Mexican Cartels: Threat and Response

Mexican Cartels: Threat and Response

• Mexico significantly impacts the daily life of the United States
• Events on one side of the border have consequences on the other

Mexico's Offensive Against Drug Cartels

• In December 2006, President Felipe Calderon initiated an offensive against Mexico's drug cartels
• The Army and Navy were called in to assist local and national police
• Cartel violence includes mutilations, beheadings, torture, assassinations, and killings of civilians
• Over 60,000 Mexican citizens died in six years of unabated violence
• Mexican cartels are a national security threat to the U.S.
• This is because of U.S. interests, close ties between the nations, and cartel networks
• The U.S. has assisted Mexico in disrupting cartels and stemming illicit drugs

Economic Ties and Challenges

• $39 billion in U.S. consumption of illegal drugs is handled by Mexican cartels
• Arms are trafficked from the U.S. to cartels, contributing to violence
• Washington and Mexico City aim to weaken the cartels
• The U.S. and Mexico's economies are linked, strengthened by NAFTA
• Mexico shares a nearly 2000-mile border with the U.S., crossed by about 300 million people per year
• Mexico is the third overall U.S. trade partner
• Mexico is the second largest U.S. export economy, nearly twice that of China
• Mexico is the third largest supplier of crude oil
• Bilateral trade equaled $460 billion in 2011
• U.S. accounts for approximately 85% of all exports by Mexico
• Rising labor wages in China make Mexico more attractive for U.S. businesses
• Mexico could become as commonplace as "Made in China"
• Mexico may export more to the U.S. than any other country by 2018
• Mexico as an ally matters economically and culturally
• Mexico has over 100 million in population
• The U.S. Hispanic population is expected to reach 30% by 2050
• Approximately 33 million people, 10% of the U.S. population, are of Mexican descent.
• The relationship between the U.S. and Mexico is "asymmetrical"

Historical Context and Strategic Partnership

• Mexico is often an afterthought for Americans
• Many Mexicans remember the disastrous war with the U.S. (1846-48)
• Relations have shifted to a strategic partnership
• Both countries tackle common issues and drug trade

The Drug War and Violence

• The war on drugs in Mexico has been a failure, requiring a new approach
• The U.S. and Mexico must partner to reduce violence, prevent spillover, and diminish cartel influence
• Significant violence from the Mexican drug enterprise has not yet reached the U.S.
• Economic and cultural interconnectedness means violence could impact U.S. national security
• The geographic border has increased economic, social, political, and security interests

Mexican Cartels as Insurgents

• Mexico is not undergoing a criminal insurgency
• The "Plan Colombia" template may not work
• Mexico suffers high-intensity crime with cartel vs cartel, inter-cartel, cartels vs government, cartel vs society and gang vs gang violence
• Violence is a struggle for smuggling routes into the U.S. and its illicit drug market
• Cartels share similarities to insurgent groups and terrorist organizations
• Cartels are transnational violent entrepreneurial networks motivated by profit

Common Characteristics of Criminal Organizations

• Involvement in illegal activities and need for supplies
• Exploitation of excessive violence and the threat of violence
• Kidnappings, assassinations, and extortion
• Secrecy
• Challenge to the state and laws
• Back-up leaders and foot soldiers
• Adaptability, open to innovations, and flexibility
• Threat to global security
• Deadly consequences for former members

Distinguishing Cartels from Insurgents/Terrorists

• Cartels are not motivated to create a homeland or substitute ideology
• Violence is directed at rival cartels (business, not politics)
• Insurgency: internal threat using subversion and violence for political ends
• Terrorism: unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments, often motivated by religious, political, or ideological beliefs
• Drug cartels in Mexico aren't trying to create a homeland, substitute ideology, or achieve any political goal

Mexico: Not a Failed State

• Some elements of Mexican power have been extended to the breaking point
• Cartels "control" territory largely in sparsely-inhabited rural areas
• Cartels operate like organized criminal groups in densely packed urban areas
• Cartels do not battle for physical terrain to occupy and hold
• Actions and words are not political engagements against the government
• Cartels see government proclamations of "winning" as irrelevant if they can continue their business
• Homicides rate per population puts Mexico in the middle of countries in the Western Hemisphere

Violence in Mexico

• At 18 homicides per 100,000, Mexico is dwarfed by Honduras (82), El Salvador (66), and Venezuela (49)
• Relative to its neighbors, Mexico's violence is moderate to average
• Ciudad Juarez had 2,101 cartel-related murders in 2010
• The nine most populated U.S. cities had a combined overall murder rate of just 2,076 in 2011

Impacts on the United States

• Drug use in America drives the Mexican drug trade
• Principally, America is bankrolling and supporting the Mexican cartels
• Significant violence on the scale being experienced in Mexico has not reached the United States
• Violence is bad for business
• Significant/barbaric violence would raise awareness
• Security concerns would create a bad operating environment for violent cartels
• Cartels avoid raising the stakes with authorities
• Some U.S. cities such as Chicago do not appear to be immune from Mexican cartel violence.
• Mexican cartels “dominate the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the United States” and are present in more than 1,000 U.S. cities

Drug Trafficking and Gang Violence

• Cartels continue to flood the U.S. with heroin, cocaine, marijuana as well as methamphetamine
• Senior DEA agent in Chicago attributes increased gang violence to Mexican cartels (Sinaloa and Los Zetas) who are able to easily blend into the city's two million Hispanic population
• The 30% increase in homicides since 2011 is a turf battle over the city as a strategic transshipment hub

Cross-Border Incursions and Sovereignty Issues

• Between 1995 and 2006 Mexican government personnel crossed into the U.S. on 226 occasions
• From 2008 to 2009 there were another 131 incursions by Mexican military and reports of 539 assaults against Border Patrol agents and National Guard troops
• Recently 33 Mexican troops strayed into Texas in four Humvees
• A Texas sheriff photographed a Mexican Navy helicopter over Brownsville and a small tactical Mexican drone crashed into a backyard in El Paso, Texas
• Mexico claims that its forces have orders to remain at least two miles off the border
• Cartel members dress in fatigues, drive military style vehicles, and are armed with military grade weapons to protect their cargo
• The U.S., for its part, admits that U.S. military and police have mistakenly crossed into Mexico in the past as well
• Events suggest that during heightened tensions Mexican and U.S. authorities could clash and result in "friendly fire".
• In the case of the helicopter and drone, a more deadly outcome could have resulted

Weapons Trafficking and Financial Impacts

• Illegal weapons trafficking from the United States to Mexico fuels violence
• 68,000 U.S.-originated firearms were confiscated by Mexican authorities during the 2007-2011 period
• Proximity of weapons across the border allows cartels easy access
• U.S. authorities need to help stem the flow of this deadly commodity fueling the violence in Mexico
• U.S. Banks have admitted to laundering money by failing to monitor and report suspected money laundering schemes
• Wachovia admitted that it did not do enough in handling some $378.4 billion in Mexican currency exchange houses which were used by cartels to launder funds
• Wachovia paid $160 million in fines, 2% of its $12.3 billion in 2009 profits
• Drug trafficking organizations send between $19 and $29 billion annually to Mexico from the United States
• $87.6 million recovered by U.S. authorities in a five year period
• Suggests law enforcement is seizing cash in sums hardly noticeable by the cartels

Impacts on U.S. Interests in Mexico

• Violence is directed toward U.S. citizens, officials, and buildings
• A total of 414 Americans were the victims of homicide in Mexico from Dec 2006 to Dec 2012
• Makes it the most dangerous country for U.S. persons outside the war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan
• Three Americans were killed by a gunman who stormed a bus in Veracruz in late 2011
• One cartel placed a mole inside the U.S. Embassy at its Interpol desk
• Corrupt activities created an environment of distrust amongst Mexico's security apparatus

Attacks on U.S. Officials and Business Interests

• The U.S. Consulate in Monterrey experienced attacks
• Two Mexican police officers assigned to the Consulate were killed in 2011
• Three people connected to the U.S. Consulate in Juarez were murdered in 2010
• An ICE officer was killed at a checkpoint between Mexico City and Monterrey in 2011
• Two CIA operatives were shot and injured while traveling to a Mexican military base
• Whirlpool announced in late 2010 that it would not go forward with building a proposed factory
• The U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Mexico surveyed over 500 U.S. companies operating in Mexico
• 160,000 businesses may have left Mexico in 2011
• Tourism numbers have been affected, and Mexico has lost nearly $9 billion over a three year period from 2009-2011
• Loss of jobs creates conditions in which unemployment makes more recruits available to the cartels

Proposed Responses to Violence

• Legalization as a strategic option is not discussed
• Aim to alter the approach in the "war on drugs" as a way to possibly subvert the cartels economically
• Proposed include: focusing first on the most violent cartel to dismantle, instituting full-spectrum high-intensity policing, reforming criminal justice system and invigorating counterintelligence.

First Approach: Zeta First Approach

• One of the primary reasons for the failure to reduce violence has been the wide spectrum strategy the Calderon administration used by applying police and military resources broadly geographically across Mexico and its multiple cartels
• No single focused effort led to failure to pacify any city, cartel, or region
• Enrique Peña Nieto is focusing less on the "drug war" and focusing on lowering the violence to an acceptable level.
• His administration should focus on achieving this goal of lowering the violence by concentrating law enforcement and military resources on the most violent cartels.

Reasons to Focus on Los Zetas

• Los Zetas have the most military training and background, demonstrated use of infantry tactics, and also their understanding of the thoughts, planning, and processes of government forces
• Openly acknowledging the destruction of Los Zetas may serve as a warning to other cartels
• Los Zetas' territorial voids would likely be filled by other cartels, but no longer with the need to feud over market space.
• Los Zetas have the greatest potential to transform into an insurgent group due to its former Special Forces background
• Los Zetas' members could be more easily isolated and other cartels may be willing to work with government forces
• The Nieto administration would have ample reason to "pile-on" Los Zetas to take down the most egregious offender of violent acts

Comprehensive Policing Strategy

• The Mexican government should develop a comprehensive full-spectrum high-intensity policing strategy
• Capability to flood the new security environment to prevent a complete takeover of the area by just another cartel
• President Nieto could then pivot and turn his attention to the next most violent cartel

Full-Spectrum High-Intensity Policing

• Police reform should be at the heart of any new strategy
• Comprehensive and full-spectrum policing / law enforcement reform
• Creating an interlocking and layered approach to security
• The military primacy strategy has failed to lower the violence and curtail the freedom of the cartels
• Mexico needs full-spectrum high-intensity policing in order to help Mexico City “create legitimate and effective government" which "can deliver essential services, including the rule of law”
• President Nieto’s decision to create a new national police force of up to 10,000 officers
• Similar to France’s National Gendarmerie- military training but with police duties
• His plan to deploy this Gendarmería Nacional to the most violent regions will provide a sorely needed capability gap between local and state police and deployed military forces
• A paramilitary force mirroring the French Gendarmerie or Italian Carabinieri can only be part of the overall solution
• Mexico must rebuild its local and state police forces while simultaneously it develops a new Gendarmería Nacional
• Must have "core policing”- “an enhancer both to legitimacy and law enforcement effectiveness”

Defensive vs. Offensive Actions

• Generally defensive and focused on protecting the population
• Leaving offensive actions in the high-intensity crime areas to the paramilitary and military forces
• Police corruption must be addressed aggressively
• Local and state levels cause loss of support by the population and resulted in the military being called into action
• “In most of the world, the police are hard to contact, unhelpful in response and predatory… They are not the public’s police…”
• Accurately describes the vast majority of Mexico’s local police
• Cartels expanded areas of insecurity and made the local police susceptible to corruption
• Local police should get back on the beat, supported by competent and capable state police/National Police forces/military units focused on handling the most violent areas and cartels
• Local and state police should conduct “core policing” with a focus on protecting and serving the local population and becoming more responsive to their needs with an emphasis on being available, helpful, fair and respectful
• Despite a desire to get the troops back in the barracks, the Mexican military will need to remain in place until the Gendarmería Nacional.
• The Gendarmería Nacional will be the primary means to offensively engage the cartels

Criminal Justice Reform

• Requires rapid and simultaneous reform of its criminal justice system in Mexico
• Must firmly establish the two other pillars of the system: effective courts and prisons
• Has 98.5 percent Impunity rate with only one conviction out of every 100 crimes result in sentencing
• President Calderon fired 3,200 National Police officers accounting for ten percent of the force in 2010 for corruption
• Human rights abuses police and military members have been accused
• Police face the lack of facilities causing them to punish the miscreants themselves or letting them go/ Either choice will demoralize and corrupt

Counterintelligence Measures

• Central to Mexico's policing problem is the penetration of high level institutions and law enforcement by the cartels
• Prevent infiltration into a new elite Gendarmería Nacional paramilitary force by the cartels or the organization will be rendered ineffective
• Mexico's problem - "the penetration of public institutions -- particularly law enforcement institutions-- by organized crime"
• Developing an aggressive and effective counterintelligence capability backed by a robust legal system is sorely needed in Mexico
• Enduring counterintelligence emphasis to ensure law enforcement screened/routinely assessed/purged
• Transparency can build public confidence and so would trust between police, military, and intelligence