Third Party Intervention PDF

Chapter 9 THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION C...

Chapter 9 THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION C hapter 1 noted that conflict interaction tends to be self-perpetuating. This characteristic of conflict has important implications for understanding how patterns of interaction develop, how escalation cycles gain momentum, and how constructive or destructive climates are sustained. This property is also important in understanding why people who are not parties in a conflict intervene in ongoing disputes. The self-perpetuating nature of moves and countermoves, actions and reactions, can stifle parties’ attempts at their own management of conflict, even when they try assiduously to alter these patterns. Moreover, trained incapaci- ties can prevent parties from even recognizing the problems or detract from parties’ efforts at finding acceptable solutions to real problems. An outsider has some distance from a conflict and can often see persistent cycles and ways of altering them. By necessity, the mere entry of a third party alters a conflict, if for no other reason than that the intervenor’s moves become part of the unfolding conflict interaction. The term third party intervention connotes a wide range of activities that span diverse con- flict contexts, from the spontaneous attempts of parents to settle conflicts between siblings, to the carefully planned attempts to mediate the release of hostages across international borders. Third parties may be fact-finders, process consultants, go-betweens, ombudspersons, clergy, managers, conciliators, mediators, group facilitators, attorneys, friends of the court, arbitrators, Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. or government diplomats. As this list suggests, third parties enact different roles and have dif- ferent responsibilities in different conflict settings. Over the past twenty years, there has been increasing interest in using a variety of third party roles in diverse conflict settings (Donohue, 2006). For example, there are many community dispute–resolution programs in the United States. These programs often use trained volunteers to intervene in neighborhood, small claims, or landlord–tenant disputes (Folger, 2010). In the past, if these cases were severe enough, they might end up in court. In many cases, conflicts sim- ply festered because the parties had no recourse outside the courts to help resolve them (Folger, 1991). In divorce cases, mediators are now used in many states to try to settle issues related to child custody or jointly owned property rather than having a judge impose a decision about such matters (Nichols, 1996; Simon, 2010). In business environments, a market has developed for dispute-resolution services that can provide out-of-court settlements for a wide range of conflicts (Singer, 1990). In addition, changes in employer–employee relationships have brought changes in third party roles within Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention 263 organizations (Blomgren Bingham, 2010). Businesses, medical facilities, and educational insti- tutions have developed intervention roles, such as hearing officers, ombudspersons, and cli- ent representatives, to address conflicts “in-house.” Middle managers have increasingly been viewed as dispute resolvers who intervene in conflicts among subordinates or between depart- ment members. This chapter examines how third parties influence the course of conflict. No matter what intervention they perform, the moves third parties make can be examined in light of their impact on parties’ conflict interaction. This chapter provides a framework for thinking about and analyzing conflict interaction as influenced by third party intervenors. This analysis of third party intervention is organized around the four conflict interaction properties introduced in Chapter 1. Although conflict interaction is often quite different when a third party is involved, it is still shaped by such factors as moves and countermoves, exertion of power, self-perpetuating momentum, episodic structure, predictable themes, and relational influences. Each of the properties points to important and unique features of third party inter- vention and its impact on the conflict. This chapter examines how these four properties help describe and explain the effects of third party involvement in conflict. 9.1 PROPERTY 1: CONFLICT INTERACTION IS CONSTITUTED AND SUSTAINED BY MOVES AND COUNTERMOVES DURING INTERACTION When third parties intervene in conflicts, they become active participants in the parties’ interac- tion. Third parties make moves—initiatives that spark reactions and launch sequences of inter- action. They also respond with countermoves—reactions to disputants’ moves. In this sense, the third party is as vulnerable to the moment-to-moment influences of action and reaction as the disputing parties themselves. Although the conflict issues may be of more (or different) consequence for the parties than the intervenor, the conflict interaction has consequences for both: the interaction emerges as the product of the third party’s and disputants’ actions, it has moment-to-moment effects on the third party’s moves, it shapes the third party’s interpreta- tions of unfolding events, and it has relational consequences for the intervenor. The moves a third party makes clearly influence the conflict interaction. What gives third Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. parties the ability to shape conflict? What powers are available to any intervenor? Given a third party’s available power, what influences the moves he or she actually makes? To understand how third party influence occurs, it is important to understand that the potential for third party influence stems from two primary sources: the third party’s mandate—the ascribed source of power the intervenor holds—and the third party’s responsiveness to the unfolding conflict interaction among the parties. 9.1.1 Third Party Mandate Any move a third party makes is rooted in the power he or she is able or willing to exert. In this sense, the basis of third party moves is identical to that of the disputing parties. However, the sources of third party power are often quite different from those held by the disputants. This is because the type of interdependence between third parties and disputants is very different from what defines the disputants’ relationships. Disputants are dependent on intervenors for such Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  264 Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention functions as structuring the interaction, reducing hostilities, and providing expertise on specific substantive or legal issues. These sources of dependency stem from the authority or mandate given to the third party by the disputants (Kaufman & Duncan, 1989; Shubert & Folger, 1986). Like the forms of power discussed in Chapter 4, the third party’s mandate is fundamentally relational: it is power endorsed by the disputing parties and thereby gives the intervenor certain resources that can be drawn from to control the interaction and substantive issues. If endorse- ment of the mandate is withdrawn or questioned, the ability of the third party to act is altered or curtailed (Merry & Silbey, 1984). Of course, some third party mandates, such as those given to judges, stem from broadly based endorsements that societies or large groups of people pro- vide. Disputing parties are sometimes under strong pressures to endorse third party mandates when they are so widely accepted. This pressure often occurs, for example, when diplomats from a super-power intervene in international conflicts between less powerful countries or eth- nic groups (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2004). A third party’s mandate—as an endorsed basis of power—can stem from formal or informal sources (Kaufman & Duncan, 1989). Many third party roles carry formal endorsements, which authorize certain types of interventions in specific conflict arenas. Such roles are typically estab- lished by law, societal traditions, or rules of an organization. The adjudicative role that judges play in legal contexts and the ombudsperson role employed to settle disputes within organiza- tions are examples of formally defined third party mandates (Howard, 2011). Other third party mandates are granted informally, usually via the implicit expectations peo- ple have about who can appropriately intervene in conflicts. These informal mandates are often the result of resources the third party holds, such as specialized knowledge or skill in interven- ing, or of the third party’s relationship to the disputants. Informal mandates are given to a wide range of individuals, including managers in organizations, parents or older siblings in families, group members who are skillful at framing problems, community leaders, and clergy. Informal mandates are also held by some intervenors who work in ethno-political conflicts in interna- tional settings such as leaders of religious or social organizations who intervene in violent con- flicts (Chigas, 2005). When third party mandates are informal and hence less clearly specified, questions may arise about the appropriateness of or limits on intervention. In such cases, the nature of the third party’s mandate may require explicit negotiation among the parties in order for the intervention to proceed. Third party mandates can carry with them a range of possible powers to conflict interaction. Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Specifically, three forms of third party influence can be distinguished: process control, content control, and motivational control (Sheppard, 1984). Process Control This refers to the third party’s ability to organize or structure the procedures that disputants follow during interaction. Process control includes such diverse activities as arranging when and where the parties should meet, setting time limits on speaking turns or intervention sessions, establishing how decisions will be made, setting rules for decorum, and specifying moves that the third party will enact to support the conflict (Kraybill, 2004). Third parties whose mandates are formally established often impose clearly specified forms of process control, which can be stated explicitly to the parties at the outset. Process control is often less clearly specified when a third party’s mandate emerges informally. Frequently, less forethought is given to the procedural rules, which are more likely to emerge during intervention than be stated initially. For example, a group member who is trying to intervene in a conflict among other members may ask that each person speak in turn rather than allowing a free-for-all to escalate. Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention 265 Content Control Third parties also vary in the amount of content control they have in the dispute. Content control refers to the third party’s influence over the arguments and substantive positions taken by the parties or over the terms parties accept as a final agreement. Third parties differ in their ability or willingness to refute or attack specific points made by the parties; interpret, frame, or add issues; present additional information relevant to the topics under discussion; or suggest or impose the terms that the parties adopt as an agreement or solution. For some third party mandates, the amount of control over outcomes is the most important defining feature of the intervention. Based on these we can distinguish three different forms of intervention, which differ in numerous ways but whose character stems primarily from the degree of control a third party has over the outcomes of a conflict: Arbitrators have clear control over the terms of a final agreement. An arbitrator is given authority to hear all sides of a case, discuss it with each party, and then make a final decision on how the dispute will be settled, much like the judge in a legal case. In most cases, the parties are compelled by law or prior agreement to enact the terms an arbitrator imposes. One less widely used form of arbitration is called nonbinding arbitration. In this form of arbitration, the third party follows the same general process, but the arbitrator’s decision is not one the parties are bound by law or prior agreement to accept. Rather, the arbitrator’s decision is a neutral opinion that the parties can consider and that might have an influence on the parties’ continued negotiation.   An arbitrator often has special background knowledge that enables him or her to grapple with the specific issues underlying the conflict. For example, arbitrators generally are used for highly technical disputes, such as labor contracts, which require knowledge of both economics and labor law. Arbitrators can also be used in “hopeless” cases for which a deci- sion must be made but repeated attempts to settle have proved impossible or in difficult public conflicts that jeopardize community welfare (e.g., labor management conflicts in schools or hospitals). Less authority over settlement terms is given to mediators. Mediators are third parties who facilitate parties’ interaction. The key characteristic of mediation is that final resolution rests with the parties themselves. Mediators intervene mostly by allowing the parties to clarify their choices, resources, and decision points and by recognizing each other’s per- spectives (Bush & Folger, 2005; Folger, Bush, & DellaNoce, 2010). Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.   For example, mediators frequently intervene in environmental disputes (see, e.g., www. clarkenviro.com). In these types of disputes, a number of parties are involved, such as government representatives, citizens, and industry spokespeople. The objective is to help diverse parties negotiate an acceptable resolution to issues such as land use, watershed preservation, or highway construction.   Although mediators have traditionally been used in environmental and labor disputes, over the last three decades they have been employed in a wider array of contexts. Volunteer or professionally trained mediators now attempt to assist parties in reaching agreements in community and neighborhood disputes, student conflicts, landlord—tenant conflicts, small claims issues, consumer and business disputes, divorce and child custody cases, and international peacemaking efforts.   Although there are a range of mediator styles and differences in how willing mediators are to risk influencing outcomes, the important point to note here is that mediators have no explicit mandate to make or implement choices for the parties. They do, however, have a Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  266 Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention mandate to support the deliberation of choices the parties discuss during an intervention and sometimes point disputing parties toward specific outcomes. It is not uncommon, for exam- ple, for divorce mediators to offer suggestions or solutions that the parties have not thought of, based on solutions the mediators have seen work for other couples (Lemmon, 1985).   Some mediators go further and actually offer evaluations of parties’ positions or choices in an effort to achieve what they consider a fair or just outcome or consciously or inadver- tently promote certain substantive choices over others (Folger & Bernard, 1985; Noll, 2003; Shailor, 1994). For example, a divorce mediator may push for an agreement that gives one spouse greater financial autonomy once the marriage is dissolved. Such a move is often controversial because it may overstep the bounds of a mediator’s mandate or be seen as a potential breach of neutrality (Bernard et al., 1984). Pushing for financial autonomy for one spouse may cause the other spouse to view the mediator as biased. The mediator, on the other hand, may believe the spouse’s autonomy will contribute to a more workable settlement. In a similar vein, ethno-political conflict mediators have been found to influ- ence the direction of the conflict by offering external incentives for the parties or issuing ultimatums to them (Bercovitch, 2005; Crocker & Nuer, 2004). Even less involvement with settlement terms is enacted by third party facilitators or concili- ators. Facilitators and conciliators are process experts who have neither extensive expertise related to the issues under discussion nor the power to make a final decision (Lieber- man, Baker, & Fraser, 2005; Schwarz, 2002). They are often brought in when the parties believe they can reach a resolution through direct negotiations, but need help managing the process.   Although the two roles are quite similar, the labels “facilitator” and “conciliator” are used to describe third parties who intervene in somewhat different settings. The facilitator label is used most often to describe a third party who intervenes in ongoing decision-­making groups such as management teams, boards of directors, or department staff (Schuman, 2010). The conciliator label is used to describe third parties who intervene in multiparty disputes among recognizable adversaries such as those involved in public policy disputes, environmental conflicts, or race-related issues.   Facilitators or conciliators offer process expertise but are not at the “center” of the inter- action. They can, nonetheless, be an active force directing the conflict. However, all the impetus for substantive movement—proposals, compromises, changes in position—arises Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. from the parties themselves. Facilitation and conciliation differ from arbitration or medi- ation, not because they are more passive forms of intervention, but because they carry a narrower range of possible involvement with substantive issues. The third party called into the Riverdale Halfway House (Case 7.1, page 215) was a facilitator. He chaired several meetings at which members tried to talk out their problems and offered assistance in clar- ifying needs and proposals, but he did not try to direct the discussion in any forceful or intrusive way. An important consideration in determining the degree of process and content control to exert is how fair parties perceive the intervention to be. The perceived fairness of intervention styles can vary according to the nature of the dispute. In disputes involving highly intense conflict, and high degrees of interdependence among parties, arbitration (high process and content control) is often perceived as the fairest approach (Sheppard, Saunders, & Minton, 1988). On the other hand, for conflicts that are less intense, mediation, with its lower degree of control, is perceived Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention 267 as more useful. Arbitration was also found to be preferred in disputes for which a settlement seemed very difficult to attain, whereas mediation was preferred for cases where a settlement seemed possible (Heuer & Penrod, 1986). Participants who have some say in the selection of the third party role generally seem to perceive the intervention to be fairer than those who do not (Sheppard, Saunders, &Minton, 1988). Finally, parties’ perceptions of a mediator’s neu- trality may be key to successfully addressing conflicts that stem from deep ideological clashes (Goldman et al., 2008). Motivational Control Besides process and content control, third party mandates also differ in the motivational control they grant to the intervenor. Motivational control refers to the degree to which the third party can induce parties to perform desired actions. Some informal third party intervenors, such as parents or managers, control incentives that can influence the parties and ultimately the outcomes of a dispute. Managers, for example, can indicate that they might reallocate or demote a recalcitrant employee if he or she does not address an ongoing dispute with a co-worker. In an attempt to encourage movement, a labor mediator may indicate that he or she is going to tell the press that one side in a dispute is making unreasonable demands (Sheppard, 1984). An international mediator might threaten to withdraw economic resources from the countries in conflict if they do not agree to stop violent attacks (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2004). Facilitators can energize groups to address difficult issues with greater optimism (Lukens, 2010). Many third parties, including parents, clergy, and teachers, have a significant motivational influence over disputants. 9.1.2 Responsiveness to Emerging Interaction The third party’s mandate provides the broad framework of endorsed powers, the possible bases third parties can draw on in making interventions. However, a third party mandate only delimits the range of possible moves perceived to be appropriate or expected. It does not entirely account for the moves a third party actually makes in the interaction or the timing of those moves. Even though a third party is involved, the conflict interaction still unfolds turn-by-turn and is subject to all the momentary forces—such as defensiveness cycles, power tactics, immediate face threats—at play in any emergent interaction. Third party moves can start from some formally or informally defined sense of what the nature of the intervention will be Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. and what role the third party will adopt, but any given act is inevitably responsive: it is part of the stream of interaction and is, in a fundamental sense, a product of it. In many discussions of third party intervention and dispute processing, there has been an increasing recognition of the emergent nature of conflict intervention processes (Folger, 2001; Mather & Yngvesson, 1980–1981; Sarat, 1988). Theorists and critics have attempted to debunk what they see as a static image of disputes, dispute processing, and third party intervention. This static image depicts disputes as fixed entities that are brought to third parties and are then acted on by intervenors to achieve some goal, such as reaching a settlement or handing down a decision. The conflict that the parties bring to the table is seen as relatively unchanged as the dispute moves through the intervention process. This image also implies that third parties and the intervention process remain unaffected by the dispute being addressed. The critics of this image say that it is misleading and fails to capture all the dynamics—the elements of change and influence—in third party interventions. They would replace this image with a less static conception—one that casts disputes and third party processes as much more Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  268 Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention fluid and malleable activities. It has been argued, for example, that “disputes, even after they emerge and are articulated, are indeterminate. They do not exist in fixed form prior to the application of particular dispute processing techniques; they are instead constituted and trans- formed as they are processed” (Sarat, 1988, p. 708). In this view, the very act of presenting a dispute to a third party can reframe the conflict. Several researchers have demonstrated how disputes are presented to intervenors in ways that “fit” the third parties’ modes of intervention (Conley & O’Barr, 1990; Mather & Yngves- son, 1980–1981; Merry & Silbey, 1984). Courtroom disputants might, for instance, narrow the issues in a conflict, simplifying a complex history of events, injuries, and relationship struggles so that a judge can impose or suggest readily available settlement terms, such as monetary awards. In the organizational context, employees sometimes select issues and define disputes in ways that will increase the likelihood that they will be addressed by their managers (Antes, Fol- ger, & DellaNoce, 2001; Kolb, 1986). Other research suggests that mediators in several conflict contexts influence the parties’ views of the issues and may even take a strong hand in shaping attitudes toward possible settlement terms (Bush & Folger, 1994; Greatbatch & Dingwall, 1989; Lam, Rifkin, & Townley, 1989). In such cases, key dispute elements—how parties view the issues, what they think is reasonable or worth fighting for, what they are willing to agree to—are transformed as the intervention occurs. Just as disputes are influenced by a third party and the intervention process, so too are third parties influenced by the disputes, the parties, and the context of intervention. In this more dynamic view of intervention, third parties are not unresponsive either. Because they are part and parcel of the interaction, they constantly adapt to contingencies that arise as interventions unfold. To understand how third parties and intervention forums adapt to cases and disputing par- ties, third party mandates must be seen as dynamic. For many third party roles, even those for which the mandate is relatively clear, there is considerable leeway in the amount of process, content, or motivational control exerted in any given intervention. In practice, third parties acting as arbitrators, mediators, facilitators, or ombudsperson engage in a wide range of moves that often blur their mandates and can erode any hard-and-fast distinctions among the various forms of intervention. Parties who have clear arbitrative powers, such as judges or labor arbi- trators, sometimes act as mediators (Phillips, 1990; Wall & Rude, 1989). Judges in divorce and custody cases, for example, often attempt to construct settlements rather than impose them. They may try to assess what terms are acceptable for both parties, encourage compromise, and Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. involve parties in creating viable options. There are also forms of arbitration that build in a certain degree of disputant control over the outcome. In “last-offer—best-offer” arbitration, the arbitrator decides a settlement for a dispute by having each party submit their last best offer and then chooses from among these options (Feuille, 1979). The decision of the arbitrator is limited to one of the settlement terms sug- gested by the parties. In this form of arbitration, the parties have somewhat more control over the substantive outcome of a final settlement than they would in “stricter” forms of arbitration because the options for settlement are determined by what they put forth. In the same vein, mediators’ actual behaviors during interventions have been found to vary considerably. Several different studies of mediators in diverse contexts paint a diverse picture of what mediators actually do in practice; at times, this picture blurs the line between mediators and arbitrators (Davidheiser, 2006). Descriptive studies of labor mediation suggest that medi- ators adopt quite different styles of intervention (Kolb, 1983; Shapiro, Drieghe, & Brett, 1985). Some labor mediators have been characterized as deal-makers because they take an active role in shaping the substantive issues, put pressures on parties to move, and spend considerable time Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention 269 caucusing with each side in an active attempt to forge a deal (Kolb, 1983). Orchestrators take a different approach to mediation. This is a less impositional style in which mediators orches- trate the negotiations among the parties, setting up processes that allow them to keep talking and leaving substantive issues more directly under the disputants’ control. Differences have been found in intervention styles in other arenas of mediation as well (Donohue, 2006; Noll, 2003). Studies of those who intervene in community, neighborhood, and small claims disputes suggest that mediators adopt bargaining and therapeutic styles of intervention (Silbey & Merry, 1986). In the bargaining style, mediators place great emphasis on reaching settlements through control over the interaction and encouraging less direct discus- sion among the disputants. Caucuses—private discussions between the mediator and one of the parties—are more frequent in this style, as are explicit attempts to narrow issues, to push for compromise, and to synthesize arguments and positions. In the therapeutic style, media- tors emphasize increasing understanding among the disputants and overcoming relationship problems. Face-to-face contact between the parties is maximized during the intervention, as are attempts to uncover underlying issues and veiled interests. The goal is not simply to reach agreements but to use the intervention as an opportunity to improve communication and to develop a foundation for addressing problems in general. As might be expected in informally mandated third party roles, there is as much or more lee- way in how the third party intervenes. Studies of managers in organizations suggest, for example, that they also take on a range of roles (Kolb, 1986). In some instances, they adopt an advisory role, consulting with one or more of the parties in the dispute and suggesting moves parties might make to help direct a conflict. At other times, the same manager may become more of an investigator, collecting facts and assessing the source and nature of the problem. In other conflicts, the manager may become a restructurer, dealing with the conflict by moving personnel or reorga- nizing subunits or chains of command. In still other situations, the manager steps into a medi- ator role, guiding communication among the disputing parties and attempting collaboration. Given the range of third party options in both formally and informally mandated third party interventions, what influences the intervention style and thus the specific moves that third parties make? This is a difficult question to answer because of the range of factors that can influence the third party’s moves—from habits individual third parties fall into to specific characteristics and demands of the case and disputing parties. Third parties adapt to the conflict cases at hand in important ways. Consider Cases 9.1 Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. and 9.2. These cases raise the type of questions about difficult intervention choices that third parties must face when they intervene in various types of conflicts. CASE STUDY 9.1 ORGANIZATIONAL CO-HEADS A large insurance firm decided to restructure one area of its business. Two separate businesses were being joined into one larger umbrella organization. Each of the sep- arate businesses had been previously headed by senior women, Sarah and Meghan. Both women had been with the firm for more than ten years, and they were both seen as highly competent leaders who had run successful businesses of their own. The two women knew each other but had never worked together. The firm felt that by joining the two groups and setting up one organization, the new, larger business unit could capitalize on the strengths of each leader and create strong, cross-client synergies. Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  270 Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention Sarah and Meghan accepted the co-leadership roles with some skepticism but were willing to go along with the firm’s vision for their future work. As Sarah put it, “when the firm asks you to do something like this, it is tough to say no without giving it a try.” The way the firm’s management launched this reorganization created difficult obsta- cles from the outset. The firm combined the two business units and announced the co-head structure just before Meghan left for a three-month maternity leave. Meghan knew that this was extremely bad timing but felt she had no choice in the matter. She was adopting a child, and although she had given the firm notice about the upcom- ing maternity leave, she was not able to provide a firm date until the adoption was approved. It was an unfortunate set of circumstances that challenged both women (as well as their employees) as the new business unit was formed. During the three-month period when Meghan was on leave, the two women tried to stay in contact with each other and to make joint decisions via phone and e-mail. At first this worked, but Meghan became increasingly frustrated as she realized that things were inevitably moving ahead—paths in the new business park were being worn—and she was simply not there day-to-day to contribute to the decisions and co-lead the organization. During this time, Meghan was also in contact with some of her former employees who told her that they felt Sarah was moving ahead with the planning without adequate input from their side of the business. Eventually Meghan simply stopped responding to Sarah’s e-mails and calls. She felt that Sarah’s activ- ity was just skimming the surface and she did not want to appear to be going along with the decisions that were being made. Sarah realized that Meghan was becoming increasingly distant but wasn’t exactly sure why. She felt she had no choice but to move forward leading the newly formed business. The result was that as the new business endeavor emerged, Sarah became the de facto day-to-day head of the orga- nization for the first three months. As Meghan’s leave drew to a close, Sarah became increasingly frustrated and wor- ried about what was going to happen next. She went to the human resource department and told a senior representative that the newly formed business had gotten off to a bad start because the communication between Meghan and her was inadequate during Meghan’s leave. She said she was afraid of how things were going to unfold when Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Meghan returned to the division; some of Meghan’s prior employees had become defen- sive and divisive and were withholding their support for the new business endeavor. Human resources contacted an external consultant to come in to help address the conflict between Sarah and Meghan. Discussion Questions Imagine you are the external intervenor in this conflict. How would you respond to the following questions? What would be your specific goals for conducting an intervention in this conflict? How would you first approach the two women—together or separately? Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention 271 What would be the risks of first meeting separately? Would you talk to upper management—those who had designed the reorganization— about how the business reorganization was implemented? And, if so, for what purpose? Under what conditions, if any, would you talk to the employees who work for Sarah and Meghan in the newly formed business unit? As the intervenor in this conflict, would you introduce your own ideas and sugges- tions about the possible ways to manage this conflict? What factors should you consider before suggesting how these two business leaders could best address the issues? CASE STUDY 9.2 THE FAMILY CONFLICT Yolanda contacted a community mediation center in her city to obtain help with a difficult family conflict. During the standard intake interview at the mediation program, Yolanda gave the mediator an overview of the nature of the conflict between herself, her brother Ted, and her sister Kate. Yolanda said that she and her two siblings are in conflict over the arrangements for the care of their eighty-year-old mother, Anna. Until recently, Anna was healthy enough to live on her own in a small condominium that she purchased after her husband died six years ago. Over the past five months, Anna began to have serious health problems. After a stay in the hospital, Anna could not return to her condominium because she could not live alone. Instead, she moved in with Yolanda and her family. This caused great stress for Yolanda because she has three children who are in middle and high school, and she works full time. Although she has brought medical personnel into her home to assist with the care of her mother, the amount of attention and time that she needs to devote to her mother is overwhelming. She said she cannot continue to be the primary support person for her mother. She feels that her brother and sister need to step in to help with the care for their aging mother. Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. She feels her brother, Ted, should invite their mother to live with him. He lives alone and has a large guest bedroom on the first floor of his house, which would be comfort- able as a living space for their mother. Ted disagrees and he believes that their mother needs to go to an assisted living residence because he does not feel he would be able to take care of her adequately, especially now that she is ill. He said he is willing to pay half of the costs of an assisted living site, if his two sisters cover the other half. Yolanda believes that her mother does not want to go to an assisted living home and that respecting her mother’ wishes is critically important. Yolanda and Ted’s sister, Kate, said she would be willing to let her mother live with her. However, Yolanda also knows that her mother would not be comfortable living in Kate’s home because Kate and her husband do not get along well and this will create a stress- ful living situation for their mother. Kate said she does not have adequate resources to be able to contribute financially to support an assisted living situation for their mother. Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  272 Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention Yolanda has asked for a mediator to attempt to resolve this difficult and emotional family conflict among the three siblings. She said she and her siblings have all agreed to try mediation. Yolanda says that they are all in agreement that they would like to try to resolve the situation without upsetting their mother so they do not want her present during their discussions about her future care and living arrangements. Discussion Questions If you were the mediator in this conflict, how would you respond to the following questions? Would you meet separately with Kate and Ted before gathering the three siblings together? Why or why not? Would you agree to the request to not involve Anna in the discussion among the three siblings? What factors would influence this decision? During the mediation with the family, would you bring up examples of how other families you have worked with have made similar decisions about parental care? Why or why not? If you felt that any of the siblings were being unreasonable about their positions, would you meet with them separately to try to influence their point of view? How does such a decision influence the type of third party role you would be enacting? These cases suggest that many different factors may influence the general approach and specific intervening moves third parties make. Although all possible contingencies have not been system- atically studied, some attempts have been made to examine how third parties decide to intervene. In one line of research, four general approaches to intervention have been studied (Carne- vale, 1986; Carnevale et al., 1989; Carnevale et al., 1991). In establishing a general orientation to intervention, third parties can (1) integrate: attempt to solve a conflict through encourag- Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. ing negotiations and reaching a mutually acceptable agreement (a collaborating approach); (2) compensate: persuade one or more of the parties to move or reach settlement by some reward or incentive offered by the third party (e.g., a manager acting as intervenor offering a “perk” in exchange for accepting some outcome in a conflict with a co-worker); (3) be inactive: allow the disputants to handle the conflict themselves; and (4) press: pressure disputants to change their goals or willingness to settle (e.g., persuading a party to move from a currently held position, giving information that shapes perceptions of fairness). These four approaches were originally developed to apply to mediators, but they apply more broadly to any third party with some leeway in his or her general intervention mandate. Research suggests that third party selection of approaches depends on two primary factors (Carnevale et al., 1989). First, the choice seems to be contingent on how much value the third party attaches to the achievement of disputants’ goals. The importance the intervenor places on this outcome may stem from a concern about the parties’ welfare, or it may come from some vested interest of the intervenor (e.g., a manager whose unit’s performance is being influenced Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention 273 by the conflict). Second, the choice can also hinge on the third party’s perception of whether there is sufficient common ground to reach a mutually acceptable solution. This factor suggests that third parties’ approaches are influenced by an assessment of how likely it is that the dispu- tants can reach an agreement. Figure 9.1 summarizes the choices third parties are likely to make among the four approaches, given their concern for parties’ aspirations and their perceptions of common ground. Third par- ties attempt integration when concern for the goals of the parties is great, and the intervenor feels there is sufficient chance that the parties can reach an agreement. The third party is most likely to be inactive when there is a good chance of reaching agreement, and he or she is con- cerned about a positive result. In this situation, he or she may believe that parties will reach an agreement on their own, and thus third party involvement is unnecessary. Third parties are likely to compensate when they are highly concerned about the parties’ reaching an agreement, but the chances for one appear slight. In this case, the third party has significant motivation to use available resources as incentives to promote agreements. Finally, the third party is most likely to press when the intervenor is not highly concerned about hav- ing the parties reach settlement, and there appears to be little common ground on which to build the intervention. In this case the third party may feel there is nothing to lose in pressuring parties because the outcome is not seen as greatly significant. It has also been found that third parties may be more likely to use pressing tactics at later stages of the intervention because intervenors may become increasingly pessimistic about the amount of common ground as the intervention proceeds. Of the four intervention approaches in this model, the press stance has received the most attention in other studies of third party adaptation. Several other factors appear to influence whether third parties adopt a pressing strategy (Kressel, Pruitt, & Associates, 1989). There is a tendency for intervenors to become more directive when the intervenors’ own values or interests clash with the parties’. One study of labor arbitrators found, for example, that arbitrators often settled labor grievances in ways consistent with the interests and rights of management rather than workers (Gross & Greenfield, 1986). Pressure tactics also appear to be more likely when the disputing parties are very hostile toward each other. For instance, mediators have been found to press for concessions, mention costs of failing to settle, and attempt to change bargaining expec- tations when parties are hostile (Hiltrop, 1985, 1989; Kochan & Jick, 1978). Similarly, divorce Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Figure 9.1 Third Party Intervention Approaches High Compensate Integrate Concern for parties’ aspirations Low Press Inaction Low High Mediator’s perception of common ground Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  274 Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention and family mediators have been found to impose more procedural structure and control when parties became defensive (Donohue, 1991). Third parties may also be more directive under the pressures of a deadline, when they have well-defined formal mandates, or when they are biased toward one side (Kressel, Pruitt, & Associates, 1989; Zartman & Faure, 2005). CASE STUDY 9.3 MEDIATOR PRESSURE AND THE INTRANSIGENT NEGOTIATOR At a recent mediation conference, an experienced mediator conducted a training that focused on dealing with difficult parties in contract mediations. He indicated that he mediates many large contract disputes in which the parties (usually senior company officials) try to negotiate a settlement in mediation sessions that he conducts. The com- pany officials usually have their attorneys present with them in the mediation session to provide counsel and advice as the negotiations unfold. The trainer indicated that in some difficult cases one of the parties becomes unreasonable and inflexible. One party refuses to budge at all on his/her position in the mediation or makes unreasonable or outrageous demands as the negotiations unfold. This inflexibility persists even though the lawyer representing the party seems to prefer that the party move from his or her position for the sake of reaching a compromising agreement and ending the dispute. When such sit- uations arise, the trainer recommends a specific approach to intervening in the dispute. The trainer suggested that the mediator might engage in a conversation with the lawyer of the intransigent party in earshot of the party, but stage it in a way that the party does not think that the mediator knows he or she can hear what the lawyer and mediator are talking about. The conversation with the lawyer should focus on a range of quite negative consequences that might occur if the party does not move from his or her tough position in the negotiations. The intent of the overheard conversation is to “scare” the inflexible party by making him or her feel that the lawyer and mediator know what can happen if the party remains intransigent and that, in a sense, they have given up talking to the party directly. This tactic can create positive change in the dynamics of the negotiation when the inflexible party decides to shift because of the information he or she has overheard. Copyright © 2017. Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Discussion Questions Consider the following questions about the mediator’s intervention in this conflict: Why would the mediator’s pressure tactic of staging a conversation with the inflex- ible party’s lawyer be effective in some mediations? What makes it work? In your view, was the mediator’s tactic ethical? Why or why not? When a party is inflexible, how far should mediators go in trying to pressure parties to change their minds, compromise, or give up their views? When are such pres- sure tactics justifiable to reach agreements in difficult conflicts? When do such pressure tactics do more to meet the mediator’s needs than the parties? Folger, Joseph P., et al. Working Through Conflict : Strategies for Relationships, Groups, and Organizations, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uhdowntown/detail.action?docID=5231336. Created from uhdowntown on 2023-10-21 04:38:15.  Chapter 9 Third Party Intervention 275 In addition to studies that bear on the general approaches to intervention, such as those dis- cussed in the Carnevale and associates model, other more specific moves that third parties make are contingent on emerging factors as well. When bargainers bring too many issues to the table during negotiations, mediators often attempt to reduce the agenda, develop an over- arching framework, or prioritize issues (Carnevale & Pegnetter, 1985). When bargainers lack experience, mediators also simplify agendas and try to educate parties in impasse processes. When issues have a potential impact on absent parties (e.g., children in a custody mediation) and absent parties’ interests are not well represented by the disputants, third parties are more likely to reject suggestions and terms for settlement (Folger & Bernard, 1985). Third party intervenors are, in a real sense, part of the ongoing conflict. Their moves shape and define interaction in ways similar to the disputing parties’ moves: Moves by third parties are possible because of endorsed power, they are adaptive to moment-to-moment influences in the unfolding conflict, and they are influential in shaping the overall conflict and its outcomes. When a third party is involved in conflict, conflict interaction is, in important ways, constituted by his or her moves and countermoves as well as those of the disputants. 9.2 PROPERTY 2: PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR IN CONFLICT TEND TO PERPETUATE THEMSELVES 9.2.1 Third Parties and Conflict Cycles The self-perpetuating nature of conflict interaction is often a rationale for bringing a third party into a conflict. If interaction is self-perpetuating, if momentum becomes difficult for disputing parties to control or direct, or if cycles of interaction are difficult to recognize because parties contribute to them, then a third party may have the best chance to alter the repetitive tenden- cies. But the discussion of how the first property of conflict interaction applies to intervention shows that third parties do not stand apart from the conflict interaction—they are interactors themselves. Does this mean that third parties’ moves are vulnerable to the self-perpetuating tendencies of conflict interaction? Or that interaction involving third parties is itself self-perpetuating? In