Chapter 1.PDF

Chapter 1 Organizing Themes in Development Learning Objectives After reading this chapter, you should be able to: 1.1 Explain the role of developmental science (research and theory) in the problem-solving processes of reflective practitioners. 1.2 Identify distinguishing charact...

Chapter 1 Organizing Themes in Development Learning Objectives After reading this chapter, you should be able to: 1.1 Explain the role of developmental science (research and theory) in the problem-solving processes of reflective practitioners. 1.2 Identify distinguishing characteristics and core issues of classic theoretical approaches in developmental science, particularly classic stage theories and incremental theories. 1.3 Explain how and why contemporary multidimensional developmental theories synthesize the extreme positions of classic theorists and assess advantages and disadvantages of using multidimensional approaches. 1.4 Identify three core developmental issues and contrast current research-based conclusions with classic assumptions on each core issue. Mai is a 56-year-old woman who was born to a poor Vietnamese immigrant family in rural California. When Mai was 5, her parents moved the family to a large city where they eventually succeeded in building a stable business that provided an adequate income. Mai was typically quiet and shy, and she had difficulty making friends in ele- mentary school, often feeling left out of her peers’ activities. Her social life improved in adolescence, but she often felt the need to hide her outstanding academic skills in order to fit in. In college and medical school, Mai felt more accepted for her intellec- tual prowess and freer to be herself, but she still ruminated at times about what oth- ers thought of her, and was plagued by vague anxieties. By her mid-twenties, cyclical problems with depression and anxiety had become a part of her existence. Her mar- riage at 33 to a scholarly man provided a haven for her, and life seemed calmer and less frightening. After the birth of a son at age 38, Mai again felt overwhelmed by anxi- ety. The couple struggled to balance the complex needs of a fragile infant with their own careers, and Mai’s husband found her heavy dependence on his attention and calming influence difficult to accommodate. As their son grew, however, the couple handled the balancing act more skillfully. Now, Mai’s child is starting college. Mai is busy with her work and usually finds her anxiety manageable. She continues to view her husband as the steadying force in her life. Mai’s story raises a host of questions about the influences that have shaped her life. How important was Mai’s early poverty, her cultural background, and her 1 2 Chapter 1 parents’ immigrant status? What was the source of her early social inhibition? Would things have been different for her if her parents had not been able to eventually pro- vide economic stability? Were Mai’s early difficulties forming social relationships just a “stage,” or were they foundational to her later problems with depression and anxiety? Did stereotype threat (expecting to be judged on the basis of ethnicity or gender) play a role? How unusual is it for a married couple to experience increased conflicts following the birth of a child? If Mai and her husband had divorced, would their child have suffered lasting emotional damage? Is Mai’s intellectual ability likely to change as she continues to age? Are her emotional problems likely to increase or decrease? What factors enable any person to overcome early unfavorable experiences and become a successful, healthy adult? And conversely, why do some people who do well as children experience emotional or behavioral problems as adults? These intriguing questions represent a sampling of the kinds of topics that developmental scientists tackle. Their goal is to understand life span development: human behav- ioral change from conception to death. “Behavioral” change refers broadly to change in both observable activity (e.g., from crawling to walking) and mental activity (e.g., from disorganized to logical thinking). More specifically, developmental science seeks to describe people’s behavioral characteristics at different ages, identify how people are likely to respond to life’s experiences at different ages, formulate theories that explain how and why we see the typical characteristics and responses that we do, understand what factors contribute to developmental differences from one person to another, and understand how behavior is influenced by cultural context and by changes in cul- ture across generations. Using an array of scientific tools designed to obtain objective (unbiased) information, developmentalists make careful observations and measurements, and they test theo- retical explanations empirically. The Appendix, A Practitioner’s Guide to the Methods of Developmental Science, provides a guide to these techniques. An understanding of the processes that lead to objective knowledge will help you evaluate new information from any source as you move forward in your career as a practitioner. Developmental science is not a remote or esoteric body of knowledge. Rather, it has much to offer helping professionals in both their careers and their personal lives. As you study developmental science, you will build a knowledge base of information about age-related behaviors and about causal theories that help orga- nize and make sense of these behaviors. These tools will help you better under- stand client concerns that are rooted in shared human experience. And when you think about clients’ problems from a developmental perspective, you will increase the range of problem-solving strategies that you can offer. Finally, studying devel- opment can facilitate personal growth by providing a foundation for reflecting on your own life. Reflection and Action 1.1 Explain the role of developmental science (research and theory) in the prob- lem-solving processes of reflective practitioners. Despite strong support for a comprehensive academic grounding in scientific devel- opmental knowledge for helping professionals (e.g., Van Hesteren & Ivey, 1990), there has been a somewhat uneasy alliance between practitioners, such as mental health professionals, and those with a more empirical bent, such as behavioral scien- tists. The clinical fields have depended on research from developmental psychology  Organizing Themes in Development 3 to inform their practice. Yet in the past, overreliance on traditional experimental methodologies sometimes resulted in researchers’ neglect of important issues that could not be studied using these rigorous methods (Hetherington, 1998). Conse- quently, there was a tendency for clinicians to perceive some behavioral science lit- erature as irrelevant to real-world concerns (Turner, 1986). Clearly, the gap between science and practice is not unique to the mental health professions. Medicine, educa- tion, and law have all struggled with the problems involved in preparing students to grapple with the complex demands of the workplace. Contemporary debate on this issue has led to the development of serious alternative paradigms for the training of practitioners. One of the most promising of these alternatives for helping professionals is the con- cept of reflective practice. The idea of “reflectivity” derives from Dewey’s (1933/1998) view of education, which emphasized careful consideration of one’s beliefs and forms of knowledge as a precursor to practice. Donald Schon (1987), a pioneer in the field of reflective practice, describes the problem this way: In the varied topography of professional practice, there is a high, hard ground over- looking a swamp. On the high ground, manageable problems lend themselves to solu- tion through the application of research-based theory and technique. In the swampy lowland, messy confusing problems defy technical solutions. The irony of this situa- tion is that the problems of the high ground tend to be relatively unimportant to indi- viduals or society at large, however great their technical interest may be, while in the swamp lie the problems of greatest human concern. (p. 3) The Gap Between Science and Practice Traditionally, the modern, university-based educational process has been driven by the belief that problems can be solved best by applying objective, technical, or sci- entific information amassed from laboratory investigations. Implicit in this assump- tion is that human nature operates according to universal principles that, if known and understood, will enable us to predict behavior. For example, if I understand the principles of conditioning and reinforcement, I can apply a contingency contract to modify my client’s inappropriate behavior. Postmodern critics have pointed out the many difficulties associated with this approach. Sometimes a “problem” behav- ior is related to, or maintained by, neurological, systemic, or cultural conditions. Sometimes the very existence of a problem may be a cultural construction. Unless a problem is viewed within its larger context, a problem-solving strategy may prove ineffective. Most of the situations helpers face are confusing, complex, ill defined, and often unresponsive to the application of a simple, specific set of scientific principles. Thus, the training of helping professionals often involves a “dual curriculum.” The first is more formal and may be presented as a conglomeration of research-based facts, whereas the second, often learned in a practicum, field placement, or first job, covers the curriculum of “what is really done” when working with clients. Unfortunately, some practitioners lose sight of the value of research-based knowledge in this process. The antidote to this dichotomous pedagogy, Schon (1987) and his followers suggest, is reflective practice. This is a creative method of thinking about practice in which the helper masters the knowledge and skills base pertinent to the profession but is encour- aged to go beyond rote technical applications to generate new kinds of understanding and strategies of action. Rather than relying solely on objective technical applica- tions to determine ways of operating in a given situation, the reflective practitioner constructs solutions to problems by engaging in personal hypothesis generating and hypothesis testing. Reflective practices are now used across a wide range of helping professions, from counseling and psychology to education to medicine and nursing (Curtis, Elkins, Duran, & Venta, 2016). How can you use the knowledge of developmental science in a meaningful and reflective way? What place does it have in the process of reflective construction? 4 Chapter 1 A consideration of another important line of research, namely, that of characteris- tics of expert problem solvers, will help us answer this question. Research studies on expert–novice differences in many areas such as teaching, science, and athletics all support the contention that experts have a great store of knowledge and skill in a particular area. Expertise is domain-specific. When compared to novices in any given field, experts possess well-organized and integrated stores of information that they draw on, almost automatically, when faced with novel challenges. Because this knowledge is well practiced, truly a “working body” of information, retrieval is rela- tively easy (Lewandowsky & Thomas, 2009). Progress in problem solving is closely self-monitored. Problems are analyzed and broken down into smaller units, which can be handled more efficiently. If we apply this information to the reflective practice model, you will see some connections. One core condition of reflective practice is that practitioners use theory as a “partial lens through which to consider a problem” (Nelson & Neufelt, 1998). Practitioners also use another partial lens: their professional and other life experience. In reflective practice, theory-driven hypotheses about client and system problems are generated and tested for goodness of fit. A rich supply of problem-solving strate- gies depends on a deep understanding of and thorough grounding in fundamental knowledge germane to the field. Notice that there is a sequence to reflective practice. Schon (1987), for example, argues against putting the cart before the horse. He states that true reflectivity depends on the ability to “recognize and apply standard rules, facts and operations; then to reason from general rules to problematic cases in ways characteristic of the profession; and only then to develop and test new forms of under- standing and action where familiar categories and ways of thinking fail” (p. 40). In other words, background knowledge is important, but it is most useful in a dynamic interaction with contextual applications. The most effective helpers can shift flexibly between the “big picture” that their knowledge base provides and the unique prob- lems and contexts that they confront in practice (Ferreira, Basseches, & Vasco, 2016). A working knowledge of human development supplies the helping professional with a firm base from which to proceed. Given the relevance of background knowledge to expertise in helping and to reflective practice, we hope we have made a sufficiently convincing case for the study of developmental science. However, it is obvious that students approaching this study are not “blank slates.” You already have many ideas and theories about the ways that people grow and change. These implicit theories have been constructed over time, partly from personal experience, observation, and your own cultural “take” on situations. Dweck and her colleagues have demonstrated that reliably dif- ferent interpretations of situations can be predicted based on individual differences in people’s implicit beliefs about certain human attributes, such as intelligence or personality (see Dweck, 2006, 2017). Take the case of intelligence. If you happen to hold the implicit belief that a person’s intellectual capacity can change and improve over time, you might be more inclined to take a skill-building approach to some presenting problem involving knowledge or ability. However, if you espouse the belief that a person’s intelligence is fixed and not amenable to incremental improve- ment, possibly because of genetic inheritance, you might be more likely to encourage a client to cope with and adjust to cognitive limitations. For helping professionals, the implicit theoretical lens that shapes their worldview can have important implica- tions for their clients. We are often reluctant to give up our personal theories even in the face of evidence that these theories are incorrect (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016; ­Rousseau & Gunia, 2016). The critical thinking that reflective practice requires can be impaired for many reasons, especially if we are busy and feel overwhelmed by the demands of the moment. The best antidote to misapplication of our personal views is self-monitoring: being aware of what our theories are and recognizing that they are only one of a set of possibilities. (See Chapter 11 for a more extensive discussion of this issue.) Before we discuss some specific beliefs about the nature of development, take a few minutes to consider what you think about the questions posed in Box 1.1.  Organizing Themes in Development 5 Box 1.1: Questionnaire Examine Your Beliefs About Development Rate yourself using the forced-choice format for each of the following items. 1. Physical characteristics such as eye color, height, and weight are primarily inherited through genes. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Moderately Agree Strongly Agree 2. Intelligence is primarily inherited through genes. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Moderately Agree Strongly Agree 3. Personality is primarily inherited through genes. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Moderately Agree Strongly Agree 4. Events in the first 3 years of life have permanent effects on a person’s psychological development. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Moderately Agree Strongly Agree 5. People’s personalities do not change very much over their lifetimes. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Moderately Agree Strongly Agree 6. People all go through the same stages in their lives. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Moderately Agree Strongly Agree 7. Parents’ socialization practices are the primary determiners of their children’s mental health. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Moderately Agree Strongly Agree 8. The cultural context in which the individual lives profoundly affects the psychological development of that person. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Moderately Agree Strongly Agree 9. Common sense is a better guide to child rearing than is scientific knowledge. ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ Strongly Disagree Moderately Disagree Moderately Agree Strongly Agree MyLab Education Self-Check 1.1 A Historical Perspective on Developmental Theories 1.2 Identify distinguishing characteristics and core issues of classic theoretical approaches in developmental science, particularly classic stage theories and incremental theories. Now that you have examined some of your own developmental assumptions, let’s consider the theoretical views that influence developmentalists, with special attention to how these views have evolved through the history of developmental science. Later, we will examine how different theoretical approaches might affect the helping process. Like you, developmental scientists bring to their studies theoretical assumptions that help to structure their understanding of known facts. These assumptions also 6 Chapter 1 guide their research and shape how they interpret new findings. Scientists tend to develop theories that are consistent with their own cultural background and expe- rience; no one operates in a vacuum. A core value of Western scientific method is a pursuit of objectivity, so that scientists are committed to continuously evaluating their theories in light of evidence. As a consequence, scientific theories change over time. Throughout this text, you will be introduced to many developmental theories. Some are broad and sweeping in their coverage of whole areas of development, such as Freud’s theory of personality development (see Chapters 7 and 8) or Piaget’s theory of cognitive development (see Chapters 3, 6, and 9); some are narrower in scope, focusing on a particular issue, such as Vygotsky’s theory of the enculturation of knowledge (see Chapter 3) or Bowlby’s attachment theory (see Chapters 4 and 12). You will see that newer theories usually incorporate empirically verified ideas from older theories. Sci- entific theories of human development began to emerge in Europe and America in the 19th century. They had their roots in philosophical inquiry, in the emergence of bio- logical science, and in the growth of mass education that accompanied industrializa- tion. Throughout medieval times in European societies, children and adults of all ages seem to have been viewed and treated in very similar ways (Aries, 1960). Only infants and preschoolers were free of adult responsibilities, although they were not always given the special protections and nurture that they are today. At age 6 or 7, children took on adult roles, doing farmwork or learning a trade, often leaving their families to become apprentices. As the Industrial Revolution advanced, children worked beside adults in mines and factories. People generally seemed “indifferent to children’s spe- cial characteristics” (Crain, 2005, p. 2), and there was no real study of children or how they change. The notion that children only gradually develop the cognitive and personality structures that will characterize them as adults first appeared in the writings of 17th- and 18th-century philosophers, such as John Locke in Great Britain and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in France. In the 19th century, Charles Darwin’s theory of the evolution of species and the growth of biological science helped to foster scholarly interest in chil- dren. The assumption grew that a close examination of how children change might help advance our understanding of the human species. Darwin himself introduced an early approach to child study, the “baby biography,” writing a richly detailed account of his young son’s daily changes in language and behavior. By the 18th and 19th cen- turies, the Industrial Revolution led to the growth of “middle-class” occupations (e.g., merchandizing) that required an academic education: training in reading, writing, and math. The need to educate large numbers of children sharpened the public’s interest in understanding how children change with age. The first academic departments devoted to child study began to appear on ­American college campuses in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The idea that development continues even in adulthood was a 20th-century concept and a natu- ral outgrowth of the study of children. If children’s mental and behavioral processes change over time, perhaps such processes continue to evolve beyond childhood. ­Interest in adult development was also piqued by dramatic increases in life expectancy in the 19th and 20th centuries, as well as cultural changes in how people live. Instead of single households combining three or four generations of family members, grandpar- ents and other relatives began to live apart from “nuclear families,” so that understand- ing the special needs and experiences of each age group took on greater importance. Most classic developmental theories emerged during the early and middle decades of the 20th century. Contemporary theories integrate ideas from many classic theories, as well as from other disciplines: modern genetics, neuroscience, cognitive science, psy- cholinguistics, anthropology, and social and cultural psychology. They acknowledge that human development is a complex synthesis of diverse processes at multiple levels of functioning. Because they embrace complexity, contemporary developmental theo- ries can be especially useful to helping professionals (Melchert, 2016). See the timeline in Figure 1.1 for a graphic summary of some of the key theories and ideas in the history of developmental science. You can expect that the most up-to-date theories you read about in this text will continue to change in the future, because theoretical ideas evolve as research t­esting  Organizing Themes in Development 7 FIGURE 1.1 Timeline of selected influences on developmental science with dates of representative works. 1923-Jean Piaget 1979-Urie Bronfenbrenner Developed theory of Studied the contextual children’s cognition, influences on development morality and language across cultures; popularized 1909-Alfred Binet development using a multidimensional systems Studied individual observational and model of developmental differences and empirical research processes (e.g., Bronfen- developmental changes methods; popularized brenner, 1979). in children’s intelligence constructivist views of development. (e.g., Binet & Simon, 1999-Michael Meaney 1916). and Moshe Szyf 1950-Erik Erikson 1911-John Dewey Studied the molecular 1872-Charles Darwin Developed a theory of processes involved in Extended research on development that Studied behavior of development to spanned the entire epigenetic transmission; species using ecologically valid settings lifespan; emphasized studied the effect of early observational like schools; emphasized social contexts (e.g., experience on gene techniques; documented the social context of Erikson, 1950/1963). expression (e.g., Meaney, children’s behavior in development 2001; Ramchandani, different cultures (e.g., (e.g., Dewey, 1911). Bhattacharya, Cervoni, & Darwin, 1965/1872). Szyf, 1999). Philosophical Antecedents 1800 1920 1960 2000 (Before 19th c) 1900 1940 1980 2020 Descartes Locke, 1904-G. Stanley Hall 1934-Lev Vygotsky Rousseau, etc. 1967–1969-John Bowlby Studied children’s Studied development of "normal development" thought and language and Mary Ainsworth 2002-Michael Rutter using scientific through the lens of Developed a theory of Studies the interaction methods and wrote an culture; emphasized the attachment that was of nature and nurture influential account of social nature of learning; fundamental to the and its implication for adolescent works originally in understanding of social and public policy (e.g., development (e.g., Russian became emotional development Rutter, 2002). Hall, 1904). available in English in the across the lifespan and 70s and 80s (e.g., across cultures (e.g., Vygotsky, 1934). Ainsworth, 1967; Bowlby, 1969/1982. 1920-Sigmund Freud 1984-Jerome Kagan/ Developed a theory of Dante Cicchetti child development Studied temperamental retrospectively from adult contributions to child patients’ psychoanalyses; development; explored emphasized unconscious questions of nature and processes and nurture (e.g., Kagan,1984). incorporated biological influences on Developed a theory that development (e.g., Freud, incorporated both normal and 1920/1955). abnormal developmental trajectories called developmental psychopathol- ogy; studies the effects of maltreatment on children’s development (e.g., Cicchetti, 1984). them either supports or does not support them. But theories are also likely to need adjusting because global shifts in immigration patterns, climate, and access to tech- nology and information are likely to modify behavior and perhaps even some of the processes that govern the development of behavior. Developmental theories must accommodate such changes (Jensen, 2012). Emphasizing Discontinuity: Classic Stage Theories Some of the most influential early theories of development described human change as occurring in stages. Imagine a girl when she is 4 months old and then again when she is 4 years old. If your sense is that these two versions of the same child are fun- damentally different in kind, with different intellectual capacities, different emotional structures, or different ways of perceiving others, you are thinking like a stage theorist. A stage is a period of time, perhaps several years, during which a person’s activities (at least in one broad domain) have certain characteristics in common. For example, we could say that in language development, the 4-month-old girl is in a preverbal stage: 8 Chapter 1 Among other things, her communications share in common the fact that they do not include talking. As a person moves to a different stage, the common characteristics of behavior change. In other words, a person’s activities have similar qualities within stages but different qualities across stages. Also, after long periods of stability, quali- tative shifts in behavior seem to happen relatively quickly. For example, the change from not talking to talking seems abrupt or discontinuous. It tends to happen between 12 and 18 months of age, and once it starts, language use seems to advance very rap- idly. A 4-year-old is someone who communicates primarily by talking; she is clearly in a verbal stage. The preverbal to verbal example illustrates two features of stage theories. First, they describe development as qualitative or transformational change, like the emer- gence of a tree from a seed. At each new stage, new forms of behavioral organization are both different from and more complex than the ones at previous stages. Increasing complexity suggests that development has “directionality.” There is a kind of unfold- ing or emergence of behavioral organization. Second, they imply periods of relative stability (within stages) and periods of rapid transition (between stages). Metaphorically, development is a staircase. Each new stage lifts a person to a new plateau for some period of time, and then there is another steep rise to another plateau. There seems to be discontinuity in these changes rather than change being a gradual, incremental process. One person might progress through a stage more quickly or slowly than another, but the sequence of stages is usually seen as the same across cultures and contexts, that is, universal. Also, despite the emphasis on qualitative discontinuities between stages, stage theorists argue for functional continuities across stages. That is, the same processes drive the shifts from stage to stage, such as brain maturation and social experience. Sigmund Freud’s theory of personality development began to influence develop- mental science in the early 1900s and was among the first to include a description of stages (e.g., Freud, 1905/1989, 1949/1969). Freud’s theory no longer takes center stage in the interpretations favored by most helping professionals or by developmental sci- entists. First, there is little evidence for some of the specific proposals in Freud’s theory (Loevinger, 1976). Second, his theory has been criticized for incorporating the gender biases of early 20th-century Austrian culture. Yet, some of Freud’s broad insights are routinely accepted and incorporated into other theories, such as his emphasis on the importance of early family relationships to infants’ emotional life, his notion that some behavior is unconsciously motivated, and his view that internal conflicts can play a pri- mary role in social functioning. Currently influential theories, like those of Erik Erikson and John Bowlby, incorporated some aspects of Freud’s theories or were developed to contrast with Freud’s ideas. For these reasons, it is important to understand Freud’s theory. Also, his ideas have permeated popular culture, and they influence many of our assumptions about the development of behavior. As you work to make explicit your own implicit assumptions about development, it will help to understand their origins and how well the theories that spawned them stand up in the light of scientific investigation. FREUD’S PERSONALITY THEORY Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory both describes the complex functioning of the adult personality and offers an explanation of the processes and progress of its development throughout childhood. To understand any given stage it helps to under- stand Freud’s view of the fully developed adult. Id, Ego, and Superego. According to Freud, the adult personality functions as if there were actually three personalities, or aspects of personality, all potentially in conflict with one another. The first, the id, is the biological self, the source of all psychic energy. Babies are born with an id; the other two aspects of personality develop later. The id blindly pursues the fulfillment of physical needs or “instincts,” such as the hunger drive and the sex drive. It is irrational, driven by the pleasure principle, that is, by the pursuit of gratification. Its function is to keep the individual, and the species, alive, although Freud also proposed that there are inborn aggressive, destructive instincts served by the id.  Organizing Themes in Development 9 The ego begins to develop as cognitive and physical skills emerge. In Freud’s view, some psychic energy is invested in these skills, and a rational, realistic self begins to take shape. The id still presses for fulfillment of bodily needs, but the rational ego seeks to meet these needs in sensible ways that take into account all aspects of a situ- ation. For example, if you were hungry, and you saw a child with an ice cream cone, your id might press you to grab the cone away from the child—an instance of blind, immediate pleasure seeking. Of course, stealing ice cream from a child could have negative consequences if someone else saw you do it or if the child reported you to authorities. Unlike your id, your ego would operate on the reality principle, garner- ing your understanding of the world and of behavioral consequences to devise a more sensible and self-protective approach, such as waiting until you arrive at the ice cream store yourself and paying for an ice cream cone. The superego is the last of the three aspects of personality to emerge. Psychic energy is invested in this “internalized parent” during the preschool period as chil- dren begin to feel guilty if they behave in ways that are inconsistent with parental restrictions. With the superego in place, the ego must now take account not only of instinctual pressures from the id, and of external realities, but also of the superego’s constraints. It must meet the needs of the id without upsetting the superego to avoid the unpleasant anxiety of guilt. In this view, when you choose against stealing a child’s ice cream cone to meet your immediate hunger, your ego is taking account not only of the realistic problems of getting caught but also of the unpleasant feelings that would be generated by the superego. The Psychosexual Stages. In Freud’s view, the complexities of the relationships and conflicts that arise among the id, the ego, and the superego are the result of the individual’s experiences during five developmental stages. Freud called these psycho- sexual stages because he believed that changes in the id and its energy levels initiated each new stage. The term sexual here applies to all biological instincts or drives and their satisfaction, and it can be broadly defined as “sensual.” For each stage, Freud posited that a disproportionate amount of id energy is invested in drives satisfied through one part of the body. As a result, the pleasure experienced through that body part is especially great during that stage. Children’s experiences satisfying the especially strong needs that emerge at a given stage can influence the development of personality characteristics throughout life. Freud also thought that parents typically play a pivotal role in helping children achieve the sat- isfaction they need. For example, in the oral stage, corresponding to the first year of life, Freud argued that the mouth is the body part that provides babies with the most pleasure. Eating, drinking, and even nonnutritive sucking are presumably more satis- fying than at other times of life. A baby’s experiences with feeding and other parenting behaviors are likely to affect her oral pleasure, and could influence how much energy she invests in seeking oral pleasure in the future. Suppose that a mother in the early 20th century believed the parenting advice of “experts” who claimed that nonnutritive sucking is bad for babies. To prevent her baby from sucking her thumb, the mother might tie the baby’s hands to the sides of the crib at night—a practice recommended by the same experts! Freudian theory would predict that such extreme denial of oral pleasure could cause an oral fixation: The girl might grow up needing oral pleasures more than most adults, perhaps leading to overeating, to being especially talkative, or to being a chain smoker. The grown woman might also exhibit this fixation in more subtle ways, maintaining behaviors or feelings in adulthood that are particularly char- acteristic of babies, such as crying easily or experiencing overwhelming feelings of helplessness. According to Freud, fixations at any stage could be the result of either denial of a child’s needs, as in this example, or overindulgence of those needs. Specific defense mechanisms, such as “reaction formation” or “repression,” can also be associ- ated with the conflicts that arise at a particular stage. In Table 1.1, you will find a summary of the basic characteristics of Freud’s five psychosexual stages. Some of these stages will be described in more detail in later chapters. Freud’s stages have many of the properties of critical (or sensitive) peri- ods for personality development. That is, they are time frames during which certain developments must occur or can most fully form. Freud’s third stage, for example, 10 Chapter 1 TABLE 1.1 Freud’s Psychosexual Stages of Development STAGE APPROXIMATE AGE DESCRIPTION Oral Birth to 1 year Infants develop special relationships with caregivers. Mouth is the source of greatest pleasure. Too much or too little oral satisfaction can cause an “oral fixation,” leading to traits that actively (smoking) or symbolically (overdependency) are oral or infantile. Anal 1 to 3 years Anal area is the source of greatest pleasure. Harsh or overly indulgent toilet training can cause an “anal fixa- tion,” leading to later adult traits that recall this stage, such as being greedy or messy. Phallic 3 to 5 or 6 years Genitalia are the source of greatest pleasure. Sexual desire directed toward the opposite-sex parent makes the same-sex parent a rival. Fear of angering the same-sex parent is resolved by identifying with that par- ent, which explains how children acquire both sex-typed behaviors and moral values. If a child has trouble resolving the emotional upheaval of this stage through identification, sex role development may be deviant or moral character may be weak. Latency 6 years to puberty Relatively quiescent period of personality development. Sexual desires are repressed after the turmoil of the last stage. Energy is directed into work and play. There is continued consolidation of traits laid down in the first three stages. Genital Puberty through adulthood At puberty, adult sexual needs become the most important motivators of behavior. The individual seeks to fulfill needs and expend energy in socially acceptable activities, such as work, and through marriage with a partner who will substitute for the early object of desire, the opposite-sex parent. provides an opportunity for sex typing and moral processes to emerge (see Table 1.1). Notice that Freud assumed that much of personality development occurs before age 5, during the first three stages. This is one of the many ideas from Freud’s theory that has made its way into popular culture, even though modern research clearly does not support this position. By the mid-1900s, two other major stage theories began to significantly impact the progress of developmental science. The first, by Erik Erikson, was focused on per- sonality development, reshaping some of Freud’s ideas. The second, by Jean Piaget, proposed that there are stagelike changes in cognitive processes during childhood and adolescence, especially in rational thinking and problem solving. ERIKSON’S PERSONALITY THEORY Erik Erikson studied psychoanalytic theory with Anna Freud, Sigmund’s daugh- ter, and later proposed his own theory of personality development (e.g., Erikson, 1950/1963). Like many “neo-Freudians,” Erikson deemphasized the id as the driv- ing force behind all behavior, and he emphasized the more rational processes of the ego. His theory is focused on explaining the psychosocial aspects of behavior: attitudes and feelings toward the self and toward others. Erikson described eight psychosocial stages. The first five correspond to the age periods laid out in Freud’s psychosexual stages, but the last three are adult life stages, reflecting Erikson’s view that personal identity and interpersonal attitudes are continually evolving from birth to death. The “Eight Stages of Man.” In each stage, the individual faces a different “crisis” or developmental task (see Chapter 9 for a detailed discussion of Erikson’s concept of crisis). The crisis is initiated, on one hand, by changing characteristics of the per- son—biological maturation or decline, cognitive changes, advancing (or deteriorating) motor skills—and, on the other hand, by corresponding changes in others’ attitudes, behaviors, and expectations. As in all stage theories, people qualitatively change from stage to stage, and so do the crises or tasks that they confront. In the first stage, infants must resolve the crisis of trust versus mistrust (see Chapter 4). Infants, in their rela- tive helplessness, are “incorporative.” They “take in” what is offered, including not only nourishment but also stimulation, information, affection, and attention. If infants’ needs for such input are met by responsive caregivers, they will begin to trust others, to feel valued and valuable, and to view the world as a safe place. If caregivers are not consistently responsive, infants will fail to establish basic trust or to feel valuable, car- rying mistrust with them into the next stage of development, when the 1- to 3-year-old  Organizing Themes in Development 11 toddler faces the crisis of autonomy versus shame and doubt. Mistrust in others and self will make it more difficult to successfully achieve a sense of autonomy. The new stage is initiated by the child’s maturing muscular control and emerging cognitive and language skills. Unlike helpless infants, toddlers can learn not only to control their elimination but also to feed and dress themselves, to express their desires with some precision, and to move around the environment without help. The new capacities bring a strong need to practice and perfect the skills that make children feel in control of their own destinies. Caregivers must be sensitive to the child’s need for independence and yet must exercise enough control to keep the child safe and to help MyLab Education the child learn self-control. Failure to strike the right balance may rob children of feel- Video Example 1.1 ings of autonomy—a sense that “I can do it myself”—and can promote instead either The children in this preschool class- shame or self-doubt. room are preparing for their lunch. These first two stages illustrate features of all of Erikson’s stages (see Table 1.2 As you watch, note the ways that for a description of all eight stages). First, others’ sensitivity and responsiveness to the children demonstrate a devel- oped sense of autonomy and an the individual’s needs create a context for positive psychosocial development. Second, emerging sense of initiative. attitudes toward self and toward others emerge together. For example, developing trust in others also means valuing (or trusting) the self. Third, every psychosocial crisis or task involves finding the right balance between positive and negative feelings, with the positive outweighing the negative. Finally, the successful resolution of a crisis at one stage helps smooth the way for successful resolutions of future crises. Unsuccess- ful resolution at an earlier stage may stall progress and make maladaptive behavior more likely. Erikson’s personality theory is often more appealing to helping professionals than Freud’s theory. Erikson’s emphasis on the psychosocial aspects of personality focuses attention on precisely the issues that helpers feel they are most often called on to address: feelings and attitudes about self and about others. Also, Erikson assumed TABLE 1.2 Erikson’s Psychosocial Stages of Development STAGE OR POSITIVE OUTCOME PSYCHOSOCIAL OR VIRTUE NEGATIVE “CRISIS” APPROXIMATE AGE SIGNIFICANT EVENTS DEVELOPED OUTCOME Trust vs. Mistrust Birth to 1 year Child develops a sense that the world Hope Fear and mistrust of is a safe and reliable place because of others sensitive caregiving. Autonomy vs. Shame & 1 to 3 years Child develops a sense of independence Willpower Self-doubt Doubt tied to use of new mental and motor skills. Initiative vs. Guilt 3 to 5 or 6 years Child tries to behave in ways that involve Purpose Guilt over thought more “grown-up” responsibility and and action experiments with grown-up roles. Industry vs. Inferiority 6 to 12 years Child needs to learn important academic Competence Lack of skills and compare favorably with peers in competence school. Identity vs. Role Confusion 12 to 20 years Adolescent must move toward adulthood Identity and fidelity Inability to establish by making choices about values, sense of self vocational goals, etc. Intimacy vs. Isolation Young adulthood Adult becomes willing to share identity Love Fear of intimacy, with others and to commit to affiliations distancing and partnerships. Generativity vs. Stagnation Middle adulthood Adult wishes to make a contribution to Care Self-absorption the next generation, to produce, mentor, create something of lasting value, as in the rearing of children or community services or expert work. Ego Integrity vs. Despair Late adulthood Adult comes to terms with life’s successes, Wisdom Regret failures, and missed opportunities and realizes the dignity of own life. 12 Chapter 1 that the child or adult is an active, self-organizing individual who needs only the right social context to move in a positive direction. Further, Erikson was himself an optimistic therapist who believed that poorly resolved crises could be resolved more adequately in later stages if the right conditions prevailed. Erikson was sensitive to cultural differences in behavioral development. Finally, developmental researchers frequently find Eriksonian interpretations of behavior useful. Studies of attachment, self-concept, self-esteem, and adolescent identity, among other topics addressed in subsequent chapters, have produced results compatible with some of Erikson’s ideas. (See Chapter 4, Box 4.2 for a biographical sketch of Erikson.) PIAGET’S COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT THEORY In Jean Piaget’s cognitive development theory, we see the influence of 18th-century philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (e.g., 1762/1948), who argued that children’s rea- soning and understanding emerges naturally in stages and that parents and educa- tors can help most by allowing children freedom to explore their environments and by giving them learning experiences that are consistent with their level of ability. Similarly, Piaget outlined stages in the development of cognition, especially logical thinking, which he called operational thought (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1955/1958, 1964; Piaget, 1952, 1954). He assumed that normal adults are capable of thinking logically about both concrete and abstract contents but that this capacity evolves in four stages through childhood. Briefly, the first sensorimotor stage, lasting for about two years, is characterized by an absence of representational thought (see Chapter 3). Although babies are busy taking in the sensory world, organizing it on the basis of inborn reflexes or patterns, and then responding to their sensations, Piaget believed that they cannot yet symbolically represent their experiences, and so they cannot really reflect on them. This means that young infants do not form mental images or store memories symbolically, and they do not plan their behavior or intentionally act. These capacities emerge between 18 and 24 months, launching the next stage. Piaget’s second, third, and fourth stages roughly correspond to the preschool, elementary school, and the adolescent-adult years. These stages are named for the kinds of thinking that Piaget believed possible for these age groups. Table 1.3 sum- marizes each stage briefly, and we will describe the stages more fully in subsequent chapters. Piaget’s theory is another classic stage model. First, cognitive abilities are quali- tatively similar within stages. If we know how a child approaches one kind of task, we should be able to predict her approaches to other kinds of tasks as well. Piaget acknowledged that children might be advanced in one cognitive domain or lag behind in another. For example, an adolescent might show more abstract reasoning about math than about interpersonal matters. He called these within-stage varia- tions décalages. But generally, Piaget expected that a child’s thinking would be orga- nized in similar ways across most domains. Second, even though progress through TABLE 1.3 Piaget’s Cognitive Stages of Development STAGE APPROXIMATE AGE DESCRIPTION Sensorimotor Birth to 2 years Through six substages, the source of infants’ organized actions gradually shifts. At first, all organized behavior is reflexive—automatically triggered by particular stimuli. By the end of this stage, behavior is guided more by representational thought. Preoperational 2 to 6 or 7 years Early representational thought tends to be slow. Thought is “centered,” usually focused on one salient piece of information, or aspect of an event, at a time. As a result, thinking is usu- ally not yet logical. Concrete operational 7 to 11 or 12 years Thinking has gradually become more rapid and efficient, allowing children to now “decenter,” or think about more than one thing at a time. This also allows them to discover logical rela- tionships between/among pieces of information. Their logical thinking is best about informa- tion that can be demonstrated in the concrete world. Formal operational 12 years through adulthood Logical thinking extends now to “formal” or abstract material. Young adolescents can think logically about hypothetical situations, for example.  Organizing Themes in Development 13 the stages could move more or less quickly depending on many individual and con- textual factors, the stages unfold in an invariant sequence, regardless of context or culture. The simpler patterns of physical or mental activity at one stage become inte- grated into more complex organizational systems at the next stage (hierarchical inte- gration). Finally, despite the qualitative differences across stages, there are functional similarities or continuities from stage to stage in the ways in which children’s cogni- tive development proceeds. According to Piaget, developmental progress depends on children’s active engagement with the environment. This active process, which will be described in more detail in Chapter 3, suggests that children (and adults) build MyLab Education knowledge and understanding in a self-organizing way. They interpret new experi- Video Example 1.2 ences and information to fit their current ways of understanding even as they make Piaget proposed stagelike changes some adjustments to their understanding in the process. Children do not just pas- in cognitive processes as children sively receive information from without and store it “as is.” And, knowledge does not develop. Compare preoperational just emerge from within as though preformed. Instead, children actively build their thinking to concrete operational knowledge, using both existing knowledge and new information. This is a construc- thinking as you observe two tivist view of development. children’s responses to Piagetian conservation tasks in this video. Piaget’s ideas about cognitive development were first translated into English in the 1960s, and they swept American developmental researchers off their feet. His theory filled the need for an explanation that acknowledged complex qualitative changes in children’s abilities over time, and it launched an era of unprecedented research on all aspects of children’s intellectual functioning that continues today. Although many of the specifics of Piaget’s theory have been challenged by research findings, researchers, educators, and other helping professionals still find the broad outlines of this theory very useful for organizing their thinking about the kinds of understandings that children of different ages can bring to a problem or social situa- tion. Piaget’s theory also inspired some modern views of cognitive change in adult- hood. As you will see in Chapter 11, post-Piagetians have proposed additional stages in the development of logical thinking, hypothesizing that the abstract thinking of the adolescent is transformed during adulthood into a more relativistic kind of logi- cal thinking, partly as a function of adults’ practical experience with the complexity of real-world problems. Emphasizing Continuity: Incremental Change Unlike stage theories, some theoretical approaches characterize development as a more continuous process. Change tends to be incremental, metaphorically resem- bling not a staircase but a steadily rising mountainside. Again, picture a 4-month-old girl, and the same girl when she is 4 years old. If you tend to “see” her evolving in small steps from a smiling, attentive infant to a smiling, eager toddler, to a smiling, mischievous preschooler, always noting in your observations threads of sameness as well as differences, your own theoretical assumptions about development may be more compatible with one of these incremental models. Like stage models, they can be very different in the types and breadth of behaviors they attempt to explain. They also differ in the kinds of processes they assume to underlie psychological change, such as the kinds of processes involved in learning. But they all agree that develop- mental change is not marked by major, sweeping reorganizations that affect many behaviors at once, as in stage theories. Rather, change is steady and specific to partic- ular behaviors or behavioral domains. Incremental theorists, like stage theorists, tend to see “change for the better” as a key feature of development. So, adding words to your vocabulary over time would be a typical developmental change, but forgetting previously learned information might not. Social learning theory and most informa- tion processing theories are among the many incremental models available to explain development. LEARNING THEORIES Learning theories, in what is called the behaviorist tradition, have a distinguished history in American psychology. They were the most widely accepted class of theories through much of the 20th century, influenced by many thinkers from 14 Chapter 1 John B. Watson (e.g., 1913) to B. F. Skinner (e.g., 1938) to Albert Bandura (e.g., 1974). These theories trace their philosophical roots from ancient Greece and the writings of Aristotle through John Locke and the British empiricists of the 17th and 18th centuries. In this philosophical tradition, knowledge and skill are thought to accumulate as the result of each person’s individual experiences. The environment gradually leaves its imprint on one’s behavior and mind, a mind that in infancy is like a blank slate. Locke described several simple processes—association, repetition, imitation, reward, and punishment—by which the environment can have an impact. Many of the processes Locke described were incorporated into behaviorist approaches to development. Some learning theories explain behavioral change as a function of chains of spe- cific environmental events, such as those that occur in classical conditioning and operant conditioning. In these processes, change in behavior takes place because envi- ronmental events (stimuli) are paired with certain behaviors. Let’s begin with classi- cal conditioning, also called respondent conditioning (Vargas, 2009). A respondent is an automatic response to a stimulus. For example, when you hear an unexpected loud noise you will automatically produce a startle response. This stimulus/response association is unconditioned, built-in to your biological system. But the response can be conditioned to a new, neutral stimulus. Suppose a child calmly watches a dog approach her. At first, sight of the dog is a neutral stimulus. But the dog suddenly barks loudly, causing the child to automatically startle and pull back. Suppose that the next time the child sees the dog, it does not bark. Even so, just the sight of the dog trig- gers the same response as loud barking would: The child automatically startles and pulls back. The child has learned a new response, because the formerly neutral event (sight of dog) has been paired with an event (loud barking) that automatically causes a startle. Perhaps the startle reaction is also accompanied by feelings of fear. If so, the child has learned to fear this dog and will likely generalize that fear to other, similar dogs. When a neutral event or stimulus is associated with a stimulus that causes an automatic response, the neutral stimulus can become a conditioned stimulus, mean- ing that it can cause the person to make the same automatic response in the future, called a conditioned response. This is classical conditioning. Operant conditioning is different. First, a person performs some behavior. The behavior is an operant, any act with potential to lead to consequences in the environ- ment (that is, to “operate” on the environment). Immediately after the operant occurs, there is a “reinforcing event,” or reinforcement, something that is experienced by the person as pleasurable or rewarding. For example, suppose that a young child happens to babble “da” just as a dog appears in the child’s line of sight, and the child’s mother excitedly claps and kisses the child. (The mother has mistakenly assumed that the child has tried to say “dog.”) The mother’s reaction serves as a reinforcement for the child, who will repeat the “da” sound the next time a dog comes into view. In operant conditioning, the child learns to produce a spontaneous behavior or operant (e.g., “da”) in response to a cue (e.g., the appearance of a dog) because the behavior was MyLab Education previously reinforced in that situation. A reinforcement is a consequence of the oper- Video Example 1.3 ant behavior that maintains or increases the likelihood of that behavior when the cue Modeling is a particularly effective occurs again (Sparzo, 2011). The mother’s approving reaction is an example of a posi- teaching strategy with young chil- tive reinforcement: Something pleasurable is presented after the operant occurs. There dren, who can observe and replicate are also rewarding consequences that are called negative reinforcements: An aversive the behavior better than they can experience stops or is removed after the operant occurs. If your brother releases you understand complicated instruc- from a painful hammer-hold when you yell “Uncle,” you have been negatively rein- tions for how to do a task. forced for saying “Uncle” (the operant) in that situation. Social learning theories, which have focused specifically on how children acquire personality characteristics and social skills, consider conditioning processes part of the story, but they also emphasize “observational learning,” or modeling. In this kind of learning, one person (the learner) observes another (the model) performing some behavior, and just from close observation, learns to do it too. The observer may or may not imitate the modeled behavior, immediately or in the future, depending on many factors, such as whether the observer expects a reward for the behavior, whether the model is perceived as nurturing or competent, and even whether the observer believes that the performance will meet the observer’s own performance standards. Current  Organizing Themes in Development 15 versions of social learning theory emphasize many similar cognitive, self-regulated determiners of performance and suggest that they too are often learned from models (e.g., Bandura, 1974, 1999). Whatever the learning processes that are emphasized in a particular learning the- ory, the story of development is one in which behaviors or beliefs or feelings change in response to specific experiences, one experience at a time. Broader changes can occur by generalization. If new events are experienced that are very similar to events in the original learning context, the learned behaviors may be extended to these new events. For example, the child who learns to say “da” when a particular dog appears may do the same when other dogs appear, or even in the presence of other four-legged animals. Or a child who observes a model sharing candy with a friend may later share toys with a sibling. But these extensions of learned activities are narrow in scope compared to the sweeping changes hypothesized by stage theorists. While these processes explain changes in discrete behaviors or patterns of behavior, learning theories do not explain developmental reorganizations and adaptations in the ways classic stage theories do. INFORMATION PROCESSING THEORIES Since the introduction of computing technologies in the middle of the 20th century, some theorists have likened human cognitive functioning to computer processing of informa- tion. Not all information processing theories can be strictly classified as incremental theories, but many can. Like learning theories, these do not hypothesize broad stages, but emphasize incremental changes in narrow domains of behavior or thought. The mind works on information—attending to it, holding it in a temporary store or “work- ing memory,” putting it into long-term storage, using strategies to organize it or to draw conclusions from it, and so on. How the information is processed depends on general characteristics of the human computer, such as how much information can be accessed, or made available for our attention, at one time. These characteristics can change to some degree over time. For example, children’s attentional capacity increases gradually with age. Yet most changes with age are quite specific to particular domains of knowledge, such as changes in the strategies children use to solve certain kinds of problems. Furthermore, processing changes are not stagelike; they do not extend beyond the particular situation or problem space in which they occur. For example, Siegler and his colleagues (e.g., Siegler, 1996, 2007; Siegler & Svetina, 2006) describe changes in the ways that children do arithmetic, read, solve problems of various kinds, and perform many other tasks and skills. Siegler analyzes very particular changes in the kinds of strate- gies that children use when they attempt these tasks. Although there can be similarities across tasks in the ways that strategies change (e.g., they become more automatic with practice, they generalize to similar problems, etc.), usually the specific strategies used in one kind of task fail to apply to another, and changes are not coordinated across tasks. To illustrate, a kindergartner trying to solve an addition problem might use the strategy of “counting from one.” “[T]his typically involves putting up fingers on one hand to represent the first addend, putting up fingers on the other hand to represent the second addend, and then counting the raised fingers on both hands” (Siegler, 1998, p. 93). This strategy is characteristic of early addition efforts, but would play no role in tasks such as reading or spelling. Overall, then, cognitive development in this kind of model is like social development in social learning theories: It results from the accrual of independent changes in many different domains of thought and skill. Development involves change for the better, but it does not lead to major organizational shifts across domains. Classic Theories and the Major Issues They Raise Classic theories of development have typically addressed a set of core issues. In our brief review, you have been introduced to just a few of them. Is developmen- tal change qualitative (e.g., stagelike) or quantitative (e.g., incremental)? Are some developments restricted to certain critical periods in the life cycle or are changes in brain and behavior possible at any time given the appropriate opportunities? Are there important continuities across the life span (in characteristics or change pro- cesses) or is everything in flux? Are people actively influencing the course and nature 16 Chapter 1 of their own development (self-organizing), or are they passive products of other forces? Which is more important in causing developmental change, nature (heredity) or nurture (environment)? Are there universal developmental trajectories, processes, and changes that are the same in all cultures and historical periods, or is development more specific to place and time? Classic theorists usually took a stand on one side or the other of these issues, fram- ing them as “either-or” possibilities. However, taking an extreme position does not fit the data we now have available. Contemporary theorists propose that human devel- opment is best described by a synthesis of the extremes. The best answer to all of the questions just posed appears to be “Both.” MyLab Education Self-Check 1.2 Contemporary Multidimensional or Systems Theories: Embracing the Complexity of Development 1.3 Explain how and why contemporary multidimensional developmental theo- ries synthesize the extreme positions of classic theorists and assess advan- tages and disadvantages of using multidimensional approaches. Throughout this text you will find evidence that development is the result of the relationships among many causal components, interacting in complex ways. Mod- ern developmental theories, which we refer to as multidimensional or systems theories, explain and describe the enormous complexity of interrelated causal pro- cesses in development. They generally assume that in all behavioral domains, from cognition to personality, there are layers, or levels, of interacting causes for change: physical/molecular, biological, psychological, social, and cultural. What happens at one level both causes and is caused by what happens at other levels. That is, the relationships among causes are reciprocal or bidirectional processes. For example, increased testosterone levels at puberty (biological change) might help influence a boy to pursue an aggressive sport, like wrestling. The boy’s success at wrestling may cause his status and social dominance to rise among his male friends (social change), and this social change can reciprocally influence his biological functioning. Specifically, it can lead to additional increases in his testosterone levels (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1992). These theories acknowledge and incorporate many kinds of change: qualita- tive, transforming changes, both great (stagelike) and small (such as strategy changes within a particular problem-solving domain), as well as continuous, incremental vari- ations that can even be reversible, such as learning and then forgetting new informa- tion (e.g., Overton, 1990). This is one example of how contemporary theories integrate features of many classic theories of development. Think again about a girl who is 4 months old, and then later 4 years old. Do you perceive so many changes that she is transformed into a different sort of creature, and yet, at the same time, do you see enduring qualities that characterize her at both ages? Does your sense of the forces that have changed her include influences such as her family, community, and culture? Do you also recognize that she has played a signifi- cant role in her own change and in modifying those other forces? If so, your implicit assumptions about development may be more consistent with multidimensional mod- els than with either stage or incremental theories alone. Multidimensional theories portray the developing person metaphorically as a vine growing through a thick forest (Kagan, 1994). In doing so, the vine is propelled by its own inner processes, but its path, even its form, is in part created by the forest  Organizing Themes in Development 17 it inhabits. There is continuous growth, but there are changes in structure too—in its form and direction—as the vine wends its way through the forest. Finally, its presence in the forest changes the forest itself, affecting the growth of the trees and other plants, which reciprocally influence the growth of the vine. Many multidimensional theories have been proposed, but they are remark- ably similar in their fundamental assumptions and characteristics. They are typi- cally different in which aspects of development they provide most detail about. They include transactional theory (e.g., Sameroff & Chandler, 1975), relational ­theory (e.g., Lerner, 1998), dialectical theory (e.g., Sameroff, 2012), bioecological theory (e.g., ­Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994), bio-social-ecological theory (e.g., Cole & Packer, MyLab Education 2011), epigenetic theory (e.g., Gottlieb, 1992), life course theory (Elder & Shanahan, Video Example 1.4 2006), life span developmental theory (e.g., Baltes, 1997; Baltes, Lindenberger, & As he describes what he does when Staudinger, 2006), dynamic systems theory (e.g., Thelen & Smith, 1998), and several he is not in school, this young boy others. (See Overton, 2015, for a deeper analysis of the similarities and differences discusses primarily proximal pro- among these theories.) Figure 1.2 provides one illustration of the multiple, interacting cesses. What are some of the more forces that these theories identify. Two examples of multidimensional models will help distal processes that also have an effect on his development? flesh out the typical characteristics of many of these theories. BRONFENBRENNER’S BIOECOLOGICAL THEORY In his bioecological theory, Urie Bronfenbrenner and his colleagues (e.g., ­Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006) described all devel- opments—including personality and cognitive change—as a function of proximal pro- cesses. These are reciprocal interactions between an “active, evolving biopsychological human organism and the persons, objects and symbols in its immediate external envi- ronment” (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, p. 996). In other words, proximal processes refer to a person’s immediate interactions with people or with the physical environ- ment or with informational sources (such as books or movies). Proximal processes are truly interactive: The organism both influences and is influenced by the immediate environment. These proximal processes are modified by more distal processes. Some of these are within the organism—such as genes. Others are outside the immediate envi- ronment—such as features of the educational system or of the broader culture. The quality and effectiveness of the immediate environment—its responsiveness to the individual’s particular needs and characteristics and the opportunities it pro- vides—depend on the larger context. For example, parental monitoring of children’s homework benefits children’s academic performance. But monitoring is more effec- tive if parents are knowledgeable about the child’s work. A parent who insists that his child do her algebra homework may have less effect if the parent cannot be a resource who guides and explains the work. Thus, the parent’s own educational background affects the usefulness of the monitoring (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994). An individual’s characteristics also influence the effectiveness of the environment. For example, motivations affect the impact of learning opportunities in a given context. A man interested in gambling may learn to reason in very complex ways about horses and their relative probability of winning at the track, but he may not display such com- plex reasoning in other contexts (Ceci & Liker, 1986). Other important individual quali- ties include demand characteristics, behavioral tendencies that often either encourage or discourage certain kinds of reactions from others. A child who is shy and inhibited, a trait that appears to have some biological roots (Kagan & Fox, 2006), may often fail to elicit attention from others, and may receive less support when she needs it, than a child who is open and outgoing (Bell & Chapman, 1986; see also Chapters 4 and 5). Changes in the organism can be emergent, stagelike, qualitative changes, such as a shift from preoperational to concrete operational thought (see Table 1.3), or they can be more continuous, graded changes, such as shifts in academic interest or involve- ment in athletics. Both kinds of change are the result of proximal processes, influ- enced by more distal internal and external causes. Once changes occur, the individual brings new resources to these proximal processes. For example, when a child begins to demonstrate concrete operational thought, she will be given different tasks to do at home or at school than before, and she will learn things from those experiences that she would not have learned earlier. This is a good example of the bidirectionality of 18 Chapter 1 FIGURE 1.2 A multidimensional (systems) model of development. This figure illustrates the external influences described in Bronfenbrenner’s bioecological theory along with internal influences on the developing child over time. Two-way arrows show bidirectional causality between all adjacent levels and between different parts of the same level. Proximal processes occur at the interface between the child and her microsystems. MACROSYSTEM Social/cultural/economic norms, values, systems EXOSYSTEM Wider community members & organizations MESOSYSTEM Relationships among microsystem influences Dad Te m a Mo ch er MICROSYSTEM te Cl yma Direct interactors with child as sm Pla Pl ate ay mate Da d om M od ho Cla or s sm hb ate ig Ne Tea che r ol ho Sc Conscious Experience e.g., self-awareness, attentional focus Cognition, Motivation, Emotion e.g., knowledge, memory, language, needs, desires Bodily Networks (of organs/glands) e.g., nervous system, cardiovascular system Cellular Processes e.g., protein production Genetic processes: e.g., gene activation, gene suppression  Organizing Themes in Development 19 proximal processes: Change in the child fosters change in the environment, leading to more change in the child, and so on. In earlier versions of his theory, Bronfenbrenner characterized in detail the many levels of environment that influence a person’s development. He referred to the immediate environment, where proximal processes are played out, as the microsys- tem. Babies interact primarily with family members, but as children get older, other microsystems, such as the school, the neighborhood, or a local playground and its inhabitants, become part of their lives. The microsystems interact with and modify each other. For example, a discussion between a child’s parent and a teacher might change how one or both of them interacts with the child. The full set of relationships among the microsystems is called the mesosystem.The next level of the environ- ment, the exosystem, includes settings that children may not directly interact with but that influence the child nonetheless. For example, a teacher’s family life will influence the teacher and thereby the child. Or a child’s socioeconomic status influ- ences where her family lives, affecting the school the child will attend, and thus affecting the kinds of experiences the child has with teachers. Finally, there