Mexico's PRI: Informal Rules & Electoral Competition

• The traditional literature on Mexico's PRI notes the importance of 'informal rules of the game' in determining outcomes, such as who will be the PRI's presidential candidate.
• The text argues that the onset of electoral competition allowed weaker actors within the party to strengthen their position by reforming the statutes in order to give them decision-making power previously denied them.
• Salinas was able to overturn statutory reforms, while President Zedillo was not.
• Now that the PRI has lost the presidential elections, internal mechanisms of distributing selective benefits have become even more important because of the president's loss.
• This text examines the evolutionary changes in one of the central institutions of Mexico's former hegemonic party system between 1988 and 2000.
• The focus is on how actors within the PRI negotiated new rules of the game in periods in which the old structures were breaking down and new ones which were acceptable to those involved had not yet been established. _ Much is gained by focusing on party rules, the PRI, an inclusionary corporatist party that dominated the electoral arena at all levels of government for over 60 years, continues to be a central actor.
• Even before that historic election defeat, its dominance had been weakened by electoral competition, which in turn had changed the internal dynamics of the party.
• To understand the Mexican transition to democracy it is imperative to study how electoral competition affected the internal relations of power within the PRI.
• Competition at the ballot box allowed lower-level actors and groups within the Revolutionary Coalition to attempt to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the Mexico president and the national leadership by changing the party.
• Electoral competition made both the quality and form of candidate selection far more important under non-competitive conditions.
• While not all changes to nomination procedures were achieved by statutory battles, these disputes over the formal rules did lay the groundwork for future alterations in nomination practices.
• Electoral pressures did not translate into statutory victories for the rank-and-file, who were faced with differential levels of presidential control over their attempts to win more decision-making power, especially over nominations.
• Not all statutory changes remained in force.
• New rules remained in force only when the executive became weaker in relation to other groups within the governing coalition.
• In 1990 to decentralise nominations was easily overturned by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), while the new rules formulated in the 1996 PRI Assembly obligated President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) to change the presidential nomination process by devolving the nomination decision to all registered voters.
• Because the president of Mexico had been the de facto leader of the PRI before 2000, he represented the Leviathan that enforced rules that promoted co-operation among the members of his party.
• Groups within the party were too weak to form a countervailing power to create internally stable enforcement mechanisms which would have forced the president to respect the party's new statutes.
• Structural reality of greater electoral competition, and the institutional situation of the presidency vis-à-vis other political institutions during Zedillo's administration help explain why the 1996 statutes remain in place.
• Not surprising that Salinas was able to overturn the rule changes of the 1990 Assembly; what is truly remarkable is that the changes from the 1996 Assembly did hold due to Zedillo's relative weakness in comparison to Salinas.
• The new rules coming out of the 1996 Assembly changed the relevant actors' behaviour and, eventually, the method for choosing the PRI's presidential candidate.
• Presidents of Mexico could directly appoint their successors in the presidency, senators and the governors.
• At lower levels, the president had veto power over lists made up by the Secretary of Gobernación, president of the party or the head of the National Executive Committee (CEN) and leaders of the sectors.
• The president's power over nominations and the lack of opposition gave the chief executive the power to determine the future career paths of his party's ambitious politicians.
• Competition altered both the incentive and opportunity structures of leaders and members of the party.
• The PRI had to win elections against serious opposition parties.
• Leaders had far greater incentives to place candidates who are more acceptable to the voting public. Politicians also faced a different world:
• The value of a 'good' candidate was low
• Candidates capable of winning elections were far more important to the party and, therefore, could increasingly make demands that earlier generations of politicians could not.
• Disgruntled PRI politicians who have lost out in nomination battles can now leave the party and run under another party's banner.
• The PRI leadership did not wish to devolve decision-making capacity to lower levels of the party structure, such as the PRI governors or the rank-and-file militants.
• Allowing the activists, low-level party leaders, or the general voters to make nomination decisions would have negated the ability of top leaders to determine the professional futures of their party's politicians.
• This loss of control would make it more difficult for party leaders to control the party's votes, especially for unpopular measures.
• Dilemma existed within the PRI: the party's leaders had to reinvent the process and find new procedures to choose better candidates without losing control over the actions of the party's politicians.
• Two categories of change can be seen: the first is which groups within the party would take advantage of the new circumstances, and the second is how the actors would fight to achieve their goals within the party.
• Groups that were most involved were the militant rank-and-file, a small group of governors, and a group of leaders of the party apparatus.
• Each of these groups fought to change the formal rules of the party.
• In the first phase of party change after 1988, then-president Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) punished one set of actors in the party - the sectors and attempted to re-work the territorial organisation of the PRI better to win elections.
• Salinas wanted to use the 14th National Assembly, held in September of 1990, to weaken the sectors' weight in leadership and nomination roles, while not turning over any real decision-making capacity to the low-level territorial activists.
• However, these activist-delegates rebelled in the Assembly and changed the statutes radically to allow full nomination power at the lowest level of the party.
• President Salinas simply ignored these new statutes in the nomination decisions of 1990 and 1991, and later overturned them in the following Assembly in 1992.
• Salinas went on to develop a new organisation , which would take on many of the grass-roots organising that the PRI otherwise would have carried out thus allowed him to maintain the party structures in a weak position.
• In the second stage of party reform which took place during Zedillo's administration, a small group of governors and some leaders of the party apparatus used the party assembly to reform the formal rules, concentrating on reducing the president's prerogative.
• Salinas was able to ignore the new party statutes, Zedillo was not in a position to do so.
• Zedillo, in order to avoid a major rupture within the party going into the 2000 elections, was forced to respect the new statutes and organise the first presidential primary in the history of the PRI.
• The changes made in the reform assembly of 1996, and Zedillo's failure to overturn them, demonstrate two fundamental points: The growing importance of both the governors and the party bureaucrats / the use of formal party rules as instruments by weaker members of the Coalition to shore up their position vis-à-vis the party leadership and president.
• In large part, the reforms of the 1996 Assembly forced the president's hand, obligating him to configure a new nomination procedure: an open primary vote of all registered voters (carried out in November 1999).
• This radical change forced potential candidates to make new types of alliances to win the nomination by convincing the votes in the primary.
• Political parties can be seen as organisations made up of party leaders and militants who attempt to place their candidates in elected positions by winning votes in fair elections.
• Nominations are the means to achieve their ends and The party organ controlling this gateway in large part determines the relations of power within the party.
• The central issue in nominations is the identity of the actors who make the rules that determine access of party members to public office and the consequences of these distinct rules and procedures.
• The general literature on party organisation notes that candidate selection methods that allow more participation by activists The PRI provides a clear example of the latter point.
• The PRI has had a vertical structure of command and control.
• The President of the Republic (who was also the de facto leader of the party) informally imposed his choice as president of the PRI, almost single-handedly decided whom to nominate as PRI candidates for governors and senators, and acted as an arbiter among various interests within the party when nominations were decided for federal deputies.
• action problems for the ruling elite; All ambitious politicians/Internal battles over The informal right granted power to the center of the party (president of mexico)
• Important interests of party: the Worker, the Peasant and the Popular sectors
• The center directed action of both national sectoral leadership and governors
• Party organized by both a corporatist base (three sectors (Worker, Peasant, Popular) + functions) and a territorial structure
• Three sectoral parties dominate before 1990 and switches to territorial base after the 14th Assembly
• Largest organizations: Workers' + CTM (National Peasant Confederation)
• 1978: Mexicans could affiliate themselves to the PRI only one way (Automatic placement into one of three sectors based on activity)
• Territorial base of the part was weak before 1990 (though natural election responsibilities) - Sections base of base of electoral activity with sectors
• All PRI candidates (federal deputies) had to officially represent one of the three sectors of the party
• Power of the sectors was a entity to measure _ CDEs and The President of Mexico via CEN+ structure dominated
• Before 1990, statutes had candidates selected in delegate conventions

The formal rules before 1988

• The aim is to make clear how able to dominate the party structure via their use of the official statutes before serious electoral challenges began (identifies the formal brakes on participation, which will help explain the fights to reform the statutes in 1990 and 1996)
• The rules make clear that the party leaders were able to control all party resources
• Before 1990 the statutes stipulated that candidates were chosen in delegate conventions
• Delegate selection was controlled by the National Executive Committee or state party committees
• In 1990 National Assembly/ the PRI was almost voted out of office by an electorate furious over recurrent economic crises.
• The electoral turnout for the PRI before 1988 had in large part been assured by allowing the sectors to choose candidates from within their occupational groupings, who then went on to win territorially-based, elections
• To meet the growing election opposition threat, A Metform Assembly was convened in September 1990
• The delegates to The National Assembly was written to allow for the participation of the territorial structure In effect resulting with - All nominations for federal level state to be decided Democratic Delegates in the sectoral and territorial structure party
• direct vote of the militant base
• 1st - The party would allow individual affirmation of the sectors
• number of delegates from the sectors had to equal to those from the territorial base.
• From 1991-199. The National Political Council was responsible for electing the General Secretary of the CEN
• The delegates and that while good candidates were needed in closely competed districts, what would determine the outcome of the elections was partisan loyalty and The performance of salinas is in office
• Other reforms from 1990 suffered same faith -1st was the president used the program
• president Zedillo abandoned Solidarity.

Zedillo Era

• Era see Fundemental relationship between the presidency and the PRI; Due to The desire of negotiation; Zedillo stated he - take NO charge of personal or inner party Life

• The elections in January 15 also ordered to write a new Democratic nomination - When efforts ended electoral failure new assembly was called

• In the rising competition by governors was important in the election to defeat the popular opposition candidates

• governors by the fact had no hope that could allow him to reduce number possible with the state election that would make the best possible candidate - there by making the state electoral disputes

• Zedillo decided would become invalid local state disputes, by calling political counsel

• All the Assembly are written by whom made the president choose the Senate and so it would

• assembly in a way that has the The the Governors of the state

• Zedillo’s cabinet was that the requirements of the change of the political - with the Senate and state assembly or by the calling to reduce to meet The CEN

• However the president was unable The long term effects of the 17th the assembly - where limit the - the most restrictive assembly that has a political apparatus

• To show up that the state is ready so they could deal to The central powers by

• 1996 the president had to offer primaries

• There wasn’t guarantee dominance/ Loyalty not guaranteed, and there by 1990 it can still could reverse the 17th assembly president who would've had to avoid internal speed

• This results in both electors pressure in the of factions