IF lecture 9 + 11

An agreement between nations to address global environmental problems. They aim to protect a collective good, such as a healthy environment.

A situation where individuals benefit from a resource without contributing to its upkeep. IEAs aim to counter this by encouraging participation and shared responsibility.

A public good is non-excludable (accessible to everyone) and non-rival (use by one person doesn't reduce its availability for others). A healthy environment benefits everyone, but individual countries may be tempted to free-ride.

A paradox in the theory of IEAs. While they are common, economic theory suggests they shouldn't exist or be effective due to the incentive to free-ride.

IEAs are designed to address the free-riding problem by creating binding obligations for member nations.

Despite the free-riding problem, IEAs are considered a natural way to address global environmental issues.

Studies on IEAs aim to understand how they work, which types are effective, and how to design optimal agreements.

The theory of IEAs examines how agreements function, what types are successful, and how to design effective ones. It aims to understand the dynamics of international cooperation in environmental issues.

An international agreement that aims to address global environmental challenges, such as climate change.

The theory of coalition formation used to analyze how countries decide to participate in IEAs.

In the first stage, countries decide whether to join the IEA and agree on how to share the burden of the agreement.

Participating countries negotiate a burden-sharing rule that determines how much each country will contribute to achieve the collective goal.

Countries play a non-cooperative game to determine their emission levels. The IEA members act as a single player and divide the resulting benefits based on the burden-sharing rule.

Assuming that all countries decide simultaneously whether to join the agreement and how much to emit.

A type of game theory where players make decisions without coordinating or communicating with each other. In this framework, each player acts in their own self-interest, maximizing their own gains.

A process where players strategically decide whether or not to join an agreement, considering the benefits and costs.

A rule that determines how the benefits or costs of an agreement are shared among the participating countries.

A game where all countries make decisions simultaneously and the outcome is determined by the combined actions of all players.

A strategy where players analyze the consequences of future events and make decisions based on those predictions. This is how countries anticipate the outcome of the emission game when deciding whether to join an agreement.

A scenario where countries that sign the agreement act as a single player and divide the resulting benefits or costs according to the burden-sharing rule.

A model used to study international environmental agreements (IEAs), focusing on the interplay between coalition formation, burden-sharing, and emission strategies.

The optimal emission level for each country, considering the benefit of reducing emissions and the cost of complying with the agreement.

A group of countries that agree to work together to achieve a common environmental goal.

A coalition is profitable if each country involved benefits from joining the coalition compared to doing nothing.

A coalition is stable if no country within the coalition wants to leave, and no country outside the coalition wants to join.

A coalition is Pareto optimal if there is no other profitable and stable coalition that could make everyone involved better off.

A situation where countries partially cooperate to solve an environmental problem, with some countries signing an agreement and others not participating.

The strategic interaction between countries, influencing their willingness to cooperate or defect.

A model that describes the behavior of countries in a situation where cooperation is beneficial, but individual incentives can lead to defection.

A situation where countries would be better off cooperating, but individual incentives lead to no cooperation.

Agreements between countries to address global environmental issues, like climate change.

The study of how to design and implement successful IEAs.

A framework for analyzing the factors that influence the formation and stability of IEAs, considering factors like costs, benefits, and strategic interactions between countries.

The results of research on IEAs, often presented in the form of models or simulations, to understand how different factors shape the outcomes of agreements.

The study of how to expand the participation in IEAs beyond a small group of countries, often by introducing incentives or policies.

Financial support or compensation provided to countries to encourage their participation in IEAs.

Linking environmental agreements with other issues of mutual interest, such as trade or development, to create greater incentives for participation.

Using the threat of negative consequences or sanctions to influence countries to join or comply with IEAs.

Using economic punishments, such as trade restrictions, to encourage countries to join and comply with environmental agreements. It's like a reward system for good behavior, but complicated.

Countries may be hesitant to join IEAs because they can feel like a burden, especially if other countries are not participating. It's like a cleanup crew - who wants to be the only one cleaning?

Despite the free-riding problem, IEAs still exist because countries understand it's in their long-term interest to protect the environment, even if they have to work together. It's like a global insurance policy to protect everyone.

Using threats, like economic sanctions, can sometimes motivate countries to join IEAs. However, these threats need to be credible and practical. It's like a grumpy parent who warns to take away toys if bad behavior continues - it needs to work!