Every War Must End: Japan's Plan After Pearl Harbor

• Fred Charles Iklé wrote about the lack of a Japanese victory plan after Pearl Harbor in "Every War Must End" (1971, revised 2005).

War Plans Without an Ending

• Three months prior to Pearl Harbor, the Emperor of Japan questioned Sugiyama, the Army Chief of Staff, about the timeline for finishing a war with the United States.
• Sugiyama estimated three months to conclude operations in the South Pacific.
• The Emperor was not convinced, recalling Sugiyama's earlier miscalculation about the war with China.
• The Emperor questioned how Sugiyama could be so sure of a three month timeline when the Pacific Ocean is even bigger than China.
• Sugiyama's excuse regarding China's vastness implied the Japanese military was aware of China's size before engaging in war.
• Japanese military leaders were aware of the Pacific's size and the industrial might of the U.S. before attacking Pearl Harbor.
• Japan made a clear decision to go to war
• It would be expected that the Japanese military have ideas about how to successfully conclude the war.
• On September 6, 1941, the proposal to attack the U.S. was further discussed in a conference among military and civilian leaders.
• The Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano, stated Japan should be prepared for a long war.
• Nagano expressed that a decisive naval victory would not necessarily end the war.
• Nagano anticipated the United States would prolong the war because of its geographical position, industrial power, and resources.
• Nagano said Japan lacked the means to take the offensive, overcome the enemy, and force them to surrender.
• Japan aimed to establish a foundation for a prolonged war by seizing strategic areas and resources initially.
• The Navy Chief of Staff said success would depend on overall national power and developments in the world situation.
• A deep plunge was an incredibly murky prospect.
• The Japanese military had not forgotten that the war needed to end; they just didn't have an answer for how it would end.
• A memorandum for the September 6 conference contained questions and proposed answers about the German-Soviet war, homeland defense, Washington negotiations, and U.S. strength.
• The central question was the outlook and the way forward in a war with Great Britain and the United States.
• The Japanese military predicted a long war with Great Britain and the United States.
• It would be almost impossible to expect the surrender of the United States.
• The Japanese military did not exclude the possibility of the war ending because of a major shift in American public opinion.
• They hoped to attain an invincible position and influence affairs to end the war.