Podcast
Questions and Answers
Under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), what potential penalty could a company face for implementing a merger prior to notifying the European Commission?
Under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), what potential penalty could a company face for implementing a merger prior to notifying the European Commission?
- A fixed fine of 1 million euros.
- A fine of up to 10% of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking. (correct)
- A written warning with no monetary penalty.
- A temporary suspension of business operations within the EU.
What is the primary legislation governing merger control in the UK?
What is the primary legislation governing merger control in the UK?
- Clayton Act.
- Enterprise Act 2002, as amended. (correct)
- Treaty of Rome.
- Sherman Antitrust Act.
What constitutes a 'concentration' under the EU Merger Regulation?
What constitutes a 'concentration' under the EU Merger Regulation?
- Any form of business collaboration.
- Mergers, acquisitions, and full-function joint ventures. (correct)
- Only acquisitions of one company by another.
- Only mergers between two or more companies.
If a merger qualifies for investigation at the EU level, what type of system does this represent?
If a merger qualifies for investigation at the EU level, what type of system does this represent?
Which authority in the UK, in addition to the Competition & Markets Authority (CMA), might review cases with public interest or national security implications?
Which authority in the UK, in addition to the Competition & Markets Authority (CMA), might review cases with public interest or national security implications?
Under EU law, what is the key criterion for determining whether a joint venture falls under the EUMR as a merger?
Under EU law, what is the key criterion for determining whether a joint venture falls under the EUMR as a merger?
Which of the following characteristics is essential for a joint venture to be considered 'full-function' under the EUMR?
Which of the following characteristics is essential for a joint venture to be considered 'full-function' under the EUMR?
If a merger does not meet the turnover thresholds for investigation at the European level, what typically happens?
If a merger does not meet the turnover thresholds for investigation at the European level, what typically happens?
Under what circumstances can a merger that does not meet the thresholds for investigation at the European level be 'referred up' to the European Commission?
Under what circumstances can a merger that does not meet the thresholds for investigation at the European level be 'referred up' to the European Commission?
Which of the following best describes the 'SSNIP' test used in market definition for merger control?
Which of the following best describes the 'SSNIP' test used in market definition for merger control?
What did the Gencor case establish regarding the territorial scope of the EU Merger Regulation?
What did the Gencor case establish regarding the territorial scope of the EU Merger Regulation?
In the context of merger control, what is the 'counterfactual'?
In the context of merger control, what is the 'counterfactual'?
What does the EU test for assessing whether a merger is problematic (the SEIC test) prohibit?
What does the EU test for assessing whether a merger is problematic (the SEIC test) prohibit?
What is the primary goal of merger control policy?
What is the primary goal of merger control policy?
In assessing the impact of a merger, what is a key step after identifying the theory of harm?
In assessing the impact of a merger, what is a key step after identifying the theory of harm?
Which of the following is NOT one of the main theories of harm in merger analysis?
Which of the following is NOT one of the main theories of harm in merger analysis?
In the context of coordinated effects, what three conditions were highlighted in the Airtours case as necessary for a collective dominant position to arise?
In the context of coordinated effects, what three conditions were highlighted in the Airtours case as necessary for a collective dominant position to arise?
Which type of remedy is generally preferred by regulators in addressing concerns raised by a merger?
Which type of remedy is generally preferred by regulators in addressing concerns raised by a merger?
In the context of remedies, what is an example of a structural remedy?
In the context of remedies, what is an example of a structural remedy?
What was the primary concern raised by regulators regarding Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard?
What was the primary concern raised by regulators regarding Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard?
What concern did the UK's CMA have regarding Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard?
What concern did the UK's CMA have regarding Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard?
Which of the following best describes the 'national security' exception in merger control?
Which of the following best describes the 'national security' exception in merger control?
What is the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) used for in merger analysis?
What is the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) used for in merger analysis?
In the context of merger control, what does the term 'unilateral effects' in horizontal mergers refer to?
In the context of merger control, what does the term 'unilateral effects' in horizontal mergers refer to?
What is a 'monitoring trustee' in the context of behavioral remedies?
What is a 'monitoring trustee' in the context of behavioral remedies?
Imagine a scenario where two major airlines propose a merger. Post-merger, they control over 80% of the routes between major European cities. Regulators suspect that this could lead to coordinated effects, allowing the merged entity to tacitly collude with other airlines on pricing and capacity.
Which of the following regulatory responses would be MOST effective in addressing these concerns, assuming structural remedies are deemed infeasible due to the unique nature of airline routes and airport slots?
Imagine a scenario where two major airlines propose a merger. Post-merger, they control over 80% of the routes between major European cities. Regulators suspect that this could lead to coordinated effects, allowing the merged entity to tacitly collude with other airlines on pricing and capacity.
Which of the following regulatory responses would be MOST effective in addressing these concerns, assuming structural remedies are deemed infeasible due to the unique nature of airline routes and airport slots?
Company A, a dominant player in the microchip industry, seeks to acquire Company B, a small but innovative startup with a groundbreaking new microchip technology that could potentially disrupt Company A's market dominance. Company A argues that the acquisition will allow them to scale up production of Company B's technology, benefiting consumers through lower prices and wider availability. Regulators, however, are concerned that Company A might shelve Company B's technology to protect its existing product line and market share.
Which of the following remedies would be the MOST effective in addressing the regulators' concerns about stifled innovation?
Company A, a dominant player in the microchip industry, seeks to acquire Company B, a small but innovative startup with a groundbreaking new microchip technology that could potentially disrupt Company A's market dominance. Company A argues that the acquisition will allow them to scale up production of Company B's technology, benefiting consumers through lower prices and wider availability. Regulators, however, are concerned that Company A might shelve Company B's technology to protect its existing product line and market share. Which of the following remedies would be the MOST effective in addressing the regulators' concerns about stifled innovation?
Acme Corp, based in the US, and EuroTech, based in Germany, both manufacture industrial robots. Acme has 70% market share in North America but minimal presence elsewhere. EuroTech has 65% market share in the EU but is a minor player in North America. They propose a merger.
Neither company has significant sales outside North America and the EU. The global market for industrial robots is highly competitive, with several other large players, mostly based in Japan and South Korea, each holding a significant, but smaller, market share. The barriers to entry are moderately high due to the need for specialized engineering expertise and significant capital investment.
Which of the following is the MOST likely outcome of the merger review?
Acme Corp, based in the US, and EuroTech, based in Germany, both manufacture industrial robots. Acme has 70% market share in North America but minimal presence elsewhere. EuroTech has 65% market share in the EU but is a minor player in North America. They propose a merger. Neither company has significant sales outside North America and the EU. The global market for industrial robots is highly competitive, with several other large players, mostly based in Japan and South Korea, each holding a significant, but smaller, market share. The barriers to entry are moderately high due to the need for specialized engineering expertise and significant capital investment. Which of the following is the MOST likely outcome of the merger review?
The EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) was established by the Treaty of Rome.
The EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) was established by the Treaty of Rome.
Failure to notify a merger prior to implementation in the EU can result in fines of up to 10% of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking.
Failure to notify a merger prior to implementation in the EU can result in fines of up to 10% of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking.
Under EU law, only mergers and acquisitions are considered concentrations; joint ventures are excluded.
Under EU law, only mergers and acquisitions are considered concentrations; joint ventures are excluded.
If a merger qualifies for investigation at the European Commission level, it is still necessary to file notifications in individual member states.
If a merger qualifies for investigation at the European Commission level, it is still necessary to file notifications in individual member states.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is the relevant authority in the UK for all merger cases, including those involving national security concerns.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is the relevant authority in the UK for all merger cases, including those involving national security concerns.
A change from sole to joint control occurs when a single owner sells their entire stake in a company.
A change from sole to joint control occurs when a single owner sells their entire stake in a company.
A full-function joint venture must operate independently on the market with its own resources and be intended to last for at least 2 years to fall under the EUMR.
A full-function joint venture must operate independently on the market with its own resources and be intended to last for at least 2 years to fall under the EUMR.
The concept of a full-function joint venture is recognized in the UK and Germany for merger assessment.
The concept of a full-function joint venture is recognized in the UK and Germany for merger assessment.
Mergers that do not meet the turnover thresholds for investigation at the European level are automatically exempt from review in all member states.
Mergers that do not meet the turnover thresholds for investigation at the European level are automatically exempt from review in all member states.
A referral 'up' to the European Commission can occur if a merger is to be reviewed in at least three member states and all of them agree to the referral.
A referral 'up' to the European Commission can occur if a merger is to be reviewed in at least three member states and all of them agree to the referral.
In a 'referral down' scenario, the notifying parties must convince all member states that the merger should be investigated at the national level instead of the European level.
In a 'referral down' scenario, the notifying parties must convince all member states that the merger should be investigated at the national level instead of the European level.
The Gencor case established that only mergers between EU companies can be subject to EU merger regulations.
The Gencor case established that only mergers between EU companies can be subject to EU merger regulations.
According to the EU test, a merger is problematic only if it creates a single dominant position, not if it strengthens an existing one.
According to the EU test, a merger is problematic only if it creates a single dominant position, not if it strengthens an existing one.
The 'counterfactual' in merger analysis always assumes that the market will remain exactly as it was prior to the merger, regardless of other potential changes.
The 'counterfactual' in merger analysis always assumes that the market will remain exactly as it was prior to the merger, regardless of other potential changes.
The substantial lessening of competition (SLC) and significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) tests are legally equivalent.
The substantial lessening of competition (SLC) and significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) tests are legally equivalent.
One key policy goal of merger control is to increase the scope for collusion in a market to promote stability.
One key policy goal of merger control is to increase the scope for collusion in a market to promote stability.
In assessing the impact of a merger, regulators primarily focus on effects on employment and national security, rather than economic theories of harm.
In assessing the impact of a merger, regulators primarily focus on effects on employment and national security, rather than economic theories of harm.
In the context of mergers, 'unilateral effects' refer to the increased likelihood of collusion among market participants.
In the context of mergers, 'unilateral effects' refer to the increased likelihood of collusion among market participants.
The SSNIP test is a method used to determine whether a merger is likely to create a coordinated effect in the market.
The SSNIP test is a method used to determine whether a merger is likely to create a coordinated effect in the market.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is primarily used as a conclusive measure of market competitiveness, directly determining whether a merger should be blocked or approved.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is primarily used as a conclusive measure of market competitiveness, directly determining whether a merger should be blocked or approved.
The 'Airtours' case established that a merger must create a single dominant position, not a collective one, to be prohibited.
The 'Airtours' case established that a merger must create a single dominant position, not a collective one, to be prohibited.
Behavioral remedies in merger control are preferred over structural remedies because they are one-off and do not require ongoing monitoring.
Behavioral remedies in merger control are preferred over structural remedies because they are one-off and do not require ongoing monitoring.
Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard was ultimately blocked by all major regulatory bodies due to concerns about its impact on console exclusivity.
Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard was ultimately blocked by all major regulatory bodies due to concerns about its impact on console exclusivity.
The primary concern of regulators regarding the Microsoft/Activision Blizzard deal was horizontal overlap in the console market.
The primary concern of regulators regarding the Microsoft/Activision Blizzard deal was horizontal overlap in the console market.
A 'gun jumping' violation in US antitrust law occurs when merging parties coordinate their business operations prior to receiving regulatory clearance, whereas in the EU, similar conduct is assessed under Article 101 TFEU, focusing on restrictive agreements that distort competition, implying that the EU lacks a specific, dedicated 'gun jumping' provision akin to that of the US.
A 'gun jumping' violation in US antitrust law occurs when merging parties coordinate their business operations prior to receiving regulatory clearance, whereas in the EU, similar conduct is assessed under Article 101 TFEU, focusing on restrictive agreements that distort competition, implying that the EU lacks a specific, dedicated 'gun jumping' provision akin to that of the US.
Flashcards
EUMR (EU Merger Regulation)
EUMR (EU Merger Regulation)
EU Merger Regulation requiring notification to the Commission for concentrations with a union dimension.
Merger Notification Penalties
Merger Notification Penalties
Failure to notify a merger prior to implementation can result in fines.
Concentration Concept
Concentration Concept
Mergers, acquisitions, and full-function joint ventures.
Merger Notification Procedure
Merger Notification Procedure
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Substance of Merger Review
Substance of Merger Review
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Relevant EU Merger Authorities
Relevant EU Merger Authorities
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UK Merger Authorities
UK Merger Authorities
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Merger Definition (EU)
Merger Definition (EU)
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Decisive Influence
Decisive Influence
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Sole to Sole Control
Sole to Sole Control
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Sole to Joint Control
Sole to Joint Control
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Joint to Joint Control
Joint to Joint Control
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Joint to Sole Control
Joint to Sole Control
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Joint Venture (JV)
Joint Venture (JV)
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Full-Function Joint Venture
Full-Function Joint Venture
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Key Characteristic of Full-Function JV
Key Characteristic of Full-Function JV
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One-Stop-Shop Merger Regulation
One-Stop-Shop Merger Regulation
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National Merger Laws
National Merger Laws
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Referral Up (Mergers)
Referral Up (Mergers)
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Referral Down (Mergers)
Referral Down (Mergers)
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Merger Jurisdiction (EU)
Merger Jurisdiction (EU)
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Extraterritorial Reach (EU Merger Regulation)
Extraterritorial Reach (EU Merger Regulation)
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Collective Dominance
Collective Dominance
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EU Merger Test (SEIC)
EU Merger Test (SEIC)
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UK Merger Test (SLC)
UK Merger Test (SLC)
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Counterfactual
Counterfactual
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Key Merger Policy Goals
Key Merger Policy Goals
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Assessing Impact of Merger
Assessing Impact of Merger
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Main Theories of Harm
Main Theories of Harm
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Structural Remedies
Structural Remedies
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Failure to notify a merger
Failure to notify a merger
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Full function JV key
Full function JV key
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When to 'Refer Up'?
When to 'Refer Up'?
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When to 'Refer Down'?
When to 'Refer Down'?
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Usual Counterfactual
Usual Counterfactual
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Main merger risks
Main merger risks
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Coordinated effects
Coordinated effects
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Airtours case conditions
Airtours case conditions
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Structural remedy
Structural remedy
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Behavioral remedy
Behavioral remedy
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Microsoft/Activision concerns
Microsoft/Activision concerns
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Study Notes
Legislation
- EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, governs mergers within the EU, but unlike Article 101/102, it was not created by the Treaty of Rome.
- National legislation in individual member states also regulates mergers.
- In the UK, the Enterprise Act 2002, as amended, is the relevant legislation.
EU Merger Regulation
- Requires compulsory notification to the European Commission for concentrations with a "union dimension".
- Failure to notify a merger before implementation can result in fines up to 10% of the undertaking's aggregate turnover.
- The concept of "concentration" (mergers) encompasses mergers, acquisitions, and full-function joint ventures.
Key Aspects of Merger Control
- Procedure: Which mergers must be notified and where, considering multi-jurisdictional filings.
- Substance: Whether the merger leads to a substantial lessening of competition and the theory of harm.
Procedure: Relevant Authorities
- EU: The European Commission in Brussels. A merger qualifying at this level results in a one-stop shop. If not, then it may qualify at the member state level.
- Third-party states (e.g., UK): The Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) for public interest/national security cases, such as those under the National Security and Investment Act 2021.
System of Exclusive Jurisdiction
- Determine if there's a 'merger' (a 'concentration').
- Determine if the merger qualifies for investigation at the EU level (one-stop-shop) or at the national level in one or more member states.
Defining a Merger ('Concentration' in EU)
- Mergers between companies involve a change in control, with the test being "decisive influence". Buying a certain amount of shares, such as 30%, can potentially give decisive influence.
- Change in control types: sole to sole, sole to joint, joint to joint, and joint to sole.
- Sole to Sole: One company controls another, and control remains with a single company, e.g., Company A owns Company B and sells it to Company C.
- Sole to Joint: A single owner sells part of their stake, so two or more companies now share control, e.g., Company A owns Company B, but now Company A and Company C jointly control it.
- Joint to Joint: The number of joint owners changes, but control remains shared, e.g., Company A and B control Company C, and then Company D joins.
- Joint to Sole: A joint venture becomes fully controlled by one company, e.g., Company A and B co-own Company C, but Company A buys out B to take full control.
- Full-function joint ventures are considered mergers under EU law.
Full-Function Joint Ventures
- A joint venture is where two or more companies create and operate a business together.
- Full-function JVs operate independently with their own resources, market presence, and long-lasting intent. Key is whether the entity operates in its own right on a market
- Own resources
- Is a market player in its own right (not dependent on parent company)
- Is intended to be long lasting (over 5 years generally)
- Only full function JVs fall under EUMR and is a merger. Key is whether the entity operates in its own right on a market.
- Concept limited to EU and most member states, notably not the UK or Germany, but included in some Asian regimes like China.
- Non-full function JVs assessed under art 101.
Qualifying for Investigation
- "Big" mergers are notified to the European Commission ("one-stop shop"), while "smaller" and "local" mergers go to member state competition authorities. Concentrations falling within the regulation thresholds need to notify the commission only.
Assessing the 'Union' Dimension
- If a merger doesn't meet the EC turnover thresholds, national laws of member states are considered.
- National laws vary, and a merger can qualify for investigation in multiple member states based on turnover thresholds. in most member states, national laws capture mergers between companies which meet specified turnover thresholds in that country, requiring information on turnover by country.
Referrals
- Referrals Up:
- If a merger doesn't meet EU thresholds but is reviewable in at least 3 member states, it can be "referred up" to the European Commission.
- Prior notification: Notifying parties request the commission to consider the merger (Art 4(5) EUMR). If the member states agree, referral happens, but it does not if one member state disagrees.
- Post notification: Member states request the commission to investigate instead (Art 22 EUMR).
- Referrals Down:
- If a merger meets EU thresholds but significantly affects competition in local markets, it can be "referred down" to a national level.
- Prior notification: Notifying parties submit to European commission their case as to why the merger should be investigated at national level instead – if the commission agrees and the member states do not object (Art 4(4) EUMR).
- Post notification: One or more member states can on their own initiative or on the commission’s invitation, ask the commission to refer the matter to them as the concentration affects competition at the local level (Art 9 EUMR).
Extraterritoriality
- Mergers outside the EU can still qualify for EU investigations; nationality of parties is irrelevant.
- Key cases: Gencor (1996), Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (1997), WorldCom/MCI (1998), General Electric/Honeywell (2001).
- Commission allowed acquisition in the Boeing/McDonnel Douglas case but prohibited acquisition of honeywell in the General electic/Honeywell case.
Gencor Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (Case T-102/96) 1999
- Gencor, a South African mining company, planned to merge with Lonrho Plc, a UK-based company.
- The European Commission intervened due to concerns it would impede competition within the EU market for platinum group metals (PGMs).
- The Court upheld the Commission's decision, affirming that the EU Merger Regulation could apply to mergers between non-EU companies if the merger would have significant effects within the EU market.
- Gencor contended that the EU Merger Regulation should not apply to an EU merger between non-EU companies operating outside the EU.
- The Court agreed that the merger would lead to a collective dominant position in the PGM market.
- The case confirmed the EU's authority to scrutinize mergers between non-EU companies and reinforced that mergers leading to collective dominance can be prohibited.
- Significance: Extraterritorial Reach and Collective Dominance was reinforced.
Substance: Assessing Lessened Competition
- Determine circumstances under which a merger would be prohibited or cleared only after commitments.
- Analysis is prospective, focusing on the effects of the merger. Analysis is usually ex ante.
When a Merger is Problematic
- EU test (EUMR): Prohibits concentrations that would "significantly impede effective competition," especially via creation or strengthening of a dominant position (the SEIC test).
- UK test: Assesses whether a merger would result in a "substantial lessening of competition" (the SLC test) in any market in the UK.
The Counterfactual
- Assess whether harm will occur as a result of the merger compared to what would have happened without the merger.
- The counterfactual is usually the status quo, but it may take into account likely changes to the market or merging firms. The counterfactual should show that in the absence of the merger, a market might have become more or less competitive
- effects of expected exits.
Policy Goals
- Merger control aims to ensure markets work efficiently.
- Prevent the creation/increase of market power and increased scope for collusion.
- There is an ascent of arguments in favor of different grounds for review, from effects on employment to national security to public interest.
Assessing the Impact of a Merger
- Identify the theory of harm and seek to prove it.
- Main theories of harm: Horizontal mergers (unilateral/coordinated effects), vertical/conglomerate mergers (foreclosure effects). Not mutually exclusive concepts: a merger could give rise to higher prices (unilateral) and increased risk of coordinated effects.
Market Definition and Concentration
- A "substantial lessening of competition" occurs within a defined market.
- The market is defined by applying the SSNIP test.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
- Three-dimensional analysis of concentration.
- UK/EU guidance includes thresholds at which increased concentration levels raise concerns.
- Rarely conclusive, but as with market shares, useful for initial screen.
Horizontal Mergers and Coordinated Effects
- As a result of a merger, market exhibits conditions likely to enable tacit coordination.
- Merger can lead to coordinated effects. Market is transparent.
- Three conditions from the Airtours case:
- Ability and incentives for competitors to align behavior.
- Deviation can be detected and punished.
- Alignment is sustainable.
- In Airtours, the court held that the commission failed to establish that a collective dominant position would be created.
Remedies
- Structural Remedies: (preference is structural remedies over behavioral)
- One-off remedy.
- Divestment of part of business (including intellectual property).
- Behavioral Remedies:
- Ongoing remedy.
- Undertaking to comply with certain conditions (e.g. provision of services to third parties, reducing long term contracts, licensing intellectual property).
- Greater monitoring burden for the regulator.
- Monitoring trustee.
Microsoft + Activision Blizzard (2022–2023)
- Microsoft wanted to acquire Activision Blizzard for $68.7 billion.
- It raised competition concerns in the UK, EU, and US.
- Theories of harm: Vertical Foreclosure and Impact on Cloud Gaming.
- Vertical Foreclosure: Microsoft would own both the games (Activision titles) and the platforms (like Xbox and Windows) and might block competitors from accessing essential content.
- UK CMA concerned Microsoft would dominate cloud gaming.
- Foreclosure theory: Microsoft might block competitors from accessing essential content.
- UK (CMA): Initially blocked the deal but was later unblocked after concessions.
- EU (Commission): Approved after remedies, e.g. free licenses for cloud services.
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