12. Reckitt Benckiser Executive Remuneration

Reckitt Benckiser plc was formed by the merger of Benckiser N.V. and Reckitt & Colman plc.

The executive remuneration system at Reckitt Benckiser plc relied strongly on performance-oriented pay.

The U.S. CEO of Reckitt Benckiser plc stated that 'The U.S. is about the size of the pie. The U.K. is about the slice of the pie.'

The 2001 Annual Report of Reckitt Benckiser plc emphasized the importance of the compensation system to the company's future success.

Reckitt Benckiser aimed for below industry average net revenue growth in 2002

Reckitt Benckiser's organic growth rates were between 6% and 7% from 2000 to 2002

47% of Reckitt Benckiser's revenue in 2002 was generated in Western Europe

In 2002, net revenues at Reckitt Benckiser grew by 7% to £3,531m

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan aimed to motivate and retain top managers without adhering to a global remuneration policy

The compensation plan at Reckitt Benckiser was performance-driven with a maximum bonus of 3 times the target bonus if targets were exceeded

Reckitt Benckiser used measures like Economic Value Added in its compensation plan

The company heavily emphasized winning and performance-oriented compensation, rating potential recruits on competency and cultural fit

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan consisted of two major parts: salary and long-term incentives

If an executive met all targets, they would receive 40% of their base salary as a bonus, with the possibility of earning up to 140% of base salary if they substantially exceeded all targets

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan consisted of three major parts: salary, short-term incentives, and long-term incentives

If none of the goals were met, the variable compensation at Reckitt Benckiser would be 50% of the base salary

Reckitt Benckiser plc ranked 11th among leading household products/personal care companies based on sales

The U.K. shareholders approved the use of 2% dilution per year over 5 years for all employee share programs, which exceeded the 75th percentile of the U.S. peer group

The chairman of the board and the chairman of the Remuneration Committee spent many days talking with U.K. shareholders about the need to exceed normal U.K. levels of dilution

The Combined Code on Corporate Governance in the U.K. summarized the recommendations of corporate governance committees in the U.K., dating back to the early 1990s

Reckitt Benckiser plc held a large proportion of shares in the U.K.

The Procter & Gamble Company had the highest net income among leading household products/personal care companies

Unilever Group and The Procter & Gamble Company held the top two positions in the global household goods market

Institutional shareholders in the U.K. were increasingly concerned about executive remuneration plans, as evidenced by protests against remuneration packages of CEOs of other companies such as GlaxoSmithKline, WPP, and Reuters

Reckitt Benckiser executives and board members were not focused on sustaining incentive compensation programs while meeting changing shareholder expectations and maintaining attractive compensation levels to recruit and retain top managers globally

U.K. stockholders were not concerned about the valuation of stock options and the length of contracts for senior executives

Reckitt Benckiser plc was not a part of the global household goods market, ranking third in terms of market share

Shareholders had not expressed concern about remuneration plans, such as the protest against GlaxoSmithKline CEO's remuneration package and the narrow passing of WPP CEO's compensation contract in a shareholder vote

Reckitt Benckiser was formed by the merger of Benckiser and Reckitt & Colman.

Alan Dalby was the CEO of Reckitt Benckiser.

In 2003, Reckitt Benckiser ranked first in household cleaning products.

Reckitt Benckiser owned leading brands in personal care products.

In 2002, sales at Reckitt Benckiser totaled £3.5 billion.

Reckitt Benckiser had a 2002 profit before taxes of £545 million.

Reckitt Benckiser's main competitors included The Coca-Cola Company.

Reckitt Benckiser aimed to increase the contribution of new products to 40% by 2004.

The company allocated 11% of net revenues to its media budget.

Reckitt Benckiser's culture reflected 75% from Benckiser and 25% from Reckitt & Colman.

The merger was not a commercial and financial success.

Reckitt Benckiser's strategy did not focus on new products and aggressive marketing.

Short-term incentives at Reckitt Benckiser were based on factors within the manager's control.

The three criteria used to determine the compensation of a manager were revenue growth, profit growth, and net working capital reduction.

Long-term pay at Reckitt Benckiser was based on targets related to corporate growth over three years.

The indicator used for long-term incentives at Reckitt Benckiser was earnings per share (EPS).

The long-term incentives, paid in options and restricted stock, vested only if the company met the EPS targets.

The EPS target for partial vesting was 6% growth per annum or 19% over a three-year period.

The Remuneration Committee set a minimum share ownership policy for Reckitt Benckiser employees to behave like owners.

Consultants from Bain & Company endorsed Reckitt Benckiser's plan.

Human Resources worked with the board's Remuneration Committee and with senior managers to formulate and maintain the remuneration policy.

Members of the Remuneration Committee of the board were referred to as the 'custodians of the compensation strategy'.

Shareholder approval was required for the remuneration policy at Reckitt Benckiser.

Reckitt Benckiser directors believed that their performance-based compensation also adhered to provisions of The Code.

Reckitt Benckiser plc was formed in December 1999 by the merger of Benckiser N.V. and Reckitt & Colman plc.

The U.S. CEO of Reckitt Benckiser plc stated that 'The U.S. is about the size of the pie. The U.K. is about the slice of the pie.'

The compensation plan at Reckitt Benckiser was performance-driven with a maximum bonus of 3 times the target bonus if targets were exceeded

The long-term incentives, paid in options and restricted stock, vested only if the company met the EPS targets.

Reckitt Benckiser's main competitors included The Coca-Cola Company.

In 2002, sales at Reckitt Benckiser totaled £3.5 billion.

Reckitt Benckiser aimed to increase the contribution of new products to 40% by 2004.

Alan Dalby was the CEO of Reckitt Benckiser.

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan aimed to motivate and retain top managers without adhering to a global remuneration policy.

Reckitt Benckiser executives and board members were not focused on sustaining incentive compensation programs while meeting changing shareholder expectations and maintaining attractive compensation levels to recruit and retain top managers globally.

Reckitt Benckiser plc was not a part of the global household goods market, ranking third in terms of market share.

In 2003, Reckitt Benckiser ranked first in household cleaning products.

The merger was not a commercial and financial success.

Reckitt Benckiser was formed by the merger of Benckiser and Reckitt & Colman.

Reckitt Benckiser aimed to increase the contribution of new products to 40% by 2004.

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan aimed to motivate and retain top managers without adhering to a global remuneration policy.

Reckitt Benckiser aimed for below industry average net revenue growth in 2002

In 2002, net revenues at Reckitt Benckiser grew by 7% to £3,531m

The compensation plan at Reckitt Benckiser was performance-driven with a maximum bonus of 3 times the target bonus if targets were exceeded

The company valued the mobility of top commercial team members, aiming to nurture 'fresh thinking and new ideas' from people moving between markets

Reckitt Benckiser's organic growth rates were between 6% and 7% from 2000 to 2002

The remuneration plan aimed to motivate and retain top managers while adhering to a global remuneration policy

If an executive met all targets, they would receive 40% of their base salary as a bonus, with the possibility of earning up to 140% of base salary if they substantially exceeded all targets

Reckitt Benckiser emphasized simplicity in the compensation plan, with consistency throughout various levels of management, and did not use measures like Economic Value Added

The remuneration plan consisted of three major parts: salary, short-term incentives, and long-term incentives, with most compensation dependent on performance

Reckitt Benckiser's strategy in 2002 aimed for above industry average net revenue growth by focusing on high growth categories where their top 15 Power Brands held leading market positions

The chairman of the board and the chairman of the Remuneration Committee spent many days talking with U.K. shareholders about the need to exceed normal U.K. levels of dilution

The EPS target for partial vesting was 6% growth per annum or 19% over a three-year period

Reckitt Benckiser plc ranked 11th among leading household products/personal care companies based on sales

The Procter & Gamble Company and Unilever Group held the top two positions in the global household goods market, with Reckitt Benckiser plc at the third position

The chairman of the board and the chairman of the Remuneration Committee spent many days talking with U.K. shareholders about the need to exceed normal U.K. levels of dilution

Reckitt Benckiser plc held a small proportion of shares in the U.K., but the Remuneration Committee felt it was important for U.K. shareholders to be comfortable with larger dilution

The Combined Code on Corporate Governance in the U.K. summarized the recommendations of corporate governance committees in the U.K., dating back to the early 1990s

Reckitt Benckiser executives and board members were focused on sustaining incentive compensation programs while meeting changing shareholder expectations and maintaining attractive compensation levels to recruit and retain top managers globally

Unilever Group had the highest sales among leading household products/personal care companies, while The Procter & Gamble Company had the highest net income

U.K. stockholders were concerned about the valuation of stock options and the length of contracts for senior executives, wanting a greater alignment between executive pay and shareholders' interests

The Procter & Gamble Company had the highest net income among leading household products/personal care companies

Reckitt Benckiser plc was a part of the global household goods market, ranking third in terms of market share

Institutional shareholders in the U.K. were increasingly concerned about executive remuneration plans, as evidenced by protests against remuneration packages of CEOs of other companies such as GlaxoSmithKline, WPP, and Reuters

In 2003, U.K. shareholders approved the use of 2% dilution per year over 5 years for all employee share programs, which was still below the 75th percentile of the U.S. peer group

Shareholders had expressed concern about remuneration plans, such as the protest against GlaxoSmithKline CEO's remuneration package and the narrow passing of WPP CEO's compensation contract in a shareholder vote

The EPS target for partial vesting at Reckitt Benckiser was 6% growth per annum or 19% over a three-year period.

The indicator used for long-term incentives at Reckitt Benckiser was revenue growth.

Members of the Remuneration Committee of the board were referred to as the 'custodians of the compensation strategy' at Reckitt Benckiser.

Reckitt Benckiser required shareholder approval for the remuneration policy.

The long-term incentives at Reckitt Benckiser were paid in cash.

Consultants from Bain & Company endorsed Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan.

The long-term pay at Reckitt Benckiser was not based on targets related to corporate growth over three years.

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan aimed to motivate and retain top managers without adhering to a global remuneration policy.

Short-term incentives at Reckitt Benckiser were based on factors outside the manager's control.

The U.K. stockholders at Reckitt Benckiser were not concerned about the valuation of stock options and the length of contracts for senior executives.

The three criteria used to determine the compensation of a manager at Reckitt Benckiser were revenue growth, profit growth, and net working capital reduction.

The executive remuneration system at Reckitt Benckiser plc relied strongly on performance-oriented pay.

Reckitt Benckiser plc was formed in December 1999 by the merger of Benckiser N.V. and Reckitt & Colman plc.

Reckitt Benckiser aimed for below industry average net revenue growth in 2002

The U.S. is about the size of the pie. The U.K. is about the slice of the pie.

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan consisted of three major parts: salary, short-term incentives, and long-term incentives

Long-term pay at Reckitt Benckiser was based on targets related to corporate growth over three years.

The EPS target for partial vesting at Reckitt Benckiser was 6% growth per annum or 19% over a three-year period.

The Remuneration Committee set a minimum share ownership policy for employees to behave like owners.

Consultants from Bain & Company endorsed Reckitt Benckiser's plan.

Members of the Remuneration Committee of the board were referred to as the 'custodians of the compensation strategy'.

Shareholder approval was required for the remuneration policy.

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan aimed to motivate and retain top managers without adhering to a global remuneration policy.

The U.K. stockholders at Reckitt Benckiser were not concerned about the valuation of stock options and the length of contracts for senior executives.

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan aimed to motivate and retain top managers without adhering to a global remuneration policy.

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan consisted of three major parts: salary, short-term incentives, and long-term incentives.

The long-term incentives at Reckitt Benckiser were paid in cash.

Reckitt Benckiser's organic growth rates were between 6% and 7% from 2000 to 2002.

Reckitt Benckiser plc held a large proportion of shares in the U.K.

The chairman of the board and the chairman of the Remuneration Committee spent many days talking with U.K. shareholders about the need to exceed normal U.K. levels of dilution

Unilever Group had the highest net income among leading household products/personal care companies

Reckitt Benckiser plc was ranked 11th among leading household products/personal care companies based on sales

The Combined Code on Corporate Governance in the U.K. summarized the recommendations of corporate governance committees in the U.K., dating back to the early 1990s

Reckitt Benckiser plc was the top company in sales among leading household products/personal care companies

Institutional shareholders in the U.K. were increasingly concerned about executive remuneration plans

The Procter & Gamble Company and Unilever Group held the top two positions in the global household goods market

Reckitt Benckiser plc was a part of the global household goods market, ranking third in terms of market share

The EPS target for partial vesting at Reckitt Benckiser was 6% growth per annum or 19% over a three-year period

Reckitt Benckiser plc was formed by the merger of Benckiser and Reckitt & Colman

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan aimed to motivate and retain top managers without adhering to a global remuneration policy

Reckitt Benckiser ranked third in the broader household goods category in 2003.

In 2002, sales at Reckitt Benckiser totaled £3.5 billion, with fabric care and surface care products generating more than 50% of sales.

Reckitt Benckiser aimed to increase the contribution of new products to 50% by 2004.

Reckitt Benckiser's main competitors included The Coca-Cola Company.

In 2002, the company's profit before taxes was £545 million.

Reckitt Benckiser's culture reflected 75% from Benckiser and 25% from Reckitt & Colman.

Reckitt Benckiser's strategy focused on new products, acquisitions, and aggressive marketing.

Reckitt Benckiser owned leading brands in personal care products.

Reckitt Benckiser aimed for below industry average net revenue growth in 2002.

Reckitt Benckiser was formed by the merger of Benckiser N.V. and Reckitt & Colman plc.

Reckitt Benckiser executives and board members were focused on sustaining incentive compensation programs while meeting changing shareholder expectations and maintaining attractive compensation levels to recruit and retain top managers globally.

The merger was not a commercial and financial success.

Reckitt Benckiser's net revenues grew by 9% in 2002 to £3,531m.

47% of Reckitt Benckiser's revenue in 2002 was generated in Western Europe.

Reckitt Benckiser's remuneration plan did not emphasize simplicity and consistency throughout various levels of management.

The maximum bonus an executive could earn at Reckitt Benckiser was 2 times the target bonus if all targets were exceeded.

Reckitt Benckiser's compensation plan was not heavily focused on winning and performance-oriented compensation.

Reckitt Benckiser's top 15 Power Brands did not hold leading market positions in high growth categories.

The majority of Reckitt Benckiser's revenue in 2002 was generated in North America.

Reckitt Benckiser's organic growth rates were between 6% and 7% from 2000 to 2002.

The remuneration plan at Reckitt Benckiser consisted of two major parts: salary and long-term incentives.

Reckitt Benckiser aimed to attract the best executives globally but did not aim to remain competitive with U.S.-based competitors like P&G in their remuneration policies.

The compensation plan at Reckitt Benckiser was not easily understood and performance-driven.

Reckitt Benckiser did not value the mobility of top commercial team members, aiming to nurture 'fresh thinking and new ideas' from people moving between markets.