Cognitive Development - Theory of Mind PDF

Cognitive development 1. Introduction & definitions – 05/11/2024 Mentalizing skills – Theory of Mind (ToM) Theory of Mind is our ability to understand what other people think, feel and how they perceive the reality. Research interests: Patterns of changes (tasks) in preschool and school aged children. Origins of individual differences (language -executive functions-teaching) → We are all different also in theory of mind, someone is better than others, someone is worse, the most of us is in the average. Consequences of individual differences (social and cognitive effects) → It affects social relationship and social and cognitive development. It affects both social and cognitive demains (language, academic achievements, etc.). Promoting ToM via training program interventions in children and older people. ToM and pragmatic skills in children and older people → Pragmatics is a high form of language which includes irony, sarcasm, metaphoric language, etc. (example: "My mom is a candy" - it is something not true, but everyone can use theory of mind to understand the metaphor). ToM and social relationships in children. Course: Theory of Mind This course is very research based and explore a very specific topic in cognitive development: Theory of Mind. We'll talk about papers, studies, numbers, findings. Main topics: How children reach an understanding of the mind? What are the processes that lead children to understand other people's mind What are the predictors and consequences of this understanding? Is it possible to teach children ToM? How? Theory of mind We use ToM to interpretate social situations, and we use it all the time. ToM isn't something theoretical or philosophical but something empirical, we use it in our daily life. What are they doing? Why? 1. 2. 3. 1. He wants to catch the bus…he knows he is late… 2. They have lost something and are looking for it …they think it might under the sofa 3. She is hangry … she loves fruit … she knows fruit is in the fridge… We use it when we watch or when we are in social situation. ToM skills are useful in our everyday life / especially in social interactions. Everyday understanding of the social world relies, at least in part, on having a theory of mind. For example, looking at picture 1, we don't think he's training for a marathon. We can interpretate situations to give sense to the social world around us and that's why ToM is important for people, to make sense to everything that happens around us, if there is not, world would be unpredictable and scaring. That's true for each age: childhood, adolescence, adulthood, etc. Understanding that… 1. The mind exists → ToM has to do with understanding that everyone has a mind. 2. The mind contains mental states → First thing important to understand is that mind contain mental states: believes, emotion, desires, perceptions: all these mental states live in our minds. 3. Mental states are of a special nature: Different/separate from reality → They're not a copy of reality: they're a representation of reality and that's totally different. There is a reality and there are mental states about the reality. Example: today is Tuesday, but I may think it's Monday. We have a brain, a mind and in the mind, there are believes, perception, thinks, emotions about reality, but not the reality itself. Change over time → I can think it's Monday, but I can understand that it's Tuesday and I can change my beliefs. Reality doesn't change but mental states do. Are subjective → They are personal. Our ToM allows us to understand that our mental states can be different from other's (believes, desires, thinks, emotions, etc.). We cannot touch the mental states, but we can develop understanding about them since our first years of life, thanks to our cognitive development. Theory of Mind is the ability to… Theory of mind is the ability to reflect on the contents of one’s own and others’ minds. It is the ability to understand what other people wants, believe, thinks, etc. We can reason about other people's mental states. It is the ability to: recognize that all people act on the basis of mental states or propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc); understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions that are different from one’s own. What’s Theory of Mind? The ability to infer others’ mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions) and to use these inferences to explain, predict and affect other’s behaviour. ToM is all about making inferences, it is the way we infer about other people's mental states, and we use it to understand and to predict what other people do. We use these inferences to predict but also to influence other people, to affect them. That's basically how advertising works. Basically, ToM contains emotions, beliefs and desire all together. What is the difference between ToM and empathy, perspective taking and mind-reading? All these things are similar but not exactly the same. Empathy Empathy is basically sharing feelings, understanding other people's feelings and emotions. It is the ‘affective’ aspect that involves congruent affect (emotional empathy) with the target, perspective-taking (cognitive empathy) and prosocial motivation to help the target (compassion/concern) (Zaki, 2003) It has 3 components. There is not an agreement about it, but people think about 3 different components in Zaki's model (Zaki is one of the main researchers in this area): Emotional empathy: sharing feelings → I see you cry so I want to cry; if an infant hears another one cry, he probably will start to cry. Cognitive empathy: understanding of other people's feelings, being able to think and reflect about other people's feeling. Compassion/concern: it is a desire to alleviate other people's negative feelings; ex: we have a friend in a difficult time, and we desire to take care of our friend to make him feel better. Perspective taking It has to do with perception, it is related to this category of mental state. Some people think this is the basis of ToM, to take other people's perspectives. Perspective taking is the ability to see a content from the other’s perspective (perceptual). It has to do with perceiving reality and has a strong visual component. It is an act of visual perception and does not concern imputing Intentional states to others to describe or predict their behaviour. That's why this ability is very basic and could be the basis of the more complex and elaborate ToM's component. Mind-reading Definition: Mind reading is the process of interpreting other minds rather than simply the skills itself (having a skill / doing something with that skill). It is not the ability, but the use of the ability in the social contest. Is Theory of Mind really a theory? Theories of theory of mind Theory-Theory ToM is a theory. Children develop a ToM. ToM is a domain specific and a choesive set of mental-state concepts employed to explain and predict behavior. This theory is basically organised in different mental states concepts, and people build theories starting from data, they make up hypotheses and develops networks or links about social behaviour, mental states, social states. There is an interplay between hypotheses and data. Children collect data, use other's behaviour to reinforce or change their hypothesis in order to understand reality. In order to this theory, learning proceeds in a progressive conceptual sequence, hypotheses become nearest to the data. ToM consists of a set of causal/explanatory laws that relate external stimuli to certain inner states. Wellman’s theory of theory says that data depend on experience: 1. Learning proceeds in progressive conceptual sequences. 2. Sequences and timetables are experience-dependent. 3. Prior conceptual knowledge influences the presence and amount of learning. What children learn earlier will influence what they will think later. There is a progression over the years to basic understandings to more complex and elaborate understandings. Think about it… There are two travellers who shared the same limousine en route to the airport and were caught in a traffic jam. Their planes were scheduled to depart at the same time, but they arrived 30 minutes late. Mr A was told that his flight left on time. Mr B was told that his flight was delayed and just left five minutes ago Who was more upset? The idea is that people can put themselves in Mr B's shoes. Simulation- Theory Mental states are not theoretical concepts but entities that are directly experienced. According to the simulation theory, we use “resources of our own mind to simulate others”: 1. Creation of pretend states to match those of target 2. Processing of ‘pretend states’ by same mechanisms used to understand own mental states 3. Assignment/projection of those states’ interpretations onto target We understand others because we simulate others, creating pretend states that could have a long or short distance between us and others. According to the simulation theory, we understand others thanks to our mental states that can pretend to be into other people. We simulate how we would feel in another person's shoes. Mindreading These theories are very different. Theory theory Theory-theory is very cognitive. Mindreading is considered a detached theoretical activity and there’s no mimicking as part of the mind-reading process. Simulation theory According to simulation theory, mimicking permits to impersonate other people's mental states. Mindreading is an attempt to impersonate the mental life of the target agent, so mimicking is a crucial part of the mindreading process. How important is ToM? ToM is relevant empirically for everyone's lives. It has implication for education, neuroscience, clinical psychology also. Many clinical condition (autism, sclerosis, alimentary disorders) could be explained by ToM. Children in the autism spectrum has difficult to be with others because they have difficult in ToM: if we don't understand others, it becomes hard. Cooperate with others, to work for the same aim. Communicate with others Repairing failed communication with others → When people have an argument with their boyfriend/girlfriend they say: "You don't understand me!". Teaching others → True teaching improve ToM. Intentionally persuading others. Intentionally deceiving others → Lies in children is a good sign, because children can't lie if they don't have a good ToM. From a cognitive point of view, it is a good sign. Building shared plans and goals → It allows to work for the same thing. Children under 3 years don't play together because their ToM is not still well developed. Intentionally sharing a focus or topic of attention. Pretending → Pretending plays are a sign of a good development of ToM. Do all humans possess a ToM? Individuals who lack a ToMwill be fundamentally disadvantaged in social situations. In some people the ToM mechanism is either absent or dysfunctional (autistics) and they show: a. Lack of awareness of the existence or feelings of others. b. Lack of social, imaginative play, they mainly play alone. c. Gross impairment in the ability to make friends. d. They do not understand jokes. e. Abnormal non-verbal and verbal communication. f. Impairment in initiating and sustaining conversation. g. They follow routines rigidly and hate change. h. Restricted and obsessive range of interests –usually object based. Why cannot people with autism tell lies? (An overview by Uta Frith) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2E0kvPsiUAk 2. The development of ToM – 06/11/2024 – 13/11/2024 Theory of Mind Theory of Mind refers to the ability to inferring other people’s mental states and use the inferences to understand others' behaviour. Some questions about ToM When do children understand others? When they start to relate to others' mental states that are different from their ones? It is very hard to understand something invisible such as mental states. There are some very early signs that children figure out the existence of mental states and they know it when they make decisions or take actions. Is there a predictable sequence in children’s learning about others’ minds? What kind of behaviours signal this understanding? Altruism Experiment in Germany: children of 18 months. These children can barely walk but they are able to infer what the experimenter wants to do and help him. Prosociality is possible only if we understand other people's needs and whe need to have a theory of mind for this. Children should have a basic understanding of other people's mind. Double tube experiment Older children: 18-24 months. It is an experiment about cooperation: understanding others allows children to cooperate. ToM development 1. Toddlers’ intuitive awareness of intentions and desires (around 1 ½ - 2 ys) → this is considered the very first manifestation of ToM. 2. Discrepancy between appearance and reality (around age 3) → They become able to understand that something could look something while being something else. 3. Preschoolers’ ability to reflect on their own or others’ (mistaken) beliefs → They understand that other can have false beliefs about reality. 4. School-aged children’s ability to engage in recursive reasoning and adopt an interpretative model of the mind. Understanding others’ intentions 18 months old children Experimental evidence shows that, from as early as 18-months of age, toddlers watching an adult fails in their attempt to perform a task and then given the opportunity to imitate, will perform the intended action, rather than copy the movements that led to failure (Meltzoff, 1995). If a child is exposed to an action without the final result, the child will imitate the action in order to help, understanding others' intentions. They become really good at it around the age of two. Sometimes children make mistakes: they show that they understand others' needs but there is a developmental progression that take time. Around the same age children behave in a way that is consistent with an understanding of others’ needs – prosocial behaviour → https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-eU5xZW7cU 24 months old children If an adult shows pleasure toward one food and disgust toward another, 24-month-olds understand that they should give the adult the food toward which she showed pleasure, even if they themselves prefer the other food (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). They become able to give a person what they want even if they don't want the same thing. The Berkeley University experiment (crackers and broccoli) There are two objects: child like the crackers and doesn't want broccoli. The woman express preference for broccoli and asks for some food. The child gives her broccoli, even if they don't like them for themselves. They are not able to consider other people have their own desires, so initially the child gives her the crackers, but then he understands. Reality-appearance task (3 years old children) Flavell and colleagues (1986) showed that children younger than 3-year-olds found it difficult to recognize that objects can be misleading in their appearance (e.g., a candle that looks like a flower, or a sponge that looks like a rock). This is a hard test for children: before age 3 they are not able to perceive that these things are not what they seem. Children shows that they can reason on the reality, and it is not the truth for everybody. These are basics understandings and fundamental to understand false beliefs understandings. Preschool 1st order false belief understanding The 1st order false belief understanding had always had a central place in ToM research. False belief tasks: Give us evidence for a distinction between the mind and the world / ability to meta- represent. Are quick task and easy to administer. Sally & Anne (Maxi) test (unexpected location) (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer& Perner, 1983) It has a central role in ToM research because it really shows that children understand others' state of mind even when they are false, so they are different from reality. Other don't act on the basis of reality but on the basis of their false beliefs. Children understand that representation from reality in really different from reality and can be really different in false beliefs. What is unexpected in this task is the location of the target object. It is a story; the experimenter tells it to the child using two dolls: Sally and Anne. 1. “This is Sally, and this is Anne” 2. “Sally puts her ball in the basket” 3. “Then Sally goes away” 4. “Anne moves the ball to her box” 5. “Where will Sally look for her ball?” We have two questions: Control question: “Where is the ball really?” box → the control reality question is to make sure that the children comprehend the story. Test question: “Where will Sally look for the ball?” basket → She has a belief that the ball is where she left it, she has a false belief about the location of the target object. Scoring Coding Sally & Anne The point is conquered only if both the answers are correct. Control Test Score If the child can answer correctly to the control question but not to 1 1 1 the test, their ToM is not fully developed. 0 0 0 1 0 0 If they fail the control but not the test, they're just lucky, they're 0 1 0 guessing. Smarties task – Unexpected content It is about unexpected content task. The content of the prototypical container is unexpected. The box doesn't contain smarties but something different (for example pencils). The box is showed to children and asked what they think there is inside. They answer smarties and it is showed the content. It is introduced another character. Scoring Coding Sally & Anne Just as Sally & Anne task, we have two questions, and the Control Test Score scoring is the same: 1 1 1 0 0 0 Control questions “What’s in there?” crayons 1 0 0 Test question “What does he think is in the box?” smarties 0 1 0 Video Sally & Anne Smarties task Elizabeth had a false belief, and she cannot represent the false belief and can't attribute to another character. Sally & Anne task Elizabeth failed the test question. Connor passed the false belief task. These two children have the same age. Developmental hypothesis that children’s Theory of Mind undergoes a major conceptual change in early life Children are not able to understand false beliefs and to attribute it to others, so they have a change. Developmental changes in first order false belief understanding This meta-analysis take together a total of 178 studies that involved more than 4000 children. Children become progressively better. False-belief performance improves with age: at 30 months children are more than 80% incorrect: at 44 months, children are 50% correct. Basically at 44 months children move to be incorrect to be consistently corrects in false beliefs tasks. Understanding of false beliefs improve with aging and almost all children can do this task correctly at age 5. Variables not significant The following variables were not significant (they don’t have any effect): Type of question (what the character will think, know, say, look). Nature of the protagonist (the protagonist is presented as a real person, a puppet, a doll, a pictured storybook character, or a videotaped person) → it shows no difference in the percentual of correct responses. The owner of the false belief. These are superficial changes that don't change the answer of children. Judgments reflect robust, deep seated conceptions of human action, rather than task- specific responses provoked by the special features of one set of materials or questions. Significant variables affecting ToM performance These variables are significant as main effects, but did not interact with the age: that means that they have the same impact on younger and older children. Motive The motive is the reason presented to the child for the change of location or the unexpected contents. If the story is presented with reasons for the change of location, the task is easier for every child. E.g. Sally and Anne: adding contextual information helps the children of every age. Participation Participation by the child in transforming the target object is also important. If at 44 months children who are passive onlookers are 50% correct, then children who are actively involved in transforming the task materials are 66% correct. Real presence Real presence describes the status of the target object at the time the false belief question is asked. Cross cultural differences Meta-Analysis of Theory of Mind Development: The Truth about False belief Children from different places behave differently. Children from Australia and from Canada are very good at this task. Children from Japan are not very good at this task. This tell us something important about ToM development: ToM is sensitive to the environment, represented by the cultures. At 44 months of age children in the United States are 50% correct, then children in Australia are 69% correct and children in Japan are 40% correct Italian vs British children These children were matched to be as similar as possible for every variable. False belief task: range 0-8. Italians tends to perform worse than british children with similar education style, gender, etc. Children of same age perform different on the basis of the country they lives. Probably in England people talk much more about mental states with their children. In Italy parents ask children if they have eaten, not if they had fun or anything. Talking about mental states (desires, thoughts, etc.) is very important for the development of ToM. In Japan people doesn't talk very much about this, people tends to perform worse in other tasks not also false beliefs (like emotional understanding). Italian children are not very different from japanese, It could be explained by the way people talk to children and about the importance given to some behaviours compared to others. A wider developmental perspective was clearly needed False belief task is a reliable measure of preschoolers’ social cognitive understandings. There is a ToM before and after the false belief Note that ToM is not only understanding FB. Children develop an understanding of desires and of emotions. Wellman & Liu (2004) developed a model of ToM development in preschool years (children’s understanding of mental states occurs following a predictable sequence). Before passing the false belief test, children show other forms of ToM and that continue developing after the false beliefs task is passed. How can we put all the achievement together? The scale is an assessment of development but also a theoretical approach. Insights about the mind develop in a predictable sequence Wellman scale is useful to understand where a child is in his development of ToM. We can see a consistent sequence in ToM development, at any age. Wellman’s scale (2004) Wellman’s scale comprehends comparable formats, materials, and questions across the task. It is validated for children aged 3-4-5-6 years. All these acquisitions happen in order. 1. Diverse Desires → e.g.: I like ToM but another person doesn’t. 2. Diverse beliefs → Children could have different beliefs about a reality that is unknown. It is very different from false beliefs, because it is easier to understand these than false beliefs. 3. Knowledge Access. 4. Contents False Belief. 5. Explicit False Belief. 6. Belief Emotion. 7. Real-Apparent Emotion → A person can have an emotion but act and show another one. There is a developmental progression, something happens before and prepare the children for the acquisition of the next step. Graphical description of Wellman & Liu’s scale (2004) Diverse desire → Same object, different desires. Diverse belief → Beliefs but unknown reality (tipically at 3 years old). Knowledge-Access → Children understanding that they have access to an information while another person doesn't. False Belief → At four children are tipically here. Hidden Emotion → Tipically at 6 y/o. Diverse desires Children see a toy figure of an adult and a sheet of paper with a carrot and cookie drawn on it. “Here’s Mr. Jones. It’s snack time, so Mr. Jones wants a snack to eat. Here are two different snacks: a carrot and a cookie. Which snack would you like a carrot or a cookie best?” If the child chooses the carrot: “Well, that’s a good choice, but Mr. Jones really likes cookies. He doesn’t like carrots. What he likes best are cookies.” (Or, if the child chooses the cookie, he or she is told Mr. Jones likes carrots.) Then the child is asked the target question: “So, now it’s time to eat. Mr. Jones can only choose one snack, just one. Which snack will Mr. Jones choose? A carrot or a cookie?” ➔To be scored as correct, or to pass this task, the child must answer the target question opposite from his or her answer to the own-desire question. Diverse Beliefs Children see a toy figure of a girl and a sheet of paper with bushes and a garage drawn on it. ‘‘Here’s Linda. Linda wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in the bushes or it might be hiding in the garage. Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the garage?’’. If the child chooses the bushes: ‘Well, that’s a good idea, but Linda thinks her cat is in the garage. She thinks her cat is in the garage.’’ (Or, if the child chooses the garage, he or she is told Linda thinks her cat is in the bushes.) Then the child is asked the target question: ‘‘So where will Linda look for her cat? In the bushes or in the garage?’’ ➔To be correct the child must answer the target question opposite from his or her answer to the own-belief question. This task was derived from those used by Wellman and Bartsch (1989) and Wellman et al. (1996). Knowledge access Children see a nondescript plastic box with a drawer containing a small plastic toy dog inside the closed drawer. ‘‘Here’s a drawer. What do you think is inside the drawer?’’ (The child can give any answer he or she likes or indicate that he or she does not know). Next, the drawer is opened, and the child is shown the content of the drawer: ‘‘Let’s see, it’s really a dog inside!’’ Close the drawer: ‘‘Okay, what is in the drawer?’’ Then a toy figure of a girl is produced: - “Polly has never ever seen inside this drawer. Now here comes Polly. So, does Polly know what is in the drawer?” - ‘‘Did Polly see inside this drawer?’’ ➔To be correct the child must answer the target question ‘‘no’’ and answer the memory control question ‘‘no.’’ This task was derived from those used by Pratt and Bryant (1990) and Pillow (1989), although it was modified so that the format was more parallel to the contents False-Belief task. Conclusions There is a clear and consistent order of difficulty: Diverse Desire >Diverse Belief > knowledge-Access > False Belief > Hidden Emotion. This ToM Scale establishes: 1. A progression of conceptual achievements that pace theory-of-mind understanding in normally developing children. 2. A method for measuring that development. By design, the ToM scale is not sensitive to differences in performance within specific age groups but is exquisitely attuned to identifying ‘early’ and ‘late’ mastery of specific concepts. It is not designed for individual differences, but for development. False belief understanding before the age of 4? Maybe the tasks are too verbal for them, so they fail the tests of false beliefs because the tasks are not right to them. Based on response modalities We can distinguish between explicit and implicit tasks, on the basis of response modalities. In explicit tasks (just like Sally & Anne task), a child has to make a decision and give an answer with a communicative intent. People before 4 years old can understand false beliefs but the tasks are too complicated and requires more cognitive resources than the one they have. Explicit tasks Implicit tasks Responses are declarative and are the Non declarative response, no decision- result from decision making processes. making processes Communicative intent No communicative intent Verbal and not verbal Not verbal (looking times, eye gaze…) Require not just the conceptual Require just the conceptual understandings but also the cognitive understandings, no additional demands resources that are necessary for decision making and for producing the answer Violation of expectation paradigm If things go against expectations, then eye-gaze duration increases. If something is strange or unexpected, they are surprised, so their eye-gaze duration is longer. In this experiment, children simply look, they don't do anything. We have: Object: watermelon slice. Location: yellow or green box. The actor could believe, truly (True Belief, TB) or falsely (False Belief, FB), that the object is hidden in the green or in the yellow box. There are 4 different conditions: True Belief → green True Belief → yellow False Belief → green False Belief → yellow Conditions A. In the TB-green the actor has a true belief that the object was in the green box. Children see that the yellow box is moved but the watermelon is not changed. B. In the TB-yellow the actresses moving from the green into the yellow box. C. The FB-green was identical to the TB- green condition except that the toy moves into the yellow box (not being seen by the infant). The actor has the false belief that the object is still in the green box. D. The FB-yellow start as the TB-yellow condition but, when the opening is shut, the object moves again from yellow to the green box. Only the infant sees this movement while the actor doesn’t. The actor has therefore the false belief that the object is in the yellow box. Half of the infants in each conditions see the actor reach the green box. The other half see the actor reach the yellow box. If infants have a False Belief, then… A. Longer looking times if the experimenter looks into the yellow box. B. Longer looking times if the experimenter looks into the green box. C. Longer looking times if the experimenter looks into the yellow box. D. Longer looking times if the experimenter looks into the yellow box. Results In each of the four belief conditions, infants expected the actor to search for her toy where she believed it to be hidden and looked reliably longer when she did not. Children expect the actor to act on the basis of the actor's true or false beliefs. 15-month-old infants already possess (at least in a rudimentary and implicit form) a representational Theory of Mind. They realize that: Others act on the basis of their beliefs. These beliefs are representations that may or may not mirror reality. Mentalism ToM is either innate or develops within the first few months of life. Young infants succeed in a range of ToM tasks because they have an implicit understanding of mental states. Evolution from Implicit to Explicit is possible thanks to inhibitory ability that allows overcome the saliency of real location of objects in FB tasks. The development of executive function allows children to show their ToM ability that they already have. Eliminating the need for learning. But… This founding is not so consistent. Failure to replicate success of infants on ToM tasks (Burnside et al., 2018; Kampis et al., 2021). No correlations across time (Poulin-Dubois et al., 2020). Hard to explain the effect of contextual variable such as siblings (Perneret al., 1994) and maternal mental state talk (Ruffmanet al., 2002). Infants could succeed on ToM tasks by understanding behaviour and not because they understand false beliefs. Minimalism vs. mentalism Can infants be credited with ToM (mentalism) or they can be credited only with an understanding of behaviours (minimalism)? Minimalism (Ruffman et al., 2003) Infants have an implicit understanding of behaviour that later evolves into an explicit understanding of mental states. Due to minimalism: Infants are very good at detecting regularities and their brains works as “prediction machines” (Clark, 2013). Infants are intensively exposed to regularities and repeated behaviour correlate with MST (mental state tasks) (Ruffman et al., 2022). Repeated behaviours might help children distinguish mistakes (one-time acts) from intentional behaviour (repeated acts). We don't see a stability of individual differences in time. Basically, we are not sure if the implicit task measure the same things that Sally and Anne task does. Can False Belief development occur later on (beyond preschool years)? (Pyers & Senghas, 2009) Is 4 years old a sensitive period for ToM? What if a child doesn't develop false beliefs in this period? First-time mastery of ‘preschool’ ToM is possible well beyond any postulated critical periods. It is possible to learn ToM much more later than preschool years. 2nd order False Belief Children are able to understand what a character thinks about another character’s thought. In this task, there is a second level: the child must understand what john thinks about Mary’s thought. This is Mary and her brother John. They are playing outside. Grandad has given them some chocolate to share. “Put it away now”, says Grandad, “You can have it when Mum says so.” John goes inside and puts the chocolate away in a tin. Then he goes outside again. Outside, Mary says to John, “That chocolate looked nice. Did you put it in the tin?” John wants to keep the chocolate all for himself. He doesn’t want Mary to find it. So he says to her “No, I put it in the fridge, not in the tin.” 1st order False Belief task The first part of the task is a 1st order false belief task. Where does Mary think the chocolate is? (if necessary, prompt: a puppy or a toy [randomise]) Where did John put the chocolate really? (if necessary, prompt: in the fridge or in the tin [randomise]) These questions are preliminary for the second part of the story. It is not possible to test the 2nd order False Belief without testing the 1st before. If child passes -continue story. (pass = fridge, tin). If child fails –stop here. After a little while, John decides to have some of the chocolate. He goes inside and gets a bit out of the tin. Mary sees John go inside, and she looks through the kitchen window. She sees him get the chocolate out of the tin! Mary says to herself, “Oh! John didn’t put the chocolate in the fridge! He really put it in the tin!” John didn’t see. Mary looking through the window, so he doesn’t know she saw where the chocolate was. The 2nd order is that John doesn't know that Mary knows Later, Mum comes out and tells Mary she can get the chocolate now. Where does John think Mary will look for the chocolate? (if necessary, prompt: in the fridge or in the tin [randomise]) → second order test question → It is a question about John's thought about Mary's thought. It is a question about 2nd order false belief. Why does he think that? → explanation → This is the explanation question of the 2nd order fb Did John see Mary looking through the kitchen window? → control Where did John put the chocolate really? (if necessary, prompt: in the fridge or in the tin [randomise]) → control The last two are control check questions to understand if the child has understand the story. What does it mean if a child answers correctly to all the questions but not to the explanation one? The child is learning, he/she understood in some way the plot but he/she's not still able to explain explicitly the 2nd order false belief because they don't clearly know why. 3. Cognitive (and Neural) bases of Theory of Mind in middle childhood and adolescence – 12/11/2024 Outline □ Model of cognitive bases of ToM Processes: Inference, storage, use Flexible ToM vs. efficient ToM □ Development of flexible ToM Increasing ToM capacity Challenges in ToM engagement Executive Functions (EF) Memory EF: scaffolding or bricks? □ Development of ToM: automatization and efficiency □ ToM and changes in social world across development Culture and social experiences Cultural effects on ToM □ Conclusions Literature Extensive literature (starting with studies in the 1980s) on when and how infants and children (especially in pre-school and early childhood) develop ToM (e.g., recursive thinking, false belief, etc.). We have plenty of studies of 1st and 2nd order false belief in this gap of age. In the last fifteen years, increasing number of researches on ToM abilities in adults, then used as basis for cognitive and neural model of «mature mindreading” that are the terminus of development of ToM. What is missing in the literature is a development between childhood and adulthood: What do we know about development in- between these two stages? What about the development of ToM before reaching adult-ToM? How does ToM develop during the last years of elementary school (9-10 y/o) and during adolescence? Model of cognitive basis of ToM Before investigating the development of ToM in middle childhood and adolescence: Model of cognitive processes → underlying ToM in adults, we need to know how ToM works in adulthood. Starting from studies on ToM abilities in adulthood, Apperly (2010) created a cognitive model of ToM. This model of ToM can be seen as working horizontally or vertically. Working horizontally We can observe 3 main processes: Inference → infer, read others’ mental states from their behaviour (or from our own knowledge about them). We are required to infer mental states, this is the first process. Storage → maintaining such information in mind. Basically, it requires our memory system. Use → use of such information to interpret/predict present and future behaviours and/or future inferences. This is the classical way to see the ToM: the ability to infer, maintain and use information to predict and interpret behaviours. We are able to isolate these components and create tasks in order to investigate each single process. While these are often all involved in a given instance of mindreading, they are clearly separable. It is possible to devise experimental tasks that selectively target and investigate one of the three processes. In support of this we can observe thatifferent neural activity depending on the processes involved. Different brain areas are involved in different processes. There are no just cognitive processes but also neural information that supports the cognitive processes (e.g., temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is recruited for storage and use, while medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is recruited during novel ToM inferences; Hartwright et al., 2014). Example of task selective for storage E.g., selectively targeted storage by presenting participants with short sentences describing 1. what someone thought (e.g., “He thinks the object on the chair is red”) 2. what was the case in reality (e.g., “Really, the object on the chair is yellow”). These were followed by a picture that asked about one or other piece of information → Participants simply had to hold the presented information briefly in mind and report it back. It is a task that doesn't require to predict or complete the ToM, but just a memory task. This task can be extended to require both storage and use ofmindreading information to predict behaviour. Sally & Anne task All three processes are required; participants are required to use all the three steps of ToM. Inference of Sally's mental state. Keeping the mental state and the actual reality in memory. Using the mental state to predict Sally's behaviour. Behavioural point of view From a behavioural point of view (accuracy and time of reaction), across a variety of tasks targeting these different component processes: «egocentric bias» = participants take more time and/or make more errors when other’s mental states are different from their own, so when the mental state of the character is different from a reality familiar to the participant. Working vertically 2 main typologies of processes: Mindreading processes that are flexible, relatively effortful and controlled → «System 2» can be applied to many people, situations and mental states, it is very flexible. Mindreading processes that are less effortful and more automatic, but less flexible → «System 1» is stricter. Prototypical mindreading needs to be highly flexible and context-specific: I need to be able to ascribe mental states concerning just about anything, to just about anybody, and to do so in a way that is sensitive to that particular person and the context that they are in. We should be able to use the ToM processes in a very flexible way. Highly flexible cognitive processes tend to be cognitively effortful: resist to egocentric bias. It requires a bit more effort because we need to be able to explain and predict others' behaviour without bias. “These characteristics are what would be expected if we think of mindreading as a flexible set of reasoning processes enabling the ascription of mental states to a wide range of people in a diverse set of situations.” (Apperly, 2021). However, some ToM processes may be more cognitively efficient, more automatic, but also limited in the kinds of mindreading they can perform (= less flexible). Presence of multiple «system 1» depending on the involved mental states (e.g., beliefs, emotions) → These allow fast-moving social interactions. Since they are less effortful, they have the advantage of being quicker. For example, in everyday life we always meet the same person and after some day with same person we can process this person in a more automatic way. Always in the same context, always with someone we know, our ability to mentalize is easier than in other contexts with people we don’t know. This multiple system 1 helps us to process others' mental states in familiar situations. Development of flexible ToM Therefore… There is a substantial gap between: The well-studied abilities of children → to pass tests of ToM concepts. The abilities of adults to → deploy (=use) those concepts in ways that are both: - sophisticated and flexible in some circumstances; - efficient and automatic in other. One thing is to pass the Sally and Anne task, another is to understand the social world in which we are. There is a need for the study of how children/adolescents become better at ToM, once they’ve acquired basic mindreading concepts. Let’s use the cognitive model proposed by Apperly (2010) as terminus of development of ToM abilities → ToM is completely developed when the abilities of system one and two are totally developed. What changes are taking place during middle-childhood and adolescence? Increasing ToM capacity In young children: qualitative changes in mindreading concepts → Children are able or not to understand or pass a task. In middle-childhood and beyond: quantitative changes in mindreading concepts → Quantitative changes are measurable through behavioural tasks (efficiency and times of reaction). In the next steps of life children has acquired the basic concepts but they need to be efficient in using ToM. Performance improves across later childhood and adolescence (e.g., Apperly et al., 2011; Dumontheil et al., 2010; Surtees et al., 2012): 10-11 years-olders are faster and make fewer errors in inferring other’s mental states. but they show similar behavioural patterns as younger children, that means that older children and younger children shows the same bias (e.g. egocentric bias) they make same number of mistakes compared between them, but older children commit less mistakes compared to younger children. The development is quantitative, instead qualitative show just if a child is able or not to pass a task. Challenges in ToM There is a continuity between some key phenomena from middle childhood/adolescence and adulthood, but what does it mean to have more/less ToM abilities? There is a lack of theories to explain this…it is an open question; it can be answered with the performance of a task. Hypothesis → Role of other cognitive processes which may drive or be connected to the quantitative ToM development? Development of Executive Functions (EF) What challenges while using ToM abilities? EF are considered complex functions involved in other cognitive abilities. Work of memory, inhibition, flexibility, etc. are involved in other cognitive processes, they can be connected to the ability to use or not ToM in everyday life. Director Task The Director Task is considered a ToM task, but it is more related to the visual- spatial perspective taking. There are some objects in some shelves and the director asks to move some objects. The director can't see all the objects. Wen the director asks to move the smallest ball, he doesn't see the white one, so to make the right move, we have to inhibit our knowledge and take the yellow one. It is useful to measure the perspective taking ToM ability, the reaction time is very different between experimental trials and control trials (in which on the covered shelf there are irrelevant objects). In the Director Task participants are asked to take the director’s perspective: comparing 8- year-olders to 10-year-older is it possible to observe fewer egocentric errors in the 10 years old children. However, in both the age group, there are fewer (approximately half) errors when the director’s instruction was simpler (in experimental trials only) E.g. “move the small ball” vs “move the small ball one slot up” → the first one is a simpler sentence compared to other with more words and information. It is more complex from a linguistic point of view: there are differences not just in the exercise by itself but also in the way the director expresses the instructions. It is required the simultaneous engagement of: perspective-taking abilities (ToM); comprehension of a linguistic complex sentence. Integration of information → working memory (WM) → The ability to be better or not can be linked to the ability to use other cognitive functions, such as the executive functions and working memory. EF and WM could be realistic constraint on children’s capacity to put their mindreading abilities to practical use. ToM development: EF and memory? What do we know about the connection between executive functions, memory and ToM? Longitudinal studies (based on individual differences): Clear improvement over middle to late childhood in ToM tasks, which permits to observe the development of the same participants in the time. Concurrent correlations with WM and EF → Both at time 1 and time 2 there is a strong correlation between ToM and EF and WM, but there is a little evidence of a longitudinal relationship (i.e., earlier EF and WM predict later ToM). It is true about adulthood and adolescence but maybe not for earlier moments of life. Memory (WM) and EF across middle-childhood and adolescence Relevant for ToM → the concurrent correlations (so the one measured at the same time, at every age) are always strong. Seem not to drive developmental change in ToM → EF/WM at T1 It doesn't predict the future ToM at T2, it is related to the ToM in the same moment but can't explain the development of ToM. EF: Scaffolding or bricks? What’s the role of EF in ToM development? To explain it, we can use the metaphor of building a house to distinguish between distinctive roles. Scaffolding → Key role in the construction of ToM but no enduring role in the finished structure. Once the ToM is built, we can remove the scaffold. Bricks → Key role in the construction of ToM and part of the final structure. The EF could have a construction role and being part of the final ToM structure. We have a concurrent relationship between EF and ToM, compared to the fact that some relationships are not true in the future. Literature on adults and adolescents shows that ToM continues to depend upon EF (=within- time correlations) both in adulthood and infancy. Probably EF are not useful to develop ToM but to use it in our everyday life. However, no longitudinal relationship (in middle-childhood, adolescence and adulthood): EF are not limiting steps for ToM. Development of ToM: automatization and efficiency Development of ToM processes How do adults end up to with «ToM- System 1»? i.e., (relatively) automatic, efficient and less effortful cognitive processes. There are two possibilities: Original feature of the architecture for ToM that develops in infancy or early childhood. Children’s initial mindreading might all be relatively effortful, but some aspects may become automatized with repeated practice and experience. Or both? A study that compared 6-years-olders to 10-years-olders: no differences in automatic ToM abilities. However, there is the need for more evidence with wider range of age because we can't base our inferences on one study with a comparison between two groups with such a small gap of age. ToM and changes in social world across development Culture and social experiences Factors that influence ToM development in middle-childhood and adolescence: Increasing cognitive abilities (e.g., EF, language, memory). Opportunities for practice-based automatization. But also changes in social environments: the adolescence is the time we pass the most time with peers instead of family: that's the reason why it is important to compare children with adolescence. In this period of life, we can observe these changes in social environments: social world expands to include more people; wider range of contexts; increasing importance of friendships and romantic relationships with peers. In this social environment changes ToM has a main role. However, there is a literature gap about the effects of social changes on ToM development in this developmental stage. We need longitudinal studies on how social world changes have an impact on Theory of mind development. Mindreading requires children to become members of a «community of minds» (Kathrine Nelson, 1995, 1996). We need to face up to the problem of how mindreaders “flesh out” (ToM permits to explain something not directly visible or available) (Hutto, 2007, pp.55) the limited information that is often directly available about someone’s thoughts and feelings; and that understanding how we form coherent mindreading explanations may tell us something fundamental about what mindreading is and how it develops. How can we study socio-cultural effects on ToM? Cross-cultural study. Australian vs. Chilean adults Strange Stories task (advanced ToM Task): It is a typical task to measure individual differences in ToM from middle childhood. Participants are exposed to the stories, and they have to explain mental states and behaviour. → requires relatively subtle and contextualised inferences about the mental states of story characters Stories with same underlying inferential structure… But adapting surface form (e.g., names of characters, locations). Culturally based stories: Story variants situated in an Australian vs. Chilean context. They're exactly the same stories, but the stories change for elements of culture. E.g. In the first story, since Jim thinks Simon never tells the truth, Jim will do the exact opposite of what Simon told him to do. Results: each group showed more accurate (and/or faster) ToM inferences for stories situated in their own culture (no differences in control stories) → Having ToM in a context familiar for us that is related to everyday life situations permits to be more efficient, so culture is important in ToM. Subsequent studies with older children and adults suggest that such effects are not solely due to prejudice against out-group members, or to variation in participants’ perception of similarity between themselves and “own-country” versus “foreign” social targets (e.g., Gonultas et al., 2019). Then how to explain this effect? No cultural differences in basic mindreading concepts. Nor in overall mindreading ability. For perfectly ordinary mindreading the role of culturally-acquired knowledge in “fleshing out” the directly-available information in order to make appropriate mindreading inferences. The differences between familiar and unfamiliar targets are explained by culture that facilitate or not the ability to use social-cultural information to complete the ToM task. → Where have we already seen the role of context in cognitive processes supporting ToM? In the model of cognitive bases of ToM mindreading inferences are part of a processing loop that includes cultural and social background. Being flexible depends on the culture in which we are. In development, multiple system 1 are dependent on the context we are exposed to: in new context we are probably not able to use system one. Need for «culture-fair» ToM task We can't use our ToM task on chinese children because they are based on our culture. Underestimation of ToM when out-group targets Importance for cross-cultural studies Importance for studying ToM abilities of a group independently from effects of familiarity with context and culture The ability to use context to make appropriate mindreading inferences is an essential component of mindreading and not a mere confound to be controlled. The ability to make relevant mindreading inferences across different contexts is a: significant developmental challenge for children as they extend their social range; a substantial and enduring source of individual variability in ToM. Become member of a “community of minds” (Nelson, 1996). Conclusions Need for a perspective shift. From children’s acquisition of mindreading concepts → towards the social and cognitive processes that enable such concepts to be deployed, in the face of competing demands for flexibility and efficiency. View ToM merely as a set of milestones in preschool children → View ToM as a much more extended development throughout childhood, and indeed across adulthood as well. Bibliography Theory of Mind in middle childhood and adolescence. Integrating multiple perspectives. - edited by R.T. Devine & S. Lecce (2021) Cap.2 – Ian A. Apperly Neural bases of Theory of Mind in middle childhood and adolescence Review concepts… Neural sensitivity Neural sensitivity = how much the population of neurons in a certain neural area responds to the characteristics of a certain stimulus, i.e. activation in response to a certain stimulus, task, etc. But 'sensitivity' is NOT exclusive → that same population of neurons in another different task or other stimulus may be equally active. Neural selectivity Neural selectivity = how much the population of neurons in a given neural area is selectively activated in response to a certain stimulus or task. When we talk about exclusivity, we always talk about comparing one stimulus or task to another. Functional connectivity Functional connectivity = how several regions within the same network work together, measuring the correlation (or coherence) in brain response over time. It is important over time because functional connectivity is about something that continues in the time. Different types: During a task → specific process During a more complex event → multiple cognitive processes At rest or resting-state → intrinsic brain organisation (depending on the co-activation history between regions) Mentalizing Network From neuroimaging studies on adults, mentalizing network: set of regions that are involved in ToM tasks (e.g., inferring mental states) compared to control conditions (e.g., inferring physical aspects). Control tasks is supposed to have all the same characteristics of the ToM tasks apart the ToM. It is a really wide network that involves a lot of different areas. Summary of main evidence a. Mentalizing network shows continuity in development: same neural regions involved in ToM abilities in different ages, from infancy to adulthood. b. Developmental changes (from preschool years to adolescence) seem to be gradual and ongoing, both for neural selectivity and neural connectivity. → What we know is that comparing these groups we have an increasing neural selectivity, so these areas become more selective for ToM stimuli. They become also more connect between them. c. These neural changes seem to be connected to increased ToM abilities. → The increasing of selectivity and connectivity correspond to better ToM performances from a behavioural point of view. d. Preliminary studies showed an increasing specialization for particular ToM typologies. → Some areas specialize for emotional stimuli, other for thoughts, etc. (e.g. affective vs cognitive ToM). e. Adolescents showed greater neural activation in ToM network, compared to younger children and adults: adolescence as a peak in activity in the mentalizing network, especially in social relationships. → This development is not just increasing, there is a peak of activation in adolescence especially in social tasks. Bibliography Theory of Mind in middle childhood and adolescence. Integrating multiple perspectives. - edited by R.T. Devine & S. Lecce (2021) Cap.4 –Warnell & Redcay 4. Cognitive causes of individual differences in ToM – 13/11/2024 – 19/11/2024 Life History Theory of Mind (Kristin Lagattuta) The idea of Kristin Lagattuta is that there is a Life History Theory of Mind. Our prior life events and direct experience affect mental states attribution. Life History ToM is the causal reasoning about how people’s life events affect their current and future emotions, thoughts, decisions. We can summarize three main areas: Thinking about the past Anticipating the future Integrating multiple past events Thinking about the Past Significant increases between 3 and 6 years in explaining characters’ current negative emotions as caused by thinking about the past. To investigate how this ability develops in children, they are exposed to scenarios in which a character with a bad feeling is introduced and then the same character is exposed to a visual trigger that reminds the past event that activated the bad feeling. Example: Scenario: Brian feels sad after a yellow car crashed into his parked bicycle Then, in the present, Brian sees a yellow car Why does Brian feel sad? → It is asked to children to explain the negative emotion of the character. At age 6: Brian feels sad because the car reminds him about it → Children become better at integrating past events when understand current emotions. They understand that thoughts of past events can affect current emotions. Anticipating the future Past events are useful also to take decision about the future acting, to anticipate the future. In this study, children between 3 and 6 years old are exposed to a scenario that represents a single negative event and then the character take a decision. Children are asked to explain the reason behind the decision, that is an anticipation of the future based on the previous experiences of the character. Example: David feels sad after a red-haired boy stole his toy David hides a toy in the presence of a red-haired boy Why does David hide his toy? Because he thinks the boy will do something bad because he’s done bad things before Decisions about the future are based to past events, they are useful to make decisions about the future and children from 6 years old understand that and get better and better in this kind of association. Integrating Multiple Past Events (Lagattuta & Sayfan, 2013) When do children become able to integrate multiple types of experience? To investigate it, Lagattuta & Sayfan (2013) created a prediction task. Children hear stories about two characters interacting with each other during the time. The experiences for the main character could be two positive experiences, two negative experiences or mixed experiences, a negative and a positive or a positive and a negative (in this time order). Then, the children are asked to predict: How the focal character would feel (happy versus worried, including intensity), What the focal character think (something good versus bad will happen, including likelihood), What the focal character think decide (approach versus avoid the perpetrator, including proximity) when re-encountering that agent again. Example of story Megan has two interactions with a short-haired girl at school, a positive and a negative one. Emotion: How do you think Megan feels right now? Does she feel worried or happy? Thought: Does Megan think that the short-haired girl is going to do some-thing good or bad Decision: What do you think Megan will do next? Do you think she will stay away from the short-haired girl or go near the short-haired girl? A little (near/far) or very (near/far)? Results These are the findings about thoughts, emotions and decisions. There are 4 ages groups: 4-5 y/o 6-7 y/o 8-10 y/o adults All age groups made distinctions among all four risk situations → PP > NP > PN > NN With age, participants inferred a stronger impact of past experience on future mental states. They become more able to distinguish different kind of experience, and they understand past information and use it to infer how they can affect future mental states. During middle childhood and into adulthood, children better integrate and weight multiple pieces of past event evidence to infer how those life experiences will bias future mental states in both direct and generalized ways. ToM across development At 7 years old, children acquire an interpretative nature of knowing: children become able to understand that knowledge is an interpretation of reality and not a real representation of reality, but a subjective mental state. E.g. It is shown to a child a picture of an elephant and it is asked what it is. Two new characters are introduced, and they see just small details of the picture. What could they understand? Between the age of 7 and the age of 11, children become better at understanding social gaffes/ complex social scenarios → Strange stories Frome the age of 10, children acquire the ability of inferring mental states from eyes, voice, movement → Baron-Cohen’s eyes task Children, through all the middle childhood, show an increment of ToM, but also in the number of mental states they can produce. There is an increment of frequency and use of mental state talk. During the middle childhood, children also reduce their egocentric bias. Visual perspective taking → it is possible to commit mistakes due to the egocentrism. It takes an effort to not give the most available answers, that are the egocentric ones. What happen to ToM in middle childhood? Children become better at: understanding of nonliteral speech (strange stories, Happé, 1994); make inferences form nonverbal cues (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test or RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001); interpret (ambiguous) social situations (Bosacki, 2000; Devine & Hughes, 2013); recognize a faux pas (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999); the ascription of mental states to non-human, inanimate objects (triangles test Abell et al., 2000). Christopher Osterhaus’s review of advanced ToM tests beyond preschool Christopher Osterhaus made a review about measurements of advanced ToM. Advanced Theory of Mind (AToM) refers to the age- related progressions in mindreading that occur in the development of theory of mind after the age of 5 years. 208 studies, a total of approximately 65,234 participants were assessed for their AToM skills. Strange Stories Late one night old Mrs. Peabody is walking home. She doesn’t like walking home alone in the dark because she is always afraid that someone will attack her and rob her. She really is a very nervous person! Suddenly, out of the shadows comes a man. He wants to ask Mrs. Peabody what time it is, so he walks toward her. When Mrs. Peabody sees the man coming toward her, she starts to tremble and says, ‘‘Take my purse, just don’t hurt me please!’’ This is a misunderstanding item, to understand if children can understand misunderstanding. There are also categories: double bluffs, white lies, persuasion, etc. Children become good at understanding strange stories between 7 and 12 years old. To younger children it is so hard, but with age they become able to understand questions. Faux pass Story 2. Helen's husband was throwing a surprise party for her birthday. He invited Sarah, a friend of Helen's, and said, "Don't tell anyone, especially Helen." The day before the party, Helen was over at Sarah's and Sarah spilled some coffee on a new dress that was hanging over her chair. "Oh!" said Sarah, "I was going to wear this to your party!" "What party?" said Helen. "Come on," said Sarah, "Let's go see if we can get the stain out." That's a social gaffe: she said something she shouldn't have said because the party was a surprise party. 1. Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? If yes, ask: 2. Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward? 3. Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward? 4. Why do you think he/she said it? 5. Did Sarah remember that the party was a surprise party? 6. How do you think Helen felt? Control question: 7. In the story, who was the surprise party for? 8. What got spilled on the dress? Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test or RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) Eyes task of Baron Cohen: it is a test created for autism. It is shown to a child a picture of eyes with four words that describe emotions, and the child have to choose which correspond the right mental state. The method behind this task is verbal: in order to get it right, it has more correlations with other verbal ToM tasks respect to other types. Changes in Advanced ToM across middle childhood There are increasing in all tasks, but the increasing depends on the task. There was a steep increase in the strange stories, but relatively minor developmental progressions in the RMET and faux-pas recognition test. The development of second-order false belief understanding appeared to reach an asymptote around age 7 after which no substantial developmental progressions occurred. Changes in Advanced ToM across life span In the typical population, results show performance on the strange stories and the RMET decreased in older adults, whereas performance in the faux-pas recognition test remained stable across ages. Data for second-order false belief understanding should be interpreted with caution, due to minimal use with adults. Very important: when we want to investigate something in a population, it is very important to consider the age of the population because some tasks can work and other cannot. It is important to choose the most adequate task for the specifical age of the population indagated. What does really change in ToM during middle childhood? The tasks are more complicated because the situation is in a social situation that is more complex, multifaced. Verbal ability? Unlikely Some people think verbal abilities is what changes and permits to children to be better in ToM. The model shows how there is a correlation between verbal ability and strange stories (it is a verbal task!) but also age has a strong correlation with both strange stories and silent task, so probably there is something different that support the development of ToM more than the verbal abilities. New conceptual insights? Unlikely In the Strange Stories task children are asked to apply their understanding of a character’s beliefs, knowledge, or desires to explain a character’s actions. The Faux Pas task, only require participants to make distinctions between their own and the character’s beliefs or knowledge. If the ability to represent another’s belief were all that mattered, then one would not expect age-related gains in performance on either of these tasks. Children don't acquire new concepts during middle childhood, they just become better at using and at putting them into contexts. In infancy children develop the knowledge of concepts, but then they become better at using it in a more flexible and appropriate way. They integrate knowledge from concepts and from the situations, so they become faster at mentalizing. Basically, the improvements in Advanced ToM concern: children’s ability to use their ToM in a more flexible and appropriate way ability to simultaneously infer a variety of mental states in complex social scenarios and develop a more complex awareness of the links among multiple mental states Individual differences A finding found many times in literature is that there are great individual differences in groups of people of same age. There is a remarkable individual variation in reaching Theory of Mind milestones: for example, in a group of 4 years old children, someone is really good at false belief tasks, and someone else is very bad. This variation that is essentially a child’s coming somewhat earlier versus somewhat later to a ToM acquisitions such as understanding of false belief. What’s the meaning of individual differences? Are they genuine or are the reflection of a transient fluctuation in performance? These differences could be genuine or could derive from measure errors. How can we see if the differences between same age people are genuine: look at stability across time: if individual differences say something about individuals, they should be stable using multiple measures to control if there is a latent common factor across different tasks: to be precise as possible at measuring, measures should correlate between each other. Stability across time Hughes, Ensor & Marks, 2011 This is a paper by Hughes, which consider children from age three and age six. In terms of stability across time, there is stability across three areas of false belief tasks. The ToM tasks correlate during the time because the tasks correlate between them. Devine, White, Ensor and Hughes (2016) This study follows children from 6 to 11 years old. The strange stories, the triangle and the silent task, indicators of ToM level, shows a stability to the tasks at age six. Why some children are better than other at solving ToM tasks? What factors can predict individual differences in children’s ToM? Why some children are better than other at solving ToM tasks? Individual factors There are many options. What are the individual factors that can explain individual differences in ToM? Genetics Personality On a more cognitive level we have two classical variables: Language and verbal ability: when someone wants to see if a variable affect another variable, but it is very hard to create two tasks (verbal and non-verbal) that matches for difficulty. We need to measure verbal ability and ToM and then measure the correlation to see if there is a relationship between language and ToM. Executive Functions and Working memory. Language and verbal abilities Training studies Training is the best design to evaluate causal relationships between the independent - trained variable -and the dependent one. To understand if language affects ToM in time, it is important to do training studies because they permit to manipulate the variable A and to measure the effect on the variable B. Language is the independent variable, ToM the dependent variable. ToM depends by language if an increasing in language produce an increasing of ToM. Training the language abilities could take to an improvement of ToM ability. Control group need to be match for everything rather than the dependent and independent variable. If the two groups are not equal at the beginning, maybe could be existing differences between the groups before the training. The variables that may can be in the way (they can be linked to the dependent or independent level) should be controlled. It is important to measure not only the variables in which we are interested but also the variables we don't want to be in our way, the control variables. They are very important because controlling them we can say that the results are not explained by them but just by the training. We need to measure the dependent variable before and after the training to investigate a change. The Role of Language in the Development of False Belief Understanding: A Training study (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003) Language is the independent variable, False Belief understanding the dependent one. The children are 3 years old German: they don't have a false belief understanding, so it is possible to observe if there is an understanding after a language training. It is important to investigate a population of children that haven't acquired the ability yet. The idea is to work with deceptive objects (a candle that looks like a flower, a sponge that looks like a rock, etc.). Training conditions There are four conditions: No language training: the deceptive aspect of the training objects no language Full training: the deceptive aspect of the training objects + mental state verbs (think, know) + sentential complement constructions. Discourse only training: deceptive aspect of the training objects -no mental state verbs -no sentential complement constructions Sentential complement training: no deceptive aspect of the training + mental verbs + communication verbs and sentential complements The differences between the three types of training are the type of language used. The idea behind creating more types of training is that it is possible to define which components works more. It could be done in one study or in different studies. The conditions change on the basis of which kind of aspects are included or not in the training. Full training It is an individual training; the experimenter saw each child individually and asked these questions. What do you think this is? You think it is an X? Yes, I also think it looks like an X. Now take it into your hand and look at it really closely: what do you think now this is really? Right, it is really a Y! When I took it out of my suitcase, and you first saw it, what did you first think this was? Right, at first you thought it is an X. It looks like an X, so you must think it is an X. Basically, this training is a FB task, it is asked to the children to answer to question and give different explanations. Discourse only In the discourse they should focus on the deceptive nature of the object. What is this? An X, all right. OK. And what is it really? Right, it is really a Y! Now again: look! What is it like this? (show X side) -Good! No, it does look like an X, right? First so (show X side) and then so (show Y side of object). But what is it really and truly? -Exactly. Really it is a Y. No, look: What is it really and truly? Sentential complement What do you think this is? You think it is a candle? Yes, I also think it is a candle. Do you think that this candle is really soft or that this candle is really hard? Right, I also think that this candle is really hard. OK. You think that the candle is soft. Do you think you can light this candle? -I also think you can light this candle. Ok. You think you cannot light this candle Results Children who followed the full training and children who followed the other two types of training showed an increase in False Belief Task that is significantly major respect to the children who didn’t follow any kind of language training. That means that language should be important in the development of ToM, especially in False Belief Understanding. In addition 1. Cross-cultural comparisons show that the effect of language on ToM is universal 2. Studies of bilingualism show an advantage of bilingual on monolingual children Why bilingual children show an advantage in ToM? Special populations are also important. More languages could mean more ToM, so it is important if children who speak more languages show an advantage in ToM. There could be a lot of reasons why bilingual children are better in ToM. Maybe the same thing can be verbally represented in two language and that permits to develop their knowledge of the reality. They can also choose which language to use, so they are able to inhibit one language and use the other. Competence account → Bilingual children have greater awareness of differences between their own and others’ states of knowledge Performance account → Bilingual children are better in controlling their mental life (Executive Functions) Specific language impairments Specific Language Impairments (SLI) is a clinical condition that affects selectively the language. There is a discrepancy between language and IQ, it is a problem specific for language. SLI, or delayed language acquisition in the absence of neurological, hearing or nonverbal impairments, affects about 7% of children (Tomblin et al., 1997). Comprises a wide range of problems (difficulties in the production, recognition or ordering of speech sounds to problems understanding long or complex sentences). This pattern of intact nonverbal ability in the face of delayed or disordered language development means that investigating ToM development in children with SLI offers an important way to gain insight into the relationship between language and ToM. Specific Language Impairment, ToM and Visual Perspective Taking: Evidence for Simulation Theory and the Developmental role of Language (2006) This study on children with SLI included two groups of children, matched for nonverbal ability, gender, and age: 20 children with SLI (M = 62.9 months) 20 typically developing children (M = 61.2 months) Results showed that in children with SLI, success on false belief shows substantial delays of about 2 to 3 years. Children with SLI shows very low performances in 1st false belief tasks. Autism spectrum disorder Verbal abilities play a role also in children with an impaired ToM. Happé (1995) pooled together data from a large number of studies in the UK and found that, for both typically developing preschoolers and children with ASD, vocabulary scores predicted false-belief success, even when effects of age were controlled. Lind and Bowler (2009): syntax predicted performance on a location-change false-belief task more powerfully for ASD individuals than for controls. Executive functions (EF) “Executive functions” (EF) is an umbrella term for a number of inter-related cognitive processes needed for purposeful, goal-orientated behaviour. They allow children to execute cognitive tasks. Executive functions include basic cognitive processes such as: 1. Inhibitory control (the ability to suppress natural impulses), 2. Working memory (a type of temporary attentional capacity for maintenance and representation of information in mind), 3. Cognitive flexibility (the capacity to adapt our mental sets to changes occurring in the environment) (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). They are interesting because they develop very slowly: teenager are still in developing of their executive functions, prefrontal lobe is not fully developed in adolescence, so adolescents take a lot of risks. Executive Functions predict… The ability to adapt behaviour to the changing environment (Zelazo et al., 2003; Banich, 2004). Many intellectual competencies, such as school readiness (Welsh et al., 2010), early literacy, and numeracy attainment (Blair and Razza, 2007), later school accomplishment (Checa & Rueda, 2011) → EFs can explain academic performance better than IQ. EF substain cognitive development in so many ways, including ToM. EFs task measurements Conflict Inhibition E.g. Children must read “night” or “day”, inhibiting the conflicting picture of sun or moon. Delay of gratification E.g. The marshmallow test → Children of about 4 years old must wait for 15 minutes with a marshmallow in front of them. If they don’t eat it, they can have a second one, if they eat it before they won’t have another one. https://www.simplypsychology.org/marshmallow-test.html Sally and Anne task If we think about Sally and Anne there are more than an executive function involved in the task. Children need to: inhibit their own knowledge of the location of the object; hold in memory a considerable amount of information; flexibly switch from Anne’s perspective to Sally’s. What’s the nature of the relationship between EF and ToM? Expression or Emergence? We know from experimental studies that children that are better at Ef are also better at ToM. But what is the role of Exective function in ToM? EFs are needed to express or to develop a knowledge? There are two ways to view the account: expression account or emergency account. Expression: the child need EF to express what he knows. Emergence: the task requires the executive functions, so they are needed for an emergence, for the development of a knowledge about the mind. EFs favour the expression of ToM The relationship between ToM and FE depends on the cognitive demands of the ToM task (e.g., Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002). Failure in ToM tests does not depend on a lack of representational theory from the mind but on limited cognitive abilities → Maybe a child understands false belief, but he/she is not able to express their knowledge. Relationship between ToM and FE is due to superficial aspects of the ToM task → It could depend on the nature of the ToM task. EFs favour the emergence of ToM EFs help children capitalize on experiences that are relevant to the acquisition of FB. This agrees with the role of FE on learning level (e.g., Blair & Razza, 2007; Bull & Scerif, 2001; Espyet al., 2004). Contradictions to the expression account Some cultural groups that have an advantage in executive skills (e.g., Chinese and Korean) do not show an advantage in ToM (Oh & Lewis, 2008; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). Those culture groups that are very good at EF should be better at ToM, but they are worse than other at the false belief tasks. Longitudinal studies There is a relationship between EF and emerging of ToM across time. Children are followed from age 2 to age 4 and it is shown that EFs predict how ToM will develop in the future. EFs predict later ToM Literature shows that the EFs predict the development of ToM over the time, thanks to longitudinal studies. ToM does not predict later EFs Training To show that EFs helps the emergence of ToM we can do that in two ways: we can test ToM before and after a training on EFs we can teach that relationship training ToM and measuring EFs. We should see major improvements in ToM in children with higher levels of EFs than in children with low EFs. Individual Differences in Executive Functioning Predict Preschoolers’ Improvemen

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