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U.S. Citizenship and Enemy Combatant Status

• The Quirin decision denied a writ of habeas corpus for defendants, upholding their trial by military commission and stating that U.S. citizenship did not exempt Herbert Hans Haupt from consequences as an enemy combatant.
• Approximately 60 years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding that the nation could hold its own citizens as enemy combatants, citing the Quirin decision.
• The detainment of U.S. citizens seized on U.S. soil has been upheld by the courts.
• Treaty obligations and international law may prevent the U.S. government from declaring mere political opponents of the President as unprivileged enemy belligerents.
• Declaring mass murderers like Timothy McVeigh and Dylan Root as militarily detainable unprivileged enemy belligerents raises legal and constitutional complexities.
• The President's and Congress's policy and law on detention, as well as judicial efforts to define the scope of a President's detention authority, are addressed in the subsequent sections.
• Bush's military order of November 13, 2001 covered members of al-Qaeda and individuals engaged in international terrorism, detaining those with a "reason to believe" they fit the undefined terms, including U.S. citizens.
• The Department of Defense's view of the military's authority to detain is different and broader, relying on the President's Article II authority and defining "engaging in hostilities" with two prongs.
• The first prong involves personal actions intended to harm the U.S., while the second prong includes being part of a non-state armed group engaged in hostilities.
• The DOD claims authority to detain individuals who engage in hostilities but are not entitled to the distinct privileges of combatant status.
• The claimed authority rests on the President's Article II authority and includes individuals engaged in hostilities against the U.S.
• The distinction between lawful and unlawful belligerents is complex and involves issues of international law.

U.S. Citizenship and Enemy Combatant Status

• The Quirin decision denied a writ of habeas corpus for defendants, upholding their trial by military commission and stating that U.S. citizenship did not exempt Herbert Hans Haupt from consequences as an enemy combatant.
• Approximately 60 years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding that the nation could hold its own citizens as enemy combatants, citing the Quirin decision.
• The detainment of U.S. citizens seized on U.S. soil has been upheld by the courts.
• Treaty obligations and international law may prevent the U.S. government from declaring mere political opponents of the President as unprivileged enemy belligerents.
• Declaring mass murderers like Timothy McVeigh and Dylan Root as militarily detainable unprivileged enemy belligerents raises legal and constitutional complexities.
• The President's and Congress's policy and law on detention, as well as judicial efforts to define the scope of a President's detention authority, are addressed in the subsequent sections.
• Bush's military order of November 13, 2001 covered members of al-Qaeda and individuals engaged in international terrorism, detaining those with a "reason to believe" they fit the undefined terms, including U.S. citizens.
• The Department of Defense's view of the military's authority to detain is different and broader, relying on the President's Article II authority and defining "engaging in hostilities" with two prongs.
• The first prong involves personal actions intended to harm the U.S., while the second prong includes being part of a non-state armed group engaged in hostilities.
• The DOD claims authority to detain individuals who engage in hostilities but are not entitled to the distinct privileges of combatant status.
• The claimed authority rests on the President's Article II authority and includes individuals engaged in hostilities against the U.S.
• The distinction between lawful and unlawful belligerents is complex and involves issues of international law.