Structuralism and Cultural Theories of War

In a negotiation, the stronger state has an advantage, as they can dictate terms.

A first-strike advantage occurs when a state can launch an attack before their opponent is prepared, giving them a significant strategic benefit.

A "pacific dove" is a state that prefers negotiation over conflict, but can still engage in violence if their interests are threatened.

Autocratic leaders need to provide private goods to their allies, and sometimes use war to secure resources for that purpose.

Democratic leaders are more cautious about war, as they are accountable to voters and sensitive to public opinion.

A situation where a state attacks another state to prevent it from becoming stronger in the future.

A war fought with the anticipation that the other side is about to attack.

When both actors in a conflict would benefit from negotiating, but one actor may gain by acting first, resulting in a conflict.

The cost a leader faces when backing down from a threat or commitment, as it undermines their image and credibility.

The ability of a state to commit credibly to a future course of action.

A situation where a leader's incentives change over time, potentially leading to unanticipated actions, like breaking promises.

The incentive to attack first, even if both sides would prefer to negotiate, because the potential gains outweigh the costs of conflict.

A leader who prefers to resolve disputes through negotiation, even if there is a perceived advantage in fighting.

A leader who prefers to achieve their goals through coercion, being more willing to fight.

A leader who, when attacked, prefers to back down rather than retaliate.

A leader who, when attacked, prefers to fight back rather than surrender.

The theory that weak actors may initiate military action even when their preference is for peace, due to the potential benefits outweighing the risks.

A foreign policy decision making model that suggests incumbent leaders must consider how their actions will be received by the opposition party, leading to more cautious decision-making.

States constantly seek to maximize their power to ensure survival. When a state observes a rival gaining power, it perceives a threat, escalating the situation into a 'security dilemma'. This fuels mistrust, encourages miscalculations, and leads to states concealing their true intentions and exaggerating their strength. This cycle of suspicion and distrust contributes significantly to the outbreak of war.

The balance of power theory suggests that the distribution of power among leading states in the international system heavily influences the likelihood of war. This distribution can take three primary forms: Bipolarity – Two major powers. Balanced Multipolarity – Multiple powers with relatively equal strength. Unbalanced Multipolarity – Multiple powers but with significant power imbalances.

This concept suggests that the prevalence of power rivalry and a 'security dilemma' can lead to conflicts despite the inherent cost and difficulty of justifying war. War is often costly and difficult to justify, and it's rarely the optimal choice, leaving the possibility of conflict a lingering concern.

Cultural explanations for war suggest that conflicts arise from clashes between different civilizations, often leading to attempts by one civilization to impose its values or expand its influence. However, this explanation is not universally accurate, especially in the modern era where interests often outweigh cultural differences.

The bargaining model views war as a costly and inefficient outcome. It argues that states should be able to settle their differences through negotiations and reach a mutually acceptable compromise. The inefficiency of war becomes evident when comparing potential gains with the costs of conflict. Even if one side believes it can win a war, the costs of war can outweigh the potential benefits.

Uncertainty surrounding the costs and strength of the opponent is a significant factor that can lead to bargaining failures and war. Information asymmetry (one side knowing more than the other) can exacerbate this uncertainty, especially if there are incentives to misrepresent information.

Some issues are inherently indivisible and cannot be divided efficiently, making compromise difficult. This can contribute to bargaining failure and war. Examples include territorial disputes or religious doctrines.

In a situation where both countries value a territory at £1 billion, with Country A currently controlling 90% and Country B controlling 10%, war could lead to a shift in control. If A gains 5% and B gains 95% but incurs significant costs (e.g., £500 million for A and £0 for B), both sides suffer a loss. This underscores the inefficiency of war, even if one side bears minimal costs.