Airport Security Module 3 PDF

ACE p l o y e e C e r t i fi ed Em Airpor t C U R I T Y O RT S E AIRP Modules 3  Security...

ACE p l o y e e C e r t i fi ed Em Airpor t C U R I T Y O RT S E AIRP Modules 3  Security © 2005 (first edition) © 2009 (second edition) © 2011 (third edition) © 2015 (fourth edition) Copyright American Association of Airport Executives 2 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 Airport Certified Employee (ACE) – Security Module 3: Aircraft Operations and Screening Authored by: Jeffrey C. Price, M.A., C.M. Owner – Leading Edge Strategies Professor – Metropolitan State University of Denver ACE Security – Module 3 / 3 of 36  Security TABLE OF CONTENTS Contents Module 4 – Objectives.................................................................................................................................................................................. 6 Introduction to Module 3............................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Abbreviations.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8 The Standard Aircraft Operator Requirements......................................................................................................................................... 10 The Security Programs................................................................................................................................................................................. 10 The Full Program...................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Partial Security Programs........................................................................................................................................................................ 12 The Twelve-Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP)............................................................................................................................. 12 Private Charter Program.......................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Full All-Cargo Standard Security Program.............................................................................................................................................. 13 The Limited Security Program................................................................................................................................................................. 14 A Special Note on Helicopter Security........................................................................................................................................................ 14 Aircraft Operator Screening Requirements................................................................................................................................................. 15 Screening Devices and Equipment.......................................................................................................................................................... 15 Screener Qualifications When the Aircraft Operator Performs Screening............................................................................................. 16 Protection Of The Aircraft, On The Ramp And In Flight.............................................................................................................................. 16 Airside Security....................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 Security of Catering................................................................................................................................................................................ 17 In-Flight Security..................................................................................................................................................................................... 17 Law Enforcement Personnel and Carriage of Weapons............................................................................................................................. 18 Firearms in Checked Baggage................................................................................................................................................................. 20 Prisoner Transport.................................................................................................................................................................................. 20 Transportation of Federal Air Marshals................................................................................................................................................. 20 Air Rage................................................................................................................................................................................................... 21 Threat Response.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 21 Foreign Air Carrier Security......................................................................................................................................................................... 22 The Model Security Program................................................................................................................................................................... 22 Air Cargo Security.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 23 Overview...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 23 Indirect Air Carriers..................................................................................................................................................................................... 23 What is Cargo?............................................................................................................................................................................................ 24 Air Cargo as a Form of Attack..................................................................................................................................................................... 24 4 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Cargo Security Regulations......................................................................................................................................................................... 25 Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)............................................................................................................................................. 26 TSA Inspectors and K-9 use in Air Cargo Security.................................................................................................................................. 27 Air Cargo Watch...................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 Screening......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 27 The Screening Process................................................................................................................................................................................ 28 Screening Technologies............................................................................................................................................................................... 28 Conventional X-Ray Systems.................................................................................................................................................................. 28 Walk-through Metal Detectors (a.k.a. Magnetometers)........................................................................................................................ 28 Explosives Trace Detection (ETD)............................................................................................................................................................ 29 Explosives Detection Systems (EDS)....................................................................................................................................................... 29 Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)....................................................................................................................................................... 30 Liquid Explosive Detection Devices........................................................................................................................................................ 30 Screening Checkpoint Operation and Design.............................................................................................................................................. 31 Checkpoint Operations............................................................................................................................................................................ 31 Checkpoint Design................................................................................................................................................................................... 32 Checked Baggage Screening................................................................................................................................................................... 33 Alternate Forms of Screening................................................................................................................................................................. 33 Summary.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 34 Endnotes........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 35 ACE Security – Module 3 / 5 of 36  Security Module 4 – Objectives Explain Regulations under 1544-1562 Know the requirements of each Aircraft Operator security program and when each applies to a particular flight operation Explain helicopter security issues Know the requirements of the Aircraft Operator and screening Explain how the Aircraft Operator protects the aircraft in flight and on the ground Know the processes for law enforcement officers travelling on commercial flights Explain the air cargo security requirements Explain the screening process and technologies Know fundamental principles in screening checkpoint design 6 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 Introduction to Module 3 Prior to 9/11, Aircraft Operators (commonly referred to as the airlines, or air carriers) were primarily responsible for providing the screening function and ensuring that individuals who boarded their aircraft had been properly screened. According to the revised federal regulations implemented after 9/11, Aircraft Operators are still responsible for ensuring that no person or item boards an aircraft that has not first been subject to the authorized screening process, although TSA or an approved contractor generally provides the screening services. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 transferred aircraft operator security regulations from 14 CFR Part 108 to 49 CFR Part 1544. These regulations are relevant to domestic aircraft operations within the U.S. or its territories and applicable to U.S. flagged carriers operating outside of U.S. territory. Many of the regulations in CFR Part 1544, 1546 and 1548 mirror Part 1542 regulations and, therefore, this module will not reiterate the information in Part 1542, but will reference it when appropriate. An additional section within 1544 covers screener qualifications when the aircraft operator performs the screening, as sometimes happens outside of the United States when there is not a foreign government available to conduct screening at the levels required by TSA. The Aircraft Operator regulations call for aircraft used in commercial carriage to adhere to the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program (AOSSP). The six programs underneath the AOSSP (§1544.1 – 1544.3) are: 1. The Full Program 2. The Partial Program 3. The Twelve-Five Program 4. The Private Charter Program 5. The All-Cargo Program 6. The Limited Program Another program, the DCA Access Program is addressed in Module 2 under Title 49 CFR Part 1552, and the Indirect Air Carrier Security Program is addressed in a separate chapter in this module. ACE Security – Module 3 / 7 of 36  Security Abbreviations AIT Automated Imaging Technology EDS Explosives Detection System Aircraft Communications Addressing and EOC Emergency Operations Center ACARS Reporting System EOP Emergency Operations Plan AC Advisory Circular ETD Explosives Trace Detection ASAC Aviation Security Advisory Committee FAA Federal Aviation Administration ADASP Aviation Direct Access Screening Program FAM Federal Air Marshal AFSD Assistant Federal Security Director FIO Field Intelligence Officer AOA Air Operations Area FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association FBO Fixed Base Operator AOSC Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator FFDO Federal Flight Deck Officer ASC Airport Security Coordinator FPS Federal Protective Service ASIS American Society of Industrial Security FSD Federal Security Director ASP Airport Security Program FSP Full Standard Security Program ATR Automated Threat Recognition GA General Aviation ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security GSC Ground Security Coordinator 2001 Act of 2001 HRT Hostage Rescue Team ATSP Airport Tenant Security Program IAC Indirect Air Carriers AVSEC Aviation Security Contingency Plan IAP Incident Action Plan BAO Bomb Appraisal Officer IATA International Air Transport Association BATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement BCP Business Continuity Planning ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization BDO Behavior Detection Officer IED Improvised Explosive Device Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screen- CAPPS ing System IFSC In Flight Security Coordinator CASFO Civil Aviation Security Field Office IMS Ion Mobility Spectrometry Nuclear/Biological/Chemical/Explosive Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security CBRNE IACSSP Weapons Program CBP Customs and Border Protection IPP Isolated Parking Position CCSP Certified Cargo Screening Program JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force CERT Community Emergency Response Team LEO Law Enforcement Officer CIRG Critical Incident Response Group LRBL Least Risk Bomb Location CHRC Criminal History Records Check MANPAD Manned Portable Air Defense System Crime Prevention Through Environmental National Explosives Detection Canine CPTED NEDCP Design Program DAC Designated Aviation Channeler NIMS National Incident Management System DEA Drug Enforcement Administration NTSB National Transportation Safety Board DHS Department of Homeland Security PCSSP Private Charter Standard Security Program EAA Exclusive Area Agreement PIC Pilot in Command 8 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 PIV Personal Identity Verification PNR Passenger Name Record PPBM Positive Passenger Bag Match RAM Random Anti-terrorism Measures RT Registered Traveler SAM Surface to Air Missile SARP Standards and Recommended Practices SeMS Security Management Systems SD Security Directive SIDA Security Identification Display Area SOC Security Operations Center Screening of Passengers by Observation SPOT Techniques SPP Screening Partnership Program SSI Sensitive Security Information SSCP Security Screening Check Point STA Security Threat Assessment TDC Travel Document Check TFSSP Twelve-Five Standard Security Program TLO Terrorism Liaison Officers TSC Terrorist Screening Center TSA Transportation Security Administration TSI Transportation Security Inspector TSO Transportation Security Officer TSOC Transportation Security Operations Center TSR Transportation Security Regulations Transportation Worker Identification TWIC Credential USAR Urban Search and Rescue VBIED Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction WTMD Walk Through Metal Detector ACE Security – Module 3 / 9 of 36  Security The Standard Aircraft Operator Requirements Any Aircraft Operator with a security program must allow the TSA to make inspections or tests and copy records to ensure regulated parties are in compliance (§1544.3). Additionally, the approval of amendments to security programs is similar to the same process and timelines as the Airport Security Program requirements. The type of security program an aircraft operator must adhere to is based on a variety of factors, such as the weight, number of passenger seats, whether the operation goes into or out of a Sterile Area, whether the operation is conducted in Alaska, or outside of the U.S., and, as always, the interpretations and influence of the TSA. A fundamental premise with an Aircraft Operator security program is that the security program outlines the requirements of the Aircraft Operator and is exclusive of the Airport Operator’s security requirements. For example, an Aircraft Operator approved under the Twelve-Five Program to carry passengers or cargo must still adhere to the requirements of their program regardless of if they go into a commercial service airport with a Part 1542 approved security program, or a general aviation airport without any approved or required security program. It is for this reason TSA inspectors have the regulatory ability to inspect these operations on both commercial service and GA airports. While this regulation applies to general aviation operations on commercial service airports, it also applies to certain commercial operations on general aviation airports. Commercial (passenger, charter or cargo) operations in aircraft 12,500 pounds and below and private aircraft operations below 12,500 lbs. are not specifically under these sections. As of the summer of 2007, Congress continues to look at whether these operations should be regulated1. The Security Programs The Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program (AOSSP) requires the operator to be responsible for the safety of persons and property on their aircraft against criminal violence, air piracy and the introduction of explosives, incendiaries or weapons onboard the aircraft. Aircraft Operators must make their security program available to the TSA and must restrict the distribution, disclosure and availability of the contents of the program under Part 1520 (SSI). Within the AOSSP however are a variety of specific security programs – just like the Airport Security Programs distinguish between a complete, supporting, or partial security program, the AOSSP distinguishes between a full, partial, all-cargo, 12-5, private charter and limited program. The most significant distinction between the ASP and the AOSSP is that the ASP is drafted by the Airport Operator (ASC in specific) and Approved by TSA. The AOSSP is Standardized, for all air carriers. While Aircraft Operators will create internal policies and procedures in order to adhere to the AOSSP, the AOSSP itself is not really a negotiable document. Aircraft operator security programs must include descriptions of the facilities and equipment used in the screening of passengers (both carry-on and checked baggage), property, and cargo. They must describe the X-ray systems and explosives detection systems in place in any access control facilities or systems, and they must designate the Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator and any alternates – similar to the Airport Security Coordinator function in Part 1542. The amendment process, as well as access to Security Directives and Information Circulars, is the same for Aircraft Operator security programs as it is for Airport Security Programs. Additionally, depending on the type of program, security programs may include procedures used to comply with the requirements for law enforcement personnel, carriage of accessible weapons, carriage of prisoners, carriage of Federal Air Marshals (FAMs), fingerprint based CHRCs, and security training. Aircraft Operators are also required to have aviation security contingency plans and bomb and air piracy plans (§1544.103). TSA requires any company operating under a TSA approved Security Program to electronically provide a Master Crew List (MCL) and Crew Manifest data to the TSA; once submitted, Aircraft Operators are required to submit crewmember changes, (additions and deletions) per instructions provided on the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) website. To review MCL submissions, TSA uses the CBP and the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), which commercial carriers also must use to submit passenger and crew manifests for trips into, out of, and overflying the United States. 1 Referencing the Large Aircraft Security Program here. 10 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 The Full Program Full programs require more extensive descriptions of the restricted areas and security procedures, and they apply to scheduled and public charter passenger operations with: Seating configurations of 61 or more seats. Seating configurations of 60 or fewer seats when operating from/to a Sterile Area. Full programs apply to most scheduled service operations in the U.S., as they apply to any operation that enplanes from, or deplanes into, a Sterile Area, regardless of the size of the aircraft. Aircraft Operators with Full programs must: 1. Screen individuals and carry-on bags (§1544.201) 2. Screen checked baggage (§1544.203) 3. Screen cargo (§1544.205) 4. Ensure that TSA has conducted screening of persons, carry-on, checked baggage, and cargo (§1544.207) 5. May use metal detectors to screen persons if part of the security program (§1544.209) 6. May use X-ray system for checked baggage if authorized by TSA (§1544.211) 7. Use an explosive detection system for checked baggage on international flights if authorized by the TSA (§1544.213) 8. Designate an Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator and a ground security coordinator for each flight (§1544.215) 9. Provide for Law Enforcement Officer support (§1544.217) 10. Carriage of accessible weapons (armed LEOs) (§1544.219) 11. Carry prisoners (§1544.221) 12. Transport FAMs (§1544.223) 13. Prevent unauthorized access to Exclusive Areas and aircraft (§1544.225). 14. Conduct security inspection of the aircraft before placing in passenger operations (§1544.225) 15. Carry out provisions of Exclusive Area Agreement (§1544.227) 16. Conduct a Security Threat Assessment for personnel with access to air cargo (§1544.228) 17. Conduct a search of the aircraft before departure (§1550.7(b)) 18. Conduct CHRCs for those with unescorted access, screeners, and those with access to checked baggage or cargo (§1544.229) 19. Conduct CHRCs of flight crew members (§1544.230) 20. Use an airport-approved ID System (§1544.231) 21. Provide training for ground and in-flight security coordinator and crewmembers (§1544.233) 22. Provide training for individuals with security duties such as the Ground Security Coordinator (§1544.235) 23. Restrict access to flight deck (§1544.237) 24. Have contingency plans (§1544.301) 25. Have bomb and air piracy threat procedures (§1544.303) 26. Comply with and protect security of SDs and ICs (§1544.305) 27. Use approved screeners and screening programs if not using TSA personnel (Part 1544 – Subpart E) Throughout the U.S., the TSA (or a TSA contractor at the Screening Partnership Program airports) conducts the actual screening of passengers, carry-on and checked baggage. However, the Aircraft Operator is still responsible under their security program to ensure that the process is completed. Since Aircraft Operators operate throughout the world, they must ensure that either TSA or another approved entity, such as a foreign government or the Aircraft Operator’s personnel themselves, conducts the screening. TSA is not responsible for the actual screening of cargo on an Aircraft Operator. That responsibility remains with the Aircraft Operator, but according to the regulations, the Operator must ensure that it is performed within the approved TSA standards. A similar situation occurs with respect to law enforcement response. At most commercial service airports in the U.S., law enforcement personnel are stationed at the airport as part of the requirements in the Airport Security Program. However, Aircraft Operators fly into all sizes and types of airports around the world and must ensure that law enforcement personnel are available to respond to incidents on their aircraft. ACE Security – Module 3 / 11 of 36  Security Partial Security Programs Partial programs generally apply to many flight operations conducted in Alaska or small air carrier operations where passengers do not usually enplane from a Sterile Area. In some cases, these flight operations terminate at a commercial service airport with a Sterile Area, but the passengers and baggage must be properly screened before being allowed access to the Sterile Area. Partial programs apply to scheduled and public charter passenger operations with: Seating configurations of 31- 60 seats that do not enplane or deplane into a Sterile Area. Seating configurations of less than 60 seats to/from/outside the United States that do not enplane or deplane into a Sterile Area. Partial programs do not require the screening of persons and property. Aircraft Operators under Partial Programs must comply with regulation: 1. Designating an Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator and a ground security coordinator for each flight (§1544.215) 2. Providing for Law Enforcement Officer support (§1544.217) 3. Carriage of accessible weapons (armed LEOs) (§1544.219) 4. Transporting FAMs (§1544.223) 5. Conducting CHRCs of flight crew members (§1544.230) 6. Providing training for individuals with security duties such as the Ground Security Coordinator (§1544.235) 7. Restricting access to the flight deck (§1544.237) 8. Having contingency plans (§1544.301) 9. Having bomb and air piracy threat procedures (§1544.303) 10. Comply with and protect security of SDs and ICs (§1544.305) The Twelve-Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP) The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 required the implementation of a security program for charter air carriers with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of more than 12,500 pounds. This requirement is referred to as the “Twelve-Five rule.” The Beechcraft King Air is most typically used as the example for an aircraft that is about 12,500 pounds, depending on the particular model. The Twelve-Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP) applies to commercial operators conducting operations “in scheduled or charter service, carrying passengers or cargo or both” The TFSSP is a baseline security program for any aircraft over the 12,500 pound threshold that is used in commercial carriage. Under the TFSSP, Aircraft Operators must: 1. Screen individuals and carry-on bags if the operation is being conducted into or out of a Sterile Area – otherwise screening is not required (§1544.201) 2. Prevent unauthorized explosives, weapons and incendiaries from being loaded when carrying all-cargo (§1544.202) 3. Screen cargo (§1544.205) 4. Designate an Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator and a ground security coordinator for each flight (§1544.215) 5. Provide for Law Enforcement Officer support (§1544.217) 6. Carriage of accessible weapons (armed LEOs) (§1544.219) 7. Transport FAMs (§1544.223) 8. Conduct a search of the aircraft before departure (§1550.7(b)) 9. Conduct CHRCs of flight crew members (§1544.230) 10. Provide training for individuals with security duties such as the Ground Security Coordinator (§1544.235) 11. Restrict access to flight deck (§1544.237) 12. Have contingency plans (§1544.301) 13. Have bomb and air piracy threat procedures (§1544.303) 14. Comply with and protect security of SDs and ICs (§1544.305) 12 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 Private Charter Program The Private Charter Standard Security Program2 (PCSSP) requires certain Aircraft Operators operating aircraft under Title 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 in private charter operations with a maximum certificated takeoff weight greater than 45,500 kg (100,309,3lbs.), or with a passenger seating configuration of 61 seats or more, to ensure all passengers and accessible (i.e., carry-on) baggage are screened prior to boarding the aircraft. To comply with this requirement, the private charter rule allows “non-TSA” screeners who have completed TSA-approved private charter screener training to perform the screening. TSA screeners who have completed the TSA-approved, basic screener-training course may also perform screening at TSA checkpoints for private charter operations. The PCSSP requires the use of metal detection devices and X-ray systems, designation of security coordinators, law enforcement personnel with accessible weapons, criminal history records checks, training for security coordinators and crewmembers, training for individuals with security-related duties, training and procedures for bomb or air piracy threats, security directives, and all of Subpart E of 49 CFR Part 1544 concerning screener qualifications when the aircraft operator performs screening. For private charter operations, Aircraft Operators must carry out: 1. Screen individuals and carry-on bags (§1544.201) 2. Ensure that TSA has conducted screening of persons, carry-on, checked baggage, and cargo (§1544.207) 3. May use metal detectors to screen persons if part of the security program (§1544.209) 4. May use X-ray system for checked baggage if authorized by TSA (§1544.211) 5. Designate an Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator and a ground security coordinator for each flight (§1544.215) 6. Provide for Law Enforcement Officer support (§1544.217) 7. Carriage of accessible weapons (armed LEOs) (§1544.219) 8. Prevent unauthorized access to the aircraft (§1544.225) 9. Conduct security inspection of the aircraft before placing in passenger operations (§1544.225) 10. Conduct a search of the a/c before departure (§1550.7(b)) 11. Conduct CHRCs for those with unescorted access, screeners, and those with access to checked baggage or cargo (§1544.229) 12. Conduct CHRCs of flight crew members (§1544.230) 13. Provide training for ground and in-flight security coordinator and crewmembers (§1544.233) 14. Provide training for individuals with security duties such as the Ground Security Coordinator (§1544.235) 15. Have bomb and air piracy threat procedures (§1544.303) 16. Comply with and protect security of SDs and ICs (§1544.305) 17. Use approved screeners and screening programs if not using TSA personnel (Part 1544 – Subpart E) Full All-Cargo Standard Security Program The Full All-Cargo Security Program (FACSSP) was created out of rulemaking in 2006 that placed additional security restrictions on large air cargo operations. “All-Cargo” operators are distinguished from scheduled passenger service or Indirect Air Carrier operations in that the aircraft carries only cargo for profit, and the operator actually owns the aircraft operating certificate. Specifically, All-Cargo operators must: 1. Prevent unauthorized explosives, weapons and incendiaries from being loaded onto an All-Cargo aircraft (§1544.202) 2. Screen cargo (§1544.205) 3. Ensure that TSA has conducted screening of persons, carry-on, checked baggage, and cargo (§1544.207) 4. May use metal detectors to screen persons if part of the security program (§1544.209) – on occasion All-Cargo operators may carry passengers accompanying sensitive air cargo shipments, such as animal handlers. 5. May use X-ray system for checked baggage if authorized by TSA (§1544.211) 6. Designate an Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator and a ground security coordinator for each flight (§1544.215) 7. Provide for Law Enforcement Officer support (§1544.217) 2 Most private charters that require the PCSSP are sports teams chartering airliners for transport to games. ACE Security – Module 3 / 13 of 36  Security 8. Carriage of accessible weapons (armed LEOs) (§1544.219) 9. Prevent unauthorized access to Exclusive Area and the aircraft (§1544.225). 10. Conduct security inspection of the aircraft before placing in passenger operations (§1544.225) 11. Carry out provisions of Exclusive Area Agreement (§1544.227) 12. Conduct a Security Threat Assessment for personnel with access to air cargo (§1544.228) 13. Conduct a search of the aircraft before departure (§1550.7(b)) 14. Conduct CHRCs for those with unescorted access, screeners, and those with access to checked baggage or cargo (§1544.229) 15. Conduct CHRCs of flightcrew members (§1544.230) 16. Use an airport-approved ID System (§1544.231) 17. Provide training for ground and in-flight security coordinator and crewmembers (§1544.233) 18. Provide training for individuals with security duties such as the Ground Security Coordinator (§1544.235) 19. Restrict access to flight deck (§1544.237) 20. Have contingency plans (§1544.301) 21. Have bomb and air piracy threat procedures (§1544.303) 22. Comply with and protect security of SDs and ICs (§1544.305) The Limited Security Program Certain Aircraft Operators can request a security program from the TSA, and the conditions and requirements are spelled out by TSA. A Special Note on Helicopter Security Commercial helicopter operations are not required to carry out security programs nor does the FAA certify heliports, vertiports or helicopter landing areas under Title 14 CFR Part 139. However, helicopter security is important for several reasons. The most common helicopter related security incidents have been hijackings in order to facilitate a jail or prison break. Helicopters have been linked to smuggling drugs by taking advantage of their ability to land and takeoff from virtually anywhere. Helicopters tend to go unnoticed as they fly low over populated areas. However, they make excellent observation platforms for terrorists or criminals to conduct pre-incident surveillance, to photograph sensitive sites, gain access to a protected facility such as a prison or nuclear power plant, or airport. The scenario of a helicopter being used in combination with an active shooter attack is not without precedent. In 2004, Pakistan provided information to the United States about a pending attack on New York City using helicopters in some capacity. While not specific to an air terrorism incident, such as a hijacking or bombing, corporate executives do have security concerns regarding helicopter flight operations. Many executives are targeted for kidnapping by profiteers looking to make quick ransom money from the individuals employer. Helicopter operators should report suspicious activity, which includes suspicious awareness training, security programs, the use of CCTV within the helicopter and code words that the pilot can use to tacitly communicate to their operations base that they are either under hijack, or feel they are in danger. For some airports with commercial helicopter operations, or at commercial heliports, passenger and baggage screening may be a concern. Some commercial helicopter operations feature TSA screening at the heliport, with direct transportation to the ramp of a commercial air carrier, such as the heliports in New York City, with flights to John F. Kennedy International Airport. Companies such as New York Helicopter provide shuttle service between JFK, Newark and LaGuardia to the VIP heliport, the Wall Street Heliport and to the East 34th Street heliport. These operations generally go into and out of the GA terminals at these airports, but at one point TSA personnel were stationed at the 34th Street Heliport in order to provide screening services. 14 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 Aircraft Operator Screening Requirements The Aircraft Operator is responsible for preventing or deterring the carriage of weapons, explosives, or incendiaries on individuals or their accessible property (carry-on luggage) prior to boarding an aircraft or entering a Sterile Area. At locations where the TSA (or TSA contractor) does not conduct screening, Aircraft Operators must conduct the screening in accordance with Subpart E of Part 1544. Outside the United States, where a foreign government conducts screening, the aircraft operator must ensure that the foreign government has properly screened individuals and their property prior to boarding or loading onto its aircraft (§1544.207). As previously stated, the TSA actually performs the screening function, but that procedure does not shift the aforementioned responsibility from the Aircraft Operator. Aircraft Operators occasionally allow flight crew and crewmembers to fly on their aircraft without going through the screening process. At airports where flight crewmembers or crewmembers are based and possess authorized access/ID for the airport, they might use their access/ID to enter the Sterile Area through a 1542.207 controlled door, and then board the aircraft. This practice is a point of contention at some airports. With respect to the previous statement, Aircraft Operators must deny entry into a Sterile Area for anyone who does not consent to a search or inspection of his or her person or property, and they must not allow any individual to board an aircraft with a weapon, explosive or incendiary (unless provided for under other regulations pertaining to the carriage of law enforcement officers, prisoners, and Federal Air Marshals) (§1544.201). Aircraft Operators must ensure that all checked baggage does not contain explosives and incendiaries prior to loading it on their aircraft and should refuse to transport any individual’s checked baggage if that individual does not consent to a search or inspection. Additionally, the aircraft operator must prevent access to checked baggage by unauthorized personnel. Aircraft Operators must ensure that cargo does not contain unauthorized explosives or incendiaries. Cargo must be screened prior to loading it on the aircraft, in a manner that prevents the carriage of unauthorized explosives or incendiaries. Access to cargo by unauthorized personnel must also be restricted. Aircraft Operators must refuse to transport any individual’s cargo if that individual did not consent to a search or inspection. The previous primary security program for air cargo was based on the Known Shipper Program. While still in place, air cargo carried on board a passenger aircraft must now be physically inspected by an approved method. Cargo screening is covered in another section (§1544.205). Screening Devices and Equipment Walk-Through-Metal Detection (WMTDs) devices must meet calibration standards as set forth by the TSA (§1544.209). Aircraft Operators must use X-ray systems approved by the TSA. X-ray systems must also meet the standards for “cabinet X-ray systems” issued by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The Aircraft Operator security program must include a program for initial and recurrent training of operators of the X-ray systems on radiation safety, the efficient use of the system, and the identification of weapons, explosives or incendiaries. Aircraft Operators cannot use defective or modified X-ray systems unless the FDA has advised the TSA that the defect or failure does not create a significant risk of injury to persons. At locations where Aircraft Operators use X-ray systems, signs must be posted in a conspicuous location at the screening checkpoints notifying individuals that all items are being inspected by an X-ray and advising them to remove all X-rays, as well as scientific and high-speed film, from accessible property and checked baggage before inspection. The sign also must advise individuals that they may request that their photographic equipment and film be inspected without exposure to an X-ray system (§1544.211). TSA may require an aircraft operator to screen checked baggage on international flights using EDS or ETD, in which case the systems must be approved by TSA. Positive Passenger Bag Match (PPBM) Positive Passenger Bag Match (PPBM) is an effective deterrent against many aircraft bombings. While the argument can be made that PPBM does not deter a suicide bomber, there are far fewer suicide bombers in the world than there are non-suicide bombers. ACE Security – Module 3 / 15 of 36  Security Prior to 9/11, the airlines opposed PPBM due to the expense associated with more flight delays. With airlines running on such thin profit margins, on-time performance is not only important to customers, it is also critical to an airline’s bottom line; a ten- minute flight delay has a trickle-down effect that could result in the loss of thousands of dollars of revenue. Delays cost the money, however, overseas PPBM was a common procedure and, in instance after instance, resulted in bombs being found before the aircraft departed and lives being saved. In 1983, during the PPBM procedure, Alitalia airline personnel discovered a bag not linked to a passenger on the flight. Baggage handlers located the bag and found a bomb hidden inside. In another case in Sri Lanka, during another PPBM process, baggage handlers again discovered an explosive in a bag for which there was no matching passenger. Unfortunately, in that case, the baggage handlers mistakenly returned the bag to the terminal building, where it exploded, killing 40 people in the terminal and causing considerable damage to the terminal building. As a result of 9/11 and despite the cost, PPBM is now in place at all U.S. airlines operating both domestic and internationally, for at least the first leg of the flight and where other forms of authorized screening is not used. Lost baggage and baggage inadvertently left behind is generally not subject to PPBM measures, as it is assumed that the passenger could not have intentionally separated their bag from the aircraft once it has been checked in. Screener Qualifications When the Aircraft Operator Performs Screening At locations where screening is still conducted by the aircraft operator or authorized contractor, Part 1544 outlines the initial and continuing qualifications, training, testing and integrity for Aircraft Operator screening personnel. Screeners must be citizens of the United States who have a high school diploma, a general equivalent diploma, or a combination of education and experience that the TSA has determined to be sufficient for the individual to perform the duties of the position. Applicants must also pass a test administered by the TSA. Screeners must be able to distinguish images on X-ray and EDS equipment, including each color displayed on each type of screening equipment and what the color signifies. Screeners must also be able to perform the physical functions of the job, including hearing audible alarms and manipulating baggage, cargo and other objects that are subject to screening (§1544.405). Individuals who show evidence of impairment due to drugs, sleep deprivation, medication or alcohol are not allowed to perform the screening function while they are under the influence of such substances or situations. This section also covers annual proficiency reviews of screening personnel (§1544.411). Protection Of The Aircraft, On The Ramp And In Flight Airside Security Aircraft Operators must prevent unauthorized access to areas controlled by the operator under an Exclusive Area Agreement. Operators must prevent unauthorized access to aircraft, as well as conduct a security inspection of each aircraft before placing it into passenger carrying operations (§1544.225). Aircraft Operators must list in their security program the locations where they have entered into an Exclusive Area Agreement with the airport operator, and they must provide the TSA with a copy of the agreement upon request. Aircraft Operators are then responsible for carrying out the requirements of that agreement (§1544.227). The Aircraft Operator must ensure that sealing procedures are carried out for vehicles transporting checked baggage, as well as implement access controls to areas such as baggage rooms and other nonpublic areas. If the airport operator agrees, Aircraft Operators may be allowed to create their own personal identification systems under an Exclusive Area Agreement (§1544.231). For Aircraft Operators to be issued access/ID under this section, they must successfully complete a Criminal History Record Check and Security Threat Assessment. 16 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 Security of Catering The security of catered items and other vendor products that are delivered directly to an aircraft for use in-flight is an important security consideration for both Airport and Aircraft Operators. Catering provides an opportunity for an individual to conceal a weapon or explosive within the catered item for use by another individual on board. The TSA requires Aircraft Operators to have procedures to ensure the security of catering loaded onto a flight, or security at catering facilities. In 1985, two individuals hijacked TWA Flight 847. They were able to clear screening as a catering crew and had hidden their weapons in panels in the aircraft lavatories. Therefore, extensive background checks, in addition to the standard CHRC and STA, should be conducted on all employees with access to catered goods, along with periodic inspections of catering facilities. Airport and Aircraft Operators should also work to ensure that catered goods being brought onto the airport property are first inspected and sealed at the catering facility. Airport and Aircraft Operators should also inspect catering facilities, particularly those that border an airport or are within the airport perimeter fence, to ensure that adequate security safeguards are in place to prevent unauthorized access to the food preparation areas. In-Flight Security Keeping unauthorized items such as weapons and explosives off commercial aircraft is a significant component of aircraft security; however, in-flight security is another vital layer in the security process. Prior to September 11, 2001, most air carriers operated with weakly constructed cockpit doors that were often not locked during flight. Access to the flight deck was easy, and in most cases, all someone had to do was ask. Prior to 9/11, pilots were often notoriously nice and accommodating when someone would ask about their job and would frequently allow access to the cockpit. The most common argument against locking the cockpit door was that it would force a flight crewmember to make a decision to open the door in the event of other crewmembers or passengers being taken hostage and beaten or killed. This incident happened numerous times over the history of air terrorism, including TWA Flight 847. Another argument came from some airline pilot organizations that expressed concern about flight crews becoming trapped inside the cockpit during an emergency. Keeping the cockpit door locked also contributes to the reduction of an air rage incident from turning into a more life-threatening situation. The locked cockpit door might have kept David Burke out of the cockpit of PSA flight 1771. ATSA required that cockpit doors be locked during flight and that they be strengthened. Access to the flight deck is to be strictly controlled with no unauthorized individuals being allowed in the cockpit during flight. Many cockpit doors now have peepholes or cameras that point into the cabin area, with TV monitors in the cockpit so the pilots can see what is going on. Bullet proofing cockpit doors is a controversial issue, due to the large expense incurred by the airlines. Additionally, there are physics issues with airflow in a compressed environment, along with weight and balance issues that may limit the airline to carrying fewer passengers. While cockpit doors are required to be reinforced, they are not required to be bullet proof. Other policies, such as the recommendation that the flight crew evacuate a hijacked aircraft at the earliest possible moment, have come under question by some aviation security experts. In September 1986, when a Pan Am 747 was attacked on the tarmac at Karachi, the flight crew used, emergency escape ropes to evacuate the flight deck, following the FAAs recommendations. The evacuation left the cabin crew and passengers at the mercy of the hijackers, who were left without a recognizable authority figure, such as the pilot-in-command. The hijackers had no way of establishing communication between themselves and the authorities, and the press criticized the airline because the flight crew had bailed out when they had an opportunity; however, this procedure is still recommend, as it would likely disable the aircraft. The hijacking of TWA Flight 847 demonstrated the need to train airline crew members on how to handle threats to the aircraft, and the need to keep a hijacked airplane on the ground (once it is there). On July 14, 1985, Shiite Muslim terrorists (Hezbollah) hijacked TWA Flight 847 en-route from Athens to Rome. With 145 passengers and crewmembers onboard the Boeing 727, the aircraft departed Athens Hellinikon Airport bound for Rome, Italy. Shortly after takeoff, two gunmen carrying guns and grenades seized control of the aircraft and ordered Captain John Testrake to fly to Beirut. A third terrorist, Ali Atwa, was supposed to be on board but missed the flight and was arrested in Greece. ACE Security – Module 3 / 17 of 36  Security The aircraft began a journey between Lebanon and Algiers. Passengers and flight crewmembers were beaten in order to obtain compliance from both Captain John Testrake and ground controllers. At each touchdown point, some passengers were allowed to leave. Controllers at both airports created additional problems by not allowing the aircraft to immediately land. Air traffic controllers in Algiers tried to close the airport, and Beirut tower controllers shut off the runway lights during a night landing. Terrorists threatened to crash the aircraft into the presidential palace, if they were not given permission to land, and the runway lights came back on. U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem, who had been subjected to numerous beatings during the ordeal, was shot and killed, his body thrown onto the tarmac in Beirut. The terrorists demanded the release of Shiites in Israeli custody, along with the third hijacker, who had been arrested at the Athens airport. In Algiers, fourteen more terrorists from the Amal organization along with Ali Atwa, the hijacker who was supposed to be on the flight back in Athens, boarded the aircraft as reinforcements. Passengers were segregated on the basis of American or Jewish-sounding names. Among the women was flight attendant Uli Derickson, who was credited with saving the lives of many on board. Derickson spoke German, as did one of the terrorists, enabling communication between the hijackers and the hostages. The only English-speaking hijacker, Ali Atwa, missed the flight. Derickson would intercede during passenger beatings, attempted to hide American, U.S. Military and Jewish identities of passengers, and eventually negotiated the release of her crew and the women passengers3. Captain Testrake also demonstrated leadership and courage throughout the hijacking. As the flight headed back to Beirut for the third time, he and his crew worked out a plan to disable the aircraft. The flight crew shut down two of the plane’s three engines and convinced the hijackers that the aircraft could no longer fly. Testrake also worked with mechanics and crewmembers from Middle East Airlines to provide food and medical assistance to his flight crew and remaining passengers4. Response plans to a hijacking while the aircraft is still on the ground calls for the disabling of the aircraft by any reasonable means. Aircraft Operators have created their own policies regarding the protection of the cockpit, particularly when a flight crewmember has to go to the lavatory. Some airlines have a flight attendant sit in the pilot’s seat if either the captain or first officer steps out to use the lavatory. This procedure is supposed to make it more difficult for a terrorist to get to the flight controls and allows the remaining pilot to remain at the controls without having to let the other pilot back in. Some airlines are developing secondary flight deck barriers. These are often cage type doors that can be deployed across the front portion of the cabin, forward of the first-class section, in order to prevent access to the cockpit while the cockpit door is open. Another critical element to in-flight security is the training of flight attendants and crewmembers in techniques to subdue and control individuals. This training was used by crewmembers when Richard Reid (the shoe bomber) attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris in December of 2001. ATSA requires airline flight crewmembers and flight attendants to be given basic self-defense training, and it also requires airlines to make more advanced training available on a volunteer basis. Law Enforcement Personnel and Carriage of Weapons Aircraft Operators’ employees must have information and procedures on obtaining law enforcement assistance at the airport (§1544.217). At airports that are not required to have a security program under Part 1542, Aircraft Operators must ensure that law enforcement personnel meet the qualifications and standards specified in Part 1542.217 and are available to respond to an incident. 3 Derickson’s name would become a household word for the courage and strength she showed throughout the ordeal, and her story was portrayed in a 1980s made-for-TV movie, “The Taking of Flight 847: The Uli Derickson Story.” 4 The standoff continued for 18 more days, after which all of the hostages were released. Ali Atwa, the terrorist held responsible for the hijacking, is reportedly dead. The hijacking also was significant as the press covered it so extensively. Media representatives were able to interview the hijackers as the aircraft sat on the ground in Beirut and Algiers, and new satellite technology enable the mass media to bring the images immediately into living rooms all over the world. Video images of Captain Testrake and a hijacker holding a gun to Testrake’s head as both peered out the cockpit window of the plane are now a part of aviation security history. 18 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 Within the United States, to date, there has never been a known instance in which someone has used counterfeit law enforcement identification to bypass airport security screening or to bring a weapon on board an aircraft for the purpose of hijacking the plane (§1544.219). Internationally, however, there have been instances of LEOs using counterfeit identification, such as in Karachi, Pakistan, and in Algiers, Algeria. Therefore, armed Law Enforcement Officers (LEO) who carry a firearm aboard an aircraft must meet the following requirements: 1. Be a federal law enforcement officer: Federal law enforcement officers are authorized to carry their firearms at all times, including on board an aircraft, whether they are on official duty or off-duty. 2. Be a full-time, municipal, county or state law enforcement officer, who is a direct employee of a government agency, such as a State, county or municipal law enforcement officers. They must present an original letter of authority signed by an authorizing official from their service, outlining the trip itinerary and confirming the need to travel armed. The law enforcement National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) is used for this purpose. a. If the LEO is escorting a foreign official, then the Department of State is authorized to sign the letter. b. Be sworn and commissioned to enforce criminal statutes or immigration statutes. c. Be authorized by the employing agency to have the weapon in connection with assigned duties. d. Have completed the Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed training program. Additionally LEOs must have a need to have access to the weapon, as determined by the employing agency or be: 1. Under the provision of protective duties assigned to a principal, advance team or on travel to prepare to engage in a protective function 2. Conducting hazardous surveillance 3. On official travel required to report to another location armed and prepared for duty 4. In control of a prisoner 5. A TSA Federal Air Marshal on duty The armed LEO must notify the aircraft operator of the flights on which he or she needs to have access to the weapon, identify himself or herself to the aircraft operator by presenting credentials that include a full face picture, the individual’s signature, and the signature of the authorizing official of the agency. Note that a badge, shield or similar device may not be used or accepted as the sole means of identification. The aircraft operator must: 1. Obtain the information or documentation required (see above) 2. Advise the LEO prior to boarding of the aircraft operator’s procedures regarding this section 3. Have the LEO confirm he or she has completed the Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed program 4. Ensure the identity of the armed LEO is known to the appropriate personnel who are responsible for security of the aircraft (flight crew, Ground Security Coordinator, flight attendants, and gate agents) 5. Notify other armed LEOs also on board the aircraft of the location of each armed LEO including Federal Air Marshals 6. Ensure the information regarding the armed LEOs is available to the Ground Security Coordinator at each connecting flight At airports where screening is not conducted, a LEO may fly armed by meeting all of the conditions except the requirement to have access to the weapon as determined by the employing agency. Procedures for LEOs carrying weapons on board an aircraft are: 1. The LEO may not consume alcoholic beverages while on board the aircraft nor have consumed alcohol within the previous eight hours. 2. Armed LEOs must keep their weapon with them at all times, concealed and out of view but in their immediate reach. 3. Weapons may not be stored in the overhead bin. In addition to the requirement to show airline ticket agent personnel the appropriate credentials and documentation to travel armed, police at the screening checkpoints must also review the LEO’s credentials. ACE Security – Module 3 / 19 of 36  Security Firearms in Checked Baggage Private citizens may carry weapons on board an aircraft, but not on their person or in their carry-on luggage. Firearms may be transported in checked baggage provided that they are unloaded, declared by the passenger either orally or in writing at the time the bag is checked, carried in a hard-sided locked container with only the authorized individual retaining the key or combination, and carried in an area not accessible to passengers or in the flight crew compartment during flight (including the cockpit). Ammunition may be carried in accordance with 49 CFR Part 175, covering the carriage of hazardous materials (§1544.203). Prisoner Transport This section applies to prisoners under the escort of an armed law enforcement officer, not to passengers under voluntary protective escort, nor to nonviolent detainees of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, nor to family members traveling with a deportee (§1544.221). This section defines two types of prisoner classifications; the “high-risk prisoner” and the “low-risk prisoner.” High-risk prisoners have an exceptional escape risk and have been charged or convicted of a violent crime. Low-risk prisoners are all other prisoners who are not considered high-risk. The controlling agency is responsible for determining whether a prisoner is high or low risk. Unless authorized by the TSA, only one high-risk prisoner may be carried on the aircraft under the following conditions: 1. At least two armed LEOs must control one high-risk prisoner, and no other prisoners may be under the control of those officers. 2. If TSA has authorized more than one high-risk prisoner on a particular flight, each high-risk prisoner must have one armed LEO and one additional armed LEO, who may control no other prisoners on the flight. The conditions for low-risk prisoners are: 1. At least one law enforcement officer must control a low-risk prisoner for a flight scheduled for four hours or less. One armed LEO may control no more than two low-risk prisoners. 2. At least two armed law enforcement officers must control one low-risk prisoner on flights that are four or more hours in duration. Two armed LEOs may control no more than two low-risk prisoners. In addition, armed law enforcement officers escorting prisoners must: 1. Notify the aircraft operator 24 hours prior to departure or as far in advance as possible, and provide the identity of the prisoner and the flight on which that individual would be transported. 2. Arrive at the check-in counter at least one hour before the scheduled departure time. 3. Assure the aircraft operator that each prisoner under the control of the officers has been searched and does not have anything on his or her person or property that could be used as a weapon. 4. Must be seated between a prisoner and an aisle seat. 5. Must accompany the prisoner at all times and keep the prisoner under control on board the aircraft. Other considerations when transporting prisoners: 1. When practicable, the prisoner should be boarded first and deplaned last. 2. The prisoner should not be seated near an exit door and preferably in the rearmost seat of the passenger cabin. 3. Armed LEOs must ensure that the prisoner is restrained from full use of his or her hands and that leg irons are not used. 4. Aircraft Operators cannot provide prisoners with food or beverages (including alcohol) or metal eating utensils unless authorized by the armed LEO. Transportation of Federal Air Marshals Federal Air Marshals may have their weapons accessible at all times and each aircraft operator must carry the number of FAMs as specified by the TSA on scheduled passenger operations and public charter passenger operations (as designated by the TSA) (§1544.223). 20 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 Aircraft Operators must assign the specific seat requested by a FAM and carry that individual on a first priority, basis without charge, while on duty. If another LEO is assigned to a FAMs seat, the FAM will coordinate the seat assignments with the other LEO. FAMs must identify themselves by presenting credentials that include a full-face picture, the signature of the Federal Air Marshal, and the signature of the TSA Administrator. Most importantly, Aircraft Operators must restrict any information concerning the presence, seating locations, names and purposes of FAMs on any flight to only those persons with an operational need to know. A FAM who is on that same flight should contact other armed LEOs on board the aircraft. Air Rage According to Andrew R. Thomas, author of the book Air Rage: Crisis in the Skies, air rage is “a type of behavior that is abnormal, aberrant, or abusive within the context of generally accepted social norms and values.” Air travel is more stressful today than in years past. The industry even has a term for this condition, known as “the hassle factor.” Additional security, airline baggage fees and other inconveniences, have driven stress levels up on air travelers since September 11, 2001. At 35,000 feet, there are few police officers (if any) to call upon in the event of a disturbance. Crewmembers are expected to deal with any situation that comes up, including dealing with those under the influence of alcohol or drugs or who is mentally impaired. Some air rage incidents are actually the result of pranksters or upset individuals who make a comment out of turn, but end up diverting the flight, as one diplomat found out on a flight in 2010. A foreign diplomat was questioned by a crewmember after emerging from an aircraft lavatory. The attendant believed that he had been smoking in the lav. The diplomat made an apparent joke that he was attempting to set his shoe on fire, a reference to Richard Reid’s attempt to bring down an American Airline plane in 2001. The crewmember reported the incident to Federal Air Marshals on the flight, and the diplomat was taken into custody when the aircraft landed in Denver, CO. Airport law enforcement officers responding to a gate on a report of in-flight air rage is a fairly common occurrence. The TSA does not officially track air rage statistics, since there is not an agreed upon definition of the term “air rage,” and most arrests occurring as a result of air rage are by local police, not the federal government. Air carriers sometimes classify an air rage incident, as uncooperative, disruptive, violent, or another type of classification, but this procedure is part of the airline policy, not an official designation that can be found in their AOSSP. Alcohol and drugs play a significant role in a great majority of air rage cases. The fact that alcohol is readily available at the airport and is purchased on board the aircraft further serves to exacerbate this problem. Another contributor, although much less so than alcohol and drugs, is the elimination of smoking onboard aircraft. Mental illness is another common element in air rage incidents. Prior to 9/11, one of the significant challenges of prosecuting air rage was jurisdiction. Local authorities were often reluctant to prosecute an incident that occurred outside of their jurisdiction. FBI agents were reluctant to prosecute, believing that the incident should be prosecuted where the aircraft landed. As a result, very few cases of air rage were ever prosecuted. Since 9/11, while not going away entirely, the incidence of air rage initially dropped dramatically, but has since crept back up, as air travel becomes less convenient. To alleviate these types of situations, crewmembers should be trained in the basics of self-defense, and in forms of verbal de- escalation. Airport personnel should be prepared to respond to incidents of air rage from an inbound aircraft. Threat Response Aircraft Operators must draft contingency plans to match National Terrorism Advisory System levels. While Aircraft Operators are not required to conduct reviews and exercises of their contingency plans, they are required to participate in airport- sponsored exercises of the airport’s contingency plan (§1544.301). ACE Security – Module 3 / 21 of 36  Security When an Aircraft Operator receives a credible threat to the security of the flight, it must immediately notify the GSC and the in-flight security coordinators of the threat and must provide an evaluation of the threat. Next ensure the in-flight security coordinator (the pilot-in-command) notifies all crewmembers of the same information (§1544.303). The Airport Operator must also be immediately notified5. The Aircraft Operator must also notify the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) and law enforcement agencies to report incidents and suspicious activities, as well as procedures, to ensure the security of aircraft upon receipt of specific or credible threats. Upon receiving a specific and credible threat to an aircraft, the aircraft operator must notify the TSA and determine whether an explosive or incendiary is present by: 1. Conducting a security inspection on the ground before the next flight or, if the aircraft is in-flight, immediately after landing. 2. If the aircraft is on the ground, all passengers must be deplaned and the aircraft searched. 3. If the aircraft is in-flight, the aircraft operator must immediately advise the pilot-in-command. Upon receiving a specific and credible threat to a specific ground facility at the airport, the aircraft operator must: 1. Immediately notify the Airport Operator. 2. Inform all other Aircraft Operators and foreign air carriers also at the threatened facility. 3. Notify the TSA. 4. Conduct a security inspection. If the aircraft is operating outside of U.S. airspace, the aircraft operator must also notify the host country controlling the airspace (or facility). The Federal Aviation Administration has a number of response protocols related to handling an aircraft that is experiencing an in-flight emergency. Some locations outside of the United States have been designated by TSA as requiring extraordinary security measures. These measures include aircraft security, passenger prescreening, screening selectee passengers, and the questioning of enplaning passengers. Foreign Air Carrier Security The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 transferred aircraft operator security regulations from Title 14 CFR Part 109 to Title 49 CFR Part 1546. Many of these regulations mirror Part 1542 and/or Part 1544 with some differences. TSA requires that the security program of a foreign air carrier provide passengers a level of protection similar to the level of protection provided by U.S. air carriers serving the same airports. Called the Model Security Program, it must prevent or deter the carriage of prohibited items, prohibit unauthorized access to airplanes, ensure that checked baggage is accepted only by an authorized agent of the air carrier, and ensure the proper handling of cargo and checked baggage to be loaded onto passenger flights. Foreign Air Carriers must also provide an acceptable level of security for passengers by developing and implementing procedures to prevent acts of unlawful interference. For the most part, Foreign Air Carriers are not allowed access to SSI materials unless specifically authorized by the TSA. Emergency Amendments are often used rather than Security Directives. Handing SSI to a Foreign Air Carrier could be construed as handing sensitive intelligence information to a foreign government. The Model Security Program Foreign Air Carrier operators are required to implement and carry out a security program for each scheduled and public charter operation (§1546.101) for aircraft with over 61 seats, enplaning or deplaning into a Sterile Area, or when notified by TSA of a threat. 5 Note: the Airport Operator may not be notified of minor security issues, such as finding a prohibited item on board a plane, depending on the type of item. 22 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 Foreign air carriers with aircraft between 31 to 59 seats, for which screening is not required, must arrange for law enforcement officers (who meet the qualifications and standards in Part 1542) to be available to respond to an incident. Crewmembers must also be provided with information on how to obtain law enforcement assistance at the airport. The same requirement is in effect at airports governed by Part 1542 for scheduled passenger or public charter operations. Foreign Air Carriers must prevent access to aircraft while it is unattended and conduct a search of the aircraft interior prior to boarding. Authorized air carrier personnel must possess and display proper identification. Foreign Air Carriers must implement procedures to respond to threats of hijacking and bomb threats. In addition, it requires that the carrier establish a procedure for reporting threats when they are received. Air Cargo Security Overview Air cargo represents a significant percentage of an air carrier’s revenue and is critical to the infrastructure of the United States and the worldwide economy. This is a fact that Osama bin Laden understood when he considered that part of the 9/11 plot was to also include the bombing of several All-Cargo aircraft. Ramzi Yousef understood this reality as well when he, too, considered the bombing of All-Cargo aircraft in conjunction with the Operation Bojinka plot. More recently, Al-Qaeda in the Middle East understood the importance of air cargo when the organization attempted to ship two bombs, concealed in printer cartridges, via air cargo from Yemen. An estimated 12.5 million tons of air cargo is transported every year – 2.8 million tons on passenger planes and the remaining 9.7 million tons of freight on all-cargo planes. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates that at least 50% of a commercial aircraft hold is filled with air cargo (the other half is filled with passenger baggage), and according to the Air Transport Association, airlines earn an average of $4.4 billion dollars from air cargo. Cargo is carried across the world in a number of ways, including rail, trucks, ships and aircraft. The advantage of air cargo is that items can be shipped and delivered nearly anywhere in the world within a day, whereas all other forms of transportation take longer. Essentially, the air cargo industry sells speed. Therefore, any security impacts to the air cargo industry that reduce the rate at which it can deliver products must be carefully considered. Indirect Air Carriers In the world of air cargo, items are shipped in a variety of ways. One method is by the All-Cargo carriers. Companies such as FedEx, UPS, DHL and the U.S. Postal Service fly aircraft, large and small, with their cabin areas filled with cargo. These operations fall under Title 14 CFR Part 125 from an aircraft safety and certification perspective and Title 49 CFR Part 1544 from a security of operations perspective. Another method of shipping air cargo is in the belly hold of a commercial passenger airliner. These types of shipments are addressed under Title 49 CFR Part 1548. Shippers that routinely ship cargo on air carriers may be classified as Indirect Air Carriers (IACs), which are also known as Freight Forwarders, and must follow the Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program (IACSSP). An Indirect Air Carrier (IAC) means any person or entity within the United States not in possession of a Federal Aviation Administration air carrier operating certificate, that undertakes to engage indirectly in air transportation of property and uses for all or any part of such transportation the services of a passenger air carrier. Each Indirect Air Carrier must adopt and carry out a security program that meets TSA requirements. Freight Forwarders are part of the Indirect Air Carrier Management System (IACMS) which is used by TSA to approve and validate new and existing Indirect Air Carriers. An Indirect Air Carrier (i.e., freight forwarder) is usually the operator of a consolidation facility where cargo is delivered by shippers to be transported by air or other means. The IAC accepts the cargo, places the cargo on a truck and sends it to the airport-sorting center. ACE Security – Module 3 / 23 of 36  Security Freight forwarders may have cargo facilities near the airport, or in a warehouse. Freight forwarders operate about 10,000 freight forwarding facilities nationwide and about 80% of shippers use freight forwarders, as it is generally less expensive when sending small numbers of items to use a freight forwarder than to build the truck or rail shipping infrastructures necessary to support a Direct Shipping operation. The entity shipping an item is known as a “Shipper,” and there are two classifications of Shipper in the air cargo world – Known and Unknown. With limited exceptions, domestic and foreign passenger aircraft operators, all-cargo aircraft carriers, or indirect air carriers, also known as freight forwarders, operating under an approved TSA Standard Security Program may tender cargo for transport on passenger aircraft only from shippers that are verified as known. A known shipper is a person that has an established business relationship with an indirect air carrier, an aircraft operator or an air carrier based on items such as customer records, shipping contracts, a business history and a site visit, or Dun and Bradstreet vetting. Known shippers are registered with the TSA’s Known Shipper Database. There are about 500,000 Known Shippers in the U.S. today. A Direct Shipper is not in the business of brokering freight, but instead uses air cargo as a means to deliver product. Large corporations, particularly those that ship perishable goods, such as pharmaceuticals or fresh flowers from South America and other exotic locations, usually have direct accounts with all-cargo or air carriers. What is Cargo? The types of air cargo transported on commercial airliners range from small, over-the-counter parcels up to very large pallet shipments. Items weighing more than 16 ounces must be screened or physically inspected to ensure that they do not contain explosives, incendiaries or hazardous material. Cargo is generally defined as anything weighing over 16 ounces and includes unaccompanied baggage on an Air Waybill and commercial consignments (cargo shipped by Freight Forwarders). An aircraft operator can carry unaccompanied baggage when that operator is transporting lost baggage back to its original owner. An “accompanied commercial courier consignment” involves a passenger checking in baggage as cargo and receiving compensation to transport the cargo. In this case, a passenger accompanies the cargo on the same flight. U.S. mail, diplomatic pouches and air carrier company mail is exempt from screening, as are human organs, human blood, emergency lifesaving drugs and human remains. According to Joseph Paresi of L3 Communications, a manufacturer of screening equipment, 70% of the shipped cargo is called break-bulk, which means it is small enough to use existing EDS systems, such as those found in the terminal building. Several larger systems including radiation detectors to detect nuclear material and heartbeat monitors to detect stowaways, are undergoing tests at several airports. Prior to 9/11, air carriers were allowed to carry cargo from unknown shippers provided the shipper included a shipper’s security endorsement, which certified that the cargo did not contain any explosives, incendiaries or hazardous materials and further that the shipper consented to a search of the cargo. Today, if an individual were to appear at the ticket counter of a commercial airline company or at their cargo facility (usually located elsewhere on the airport property) and asked to ship an item, that individual would be an unknown shipper. All cargo accepted from an unknown shipper is required to be carried on an all-cargo aircraft or on ocean freight. Much of the air cargo shipped on commercial airliners comes from large corporations such as computer manufacturers. The cargo arrives at the airport already shrink-wrapped in large palette or container, making it difficult to fit inside conventional X-ray machines. Air Cargo as a Form of Attack When most people ship an item, they assume that their next day or two-day package is rushed to the airport, is placed immediately onto the next flight, but in fact, only a small percent of packages actually make it onto an airplane. Even smaller amounts are placed on a passenger-carrying plane. According to the TSA, of the hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo shipped from coast to coast every day, only about 50,000 tons are classified as air cargo – of that amount, about one quarter is shipped by domestic passenger air carriers. 24 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security issued warnings that Al-Qaeda may be plotting to fly cargo planes from overseas into U.S. targets, such as nuclear power plants, bridges and dams. In 1979, Ted Kaczynski (the Unabomber) placed a bomb on board an aircraft via cargo. The bomb detonated, but no one was injured and the aircraft landed safely. These two incidents point to the primary threat from air cargo: 1. The use of an All-Cargo aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction. 2. The placement of an explosive device within the cargo hold of a commercial passenger airliner. While the use of an All-Cargo aircraft as a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a significant threat that would cause a lot of destruction, most of the security regulations have focused on preventing bombs from being placed on commercial airliners. While definitely not ruling out this method as a form of terrorist attack, there are some important distinctions to make in evaluating the risk of this type of attack. Historically, terrorists select specific targets for specific reasons. When using an Indirect Air Carrier, the Shipper is not always guaranteed what flight the cargo will be shipped. Therefore, for a terrorist desiring to bomb a specific aircraft, there’s no guarantee that the bomb would be placed on the specific aircraft that the terrorist wants to destroy. A bomb using a timing device may not be very effective, as there’s no guarantee when the cargo will move from the air carrier sorting facility to the aircraft. Bombs triggered with a barometric trigger switch (where the bomb detonates once the aircraft achieves a certain altitude and the outside barometric pressure changes) provide some assurance that the bomb will detonate in-flight. However, there’s no guarantee what flight the bomb will be on. In some cases, when using a freight forwarder, the shipment may never go onboard an aircraft, and could be ground shipped to its destination. A terrorist could place several bombs in air cargo with barometric trigger switches and not care what flights are attacked. This is the threat that Congress and the media have been focused on and that resulted in regulations in 2006. However, and despite the Yemen air cargo bomb attempt, due to the nature of the commercial cargo supply chain, there is still the possibility that the bombs will never reach a commercial airliner, as freight forwarders and shippers often use a combination of trucks, rail, All- Cargo operators and commercial airliners to ship freight. In 2003, the air cargo industry was given a black eye when an individual shipped himself in a cargo box from Newark to Dallas to visit his mother. The cargo delivery driver discovered the individual when he delivered the container to the front doorstep. Inside was the man, who incidentally worked for a cargo company that was a Known Shipper. The individual used a company credit card to pay for him to be shipped. Critics of air cargo security were quick to point out that it could have just as easily been a weapon or terrorist in the crate. This incident alerted lawmakers that perhaps more attention should be paid to the cargo security programs. In February 2004, three people tried shipping themselves from Santo Domingo to Miami. They were caught in a warehouse at Miami International Airport, but the incident again spotlighted the apparent lack of security in the air cargo industry. According to the TSA, the Known Shipper program has proven to be an effective deterrent. On average, TSA’s known shipper receives approximately 18,000 inquiries, of which an average 6,000 are generated from unknown shippers. The database alerts carriers that this cargo cannot be accepted and must be diverted to an all-cargo aircraft or another form of transport, but this practice has not been enough to satisfy Congress or the public. Cargo Security Regulations Historically, three specific incidents drew attention to air cargo security: the bombing of Pan Am 103 (Lockerbie), the 1996 ValuJet crash, which was attributed to hazardous material stored in the aircraft, and the 1996 crash of TWA flight 800. These incidents did little to address air cargo security but did identify vulnerabilities within the system. Then, in 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act required screening of all passengers and property, including carry-on and checked baggage, U.S. mail, and cargo carried aboard commercial aircraft. ACE Security – Module 3 / 25 of 36  Security In November 2003, the TSA implemented random inspections of air cargo and required foreign all-cargo air carriers to comply with the same cargo security procedures that domestic air carriers must follow. In 2006, additional regulations required the following items to be implemented: 1. Cargo shippers implement en-route security measures (meaning en-route from the freight consolidation facility to the airport) 2. Personnel involved with the shipping of cargo be trained in security measures as set forth by the TSA 3. Indirect Air Carriers must appoint security coordinators and have approved security programs (i.e., IACSSP) 4. Individual’s with airfield access must undergo Criminal History Record Checks6 5. Individuals with access to cargo (but not to the airfield) must undergo Security Threat Assessments – this number is estimated to be in excess of 100,000 individuals 6. Mandates the Known Shipper program and shifts the responsibility of approving Known Shippers to the TSA (from the Aircraft Operator) 7. Established security programs for All-Cargo operators 8. Required the physical inspection of cargo for explosives 9. Required Airport Operators to designate air cargo areas as Security Identification Display Areas and implement appropriate security measures for a SIDA 10. Required foreign air carriers to implement cargo security programs that provide a level of protection that is equal to or greater than domestic air cargo security programs NOTE: Since the implementation of these regulations, the “inspection process” generally consisted of air carrier personnel conducting visual and manual inspections of air cargo. Visual inspections consist of looking for signs of unauthorized tampering, including scratch marks on screws, tampering with packaging tape, unusual odors and other signs. If X-ray equipment is not available or an item is too large or too sensitive to be cleared by an X-ray, a manual inspection may be performed, provided the inspection is conducted with the shipper present. Air cargo personnel are required to be trained in proper and safe search procedures and to have information available to notify local law enforcement if a suspicious item is discovered. By 2007, Congress was still focused on the issue of air cargo security and TSA worked with Congress to strengthen air cargo security. The requirements were part of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. (a.k.a., the 9/11 Bill). The legislation called for the 100% screening of all air cargo within the next three years. Although the intent of the legislation was for all cargo to be screened using the same measures and technologies as screening for carry-on and checked baggage, the TSA quickly stated that screening (i.e., physical inspection) could be waived if the cargo came from a “certified” facility that meets certain security standards. The Air Transport Association and several cargo operators have argued that putting in facilities and equipment to screen all cargo would effectively shut down the air cargo industry, even while airline pilot and flight attendant unions have supported the 100% cargo screening measure. There is research to support these claims, as a Congressional Research Service report released in 2002 stated that TSA computer models estimated that if full physical screening is implemented, only 4% of the daily volume of freight at airports could be processed due to the time that would be required to breakdown shipments, inspect them, and reassemble them for transport. Since 2002, the industry has made great strides in developing screening equipment for air cargo. The combination of physical screening at the airport and the Certified Cargo Screening Program has led to the near 100% of screening of cargo carried on domestic passenger jets. Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) TSA recognizes the logistical issues involved if air carriers are forced to screen every item of cargo “at the piece level” (meaning the lowest level you can break it down to). The potential for delays and damage to shipments is a serious concern. In response, the TSA developed the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) as a solution to help industry reach the 100 % 6 The Federal Security Director may occasionally allow individuals to be escorted in some instances such as for additional hiring during holidays. 26 of 36 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 3 screening mandate. The program enables freight forwarders and shippers to pre-screen cargo prior to arrival at the airport. Most CCSP shipper participants have been able to quickly incorporate physical screening into their shipping process at a small cost to their operation. Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF) must carry out a TSA approved security program and adhere to strict chain of custody requirement