International Cooperation

Analysing International Relations 6 – International cooperation Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  AIR part III: The basics of global governance Lecture 6: International cooperation Lecture 7: International rules – norms & law Lecture 8: International organisations I -- de...

Analysing International Relations 6 – International cooperation Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  AIR part III: The basics of global governance Lecture 6: International cooperation Lecture 7: International rules – norms & law Lecture 8: International organisations I -- design Lecture 9: International organisations II -- autonomy  Today’s focus The dynamics of international cooperation Introduction to cooperation What motivates states to cooperate? Why is cooperation difficult? Why is cooperation possible? Bonus: How is cooperation negotiated? Introduction Cooperation among states is essential to addressing global problems.  What is ‘international cooperation’? the mutual adjustment of behavior by states (and other actors) to achieve common aims. -- Robert O. Keohane (1984). After Hegemony (red text added)  When is cooperation necessary and possible? Imagine 3 types of relationship among states: States have no common interests or policy preferences, so their behavior is always conflictual. * Cooperation is not possible. A B States have identical interests & policy preferences, so they pursue common aims without adjusting their behaviours. * Cooperation is not necessary. A&B States have overlapping interests & policy preferences, so they can only achieve common aims by mutually adjusting their behaviors. * Cooperation is possible, but not guaranteed.  The depth of int’l cooperation Moritz S. Graefrath and Marcel Jahn (2023). Conceptualizing interstate cooperation. International Theory 15(1), 24-52 Minimal: States implicitly coordinate policies to achieve mutual benefits. – via mutual observation & policy adjustment over time. – ex. US & USSR on non-deployment of anti-satellite weapons Thin: States explicitly coordinate policies to achieve mutual benefits. – via negotiation & agreement on policy adjustments. – ex. US & USSR on anti-ballistic missile treaty Thick: States engage in joint pursuit of mutual benefits. – via shared commitment to joint activity and mutual support. – ex. UK, US, USSR to defeat Nazi Germany  Remember… International cooperation does not necessarily serve morally ‘good’ purposes..  What motivates states to cooperate? Several possible motives, alone or in combination: 1. Shared threats 2. Shared or complementary material interests 3. Shared identities  Shared sense of threat States are vulnerable to threats that can be reduced through cooperation. External military threat – Vietnam & US Internal political threat – Belarus & Russia Global threat – cooperation on climate change  Shared or complementary material interests World economy creates opportunities for material gain through cooperation. Gains from trade – Cooperation improves economic efficiency, so it benefits both state A and state B overall. Interdependence – Policies adopted in state A affect conditions in state B, and vice-versa, so cooperation benefits both by reducing their vulnerability to external shocks. Class interests – Certain types of cooperation reinforce capitalism and thus benefit the transnational capitalist class.  Shared identities Common values, history, culture motivate states to cooperate. Political values, form of government – Frontline States (against apartheid South Africa) – Community of Democracies (against autocracies) Moral values, religion – Organization of Islamic Cooperation History – British Commonwealth of Nations Culture, language – ‘Five Eyes’  But cooperation is often hard to achieve and it sometimes falls apart..  What makes int’l cooperation so difficult… difficult to achieve and difficult to sustain? 1. Transaction costs 2. Security dilemma 3. Credible commitment problem 4. Relative gains problem 5. Free rider problem 6. Two-level games  Transaction costs Oliver E. Williamson (1990). Economic Organization Cooperation isn’t free. The process of achieving agreement & implementing cooperation involves ‘transaction costs.’ Information costs – Identifying opportunities for mutual gain Decision-making costs – Negotiating the terms of cooperation Sovereignty costs – Compromises on autonomy to achieve cooperation Enforcement costs – Monitoring behavior, punishing violators  Security dilemma Robert Jervis (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics 30:2, 167-214 Anarchy  fear & insecurity  defensive actions  more fear & insecurity  difficulty of cooperation.  Credible commitment problem Cooperation often requires that all actors focus on long-term interests (rather than maximizing short-term gains), but they may not trust others’ promises to cooperate. Why this mistrust? States lack good information on others’ intentions and future actions. – Other may be lying, trying to cheat or exploit me. – Other may change its mind. – Other may change its government. Today’s gains are more certain than future gains. Result? Misfit between long-term incentives (cooperation is beneficial) and short-term incentives (can’t trust that other will do its part). Mistrust  cooperation is hard to achieve & easily broken.  Relative gains problem When facing possible cooperation, states may focus on… absolute gains -- how much do I gain? relative gains -- how does my gain compare to other’s gain? Question: Will State A & State B want to cooperate? State A State Answer: B Before cooperation 2 4 If absolute gains: A yes, After possible 4 6 B yes cooperation If relative gains: A yes, B no Under anarchy, “relative gain is more important than absolute gain.” – K.Waltz (1959). Man, the State and War.  Free-rider problem Mancur Olson (1965). The Logic of Collective Action Self-interested actors seek to benefit from public goods and common resources without contributing to their provision. Public goods: non-excludable: accessible to all non-rival: use by A doesn’t limit use by B ex. safe transit of ships; elimination of disease free riding  under-provision of public goods Common resources: non-excludable: accessible to all rival: use by A reduces use by B ex. ocean fisheries; satellite orbits free riding  loss of common resources  Two-level games Robert D. Putnam (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. Int’l Organization 42:3, 427-460 When considering possible int’l cooperation, national governments must consider domestic audiences (voters, business…) and international audiences (other govts). Cooperation is only possible when both audiences are satisfied.  Basic consequences of two-level games To maintain support at home, governments sometimes make unrealistic demands of other states, which makes cooperation difficult. To gain leverage in int’l negotiations, governments may exaggerate the strength of domestic opposition to cooperation.  What makes int’l cooperation possible?.  3 models of int’l cooperation. Hegemonic cooperation: cooperation enabled or imposed by powerful states Decentralized cooperation: cooperation without hierarchal authority or centralized enforcement Institutionalized cooperation: cooperation enabled or promoted by joint institutions  1. Hegemonic cooperation cooperation enabled or imposed by powerful actors Great powers have more resources and are expected to lead, so they can promote or impose cooperation.  ‘Hegemonic stability theory’: Cooperation requires hegemony Charles Kindleberger (1973). The World in Depression, 1929- 1939 Robert Gilpin (1981). War and Change in World Politics Hegemonic leadership is necessary to get cooperation started and to create cooperative institutions. Requirements for hegemonic leadership: Capability: resources to promote negotiation, monitor compliance, punish violators Willingness: political interest in promoting cooperation Legitimacy : acceptance by others of hegemon’s role & plans Without hegemony, cooperation and institutions break down.  Post-hegemonic cooperation Robert O. Keohane (1984). After Hegemony Hegemon’s power may be necessary to get cooperation started and to create cooperative institutions. After hegemonic decline, states’ shared interests in managing interdependence may enable cooperation and institutions to continue.  2. Decentralized cooperation** cooperation without hierarchal authority or centralized enforcement Sometimes made possible by… Weak security dilemma Absolute gains Reciprocity Incentives – negative or positive Reassurance Shared identities ** a.k.a. ‘Cooperation under anarchy’  Security dilemma may be weak Robert Jervis (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics 30:2, 167-214 The strength of the security dilemma depends on: 1. Offense-defense balance: does current military technology favour offense or defense? 2. Transparency of offensive vs defensive posture: Can states observe and distinguish each other’s military posture? Strong dilemma: offense dominant, low transparency Weak dilemma: defense dominant, high transparency States may focus on absolute gains Duncan Snidal. (1991). Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation. Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 85:3, 701- 726 Anarchy does not force states to focus on relative gains when considering cooperation. They are more likely to focus on absolute gains when: 1. Many states are involved in the cooperation. If few states, then more incentive to focus on relative gains. If more states, then more incentive to focus on absolute gains. 2. The consequences of cheating are not threatening. If cheating by Other is likely to be threatening, then more incentive to focus on relative gains. If cheating by Other isn’t likely to be threatening, then more incentive to focus on absolute gains.  The power of reciprocity Robert O. Keohane (1986). Reciprocity in international relations. International Organization 40:1, 1-27 Reciprocity = an int’l norm that compromises by one state should be balanced by compromises by others. Specific reciprocity: A and B make simultaneous compromises to enable an agreement. Not dependent on trust, so there’s no credible commitment problem. General reciprocity: A makes a compromise to enable an agreement with B on the understanding that B will make an equivalent compromise later. Heavily dependent on trust, so requires shared identity or expectation of an on-going relationship (distant shadow of the future).  Positive incentives Benefits for those who cooperate or support cooperation. How? Log rolling: a deal with off-setting benefits for all participants. Part of the deal benefits A, another part benefits B, etc. Side payments: compensation for any actor (domestic or int’l) that doesn’t benefit from cooperation and could block it. Cooperation benefits A & B but C can block it, so A & B offer some other ‘goodies’ to C so that it doesn’t block the cooperation.  Negative incentives Sanctions against non-cooperators to reduce free-riding and credible commitment problems. But they are not easy to impose! Some non-cooperation can be hidden. No states want to be monitored & punished by others. Few states want to do the punishing, because it annoys partners. Sanctions can be avoided.  Reassurance may overcome fear Janice Gross Stein (1991). Reassurance in International Conflict Management. Political Science Quarterly 106:3, 431-451 Logic: If fear feeds the security dilemma, which makes cooperation difficult, then reassuring words and actions can promote positive identification and cooperation. Strategy: Use words and actions (including self- restraint and de-escalation) to make Other less fearful & allow focus on shared interests. If reciprocated, it can create a positive spiral. Example: Gorbachev used reassurance to reduce  Shared identities facilitate cooperation Thomas Risse-Kappen(1995). Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy The ease of cooperation depends on the extent of shared values and norms among states. During the Cold War, cooperation between Canada, Europe and the US was facilitated by shared values -- problem-solving through dialogue and openness to civil society -- that outweighed other interests.  3. Institutionalized cooperation: cooperation enabled or promoted by joint institutions How international institutions promote cooperation: Reduce transaction costs. Shape expectations. Make commitments more credible. Facilitate reciprocity. Extend shadow of the future. Enable interlinkage of issues.  Reduce transaction costs Int’l institutions promote cooperation by reducing transaction costs: Information costs: Institutions consolidate expertise, identify opportunities for mutually-beneficial cooperation. Decision-making costs: Institutions promote regular contacts, set agendas, establish decision-making procedures, encourage compromise. Sovereignty costs: Institutions enable joint input on cooperation. Enforcement costs: Institutions centralize & de-politicize monitoring and sanctions.  Shape expectations Int’l institutions shape actors’ expectations by establishing: rules that define acceptable & unacceptable behavior procedures for sanctioning unacceptable behavior  Make commitments more credible. Int’l institutions make states’ commitments more credible by: monitoring: increasing transparency of (non-)compliance sanctioning: shaming & punishing non-compliance  Facilitate reciprocity Int’l institutions promote dynamics of reciprocity by: reminding states of shared identities & shared interests in cooperation arranging complementary compromises (see specific reciprocity) promoting on-going relationships (see general reciprocity)  Extend shadow of the future Int’l institutions promote on-going relationships, which encourages states to prioritize long-term gains from cooperation over short-term gains from non-cooperation.  Enable inter-linkage of issues Int’l institutions promote cooperation via multi-issue ‘package deals’ in which all actors compromise on some issue(s) to achieve gains on other issue(s).  TODAY’S READING: What about ‘nonhegemonic cooperation’? Yong-Wook Lee (2015). Nonhegemonic or Hegemonic Cooperation? Institutional Evolution of East Asian Financial Regionalism. Korean Journal of International Studies 13(1), 89-115 What are the major trends in East Asian financial cooperation, according to Yong-Wook Lee? Which model best fits this – decentralized cooperation, institutionalized cooperation, or hegemonic cooperation? Or is nonhegemonic cooperation a distinctive, 4th type?  Bonus section: The negotiation of int’l cooperation, with varying levels of complexity  Cooperation as a one-level game. Amax Bmin Amin Bmax Amax = maximum or ideal outcome for A Bmax = maximum or ideal outcome for B Amin = minimum outcome acceptable to A Bmin = minimum outcome acceptable to B  outcomes between Bmin and Amin are acceptable to both A & B, but each prefers outcomes closer to its maximum point  If we think about negotiations between states as a one-level game, what determines the outcome?. Relative power of A & B Intensity of A’s preferences & B’s preferences Possibility of issue-linkage by A & B Possibility of reciprocity between A & B Identities & values – shared vs. not shared by A & B Other?  Int’l cooperation as a two-level game: game 1 & game 2 State A State B Government Government A B Voters Industry Voters Industry Social Social Lobbies Lobbies movements movements  A two-level game across time Imagine: Between time 1 (t1) and time 2 (t2),. domestic actors in state A mobilize pressure against their government, but there’s no change in state B. A’s minimum shifts from Amin(t1) to Amin(t2), but B’s minimum does not change. Amax Bmin Amin time Amin Bmax t1 & t2 t1 t2 Q: How will this affect the negotiation space (i.e., the range of agreements acceptable to both A & B)? Q: Does this make a negotiated agreement more or less likely? Q: How will it affect the negotiating power of A? And of  Questions How intra-state negotiations (game 2) affect inter- state negotiations (game 1) How can the mobilization of domestic actors change the inter-state negotiation space? Do strong demands by domestic actors in state A strengthen or weaken government A’s position vis-à-vis government B? Is domestic weakness a source of strength or weakness in inter-state negotiations, according to the ‘credible commitments problem’ and to the ‘two-level game’? How does the politicization of international negotiations affect the government’s negotiating position? How do the costs of no-agreement for domestic constituencies affect the government’s negotiating position? How does this affect the likelihood of successful negotiations between states?  More questions What are the advantages of the ‘two-level game’ as a theory of international cooperation, compared to theories that treat states as unitary, rational actors? What are its limitations? What does it miss? What dynamics can it not incorporate?  Analysing International Relations 7 – International rules Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Format and scope of the exam Scope The exam will cover lectures, slides and assigned readings. It will test your understanding of analytical concepts (anarchy, two- level game, multistakeholderism, etc.). No data, no historical events, no minor points from pg.36… Format Multiple Choice Questions (50%) About 25 questions For each, choose the best 1 of 4 possible answers Open Questions (50%) Choose 2 of 6 concepts. Write 2 mini-essays (200-300 words each) that define the chosen concept and discuss how it helps us to understand IR.  Types of MCQ questions (a sample) Which of the following best summarizes Concept X? Which of the following best summarizes Author X’s concept of Concept X? Which of the following arguments is not associated with Concept X? According to Concept X, which of the following is likely to occur under conditions ABC? Under which of the following conditions is the phenomenon described by Concept X most likely to be found?  AIR part III: Basics of global goverance 19 Nov: International cooperation 21 Nov: International rules – Overview of int’l institutions – What are they? – Sources of int’l rules – Where do they come from? – Effects of int’l rules – Do they matter? 26 Nov: Creation and design of international organisations 28 Nov: Autonomy of international organisations  International institutions Types: International norms ‘International International law rules’ Inter-governmental organisations International regimes (usually a mix of rules and organizations) May be effective or ineffective May be fair or unfair, morally good or bad May involve only states or also non-state actors  What do int’l institutions do? A functional definition: Int’l institutions are rules and organisations that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations in world politics. prescribe roles: define the characteristics, rights and responsibilities of actors with certain identities (state, member state, NGO, ambassador, prisoner of war, refugee, etc.) constrain activity: establish positive and negative incentives for acting in certain ways (do this and you will benefit, do this and you will pay a cost) shape expectations: provide ideas and information that helps actors predict how others are likely to act in various situations  Rules Organizations (today’s lecture) (coming lectures) Formal International law Formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) International regimes Informal International norms Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs)  International norms What are int’l norms? Informal but widely accepted standards of appropriate behavior for international actors of a particular type. Procedural norms: define how actors should interact, how decisions should be made Reciprocity Consultation Substantive norms: define what outcomes should be achieved Territorial integrity National self-determination Respect for human rights Stop killing whales  International law What is int’l law? Rules and principles that are generally recognized as binding on states and other international actors. What does it do? Public IL defines rights and responsibilities in relations between states, and between states and individuals/other private bodies. Private IL defines rights and responsibilities in relations between private bodies (individuals, companies, etc.) in different countries.  Anarchy and law? If there’s no government above governments, how can there be international law? The int’l legal system is decentralized, not hierarchical like a domestic legal system. Rule making, rule commitment, rule enforcement, rule compliance depend heavily on voluntary choices by states and other actors.  2 big questions: Where do int’l rules come from? Do int’l rules make a difference?  Dynamics of international rules ‘International rules’ = international norms + international law I. Sources II. Effects  Sources of int’l law (in legal doctrine) 1. Treaty Law: Rules that states have agreed to follow by signing and ratifying treaties or conventions. 2. Customary Law: Rules that most states follow most of the time based on a sense of legal obligation.** – Sometimes unwritten; sometimes later formalised in treaties. – Ex. diplomatic immunity 3. General principles of law: Rules found in many national legal systems. ** Special type of ‘customary law’: jus cogens -- rules that are widely considered binding on all actors, whether or not they have agreed to be bound. An exception to the general norm that int’l law is based on consent. May be reinforced by treaties but this is not required. Ex. No aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, slavery,  Sources of international rules How are they created, how do they spread, how do they evolve? Rational pursuit of joint gains Imposition Persuasion Norm life cycle Localization Contestation  Rational pursuit of joint gains Robert O. Keohane (1982). The Demand for International Regimes. International Organization 36:2, 325-56 States accept rules that enable them to cooperate under anarchy and thus to achieve joint gains. For example: – Rules that reduce fears of non-compliance (ex. reciprocity & consultation norms) – Rules that promote transparency (ex. rules that require information-sharing or monitoring) – Rules that facilitate the negotiation of agreements (ex. diplomatic immunity) States will continue to support these rules as long as they enable cooperation and the achievement of joint gains… even if the distribution of power among states changes!  Imposition (unrestrained power) Lloyd Gruber (2000). Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions Strong states impose rules on the international system that maximise their self-interests. Weak states accept these rules when rejecting them would be more costly. When new great powers emerge, they create & impose new rules.  Imposition (restrained power) John Ikenberry (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars After major wars, victorious powers seek to re-establish international order by imposing formal and informal rules on the international system. When the dominant state(s) accept limits on their own power and avoid maximising their self-interest, the rules they impose will be more acceptable to other states and more likely to survive re- distributions of power.  Persuasion ‘Policy entrepreneurs’ (diplomats, NGOs, activists, scientists, etc.) persuade state officials or mass publics that certain rules are right and desirable. Persuasion may be based upon: Moral arguments: ex. prohibition of slavery – Ethan A. Nadelmann (1990). Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society. International Organization 44:4, 479- 526 Causal arguments: ex. environmental treaties -- Peter M. Haas (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization 46:1, 1-36  Norm life cycle Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization 52:4 (Autumn), 887-917 Q: How do norms evolve? A: 3-step process from new idea to taken-for-granted norm Norm emergence Individuals, NGOs, governments try to persuade others that a certain idea should be an international norm. Norm cascade More & more govts accept the norm. After a ‘tipping point’ is reached, it becomes unacceptable to reject the norm, so more accept it. Norm internalization Governments integrate the norm into their expectations, national legislation, and bureaucratic procedures.  Localization Amitav Acharya (2004). How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. Int’l Organization 58:2, 239-275 Q: How are int’l rules received around the world? A: When an int’l rule is spreading around the world, local actors have several options: Rejection: Sustained resistance blocks local adoption of the int’l rule. Localization: The int’l rule is merged with pre-existing ideas and rules, producing a new, hybrid rule at local level. Adoption: The int’l rule replaces pre-existing local ideas and rules. Localization = “the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices” (245).  Contestation Antje Weiner (2018). Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations Contestation is when actors challenge the meaning, legitimacy, or applicability of a prevailing rule. This is important because the strength of rules depends heavily on actors’ agreement on their meaning, legitimacy and application. Possible effects of contestation: - clarify or obscure the rule’s meaning (make it more or less clear) - reinforce or undermine the rule’s legitimacy and thus its strength  Assigned reading: Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann (2020). Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of Contestation Affect the Robustness of International Norms. International Studies Review 22(1), 51-76 What are the types of norm contestation? What is norm robustness? What is the relationship between norm contestation and norm robustness? How is the relationship between contestation and robustness evident in their 2 case studies -- the Responsibility to Protect and commercial whaling?  Effects of international rules Do int’l rules matter? Do they shape outcomes? “Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time.” -- Louis Henkin (1979). How Nations Behave Realist approach Managerial approach Incentives approach International socialization Domestic politics Rule evasion  The realist approach John Mearsheimer (2001). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19(3), 5-49 Anarchy  to ensure survival, all states seek to maximize their power. Int’l rules are unreliable: Godzilla doesn’t respect rules, so Bambi can’t count on them. Policy implication: To ensure your security, don’t depend on int’l rules.  The managerial approach Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (1993). On compliance. International Organization 47:2 (March), 175-205 Assumption: States generally intend to comply with int’l law, for 3 reasons: Efficiency: Routine compliance avoids costly calculations. Interests: Int’l law reflects states’ interests. Norms: States are sensitive to social pressure. Argument: Non-compliance is generally not intentional -- it’s due to: Ambiguity: Rules aren’t clear. Incapacity: States lack financial or administrative capacity to comply. Policy implication: To increase compliance, make rules clearer & improve states’ capacity to comply.  The incentives approach George W. Downs et al. (1996). Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization 50:3, 379-406 Assumption: Compliance can be costly, so it depends on states’ deliberate calculation of incentives: The likelihood that non-compliance will be observed. The likely costs and benefits (both material & reputational) of compliance vs. non-compliance. Arguments: If rules require little departure from states’ preferences, then compliance may be high even if monitoring and punishment of violators are weak. As rules require greater departure from states’ preferences, compliance becomes more dependent on the monitoring and punishment of violators. Policy implication: To increase compliance, strengthen positive and  Domestic politics Xinyuan Dai (2005). Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. International Organization 59:2 (Spring), 363-398 The two-level game of compliance with int’l rules: International partners prefer the state to comply. Domestic constituencies have various preferences. The domestic compliance game: Governments face domestic constituencies with different preferences on int’l rule compliance and different degrees of influence. The larger & better-informed a constituency is, the more influence it has on government’s choices regarding rule compliance.  International socialization Jeffrey T. Checkel (2005). International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. International Organization 59:4, 801-826 Individual states adopt the rules of groups of states (international society) to which they belong or hope to belong. Processes of socialization: Role playing: States adjust their behaviour to fit the rules connected to their role, even if the rules don’t fit their beliefs or preferences. Persuasion: States’ leaders or citizens are persuaded by the moral or causal logic underlying an int’l rule. Bureaucratic normalization: A state’s bureaucracy incorporates int’l rules into its standard routines. Over time, these routines become taken-for-granted.  Rule evasion Zoltán I. Búzás (2017). Evading international law: How agents comply with the letter of the law but violate its purpose. European Journal of Int’l Relations 23:4, 857-883 What is evasion? “intentional compliance with the letter of the law but not its purpose in order to minimize inconvenient obligations in an arguably legal fashion.” Why do states evade int’l rules? It looks like compliance so avoids accountability and punishment, but it allows them to avoid more costly changes to their behaviour. When do states evade int’l rules? Evasion is most likely when: (1) legal obligations are costly, (2) there’s a significant gap between the rule’s letter and purpose. Example: France’s use of financial incentives to expel Roma persons with EU passports.  Analysing International Relations 8 – The design of international organizations Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Today Continuing to explore the dynamics of global governance – i.e., how global problems are managed. Focusing on inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) – int’l organizations whose members are states. The basics: What’s an IGO and how does it compare to an int’l regime? Form: How do IGOs vary in terms of membership, function, formality, and decision-making procedures? Design: What factors shape the design (and redesign)  The basics Int’l rules Int’l organizations (last lecture) (today & coming lectures) Formal International law Formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) International regimes Informal International norms Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs)  Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) Organizations with states as members that govern a cross-border geographic area (regional or global) or issue area (trade, environment, etc.) or both. The conventional building blocks of regional or global governance and problem-solving.  3 faces of IGOs IGOs as forums – places where states meet and negotiate IGOs as instruments – tools that states use to achieve their interests IGOs as actors – independent bodies with their own interests, policy preferences, and ability to act  International regimes Sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and organizations that govern behaviour within a region or issue-area. Often involve a formal treaty and/or a formal IGO, but not necessarily. 2 examples: Antarctica regime (to govern activities in Antarctica) Antarctic Treaty + 200 other agreements Since 2014: Secretariat in Buenos Aires Ozone regime (to protect the atmospheric ozone layer) Montreal Protocol & Vienna Convention Multilateral Fund  IGO’s relationship to international regimes 1. A single IGO may be active in multiple regimes. Ex. United Nations is active in: int’l human rights regime nuclear non-proliferation regime int’l refugee regime and many more… 2. A single regime may include multiple IGOs. Ex. Nuclear non-proliferation regime includes: Int’l Atomic Energy Agency (monitoring) London Suppliers Group (export controls) UN Security Council (sanctions)  Different forms of IGO IOs differ in various ways, including: Membership Function Formality Decision-making  Membership Limited – open to states with a given character (regional, cultural, etc.) European Union – limited by geography and political, economic, administrative criteria OPEC – limited to petroleum-exporting countries Universal – open to all states United Nations – open to all states (with UNSC approval)  Function to govern an issue-area WTO for trade, WHO for health… to govern a geographic space African Union, European Union… to promote a particular culture or set of values Org. Int’l de la Francophonie, Org. of Islamic Cooperation, Community of Democracies… mixed -- to govern an issue-area within a geographic space Asian Development Bank, Council of Europe…  Formality Formal Informal Organizing principle Written and formally Explicitly shared adopted expectations Membership Defined by legal Explicit but non-legal agreement Structure Regular meetings, Regular meetings, formal budget, rotating chair, secretariat no secretariat (more discussion after the break)  Decision-making, policy-making Supranational: Decisions/policies are made by an executive, legislative, or judicial body that is not (directly) controlled by member- states. Inter-governmental: Decisions/policies are made collectively by member states. Consensus unanimity (every member has a veto but can abstain) or consensus-minus-one (to prevent veto by a single state) Majority 50%-plus-one super majority (more than 50%-plus-one) weighted majority (based on size, contribution, etc.) Mixed some have veto, others don’t no veto plus majority  Today’s core question If IGOs can take such different forms… … then how can we explain the creation, design and reform of IGOs?  Design of IGOs What factors shape the creation, design and reform of inter-governmental organizations? Power Shared interests Shared normative aims Past choices  Power and IO design Lloyd Gruber (2000). Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions Strong states design and promote IOs that maximise their self-interests. Weak states accept these IOs when rejecting them would be more costly. When new great powers emerge, they create & impose new IOs.  Shared interests and IO design: the basic logic Robert O. Keohane (1982). The Demand for International Regimes. International Organization 36:2, 325-56 Interdependence exposes states to external risks (economic, environmental, etc.) and creates opportunities to achieve joint gains. Int’l institutions help states to manage interdependence through mutually-beneficial agreements. Which IO design will states ‘demand’ (i.e., support)? Demand for various IO designs “will vary directly with the desirability of agreements to states and with the ability of [each design] actually to facilitate the making of such agreements.”(152)  Shared interests and IO design: hypotheses Barbara Koremenos et al. (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. International Organization 55:4, 761-99 States design international institutions in order to overcome cooperation problems and achieve joint gains. Assumptions: 1. The shared interests of states shape the design of int’l institutions. 2. States behave rationally – they make choices based on costs and benefits. Argument: Nature of cooperation problem faced by states  Choices on institutional design.  Koremenos et al. 2001 – some findings More uncertainty about the preferences of other states  More restrictive membership rule. More difficult distribution of gains  Broader issue scope. More actors  More centralization of tasks.  Normative aims and IO design John Gerard Ruggie (1982). International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. Int’l Org 36:2, 379-415 The design of IOs is shaped by the shared normative aims of the states that create them, not just by state power or shared interests. Post-WW2: Govts wanted an int’l economic order that would advance social welfare. Result: GATT was designed to balance growth (via tariff reductions) and welfare (via domestic social protections) – ‘embedded liberalism.’ Post-Cold War: Govts wanted an int’l economic order that would maximise economic growth. Result: WTO was designed to promote tariff reductions and to limit the ability of govts to adopt social protections – ‘neo-liberalism.’  Normative aims and IO design John Gerard Ruggie (1982). International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. Int’l Org 36:2, 379-415 The design of IOs is shaped by the shared normative aims of the states that create them, not just by state power or shared interests. Post-WW2: Govts wanted an int’l economic order that would advance social welfare. Result: GATT was designed to balance growth (via tariff reductions) and welfare (via domestic social protections) – ‘embedded liberalism.’ Post-Cold War: Govts wanted an int’l economic order that would maximise economic growth. Result: WTO was designed to promote tariff reductions and to limit the ability of govts to adopt social protections – ‘neo-liberalism.’  Past choices and IO re-design Tine Hanrieder (2014). Gradual Change in International Organisations: Agency Theory and Historical Institutionalism. Politics 34:4, 324–333 Past choices on IO design shape current options and decisions. Ex. An IO’s treaty may enable a minority of member states to block re-design, even when change would be advantageous for most states. Ex. UNSC reform is blocked by P-5 veto power.  ‘Irrational’ responses to functional incentives for IO change: Layering: IO gains new functions despite not fulfilling old functions. Ex. Int’l Labour Org adopts new conventions even though many old conventions aren’t ratified or implemented. Drift: IO isn’t updated so it survives but becomes less effective. Ex. Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees loses relevance because governments block redefinition of ‘refugee’. Today’s reading: Medina de Souza 2015 What questions or puzzles motivate this article? What is Medina de Souza’s answer or argument?  Critical reflections on Medina de Souza 2015 How persuasive is Medina de Souza’s argument? What do you think led the Global South to accept the WTO? – the exercise of state power under anarchy? – problem-solving under interdependence? – shared normative aims? – the dynamics of global capitalism? – something else? Is Medina de Souza right to argue that Global South suffers from the WTO & free trade? What is Philip Golub’s argument (lecture 3) on this?  On formal vs. informal IGOs What is an informal IGO? How do informal IGOs differ from formal IGOs? So what? Why does this matter? When do states prefer IIGO vs FIGO?  Informal intergovernmental orgs Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal (2013). Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements. Review of International Organizations 8:2, 193-220 Formal IGOs Informal IGOs Organizing Written and formally adopted Explicitly shared expectations principle expectations Membership Legal membership Explicit but non-legal Structure Regular meetings, formal Regular meetings, rotating budget, secretariat chair, little or no secretariat Delegation of Yes No authority to IGO Examples UN, WHO, WTO, EU G-7, G-20, G-77, BRICS, ASEAN+3, Visegrad 4  Example of IIGO: ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’ 107 states Shared goal: to prohibit the illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials to and from states and non-state actors. No legal status or permanent staff. Military and law enforcement personnel from PSI states convene periodically for training exercises.  So what? The implications of IIGOs vs FIGOs Formal IGOs Informal IGOs Flexibility Low High Rules & Legally binding, hard to Non-binding, easy to commitmen change change ts Policy High Uncertain continuity Autonomy Low: centralised oversight High: decentralised of states oversight Autonomy Some -> High None of IGO Expertise & Centralised, available to Decentralised, uneven capacity all Costs Low re-negotiation costs Low set-up costs What determines whether states prefer IIGO vs FIGO? 2 arguments (from Vabulas and Snidal 2013): Functional efficiency “States opt for… IIGOs when the advantages of lower sovereignty and negotiation costs, flexibility and speed outweigh the need for enforcement, commitment, consensus, and bureaucratic centralization.” (219) Relative power Status quo states are likely to prefer FIGOs (to lock in their power & policy preferences). Rising states are likely to prefer IIGOs (to avoid binding commitments that they may regret later, when they’re stronger). Rising states won’t challenge FIGOs (they’re hard & costly to reform) until the gap between institutionalized power and actual power is large. As rising states gain power, they are likely to challenge or create  Analysing International Relations 9 – Autonomy of intergovernmental organizations Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Key questions on IGOs LAST CLASS How do IGOs vary? How can we explain the design and reform of IGOs? TODAY How independent (‘autonomous’) are IGOs from the interests, power and policy preferences of their member states?  Autonomy of IGOs IGO autonomy = The ability of IGOs to set their own goals and to act in ways that contradict the interests and policy preferences of member states.  Autonomy and the 3 faces of IGOs Forums – places where states meet and negotiate Instruments – tools that states use to achieve their interests Actors – independent bodies with their own interests, policy preferences, and ability to act – autonomy??!! This is not just an academic debate! Is the EU an ‘out-of-control bureaucracy’? Is major reform need to re-establish control by member states? Or is exit the only option to maintain control? Is the UN an ‘out-of-control world government’ and a threat to national sovereignty? Is the UN Secretary General a secretary or a general?  Making sense of IGO autonomy – 1 dilemma and 4 theories How much autonomy do IGOs have from the interests, power and policy preferences of states, and why? The ‘governor’s dilemma’ Realist theory – no autonomy Marxist theory – relative autonomy Principal-agent theory – limited autonomy Organizational theory – high autonomy  The governor’s dilemma Abbott, K.W., Genschel, P., Snidal, D. and Zangl, B. (2020), Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma. Regulation & Governance 14: 619-36 The question of IGO autonomy is an example of the ‘governor’s dilemma’ at local, national, global levels. Fact: Most governance is indirect, implemented through intermediaries. Question: How much autonomy should the governor give to the intermediaries? Dilemma: micromanagement vs loose cannons – Too much control weakens intermediary competence and risks policy failure. – Too much intermediary competence risks control failure.  Realist theory Waltz, Mearsheimer, Gruber… IGOs have no autonomy from the interests and preferences of powerful states. IGOs serve the interests of powerful states. They do as much (or as little) as powerful states want them to do. IGOs change when the distribution of power among states changes.  Marxist theory Paul Cammack (2003). The Governance of Global Capitalism: A New Materialist Perspective. Historical Materialism 11:2, 37–59 IGOs have ‘relative autonomy’ from capitalist states. IGOs promote capitalism as a system, but do not necessarily follow the (monopolistic) preferences of particular capitalist states or corporations. Cammack’s example: World Bank & IMF promote global capitalism by supporting debt sustainability and anti-poverty programs that enable capitalism to survive.  Principal-agent theory Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, eds. (2006). Delegation and Agency in International Organizations IGOs have limited autonomy from their member states. In order to achieve their preferred outcomes, states (‘principals’) delegate a limited amount of decision-making authority to IGOs (‘agents’) via contracts that empower the IGO to act on behalf of the states while allowing the states to control the IGO.  Principal-agent theory – 2 The pros and cons of delegating authority to IOs Agency gains: Member states can benefit from delegating authority to IGOs, in various ways: Specialization of functions Easier decision-making Easier resolution of disputes Greater credibility of commitments Greater policy continuity Agency costs: Member states can lose from delegating authority if the IGO acts in a way that is undesired by the member states. This ‘agency slack’ can take 2 forms: Shirking: IGO minimizes its efforts on behalf of states. Slippage: IGO shifts policy away from states’ preferences, toward its own preferences.  Principal-agent theory – 3 The challenge of controlling IGOs Conflict of interests States want IGOs to be effective and under their control. IGOs want autonomy from states. How member states (try to) control IGOs Limiting the discretion available to IGO. Monitoring and reporting requirements. Institutional checks and balances. Sanctions, especially budget cuts. Obstacles to member state control of IGOs Disagreements among member states. Societal interests support IGOs. IGOs lobby states, seek to change their preferences.  Organizational theory Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. International Organization 53:4, 699-732 IGOs have high autonomy. They are not “empty shells or impersonal policy machinery… manipulated by other actors.” IGOs are bureaucracies with independent expertise whose powers and actions often do not fit the interests and preferences of states. IGO action cannot be explained by state-centric theories (realism, rational design, principal-agent).  Organizational theory – 2 IGO ‘pathology’ = the tendency to produce outcomes that are dysfunctional or undesired from the perspective of their member states. 3 mechanisms, due to the bureaucratic nature of IGOs: Compartmentalized knowledge --> tunnel vision. IGO actions are tailored to fit rules & standard operating procedures. The tendency to downplay local variables --> IGOs make inappropriate policy recommendations. Divergent norms within a bureaucracy (ex. non-interference vs. humanitarian action) --> IGO outputs are incoherent.  Questions on IGO autonomy Which of these theories do you find most persuasive, and why? Are IGOs best understood as tools of states or as actors with their own agendas and effects? What are the implications of the IO autonomy debate for our understanding of the international system and global governance? What do various theories of IO autonomy indicate about anarchy or hierarchy in the international system?