Civ Pro Wednesday 10/09/24 PDF

**CIV PRO WEDNESDAY 10/09/24** We talked about how there\'s a one-year limit in any event on a diversity removal, right, and that limit does not apply in a federal question situation. A couple of things about that, and this is covered on the bottom of page 83, top of page 84. They go through two si...

**CIV PRO WEDNESDAY 10/09/24** We talked about how there\'s a one-year limit in any event on a diversity removal, right, and that limit does not apply in a federal question situation. A couple of things about that, and this is covered on the bottom of page 83, top of page 84. They go through two situations where cases initially are not removable. One because of the presence in a diversity case, one because of the presence of a non-diverse defendant, and the other because of the presence of an in-state defendant. So, in either of those cases, initially, unless somebody manages around it with a snap removal option, the case is not going to be removable. And so the question is what if the non-diverse defendant is dropped from the case in the one hypothetical and the other one is what if the in-state defendant is dropped from the case? Can the case be removed? And that case, you would feel likely at this point to say yes, the case has become removable and as long as we\'re within the one-year limit, this being a diversity situation, you\'d be fine. The only thing that that note points out that is a little bit of a twist on this is the case can be removed if those defendants are voluntarily dropped by the plaintiff. In other words, the plaintiff dismisses them for some reason. One example of that would be she settles with them. They immediately pay up and she settles. And they\'re out of the case. Or you can change your mind. I mean, we\'re going to talk very briefly about amended complaints, but what we need to know about amended complaints is that very early on after a pleading is filed, a party has a right to amend it. And then when some time passes, a party can ask the court for permission to amend. So amendments are possible either as of right or with the permission of the court. So the point is, and the book doesn\'t give the reason why there\'s this difference between dropping, a plaintiff who voluntarily drops a non-diverse or in-state defendant, and a plaintiff who involuntarily. They tell you the rule is different, right? If it\'s involuntary, and we\'re going to talk a little bit about what that means, there can be no removal, most courts say. The Supreme Court of the United States hasn\'t answered this question, but most courts say. And that\'s all in your book. I\'ve said nothing so far that isn\'t in your book. It helps me, when I try to remember this rule, to remember why this is. So that\'s why I\'m telling you why it is. And it\'s because if the party is voluntarily removed, they\'re never coming back. They can\'t be reinstated into the action. The plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed the sort of removal-thwarting defendant. They\'re never coming back if it\'s voluntary. So the case can safely be removed to federal court and go on its merry way. But if it\'s an involuntary dismissal, and involuntary means over the plaintiff\'s objection. And the classic example would be lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant comes in, says, there\'s no personal jurisdiction over me, I move to dismiss. And the court says, yes, you are dismissed. And the plaintiff, of course, is screaming bloody murder, saying, no, no, no, there is personal jurisdiction. So when the court orders dismissal, it is over the plaintiff\'s, it is despite the plaintiff\'s objection. The problem is that that ruling by the trial court dismissing that defendant might have been erroneous. And on appeal, that defendant might come back in. And so the courts in the involuntary situation don\'t allow removal because of the possibility that that removal-thwarting defendant will be back. So that\'s the point there. The second point of my three removal wrap-up points concerns the bottom of page 84. And I was talking with one of you right after class about this. Suppose that a plaintiff files an action in state court against a diverse defendant and asserts an amount of controversy less than the statutory amount of controversy. And bottom line here is if the plaintiff is willing to stipulate, this is what, you know, it\'s right in your book, I\'m not telling you anything that\'s in your book, if the plaintiff is willing to stipulate that she will not seek an amount in excess of \$75,000, that stipulation will bind her and thwart removal. A stipulation is an agreement between the parties. And the court will enforce that agreement. So a plaintiff can thwart removal by stipulating that she won\'t seek \$75,000 before removal. And the book talks about this, it\'s the bottom of that page. But she will not be able to accomplish that same thing by stipulating after removal. It\'s too late at that point to stipulate away federal jurisdiction. She can stipulate, but it won\'t exceed federal jurisdiction. And the reason is that the removability of the case is determined at the time of removal. And that\'s certainly true when it comes to the amount controversy. That\'s the one area where we know it\'s true. As we talked about the Walschlager situation, it\'s a little more complicated in other situations, but in this situation, it is clear that the case is removable at the time it was removed because the plaintiff\'s complaint alleged an excess of \$75,000 or one of the exceptions that we talked about yesterday. It alleges a non-monetary relief or during the course of the case, it comes out that the plaintiff is seeking, in fact, more than the amount of controversy she alleged. But she can\'t, so it can become removal and stipulation can support removal, but it can\'t support it afterwards. Did you have a question? For the hypothetical that you had yesterday, Professor, where it was a woman breaks an arm and the defendant says, whoa, whoa, whoa, she\'s only suing me for \$10,000. It could be so much more than that. So if it\'s stipulated up front, that defeats that. There\'s nothing the defendant can do about it. No, and the defendant\'s thrilled because the defendant\'s only paying \$10,000, right? Defendant\'s happy to stipulate to most cases, right? You know, I appreciate your enthusiasm for the rules of civil procedure, believe me, but don\'t get so caught up in this that you forget about the big picture, right? The defendant\'s happy to say, yeah, fine, you want to stipulate that your damages are limited to \$30,000? I\'m all in, okay? Especially since before this lawsuit began, you were, you know, so. But yes, so yeah, most defendants would be fine with that. They care more about paying less than they care about where they\'re going to litigate. Because it\'s all, right, the where they\'re going to litigate is designed to help them pay less. Right, that\'s the overarching goal, usually. Of a defendant, that may or may not be the overarching goal of a plaintiff. I mean, you know, we\'ll see. There\'s a lot of politically motivated litigation going on right now. Like never before. But it\'s usually plaintiffs who have the political motivations, one way or the other. Okay, the last point is about fraudulent joinder. And you already know this. I mean, this is just, I mean, you know, you get a sense of it. The Worldwide Volkswagen example is given to you here as an example of not fraudulent joinder, right? The fact that Seaway and Worldwide Volkswagen were joined was not in any way fraudulent. I mean, it was an effort, no doubt, to defeat removal. But it was a completely legitimate effort to defeat removal. Because the Woodsons, or not the Woodsons, the Robinsons, had legitimate claims against Seaway and Worldwide Volkswagen. It was a product\'s liability claim. A product\'s liability claim is a claim that everybody in the chain of distribution is fully liable. I mean, they could have sued Seaway alone for the full amount of their damages. It\'s a perfectly legitimate claim. So there\'s nothing wrong, or in the language of the law, term of art fraudulent, about adding defendants to defeat removal when you have legitimate claims against them. The problem for Pete Rose was that he didn\'t have, under the law, a legitimate claim against the non-diverse parties he joined to that litigation. And what happens there is the court just ignores them, ignores the presence of the fraudulently joined defendants. Their nominal, fraudulently joined defendants. Good, all right. Let\'s move on to challenging subject matter jurisdiction. I just put here a reminder that, you know, the case begins in federal district court or is removed to federal district court, and that\'s what we\'re talking about, right? Removal is a concept all about removing to a federal district court, from a state court. So the case is filed in federal district court or is removed to federal district court. Its course of appeal is up to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. You get one appeal by statute as of right, not by constitution. No constitutional right to appeal in a civil case, but statutory right to appeal. And then there\'s the possibility of certiorari to the high federal court, U.S. Supreme Court. This would be a single case, right? One case. And so any challenge to subject matter jurisdiction here is a direct attack. And you know that subject matter jurisdiction is, federal subject matter jurisdiction is never waivable. It can be raised by anyone, including the court, at any stage of the litigation. That\'s how seriously we take it. And you read about the, as the book says, outrageous gamesmanship that can lead to, right? And you know, that outrageous gamesmanship, which can take the form of concealing your citizenship, right? Lying about it. I mean, who knows? I mean, that, it\'s not to say there are no consequences for that, right? If an attorney participates in that, they are putting their law license on the line. And there may be sanctions that can be imposed against parties who engage in this kind of gamesmanship. Financial sanctions and other kinds of, well, usually in the case of a party, it\'s financial sanctions. In the case of a lawyer, we\'re going to talk about all kinds of crazy sanctions that can be imposed upon lawyers. So that\'s separate. The point is, the federal court doesn\'t have subject matter jurisdiction. So whether or not, you know, however outrageous the gamesmanship is, the case has to be dismissed. Okay, so that would be all in a direct attack. So the question now is, what about collateral attacks when it comes to subject matter jurisdiction? We\'ve talked about it when it comes to personal jurisdiction. So I drew this on the board right out of your book. And I just wanted to go over that a little bit. So if in the first action, and by that I mean this case, right? Somewhere in here, if in the first action a party litigates subject matter jurisdiction and loses, can they raise subject matter jurisdiction in a collateral attack? This is, the answer is no. This should look familiar to you because it\'s like Baldwin, right? That\'s what happened in Baldwin in personal jurisdiction land. So I\'ll put that up here. You know, it\'s like the Baldwin situation for PJ, right? You\'ve litigated it in the first action. You\'ve lost it. You\'re done. All right, so that\'s kind of easy and at least there\'s that parallel with personal jurisdiction. If you litigate the merits in the first action without raising subject matter jurisdiction, can you collaterally attack? And, of course, in personal jurisdiction land, the answer would be no because you have waived it. But subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable, right? So thus the drama here. So the thing, though, is the answer, according to the Supreme Court, is still no, but for a different reason. Okay, so the reason the answer to this in personal jurisdiction land is no is because of waiver. But subject matter jurisdiction is never waived. So the reason that it\'s no here is because of the maxim that a federal court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. And that doesn\'t mean a lot to you. It doesn\'t mean an awful lot in the real world. But what you need to know is, I mean, you need to know the law. You don\'t need to know the case. The case is the Chico County case out of the Supreme Court. And it has to do with the fact that a court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. And this is bottom of page 88. They did not raise or litigate the issue of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court refused to allow collateral attack. According to the court that litigated statute, which was the issue in that case, a statute that purported to confer subject matter jurisdiction, but did so unconstitutionally. So the court says that issue should have been raised during case one. Courts have jurisdiction to determine whether they have jurisdiction. That is, even if the court ultimately determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it had the authority to reach that decision. Thus, as to that decision, the court\'s jurisdictional ruling is conclusive. So it has to do with the fact, if it helps you to think about it this way, you can think about it as the book on the top of the next page says, is that, you know, sort of the trial court, the federal district court should have seen it. Or somewhere along the way, a federal court should have seen it. Having not raised it, the court has effectively determined its jurisdiction, and that\'s it. That\'s the reason. So I do want you to know that. So, you know, for PJ, it\'s also no. But the answer there is waiver. Becca. When we were talking about, I can\'t remember the name of the case, but a different case, maybe Rodazzo, and they were saying, or maybe Belleville, but they were saying, like, why can\'t you just assume subject matter jurisdiction? Why do you have to send it all the way back? And then the federal court was like, we\'ve never done that. Like, I guess my question is, like, if they can assume that they do have subject matter jurisdiction? They\'re not assuming it. Okay. I mean, it\'s a little bit of a legal fiction. It stems from the fact that the original court should have determined that it didn\'t have jurisdiction, if it didn\'t. And having not determined that it didn\'t, it effectively determined that it did. So is the difference between this and Belleville the fact that it was the first federal court in Belleville that was looking at it? Yeah, it was within the same case. It was in a direct attack. Okay. So, because Belleville was the circuit court of appeals, so it was in a direct attack. I mean, I don\'t see a difference. So you\'ll have to come and talk to me about that if you do, because I don\'t see a difference. The case wasn\'t about collateral attack. Oh, okay. This question is, can subject matter be, in a separate case, right? This case is now over. Okay. And then the last situation is, what if in the first action the party defaults entirely? Like, no show, right? Can subject matter jurisdiction be raised? And the sad story here is that it\'s kind of murky. And the reason it\'s murky is because on the one hand, you might say, well, this looks a lot like Chico County. The case, it wasn\'t litigated. So that would point in the direction of a no. But the restatement has managed to come up with a tiny few cases where a party was allowed to collaterally attack, although the restatement says we have very little support for our position. So, I mean, I\'m fine if you tell me the restatement says yes. I always have to remember that because my gut tells me, wants me to say no, but the restatement says that\'s all we know. It\'s just uncharted waters, basically. And of course, in personal jurisdiction land, what\'s the rule if you default? Can you attack, collaterally attack? Yes. All the way back to Penoyer versus Neff. Right? Okay, so in personal jurisdiction, the answer is yes. Okay. You look thrilled, and you\'re about to get even less thrilled. Today is venue, the part of venue we\'re doing today, particularly, this is the least exciting day of the entire semester. And you\'re probably thinking, wow, that is a low bar. So, I\'m okay with that, because I think this stuff, I, you know, I am all in. I have to, like, force myself through this material. That\'s how unexciting it is. And you know I think it\'s all exciting. All right, a reminder. I\'ve put up on the board several times what I\'ve referred to as the four requirements for valid final judgment. Personal jurisdiction, notice, subject matter jurisdiction, venue. In the beginning, I used to put an asterisk by venue, because it\'s not really a requirement for a valid final judgment in the same way that personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and notice are. In the sense that you\'re never going to be able, there\'s no collateral attacks based on venue, ever. Okay, it is of so much less importance than the other three. I mean, first of all, personal jurisdiction and notice are constitutional rights, right? Subject matter jurisdiction has a constitutional, big time constitutional aspect to it, right? Federal courts cannot assume power that has not been given them by Congress. That\'s all about the Constitution. Even though the battlegrounds are the statutes. Because that\'s why, right? That\'s why. The question is, did the Constitution, did Congress give the courts the power they\'re exercising? Because they cannot constitutionally exercise any power that Congress hasn\'t given them. So those three doctrines are very much enmeshed with the Constitution. This doctrine has nothing to do with the Constitution. Nothing. No constitutional aspect whatsoever. And so I sometimes jokingly say to students, it\'s not true. You have to know venue. You have to know the rules. It matters. It can have course-changing impacts on your litigation, as we will discuss, as you read for today about the Ferens case, right? The John Deere case. You can use venue as a very powerful tool in your toolbox. But constitutionally speaking, venue is about nothing. It\'s kind of like Jerry Seinfeld writing a show about nothing. Venue is about nothing compared to the other three doctrines. What is venue about? It\'s all about two things. The convenience of parties and witnesses. And we mean that in the sort of legal sense of convenience. Where are they? Where can they be subpoenaed from? Parties\' access to proof and witnesses and their own convenience. Convenience of parties and witnesses. And it\'s about allocating the workload of the federal judicial system around the 94 federal judicial districts, right? And it limits where suit can be brought, as does personal jurisdiction, but this time in a different way. And so some of it is about spreading the workload out, limiting parties so that they can\'t, you know, bring down a whole federal district court by filing all their cases there. So that\'s what it\'s about. It is like personal jurisdiction about, back to geography again, right? Subject matter jurisdiction has nothing to do with geography. It\'s about federal court or state court. And it\'s completely separate from personal jurisdiction. And venue is, well we start out with the principle that venue is completely separate from personal jurisdiction. If you read closely, you know personal jurisdiction creeps its way back in here a little bit. But let\'s start with the premise that we think about venue entirely separately from personal jurisdiction. It\'s one of the four things that a plaintiff has to worry about when they\'re thinking about bringing an action. And my recommendation is that you put the blinders on and don\'t think about personal jurisdiction or notice or subject matter jurisdiction when you\'re worrying about venue. Except to the extent you have to worry about personal jurisdiction because of the venue statute. So we\'re back in the land of geography, right? Personal jurisdiction is about, you know, which state or states can issue a binding judgment in this case. But venue in the federal system is about where in the federal system a case can be brought. And there we think about the country in terms of the 94 federal judicial districts. So it\'s as if, you know, it\'s almost like the state lines are gone and the country is now chopped up into these 94 federal judicial districts. That\'s the way they\'re going to think about it. So it\'s all about, go ahead Ari. Is there ever a time where one of the federal courts in a state goes to a different circuit court than another federal court in the state? I don\'t believe that\'s true. Nope. But all we would have to do is look at a map on the internet. But I don\'t think that\'s true. I think they all appeal entirely to, you know, whatever circuit it is. Venue, again, is about where within a judicial system. So, you know, you read about state venue rules. States have venue rules. New York has venue rules that would tell you in a given action where in New York state geographically a certain case could be brought. Every state has venue rules. We\'re going to focus on the venue rules in the federal judicial system, the 94 federal judicial districts. It\'s purely statutory, right? Nothing at all to do with the Constitution. The book points out that some kinds of actions brought in federal court have special venue statutes. We\'re going to not worry about those. We\'re going to worry only about the general venue statute, which is 28 U.S. Code Section 1391. So, we\'re going to need that. And we\'re going to focus on two things, two big topics about venue are what are the judicial, you know, what is the judicial district or are the judicial districts in which a plaintiff can properly lay venue? In other words, bring a case in the first act. Where is venue proper? And in many cases, it\'s multiple places where venue is proper. Sometimes it\'s only one. Sometimes it\'s two. Sometimes it\'s seven. So, we\'re going to be, you know, sort of, you\'re thinking about two questions. One in that vein is what are all the places where venue is proper? I could ask you on that on exam. Where are all the proper venues? And some of the questions in the book that you read and did for today do it that way. I could also give you facts and a particular judicial district and say, is venue proper here or not? And by the way, I could do the same thing with personal jurisdiction. Where are all the places, where are all the states where personal jurisdiction is proper? A different kind of question is, is personal jurisdiction proper here or not? So, that\'s all in the one category. Like, where is venue proper? The second category, the second part of our discussion is going to be about change of venue. And we\'ll hopefully get into that a little bit today, certainly tomorrow. All right, so 1391, let\'s take a look at it. Venue generally, except as otherwise provided by law, this section shall cover the venue of all civil actions brought in district courts in the United States. The general venue statute. We\'ll skip over the next line. Venue in general. These are the rules. B, 1391B are the rules for proper venue. 1391B, its purpose is to tell you where venue is proper. That\'s what B does. It gives you the rules. Civil action may be brought in, one, a judicial district in which any defendant resides if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located. This is called residential venue. Where any defendant resides, but only if all defendants are residents of the state in which that district is located. Personally, I stick very close to this text. I mean, partly that\'s because this provision was radically changed in 2011, but partly it\'s just because I don\'t try to do this without the statute in front of me. But I do know that there are two kinds of venue. One is residential venue. Two, B2 here, is transactional venue. It focuses on the place where a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated, but that has to do with NREM actions, right? The property that is the subject of the action. That\'s what the fight is about. The vast majority of civil claims are not NREM claims. They\'re not about fighting property. They fall into that first category, judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. That\'s transactional venue. The third one, I want to just take off the table right away. If there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought under one or two, then any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court\'s personal jurisdiction with respect to the action. This provision is almost never applicable, right? Because there is almost always at least one proper venue under one and or two. You can never use three unless there is no proper venue anywhere in the United States of America under one, and no proper venue anywhere in the United States under number two. So what kind of facts would you need? Well, let\'s see. You need no defendant resides in the United States, and there is no judicial district in the United States where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. I mean, so it\'s a plane crash, I guess, that happened outside the United States, and none of the parties you\'re suing are residents of the United States. But somehow, there\'s personal jurisdiction over them in the United States. Okay, so, Alana. So would that be like Asahi if they had decided that there was personal jurisdiction? Would that be a case where those two parties, Asahi and Dunn? Probably. Okay. Yep. But that was a state court action, not a federal court action. Evan. So prior to Shaker, then, if the plane crash occurred and there was property within the state, but there was nobody residing there, could they attach the property for like\... I doubt it, because the property was not the subject of the action. Even before? I don\'t know. That\'s why it was quasi-in-room and not in-room. So, the point is, do not assume that B-3 is the answer, because it is a vanishingly small possibility that you\'re going to ever use B-3 in your entire lives. So what you need to worry about is knowing the rules on residential venue and transactional venue. Okay. Now, what C does is define residence for individuals and entities. So C is nothing but definitions. It\'s not rules. It\'s definitions. So notice that for a natural person, including an alien admitted, luckily admitted for permanent residence in the United States, they reside where they\'re domiciled. So for an individual, residence means domicile. That\'s where they reside. But the language of the venue statute is reside. Reside, reside, reside. And that\'s why your problems are written in the language of reside. And that\'s why complaints, when they talk about venue being proper in this district, will talk about reside. But the statute says reside means domicile. So an individual only resides in one place, thankfully. That helps. Okay. Unfortunately, an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name, whether or not incorporated. So all entities, that\'s the good news. All entities have the same rule here, unlike subject matter jurisdiction. All entities have the same rule. Shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court\'s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question in this action. And, well, we\'re not gonna talk about plaintiffs because we\'re never gonna, in this class, be deciding venue based on anything about the plaintiff. The only reason plaintiffs are mentioned in this statute is because it provides definitions for other statutes where venue does turn on something about the plaintiff. You can forget about plaintiffs in terms of anything about them. It\'s like personal jurisdiction. You can forget about anything about them. It\'s all about either the residence of the defendant, whether that be an individual or an entity, or it\'s about where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. So two more sort of complications. Emma. For this entities section, when you\'re looking at the unincorporated ones, like the unions, would that mean, like how does that work with all of the\... Locations, the offices. Yeah. We\'re gonna look for, you know, their, well, they\'re not incorporated, so they don\'t have that. So we\'re gonna look for their principal place in business. That\'s some kind of headquarters. So it couldn\'t just be everywhere where their members are, like in\... Well, that\'s their dom saw. It could be if the\... They could be specifically amenable, right, because of their activities in a particular location, just like a corporation can. Right. So yeah, there\'s some like union office that was the problem. Okay. Yes. So that\'s a helpful point. When we talk about personal jurisdiction here for entities, where it, you know, it says basically the district where it is subject to the court\'s personal jurisdiction with respect to the action in question, either generally or specifically. Okay. And so we\'ve got some problems that\'ll help us think about that, but yes, that either generally or specifically, because they are subject to personal jurisdiction in this action, whether it\'s because they are generally amenable here or because they are specifically amenable here. All right. Two complications. One sort of piece of good news, I guess. Maybe it\'s not good news. Probably not good news for law students. B2, judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. If you read the Bates decision, you already know this. That can be more than one district. That\'s fairly liberally interpreted. It\'s not like the most events happened. It\'s just where any substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. So, B2 often leads to multiple proper venues. And the Bates case is a great example of that. Right? The letter went from the Western District of Pennsylvania, got forwarded up to the Western District of New York. Both of those were places where, for that claim, a unfair debt collection practices claim, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. One was where the letter was dispatched. Well, it was dispatched to, I think it was also dispatched from, Western District of Pennsylvania. I don\'t know. But in any event, it was originally sent there and it was opened by the guy in the Western District of New York. And the court said that\'s where the injury was felt. That was where the claim was born. Right? When he opened the letter and saw he was\... So, that\'s fairly\... So, make sure you know that that doesn\'t mean like that there\'s only one place, including because from a statutory interpretation standpoint, it says a judicial district in which a substantial doesn\'t say anything about the\... Right? These are open to multiple places. And it\'s not like you have to find the place where the most substantial events occurred. It\'s not true. But the real sort of misery of this section is D, what about states that have multiple districts and corporations, right? For purposes of venue under this chapter in a state which has more than one judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that state within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state. All right. So, the point is, I mean, I guess it kind of takes us all the way back to where we began, which is we\'re looking district by district. So, we\'re sort of doing a personal jurisdiction analysis, but by a district. So, the problems will help us with this. I should not have closed my statute because I\'m going to need it. All right. So, let\'s look at some of these problems. I\'m going to go through them kind of quickly. You can write the answer down and ask me questions if you need to. Page 252. Does 1391B apply to a case that has been removed from state to federal court? No. We talked about the venue provision governing removal yesterday, right? So, this is only for cases filed originally in federal court. Removed cases can only go to one judicial district. Okay. Two. Now, let\'s apply residential venue. Under this provision, is the district in which the plaintiff resides relevant? No. Never. B. Suppose P sues two defendants in one case. D1 resides in the District of Kansas. D2 resides in the District of South Dakota. For the case of P versus D1 and D2, is venue proper under 1391B1 in the District of Kansas in the District of South Dakota? No, because you have to use transactional venue here because the defendants don\'t reside in the same state. So, they can\'t possibly reside in the same state where the district is located. So, the only proper venues there are transactional venue. The plaintiff\'s attorney is going to have to find at least one venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. Suppose P sues two defendants in one case. D1 resides in Southern District of California. D2 resides in the Central District of California. For the case of P versus D1 and D2, is venue proper under 1391B1 in the Southern District of California? Yes. Any judicial district, a judicial district where any defendant resides if, I shouldn\'t start doing this without stopping my head, if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located. So, the answer is yes for Southern District of California, yes for Central District of California, no for Northern District of California. Very good. I see some heads nodding. Consider the summary of residential venue. P may lay venue in any district where all defendants reside and if all defendants reside in different districts of the form state, P may lay venue in a district in which any defendant resides. Is this summary accurate? Yes. Yes, that is exactly accurate. I mean, if you like that better than the language of the statute, fine, but you\'re not going to have that on an exam. You will have this on the exam. All right. Now, we turn to transactional venue. Of course, conclude that more than one district might qualify as a proper venue in a single case. That\'s the in a district, right? Not in the district, in a district, the statute says. In a district, open to more than one. In a torts case, what districts might qualify? Well, right off the top of your head, you know the claim is born where the injury occurred, right? So, it\'s definitely a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred where the injury occurred. And that\'s kind of like Bates, right? That\'s what the court said there. And, but also anywhere a substantial part of whatever malfeasance is being complained about, right? Defective design, where did that happen? Defective manufacture. Whatever the claim is, you have to look at the claim. It\'s tied to the claim. So, wherever a substantial part of the alleged malfeasance occurred. In a contract case, what districts might qualify? Well, where the contract was made, right? I mean, you\'re not going to breach a contract case without a contract. And where it was breached, certainly. Where performance was supposed to happen and didn\'t happen. So, that\'s the kind of thing you\'re looking for with a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim. Ari? So, just to clarify, you can go under A or B? Yes, absolutely. Thank you for that. Yes. The statute says, well, it\'s 1 or 2, right? It\'s B1 or B2, right? That\'s what you mean, right? Yes. B1 or B2. And the reason for that is the word or between 2 and 3. It\'s a mention. Archana? So, just for the contract case, can you apply for counseling if they say that there was an accident in Florida where the contract was made in Hawaii? Is that something that we can argue? You know, I wouldn\'t, I guess, I mean, I don\'t, are you talking about, you want to do venue on the facts of Hansen? Or, when you say apply Hansen. Yeah, on the facts of Hansen. Okay, on the facts of Hansen. Yeah, I think that, I don\'t, that wasn\'t even a contract case, I don\'t think. It was a trust administration. So, I mean, yeah, I don\'t think Florida is a proper venue. I think Delaware or Pennsylvania, wherever the trust was made, is certainly a proper venue. Okay. All right, be careful when studying B3. Forget about B3. Assuming the defendant resides somewhere in the United States, does B3 apply? No. Assuming a substantial part of the event arose somewhere in the United States, does B3 apply? No. Right? And they both have to be true for B3, not for B3 to apply. No defendant resides in the United States and no substantial part of the events giving rise to claim occurred anywhere in the United States. All right. One thing I think we skipped. Oh, we didn\'t get there yet. I guess there is the part about foreign. Oh, yeah. Residency. Definition three. A defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district and the joinder of such a defendant shall be disregarded in determining whether the action may be brought with respect to other defendants. But as is pointed out, I think somewhere in here. Yeah, look on page 254. I have a big star beside this. Question nine. Then we\'ll go back and do the other ones. Question 7B. We saw that the defendant does not reside in the United States. 1393C3. 91C3. If a co-defendant does not reside in the United States, however, venue must be proper as to that defendant. So the mere fact that you have a foreign residing defendant in the case does not mean you can sue anywhere you want. All that means is you have a co-defendant who is a non. So we have a defendant resident in the United States, a co-defendant not resident in the United States. Two defendants. The foreign co-defendant can be sued in any judicial district. But that doesn\'t make venue proper in this action. You have to worry about the resident defendant. So we would sue in the district where the resident defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. And the non-resident defendant, venue is proper over him there too. Because of the any district. That\'s the way that works. Now of course if there is no U.S. residing co-defendant, if the only defendant is the foreign residing defendant, then venue is proper in any judicial district. But you still have to worry about personal jurisdiction separately. I will give you a planning problem, what I call a planning problem, and it requires you to worry about personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and venue. You\'re the plaintiff\'s attorney trying to figure out where to bring a lawsuit. I don\'t think it has you worried about notice. But we\'ll get to see. You know, and what I would do with that is I would work on each of those three entirely separately from the other two. And then see where the overlap is. Emma. Did I have a question going back to question 2B? Which, they\'re not, the venue isn\'t proper in Kansas. Is there a venue that would be proper? Wherever a substantial part of the event is giving rise to the claim occurred. Okay. That\'s the interaction between B1 and B2. So sometimes residential venue won\'t work. And you don\'t have to wait until it doesn\'t work to rely on a substantial part of the event giving rise to the claim. It\'s completely, all venues that are given to you under B1 or B2 are proper. All right. Let\'s see. Now we will focus on residential venue. Okay, top page, page 253. If venue is proper in one district under B1 and in a different district under B2, may the plaintiff choose either district. Yes. Yes. Yes. In other words, is there anything in 1391B1 that suggests a hierarchy or B? No. No hierarchy. Complete venue. Okay. Or are they alternatives of equal dignity? Yes, they are alternatives of equal dignity. Now we will focus on residential venue, the definitions of residence. Plaintiff is injured in an auto collision with defendant. Plaintiff is a Massachusetts citizen. Defendant is a New York citizen domiciled in the Eastern District of New York. The accident occurred in the District of Maine. Assume that the plaintiff\'s claim exceeds \$75,000. She\'s only suing the defendant, driver, at this stage of the game. In what federal districts would venue be proper? Well, Maine, substantial part of the event giving rise to the claim occurred in Maine and Eastern District of New York where the individual defendant resides. Plaintiff sues defendant in the District of Vermont where defendant lives while attending college. Is venue proper in the District of Vermont? No. Because for venue purposes, residence means domicile for an individual. Plaintiff sues defendant in the District of Massachusetts. Plaintiff has defendant serve the process while she is voluntarily present in Massachusetts doing business. Is venue proper in the District of Massachusetts? No. Personal jurisdiction and venue are completely separate things. Certainly for individuals they are. And the fact that she can get personal jurisdiction over him in Massachusetts does not solve her venue problem. So she\'s going to have to fight. I mean, but the good news is he can be sued in his domicile in the Eastern District of New York because there\'s personal jurisdiction there and venue. Right? And he can be sued in the district where a substantial part of the event giving rise to the claim occurred, which is Maine. But he can\'t be sued in Massachusetts. He can personal jurisdiction wise, but not venue wise. Separate issues. You got to worry about them both. I say this because somebody on the exam said, you know, that there was no subject matter jurisdiction because there was no personal jurisdiction. No. No. No. No. No. They\'re separate issues. So, let\'s see. Suppose the facts are the same in note six except as noted below, where would venue be proper? Defended as a citizen of France. Admitted to the United States for permanent resident status. Domicile in the Eastern District of New York. The answer is the same as question 6a because a permanent resident alien domiciled in the United States, as you have to be to be a permanent resident alien. As a domicile for purposes of the venue statute and it is where you are domiciled. As a resident, it\'s where you are domiciled. So, it\'s Maine in the Eastern District of New York. Defendant is a citizen of France, domiciled in France, any district. Venue is proper in any district. This is a single defendant action. We don\'t have the co-defendant issue. Right? We\'re suing the domiciliary or the French citizen, doesn\'t reside in the United States, venue is proper in any district. That\'s what the statute says. It says, right, C3. The definition of residence for a person not residing in the United States. Suppose plaintiff sues only Car, Inc. now. Forget about the driver. Now we\'re suing only Car, Inc. The manufacturer of her car alleging defective design and manufacturer of the car. You should immediately be thinking where was the car designed, where was the car manufactured, right? That\'s what she\'s alleging. Car, Inc. is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in the Western District of Michigan. Plaintiff\'s claim exceeds \$75,000. In Plaintiff v. Car, Inc., where is venue proper? What are all the places where venue is proper? Start with the residential statute. It\'s proper anywhere that defendant is amenable in this action. Delaware, right? Western District of Michigan, right? It\'s domiciled in those two places. Wherever it was designed and manufactured, I mean, obviously, on a real exam, I would give you facts, but a substantial part of the events, that\'s the claim. The claim is defective design and manufacture. The events occurred, a substantial part of the events occurred in those judicial districts, which may or may not be the Western District of Michigan, right? We don\'t know whether it was designed and manufactured at the principal place of business or not. Also, and that\'s the transactional venue, it\'s also the residential venue there. Do you notice that? Where the car was designed and manufactured, that probably qualifies as both residential venue and transactional venue because the design and manufacture would make the car manufacturer amenable in this action, probably. Right? They have contacts there and the claim is arising out of the design and manufacture. So, on both fronts. Doesn\'t really matter, but I guess it matters if I ask you, tell me all the venues under B1, tell me all the venues under B2. And also, of course, Maine, where the car crash happened, right, where the injury occurred, that\'s only transactional venue. I mean, for that matter, going back to B1, ready to have your minds blown a little bit? All right, so we talked about general amenability in Delaware and Western District of Michigan. We talked about specific amenability where there\'s design and manufacture. In any state where the defendant has registered to do business and signed a Mallory-type consent, they are generally amenable. Now, there aren\'t probably that many of those states because most situations where a corporation registers to do business, they make themselves specifically amenable in that state. But in Mallory, right, Pennsylvania had general amenability over that railroad. Let me finish the mind-blowingness first. And then we have to bring up Ford because perhaps, let me think about this for a minute. Yeah, perhaps if Car, Inc. is Ford, or maybe even not quite Ford, we don\'t know, then you would get Maine potentially under a B1 venue, too, under a personal jurisdiction theory. So Maine would be both transactional and residential. So think about all the ways a corporation can be amenable is the point. Jawad? For venue purposes, can they use both state and federal venue statutes? No. They have to use- The federal venue statute, absolutely. Thank you for that. Yeah, as a general rule, what we\'re going to see, Jawad, is this is a procedural thing. What happens in federal court, because you started to read a little bit about this for today, federal courts apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit, but not the procedural law. The procedure is governed by federal procedure. And they only apply state substantive law when it\'s a state law issue. But it\'s because of that, Jawad, that it\'s because federal courts don\'t apply state procedural law. All right. Would the answer be different if Car, Inc. was a partnership or an unincorporated business? No. All entities are treated the same. Thank heavens. And then you get into the sort of district by district problem, the 1391D problem. And so let\'s assume, I guess it\'s saying here, Car, Inc. is a principal business in the western district of Michigan. Does that mean venue would be proper in the eastern district of Michigan? This is a tough question. On the one hand, it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the eastern district because it has its principal place of business in Michigan. And we don\'t look at personal jurisdiction on a district by district basis. On the other hand, jurisdiction based on contacts with the western district, there is no easy answer to this problem. Congress created the ambiguity and we\'re all suffering. So, all right. So you need to spend a lot of time with this. You need to practice with it. You need to get used to it. I\'m trying to tell you the kinds of questions I could give you again. I could give you a situation and say, is venue proper? And you\'d have to check under B1 and under B2. Or I could say, like this first problem gave here, it said, where are all the districts where venue is proper? Identify them all. And from a planning standpoint, well, I guess plaintiffs would do it differently. But, you know, I think a plaintiff, there are situations where a plaintiff\'s attorney would look at all the situations. Jess. Do you think we\'d ever get a B3 question? No. Forget about B3. I can barely even create a B3 question. All right. We will continue. We\'ll see, you know, if you plow through. And then we\'ll certainly get into Piper. And your assignment for tomorrow is largely just Piper. So make sure you get it. Yep. Lucky you. You got out of the bubble.