Language, Thought, and Culture Chapter 9 PDF

9 Language, thought and culture Chapter 9 Language, thought and culture 9.1 A relationship at the heart of psycholinguistics The relationship of language, thought, and culture is a topic that is central to psycholinguistics. People throughout the ages have wondered whether speech or language is...

9 Language, thought and culture Chapter 9 Language, thought and culture 9.1 A relationship at the heart of psycholinguistics The relationship of language, thought, and culture is a topic that is central to psycholinguistics. People throughout the ages have wondered whether speech or language is necessary for thought. Can we think without lan- guage? Does language influence culture? Does language affect our perception of nature? Does language affect our view of society and the world? We shall deal directly with these questions. However, before doing so, we would like to begin in an indirect way – by recounting a court case, one that exemplifies the issues that we will consider. The case and the fate of Robert Meyer is true and it happened in the United States about 85 years ago. 9.1.1 The arrest of the Sunday School teacher In May of 1920, in Hamilton County, which is a rural area in the state of Nebraska, Robert Meyer was arrested for violating a certain state law. This Nebraska law forbade the teaching of a foreign language, that is, a language other than English, to children under the age of 13 years. Meyer had been teaching Bible stories in German at Zion Parochial school to a 10-year-old boy. Since German was a foreign language for the boy, Meyer was in viola- tion of the law. According to Nebraska’s 1919 Siman Act, No person shall teach any subject to any person in any language other than the English language. Languages other than English may be taught only after a pupil shall have... passed the eighth grade.... Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each offense. (US Supreme Court Reports, 1922, pp. 392–403) Actually not only Nebraska but 21 other states prohibited the teaching of foreign languages. Only so-called ‘dead’ languages such as Latin and 177 Language, mind and brain Greek could be taught. The states had passed these laws essentially with the German language as the target. America had just finished a war with Germany and generally there was a hatred of Germany and things German, particularly its military and authoritarian values, ideals, and political insti- tutions. The language law reflected the widespread American belief that the German language itself embodied all that was wrong in German culture and so to teach such a language to young Americans would be immoral and corrupting. It is here that the psycholinguistic question arises. Is it the case that a particular language such as German embodies the culture, values, and ideals of a particular people such as the German people? Let us put aside this question for the moment and return to the fate of Robert Meyer. Meyer appeals to the Nebraska Supreme Court Meyer was in fact found guilty. However, he decided to appeal his lower- court case to the Supreme Court of the state of Nebraska. (Each state in the United States has its own Supreme Court.) Ironically, lawyers for the state of Nebraska made essentially the same claim that the famous German philosopher, Wilhelm von Humboldt, made for the German language in 1836 (von Humboldt, 1971). That is, a language by its very nature represents the spirit and national character of a people. Never could von Humboldt have dreamed that the German national character and spirit (of which he was so proud), along with the German language, would be held in such disrepute by other countries as to result in their demanding the banning of anything German! The state of Nebraska argued that by teaching children the grammar, structure, and vocabulary of the German language, Meyer could harm American children by instilling in them the wicked German values that were embedded in the German language. The US Supreme Court takes a position on language, thought, and culture The Nebraska Supreme Court denied Meyer’s appeal, but Meyer was not content with that ruling. He took his case to the highest court in the country, the United States Supreme Court. There he won his case, with the court overturning his Nebraska convictions. The court declared as unconstitutional all laws in the United States that forbade the teaching of a foreign language. In its 1922 ruling, the court stated as one basis (there were others on con- stitutional grounds) for its decision that ‘Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful’ (p. 400). It maintained that knowing a foreign language would not in itself provide the values and culture of the country from which that language is derived. Was the court correct? It is up to us, in effect, to assess the validity of the court’s psy- cholinguistic conclusion. 178  9 Language, thought and culture 9.1.2 Can we distinguish a ‘safe’ from a ‘harmful’ second language? In the present case, the question is clear: if teaching a second language to children is antithetical to the morals and values of the society in which they live, then clearly children should not be taught a second language. Perhaps, though, a second language could be taught if that language is a ‘good’ language, i.e. does not conflict with the first language. But, if so, how are we to decide which are the good languages and which are the bad ones? Is it safe to teach American children the Italian and Russian languages since Fascists and Communists are no longer in control in Italy and Russia? On the other hand, is it dangerous to teach British children Chinese and Vietnamese because Communists control China and Vietnam? But then, what about teaching Korean, for there is Communism in North Korea but democracy in South Korea? And how about the teaching of Spanish – after all, there is Communism in Cuba but democracy in Spain? Just what are the safe or dangerous second languages, if any? These are among the problems with which we will deal in this chapter. 9.2 Four theories regarding the dependence of thought and culture on language It seems that most people take it for granted that thought is somehow dependent on language. However, there are a number of formulations that idea can take. Four principal formulations (some overlapping) concerning the relationship of language, thought, and culture that have been expressed over the centuries are as follows: l Theory 1: Speech is essential for thought. We must learn how to speak aloud, otherwise we cannot develop thinking. l Theory 2: Language is essential for thought. We must learn language, how to produce or understand speech, otherwise we cannot develop thinking. l Theory 3: Language determines or shapes our perception of nature. The learning of language will determine or influence the way we perceive the physical world, visually, auditorily, etc. l Theory 4: Language determines or shapes our world view. The learning of language will determine or influence the way we understand our culture and the world. Let us now discuss the adequacy of these four theories so that we may determine if further theorizing is necessary. 179 Language, mind and brain 9.3 Theory 1: Speech is essential for thought 9.3.1 Proponents of the theory Proponents of this view hold that thought is a kind of behaviour that originates from speech production. Typically, such theories are held by Behaviourists who wish to get rid of mind and Mentalism in psychology, linguistics, and philosophy and to replace the notion of thought or cognition with something that is physically observable or potentially observable. The psychologists Watson, Skinner, and Staats, the linguists Bloomfield and Liberman, and the philosophers Ryle and Quine are but a few of the many who advocated such a conception. They define thought as subvocal speech or behaviour and not something mental, as in the traditional view of psychology. The following quotations characterize the theory that thought originates from uttered speech: The simplest and most satisfactory view is that thought is simply behavior – verbal or nonverbal, covert or overt. It is not some mysterious process responsible for behavior but the very behavior itself in all the complexity of its controlling relations, with respect to both man the behaver and the environment in which he lives. (B. F. Skinner, 1957, p. 449) The fully literate person has succeeded in reducing these speech movements to the point where they are not even visible. That is, he has developed a system of internal substitute movements which serve him for private purpose, such as thinking and silent reading, in place of audible speech sounds. (Leonard Bloomfield, 1961, p. 31, from a 1942 paper) Articulatory movements and their sensory effects mediate between the acoustic stimulus and the event we call perception. (Alvin Liberman, 1957, p. 122) Liberman proposed the Motor Theory of Speech Perception, according to which, before we can understand speech, we must first repeat subvocally or internally what another person has said. Only by this prior motor act can we understand speech. 9.3.2 Inadequacies of the theory We would like to raise objections with regard to the adequacy of this theory. Sometimes, given the abstract and intangible nature of the subject matter, not all objections can be expected to be definitive. Our principal aim, how- ever, is to provide a number of objections whose combined effect is to raise reasonable doubts about the theory in question. We shall raise six objections to this theory. They are: (1) Children having no speech production can com- prehend speech and think; (2) Speech comprehension, which implies thought, 180  9 Language, thought and culture develops before speech production in normal children; (3) Simultaneously speaking aloud while thinking about something different commonly occurs in everyday life; (4) Telling a lie; (5) Meaning and thought occur without behaviour; and (6) Interpreting between languages can be done. Each of these objections will now be discussed in turn. 9.3.2.1 Children having no speech production can comprehend speech and think While the ability to utter speech in appropriate situations is a good indicator of language knowledge, the absence of the ability to produce speech may not indicate a lack of language knowledge. There are many hearing persons who are born mute. People such as these may be born with cerebral palsy or some other abnormality that prohibits them from articulating speech. In Chapter 1, we described among others the cases of Nolan, the noted Irish writer, and Rie, the 3-year-old Japanese child who learned to read words, with understanding, that she could not say. None of these persons could speak. Were these people able to think? Let us answer this question by implica- tion, since a direct answer would require a lengthy and contentious thesis on the nature of thought. If a person can comprehend the meaning of speech, that person must have the ability to think. It would be ludicrous to have to argue that persons exist who understand the meaning of speech but are unable to think. Surely the ability to answer items on an intelligence test presupposes the existence of thought in the person taking the test. It must therefore be concluded that persons without the ability to speak can think. The notion that speech production is necessary in order to think is clearly false. 9.3.2.2 Speech comprehension, which implies thought, develops before speech production in normal children As was discussed in Chapter 1, the developmental process is that speech comprehension precedes speech production. It is the pattern that continues throughout the acquisition process (Ingram, 1989), whether it be for first words (Clark and Barron, 1988), elaborate syntax such as passives (Golinkoff and Hirsch-Pasek, 1995), or the later acquisition of idioms and figurative speech (Levorato and Cacciari, 1995). The comprehension and production processes develop in a parallel mode with production always trying to keep up with comprehension. As the child acquires an aspect of language in comprehension, the child can then try to figure out how to use it in production. The child attempts to co- ordinate production with respect to the system that has been developed for understanding (Clark and Hecht, 1983). Thus, Huttenlocher (1974), who studied four young children aged 10 to 13 months over a six-month period, found that they were able to comprehend speech at a level beyond that to which they had progressed in production. 181 Language, mind and brain Similarly, Sachs and Truswell (1978) found that children who could only produce single-word utterances (they were at the one-word stage of speech production) nevertheless could understand syntactic structures composed of more than one word. The outcome was the same for the child in the Steinberg and Steinberg (1975) research, where a 2-year-old boy learned to read (under- stand the meaning of ) many written words, phrases, and sentences before he was able to say them. That children would not be able to utter words or sentences for the purpose of communication (not simple imitation), without gaining a prior understand- ing of speech, is surely to be expected. One could not use speech meaning- fully unless one knew what meaning such speech had. Thus, it must be concluded that for normal children as well as for mute- hearing children, speech comprehension is the basis for speech production in the mind. Since the ability to comprehend speech implies the existence of thought, it therefore must be concluded that speech production is not necessary for thought. 9.3.2.3 Telling a lie Neither would telling a lie be possible if thought is a kind of speech. The very essence of a lie is saying one thing while thinking something quite different. Behaviourists wish to use one process of sentence creation for both processes (saying and thinking) simply by distinguishing the overt (speaking aloud) sentence from the covert (speaking to oneself or subvocally) sentence. However, because there is only one sentence-making apparatus, an overt pronunciation of one sentence and the covert pronunciation of an entirely different sentence (the covert sentence being the Behaviourist’s idea of thought) cannot occur simultaneously. Clearly, a valid psycholinguistic theory must allow two distinct processes with different content to occur at the same time. The issue of lying demonstrates that the Behaviourist cannot define thought out of existence! 9.3.2.4 Meaning and thought occur without behaviour Behaviourists: behaviour of the body is essential for thought In his theory of the origin of thought, Skinner suggested that behavioural responses could be the basis of thought in addition to speech utterances. Such behavioural responses could be muscular or glandular in nature. It seems that Skinner was influenced by the work of some Behaviourist psy- chologists who were his contemporaries around the 1950s. Experiments showed, to the delight of Behaviourist psychologists, that changes in electrical potential occurred in certain parts of the bodies of subjects when the subjects were instructed to think of certain motor activities. For example, changes in electrical potential in the musculature of the right arm occurred in response to instructions to think about lifting that arm. They concluded that thinking 182  9 Language, thought and culture was nothing more than a reflection of physical events in the body. Many psychologists then believed that they had begun to localize meaning and thought in the body so that once and for all mind could be banished from psychology. It was not long, however, before the inadequacies of such a formulation became apparent. The major problem with this theory is that it incorrectly predicts that a loss of thought or meaning will occur with damage or removal of body parts. In fact, people do not lose the meaning of words nor are they unable to think when a limb is lost or their larynx is removed. (See Osgood, 1953, p. 648, for a critical review of such research attempts prior to 1950.) One is reminded of the debilitating losses of muscle control that occurred in the bodies of the physicist/astronomer Stephen Hawking and of the late actor Christopher Reeve (of Superman fame). Hawking lost the ability to speak but still has some bodily controls while Reeve retained the ability to speak but lost control of most of his body. The result? These intrepid souls responded with an even greater mental output! Clearly, neither control of the vocal apparatus nor of most of the voluntary musculature of the body is relevant to thought. A daredevil researcher’s body is paralyzed by a drug About 50 or so years ago, a group of researchers (Smith et al., 1947) wondered what would happen to the thinking of a person if that per- son’s body were almost completely paralyzed. Their wondering led to the researcher Smith having himself injected with a curare-like drug that tem- porarily induced complete paralysis of the voluntary muscles of the body. Since only smooth muscle systems such as the heart and digestive system continue to function under the drug, Smith needed the assistance of an artificial respirator in order to breathe. When the effects of the drug wore off, Smith reported that he had been able to think quite clearly; also he could solve the series of problems given to him by the other researchers. At the risk of his life, Smith had made a scientific point. Since while paralyzed he could in no way speak and could make only minimal bodily responses, it is clear that thought was not de- pendent on body movement or movements of the organs of speech, because no movements occurred, not even subliminal ones. 9.4 Theory 2: Language is essential for thought 9.4.1 Proponents of the theory Theorists such as Sapir, Whorf, and Vygotsky hold that the language system, with its rules of vocabulary, is necessary for thought. This theory is broader than the prior theory, which held that thought was derived from speech 183 Language, mind and brain production, since it encompasses all of language, both speech production and speech understanding. Let us consider some choice quotations to get some idea of the scope of this theory. For example: The writer, for one, is strongly of the opinion that the feeling entertained by so many that they can think, or even reason, without language is an illusion. (Edward Sapir, 1921, p. 15) Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them... The relation between thought and word is a living process: thought is born through words. (Vygotsky, 1934, pp. 125, 153; emphasis ours) The background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language... is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the indi- vidual’s mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade. Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a particular grammar, and differs, from slightly to greatly between different grammars. We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. (Benjamin Whorf, from his 1940 paper (Carroll, 1956, pp. 212–13)) 9.4.2 Inadequacies of the theory We have two objections to raise regarding this theory. They are: (1) Deaf persons without language can think; (2) Multilinguals are whole persons. 9.4.2.1 Deaf persons without language can think There are many deaf children who do not begin to acquire language until quite a late age, often after 3 years, when they begin to attend special schools. These are typically children who have a congenital hearing loss of over 90 decibels and are unable to receive speech, and whose parents (usually hear- ing) do not know sign language. These children, when at play and when participating in activities around the home, behave just as intelligently and rationally with respect to their environment as do hearing children. If one holds that language is the basis for thought, one would have to argue that these children do not think; that they were automatons, mere robots. Furthermore, if one holds that grammar determines how we ‘dissect’ nature, then it must be argued that either the non-language deaf children cannot dissect nature or, if they do, they do so differently from children who do have grammars. No such difference has ever been noted, nor has it ever been observed that deaf children who acquire language late undergo a radical change of perception. Rather, research evidence points to the opposite conclusion. Furth (1966, 1971), for example, provides research data that shows no difference in intelligence between normal and deaf persons, even though the language knowledge of the deaf persons is generally far below that of hearing persons. 184  9 Language, thought and culture The case of Helen Keller, whose language knowledge was minimal until she was 7 years old, is also relevant to this issue. Keller reports in her book, The Story of My Life, many memories of the period in which she was without language (Keller, 1903/1996). For example, in one pre-language incident she remembers getting angry when her teacher tried to teach her the words ‘doll’ and ‘mug’. She got so angry that she threw the doll down on the floor. It would be insupportable to maintain that Keller could not think or sensibly perceive the world prior to the age of 8, when she had little or no language. A more recent case is that of a 27-year-old deaf man (Schaler, 1991) who demonstrated that he understood objects, situations, and events even though he had no language for them. Furthermore, when he later acquired sign language, he was able to describe experiences in his life that had occurred before the acquisition of sign language. The man was a thinking human being even before he had acquired language. Such a fact cannnot be ex- plained by the theory that thought comes to existence through language. 9.4.2.2 Multilinguals are whole persons Consider persons who are proficient in more than one language, where two or more languages had been learned in childhood. If the language system forms thought, and if different languages form different thought systems, then such persons would have formed more than one system of thought. (It would not have been possible under the theory to form a single system because, according to the theory under consideration, opposing concepts derived from the different languages would be involved.) If multilingual persons have more than one thought process (one for each language), such persons would not be able to think coherently or would have separate thought intelligences or personalities. Different guiding ideas would be involved with the different languages. Then, too, such persons would have difficulty in using the knowledge gained through one language when operating in the other language(s), since thought is supposed to be language-specific and not universal, according to this theory. However, no evidence of such malfunctioning or any other sort of problems for multi- lingual persons has ever been observed. Cases of persons who live in only one environment but have learned a number of languages simultaneously in that environment provide perhaps the best test of the theory in question. The environment is constant except for language. In this regard, the first author would like to offer the case of a family he knows well since they are his friends. The two sons grew up in that family speaking English, Japanese, and Russian. They were trilingual by the age of 3 years! This occurred because the father spoke English to the children, the mother spoke Japanese, and the grandmother, who lived with them, spoke Russian. The two boys, four years apart in age, each learned all of these languages simultaneously from birth. 185 Language, mind and brain The children appeared no different from monolingual English-speaking children of their age in terms of beliefs, values, personality, and their per- ceptions of the world and nature. One would not expect such an outcome from a theory that predicts that significant mental differences will result from the effects of learning such disparate languages as English, Japanese, and Russian. 9.5 Theory 3: Language determines or shapes our perception of nature 9.5.1 Proponents of the theory Whorf, Sapir, Korzybski, and others are of the view that one’s knowledge of vocabulary or syntax influences one’s perception and understanding of nature. Newtonian space, time, and matter are not intuitions. They are recepts from culture and language. That is where Newton got them. (Benjamin Whorf, from Carroll, 1956, p. 153) Einstein’s relativity of time is a reform in semantics, not in metaphysics. (Philipp Frank, 1953, p. 218) 9.5.2 Inadequacies of the theory We will raise a number of objections to the theory. These will be under the headings of: (1) Perception, interest, and need determine vocabulary; (2) Colour and snow vocabulary; (3) Hopi ‘time’ and Chinese ‘counterfactuals’; (4) Lack of vocabulary does not indicate lack of concept; (5) Knowledge overrides literal word meanings; and (6) Multilinguals’ view of nature. 9.5.2.1 Perception, interest, and need determine vocabulary Psychologists have tried experimentally to determine what effects, if any, knowledge of the vocabulary of language has on perception or behaviour. (See Niyekawa-Howard, 1972, for an older but interesting survey of such research.) Rather than vocabulary determining our interest and need, re- searchers have found the contrary to be true. It is our interest and need that determines our coinage of vocabulary and its use. Nowadays people know little of the vocabulary surrounding horses and horse-driven transportation. We know a lot, though, about automobiles and their parts and functions. Vocabulary is selected for use. Once it fails to serve a need, it falls out of use. Regarding interest and need as the prime motivators for the acquisition of vocabulary, we find that American children, like children in many other countries, are enchanted by dinosaurs. They can often name 25 or more! It 186  9 Language, thought and culture is not the case, however, that they perceive the types of dinosaurs because of their language. Rather, it was through perception that they developed their interest in dinosaurs so that they seek the names of these objects. Pronoun- cing the names for such creatures is not an easy task, as many a parent will testify! 9.5.2.2 Colour and snow vocabulary Colour words Some languages have only a small number of colour words. The Dani lan- guage of New Guinea has only two colour words, one for light colours and one for dark colours. If language were the basis of thought and of the perception of nature, as Whorf and the others contend, then one would expect speakers of this language, with such a limited repertoire of colour terms, to have perceptual difficulty in distinguishing colours they have no terms for. Research has generally shown that this is not the case, although some conflicting results have been obtained. Kay and McDaniel (1978) in a large cross-cultural investigation found no difference in perception of colours for different language speakers. Heider (1972) found similar results in testing the Dani people, who have only two colour terms in their language. Thus, speakers of languages that have only two, three, or four colour terms are as capable of distinguishing among the many colour bands of the visible spectrum as those whose languages have more than eight basic colour terms. People can see the differences but will not give them a name unless there is a good reason to do so. Kay and McDaniel (1978) conclude that ‘rather than language determining percep- tion, it is perception that determines language’ (p. 610). A recent investigation, Robertson (1999), however, contends that the per- ception of colour is determined by the colour words of a language. The researchers studied the Berinmo, a people who live in Papua New Guinea close to the Dani and who have five colour words in their language. They report that in a matching task, the Berinmo were more apt to match colour tokens together according to their language; just as English speakers were more apt to put colour tokens together according to their language. Now, supposing that these results are valid, what is one to conclude? In a New York Times report Robertson (1999) states that ‘Berinmo color vision is the same as ours. If they are asked to identify a single color from a group of colors, they would do it in the same way as you or I. But say that you have three colors, and call two of them blue and one green. We would see them as being more similar because we call them by the same name. Our linguistic categories affect the way we perceive the world’ (emphasis ours). But, is this conclusion justified? Clearly not, because Robertson’s conclu- sion contradicts what she had said before, that Berinmo colour vision is the same as ours and they can identify a single colour from a group of colours. 187 Language, mind and brain It is clear from this statement that the colour terms of the Berinmo language did not affect the Berinmo’s basic perception of colours. If the Berinmo are able to identify colours as English speakers can, it follows that the Berinmo’s perception of colour has not been affected by their language. Snow words There are dramatic vocabulary differences from language to language. The Inuit (previously called Eskimos), for example, have a large number of words involving snow. In Hawaii, there is only one, the English word ‘snow’. The Inuit, though, have single words for snow-on-the-ground, hard-snow- on-the-ground, block-of-snow, and others. Incidentally, the superficiality of the linguistic analyses of the Inuit language has been documented by a number of theorists. (For an excellent summary and discussion on the snow example see Martin, 1986.) There is no reason to suppose, though, that Inuits learn to perceive varieties of snow because of their language rather than through their life experience and needs. It is because of the importance of snow in their lives that they have created more words for snow than have Hawaiians. Then, too, English- speaking skiers in cold countries do distinguish a variety of types of snow despite the lack of vocabulary in English. What they do to describe in language the physical condition of snow is create phrases, e.g. ‘powder snow’, ‘wet snow’, etc. It is this language device of creating phrases that every language has that makes up for any vocabulary deficiency. 9.5.2.3 Hopi ‘time’ and Chinese ‘counterfactuals’ Hopi people and time Whorf’s research in the 1930s with the Hopi, Native American people, con- vinced him that their language forced them to see the world in a completely different way from speakers of European languages. He believed that the Hopi language had few words relating to time, and that this gave them radically different concepts of space and time. More recently, however, other researchers have found that Whorf was wrong in claiming that the Hopi language is a ‘timeless’ one. Gipper (1979), for example, who lived with a Hopi family for a period of time and studied their language, found that while Hopi does not have a formal tense, it nevertheless contains a whole series of expressions for time. Many of these expressions appear as adverbs or prepositions. According to Malotki (1985), another researcher who spent many years living with the Hopi, Hopis actually do use a variety of time referents such as periods relating to harvest, the moon, the sun, and other significant events. We do much the same in English (‘Let’s go when it gets dark’, or ‘I’ll fix it when the weather gets warm’). Malotki very neatly concludes, ‘People are not different because of their 188  9 Language, thought and culture languages, but because of their experience. Deep down, we’re all the same. It couldn’t be otherwise.’ The Chinese language and ‘counterfactuals’ Reminiscent of the Whorf claim for Hopi and its later debunking by Gipper and Malotki is the claim by Bloom (1981) about Chinese. After a superficial analysis of Chinese, Bloom claimed that Chinese were not as able as English speakers to think hypothetically about what is not true (to think ‘counter- factually’) because of certain grammatical features of the Chinese language. Again, someone who really knew the language, in this case Au (1983), found that the results obtained were due to faulty translations, and that once proper translations were made, there was no basis for claiming a difference in thinking. 9.5.2.4 Number vocabulary in the Amazon Interestingly, two studies on Amazonian languages were published in 2004, both of which concerned with speakers’ numerical understanding. Pica et al. (2004) investigated the Munduruku language, while Gordon (2004) investig- ated the Piraha language. Both of these languages have a rather small set of number words. Munduruku has words only up to the number 5, while Piraha has only words for 1, 2, and many (more than 2). After applying some tests, in both cases the authors of the studies con- cluded that the speakers of these two languages were conceptually affected negatively because of the small size of their number vocabulary. The reac- tion to this conclusion was quick and pointed. The critics demonstrated problems in the reasoning of the researchers, particularly Premack and Premack (2005) for Pica et al.’s Piraha study, and Casasanto (2005) for Gordon’s Munduruku study. In the latter case, the criticism was so telling that Gordon (2005) reversed his earlier position. The dominant view emerg- ing is that, given the proper settings, speakers of these Amazonian lan- guages would not show a cognitive defect because of their language. Premack and Premack (2005) argue that these limited numerical systems are conven- ient and suitable for the needs of these Amazonian speakers, who are hunter- gatherers. They say, ‘Although hunter-gatherers had little need for exact numbers, one can imaging that no owner of stored goods would wish to receive three casks of oil when he had stored four’ (Premack and Premack, 2005, p. 673). 9.5.2.5 Lack of vocabulary does not indicate lack of concept Simple vocabulary is not a good measure of the concepts that speakers of a language may hold. It is a fallacy to believe that the vocabulary of a language represents the sum total of the concepts that a person or culture may have. Experience does not always lead us to coin vocabulary items; some- times we choose to create phrases. For example, English speakers are quite 189 Language, mind and brain aware of their hand, yet although we have a vocabulary item for the under- side, ‘palm’, we have no word for the topside. Instead we use a phrase, ‘back of the hand’. Lack of a vocabulary item is not indicative of a lack of a concept. Many theorists do not realize that a lack of vocabulary does not imply the lack of a concept. Thus we find an educator like Tadao Suzuki saying that ‘We recognize the fragments of the universe as objects or properties only through words... without words we could not even distinguish dogs from cats’ (Suzuki, 1984, p. 35). However, if dogs and cats can distinguish one from the other without language, it would be absurd to think that humans could not do the same thing. New animals, plants, and other things in nature are continually being discovered. The discoverer notes the difference, then offers a name. Not the other way around! There would be no discoveries if we first had to know the name of what it is we would discover! 9.5.2.6 Knowledge overrides literal word meanings Consider such items as: ‘the sun rises’, ‘sunset’, ‘red hair’, ‘time flies’, and ‘white wine’. The theories under consideration imply that, as the result of our hearing and using such items, we would come to believe that the sun actually rises or sets on its own, that a person’s hair is actually red, and that white is the colour of white wine. The fact of the matter is that we can believe something quite different from what the language literally specifies and that the continual use of a language form may not change an underlying thought. We know that the sun does not rise or set no matter how many times we hear people say it or we say it ourselves. English speakers have simply stuck with the original coinings even though it came to be known that it was the earth and not the sun that was doing the moving. Such a fact, where one thing is said but another is understood (similar to lying, except that everyone knows that what is said is not true) runs counter to the implications of the theory being assessed here. 9.5.2.7 Multilinguals’ view of nature If the language system forms or guides thought in the way we perceive nature, then multilinguals must be said to have a variety of ways of view- ing the physical world. The multilingual would have as many different conceptual–perceptual systems of the physical world as he or she has lan- guages. If it is true that different languages have distinctive and important effects on the way we view nature, then the multilingual must similarly have distinctive and important ways of viewing nature. As was noted in a section on multilinguals earlier in this chapter, no such differences have ever been noted. The multilingual person is a whole and integrated person who perceives nature as other humans do. 190  9 Language, thought and culture 9.5.3 Conclusion There is no foundation to the claim that vocabulary affects our view of nature. In fact, the evidence shows the reverse to be true. One would think that on such an important issue, the proponents of the theory would offer sound evidence in support of their view. The fact is that Sapir, Whorf, and the others offer little beyond mere assertion in favour of their claims. 9.6 Theory 4: Language determines or shapes our cultural world view 9.6.1 Proponents of the theory Some theorists believe that even if language is somewhat distinct from thought, nevertheless, knowing a language will itself condition and influ- ence one’s cultural, social beliefs or views of the world. For example, in the early part of the nineteenth century, Wilhelm von Humboldt held that lan- guage embodies the spirit and national character of a people. The views of the following theorists are of a more recent vintage, and would include Whorf (quoted in the previous section) and others. Language is a guide to ‘social reality.’ Though language is not ordinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes. Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for society... No two languages are sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached... (Edward Sapir, 1929, p. 209; emphasis ours)... a language, any language, has at its bottom certain metaphysics which ascribe, consciously or unconsciously, some sort of structure to this world. (Alfred Korzybski, 1933, p. 89)... the aristotelian type of education (through language and its subject- predicate form of representation) leads to the humanly harmful, gross, macro- scopic, brutalizing, biological, animalistic types of orientations which are shown today to be humanly inadequate. These breed such ‘führers’ as different Hitlers, Mussolinis, Stalins, etc., whether in political, financial, industrial, sci- entific, medical, educational, or even publishing, etc., fields, fancying that they represent ‘all’ of the human world. (Alfred Korzybski, 1933, p. xxi) Exactly how we are ‘at the mercy of the particular language which has be- come the medium of expression for society’ Sapir doesn’t tell us. In any case 191 Language, mind and brain Sapir, Whorf, Korzybski, and others clearly claim that the language system does provide a view of culture and society and an outlook on the world. 9.6.2 Inadequacy of the theory If these theorists are correct, we would expect to find differences and sim- ilarities in such essentials as philosophy, religion, politics, or societal struc- ture to be a function of language. In this regard, we would like to provide objections to these contentions. These are: (1) Same language yet different world views; (2) Different languages yet similar world views; (3) Same lan- guage but world view changes over time; (4) Multilinguals have a unitary world view. 9.6.2.1 Same language yet different world views Consider, for example, the United States, where we can find native speakers of the same English language who vary greatly in terms of their philosoph- ical, religious, and political ideology. Variation may be observed among speakers in the same neighbourhood and even in the same family. Con- sider, for example, a monolingual English-speaking family where the mother is an atheist, the father a Christian, the daughter a Moslem, and the son a Zen Buddhist. If it is true that language influences or determines one’s world view, then we should expect uniformity of religious outlook since only one language system is involved, English. This is obviously false. The theory predicts that we should not expect differences in politics, social organization, or metaphysical thinking among speakers of the same language because their views must somehow be conditioned by their lan- guage. Not only the existence of various religions but of various political parties (from Fascism to democracy to Communism) and cult doctrines shows that monolingual speakers of English are not at all restricted by their ‘subject-predicate’ grammar. 9.6.2.2 Different languages yet similar world views Consider that many countries having widely different languages may share similar political, social, religious, scientific, and philosophical views. If a language system influences or determines world view, then we would expect that people with different languages would hold different world views. Such is not the case. Christian doctrine, for example, is shared by speakers of various lan- guages around the world. The same can be said for Communist doctrine. In China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba, Communism is shared by speakers of widely different languages. Obviously it was not the language but other cultural and historical events that brought those countries to adopt Com- munism. It should be remembered that the origin of Communist doctrine came from the writings of a German speaker, Karl Marx. As far as differences 192  9 Language, thought and culture go, the grammars of Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese are as remote from the German language as any language can be. Then, too, if it were really believed by the Chinese Communists that know- ledge of a foreign grammar, like English, would itself be a danger to the government, the country would not allow its teaching. However, the Chinese government does promote the teaching of English. The government is not afraid of the grammar of English. They simply have students learn English grammar with sentences having the content that they consider appropriate. For example, the wife of the first author, who was born and raised in Beijing, was a Red Guard and then a member of the Communist Youth League at the time that she began studying English as a second language in high school. It is interesting to note some of the sentences included in her lessons: ‘Long live Chairman Mao!’ ‘Keep fit, study hard, work well!’ (Mao’s instruction to children), ‘We love our Motherland; we love the Communist Party; we love the people’, ‘We study Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong thoughts’, ‘We love our great Socialist country’, ‘We learn from the People’s Liberation Army’. Change ‘Mao’ to ‘Lenin’, and you will get the same sentences that were learned by the second author in Russia at school English lessons. The same can be said for the Roman Catholic Church in the advocacy of its doctrines. The Catholic Church is not wary of languages but it is wary of books in those languages that can spread ideas that are opposed to the teach- ing of the Church. The Church bans books but it does not ban languages! The grammar of a language is not a threat – the potential threat lies in the sentences that the speaker of a language may produce with that grammar. Thus, we may conclude, along with the Chinese and former Russian Communist Government, and the Catholic Church, that it is the use of the grammar of the language that is important and that the characteristics of the grammar itself are not relevant. 9.6.2.3 Same language but world view changes over time We may observe that a society may change its social structure and world view even though its language remains relatively unchanged. For example, in about 100 years, China has changed from feudalism under the Qing (Manchu) dynasty, to capitalism (under Chiang Kai Shek) to versions of Communism (under Mao and subsequent leaders). Yet the Chinese language has changed relatively little over that period in terms of its basic grammar. Similar changes may be noted in the history of many countries, such as Russia. These facts are something that the theory under discussion cannot explain. If the grammar does not change, then the culture and world view should not change either. 9.6.2.4 Multilinguals’ world view If a person is multilingual, the theory predicts that such a person will have as many distinct world views as language systems. Thus, a multilingual 193 Language, mind and brain would have to hold competing views as being true, which would surely confuse a person’s functioning. For example, would a Chinese–English bilingual think like a Communist (assuming, for the sake of argument only, that the Chinese language has Communist doctrine inherent in it) when speaking Chinese but think like a capitalist exploiter (assuming, for the sake of argument only, that the English language has capitalist doctrine inherent in it) when speaking English? If so, the bilingual person would be deemed schizophrenically insane. But that is not true. Since the implications of the theory are absurd, the theory must be regarded as false. 9.7 Erroneous beliefs underlying the four theories What led the theorists whose theories we have discounted to advocate the theories they did? Discarding the anti-Mentalist position of some of the Behaviourist theorists who would treat thought as some sort of speech or behaviour, there are certain erroneous beliefs which might have been held by the other non-Behaviourist theorists that led them to invalid conclusions. We will consider three such mistaken beliefs: (1) Their analysis of language is adequate; (2) The meaning of words is linguistic in origin; and (3) There are primitive languages and primitive human intelligence. 9.7.1 Erroneous belief 1: Their analysis of language is adequate The most serious deficiency in the theorizing of Whorf, Sapir, Korzybski, Skinner, von Humboldt, and others concerns the assumption that the directly observable words or the structure of a sentence represent all of the semantic or thought elements of that sentence. These theorists drew conclusions largely based on what linguists today would consider a superficial surface structure analysis. Whorf (Carroll, 1956), for example, states that ‘Our Indian languages show that with a suitable grammar we may have intelligent sentences that cannot be broken into subjects and predicates’ (p. 242), and that ‘the Hopi language contains no reference to “time” either explicit or implicit’ (p. 58). Such statements (disavowed by subsequent linguists) are made essentially because it is assumed that surface structure directly signifies all of the mean- ing of a sentence. These linguists thus had a tendency to focus on the differences between languages. The idea that grammatical differences made thought differences was not long in coming. It seems that most of the linguists simply played with the idea, because they offered little or no evidence for their assertions. They had other concerns. Except for Whorf, they did not bother to seek out hard evidence to support their contentions. 194  9 Language, thought and culture It was only when Chomsky came along and postulated underlying struc- tures that it was realized that languages had a lot of similarities. It is not surprising, therefore, that only after Chomsky did the search for language universals begin in earnest, although the linguist Joseph Greenberg was an earlier initiator. 9.7.2 Erroneous belief 2: The meaning of words is linguistic in origin Except for the minor case of onomatopoeia (speech sounds imitating envir- onmental sounds), the relationship between a word and its meaning is conventional. That is, there is no necessary relationship between the sound of a word and its meaning. There is no inherent reason for a dog to be called ‘dog’ and not ‘pen’. Thus, when one hears a word for the first time, e.g. the obscure English word ‘tantivy’, its meaning is not understood, unless it is composed of known morphemes. The meaning that is to be associated with a particular sound sequence must be learned. It is not possible to know from the sound sequence alone (especially if not in a phrase or sentence) that the meaning of ‘tantivy’ is related to horses and indicates ‘a gallop or rapid movement’. Meaning for words is acquired in four main ways: (1) a sound form is associated with an object, situation, or event in the world, e.g. the sound ‘dog’ with the object ‘dog’; (2) a sound form is associated with an idea or experience in the mind, e.g. ‘pain’ with the feeling of ‘pain’; (3) an inference may be made in a linguistic context, an idea may be suggested, e.g. in reading a paragraph one word may not be known but because everything else is understood, its meaning may be guessed at by inference; and (4) an analysis of known component morphemes may suggest a meaning for the sound form, e.g. the meaning of ‘unprimitive’ can be gained through know- ledge of the morphemes ‘un’ and ‘primitive’. In considering these four ways of acquiring word meaning, we may note that the first two involve non-linguistic sources. In (1) the experiencing of objects, situations, and events in the world provides a basis for meaning, and in (2) experiences in the mind itself provide the basis. These are the experiences that attach to empty sound forms and thus form a meaningful word. While (3) and (4) do provide meaning through the medium of lan- guage, it must be recognized that such mediums themselves are composed of language that was derived from non-linguistic origins, i.e. through the experience of items in the world (1) or through experience of items in the mind (2). Thus, the ultimate source of all meaning is based on non-linguistic experiences of the world or mind. The mistake of Whorf and others is to assume that the mere hearing of the sound form of a word (an unknown one) itself provides some sort of meaning. They do not allow for a prior mental experience because that would 195 Language, mind and brain imply that thought precedes language. A language sound form itself, how- ever, does not provide meaning. 9.7.3 Erroneous belief 3: There are primitive languages and primitive human intelligence One often hears observers of other cultures say that such and such a people are not logical or rational or that they are somehow deficient in intellect. Such supposed deficiencies are frequently attributed to their having a primi- tive language. Yet modern linguistic research has never found a single lan- guage that could be called ‘primitive’. Thus it is that Chomsky (1967a) can with some assurance assert that all languages are of similar complexity, with each having similar basic forms and operations. And, while other linguists may disagree with Chomsky on what the basic form and opera- tions might be, they do not disagree that all languages are constructed and operate with essentially the same principles. It appears to us that Sapir, Whorf, and the others assumed that there was such a thing as a primitive people and that those people had a primitive grammar. Since they supposed that the primitive grammar of these people reflected their thought, they concluded that their thought was primitive too. How else could Whorf have concluded that the Hopi people had no concept of time, even with the faulty linguistic data that he gathered from those people? Such notions about primitive peoples and primitive languages were virtually taken for granted in the first half of the twentieth century when Sapir and Whorf were doing their theorizing, when the world still had undiscovered peoples and lands. Those days seemed long gone. Then, too, there is a case of non-standard speakers of such dialects as Black English, whom many naive people regard as irrational. Labov (1970), however, clearly demonstrated that logic does underlie the utterances of those speakers. Once one learns the premises that a people hold, their behaviour and statements that were previously thought to be strange or illogical immediately become rational. 9.8 The best theory: Thought is independent of language 9.8.1 Thought is independent of language The relationship between language and thought that will be proposed here is essentially the one that was advocated by the philosopher John Locke some three centuries ago. It is that thought is independent of language, that language is dependent on thought, and that the function of language is to provide a means for the expression and communication of thought. 196  9 Language, thought and culture The thought system in the mind of the child develops over time as input stimuli of the world, such as visual, auditory, and tactile stimuli represent- ing objects, events, and situations in the environment, are experienced by the child. Until thought is sufficiently developed (ideas of objects, relations of objects, states and actions of objects), words uttered in the presence of the child are not meaningfully processed. When that happens and when language input is experienced in coordination with objects, events, and situations, then language can begin to be learned. Over a period of time, the language system, with its vocabulary and grammatical rules, is formed. Part of the language system is actually part of the thought system, for the meaning and semantics of the language system are those ideas that are part of the content of thought. There is not one idea for ‘dog’ in language and another in thought. Such a view would be unparsimonious in the extreme. Rather, the thought and language systems are joined through meaning and ideas. 9.8.2 The development of thought precedes the development of language As thought develops, the child seeks to express those thoughts to others. Through speech understanding the child develops a grammar and finds a means through speech production to provide meaningful speech (see Chapter 1). The grammar develops as the result of prior thought. Thus, the sequence is as follows: Thought → Speech understanding → Speech production It is with this sequencing of thought, speech understanding, and speech production that we can explain all of the problems that were raised in objection to the four previously described theories. None of the other theor- ies can do this. 9.8.3 The notion of ‘thinking in language’ is a fallacy It is often observed that sound forms of words come to one’s awareness while one is thinking. It is a mistake, however, to conclude from this that the sound forms themselves are thought. Such word forms are merely re- flections of some underlying ideas. It is thought that determines the selection of word forms. As children, we learn to encode thoughts into language and then into acoustic speech. Because we discover that in order to interact effectively with people, we must be instantly ready to express our thoughts into speech, we consequently develop a habit of converting thoughts into speech at a mental level. It is this mental sound form that we sometimes become aware of when we think. The connections from particular thought to mental language and then physical speech are mainly automatic and it is 197 Language, mind and brain only with conscious effort (our normal condition) that we do not say every- thing that we think. When a child first learns to speak, it seems that the child does not have suppression control and that much of what he or she thinks is articulated into speech. What the child must and soon does learn is that while it is all right to automatically convert all thoughts to sentences in the mind, it is not all right to convert all of those sentences to overt speech. Socially unpleasant consequences result for those who do. 9.8.4 John Locke said it best Concerning the relation of language and thought, in our view John Locke said it best: The Comfort and Advantage of Society, not being to be had without Commun- ication of Thoughts, it was necessary, that Man should find out some external visible Signs, whereof those invisible Ideas, which his Thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. (Locke, 1690: Book III, ch. ii, sect. 1) 198