance arose through the plaintiff having given a non-refundable deposit for the purchase of a hotel. The bank draft was returned to the plaintiff's solicitors, who promptly sent it back again. However, it was never lodged. Quinn J referred to Howlin having held that where a sum is tendered for repayment, this undermines the claim of prejudice. The plaintiff further submitted in Keena that the conduct of the defendants was unconscionable in standing by and allowing her to approach Ulster Bank to obtain the draft and travel to Dublin in the belief she had a concluded agreement for the purchase of the hotel and receiving the deposit from her. Where the deposit was not retained, however, Quinn J could not see how the act of driving to Dublin in reliance on a mistaken view of the situation that an agreement had been concluded could give rise to the application of the doctrine of part performance (or any other principle which might overcome the absence of a note or memorandum for the purposes of s 51 Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009). Part performance can also be effected by the expenditure of effort or labour, e.g. in construction works. In *Greenband Investments v. Bruton* \[2009\] IEHC 67, as noted above, Clarke J found that a sufficient memorandum existed for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds. Independent of that finding, however, the court was also satisfied that the defendants had allowed the plaintiff to conduct development works on the land which was the subject-matter of the contractual dispute, thereby allowing part performance by the plaintiff to occur: **5.2 Waiver** -------------- A party may "waive" performance of a clause which is inserted into a contract purely for their benefit and which is severable from the other terms of the contract. That party can then insist on completion despite the non-performance of the waived term. In *Anom Engineering Ltd v. Thompson* (Unreported, High Court, 1 February 1984, Costello J), the defendants verbally agreed to sell property to the plaintiffs. Solicitors for the defendants sent a draft contract and documents of title to the plaintiff. At this point, no agreement had been reached as to the operation of power and water services and the discharge of effluent into the defendants' water course. The defendants subsequently reneged on the agreement and the plaintiffs sued for specific performance. The agreement had been largely evidenced in writing but terms as to power and water services had not been reduced to a written document. Costello J held that the plaintiffs could waive these terms, as they were solely for the benefit of the plaintiffs, and so were entitled to specific performance. **5.3 The Statute May Not Be Used as an Instrument of Fraud** ------------------------------------------------------------- In *Doherty v. Gallagher* (Unreported, High Court, 9 June 1975, Finlay P) the plaintiff contracted to buy property from the defendant in return for £500 paid by cheque. It was agreed that the defendant could keep his cattle on the land until it was sold. The defendant cashed the cheque but later returned the money and refused to convey the property to the plaintiff, who promptly sued for specific performance. The defendant objected that there was no sufficient memorandum under the Statute of Frauds as the note which did exist did not stipulate as to the maintenance of the cattle on the land. Finlay P held that it an injustice would arise were the defendant allowed to avoid specific performance. He noted that the Statute was intended to prevent fraud or mischief and there was no risk of the defendant being defrauded by virtue of the absence of a memorandum setting out the reasonable time during which the defendant would be allowed to graze his cattle. Finlay P made an order for specific performance: This illustrates the well-established principle that the courts will not allow the Statute of Frauds, having been designed to prevent or avoid the perpetration of frauds in the law of contract, to be used itself as an instrument of fraud. **5.4 No Evasion by Estoppel** ------------------------------ In relation to contracts of guarantee (see 3.1 *supra*), it has been held by the House of Lords that estoppel founded on the guarantor's promise (and without any extra encouragement or assurance) cannot circumvent s 4 of the Statute of Frauds. In *Actionstrength Ltd v. International Glass Engineering SpA* \[2003\] 2 AC 541, an employer in a building project was claimed to have given an oral promise to a sub-contractor that payments owing to the sub-contractor by the head contractor were guaranteed, provided the sub-contractor did not withdraw labour. The employer relied on s 4 when the sub-contractor sought to enforce this oral guarantee, and the House of Lords held that the employer could successfully do so. To allow oral guarantees to be routinely enforced by estoppel would completely undermine s 4. **6. Writing Requirements outside the Statute of Frauds** ========================================================= The legislative protectionism evident in the Statute of Frauds is also found elsewhere in the law of contract. In particular the Consumer Credit Act 1995 creates a number of categories of contract in which certain information must be signed off on by the consumer for his own protection, and a 10-day 'cooling-off' period applies. Such categories include: a. a hire purchase agreement where the hirer is a consumer (ss 58-62); b. a credit agreement made by a consumer (ss 29-39); c. a consumer hire agreement entered into by a consumer (ss 84-91). ** ** ===== ::: {.section.footnotes} ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. ::: {#fn1} Kötz, *European Contract Law* (1997), p 80.[↩](#fnref1){.footnote-back} ::: 2. ::: {#fn2} Law Reform Commission of South Australia, 34^th^ Report (1975).[↩](#fnref2){.footnote-back} ::: 3. ::: {#fn3} This amount is converted to €12 by virtue of the First Schedule to the Euro Changeover (Amounts) Act 2001.[↩](#fnref3){.footnote-back} ::: 4. ::: {#fn4} Section13 was ultimately repealed by s 1 Statute Law Revision (Pre-Union Irish Statutes) Act 1962 and the Schedule thereto.[↩](#fnref4){.footnote-back} ::: 5. ::: {#fn5} Clark, *Contract Law in Ireland* (6^th^ ed, 2008), p 120.[↩](#fnref5){.footnote-back} ::: 6. ::: {#fn6} *Id*.[↩](#fnref6){.footnote-back} ::: 7. ::: {#fn7} McDermott, *Contract Law* (2001) paragraph 4.34.[↩](#fnref7){.footnote-back} ::: 8. ::: {#fn8} Clark, *Contract Law in Ireland* (6^th^ ed, 2008) p 120.[↩](#fnref8){.footnote-back} ::: :::