Analyzing International Relations: IGO Autonomy PDF

Analysing International Relations 9 – Autonomy of intergovernmental organizations Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Key questions on IGOs LAST CLASS How do IGOs vary? How can we explain the design and reform of IGOs? TODAY How independent (‘autonomous’) are IGOs from th...

Analysing International Relations 9 – Autonomy of intergovernmental organizations Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Key questions on IGOs LAST CLASS How do IGOs vary? How can we explain the design and reform of IGOs? TODAY How independent (‘autonomous’) are IGOs from the interests, power and policy preferences of their member states?  Autonomy of IGOs IGO autonomy = The ability of IGOs to set their own goals and to act in ways that contradict the interests and policy preferences of member states. Autonomy and the 3 faces of IGOs Forums – places where states meet and negotiate Instruments – tools that states use to achieve their interests Actors – independent bodies with their own interests, policy preferences, and ability to act – autonomy??!! This is not just an academic debate! Is the EU an ‘out-of-control bureaucracy’? Is major reform need to re- establish control by member states? Or is exit the only option to maintain control?  Is the UN an ‘out-of-control world government’ and a threat to national sovereignty? Is the UN Secretary General a secretary or a general?  Making sense of IGO autonomy – 1 dilemma and 4 theories How much autonomy do IGOs have from the interests, power and policy preferences of states, and why? The ‘governor’s dilemma’ Realist theory – no autonomy Marxist theory – relative autonomy Principal-agent theory – limited autonomy Organizational theory – high autonomy  The governor’s dilemma Abbott, K.W., Genschel, P., Snidal, D. and Zangl, B. (2020), Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma. Regulation & Governance 14: 619-36 The question of IGO autonomy is an example of the ‘governor’s dilemma’ at local, national, global levels. Fact: Most governance is indirect, implemented through intermediaries. Question: How much autonomy should the governor give to the intermediaries? Dilemma: micromanagement vs loose cannons – Too much control weakens intermediary competence and risks policy failure. – Too much intermediary competence risks  Realist theory Waltz, Mearsheimer, Gruber… IGOs have no autonomy from the interests and preferences of powerful states. IGOs serve the interests of powerful states. They do as much (or as little) as powerful states want them to do. IGOs change when the distribution of power among states changes.  Marxist theory Paul Cammack (2003). The Governance of Global Capitalism: A New Materialist Perspective. Historical Materialism 11:2, 37–59 IGOs have ‘relative autonomy’ from capitalist states. IGOs promote capitalism as a system, but do not necessarily follow the (monopolistic) preferences of particular capitalist states or corporations. Cammack’s example: World Bank & IMF promote global capitalism by supporting debt sustainability and anti- poverty programs that enable capitalism to survive.  Principal-agent theory Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, eds. (2006). Delegation and Agency in International Organizations IGOs have limited autonomy from their member states. In order to achieve their preferred outcomes, states (‘principals’) delegate a limited amount of decision-making authority to IGOs (‘agents’) via contracts that empower the IGO to act on behalf of the states while allowing the states to control the IGO.  Principal-agent theory – 2 The pros and cons of delegating authority to IOs Agency gains: Member states can benefit from delegating authority to IGOs, in various ways: Specialization of functions Easier decision-making Easier resolution of disputes Greater credibility of commitments Greater policy continuity Agency costs: Member states can lose from delegating authority if the IGO acts in a way that is undesired by the member states. This ‘agency slack’ can take 2 forms: Shirking: IGO minimizes its efforts on behalf of states. Slippage: IGO shifts policy away from states’ preferences, toward its own preferences.  Principal-agent theory – 3 The challenge of controlling IGOs Conflict of interests States want IGOs to be effective and under their control. IGOs want autonomy from states. How member states (try to) control IGOs Limiting the discretion available to IGO. Monitoring and reporting requirements. Institutional checks and balances. Sanctions, especially budget cuts. Obstacles to member state control of IGOs Disagreements among member states. Societal interests support IGOs. IGOs lobby states, seek to change their preferences. Break time  Organizational theory Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. International Organization 53:4, 699-732 IGOs have high autonomy. They are not “empty shells or impersonal policy machinery… manipulated by other actors.” IGOs are bureaucracies with independent expertise whose powers and actions often do not fit the interests and preferences of states. IGO action cannot be explained by state-centric theories (realism, rational design, principal-agent).  Organizational theory – 2 IGO ‘pathology’ = the tendency to produce outcomes that are dysfunctional or undesired from the perspective of their member states. 3 mechanisms, due to the bureaucratic nature of IGOs: Compartmentalized knowledge --> tunnel vision. IGO actions are tailored to fit rules & standard operating procedures. The tendency to downplay local variables --> IGOs make inappropriate policy recommendations. Divergent norms within a bureaucracy (ex. non-interference vs. humanitarian action) --> IGO outputs are incoherent.  Questions on IGO autonomy Which of these theories do you find most persuasive, and why? Are IGOs best understood as tools of states or as actors with their own agendas and effects? What are the implications of the IO autonomy debate for our understanding of the international system and global governance? What do various theories of IO autonomy indicate about anarchy or hierarchy in the international system?  Remember – office hours! Today, 15.00-16.00 Wijnhaven 2.14A Small group discussion