Criminal Law: Murder - Actus Reus, Mens Rea

• Murder, as defined by Lord Coke, involves the unlawful killing of another person under the Queen's peace.
• For murder to be proven the victim must be dead.

Actus Reus

• The actus reus of murder consists of several elements.
• The victim must have died, with death defined as brain death (Malcherek v Steel).
• The victim must be a person in being, excluding an unborn child or stillborn child (AGs Ref No.3 of 1994).
• The killing must occur under the “Queen’s peace,” meaning not during wartime in England and Wales.

Mens Rea

• The mens rea for murder is "malice aforethought," interpreted as intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm (GBH).
• GBH is defined as "really serious harm" (DPP v Smith).
• Intent can be direct, where the consequence is desired, or oblique.
• Oblique intent requires the defendant to realize the consequences are a virtual certainty (Nedrick and Woollin).

Causation

• Establishes the link between the defendant's actions and the victim's death.
• Factual causation requires the "but for" test, meaning the victim would not have died when they did without the defendant's actions (R v White 1910).
• The de minimis rule requires more than a trifling link between the injury and the cause of death (R v Pagett 1983).
• Legal causation requires the defendant's actions to be the "operating and substantial cause of death".
• A novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) can break the chain of causation.
• Medical treatment rarely breaks the chain of causation unless it is "palpably wrong" (R v Smith, R v Jordan, R v Cheshire).
• For a victim's actions to break the chain, they must be unforeseeable (Roberts (1971), Williams and Davies (1992)).
• The "thin skull" rule means the defendant is liable even if the victim's pre-existing condition makes them more susceptible to death (R v Blaue 1975).
• Acts of nature only break the chain if extraordinary or unpredictable (Hart).

Coincidence of AR and MR

• Both actus reus (AR) and mens rea (MR) must coincide for a murder conviction, known as the contemporaneity rule.
• Mens rea does not need to be present at the start of the actus reus in a continuous act (Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1969)).
• Actus reus and mens rea need not occur simultaneously in a single transaction of events (Thabo Meli (1954)).

Transferred Malice

• Mens rea can be transferred from an intended victim to an unintended one (Latimer (1986)).

Loss of Control

• A partial defense under S.54/55 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, reducing murder to manslaughter.
• The loss of control does not need to be sudden (S.54(2)).
• It cannot be an act of revenge (R v Jewell (2014)).

Qualifying Triggers

• Fear of serious violence from the victim against the defendant or another person (S.55(3)).
• Things done or said that constitute circumstances of an extremely grave character or cause a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged (S.55(4), Camplin).
• A combination of the above (S.55(5)).

Limits

• Sexual infidelity is disregarded (S.55(6)(a), Clinton).
• A person cannot raise a qualifying trigger if they incited the thing done or said or the violence (S.55(6)(b), Johnson, Dawes (2013)).

Normal Person Test

• Asks whether a person of the defendant’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint, might have reacted similarly (R v Hill (2008), R v Van Dongen (2005), Rejmanski and Gassman (2017)).

Diminished Responsibility

• A partial defense under S.52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
• Only the defendant can raise this defense.
• The defendant must be suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning (R v Byrne (1960)).
• The abnormality must arise from a recognized medical condition (Tandy, Wood, Stewart).
• The abnormality must have substantially impaired the defendant’s ability to understand their conduct, form a rational judgment, or exercise self-control (R v Byrne (1960), R v Golds (2016)).
• The abnormality must provide an explanation for the killing (s.52(1b), R v Dietschmann (2003)).
• The burden of proof is on the defendant on a balance of probabilities.

Involuntary Manslaughter

• A lesser offense than murder.
• Includes unlawful act manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter.

Unlawful Act Manslaughter

• The act must be unlawful (Franklin (1883)).
• The unlawful act must be dangerous, meaning the ordinary reasonable man would see a risk of some harm (Church (1967), Newbury and Jones (1976)).
• It must be an act, not an omission (Lowe (1973)).
• Normal rules on causation apply (Kennedy (2007)).
• Transferred malice can apply (R v Mitchell (1983)).

Gross Negligence Manslaughter

• Requires a duty of care (Donoghue v Stevenson (1932), Wacker (2002)).
• Breach of duty must have caused death (Broughton (2020)).
• There must be a risk of death that a reasonably prudent person would foresee (Singh (1999), R v Kuddus (2019), R v Ruddling (2016), R v Rose (2017)).
• Gross negligence must be such that it is a crime against the state (Bateman (1925), R v Misra and Srivastava (2004)).

Self-Defense

• A defense under Criminal Law Act 1967 Section 3 and s.76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.
• The defendant must have an honest belief that it was necessary to use force in response to an imminent threat (R v Gladstone Williams (1984)).
• The level of force used must be reasonable (Palmer v R, s76(7)(a) CJIA 2008).
• Force cannot be used after the danger is over (Hussain and another (2010)).
• Excessive force will cause the defense to fail (Clegg (1995), Martin Anthony (2002)).
• Personality disorders are not relevant (Cairns (2005), Oye (2013)).
• Householder cases allow for a wider defense where the force is not grossly disproportionate (S.43 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013).

Automatism

• Defined as an act done by the muscles without control by the mind (Bratty (1963)).
• Requires an automatic state caused by an external cause with no fault of the defendant (Hill v Baxter (1958), Kay v Butterworth (1945)).
• Self-induced automatism is not a defense for basic intent offenses if the defendant was reckless (Bailey (1983)).

Insanity

• Defined by M'Naghten’s Rule 1843.
• The defendant must show they were laboring under a defect of reason due to a disease of the mind, either not knowing the nature and quality of their act or not knowing it was wrong.
• Examples include sleepwalking (R v Burgess (1991), R v Thomas (2009)), epilepsy (R v Sullivan (1984)), arteriosclerosis (R v Kemp (1956)), and diabetes (R v Hennessy (1989)).
• If insanity is successful, the judge can grant various orders, including discharge, supervision, treatment, or hospitalization.

Intoxication

• Can be voluntary or involuntary.
• Voluntary intoxication is not a defense for basic intent offenses (Majewski, R v Richardson and Irwin).
• It can be a defense for specific intent offenses (DPP v Beard 1920, R v Sheehan and Moore 1975) unless the defendant still forms the mens rea (AG for NI v Gallagher (1963), R v Coley (2013)).
• Involuntary intoxication can negate mens rea, leading to a not guilty verdict (R v Hardie 1985).