1a. Impact of WW2 - REES Chapter PDF

## Britain and the Nationalist Challenge in India 1900-47 ### Britain and the Nationalist Challenge in India 1900-47 Because the Indians couldn't agree amongst themselves, the British government imposed a constitution (the Government of India Act 1935) that aimed at creating a federal India. Howev...

## Britain and the Nationalist Challenge in India 1900-47 ### Britain and the Nationalist Challenge in India 1900-47 Because the Indians couldn't agree amongst themselves, the British government imposed a constitution (the Government of India Act 1935) that aimed at creating a federal India. However, both Congress and the Muslim League were opposed to the Act. By 1939, a discernable shift had taken place. Indian independence no longer seemed to be an impossible dream but an achievable reality. The problem was that the structure and composition of an independent India was far from clear. ### What skills have you used in this unit? You have worked with a range of primary, contemporary and secondary sources in order to explore and analyse the different tensions that were present at the Round Table Conferences. You have explored the reasons for the imposition of the 1935 Government of India Act and the reasons it was opposed in Britain and in India. You have considered and evaluated the complexity of the relationships between the different racial and religious groups in India, in particular the relationships between Hindus and Muslims, Congress and the Muslim League. ### Exam tips This is the sort of question you will find appearing on the exam paper as a (b) question. * Study Sources B, L and M, and use your own knowledge. Do you agree with the view that, by the beginning of 1939, the only obstacle to Indian independence was the Indians/themselves? Draw up the sort of plan that works for you when answering a (b) style question. As you draw it up, remember to: * Be very clear about the view being put forward. It is not contained in one of the sources, so you will have to work out how the sources relate to that view. * You will need to use your knowledge of the obstacles in the way of Indian independence, including the attitudes of the British. * Analyse the three sources for points that support and points that challenge the view that the only obstacle to Indian independence was the Indians themselves. * Cross-reference between the sources for points of agreement and points of disagreement. * Combine these points with your own wider knowledge into an argument for or against the view given in the question. * Reach a balanced, supported conclusion. ### RESEARCH TOPIC Research the reaction of the British press and public to the Round Table Conferences and to Gandhi's presence in Britain. ## UNIT 10 The impact of the early years of the Second World War ### What is this unit about? The First World War (1914-18) had the effect of bringing Hindus and Muslims together and so unifying India's Nationalist Movement. Events in the 1920s and 1930s drove Congress and the Muslim League further and further apart, while at the same time making it more and more clear that India's independence from the Raj was achievable. The Second World War (1939-45) confirmed both of these developments: the ending of the Raj and the separation of Muslim and Hindu. It shattered all hopes of Congress and the Muslim League coexisting in an independent India. In this unit, you will find out just how this happened. ### Key questions * Why did Congress and the Muslim League react to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 in different ways? * To what extent was Gandhi's 'Quit India' campaign a mistake? * What was the significance of the Second World War to the fortunes of the Muslim League? ### Timeline | **1939** | **Event** | |---|---| | 3 September | Viceroy Linlithgow announces that India is at war with Germany | | 14 September | Congress Working Committee declares it will not support the British in war unless self-determination is granted to India | | 23 October | Congress asks all Congress provincial ministries to resign; all resign by the end of the month | | 22 December | Observed by the Muslim League as Deliverance Day from Congress rule | | **1940** | **Event** | | 20 March | Congress demands complete independence and a constituent assembly | | 23 March | Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League demands separate Muslim homeland | | 7 August | August Offer from the Viceroy on India's constitutional development | | 15 September | Congress rejects the August Offer | | 28 September | Muslim League rejects the August Offer | | **1942** | **Event** | | 23 March | The Cripps Mission arrives in India | | 2 April | Congress and Muslim League reject Cripps' proposals | | 11 April | Cripps leaves India | | 8 August | Congress endorses Gandhi's 'Quit India' campaign | | 9 August | Gandhi, Nehru and Congress leaders arrested | ### War! On 3 September 1939, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain declared war on Nazi Germany. Lord Linlithgow, India's Viceroy, followed suit. On the same day, and acting (just) within his legal powers, he committed over 300 million Indians to war without consulting a single one of them. ### Source A Confronted with the demand that she should accept the dictation of a foreign power in relation to her own subjects, India has decided to stand firm. Nowhere do these great principles [of morality and international justice] mean more than in India. Comments made by Viceroy Linlithgow after declaring war on India's behalf ### How did Congress and the Muslim League react to the outbreak of war in 1939? ### What did Congress do? Congress' first reaction was one of shock and horror. What was the Government of India Act 1935 about if not some form of power-sharing? How could the Raj behave as if India was still in the nineteenth century? Wasn't Viceroy Linlithgow demonstrating clearly that Britain still considered itself to be master in India? Had the previous 20 years been in vain? This initial reaction was complicated by a feeling of deep sympathy with Britain in its struggle with European Fascism. Gandhi urged the British government to negotiate with Hitler, using peaceful means, of course. Those members of Congress, like Nehru, who were at all familiar with events in Europe knew just how futile this suggestion was. As hostilities commenced, Gandhi gave his wholehearted support to the British people: 'We do not seek our independence out of Britain's ruin. That is not the way of non-violence.' Nehru and other Indian Socialists sympathised completely with the British approach to Fascism. They were not, however, prepared to commit themselves openly to support a government that had not consulted them prior to the declaration of war nor, or so they said, were they prepared to fight unless they were granted immediate swaraj. ### Source B The Congress considers the declaration, by the British Government, of India as a belligerent country, without any reference to the people of India, and the exploitation of India's resources in this war as an affront to them, which no self-respecting and freedom-loving people can accept or tolerate. The recent pronouncements made on behalf of the British Government in regard to India demonstrate that Great Britain is carrying on the war fundamentally for Imperialist ends and for the preservation and strengthening of her Empire, which is based on the exploitation of the people of India as well as of other Asiatic and African countries. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Congress cannot, in any way, directly or indirectly, be party to the war, which means continuance and perpetuation of this exploitation. This Congress, therefore, strongly disapproves of Indian troops being made to fight for Great Britain and of the drain from India of men and material for the purpose of the war. Congressmen and those under the Congress influence cannot help in the prosecution of the war with men, money or material. The Congress hereby declares that nothing short of complete independence can be accepted by the people of India. The people of India alone can properly shape their own constitution and determine their relations to other countries of the world, through a constituent assembly elected on the basis of adult suffrage. From the Resolution passed by the Indian National Congress at Ramgarh on 20 March 1940 Congress withdrew the Ministries from the provinces where Congress had a majority in order to dissociate India from the war and to enforce Congress determination to free India from foreign domination. ### Source C [No content] ### SKILLS BUILDER: Read Source B 1. Why was Congress opposed to involvement in the Second World War? 2. What did Congress hope to achieve by withdrawing its members from provincial assemblies? 3. How far does Source C challenge Source B bout Indian participation in the Second World War? ### Source D I wish the Musalmans all over India to observe Friday 22 December as the 'Day of Deliverance' and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress regime has at last ceased to function. I hope that the provincial, district and primary Muslim Leagues all over India will hold public meetings and offer prayers by way of thanksgiving for being delivered from the unjust Congress regime. I trust that public meetings will be conducted in an orderly manner and with all due sense of humility, and nothing should be done which will cause offence to any other community, because it is the High Command of the Congress that is primarily responsible for the wrongs that have been done to the Musalmans and other minorities. From M.A. Jinnah, in his appeal for the observation of Deliverance Day, given on 2 December 1939. ### SKILLS BUILDER: Read Source D. What, in your view, was the purpose of the Muslim Day of Deliverance? ### Source E Two days ago I sent you a letter informing you that I intended going to Bombay soon and hoped to meet you there. Yesterday morning I read in the newspapers your statement fixing December 22nd as a day of deliverance and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress government have at last ceased to function. I have read this statement very carefully more than once and have given 24 hours thought to the matter. What has oppressed me terribly since yesterday is the realisation that our sense of values and objectives in life as well as in politics differs so very greatly. I had hoped, after our conversations, that this was not so great, but now the gulf appears wider than ever. Under these circumstances, I wonder what purpose will be served by our discussing with each other the problems that confront us. There must be some common ground for discussion, some common objective aimed at, for that discussion to bear fruit. From a letter written by J. Nehru to M.A. Jinnah on 9 December 1939 ### Source F I am in receipt of your letter of 9th December. I quite agree with you 'that there must be some common ground for discussion to yield fruit'; that is the very reason why I made it clear in our conversation at Delhi in October last to Mr Gandhi and yourself. First, that as long as the Congress is not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims in India it was not possible to carry on talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement. If happily we could settle the Hindu-Muslim question then we would be in a position to evolve an agreed formula for a demand of a declaration by H.M. Government [on H.M. Government's war aims in respect of democracy and imperialism] that would satisfy us. I can only say that if you desire to discuss the matter further I am at your disposal. From a letter written by M.A. Jinnah to J. Nehru on 13 December 1939 ### SKILLS BUILDER: Read Sources E and F. How likely was it that Nehru and Jinnah would find common ground for talks? ### Source G There seemed to be no way back, now. With Congress out of the political picture, the Muslim League worked with the Raj and the British government to support the war effort and to strengthen their own position within India. ### The Lahore Resolution, March 1940 Freed from the necessity of coping with Congress, Jinnah focused on the Muslim League and the challenging problems of formulating its constitutional goals goals with which all Muslims could agree. He called a meeting of the League in Lahore in March 1940, which was attended by approximately 100,000 Muslims. If the British Government is really in earnest, and sincere to secure peace and happiness for the people of the sub-continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national states. There is no reason why these states should be antagonistic to each other. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither inter-marry, nor dine together and indeed they belong to two different civilisations, which are based on conflicting ideas. To join together two such nations under a single state, one as a minority and one as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of such a state. Muslim India cannot accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government. Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced upon the minorities can only mean Hindu Raj. From the presidential address by M.A. Jinnah at the Lahore session of the All-Indian Muslim League in March 1940. The word 'separate' had not only been said, it had been driven home relentlessly. The genie was out of the bottle. It seemed that Jinnah could no longer see any possibility of a Hindu-Muslim rapprochement. ### Source H Resolved that it is the considered view of the session of the All-Indian Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country, or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests, in consultation with them, and in other parts of India where the Muslims are in a minority. This session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption, finally, by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary. From the Resolution of the Muslim League at Lahore, 24 March 1940 ### SKILLS BUILDER: Read Sources G and H, and sue your own knowledge. What, in your view, did Jinnah and the Muslim League really want in March 1940? It is, however, by no means certain that at this point the Muslim League envisaged that two separate states of East and West Pakistan would eventually emerge. It is by no means certain that Jinnah himself wanted this: he may have been using the idea of separate states as a bargaining tactic to gain separate representation within a united sub-continent. If so, he was playing a dangerous game, risking his bluff being called. However, the involvement of Fazul Huq, the eminent Bengali politician and strong proponent of a separate Pakistan, in the drafting of the Lahore Resolution makes it more than likely that this was a possibility in the minds of the drafters when they wrote of 'independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign'. ### What was the reaction of Congress? A battle of words between Jinnah and Gandhi ensued, with Gandhi maintaining that the Lahore Declaration was tantamount to the vivisection of India and appealing, over the head of Jinnah, to the commonsense of Muslims to draw back form the obvious suicide that Partition would mean for India. Mini-satyagraha campaigns broke out and the perpetrators were jailed. Nehru denounced the idea of Pakistan as a mad scheme and toured India trying to strengthen the will of Congress supporters. The young were already drilling and wearing pseudo-uniforms, ready for the supposed conflict with the Muslims. Nehru inspected one such body, carrying an imitation Field Marshal's baton, and was promptly thrown into gaol for his trouble. In reality, Congress was suffering from a self-inflicted wound: the withdrawal of congressmen from positions of authority and influence in the provinces had completely weakened their hand politically. ### What were the threats to India? ### Source I [Image] ### Source J: Bose: the enemy within? In 1939, Subhas Chandra Bose (see page 107) left the Congress Party and formed the Forward Bloc Party, which was basically a terrorist organisation aimed at getting the British to quit India. The organisation was banned by the Raj in 1941 and Bose fled to Afghanistan, finally ending up in Berlin. There, his reception was lukewarm. Hitler feared that any collapse of the British Raj in India would lead to Russia moving into the power vacuum created in the sub-continent. However, Bose was encouraged to broadcast propaganda to India, urging Indians to rise up against British tyranny. Finally having no more use for him, the Nazis agreed that he could work with the Japanese on a possible land invasion into India. Bose was moved to Japan, where he formed the Indian National Army from Indian prisoners of war taken by he Japanese. Initially, Japan used this army as a source of agents for behind-the-lines sabotage and spying in mainland India. Most of these agents were picked up by the Indian authorities; many became double agents and some simply took the train home. Bose, however, still planned for a full-scale invasion of India. The Japanese had more limited objectives, centred on a push against Imphal. In the spring of 1944, some 6000 soldiers of the Indian National Army went into action with Japanese troops. Of these 6000, some 600 deserted to the British, 400 were killed, 1500 died from dysentery and malaria, and a further 1400 were invalided out of the war zone. The rest surrendered. Bose, escaping in the last Japanese plane to leave Rangoon, died from burns shortly after the plane crashed. ### Source K [Image] ### SKILLS BUILDER: Read Sources J and K. How far does Source K support what Source J says about the activities of Bose? 2. Use your own knowledge and Sources J and K to explain whether, in your view, Bose was a patriot or a traitor. ### Source L [Image] ### Source M You know the weight which I attach to everything you say to me, but I did not feel I could take responsibility for the defence of India if everything has again to be thrown into the melting pot at this critical juncture. That I am sure would be the view of Cabinet and of Parliament. From Winston Churchill's reply to President Roosevelt on 12 April 1942 ### Questions 1. Why did Roosevelt become involved in the situation in India? 2. Why was Churchill so determined to oppose all moves towards Indian independence? ### Source N The All-Indian Congress Committee would yet again, at this last moment, in the interest of world freedom, renew this appeal to Britain and the United Nations. But the Committee feels that it is no longer justified in holding the nation back from endeavouring to assert its will against an imperialist and authoritarian Government, which dominates over it and prevents it from functioning in its own interest and in the interest of humanity. The Committee resolves, therefore, to sanction for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and independence, the starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale, so that the country might utilise all the non-violent strength it has gathered during the last twenty-two years of peaceful struggle. Such a struggle must inevitably be under the leadership of Gandhi and the Committee requests him to take the lead and guide the nation in the steps to be taken. From the 'Quit India' demand, in a resolution of the All-Indian Congress Committee on 8 August 1942 'Quit India' was the shout that greeted every English man, woman and child as they went about their daily lives in India. 'Quit India' was shouted at the troops who were desperately trying to defend India's frontiers against the Japanese. Correctly guessing that the response of the Raj. would be repression, Congress leaders, before they could be imprisoned and silenced, called on their supporters to make India ungovernable. ### What, in the context of the Second World War, were the risks involved in starting the 'Quit India' campaign? ### Congress versus Raj Congress had spent three months arguing as to whether the Congress Party should, or should not, support Gandhi's 'Quit India' satyagraha and the Raj had plenty of time to prepare contingency plans. On 9 August, the day after Congress officially sanctioned the campaign, Gandhi, Nehru and most of the Congress Party's leaders were arrested and interned. Within the next fortnight, thousands of local activists were rounded up and imprisoned. Offices were raided, files taken and funds frozen. Gandhi, anticipating that this would happen and realising that it would thus be impossible to organise the satyagraha from above, told his followers to 'Go out to die, not to live', urging every demonstrator to become their own leader. So began a horrific round of riots, killings, attacks on Europeans, and damage to, and destruction of, government property. There were the usual targets: revenue offices and police stations, but, alarmingly in time of war and with India daily expecting an invasion from the Japanese troops massing on its borders, stations and signal boxes were wrecked, railway tracks were torn up, and telegraph and telephone lines were pulled down. Over 1000 deaths and over 3000 serious injuries were directly attributed to the 'Quit India' campaign. The Raj did not stand idly by. The threat to the transport of troops and war supplies was so great that on 14 August the RAF began flying sorties against the crowds threatening railway lines in the United Provinces and Bihar. They were ordered first to drop flares and, if that didn't disperse the crowds, machine-gun them. During one of the sorties, a plane crash-landed and two of its crew were murdered. Thirty-five thousand British troops were made available to support the police. Some were rushed between trouble spots; others guarded lines of communication, munitions stores and public buildings. The authorities reckoned that they had about six weeks to get India under control before the monsoons stopped and a Japanese invasion could be expected from the east and a German one from the west and north-west. Viceroy Linlithgow wrote to Prime Minister Churchill on 31 August:'I am engaged here in meeting by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857, the gravity and extent of which we have so far concealed from the world for reasons of military security. Mob violence remains rampant over large tracts of the countryside. I am by no means confident that we may not see in September a formidable effort to renew this widespread sabotage of our war effort.' Churchill, always an opponent of Congress, made his position clear to MPs in the House of Commons: 'We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.' Linlithgow may have been a little over-dramatic in comparing the situation to the Indian Mutiny. In 1942, British Intelligence knew what was likely to happen and had forces waiting to be deployed. Raids on Congress branch offices yielded more information about the positioning of local disturbances. Undercover CID agents and informers had penetrated most of Congress' networks and, as a result, Congress' room for manoeuvre was severely limited. In 1857, the Mutiny came as a terrible shock. The 'Quit India' campaign may have come as a shock, but the Raj was more than ready. Even so, there were brief losses of control everywhere. At Chinur, in Bengal, on 14 August, a crowd assembled to attack a police station even though the ring leaders had been arrested a couple of days earlier. The local police inspector was murdered and two magistrates burned alive. Order was restored by 20 August by soldiers from the Green Howards. Afterwards, they were accused of murder and rape. At Sasaram, in Bihar, the railway line from Lucknow to Calcutta was attacked by a body of school children, university students and criminals. Local Hindu policemen refused to intervene because they were heavily outnumbered and order was only restored when a battalion of the Bedfordshire Regiment arrived on the scene. At Ballia, in Uttar Pradesh, the outnumbered magistrate burned banknotes worth 400,000 rupees to stop them falling into the hands of the mob. Later, charred and burned notes were found to be in circulation. At Madhuban, in the United Provinces, local policemen barricaded themselves inside the police station. Ranged against them were 4000 angry villagers armed with spears, saws, spades and two elephants. The standoff lasted two hours and ended with the rebels running away. The defenders had fired 119 rounds and killed 40-50 villagers; there were no police casualties. By November 1942, the worst of the attacks were over. What, if anything, had been achieved? Congress analysts showed that the 'Quit India' satyagraha had failed to paralyse the government, even in militant Hindu areas like Bihar. The reason they gave was that the military had remained loyal to the Raj. Even among Indian regiments, only 216 soldiers had gone absent without leave. The campaign had not attracted support throughout India in terms of geography, religion or caste and non-co-operation had brought detention, despair and death. ### How did the Muslim League handle the war? Back in 1940 (see page 153), Jinnah and the Muslim League had come out conclusively in favour of a separation of Hindu and Muslim after the war, as expressed in the Lahore Declaration. Whether this was to be as a state within India or as a separate country altogether remained unclear then. But since then the Muslim League's commitment to separateness had been openly stated and the proposed Muslim state had been given a name Pakistan. Throughout the war years, Jinnah proved to be a much cleverer operator than either Gandhi or Nehru. He showed himself and the Muslim League to be prepared to co-operate with, and even support, the Raj, but without making any firm commitments. In doing so, he pointed up the contrast between the League and Congress, providing the Raj with ample reasons to prefer to negotiate with the League. ### The August Offer In May 1940, Linlithgow invited Jinnah to Simla, with the aim of discussing with him a whole range of issues relating to India and the war. Two months later, Jinnah submitted a list of tentative proposals to Linlithgow, which were welcomed. Linlithgow made these proposals the basis of his 1940 August Offer: * 'representative' Indians would join his Executive Council * a War Advisory Council would be established, which would include the princes and 'other interests in the national life of India as a whole' * an assurance that the government would not adopt any new constitution without the prior approval of Muslim India. The Viceroy accompanied this offer with a statement that seemed to place the Muslim League at the centre of any decision-making about the future of India: 'It goes without saying that His Majesty's Government could not contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life.' The message was clear. The wishes and needs of the Muslim community would have to be taken into account in any post-war settlement. It was obvious that the vital role played by Muslims in the Indian army at home and abroad greatly strengthened Jinnah's hand, particularly when compared to what was perceived by the British government as the obstructive attitude of Congress. The Secretary of State for India, L.S. Amery, complained to the House of Commons, 'If only Congress could, in fact, speak for all main elements in India's national life then, however advanced their demands, our problem would have been in many respects far easier.' Here, indeed, was recognition of the fact that Congress did not speak for the whole of India and an understanding that the millions of Muslims had to have their interests safeguarded. The huge problem that remained for the British was not so much whether power should be transferred, but to whom? ### Unit summary ### What have you learned in this unit? You have learned that the Second World War was in many ways a watershed. Before the war there was the possibility, however faint, that Hindus and Muslims could work out some sort of rapprochement. Afterwards, that possibility had gone. During the war, Congress had shown that it still had control and influence over millions of Indians and that these Indians had irrefutably demonstrated that the Raj no longer had the consent of its Congress-supporting Indian subjects and should go. The Muslim League had greatly strengthened its position, gaining tacit agreement from Britain that some sort of separateness for the Muslim community was possible, inevitable and even desirable. The Raj, in turn, had demonstrated that it could hold India by force if necessary and that it was more resilient than any had thought possible. ### What skills have you used in this unit? You have worked with a range of source material to explore the impact of the war on India and in particular on Congress and the Muslim League. ## UNIT 11 The end of the Raj: dreams and nightmares ### What is this unit about? In October 1943, Field Marshal Wavell was appointed Viceroy of India and remained in the post until he was replaced in March 1947. During this time, Wavell tried to pave the way for independence and the British government, by sending out the Cabinet Mission (see pages 174-76), made one final attempt to resolve India's constitutional problems. They failed. In the end, Wavell was recalled and replaced as Viceroy by Lord Louis Mountbatten of Burma, great-grandson of Queen Victoria and close friend of the British Royal family, whose charm offensive was supposed to smooth the way to a peaceful handover of power. It didn't work. The Raj's withdrawal from India after imposing Partition resulted in terrifying rioting, mass destruction of property and the uncontrollable bloodletting and murder of thousands upon thousands of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. ### Key questions * Why, after the Second World War, did Britain need to lose its Indian Empire? Why did independence for the Indian sub-continent involve Partition? * Who was to blame for the terrible violence that accompanied Partition: Jinnah, Gandhi, Nehru or Mountbatten? ### Timeline | **1943** | **Month** | **Event** | |---|---|---| | June | | Field Marshal Wavell appointed Viceroy of India | | August | | Bengal famine begins | | **1945** | **Month** | **Event** | | May | | VE day marks the end of war in Europe | | June | | Simla Conference to consider Wavell's proposals to advance India towards self-government | | July | | Simla Conference fails | | | | Labour government comes to power in the UK | | August | | Japan surrenders | | November | | Trial of Indian National Army officers begins in Delhi | | Winter | | Indian general elections | | **1946** | **Month** | **Event** | | March | | Cabinet Mission arrives in India | | May | | Second Simla Conference results in conditional agreement between Congress, Muslim League and the British government | | July | | Muslim League denounces Congress and declares Direct Action Day | This evaluation has led you to an understanding of the motives underpinning the actions of Gandhi, Nehru and Congress, as well as Jinnah and the Muslim League. You have considered whether the actions of Subhas Bose were traitorous or not, and you have assessed whether Gandhi's 'Quit India' campaign helped or hindered Congress' cause. Perhaps most importantly, you have begun to consider the ways in which the possibility of a separate Muslim state was emerging in the thinking of Congress, the Muslim League and the Raj. ### Exam tips This is the sort of question you will find appearing on the exam paper as an (a) question. * Study Sources D, E and F. How far do the sources support the view that Congress and the Muslim League were working toward a separate state for Muslims? You have tackled (a) questions at the end of Units 2 and 5. Now let's develop what you learned there about approaches to the (a) question. * What is the question asking you to do? It is asking how far the sources support a view. * What is the view? * Consider the sources carefully and make inferences and deductions from them rather than using them as sources of information. You might put these in three columns, one for each source. * Cross-reference points of evidence from the three sources by drawing actual links between evidence in the three columns. This will enable you to make comparisons point by point and so use the sources as a set. * Evaluate the evidence, assessing its quality and reliability in terms of how much weight it will bear and how secure the conclusions are that can be drawn from it. * Reach a judgement about how far the sources can be said to support the given view. ### RESEARCH TOPIC You read something about the interest the USA took in the Cripps Mission (see pages 157-59). Explore further the attitudes the USA had towards the British Empire in general and India in particular. 1. What attitudes did the US President, Congress and public opinion express towards the Empire and India in the years from 1939 to 1945? 2. Why did the USA find the continued existence of the British Empire troublesome?