4. Search and Seizure - Vehicles Etire Section.docx

4 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - VEHICLES Detentions; searches incident to arrest; searches based on probable cause; plain view; plain smell; consent searches; vehicle as instrumentality of crime; impounds and inventories; abandonment; emergencies. I.   INTRODUCTION This chapter discusses the legality of wa...

4 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - VEHICLES Detentions; searches incident to arrest; searches based on probable cause; plain view; plain smell; consent searches; vehicle as instrumentality of crime; impounds and inventories; abandonment; emergencies. I.   INTRODUCTION This chapter discusses the legality of warrantless searches and seizures of vehicles and persons occupying vehicles. Some important general considerations that apply to this chapter may be found in the "Introduction" to Chapter 2. A.   Expectation of Privacy As with the search of a residence, a person challenging a search or seizure of a vehicle must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle.  (Byrd (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1518.)  A claim of ownership may not always be enough. The same questions asked as to residential searches apply:  "(1) did the defendant manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the search and (2) is society willing to recognize the expectation of privacy as legitimate?"  (Tolliver (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1231, 1239.) Example:   Villasenor funded his brother's purchase of a load car to transport cocaine from Texas to California in a large-scale narcotics trafficking operation.  Villasenor disassociated himself from the car in every way possible:  he had his brother purchase the Concorde; he listed his brother's name on the pink slip; and he did not register the Concorde with the DMV or obtain insurance in his name.  Cocaine was found stashed in a false compartment.  HELD:  Although Villasenor was the owner of the car, the Fourth Amendment does not protect an "illegitimate" privacy interest.  Villasenor could not challenge the car search because his "own actions delegitimatized his privacy interest in the Concorde."  (Tolliver (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1231.) Example:   Byrd was not an authorized driver on the rental agreement for the rental car his girlfriend had rented for him.  HELD:  He could challenge the car search if he was, otherwise, in lawful possession and control of the car.  (Byrd (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1518.)  II.   DETENTIONS/ STOPS A.   Definition A temporary "detention" or vehicle "stop" is a "limited seizure" of the driver, that is, something less than a full arrest but more substantial than a simple "contact" or "consensual encounter."  (Wilson (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777.)  A detention exists (1) when you assert authority over a person in a way that a reasonable innocent person would feel compelled to submit to and (2) the person in fact submits.  (Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621, 626; Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 180.) Example:   Activating your red light does not constitute a stop or detention until and unless the driver complies by pulling over.  (Smith (9th Cir. 2000) 217 F.3d 746, 751.) Example:   No detention when vehicle you are following pulls over on its own and you have not activated your emergency (red) lights.  (Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1237.) Example:   No detention where officer briefly shined white light into moving car, then followed it without using red light or siren until driver pulled over on his own.  (Rico (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 124, 128-130; Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492; but see Kidd (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 12--pulling behind a parked car and shining spotlight was a detention.) Example:   No detention to walk up to a driver who was already stopped in his vehicle and ask (not demand) to see his driver's license.  (Gonzales (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1194.) Example:   Pulling in behind parked car and activating patrol car emergency lights is a detention.  (Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968.) B.   Reasonable Suspicion A detention is valid if you have "reasonable suspicion" that:  (1) something relating to criminal activity has just happened (or is happening, or is about to happen); and (2) the vehicle or the person in the vehicle you are about to detain is connected with that activity.  (Navarette (2014) 572 U.S. 393; Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7-8; Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893.)  This applies to drivers and passengers.  (William J. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 72.)  Your "reasonable suspicion" must be based on specific facts that you can articulate to a court.  The court will decide, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether the facts were enough, objectively, to constitute reasonable suspicion.  (Navarette (2014) 572 U.S. 393; Ramirez (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1608.)  Reasonable suspicion requires "considerably less" than a preponderance of evidence.  (Glover (2020) 140 S.Ct 1183.)  But a valid detention cannot be based on only a hunch, rumor, intuition, instinct, or curiosity.  (Renteria (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 440, 443.)  Your suspicion may be based on a "wanted" bulletin from another jurisdiction for a completed crime if the other jurisdiction had a reasonable basis for issuing it.  (Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221; Conway (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 806.) Note:   Even if the computer information you are relying on is erroneous--e.g,, indicating an outstanding arrest warrant--your stop would nevertheless be valid and the evidence would not be suppressed, at least where the mistake was made by court personnel as opposed to police personnel.  (Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1.)  The same is true for DMV errors made by data entry clerks, such as erroneous information regarding expired registration.  (Hamilton (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1311; see also Miguel (9th Cir. 2004) 368 F.3d 1150, 1154.) You may also legally stop a vehicle when you know an arrest warrant exists for the registered owner if the driver could be the registered owner, i.e., you are not aware that he is a different sex, race, etc.  (Dominguez (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1315, 1317-1318; Williams (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 467, 476.)  If the registered owner's license has been revoked, a stop is reasonable unless you have information negating the inference that the owner is the driver.  (Glover (2020) 140 S.Ct. 1183--recognizing states' vital interest in ensuring that licensing, registration, and vehicle requirements are followed.)  1.   Traffic Stops A traffic stop is lawful if based on reasonable suspicion that the motorist has violated the Vehicle Code or other law.  (Watkins (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408; Kodani (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 471, 476--seatbelt violation; see also Whren (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 810.)  Even a parking violation justifies a detention.  (Bennett (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907; Choudhry (9th Cir. 2006) 461 F.3d 1097.) Example:   Officers saw defendant parked on the side of the road texting.  Five minutes later, he was driving in traffic while leaning and looking down and making movements with his hands for 30 to 40 seconds as if still texting.  There was reasonable suspicion of a violation of Vehicle Code section 23123.5.  (Corrales (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 696.) As with all offenses, the existence of a Vehicle Code violation is evaluated based on an objective standard.  (Justin K. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 695, 699.) Example:   Officer's visual estimate of driver's speed in excess of 25-mph limit was sufficiently grounded in objective facts--observations, training and experience, and estimated speed differential--for traffic stop.  (Nice (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928.) Example:   Kansas trooper ran a computer check of a truck's license plate that indicated the registered owner's driver's license had been revoked.  It was lawful to detain the driver based on the database information and commonsense inference that driver was the registered owner absent facts--e.g., wrong sex or race--that it could not have been the owner who was driving.  (Glover (2020) 140 S.Ct. 1183.) Example:   Driver was stopped for an inoperable rear window brake light.  The supplemental light was required under federal safety standards, but the officer was unaware of the specific provision.  An "officer's reliance on the wrong statute does not render his actions unlawful if there is a right statute that applies to the defendant's conduct."  (Justin K. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 695, 699.) A command of the Vehicle Code and the ability to provide specific articulable facts in court can change the outcome of a case if a traffic stop is challenged.  For example, in White, an appellate court determined that it was not objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that a tree-shaped air freshener hanging on the rearview mirror obstructed the driver's clear view of the windshield (Veh. Code, § 26708, subd. (a)(2)).  (White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636, 647.)  The officer in White had not testified that he believed the air freshener reduced the driver's view or that he had observed a driving pattern suggesting that the driver's view was impeded; the defense, in contrast, presented testimony from a civil engineer that, based on his experiments, the small item hanging from the mirror would not obstruct a six-foot-tall driver's vision.  In Colbert (2008) 157 Cal.App.4th 1068, the appellate court held that the same tree-shaped air freshener was the basis for a lawful stop because the officer testified to the precise dimensions of the air freshener and explained how its proximity to the driver's face actually obstructed his view of distant objects, such as cars or pedestrians. Further, even when no traffic violation is observed, there can still be a valid basis to detain and investigate.  Sustained and pronounced weaving within a given lane would justify a detention by an experienced officer for suspicion of DUI.  (Bracken (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1; Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 104.)  Driving significantly below the posted speed limit without other cause for the reduced speed can contribute to reasonable suspicion.  (Letner (2010) 40 Cal.4th 99, 147.)  It would also be lawful to stop a car being driven at night without lights in a private parking lot simply to remind the driver to turn on his headlights before entering public streets.  (Ellis (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1201-1202.)  "Pretext" Stops.  The term "pretext stop" is a loaded term that implies something underhanded.  In reality, the term applies to a lawful stop to investigate a crime or infraction when officers also have an additional subjective motive for the contact.  A traffic stop is lawful if:  (1) you have a valid basis for the stop (an actual or suspected violation of the Vehicle Code or other law) and (2) your actions are consistent with that basis. In other words, "pretext stops" are not illegal because the officer's subjective intent or purpose makes no difference, as long as there is an objective lawful basis for his actions.  (Whren (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813; Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1054.)  "The subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer's actions violate the Fourth Amendment."  (Bond (2000) 529 U.S. 334, 338, fn. 2; Whren (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813; Sullivan (2001) 532 U.S. 769, 771-772; Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 38; Letner (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145.)  The only exception to this rule is that the programmatic purpose is relevant in the context of certain "special needs" or administrative stops or searches conducted without individualized suspicion, such as checkpoints for impaired driving or drug trafficking and vehicle inventories.  (See Brigham City (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 405; Al-Kidd (2011) 563 U.S. 731.) Example:   Plainclothes officers in an unmarked car saw two men in a truck lingering at a stop sign in a "high drug area" for an unusually long time, then make a right turn without signaling and take off at an "unreasonable" speed.  The officers stopped the truck, supposedly to warn the driver about traffic violations, and found the passenger holding plastic bags of crack.  The Supreme Court found that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."  "The Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent."  (Whren (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813.) Example:   Narcotics agents radioed marked units and asked them to follow and stop a truck the agents had been watching in a narcotics investigation.  When patrol officers observed an "unsafe lane change" violation, they stopped the truck, followed their usual routine, and obtained consent to search.  HELD:  The stop was valid because it was supported by objective facts of a vehicle Code violation.  (Uribe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436; Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531--seat belt violation; Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 925--unsignaled left turn; Valencia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 906, 914-918--loud muffler.) Example:   Officers who were instructed to find a reason to stop a vehicle believed to be heading to a retaliatory gang shooting initiated a traffic stop for tinted windows.  The record substantiated a violation of Vehicle Code section 26708.5, subdivision (a).  HELD:  The stop was legal, even if it was a "pretext" for investigating the occupants' involvement in gang activity.  (Roberts (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1191.) Be aware that there is a distinction between a so-called pretext stop and a "ruse."  A ruse is when officers lack any legal basis for a stop.  If an officer's justification for a car stop is no more than a ruse--i.e., the officers fabricate the factual basis for the stop--evidence obtained as a result of the stop will be suppressed.  (Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137 [defense claimed that officers lied about a broken taillight, which, if true, was a "ruse"].) Temporary Operating Permits.  An officer may not stop a vehicle displaying a temporary operating permit on the sole basis that permits are often forged or invalid:  a lawful stop requires reasonable suspicion that the particular permit is invalid.  (Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 297.)  This is a factual inquiry, and it is therefore critical that you include in your report all of the circumstances that make you suspect that a permit is invalid.  Hunches, rumors, and bare statistics will be insufficient. Example:   A sheriff's deputy stopped Hernandez's pickup truck solely because it was being driven with a temporary operating permit and no license plates.  He relied on his experience that operating permits were very often forged or issued for a different vehicle.  HELD:  The officer's belief that permits are often forged or invalid, without more, did not justify the detention.  (Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295.)  A stop will be lawful when you can articulate a suspicion that the vehicle is being driven in violation of vehicular license requirements.  For example, the absence of a temporary permit, where one is required, is a valid basis for a traffic stop to investigate a violation of Vehicle Code sections 5200 and 5201.  (Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303, 307; see also Dotson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1045.)  A stop is also lawful when you observe expired tags and the absence of a front license plate, even though the car displays a temporary permit.  (Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129; see cases in Greenwood (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 742, 748.) Example:   At 1:00 a.m., officer saw a minor driving a late-model Acura without license plates or a temporary operating permit in the rear window.  The officer could not see if there was a temporary permit in the front window.  HELD:  The stop was lawful.  The officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the car was being driven in violation of Vehicle Code sections 5200 and 5201 license plate requirements.  The court specifically rejected the argument that the officer was required to drive around the car to see all of the windows before making the stop. (Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303.) Example:   A DMV records check on a vehicle with a temporary operating permit indicated that the vehicle registration had expired two years earlier.  HELD:  The DMV report of the expired registration without any mention of a valid operating permit justified the traffic stop.  (Greenwood (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 742, 744.) 2.   Investigative Detentions Investigatory detentions involving vehicles are based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that may or may not be connected to a traffic offense.  (Navarette (2014) 572 U.S. 393; Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303, 307.)  The suspicion may relate to the driver, the passengers, or the vehicle.  As with traffic stops, courts look to the "totality of the circumstances" in evaluating reasonable suspicion.  (Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266.) Example:   Officers investigating a "grand theft person" report near midnight saw a car drive past a nearby school and blink its headlights several times.  Another car, parked in the school parking lot, blinked back and then followed the first car.  HELD:  The officers, who were aware of school burglaries and gang activities in the area, could lawfully detain both vehicles.  (Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 598-600.) Example:   An officer saw an unfamiliar van driving slowly in a circle through a residential neighborhood at 1:30 a.m.  HELD:  Stop of the van was legal because (1) its speed and route were suggestive of a "casing" operation; (2) the officer was very familiar with the neighborhood, its vehicles and local driving patterns and did not recognize the van; and (3) he knew that vans were linked to many residential and auto burglaries that had occurred in the neighborhood.  (Remiro (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 809; compare Kidd (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 12--a car parked with only fog lights on in a residential area at 1:30 a.m. did not justify a detention.)  Example:   There was reasonable suspicion to justify a vehicle stop because (1) the passenger physically resembled a wanted murder suspect in several respects, (2) the car was in a neighborhood frequented by the suspect, (3) the vehicle was a rental car from a different state where the suspect reportedly had been seen, and (4) the passenger attempted to hide his face when the officer pulled up next to his car.  (Monroe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1194.) Example:   A robbery involving two armed African-American men wearing dark clothing with hoods had just occurred five to seven minutes away on Coronado Island.  It was reasonable for an officer to anticipate that a car would be used to leave the island and then stop a car that was (1) traveling away from the crime scene on one of two logical escape routes from Coronado, (2) occupied by three African-American males who fit the general broadcast description, and (3) had two passengers trying to conceal themselves from the officer.  (Overten (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504-1505; compare Bates (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60--officer could not stop a car in a location adjacent to the suspect's residence two hours after a robbery when the car was not related to either the crime or the named suspect.)  Example:   Officers, who arrived quickly at the scene of reported reckless motorcycle driving and saw no other vehicles except a motorcycle pulling away from a house, had a sufficient basis to detain it.  (Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1238, fn. 2.) Example:   Expert officers watching a chemical supply house observed an individual load what appeared to be ether into a Ford LTD and (after meeting another vehicle and engaging in counter surveillance tactics) drive to a remote desert goat ranch that was ideally situated for the manufacturing of drugs and whose owner had been arrested three months earlier for manufacturing PCP there.  These facts (plus a few other details) provided an ample basis to detain both vehicles.  (Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493; Carvajal (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 487--report of narcotics activity from a reliable informant combined with observations during surveillance justified vehicle stop.)  Example:   A Border Patrol agent lawfully stopped a minivan on an unpaved backroad in southern Arizona based on reasonable suspicion of smuggling activity.  The agent had received a radio report that two "intrusion" sensors had been activated on a road used by smugglers to avoid border patrol highway checkpoints.  The timing of the radio report coincided with a Border Patrol shift change that reduced the number of roving patrols on the backroads.  The agent intercepted the minivan and watched the driver slow dramatically from 50-55 mph to 25-30 mph.  The driver appeared stiff with rigid posture, and he would not look at the agent.  The knees of the two children in the rear seat were unusually high, as if their feet were propped up on cargo.  When the agent began to follow the minivan, which was a type of vehicle commonly used by smugglers, all three children in the van simultaneously raised their hands to wave at the agent in an abnormal pattern for four or five minutes as if instructed to do so.  The driver abruptly turned onto the last road that would have allowed him to bypass the checkpoint.  The road was suitable for four-wheel-drive vehicles, not a minivan, and it would not have led to a family picnic or sightseeing area.  A registration check indicated that the minivan was registered to an address in Douglas, Arizona, in an area notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling.  The agent stopped the van and obtained consent to search. He found 128 pounds of marijuana.  HELD:  The stop was lawful.  The agent was entitled to assess the situation in light of his specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the area inhabitants.  "We think it quite reasonable that a driver's slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a sighted law enforcement officer might well be unremarkable in one instance (such as a busy San Francisco highway) while quite unusual in another (such as a remote portion of rural southeastern Arizona)."  (Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266; see also Tiong (9th Cir. 2000) 224 F.3d 1136, 1138-1141; compare Mendoza (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1044--no reasonable suspicion for stop along drug-trafficking corridor based only on record of Jeep's recent border crossing and driver's slow speed, lane change, and rigid posture.) Example:   Two hours after heavy rains, an officer on patrol at midnight noticed a red Ford Fairmont with beads of water on its exterior similar to cars parked in the area but unlike the dry cars traveling on the roads. The officer surmised that the Ford must have been driven only a short distance from the area, where there had been car thefts from the downtown lots, including the Ford dealership.  A license check indicated that the vehicle was registered to a private party and had not been reported stolen.  When the Ford merged onto the freeway, it kept its speed at 40 miles per hour, well below the posted 55 mph limit.  The patrol car was the only other vehicle in sight, and the officer did not hear engine noise consistent with mechanical problems.  Concerned that the slow speed might indicate an intoxicated driver, he followed the Ford for one mile before initiating a traffic stop.  HELD:  The stop was supported by sufficient specific articulable facts to investigate whether the men in the car had been involved in criminal activity, including car theft, and were trying to avoid apprehension.  The officer's subjective reason for the stop--mainly suspicion of intoxicated driving--was irrelevant.  (Letner (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99.) Example:   At 3 a.m., two minutes after the report of a residential burglary in progress, it was legal to stop a car leaving the area even though the officer had no description of the two suspects and did not know if they had a car, where there was no other vehicular or foot traffic.  (Conway (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 385, 390.) 3.   Anonymous Tips/9-1-1 Calls An anonymous telephone tip may not be sufficient to justify a traffic stop if the tip lacks indicia of reliability.  (J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266.)  What is required is some basis for believing that the tip is worthy of belief.  Corroboration of seemingly "innocent" facts may suffice, at least when they involve predicting future behavior.  (White (1990) 496 U.S. 325; Pinela-Hernandez (9th Cir. 2001) 262 F.3d 974, 978; see Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458--detention valid even though officer could corroborate only non-crime details regarding driver of a parked car reported to have committed an assault with a firearm.)  Example:   Police received an anonymous telephone tip that Vanessa White would be leaving a described address at a given time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight lens, that she would be going to Dobey's Motel, and that she would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attaché case.  Officers went to the address, observed a car that matched the description, saw a woman come out of the described residence at approximately the anticipated time, not carrying anything, and drive toward Dobey's Motel.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that this corroboration made the tip sufficiently reliable to provide reasonable suspicion to detain.  (White (1990) 496 U.S. 325; see also Pinela-Hernandez (9th Cir. 2001) 262 F.3d 974, 978.) Example:   At 1:43 a.m., CHP dispatch reported a possibly intoxicated driver "weaving all over the roadway" in a '80s model blue van traveling northbound on Highway 99.  An officer who was less than four miles from where the van was seen positioned himself on the shoulder of Highway 99 to intercept the van.  He stopped the van two to three minutes later.  He did not observe any weaving, speeding, or other violation of traffic laws before initiating the stop.  HELD:  The anonymous tip of a possible intoxicated driver "weaving all over the roadway" combined with the officer's spotting the described vehicle at the expected time and place provided reasonable suspicion to justify an immediate stop to protect the driver and other motorists.  (Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078.) 9-1-1 calls, unlike "anonymous" calls, require a somewhat different analysis.  The reason is that, today, 9-1-1 calls are not truly anonymous.  They are recorded, which allows investigators or victims of a false tip to identify a caller who would be criminally liable for falsely reporting a crime.  Additionally, for 9-1-1 calls from cell phones, the caller's phone number is relayed to 9-1-1 dispatchers and cell phone service carriers are required to identify a caller's geographic location.  These technological and regulatory developments allow reasonable officers to rely on information reported in a 9-1-1 call.  (Navarette (2014) 572 U.S. 393.) Example:   CHP received an "anonymous" 9-1-1 call identifying a pickup truck that ran the caller off the road on Highway 1.  The truck was stopped southbound on Highway 1 approximately 18 minutes after the call even though the officer did not personally observe impaired driving.  HELD:  The 9-1-1 call was sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that the driver had committed a traffic offense in running another car off the road.  The officer was not required to allow a possibly impaired driver a second chance for dangerous conduct.  (Navarette (2014) 571 U.S. 393.) Example:   An unidentified 9-1-1 caller reported that a light-skinned African-American male with a bandaged left hand who was sitting in the driver's seat of a parked gray Maxima pulled a gun on the caller after mentioning a gang name.  The caller was afraid to give his name because of possible retribution.  HELD:  The investigative detention was lawful.  The 9-1-1 call was a firsthand report of violent criminal conduct requiring immediate investigation to protect public safety; the call was recorded; the caller, who had given a reason for remaining anonymous, reported immediate and detailed facts; and the police responded within minutes.  (Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 461.) Note that even a truly anonymous report concerning drunk or reckless driving will justify a brief detention if the report is made contemporaneously and the car is still being driven on a public roadway because the grave risks to public safety justify a brief investigatory stop.  (Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078; Lowry (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 926.) 4.   "Community Caretaking" and "Special Needs" Although the usual basis for stopping a vehicle is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, there are additional grounds under very specific circumstances.  For example, one California appellate court has recognized that the "community caretaking" exception, which encompasses the "emergency aid" doctrine, can provide a basis for a lawful stop of a vehicle.  Applying this exception, an officer can stop a vehicle to ensure the safety of its occupants if the objective facts provide a reasonable basis for believing that a person in the vehicle is ill or injured.  (Madrid (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1050.)  Example:   A patrol officer observed a man, who was walking with an "unsteady" gait and sweating, stumble and break his fall with a nearby shopping cart.  The man walked 50 feet to a parked Toyota and entered the passenger side.  As the Toyota started to leave, the officer drove over and blocked it with his patrol car.  HELD:  Although the court recognized that the "community caretaking" doctrine would have allowed a detention of the vehicle to investigate the passenger's welfare, the stop of the vehicle in this case was not reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.  (Madrid (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1050.) A vehicle also may be stopped, without reasonable suspicion, based on the state's special need for an administrative search or seizure. Example:   A game warden observed Maikhio fish off a public pier when it was unlawful to be fishing for lobster and place something he caught in a bag. The warden stopped Maikhio's car a few blocks from the pier.  HELD:  Suspicionless stops, including vehicle stops, of anglers and hunters are lawful administrative seizures required to meet the special and important state needs distinct from the state's ordinary interest in enforcing the criminal code.  (Maikhio (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1074.) 5. "Mistake of Law" A "mistake of law" is a misunderstanding of the terms or operation of a controlling statute or local ordinance.  A "mistake of law" is distinguishable from a "mistake of fact." Historically, California courts had determined that suspicion founded on a mistake of law could not constitute a reasonable basis for a traffic stop.  (See Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856.)  In Heien (2014) 574 U.S. 54, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a lawful detention can be based on a reasonable mistake of law.  Because the test under the Fourth Amendment centers on reasonable police conduct, a reasonable mistake of law bears the same consideration as a reasonable mistake of fact.  It should be emphasized that the mistake of law must be objectively reasonable:  an officer's subjective belief is irrelevant.  Example:   A North Carolina sheriff's sergeant stopped a driver for a faulty right brake light, and a subsequent consent search led to the discovery of cocaine in the passenger's duffel bag.  The appellate court reversed the drug trafficking conviction on the ground that the stop was based on a mistake of law concerning the need for two operable brake lights.  Reversing the state court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law--such as the apparent misunderstanding that two operable brake lights were required in North Carolina--did not invalidate the traffic stop.  "Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an officer's understanding of the facts and his understanding of the relevant law.  The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either ground."  (Heien (2014) 574 U.S. 54; see Campuzano (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 14--Heien applied to an ambiguous city ordinance prohibiting bike riding on sidewalks in commercial areas.)  Also, even if an officer's mistake of law is found to be unreasonable, it will never result in the suppression of evidence if objectively reasonable suspicion exists to justify the detention on another basis.  (See Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 543 U.S. 146--same rule applies to arrests.)  "[A]n officer's reliance on the wrong statute does not render his actions unlawful if there is a right statute that applies to the defendant's conduct."  (Justin K. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 695, 699-700.) 6.    Attenuation In Brendlin II, the California Supreme Court made clear that an unlawful traffic stop does not always result in the suppression of evidence.  Absent purposeful or flagrant misconduct, courts will consider whether the evidence obtained was attenuated from the lawful conduct or whether the "chain of causation" was interrupted by an intervening circumstance.  (Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 265.)  This "no taint" rule is discussed fully in Chapter 2-III-B-3. Example:   A patrol deputy saw Carter, who matched the description of the suspect in a robbery of a nearby fast food restaurant, riding in a car with illegally tinted windows.  The deputy stopped the car for the Vehicle Code violation and discovered that Carter was wanted on an outstanding warrant.  While transporting Carter to the sheriff's station, the deputy arranged a field identification by a witness to the robbery.  Carter claimed on appeal that an unlawful traffic stop tainted the field identification.  Rejecting his claim, the appellate court held that the car was lawfully stopped for a traffic violation and found that the deputy's discovery of the arrest warrant would have attenuated any taint of an improper traffic stop.  (Carter (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 522, 529-530.) C.   Length of Detention A routine traffic stop "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."  (Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500; Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 761.)  Typically, this means no longer than the time it takes to perform the duties necessary to warn the driver or issue a citation.  A detention "justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission."  (Caballes (2005) 543 U.S. 405, 407.)  It is impossible to set an absolute time limit for a reasonable detention because it depends on the circumstances.  For example, a 20-minute detention might be reasonable under one set of circumstances but not under another.  (Dasilva (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 43, 50; Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1519-1520.) The key is whether or not "the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly."  (Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 686-688; Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.) The Supreme Court has noted that an officer's ordinary investigation includes checking the driver's license, checking for outstanding warrants, and inspecting the registration and proof of insurance.  (Rodriguez (2015) 575 U.S. 348; see Strieff (2016) 136 S.Ct. 2056--checking for warrants recognized as an officer safety precaution; Vera (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1081--necessary safety precautions are included in the "mission" of the stop.)  California cases have traditionally found that a routine traffic stop allows a radio or computer check on the vehicle and/or the driver, so long as "the check does not unreasonably prolong the detention."  (Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 498; McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 584-587; Castaneda (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1227; Valencia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 906, 918.)  When there is a traffic violation, officers also need to verify the driver's identity.  (Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353.) Other investigative activities are also permissible as long as they do not prolong the stop beyond the time it would otherwise take.  (Gallardo (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 238.)  For example, questioning the driver on matters unrelated to the reason for the traffic stop is allowed as long as the questioning does not unduly prolong the detention.  (Mendez (9th Cir. 2007) 476 F.3d 1077, 1080; see Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 325--the officer's inquiries may not "measurably extend the duration of the stop.") Example:   Mendez's car was stopped for failure to display a visible license plate or registration tag.  While one officer ran a records check, the other asked Mendez questions related to gang membership and unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop.  Mendez, a convicted felon, admitted that he had a firearm in the driver's door handle.  HELD:  The officer's questioning leading to the discovery of the weapon did not prolong the traffic stop.  (Mendez (9th Cir. 2007) 476 F.3d 1077, 1080 [applying Muehler v. Mena (2005) 544 U.S. 93 to traffic stops]; accord, Turvin (9th Cir. 2008) 517 F.3d 1097, 1101--officer stopped writing his ticket for a few moments to ask the driver questions unrelated to the traffic stop.)  You should keep in mind that once the reason for the stop has been resolved or disappears, or if you have finished issuing a citation or warning without discovering anything providing independent suspicion for a continuing detention, the justification for the detention is over andthe driver must be free to go. Example:   An officer on routine patrol stopped two young African-American males because he considered their presence in the neighborhood to be suspicious and also because he wanted to check out their vague resemblance to the description of suspects in some recent robberies.  He waited until he observed a violation of the Vehicle Code and then stopped their car.  Even though everything checked out and he discovered nothing suspicious, the officer prolonged the detention, patted-down the men, obtained consent to search in an effort to further investigate the robbery connection, and eventually discovered cocaine.  HELD:  The traffic detention was initially proper but was illegally prolonged, and there was an insufficient basis to detain based on a possible connection with the robberies.  The cocaine was therefore discovered illegally and had to be suppressed.  (Williams (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 349.) Example:   A Nebraska officer stopped a car for driving on the shoulder, completed a written warning, and returned the driver's and passenger's documents (licenses, registration, proof of insurance).  At that point, the officer had the driver step out of the car while a narcotics detection dog walked around the car.  HELD:  The dog sniff was not lawful because the driver was detained after completion of the traffic stop.  (Rodriguez (2015) 575 U.S. 348; compare Vera (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th--traffic stop for tinted windows was not prolonged by use of canine to sniff for drugs.) On the other hand, if, before the original detention has been resolved, (1) you have obtained the detainee's valid consent for a continuation of the detention, for instance, while you search his vehicle, or (2) you have developed reasonable suspicion about some other or different offense, then you are permitted to extend the detention, i.e., you may take a reasonable amount of additional time to check out this possible other crime as well.  (Rojas-Millan (9th Cir. 2000) 234 F.3d 464, 469-470--license plate and possible stolen vehicle concerns escalated to possible drug transportation; Suennan (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 192--officer observed marijuana roaches under prior marijuana laws; Valencia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 906, 918--inconsistent information indicated possible stolen vehicle; Ellis (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1200--driver was under the influence.) Example:   Officer stopped vehicle for possible DUI but eventually concluded the driver was not under the influence.  By the time he reached this conclusion, however, the officer had already developed reasonable suspicion that the driver was transporting narcotics, based on a very strong masking odor in the vehicle, contradictory answers by the two occupants about their destination and purpose, etc.  Therefore, it was proper to extend the detention to investigate this possible "other" offense. (Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96.) Example:   Officer validly stopped a vehicle for suspicion of displaying fictitious plates.  He was also concerned about the vehicle possibly being stolen.  Although the driver produced a valid Oregon driver's license and vehicle registration, there was a strong "masking" odor of perfume coming from inside the car, and both the driver and passenger gave vague and somewhat conflicting accounts of their purpose and destination.  While running further checks, the officer obtained consent to search.  HELD:  The officer's conduct was lawful.  The short additional detention was justified, and the consent was voluntary.  (Rojas-Millan (9th Cir. 2000) 234 F.3d 464, 469-470.) Example:   An officer made a valid traffic stop of a vehicle he suspected might be occupied by two armed robbers and called for backup.  When the occupants got out of their vehicle, one was recognized as a "known burglar" and a "white tennis bag" that had been used in the robbery was observed in plain view.  HELD:  Everything was legal because additional suspicious circumstances came to light during the traffic stop without the officers having prolonged the detention or made any separate investigation or intrusion.  (Franklin (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 627.) Example:   Detention of a driver stopped for speeding was not prolonged based on need to verify driver's compliance with § 290 registration requirements, information from another officer that driver was selling narcotics and firearms, and observation of furtive movement at the time of the stop--all of which provided reasonable suspicion of independent criminal activity.  (Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746.) Example:   Officer made a stop for speeding and then became suspicious that the vehicle might be stolen or involved in transporting drugs.  After informing the driver that he was not going to issue a citation, the officer asked him to step back to the patrol car, invited him to sit inside (due to the weather), then questioned him for about 20 minutes before securing a consent to search the car, which turned up drugs.  HELD:  The 20-minute detention was not excessive in duration or scope and did not amount to a de facto arrest, no Miranda warnings were necessary, and the consent was voluntary.  (Torres-Sanchez (9th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 1123, 1127-1130.) Note:   Only violations of the federal Constitution can result in the suppression of evidence.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a prolonged detention for a traffic violation (seat belt violation), which resulted in a de facto arrest, did not require the suppression of evidence because an arrest was supported by probable cause.  The fact that the California seat belt law is classified as a cite-and-release offense had no bearing on whether the de facto arrest, fully supported by probable case, violated the Fourth Amendment.  (Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531.) D.   Occupants/Passengers The Supreme Court has held that in all traffic stops the driver and the passengers are seized and all persons in the car can therefore challenge the constitutionality of the stop.  (Brendlin (2007) 551 U.S. 249.)  The detention of the occupants "ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop."  (Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 333; see Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 894.)  The use of handcuffs on a driver during the investigation of a traffic violation does not transform the detention into an arrest.  (Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353.) The courts acknowledge the risks associated with traffic stops and have recognized your need to control the occupants' movements.  In all cases, you have the right to order the driver to get out of the vehicle.  You do not need any particular reason, such as danger or suspicion of a crime.  This is because the courts believe that all traffic stops involve enough inherent risk to justify the minimal additional intrusion of ordering a validly detained driver to get out of the vehicle.  (Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106; Maxwell (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1004; Valencia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 906, 918; Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 927.) Note:    You may order the driver to step out of his vehicle even though you have already (previously) decided to release him with just a warning but no citation.  This is so because your subjective thinking plays no role in what you are objectively authorized to do.  (Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 38.) The same rule applies to passengers:  an officer may order passengers out of the car pending completion of a traffic stop.  "[T]he same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger."  "[D]anger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car.  While there is not the same basis for ordering the passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver out, the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal."  (Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 414-415; Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134-1135; Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 892.)  Therefore, it is always reasonable to order passengers out for the sake of your safety in every traffic stop.  (Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 564.) You may also order a passenger to remaininside or get back into the vehicle.  (Vibanco (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1, 14; Castellon (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1374; Williams (9th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 1029, 1034.) Example:   When neither the driver nor the passenger could produce a valid license after a traffic stop, the officer ordered them out of the car so that he could conduct an impound inventory.  Within a minute, the officer found a gun magazine under the driver's seat cover.  HELD:  The passenger's detention outside the car was lawful as a "brief continuation" of the initial detention for officer safety.  (Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 893-894.) As to identification, merely asking a passenger detained after a car stop for identification does not amount to a "separate 'detention' requiring separate justification."  (Vibanco (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1, 14; Grant (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1451.)  (See "Identification," Ch. 2-III-D.) Example:   For purposes of officer safety following a traffic stop, defendant was first ordered to stay in the car and then ordered to get out and sit on the curb with the other passengers.  While he was still detained, the officer asked him for identification.  HELD:  The request for identification was not an "additional seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.  (Vibanco (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1.) Also, you must be sure that the request for identification does not prolong the passenger's detention.  A prolonged detention would amount to an additional seizure requiring separate justification.  (Vibanco (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1, 14.) Unlike a driver or registered owner, a passenger cannot automatically challenge the seizure of evidence found in a search of a vehicle.  To bring a suppression motion, a passenger must first establish a property or possessory interest in the car or the property seized.  (Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 122 [passenger lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area under the driver's seat]; Rakas (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 148; see also Pulliam (9th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 782, 786.)  Note, however, that passengers have standing to challenge a car search if they can assert that the search was the fruit of their detention as a passenger.  (Brewer (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1019.) Example:   Patrol officers saw a Dodge Grand Caravan in the parking lot of an apartment complex claimed by the Manor Boyz in a high-crime area of Richmond.  Brewer, who was sitting in the rear of the van, immediately ducked down behind the driver's seat when the officers approached.  The officers told Brewer to get up and put his hands up, but it took several orders for him to comply.  Marijuana was found in plain view in the front passenger's possession, and a Glock was under the driver's seat near Brewer.  HELD:  Brewer could challenge the search of the car as fruit of his detention even if he could not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the van itself.  (Brewer (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1019.) 1.   Arrests Passengers can be arrested if, based on all the facts and circumstances, you have probable cause to believe the passenger has committed a criminal offense. Example:   Pringle was the front-seat passenger in a car stopped for speeding.  A search of the Nissan sedan conducted with the driver's consent uncovered $763 in cash from the glove compartment and five plastic baggies of cocaine behind the back-seat armrest.  When questioned, Pringle, the driver, and the back-seat passenger all denied ownership of the money or the drugs.  HELD:  The officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle for possession of the cocaine.  A reasonable officer could infer that any or all three of the vehicle's occupants were in possession of the narcotics, either jointly or alone.  (Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366.)  Example:   The arrest of the driver and passenger for burglary and receiving stolen property was based on the observation of numerous cell phones behind the driver's seat and the contents of a canvas bag in the front part of the pickup.  HELD:  No probable cause to arrest the passenger, who had not done or said anything suspicious and to whom the officer had not made any inquiries before the arrest.  (Justin B. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 879, 887-888.) Example:   There was no probable cause, without more information, to arrest the Hispanic passenger (and the other three occupants) in a suspected getaway car that had been used in a robbery nine days earlier.  The two robbers, wearing ski-masks, were described only as a black and a Hispanic male and no further description had been given. (Gonzalez (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 432, 439.) E.   Searches During Detentions In general, you may not conduct a full search either of the vehicle or of its occupants during a traffic stop or investigative detention.  This is because you only have "reasonable suspicion" to detain and lack "probable cause" to arrest or search.  (Terry (1968) 392 U.S. 1; Orozco (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 435.)  There are, however, three exceptions. 1.   Limited Search of the Occupant(s) for Weapons (Patdowns) The rule for patting down the driver or other occupant does not change just because the person is (or has just been) in a vehicle, as opposed to the street.  You are permitted to conduct a limited search of the driver or other occupant for weapons or objects that could be used as a weaponif you have specific facts indicating that the individual may be armed and dangerous.  (Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323; see also Knowles (1998) 525 U.S. 113, 117-118.)  Example:   Officer made a DUI stop at night for erratic driving.  The driver gave false identification, admitted he had recently done time for robbery, and was wearing a bulky jacket that he had trouble keeping his hands out of.  HELD:  It was legal to order him out, pat him down, and remove what felt like syringes from his jacket pockets.  (Autry (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 365; see also Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 112--bulge under sports coat was enough.) Example:   Collier was a passenger in a car stopped because the front license plate was missing.  Officers could smell a strong odor of marijuana in the car, and one officer asked Collier to step out of the car.  Collier, who was taller than the officer, was wearing baggy clothing that could conceal a weapon--baggy shorts that hung down to his ankles with a large untucked shirt hanging over the shorts.  HELD:  Collier's attire and the need to conduct a further search of the car for marijuana justified a limited pat down search for weapons.  (Collier (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1374.) Example:   Officers could not further detain and frisk driver based solely on location of traffic stop in high-crime area at midnight.  (Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171.) See the expanded discussion of pat searches in Chapter 2 III-J. 2.   Limited Search of the Vehicle for License and Registration Prior to November 25, 2019, officers who were conducting a traffic stop for any violation of the Vehicle Code were allowed to conduct a limited search of the passenger compartment to locate the driver's license or identification if the driver failed to produce a driver's license.  (See Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60.)  In Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, the California Supreme Court partially overruled its prior decision in Arturo D. and held that officers could not search for the identification documents needed to issue a traffic citation.  The court acknowledged that its decision could result in drivers who have committed no more than a traffic infraction being arrested and booked into jail for what would normally be just a cite-and-release violation.  Example:   A Woodland officer observed a car whose driver had twice been reported to police as driving under the influence on the Fourth of July.  The driver--Lopez--saw the officer, appeared nervous, and then immediately got out of her parked car and started walking to a residence.  When the officer asked Lopez if she had a driver's license, she said she did not, adding that she might have identification in the car.  A second officer arrived and picked up Lopez's purse left on the passenger seat.  Looking for her identification in a side pocket, the officers found methamphetamine.  HELD:  Obtaining her purse and searching for her identification were not permissible under the Fourth Amendment.  Although the officers' conduct comported with existing California Supreme Court precedent in Arturo D., "the Fourth Amendment does not contain an exception to the warrant requirement for searches to locate a driver’s identification following a traffic stop."  The court overruled that portion of Arturo D. that had approved of limited ID searches.  (Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353.) Note:   Although the Lopez court reversed the portion of Arturo D. concerning the driver's identification papers, it did not find that suppression of the evidence was required.  Rather, it returned the case to the appellate court to evaluate whether suppression is a remedy when officers follow existing law.  Suppression of evidence will not occur when officers "act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful," such as relying on legal precedent that is later overruled.  (Davis (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 238.)  This applies to any Arturo D. searches prior to the date Lopez was issued. Additionally, Lopez specifically did not overrule Arturo D. with respect to a limited search of a passenger compartment for vehicle registration.  During any vehicle stop, you are entitled to see and examine the driver's license and the vehicle's registration.  (Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 430.)  The law remains that in any vehicle detention situation where the driver, upon your request, "fails to produce" the necessary documentation, you have the right to conduct a limited search for the vehicle registration.  This search--which must be carried out before you issue the citation--is not restricted to "traditional repositories," such as a glove compartment or a sun visor, but may include any area within the vehicle where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found.  (Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60.)  Note that this area would normally not include the vehicle's trunk. The Lopez court did not address whether it was also disapproving of pre-Arturo D. cases that recognized officer safety as a reason for an officer, versus the driver, to retrieve necessary documents.  Prior cases have held that if the driver does not have the required document on her person but indicates where it is located inside the vehicle, you may retrieve it yourself if the driver has no objection, or if doing so is reasonably necessary for your safety. (Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 430--registration; Ingle (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 188--driver's license in a woman's wallet; Hart (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 852, 863-864--ID in woman's purse.) Example:   Officer, who stopped a car for speeding and lawfully ordered everyone out, could lawfully search the glove compartment and visor for registration because the driver had no license, denied ownership, and said the other occupants were hitchhikers.  When the officer observed a wallet on the front seat, it was proper to seize it and, after everyone denied owning it, to open it to determine its owner.  (Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 428-430.) Also, the United States Supreme Court has held that whenever you have made a lawful vehicle stop, you have the right to inspect the VIN.  If the VIN is not visible from outside or not voluntarily disclosed by the driver, you may enter the vehicle to the extent necessary (such as removing papers from the dashboard) to read it.  (Class (1986) 475 U.S. 106.)  3.   Limited Search of the Vehicle for Weapons Just as you may lawfully conduct a limited search (patdown) of a person for a weapon when you have specific facts indicating possible danger to you or others, it is also proper for you to enter a vehicle during a detention to conduct a limited search for weapons in situations where the circumstances justify it.  (Long (1983) 463 U.S.1032; Lafitte (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1429; see also Molina (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1042.)  In other words, although you may not conduct a full search of a vehicle during a detention, you are entitled to conduct a limited,protective search of the passenger compartment in areas where a weapon could be placed or hidden if you believe, based on specific facts, that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate access to a weapon.  (Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032; see Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 927, fn. 18.) In Long, the driver--who had been detained for erratic driving--got out of his car as the officers approached.  When asked for his registration, he headed back to his open car in which the police had seen a knife lying on the floorboards.  Under these circumstances, it was reasonable to conduct a quick weapons search of the passenger compartment before allowing the driver to reenter the vehicle.  During the search, the police found illegal marijuana. The Court stressed that "our decision does not mean that the police may conduct automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop."  (Long 463 U.S. 1032, 1050, fn. 14.)  You need facts making it reasonable to believe that the suspect presents a potential danger to you and that he is either about to reenter the vehicle (e.g., to obtain registration or perhaps because the detention is over and he is about to leave) or is close enough to it that he could break away from police control and grab a weapon from inside the vehicle. (See also Lafitte (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1429, permitting a limited weapons search based solely on the observation of a legal sheathed knife on the open glovebox d