Psychology of Human Thought Chapter 8: Inductive Reasoning Table 8.3 Quiz

Premise monotonicity provides less coverage of the inferred superordinate category.

Experts are more influenced by premise diversity than novices when making generalizations.

Tree experts focused mainly on typicality and diversity of premises when inferring about tree diseases.

Experts are more likely to be influenced by taxonomic relationships between premises and conclusions.

Causal induction is not a common form of reasoning used in science or daily life.

Experts tend to rely on thematic, causal, and ecological relations for their generalizations.

Premise typicality is more influential for novices than for experts in making generalizations.

Local coverage involves extending a property to other members of the same folk family.

In the method of disagreement, pie was indicated as the source of illness for all family members.

The joint method of agreement and disagreement combines the first two methods mentioned in the text.

If one group in an experimental condition shows different behavior than the other group, it can be concluded that the experimental manipulation caused the difference.

Surveys and naturalistic observations can be used to draw cause and effect conclusions according to the text.

The method of concomitant variation was discussed in Chapter 8 of Psychology of Human Thought.

Both you and your brother avoided something that your parents ate in the joint method of agreement and disagreement.

The table 8.3 inductive reasoning categorizes different types of reasoning methods.

The experimental method used in psychology aligns well with the joint method of agreement and disagreement.

A single-premise argument is viewed as weaker if the more typical member of an inferred superordinate category is used in the conclusion.

It is more convincing to project a property of bats onto lions because bats are viewed as a better prototype of mammals than lions.

Category similarity weakens inductive arguments and decreases the likelihood of generalizing properties across categories.

Individuals are more likely to generalize a property from giraffes to hippopotamuses than from wolves to lions due to their perceived similarity.

According to the similarity-coverage model, inductive generalizations are made when there is minimal overlap between the features of the premise and conclusion categories.

The similarity-coverage model predicts the premise-conclusion asymmetry effect observed in many studies of category-based induction.

Using distinctive features that two categories do not share strengthens inductive arguments according to the research by Hayes & Heit (2017).

Perceived similarity between premise category and conclusion category weakens inductive arguments and decreases the likelihood of generalizing properties across categories.

Participants spent more time on encoding and preparation-response components than on inference, mapping, and application.

For all three types of analogies, the inference component was the one most highly correlated with standardized tests of reasoning.

Sternberg identified lower-order components (subcomponents) that are used successfully to plan, evaluate, and monitor strategies and solutions for analogies and other problems.

Some individuals fail to form a connection between the first and second halves of an analogy because they do not select the lower-level component of matching.

According to Sternberg's work on analogical reasoning, the elements in an analogy do not need to be linked by a relation they have in common.

In Sternberg's triarchic theory of intelligence, his work on analogical reasoning does not play an influential role.

In Sternberg's theory of successful intelligence, there is no mention of analogical reasoning.

Individuals who do not select the best strategy for combining lower-level components end up using an efficient search strategy for inferring relations between the first two terms in an analogy.

Insightful solutions to problems occur immediately upon presentation of the problem.

Successful search for relevant information in problem-solving does not lead to a change in the problem solver's mental representation.

Studies have shown that insight processes play no role in solving non-routine problems.

Individuals who solve non-routine problems correctly are less likely to have above-average intelligence.

Applying the three insight processes spontaneously is associated with solving non-routine problems correctly.

Experiencing a sudden and dramatic decrease in confidence can lead to solving non-routine problems correctly.

Taking longer than others to solve non-routine problems is a disadvantage in problem-solving.

Successful insights in problem-solving do not require additional time for restructuring mental representation.

The circular argument of using induction guarantees that inductive inferences will always work in the future.

Hume concluded that induction works logically and consistently in all situations.

According to Hume, humans rely on induction because they have a 'habit' of assuming the future will resemble the past.

In a modern context, cognitive systems are designed to track regularities in the world but do not rely on assuming any patterns.

Hume considered induction a problem because it provides a logical and certain way to predict future events.

Induction is solely based on the premise that the future will resemble the past.

Humans do not need to rely on induction because there are other more reliable methods of making predictions.

Despite its logical flaws, humans do not use induction at all in their decision-making processes.

People tend to find the first argument to be stronger, according to Lo et al., 2002.

The reason people find the first argument weaker is due to a causal link between house cats and field mice.

Quine's notion of a natural kind aligns well with the causal link between house cats and field mice.

The study by Doug Medin and colleagues showed that people preferred an argument when the order of presentation highlighted a causal relationship.

In statement 1, the premise is: 'Lions contain the protein retinum'.

The study by Medin et al. (2003) focused on the relationship between lions and tigers in terms of protein content.

The alternative argument concerning house cats and tigers seems weaker due to a lack of biological link between them.

In the context of the arguments presented, projecting a property from house cats to tigers is more likely than projecting it to all mammals.

Rats press the lever vigorously when they see a specific color, and the lever press rate drops off as the color becomes less similar to the specific color.

Hume's suggestion that individuals tend to predict the future based on the similarity to past events is refuted by the research mentioned in the text.

Stimulus generalization is a universal law that applies to all organisms according to the text.

If one's past experiences are very similar to the present situation, inferences have a low likelihood of being accurate.

The research discussed in the text contradicts the idea that individuals base predictions about the future on similarity to past events.

Generalizing to new stimuli based on their similarity to previously encountered stimuli is not considered a fundamental behavior according to the text.

The rate of lever pressing by rats increases as the colors become less similar to the specific color they were trained on.

The tendency to behave as if the future will always resemble the past is only seen in human beings according to the text.

Goodman's example of green and grue emeralds suggests that all emeralds seen so far are simultaneously green and blue.

In Goodman's paradox, the property of 'grue' means that all emeralds you have seen so far are blue and all the emeralds not yet seen are green.

Goodman suggests that both the properties of green and grue can be simultaneously true given the available evidence.

The properties of green and grue make the same prediction about the color of the next emerald to be picked up.

According to Goodman, if the property of grue is true, then the next emerald picked up will be blue.

Goodman's paradox illustrates that past experience (green emeralds) has different implications for the properties of green and grue.

In Goodman's example, the property of 'grue' is always false at any given time.

Goodman suggests that it is impossible for all emeralds to be green based on the evidence presented.

Our linguistic inferences always help us to reduce the inherent ambiguity in language, never producing any false inferences.

The design features of our conceptual representation system do not allow us to behave adaptively and make predictions efficiently.

The representativeness heuristic always ensures accurate reasoning without any errors.

Chapter 6 delves into the heuristics related to cognitive shortcuts and their impact on decision-making.

Cognitive shortcuts like the representativeness heuristic do not play a role in our decision-making process.

Chapter 4 of the text specifically discusses the psychology of inferential reasoning and its impact on decision-making.

Inferential reasoning does not play a significant role in how we make inductions based on past experiences and events.

The tendency to need to generate expectations when hearing or reading a sentence was not discussed as an aspect of language processing.