APC1502 2013-2017 University of South Africa PDF

# 2012 University of South Africa All rights reserved Printed and published by the University of South Africa Muckleneuk, Pretoria APC1502/1/2013±2017 98832522 3B2 A4 6 pica (iii) APC1502/1/2013±2017 Contents Chapter Page ORIENTATION WITH REGARD TO THIS MODULE (vii) Introduction (vii) General note (vii) How to approach the module material (vii) Reading (ix) 1 IDEOLOGY IN AFRICAN POLITICS 1 STUDY UNIT 1: IDEOLOGY AND SOME DEFINITION-RELATED PROBLEMS 1 STUDY UNIT 2: AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AS IDEOLOGY 3 Pan-Africanism 3 Negritude 3 African socialism 4 African humanism 5 Ideology, performance and the future 6 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 2 7 2 THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY AND CLASS IN AFRICA 8 STUDY UNIT 3: INTRODUCTION 8 Definition-related issues 8 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 3 STUDY UNIT 4: MODERNISATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 9 Ethnic compacts 12 Ethnic intermediaries 12 Ethnic balance and proportionality 12 The breakdown of ethnic compacts 13 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 4 14 STUDY UNIT 5: CASE STUDY: ETHNICITY AND THE NATION-STATE IN NIGERIA 14 TEST YOURSELF: UNIT 5 14 STUDY UNIT 6: THE POLITICAL RELEVANCE OF CLASS IN AFRICA 14 Definition-related issues 14 The nature and meaning of class and its relevance to stratification 15 Foreign bourgeoisie 16 African bourgeoisie 16 Lumpenproletariat and African peasantry 17 Stratification in precolonial Africa 18 (iv) Chapter Page The formation of classes in colonial and postcolonial Africa 19 Class as a source of political conflict in Africa 23 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 6 24 3 POLITICAL PARTIES AND SINGLE-PARTY RULE 25 STUDY UNIT 7: THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AFRICA 25 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 7 26 STUDY UNIT 8: POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRENCH AND BRITISH AFRICA 27 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 8 29 STUDY UNIT 9: POSTINDEPENDENCE TRENDS IN AFRICAN POLITI- CAL PARTIES 29 The move towards single-party rule 30 Methods of implementing one-party rule 30 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 9 32 STUDY UNIT 10: JUSTIFICATION FOR SINGLE-PARTY RULE 33 Traditional argument 33 Unity and development argument 34 Vanguard justification 34 Objective conditions that promoted the single-party system 35 Performance of the single-party system 36 The limited role of other interest and civil society groups 37 Subordination of the party to the state 37 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 10 38 4 MILITARY RULE IN AFRICA 39 STUDY UNIT 11: MILITARY RULE 39 The prevalence of military rule in Africa 39 Methods of attaining power 43 What do you understand by ``civilian government'`? 44 Reasons for assumption of power by the military 44 Organisational ability of the military 44 Contagion effect 45 Encouragement by foreign powers 45 Models of civil/military relations 45 Civil supremacy model 46 Watchdog model 46 Balance wheel model 47 Direct model 47 Social transformation model 47 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 11 50 5 PERSONAL RULE IN AFRICA 51 STUDY UNIT 12: PERSONAL RULE 51 Characteristics of personal rule 52 Conspiracy 52 Factionalism and clientism 52 (v) APC1502/1 Chapter Page Corruption 53 Political purges and rehabilitations 53 Succession manoeuvres 54 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 12 55 6 THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 56 STUDY UNIT 13: EXPLAINING CIVIL SOCIETY 56 Traditional organisations as part of civil society 58 Relations between civil society and the state 59 Resurgence of civil society in Africa 59 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 13 60 7 DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN AFRICA 61 STUDY UNIT 14: DEMOCRATISATION 61 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 14 63 STUDY UNIT 15: AFRICA'S SECOND INDEPENDENCE 63 Waves of democratic struggles 64 Rise of protest movements 64 Internal resistance 65 Collapse of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe 66 Pressure from Western countries and financial institutions 66 The Cold War and Africa 67 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 15 68 STUDY UNIT 16: REACTION OF AFRICAN LEADERS TO PRESSURE TO DEMOCRATISE 68 Politicising grievances 69 Movement towards democratisation 69 Constitutional reform: first stage to democratisation 70 Paths towards democratisation 72 Restoring multiparty democracy (1990±1994) 72 Change via multiparty election 73 Change via national conference 73 Co-opted transition 73 Guided transition 73 Authoritarian reaction 74 Constitutional reforms 75 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 16 78 8 CASE STUDIES: ZAMBIA, KENYA AND BENIN 79 STUDY UNIT 17: ZAMBIA 79 Introduction 79 Rising protests and politicisation of grievances 80 Response of Kaunda 80 Democratisation process 81 KENYA 81 Introduction 81 Rising protests 81 (vi) Chapter Page Reaction of Moi 82 Democratisation 82 BENIN 83 Introduction 83 Protests 83 National conference 83 Problems of Africa's new democracies 84 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 17 84 9 AFRICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY Ð New challenges 85 STUDY UNIT 18: THE AFRICAN CRISIS 85 Challenges and solutions in the 21st century 86 Challenges 86 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 18 91 BIBLIOGRAPHY 92 APPENDIX 95 (vii) APC1502/1 Orientation with regard to this module INTRODUCTION In this module we deal with the factors and dynamics (forces) which drive politics in contemporary Africa Ð that is Africa in the postindependence period. In module APC1501 we dealt with the evolution of the African state from precolonial times to the present. In this module Ð which may be referred to as a survey module Ð we analyse some factors and dynamics (eg ideology, ethnicity and class, military rule, single and multiparty rule, personal rule, civil society and democratisation) which drive politics in the contemporary African state. We conclude by assessing some of the challenges facing African states in the future. GENERAL NOTE This study guide is the second of eight undergraduate study guides that deal with politics in Africa. This module should be studied in the early stages of one's studies in the field of African Politics so as to acquaint oneself with many of the fundamental issues that affect politics on the continent before these issues are addressed at higher levels and in greater depth. You should preferably have studied module APC1501, ``The evolution of the African state'', before studying this module. HOW TO APPROACH THE MODULE MATERIAL Your three key sources of reference for this module are this study guide, Tutorial Letter 101, and the prescribed reader produced in tutorial letter format which includes selected journal articles. The prescribed reader forms an integral part of the course. You will not be able to answer assignment and examination questions if you have not studied the prescribed reader. Must-read articles in the prescribed reader and every relevant study unit. Students who wish to go the extra mile and read more widely on the module material, may consult the recommended books and additional reading listed in Tutorial Letter 101. You are advised to keep a good dictionary close at hand to consult when you come across a word or words you do not understand. (viii) FIGURE 1 Political map of Africa Source: BBC Focus on Africa Begin by first working through this study guide and the prescribed reader before you attempt to answer the assignment questions of your choice. Answer each of the test-yourself questions at the end of each study unit before you attempt to answer the assignment questions. The answers to these questions may be found in the discussion of the relevant study unit and/or in the relevant prescribed reading material. The study guide has nine chapters which have been subdivided into 18 (ix) APC1502/1 study units. Pace your studies so that you can complete a thorough study of at least one study unit per week. Study the map of Africa in figure 1 for a visual impression of the political geography of the African continent. READING The following publications are recommended, in addition to the reading material prescribed for this module, for those students who wish to study the subject matter in greater depth:. Schraeder, PJ. 2000. African politics and society. A mosaic in transformation. Boston: Bedford/St Martins.. Thomson, A. 2000. An introduction to African politics. London: Routledge.. Tordoff, W. 2002. Government and politics in Africa. 4th edition. Busingstoke: Palgrave. 1 APC1502/1 CHAPTER 1 Ideology in African politics STUDY UNIT 1 Ideology and some definition-related problems Ideologies have been very important in shaping the African political culture, socialisation and behaviour. They influence various aspects of political life and also the decisions that political leaders make. In Africa, ideologies have played a major role as a form of political thought and a programme through which political parties (more especially single parties) articulated their vision. It is important to note that ``ideology'' is the most contested concept in terms of its meaning and importance. Baradat (2006:1) formulated the five-part definition of ideology like this:. Ideology can be used in many contexts and it is proper to give it political meaning. This means that ideology is significant in the political context as long as it denotes a political meaning.. All ideologies provide an interpretation of present conditions and the desired future (a Utopia). The Utopia is presented as better than the present material conditions which can only be attained by following the particular ideology.. Each ideology includes a list of specific steps or directions that can be taken to accomplish its goals.. Ideologies are aimed at the masses and must therefore be articulated and disseminated in a language the masses can identify with.. Ideologies are simply states presented in motivational terms. To add to the above, Heywood (2007:5) outlines the following meanings of ideology:. a political belief system. an action-oriented set of political ideas. ideas of the ruling class. the world view of a particular social class or social group. political ideas that embody or articulate class or social interests. ideas that propagate false consciousness among the exploited or oppressed. ideas that situate the individual within a social context that generates a sense of collective belonging. an officially sanctioned set of ideas to legitimise a political system or regime 2. an all-embracing political doctrine that claims a monopoly of truth. an abstract and highly systematic set of political ideas The above ``definitions'' are not a cast in stone, but at least provide a sense of what ideology means. Heywood (2007:5) says that the origin of the term ``ideology'' is not clear. It was coined by Antonie Destutt de Tracy (1754±1836) during the French Revolution, and the concept was first used in 1796. Ideology in this context means ``the science of ideas'' since Destutt de Tracy held the view that it would be recognised as the ``queen of sciences'' (Heywood 2007:5±6). Karl Marx (1818±1883) considered ``ideology'' as an idea of the ruling class. In each and every political era, the ruling class made its ideas dominant in society. According to Marx, ``ideology'' represents a false consciousness in terms of which the ruling class manipulates the exploited not to be aware that they are being exploited. Antonio Gramsci (1891±1937) developed Marx's perspective of ideology and introduced what he termed ``hegemony'', which is the ascendency or domination of one class over others, based on consent or creating a common-sense sociopolitical condition. To the present, there are many debates about the concept ``ideology'', and more specifically about ideologies that are relevant to African politics. For the purposes of this module, ideology should be understood in the African context. This means that ``ideology'' represents an ideal to realise liberation and self-determination. These are the ideals which African leaders advocated during the struggle to become independent, and they were used as mobilising tools and identity markers. This also means that ideologies in the African context have been largely Utopian. The general definition is that ideology is a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides a basis for organised political action, whether this action is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow an existing system of power relations. All ideologies account for an existing political order, provide a model for a desired future, and outline how change is to be brought about. Ideologies in Africa have shown different dynamics than elsewhere. Ideologies were for example used to keep incumbent leaders in power. As such, ``ideology'' is the train of thought that represents political power, since political power is needed to implement or to propagate an ideology (Andrain 1964:10). Ideologies in Africa have strengthened the political action and character of the existing political leaders. This partly explains why these leaders opted for a one-party system that enabled them to advocate or impose their personal ideology in an environment where there is no opposition. As Andrain (1964:10) points out, these leaders expressed and articulated their ideologies to the party followers rather than the masses to strengthen their legitimacy in the eyes of their junior-ranking party officials. Ideologies in their very nature are fluid sets of ideas which overlap at a number of points. 3 APC1502/1 Several ideologies that influenced the African political scene are discussed in the next study unit. STUDY UNIT 2 African political thought as ideology PAN-AFRICANISM Pan-Africanism promoted the realisation of national unity, legitimacy, and identity on the African continent. Pan-Africanism was largely concerned with the liberation of Africa and its peoples from the clutches of colonialism, imperialism and all other forms of oppression or subjugation. Pan-Africanism entails self-determination and links all people of African descent to share a common sociopolitical experience. Note that the origin of pan-Africanism was not Africa, but the African diaspora. It is seen as an ideological movement based on ideals to realise liberation and the ideal of African unity. Achieving liberation from oppression would overcome the alienation imposed by colonial- ism. Kwame Nkrumah, a former president of Ghana, is for example famous for calling on all colonial subjects to free themselves from the shackles of colonialism. Nkrumah was influenced by pan-Africanism, and he worked hard to attain pan-African unity. Pan Africanism is not only continental, emphasising unification of the African states, although Pan-Africanism considered such unification necessary for Africa to become an influential participant in global affairs. Andrain (1964:207) writes: ``To play an active part in world affairs, African states need to secure national integration.'' Pan- Africanism is also a necessity in the economic field where the African economies had to be owned and controlled by the Africans themselves. Pan-Africanism in fact affirms equality, dignity and self-sufficiency and it therefore follows that Africans had to be the masters of their own destiny instead of being caught up in the clutches of colonialism or imperialism. Africa's total rejection of oppression by others became known through Pan-Africanism's concept of ``nonalignment''. Pan- Africanism remains an ideological force, despite different interpreta- tions over time. NEGRITUDE ``Negritude'' refers to a literary and ideological movement led by French-speaking black intellectuals who asserted a distinctive African identity that defied colonial myth and stereotypes about Africa (Irele 1977:122). No clear definition of the term ``negritude'' exists, but these writers advocated ``negritude'' in their intellectual writings and poems, known for their political content, and all three had distinct 4 interpretations of the concept. The movement was subjected to controversy, criticism and rejection since its inception. However, negritude centred on black solidarity and a collective pride in being black and African. Broadly speaking, it encompassed the African's aspiration to a unique spiritual, mental and aesthetic character. The Negritude movement was founded by. Aime Ceaser, a Martinique poet, playwright, teacher and politician. Leopold Senghor, poet, and former President of Senegal, and. Leon-Gontras Damas, a French Guyanese poet and former member of its national assembly. It is interesting that these writers had different identities, as Senghor was an African, Ceaser a Martinican, and Damas a Frenchman. Irele (1977:122) writes that negritude represented an extensive exploration of the historical and contemporary black condition and attempted to steer it in the direction of ultimate significance, which is of universal importance. The preoccupation of negritude with the idea of the universal is that it emphasises the contribution of Africa to the world and its civilisation. According to Senghor (1970:180), negritude is the humanism of the 20th century. He brings African tradition to his idea of the universal, namely that Africa is part of the universe because of its contribution to history, culture, art, achievements and Africa's civilisation. The African attitude to the world is the one which Senghor claims that negritude, through its artistic expression, should reclaim in the universe and also in the global humanity. Allen (1962:311) writes that this represents recovering the world in which the African personality has been shamed by subordination and neglect of its African identity. AFRICAN SOCIALISM The idea of African socialism came into being after independence. It emphasised the need for consolidated political independence in tandem with economic independence. As Mboya (1964:78) notes, African socialism is the economic and social goals of most African government policies. African socialism is deemed relevant, largely because Africa experienced critical stages in its transition from colonialism to independence and African socialism would be a way of giving meaning and direction to its political aspirations. Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania, worked to promote a socialist, self-reliant and developed state. To Nyerere, African socialism was based on the principles of ujamaa (familyhood). Nyerere believes that African socialism differed from the Marxist concept, 5 APC1502/1 simply because African socialism is based on the idea of extended family. `'The concept of African socialism has many similarities with the African interpretation of democracy'', writes Andrain (1964:108). Both these concepts reflect the aspiration for an egalitarian form of society where values like unity, independence, cooperation and absence of conflict prevail in economic matters. As Nyerere (1964:238) declares, ``Socialism Ð like democracy Ð is an attitude of mind''. To Nyerere, African socialism is rooted in the psyche of the African people. This seems to suggest that African socialism existed in the precolonial era, without being referred to as such. Nyerere believed that socialism was essentially distributive and less concerned with being acquisitive. African socialism was characterised by caring for each other and would restore the solidarity that was destroyed by the divide-and-rule strategy of colonialism. Mboya (1964:79) points out that African socialism is not Marxist socialism, and that African socialism is rooted in communal beliefs that have always been part of African life. Since recovery of the African past was indeed necessary for creating the new African socio-politico-economic way of life, traditional values had to be blended with modern values. This hybrid model would inevitably lead to a unique form of African ideology. Creating this hybrid ideological model was an attempt to unify the rural and urban sectors of the population. African socialism emphasised values that expressed communal sensibilities and sentiments (eg saving, hard work, selflessness, sharing and striving for achievement). Nyerere (1964:71) states, ``There is no such thing as socialism without work''. This work has to be accomplished to the best of everyone's ability, so that prosperity can be shared by everyone in a harmonised, common economic system. AFRICAN HUMANISM According to Kaunda, (1966:10) former President of Zambia, African humanism referred to a form of cooperative socialism that provided opportunities for individual initiative. This meant that effective controls had to be in place. Kaunda's idea of African humanism was reminiscent of the precolonial social order, characterised by mutuality, collectivism, and nondiscrimination against the weak and the poor. African humanism was to be a noninstitutionalised social security system rooted in the extended family and demonstrating social solidarity. Kaunda's African humanism was Utopian as well as prescriptive in nature. It put more emphasis on human relations than on property relations. In a society where human relations stand at the centre, the following are required: 6. political morality. participatory democracy in a one-party state. equal distribution of national resources. total control of the economy by the people. avoidance of class formations and a mixed economy. communal as opposed to individual land ownership. rural development Africanism was translated into a political policy in 1967. The central tenet was that the wellbeing of the individual should not be sacrificed in pursuit of the common good. African humanism was based on a cooperative system. Humanism is opposed to capitalism for two reasons, namely that humanism is individualistic and materialistic in nature, whereas capitalism promotes the very class conflict that African humanism seeks to avoid. IDEOLOGY, PERFORMANCE AND THE FUTURE You are probably asking yourself which ideology performed best in the past, and what the future ideology in Africa would be. Has just one ideology performed best, or did they all perform equally well? There is much debate around these questions and the above ideologies are controversial. One serious question is their relevance in the 21st century as ideologies change over time and depend on political conditions. Schraeder (2000:187) writes that all ideologies across the political spectrum fared poorly in terms of human rights and fair political participation. The above ideologies assumed the doctrine of a leader and a party, so that no contending ideologies were allowed to contaminate the development process. Schraeder (2000:187) concludes that an African regime's commitment to a specific ideology gives rise to various development issues, obviously because the ideology was equated with a political, social or economic programme (eg pan-Africanism, African socialism and African humanism). Negritude was more social and political, however, in that it had no interest in economics. What is the future direction of ideology in Africa? After the Cold War capitalism emerged as the predominant ideology. This was emphasised by Francis Fukuyama (1989), first in his essay, ``The end of history'', and subsequently his book, The end of history and the last man. Fukuyama's thesis is that capitalism and liberalism are victorious because socialism and communism failed. This victory meant the victory of Western values and institutions, to be spread throughout the world. Africa having been a battleground of ideologies, is probably supposed 7 APC1502/1 to follow the capitalist route. However, Africa saw few changes. What was supposed to be prosperity and freedom, brought nothing but civil wars. Ideological battles were replaced by ethnic conflict. The Africa of today represents no political thought or ideology, and none of the current political leaders has forwarded an ideological ideal. TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 2 (1) Define ``ideology'' and issues related to this definition. (2) Discuss ideologies in the context of African politics, and state whether ideologies are relevant in the 21st century. (3) Which ideological belief do you think is likely to bring about development in Africa? 8 CHAPTER 2 The politics of ethnicity and class in Africa STUDY UNIT 3 Introduction Ethnicity and class are analytical tools to identify the roles and interests of individuals and groups and to assess the choices they make. Both ethnicity and class have influenced evolution on the African continent since independence. Nationalism was an important unifying force in the run-up to independence. As pointed out in APC1501, nationalism bridged ethnic divides in achieving its goal of indepen- dence for African countries. Ethnic mobilisation became important during the African independence period (further discussed below), and class became important when different groups began competing for power. This chapter deals with four themes: (1) Definition-related issues (Study Unit 3) (2) Ethnicity, modernisation and ethnic mobilisation (Study Unit 4) (3) Case study: Ethnicity and the nation-state (Study Unit 5) (4) The political relevance of class (Study Unit 6) After studying this study unit, you should be able to. describe the meanings of ethnicity, primordialism, tribalism and communalism briefly. DEFINITION-RELATED ISSUES Thomson (2000:58) defines an ethnic group as ``a community of people who have the conviction that they have a common identity and a common fate based on issues of origin, kinship ties, traditions, cultural uniqueness, a shared history and possibly a shared language''. Ethnicity focuses on origin and descent rather than on geographical considerations. Ethnic groups are important to the political scientist and the Africanist in terms of how they relate to one another within the state. These ethnic groups are generally smaller communities within society and may be referred to as ``ethnic minorities'`. Ethnic groups may also be divided into subgroup identities and 9 APC1502/1 loyalties. Subgroups that are based on kinship (blood relationship), are referred to as ``clans''. For example: The Tswana ethnic group, which has about one million members, represents two thirds of the population of Botswana, it may be subdivided into eight major clan groups, namely the Bamagwatho, Bakwena, Bangwaketse, Bakgatla, Barolong, Botlok- wa, Bamalete, and Bahurutshe. The words ``primordialism'' and ``tribalism'' are related to ethnicity. Primordialism refers to an early state of development and is related to psychological ties stemming from a common linguistic, racial, regional or religious background. The concept of tribalism has been used to describe an ethnically homogeneous sociopolitical unit, but one that forms part of a larger, interrelated grouping. ``Tribe'' also connotes a primitive, evolutionary stage in human organisation. A final noteworthy concept is that of ``communalism'`. Communalism signifies a religious distinction between groups that may incorporate several nations, including some tribal groups, but excluding others. TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 3 (1) Define each of the following concepts: ethnic group, clans, primordialism, communalism, and tribe. STUDY UNIT 4 Modernisation and ethnic conflict After studying this study unit you should be able to. describe the impact of modernisation. identify factors that promote the continued persistence of ethnic groups Reading: Article included in your reader (Thomson 2000) Case study: Ethnicity and the nation-state in Nigeria On the eve of independence, many recognised Africanist scholars Ð and probably most African leaders Ð expressed strong hopes, or even confidently predicted, that ethnically rooted politics would, in time, make way for a new system of political values or a political culture in which a person's ethnic affiliation would either diminish or disappear as a determining factor in political behaviour (eg in choosing which political party to support). The premise on which this anticipated outcome rested, was that the process of modernisation would have the desired effect of bringing people together in pursuit of common goals such as education and democracy. The reality of ethnic affiliations in Africa, after three decades of 10 independence, is disappointing because ethnic affiliations have repeatedly resurfaced. This study unit is designed to help you understand this reality and grasp the facts Ð typified in the following forthright observation by Hilary Ng'weno, editor of the Kenyan Weekly Review (1:1993) (which is still relevant in 2012) in the wake of the 1992 national elections in his country: From the very inception of this publication 17 years ago, we have reminded Kenyans that the most potent force in Kenyan politics is ethnicity. Many have derided us for holding that view. Unfortu- nately, the just ended general election has proved beyond all doubt that we have been right all along. When shove came to push, Kenyans behaved blatantly in a tribal manner. Kalenjins voted en masse for a Kalenjin presidential candidate, Kikuyus for Kikuyu presidential candidates and Luos for the Luo presidential candi- date. The rest of Kenyans had to make do with deciding which of the major ethnic groups held out the best advantage for their respective communities and voted accordingly. And the final election outcome was as much a lesson in Kenya's ethnic arithmetic as it was in the propensity for Kenyans to delude themselves about political realities. Ali Mazrui (1983:284±285), the famous Africanist scholar, in like vein observed that the prospects for socialism in postindependence Africa at first looked promising. But this was not to be. In Mazrui's words the difficulty lay in ``the primacy of ethnicity in Africa over class consciousness. Most Africans are members of their ethnic group first and members of a particular social class second''. This meant that ``on balance, it can be legitimately argued that whenever there has been a neat confrontation and competition between the forces of ethnicity on the one side and the forces of class consciousness on the other side, ethnicity has almost invariably triumphed in Africa''. Bates (1974:457), in an article titled Ethnic competition and moder- nization, even if dated, still a luminary piece of writing, provides a comprehensive and systematic overview of the topic of ethnicity which is still relevant. A few salient points from this article are referred to below. Bates (1974:457) argues that modernisation promoted competition and that this competition assumed ethnic forms. We need definitions for modernity and for ethnic competition: Modernity refers to the attainment of higher levels of the following: education, per capita income, urbanisation, political participation, industrial employment, and media participation. Modernisation is therefore the process of attaining modernity. 11 APC1502/1 Ethnic competition refers to ethnic groups striving for valued goods that are scarce compared to the demand for them. Ethnic groups are people who share a conviction that they have common interests and a common fate. Most Africans strive for modernity and possession of land, markets and jobs. Modernisation creates competition and those who have been modernised can claim a higher rank in society than those who failed to become modernised. This gives rise to social stratification. The groups who are wealthier, better educated and more urbanised are envied, or resented, and sometimes feared by others who failed to attain a similar level of modernity. Why should the competition for components of modernity and for status involve ethnic groups at all? Bates (1974:459) answers this question, stating that the distribution of modernity and ethnic groups tend to be governed by the space factor. Where modernisation takes place, it largely determines who gets modernised. Ethnic groups tend to cluster in space and the ethnic groups closest to the locus of modernisation tend to be the most modernised. Bates (1974:459) also writes that administrative and ethnic areas often coincide. In the colonial era, boundaries often ran along tribal lines, and the ethnic groups became organised to gain control over administrative struc- tures. In this way they could exclude others from the benefits of modernity, thereby reserving a larger portion of the spoils of modernity for themselves. It is also true that those engaged in competition for modernity find it useful to generate and mobilise the support of ethnic groups. They organise collective support to advance their own position in the competition for the benefits of modernity. This same process is evident in the political sphere. Electoral competition arouses ethnic conflict, and those holding power can control the benefits of modernity. Ethnic groups persist over time and have devised mechanisms to cope with modernisation and the benefits derived from modernisation. Ethnicity was largely ignored by foreign observers and Africanists during the first few decades of African independence. One reason was the belief among modernisation theorists that as Africans became modernised, their ethnic loyalties would be transcended by a new loyalty to the state. However, several political developments ensured that ethnicity would emerge in the 1960s as one of the most important fields of political enquiry. The emergence of authoritarian political systems was often dominated by one ethnic group. Ethnic majorities made their presence felt when voting and then refused to relinquish power when the vote was lost. Moreover, ethnic violence threatened to break up the newly created states. Ethnic conflicts nevertheless continued, even after the Cold War, and this has once again prompted scholars to focus on ethnicity. 12 ETHNIC COMPACTS In the APC1501 module, we studied the concepts of the ``nation-state'' and the ``state-nation''. During the first few decades after indepen- dence, African leaders attempted to create nation-states. In other words, they attempted to unify people of different backgrounds within their states into nations. Both the African leaders and Western observers believed that the future success of the newly independent countries would depend on their ability to promote a unifying nationalism that would transcend ethnic differences. It was believed in the early independence era that an ethnic compact acceptable to all ethnic groups in society could be devised between the central government and the ethnic leaders. This ethnic compact would be based on the assumption that ethnic groups could compete peacefully for resources within the established political framework (eg central government allocations for local education, health care, infrastructure development, appointments to civil service positions and the executive of the central government, and representa- tion in various government structures). It was assumed that the different ethnic groups in the state would be treated equitably (fairly), and it was believed that the central government would resolve conflicts between ethnic groups and protect individual rights (Schraeder 2000:140). ETHNIC INTERMEDIARIES The success or failure of the ethnic compact depended on the role of an ethnic intermediary who was usually an ethnic leader or go-between who represented the demands of their ethnic groups. The national political leaders in turn transmitted their demands and expectations through this intermediary to their ethnic constituents. Ethnic inter- mediaries operated in all political systems (eg democratic, authoritar- ian, capitalist, socialist, civilian or military, secular or religious systems). ETHNIC BALANCE AND PROPORTIONALITY African leaders who were committed to seeking ethnic compacts, attempted to find ethnic balances in their government structures by applying proportionality principles. This means that the leaders allocated resources, government positions and representation in public institutions in proportion to the representation of every ethnic group in the total population. For example: If minority ethnic group A represented 25% of the population in the country, it would be allocated 25% of the posts in the executive body, and the majority ethnic group would fill the remainder of the cabinet posts. This process is also referred to as ethnic arithmetic in that the leaders could submit calculations to ensure that all the ethnic groups in society received an appropriate share of the state's resources. 13 APC1502/1 This principle was entrenched by appointing ethnic strongmen in the executive bodies. They would be replaced by other strongmen from the same ethnic group when they retired, and in this way geographical balances would be maintained. It was believed the regime would remain stable if the proportionality principle was applied to the inclusion of diverse ethnic groups in decision-making structures. Thomson (2000:62±63) describes the relationship between the central government and the ethnic groups. He said that when the African states did not have enough power to impose themselves on civil society, meaning that they could not unilaterally impose their will on other powerfully mobilised ethnoregional groups, the state would negotiate with these groups (albeit from a position of strength). The ethnic groups would, in return, relinquish overt challenges to the state, as long as they felt that enough resources kept flowing into their regions. This relationship is referred to as a ``hegemonial exchange''. The hegemonial model is criticised in that it might bring about stability, but not necessarily efficiency. For example: The state establishes a factory in the region of ethnic group A in order to placate the group, instead of in the region of ethnic group B where it would have been operationally more efficient. The hegemonial model could also give rise to inadequate strategic planning when short-term decisions are preferred to long-term considerations. THE BREAKDOWN OF ETHNIC COMPACTS Ethnic compacts broke down in a number of instances when leaders were confronted by ethnic opposition groups and guerrilla insurgen- cies. For example: In the case of Djibouti, the Afar leaders (the Afar group represented 20% of the population and the Issa group a further 33%) became disenchanted with their second-class role in the political system and dissident groups were formed. In 1991 the Afar community mounted a military force of approximately three thousand fighters, launched an attack on Djibouti, and captured large parts of the northern territory. The Afar were eventually defeated, but Djibouti remains a ``boiling cauldron'' due to its potential for ethnic violence. Another response to the breakdown of ethnic compacts is to establish secessionist movements. These movements are formed by ethnic groups who want to secede (break away) and have their territory recognised as an independent nation-state. However, doing so frequently results in a protracted civil war. The most extreme outcome associated with the failure of ethnic compacts is genocide (ie the systematic killing of an entire ethnic group). In Rwanda during 1994, for example, members of the majority Hutu group unleashed a reign of terror against the Tutsi minority, resulting in the death of almost half a million people (Schraeder 2000:143±146). 14 TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 4 (1) Have ethnic identities helped or hindered political processes in postcolonial Africa? (2) Describe the roles of ethnic compacts, ethnic intermediaries, ethnic balance and proportionality. (3) Why do ethnic pacts break down? STUDY UNIT 5 Case study: ethnicity and the nation-state in Nigeria After studying this unit you should have a better understanding of the relevance of ethnic politics in the specific circumstances of Nigeria. Read the article, ``Case study: Ethnicity and the nation-state in Nigeria'' by Thomson (2000), (refer to your tutorial letter). Note the following points: The current existence of different ethnic groups in Nigeria, and the coincidence of support for the ethnic groups and support for the party. Also note the acknowledgement of ethnoregional power considerations and the subsequent balancing of ethnic groups. TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 5 (1) Describe how ethnicity has been accommodated in Nigerian politics since the beginning of colonial rule. STUDY UNIT 6 The political relevance of class in Africa After studying this unit you should be able to. explain what is meant by ``class'` in the context of African politics. explain the stratification concept in Africa. describe the process of class formation in African precolonial, colonial and postcolonial history. assess the likelihood of class conflict in an African country DEFINITION-RELATED ISSUES ``Class'' refers to a group of individuals who share a common social status based on cultural, political or economic distinctions. For example: One class based on cultural considerations was that of the eÂvolueÂs (evolved or civilised Africans) under French colonial rule (referred to in module APC1501). The eÂvolueÂs could be distinguished from their nonevolved or uncivilised African counterparts. The classical understanding of ``class'' draws on the works of Karl 15 APC1502/1 Marx (1818±1883) who focused on the individual's position in society. Marx wrote that all capitalist societies could be divided into a property-owning class that dominated and exploited society, and an exploited propertyless class that had to accept inferior working conditions. He believed that the exploitative nature of capitalist society could only be changed through class revolution. ``Social stratification'' may be described as a society consisting of different layers of classes. THE NATURE AND MEANING OF CLASS AND ITS RELEVANCE TO STRATIFICATION Before we continue the discussion on ``class'', it would be appropriate to provide more information about the concept of ``social stratifica- tion''. As the term suggests, stratification denotes how social strata are ``layered'', that is which groups are higher and which lower in the social hierarchy. This is a complex issue, since a society's system of stratification may be determined by the interplay of several different forces (eg economic power, political power, prestige, status, age, sex, race or ethnicity, birth). The combinations of these different forces vary from society to society. Note here that stratification is multicausal in its origins. Single-factor explanations of stratification are unaccep- table, especially in Africa. Class is one principle in terms of which society may be stratified. However, other principles or forces often combine with class to make up a particular stratificational system. Despite its everyday nature, ``class'' has been a difficult term to define. Indeed, in looking through the literature on class in Africa, one is struck by the number of writers who use the term but do not bother to define it in precise, conceptual terms. We made an attempt below. In the original Marxian context, a ``class'' referred to an aggregate of persons who stood in the same relationship to the prevailing mode of production. Marx himself was ambiguous about this concept, and gave different answers to the question of the number of classes in society. In a capitalist society, Marx said, there were three large classes: wage earners, capitalists and landowners. He acknowledged though, that in England the simple three-class model was complicated by middle and intermediate strata. Elsewhere in his writings, Marx held that the configuration of classes was rapidly simplifying into a two-class situation, the bourgeoisie and proletariat. A further important question in Marx's handling of class relates to ``class consciousness'`. One category of people might stand in the same relationship to the means of production but remain unaware of their common class interests. This, in Marxian terms, would be a class in itself. And, when a common perception of class interests was generated, it would also denote a class in itself. 16 A leading contemporary Marxist theorist, Nicks Poulantzas (1972:27), defines social classes as follows: They are groups of social agents, of men defined principally but not exclusively by their place in the production process, i.e. by their place in the economic sphere. The economic plan of the social agents has a principal role in determining social classes. However, we cannot conclude that this economic place is sufficient to determine social classes. Marxism states that the economic superstructure does indeed have the determinant role in a mode of production or a social formation, but the political and the ideological (the superstructure) also has an important role. For whenever Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao analyse social classes, far from limiting themselves to economic criteria alone, they make explicit reference to political and ideological factors. We may therefore conclude that a social class is defined by its plan in the ensemble of social practices, that is by its place in the ensemble of the division of labour which includes political and ideological relations. We may compare the above definition with some others. Kitching (1970:44), in his article entitled ``The concept of class and the study of Africa'', uses class with the focus on economic inequality based largely upon differentials, which in turn are largely based upon occupation. Tuden and Plotnicov (1969:30), following the common synthesis of Marx and Weber, explain class in terms of its sense of identity, its lifestyle and economic condition in the stratum, and then list the implications for their material wellbeing. It should be clear from the above that there is little consensus among scholars on the nature of ``class'', regardless of their ideological persuasion. Schraeder (2000:80) elaborates further on ``class''. He says there are individual classes or class factions within the broad category of class, and identifies several general categories. FOREIGN BOURGEOISIE The ``foreign bourgeoisie'' includes political and business leaders, particularly of the former colonial powers, who maintain economic relationships with their former colonies. The local expatriate class includes individuals who live and work in the African countries but remain foreigners in those countries. For example: At the end of 1990, there were approximately fifteen thousand French nationals living in Senegal, a country that received independence in 1960. AFRICAN BOURGEOISIE The ``African bourgeoisie'' constitutes the dominant class in most 17 APC1502/1 African countries. It can be divided into four classes, namely the political bourgeoisie (ie the political elite), the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (ie the upper division of the civil service), the commercial bourgeoisie (ie private business persons, notably senior executives of major local businesses), and the petty bourgeoisie (ie small traders, shopkeepers, artisans, teachers and soldiers). LUMPENPROLETARIAT AND AFRICAN PEASANTRY Another class is that of the African proletariat, who are urban workers who receive set wages for the work they do. The unemployed or underemployed urban working class is known as the lumpenproletar- iat. Finally there is the African peasantry, usually the most extensive class category in the African countries. The peasant is the rural dweller who grows food and raises livestock, either for personal consumption or for sale to the market. TABLE 1 African social groups Social group Characteristics Peasants ± Majority of small population Small agricultural producers, largely ± Based in small rural communities for their own consumption ± Primarily involved in subsistence agri- culture ± Family is the main unit of production ± Limited contact with the capitalist economy ± Occupies an ``underdog'' position in society Proletariat ± Small proportion of the population Wage-earners within capitalist societies ± Landless rural labourers who rely on selling their labour ± Urban labourers (industry, mining, transport, etc) Informal-sector entrepreneurs ± Not permanently employed in formal Individuals who make a living from economy petty trading, often involving illegal ± Often irregular/insecure work activities ± Often unlicensed/illegal ± Street vendors ± Money changers/lenders (including foreign currency) ± Smugglers ± Petty thieves ± Prostitutes Petty bourgeoisie ± Predominantly male Minor owners of productive property ± Self-employed artisans whose exploitation of labour is limited, ± Small farmers employing labour or the lower ranks of the salaried state ± Small traders bureaucracy. ± Teachers ± Soldiers ± Lower ranks of public service 18 Bourgeoisie ± The ruling class (a) National bourgeoisie: ± Predominantly male The indigenous ruling class ± A small portion of the population (b) Commercial bourgeoisie: ± Largely in the trading and agricultural The classical bourgeoisie defined by sector (rather than manufacturing) Marx in his studies of Western ± Entrepreneurs capitalist societies ± Business interests (c) Bureaucratic bourgeoisie: ± Commercial farmers Those who control rather than own ± Land owners the means of production, exploiting ± Largely urban their command over state institu- ± Educated tions to accumulate capital ± State decision makers ± Political class (eg MPs, ministers, (d) Comprador bourgeoisie or interna- party officials) tional bourgeoisie: ± Higher ranking bureaucrats International capitalists based in ± Military officers the `'north'' who exploit peripheral ± Public managers (eg in nationalised economies in Africa and other areas industries) of the ``south'' ± Professionals (in public sector) ± Any section of the national bourgeoisie which acts as an agent for the interna- tional bourgeoisie ± The ultimate ruling class according to underdevelopment dependency theor- ists. (e) Traditional rulers: ± Clan heads Those whose authority is mainly ± Chiefs based on tradition and custom ± Paramount chiefs ± Emirs ± Monarchs STRATIFICATION IN PRECOLONIAL AFRICA Let us return briefly to stratification and class. A myth to which large numbers of African politicians subscribe, is the claim that Africa was ``classless'' before the colonial epoch. Speaking of African socialism, Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, claimed that class and/or social stratification did not spring from the existence of conflicting classes in society: Indeed, I doubt if the equivalent of the word `'class'' exists in any indigenous African language; for language describes the ideas of those who speak it, and the idea of `'class'' or `'caste'' was non- existent in African society! (Shivji 1976:39). For Nyerere the African reality was ujamaa or familyhood, a socialistic principle based on the African heritage which sees society as an extension of the basic family unit. In the very different West-African state of Senegal, its former philosopher-president, Leopold Senghor, has similarly disputed the 19 APC1502/1 applicability of European notions of class to African societies. Senghor wrote of Senegal: ``There was in fact no proletariat, since there was no bourgeoisie; there was no capital, no saving, therefore, no capitalists'' (Shivji 1976:42). To suggest, however, that traditional African societies were not stratified is incorrect. Indeed, as the social anthropologist Aidan Southall (1970:268) pointed out, African societies offer ``almost the complete range of stratification systems known to man''. His survey describes caste (ie the hereditary and exclusive status conferred by birth) systems such as in Rwanda and other neighbouring societies; societies that incorporated slavery; neofeudal systems; systems such as that of the Hausa of Northern Nigeria, whose social structure incorporated stratification on the basis of occupation, and other West African societies like the Yoruba and Akan, who had comparable, if less complex, systems of stratification. Southall (1970:270) concludes that ``only the smallest and simplest African societies lacked any concept of serf or slave''. In the introduction to their volume on stratification in Africa, Tuden and Plotnicov (1969:10±11) make similar points, including the important one that systems of stratification in individual societies can change over a period of time, and that it is by no means unknown for a society to have two or more types of stratification simultaneously. The Wolof of the Senegambia region and the Bachama of Northern Nigeria are societies with castes as well as slavery, and among the Azande, slavery coexisted with ethnic stratification. These authors maintain correctly that these examples point to an important theoretical problem, namely how to account for the variety of stratification types within one overriding social system and how to discern whether these coexisting or incompatible principles of stratification force changes within the total system. Remember that the above comments and findings apply to individual, precolonial African societies. Clearly, with the coming of colonial rule and the bringing together of many different societies under one administrative and governmental system, the variety of stratification systems increased, and, with the forces of colonialism, new forces were unleashed, making for additional forms of stratification. THE FORMATION OF CLASSES IN COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA We have seen that it is incorrect to assert that traditional African societies were not stratified. However, it does not necessarily follow that there were entities that could reasonably be described as classes. Clearly there was nothing like the class structure of Western Europe about which Marx wrote. It cannot even be said today that the configuration of social entities in most African states bears a 20 resemblance to the class structures of advanced industrial societies. In fact, it is difficult to recognise class as a politically salient feature of any society in Africa. Does class therefore have any relevance at all in Africa? There are different schools of thought. Much of the work on class in Africa has been done by scholars writing from a Marxist or neo-Marxist perspective. Some of the earlier work was crude because people tried to force African data into European-based Marxian categories. But some later work is much more sophisticated and based on detailed fieldwork. In an introductory chapter to his book on Tanzania, Shivji (1976:18) writes as follows: It is true that in Africa there are no classical types of class divisions into bourgeoisie and proletariat with `'middle classes'' on the fringes as in Europe. This is precisely what is to be expected. For the two areas of the world have had different though inter-connected histories resulting in different socio-economic formations. It would be most surprising if under such a situation one should find similar patterns of class divisions and a similar nature of classes in these two sets of societies. This point must be emphasised because even some Marxists tend to apply the classical Marxian class categories to Africa. It is possible that some classes which existed in Europe may not be found in Africa, and those that look similar may in fact be different: both in the way they developed historically and in their present relation to other classes, to the state, and to means of production. For when we talk about Africa today, we are talking about countries that have had historical relations with advanced capitalist countries and now form part of the world capitalist system. Kitching (1972:42) argues in similar vein, pointing out that nowhere did Marx commit himself to the view that class analysis is irrelevant to situations in which classes have not yet crystallised into cohesive and class-conscious entities. A contrary view is offered by Jackson (1973:381±382) who writes in an article entitled ``Political stratification in tropical Africa'': To have sociological meaning social classes must be recognised categories in the social outlook of a society's population... In the tropical African case the great disparity between urban and rural incomes cannot be taken to signify class differences unless they are so recognised by the populations themselves and, political scientists would add, unless they have given rise to collective political interests. Most analyses of Africa in terms of class employ the dependency theory, which, briefly stated, holds that the Western capitalist world brought the Third World into its network of markets in a long process 21 APC1502/1 that began in the 16th century, was accelerated by the whole colonial experience, and now, in the postcolonial era, endures by way of neocolonialism. African independent states, it is argued, are part of this network and have little real independence. Their economies, reflecting the primary concerns of the colonisers, are heavily oriented towards extractive industries and peasant or subsistence agriculture, and exist as peripheries to or satellite economies of metropolitan core economies (ie the economies of advanced capitalist societies). Viewed in this way, internal class relationships are a function of the African state's dependency. In an article entitled ``Class and class conflict in contemporary Africa'', one of the leading exponents of this approach, Wallerstein (1973:377), writes the following: On the one hand, class is defined as relationship to the means of production, and hence position in the economic system which is a world-economy. On the other hand, a class is a real actor only to the extent that it becomes class-conscious, which means to the extent that it is organised as a political actor. But political actors are located primarily in particular national states. Class is not the one nor the other. It is both, and class analysis is only meaningful to the extent that it is placed within a given historical context. Several efforts have been made to conceptualise the groups which led the colonies to independence and which then constituted themselves as a kind of ``ruling class''. In general they have been described as the ``middle class'', the ``bourgeoisie'' or ``elite''. Their differences to the European middle class are immediately apparent. The classical bourgeoisie of Western Europe were property owners, and the upwardly thrusting mobile class was associated with commercial and industrial revolutions. They elbowed ruling aristocracies out of the way and asserted their own political hegemony. In Africa the ``middle class'' has no comparable achievements to its credit. The `'new men'' were educated, often possessed university degrees, maintained Western lifestyles, and aspired to power Ð power they could not fully exercise under colonial rule. Ownership of property or wealth was not a significant extension of this group, because many if them had family backgrounds of high status in traditional society. Generally, West Africa differed greatly from much of the rest of Africa, with a fairly substantial ``middle class''. This was partly because the colonial relationship was much older than in, say, East Africa, and partly because the West African environment was hostile to white settlement. The colonial administrations therefore needed many more functionaries, clerks, professionals and other white-collar people than was the case elsewhere. For many analysts the classes that took over the government in the new states were not fundamentally hostile to the departing colonial powers and accepted the neocolonial or dependent relationship as a source of gain, prestige and power for themselves. 22 This ruling elite is described as an ``administrative bourgeoisie'', the `'national bourgeoisie'', the ``political class'', and the ``ruling class''. There is general agreement that this category is the nearest thing, in Africa, to a fully formed class. Analysing a society in terms of classes does not necessarily imply that classes have fully formed and crystallised. Analysis may show that classes are in the process of formation. Staniland (1969:23) writes in an article entitled ``Frantz Fanon and the Africa political class'', that although such terms as national bourgeoisie, political class, and ruling class seem to be acquiring favour in African studies, they will only have explanatory value if some sociological evidence can be found to support them. Such sociological evidence would demonstrate a marked uniformity of origin, interest and ideology among those who belong to the class, and that a consciousness of such uniformity exists, at least among the members of this class, and preferably also among nonmembers. In most of the independent states in Africa the criteria for ``class'` that Staniland (1969:24) suggests are fulfilled neither by the political class, nor the working class or peasantry. The crystallisation of a middle class or a bourgeoisie may be discerned, but its members as well as nonmembers lack a precise sense of social boundaries Ð which must surely be a major criterion of ``class'`. Note that the urban working class in Africa is at best an incipient class. As with ``bourgeoisie'', it is very differentiated, because those who are more skilled or less skilled, who are permanently or casually employed, have stronger or weaker ties with rural areas. The chances of a ``pure'' class consciousness emerging and being sustained are slight. Another highly significant limitation on the development of class solidarity is the all-pervasive ethnicity in most African states. Workers tend to see themselves primarily as members of a particular ethnic group. Despite these limitations, the incidence of working-class action should not be ignored. The formation of trade unions, demands for higher wages and strikes have a long history in Africa. The trade unions initiated a number of class actions, being sufficiently independent of government control. Migrants may be tribal in the context of their rural or home environment, but may act with class consciousness in an industrial environment. Kitching (1972:336) writes as follows: The problem is oversimplified if, as is often implicitly done, the ``cross-cut'' or impure class consciousness of the urban worker in Africa is contrasted with the pure class consciousness of workers elsewhere... The evidence is very strong that such ``pure'' class consciousness is rarely, if ever, to be found. It is nearly always ``cross-cut'' and may even be nullified (in certain circumstances) by other ethnic, regional or religious loyalties. 23 APC1502/1 Jackson (1973:388) points out that true proletarians are a very small minority in Africa and, because they can fall back on their kinship ties and rural bases in times of hardship, `'few are fully available to the logic of class appeals in times of hardship, a strong force in the development of working men's associations and labour organisations or socialist parties in nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe''. The discussion so far has made little or no reference to the class that makes up nearly 80% of Africa's population, namely the peasantry. As with most aspects of Africa, generalisations are perilous. The rural areas of Africa present an incipient stratification: large-scale farmers, peasants employing labour and producing both for the market and for subsistence, purely subsistence farmers who invariably have to augment their incomes by work as migrants, labourers, squatters and other landless people. With these divisions one may expect conflict and antagonism, and even some form of peasant/farmer organisation and consciousness. Kitching (1972:346) maintains that... the view of the African rural areas as populated by an undifferentiated ``mass'' can at least be qualified by evidence currently available. This shows marked economic differentiation both within and between tribal groups in cash crop zones, and finds a reflection in the very varied attitudes and aspirations to be found in different rural groups. Moreover, the privileged groups in such areas appear to attempt to solidify and enhance their position by gaining preferential access to externally derived resources. For much of Africa, however, these class-like reactions are muted and obscured by nonclass ties. In the economic dimension of their lives, many may behave as peasants and may share common interests with other peasants, but for the most part they remain conscious of themselves as members of particular regions, kinship groups, clans, lineages or ethnic groups. Their formation as a class, in other words, is seriously inhibited. CLASS AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN AFRICA For the most part the analysis of class in Africa has suggested that classes are in a formative stage and that class consciousness remains far off. If that is true, does class in Africa have any political importance? It seems clear enough that we can rule out two possibilities: one is a revolution of the proletariat predicted by Marx. The revolutionary inclination and capacity of urban working class formations in Africa seem slight. This does not mean that the working- class category will not be able to achieve a good deal of political influence. There is evidence that it has done so in a number of cases. 24 Relatively skilled and stable workers, especially if they man strategic areas like docks, railways and the like, can hold the government to ransom. The mineworkers of Zambia's Copper Belt have been a headache to Zambia's leaders in the past, precisely because of their strategic position in relation to the country's major resource. However, the possibility of a ``peasant revolution'', as in China, and anticipated and advocated by Fanon in his book, The wretched of the earth, seems highly unlikely. It has been argued that a major factor in the drive towards the one- party state was an attempt by the social upper strata to buttress their own positions. As heirs to the privileges, power and lifestyle of the departing colonial power, they have tried to carry on as a ruling class and they have tried to centralise power. However, class is not likely to be a significant source of conflict. What is much more likely, and has indeed occurred, is friction, antagonism and conflict among different segments of the political class, the bureaucrats and the army chiefs. Lofchie (1972:19) wrote in his article, ``Class action by the military'', that the coup in Uganda in fact reflected class action by the military, as economic grievances were prominent in the army's resentment of the Obote regime, but can this be described as class action? In a response by Narenin (1973:135), in an article entitled ``Class analysis in African studies'', it is stated that the military behaved as an economic interest group, but not as a class. If a group is not a class, it cannot act as a class nor can it be understood to act as a class. But it can be understood to act like a class, and this is how Lofchie (1972) uses the term. Class analysis can become a form of explanation by analogy. Though not descriptively correct or logically integrated into a wider theory, it does allow different insights. TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 6 (1) Can precolonial Africa be described as completely unstratified or classless? (2) Comment on the problem of consensus among scholars on the nature and meaning of class. (3) Comment on the future political role of class divisions in Africa. 25 APC1502/1 CHAPTER 3 Political parties and single-party rule STUDY UNIT 7 The origins of political parties in Africa After completing this study unit you should be able to. explain the reasons for the formation of associations and congresses in the prewar era World War II. discuss the nature of these associations and structures. discuss the origins of political parties in Africa This chapter focuses on political parties and single-party rule in postindependent Africa, but you should know the origins of political parties on the continent. This is important because the political parties which dominated politics in the new countries were formed during the colonial era and were instrumental in gaining independence in these countries. In the discussion on African nationalism in your APC1501 study guide, a passing reference was made to political parties. This study unit (APC1502) provides background information and does not require any essential reading. In his book, African politics: crises and challenges, Liebenow (1986) writes of the difficulty in determining with accuracy where and how political parties developed in Africa. Generally, however, one can say that political parties first emerged in those parts of Africa that were not subject to colonial rule, and that virtually all African political parties, whether ``nonideological'' congresses or cultural and voluntary organisations, were extraparliamentary (ie operating outside parlia- ment). Liberia is the West African state which the United States government bought in 1820 as a home for its freed slaves. This country became independent in 1847, before the onset of colonisation proper. Liberia had the beginnings of political parties in the early 19th century. Liebenow (1986:209) refers to Liberia's ``True Whig Party'' (which he believes is Africa's oldest political institution) which was formed in 1870 and existed until the 1980 military coup that brought Samuel Doe to power. Doe was ousted from power and assassinated in 1991. The above bit of history means that Liberia was never colonised. What do you think about that? How did Liberia survive the scramble for Africa? 26 In colonial Africa political parties appeared at a later stage. In settler colonies like Kenya, Zimbabwe and Zambia, the sizeable white communities established political parties in the early 20th century, but African political parties mainly developed after World War II. Mazrui (1983:279) Ð whom Christopher Clapham (1986) calls ``Africa's premier essayist'' Ð emphasises the importance of bearing in mind that political parties in Africa are an even more recent phenomenon than the very young African states themselves. He says that the general youthfulness of political parties in Africa ``aggravates [Africa's] crisis of general institutional fluidity''. Mazrui (1983:280) adds that African leaders have attempted to compensate for state weaknesses by seeking strong parties, and that the ``lure of the one- party principle'' must be seen in this light. In the years before World War II, the usual political formations were associations and congresses led by the middle class, from which the political parties proper, or liberation movements, were later struc- tured. Two examples of these loosely structured, predominantly urban, elitist (not mass-based) and system-oriented associations or congresses are the African National Congress (ANC), which was formed in 1912 in South Africa, and the National Congress of British West Africa which was formed by Joseph Casely-Hayford (according to Tordoff (1984:46) in 1920, but according to Liebenow (1986:10) in 1917). The National Congress of British West Africa attempted to unite the four British colonies in West Africa (ie Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia), but was `'not founded as an anti-government movement'' (Tordoff 1984:62). The Aborigines' Rights Protection Society (ARPS), estab- lished on the Gold Coast of Ghana at the end of the last century, is a further example of the reformist African political organisations that predated the political parties proper. The 1930s and 1940s Ð especially in British West Africa Ð saw the emergence of better organised, territory-based youth movements, congresses and leagues. Tordoff (1997:51) describes the nature and tactics of these congresses. Like the earlier congresses and associa- tions, they were generally reformist, that is antirevolutionary and federal in structure, and primarily used petitions and deputations as methods of protest. Mass action, boycotts and strikes were only used as a last resort. Examples of these newer congresses were the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (NRAC), and the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) Ð a supraterri- torial organisation established in both of the French African federa- tions. Political parties developed from these congresses and voluntary and cultural organisations, and these political parties challenged colonial rule. TEST YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 7 (1) In which two African countries did political parties first develop? 27 APC1502/1 (2) Discuss the nature of relevant associations, leagues and congresses and list the functions they performed. (3) Explain the reasons why these African political parties developed after World War II. STUDY UNIT 8 Political parties in French and British Africa After completing this study unit you should be able to explain the difference between political parties in French and British Africa. This study unit focuses on the differences between political parties in French and British Africa. Given the differences between the French and British forms of colonial administration (see Study Guide APC1502 on colonialism in Africa), it is not surprising that there were what Tordoff (1997:55) terms ``obvious and sharp differences in the political experience of British and French Africa'', and that these differences influenced developments in the party political sphere. The ``metropo- litan axis'' of French colonial policy (ie that colonial policy was largely formulated and implemented in a uniform manner from the French metropole and for the centre's exclusive benefit) had a marked influence on the French colonies and, says Tordoff (1997:66), ``overlay significant differences between parties'' in a region. There was a far closer link between the pre-independence political parties in the French colonies and political parties in metropolitan France than between the British colonies and Britain. FeÂlix Houphouet- Boigny's Parti DeÂmocratique de CoÃte d'Ivoire (PDCI) was in fact at one time affiliated to the Communist Party in metropolitan France. The ties were severed in the early 1950s when Houphouet-Boigny and the Ivory Coast adopted a ``conservative'' position on the question of indepen- dence outside the French Empire. (Consult the earlier study unit, APC1501, on nationalism in Africa, and especially the sections on the development of nationalism in the Ivory Coast.) But, generally speaking, there are still far closer ties today Ð not only party politically Ð between the former French colonies and metropolitan France than between the former British colonies and the United Kingdom. There are, for example, almost four times as many French- men living in the Ivory Coast today as there were at the time of independence Ð a fact which academics and commentators with a left- wing bias use to justify arguments about the continuation of colonialism and alleged exploitation after formal political indepen- dence, in other words neocolonialism. A further distinction between the political parties of the two major colonial powers in Africa, was that the parties in the French colonies had much closer links with one another than the British parties had with one another. We have in fact already referred to the interterritor- 28 ial political organisation which spanned the French colonies after World War II and up to the mid-1950s (see above). Another distinction between the two categories of political parties flows from the differences between French and British colonial policy. It is a fact that Britain realised the inevitability of independence for her colonies before France did, and adopted political and economic measures Ð albeit limited Ð to prepare her colonies first for self- government and later for full independence. France was much slower in this regard. The American political scientist, Ruth Morgenthau (1964:226), maintains that when France in 1956 responded to growing nationalist demands by passing the loi-cadre law, thus accepting territorial autonomy for its colonies, it did so ``as a way to prevent independence''. As late as 1958 France took a hard line about independence for its colonies. France was driven out of Indo-China in the mid-1950s, and the Algerian war of independence was becoming increasingly bloody. France was not in conciliatory mood. The loi- cadre law stated broad directives to be implemented by decree, thus bypassing the normal legislative procedure. However, this became necessary because of growing impatience for independence in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa (Zolberg 1964:173). The collapse of the French Fourth Republic (1940±1958) Ð which brought De Gaulle back to power Ð was in fact largely attributable to colonial troubles. The constitutional referendum on independence held throughout the French colonies in 1958 resulted in only one country, that is Guinea, choosing to opt for full independence. Realising the determined French position on independence, the political parties in the French colonies did not strive for independence, especially immediately after World War II, but simply asked for the same rights as those of French citizens for indigenous Africans (Tordoff 1997:66). In the British colonies, steady constitutional development towards independence in the postwar period Ð often referred to as the ``transfer of power'' Ð contrasted markedly with the rather abrupt introduction of universal franchise in French Africa in 1957 (Tordoff 1997:66). In terms of the Fourth Republican Constitution of 1946, French Africans were entitled to vote at territorial level and at French national level, but they were few in number, given the voting qualification. Before the loi-cadre reforms of 1956, the territorial legislative assemblies were largely powerless and controlled by colonial elites. Tordoff (1997:64) makes the point that although elections in the French territories occurred frequently in the postwar period, they were less meaningful from a nationalist point of view than the less frequent but nonetheless regular elections in the British territories. In British Ghana, Nkrumah's CPP ruled jointly with the colonial government between 1951 and independence in 1957. By 1954, Ghana was self- governing and had ``an entirely African legislature from which the cabinet was drawn'' (Tordoff 1997:64). In the majority of the British 29 APC1502/1 eastern and southern African colonies (ie Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Zambia, and Nyasaland (Malawi) a broadly similar process took place, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) being the obvious exception. Strong political parties developed in French Africa and dominated the party-political dispensation before independence. Some of the French colonies were in fact already embryonic one-party states before formal independence. TEST-YOURSELF: STUDY UNIT 8 (1) Explain the difference between political parties in French Africa and in British Africa. (2) Discuss the reasons why France was not eager to grant indepen- dence to its colonies. STUDY UNIT 9 Postindependence trends in African political parties On completing this study unit you should be able to. explain the various methods African leaders used to implement single-party systems in their countries. explain why the leaders of nationalist movements refused to relinquish power. discuss the origin of the single-party system in the former Portuguese colonies Your essential reading for this study unit are the articles by Schraeder (2000) and Legum (1990) in your tutorial letter. Tordoff (1997:113±120) identifies five postindependence trends in African political parties. During the independence period, all Africa's political parties suffered a virtually uninterrupted decline, from their positions as prime movers in the nationalist struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. The decline of Africa's political parties is in a sense the reverse side of the increased importance of the military in African politics over the past 30 years. Tordoff (1997:113±120) lists the following five trends:. the move towards single-party rule. the development of greater ideological clarity. military rule and the personalisation of power (ie personal rule). the increased limitations that political parties placed on other interest groups, especially the trade unions. the increased subordination of the party to the state 30 THE MOVE TOWARDS SINGLE-PARTY RULE As was said earlier, some of the French colonies were de facto (by force of habit) one-party states before they became independent. When they achieved independence in the early 1960s, many of these states became de jure (by law) one-party states. By 1965 the politics of West Africa as a region was already dominated by authoritarian one-party regimes (Jackson & Rosberg 1985:29). However, the multiparty regimes in the former French African countries were not maintained. The former British colonies also tended towards one-party states, although more slowly. As soon as independence was won, support for democratic multiparty government largely ceased. The doctrine of the mass single party as the vanguard of African progress soon took root, planted by the most charismatic leaders of the independence generation and nurtured by persuasive academic commentators. METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING ONE-PARTY RULE Schraeder (2000:269) writes that the African leaders offered different and contradictory reasons for converting their independence constitu- tions, which made provision for multiparty democracies, into one-party systems. The newly elected governments used various methods to change their inherited constitutions and implement a one-party system. Some leaders sought the consensus of the people before they declared a one-party state (as in Tanzania), but in other countries the leader and members of the ruling clique made the decision to convert and legislation was passed in parliament (as in Kenya). Chazan et al (1992:47) discuss the various methods that were used to consolidate one-party states. In most countries the one-party states emerged because restrictions were imposed and all opposition groups were banned, but in others a forced amalgamation of political parties took place. Restrictive measures (eg the harassment and detention of opposition leaders, press censorship, bans on public meetings, and intimidation by the police) were used to weaken opposition parties without having to ban them. These opposition parties contested elections at their own peril. Ghana's one-party state was established by way of repression. Although Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) won the first election with a large majority, it faced organised opposition in several parts of the country. Some of th

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