Tradecraft Primer PDF

A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis Prepared by the US Government March 2009 This primer highlights structured analytic techniques—some widely used in the private sector and academia, some unique to the intelligence profession. It is not a compr...

A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis Prepared by the US Government March 2009 This primer highlights structured analytic techniques—some widely used in the private sector and academia, some unique to the intelligence profession. It is not a comprehensive overview of how intelligence officers conduct analysis. Rather, the primer highlights how structured analytic techniques can help one challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity, and manage uncertainty. In short, incorporating regular use of techniques such as these can enable one to structure thinking for wrestling with difficult questions. T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Introduction................................................................................................................. 1 How To Use These Techniques.................................................................................. 5 Diagnostic Techniques................................................................................................ 7 Key Assumptions Check..................................................................................... 7 Quality of Information Check............................................................................. 10 Indicators or Signposts of Change.................................................................... 12 Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH)....................................................... 14 Contrarian Techniques............................................................................................... 17 Devil’s Advocacy................................................................................................ 17 Team A/Team B................................................................................................. 19 High-Impact/Low-Probability Analysis............................................................... 22 “What If?” Analysis............................................................................................. 24 Imaginative Thinking Techniques.............................................................................. 27 Brainstorming..................................................................................................... 27 Outside-In Thinking............................................................................................ 30 Red Team Analysis............................................................................................. 31 Alternative Futures Analysis............................................................................... 34 Strategies for Using Structured Analytic Techniques................................................ 38 Selective Bibliography............................................................................................... 40 I N T R O D U C T I O N “ THE “MIND-SET” CHALLENGE Cognitive and perceptual biases in Intelligence human perception and judgment are analysts should Using the analytic techniques contained another important reason for analysts to be self-conscious in this primer will assist analysts in consider alternatives. As Richards Heuer about their reasoning and others have argued, all individuals processes. They dealing with the perennial problems should think about of intelligence: the complexity of assimilate and evaluate information how they make international developments, incomplete through the medium of “mental models” judgments and reach and ambiguous information, and the (sometimes also called “frames” or conclusions, not just inherent limitations of the human mind. “mind-sets”). These are experience- about the judgments Understanding the intentions and based constructs of assumptions and and conclusions ” capabilities of adversaries and other expectations both about the world in themselves. foreign actors is challenging, especially general and more specifc domains. when either or both are concealed. These constructs strongly infuence what —Richards Heuer, Moreover, transnational threats today information analysts will accept—that is, The Psychology of pose even greater complexity, in that data that are in accordance with analysts’ Intelligence Analysis 1 they involve multiple actors—including unconscious mental models are more nonstate entities—that can adapt and likely to be perceived and remembered transform themselves faster than those than information that is at odds who seek to monitor and contain them. with them. Finally, globalization has increased the diversity of outcomes when complex, Mental models are critical to allowing interactive systems such as fnancial fows, individuals to process what otherwise regional economies or the international would be an incomprehensible volume of system as a whole are in fux.2 information. Yet, they can cause analysts to overlook, reject, or forget important The frst hurdle for analysts is identifying incoming or missing information that is the relevant and diagnostic information not in accord with their assumptions and from the increasing volume of ambiguous expectations. Seasoned analysts may and contradictory data that is acquired be more susceptible to these mind-set through open source and clandestine problems as a result of their expertise means. Analysts must also pierce the and past success in using time-tested shroud of secrecy—and sometimes mental models. The key risks of mind- deception—that state and nonstate actors sets are that: analysts perceive what they use to mislead. A systematic approach expect to perceive; once formed, they are that considers a range of alternative resistant to change; new information is explanations and outcomes offers one assimilated, sometimes erroneously, into way to ensure that analysts do not dismiss existing mental models; and conficting potentially relevant hypotheses and information is often dismissed or ignored. supporting information resulting in missed opportunities to warn. 1 Richards J. Heuer, Jr., The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999). 2 These observations were drawn from a lengthier treatment of cognitive bias found in the Sherman Kent Center’s Occasional Paper, Making Sense of Transnational Threats, Vol. 3, No. 1, October 2004. 1  Common Perceptual and Cognitive Biases Perceptual Biases Biases in Evaluating Evidence Expectations. We tend to perceive what we Consistency. Conclusions drawn from a expect to perceive. More (unambiguous) small body of consistent data engender information is needed to recognize an more confdence than ones drawn from a unexpected phenomenon. larger body of less consistent data. Resistance. Perceptions resist change even Missing Information. It is diffcult to in the face of new evidence. judge well the potential impact of missing Ambiguities. Initial exposure to ambiguous evidence, even if the information gap or blurred stimuli interferes with accurate is known. perception, even after more and better Discredited Evidence. Even though information becomes available. evidence supporting a perception may be proved wrong, the perception may not quickly change. Biases in Estimating Probabilities Biases in Perceiving Causality Availability. Probability estimates are Rationality. Events are seen as part of infuenced by how easily one can imagine an an orderly, causal pattern. Randomness, event or recall similar instances. accident and error tend to be rejected as explanations for observed events. For Anchoring. Probability estimates are example, the extent to which other people adjusted only incrementally in response to or countries pursue a coherent, rational, new information or further analysis. goal-maximizing policy is overestimated. Overconfdence. In translating feelings of Attribution. Behavior of others is attributed certainty into a probability estimate, people to some fxed nature of the person or are often overconfdent, especially if they country, while our own behavior is attributed have considerable expertise. to the situation in which we fnd ourselves. Intelligence analysts must actively review Identifying indicators of change (or the accuracy of their mind-sets by applying signposts) that can reduce the chances structured analytic techniques that will of surprise. make those mental models more explicit and expose their key assumptions. Incorporating fndings derived from these The techniques found in this primer are techniques into our intelligence products designed to assist in this regard by: also serves the policymaker by: Instilling more structure into the Highlighting potential changes that intelligence analysis. would alter key assessments or predictions. Making analytic arguments more transparent by articulating them and Identifying key assumptions, challenging key assumptions. uncertainties, intelligence gaps and disagreements that might illuminate Stimulating more creative, “out-of-the- risks and costs associated with policy box” thinking and examining alternative choices. outcomes, even those with low probability, to see if available data might Exploring alternative outcomes for which support these outcomes. policy actions might be necessary. 2  Strategic Assumptions That Were Not Challenged 1941 World War II Japan would avoid all-out war because it recognized US military superiority. Given that US superiority would only increase, Japan might view a frst strike as the only way to knock America out of the war. 1950s Korean War China would not cross the Yalu River in support of the North Korean government. Red China could make good on its threats to counter “US aggression” against the North. 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis The Soviet Union would not introduce offensive nuclear weapons into Cuba. The Kremlin could miscalculate and believe it could create a fait accompli that a young US President would not be prepared to reverse. 1973 Yom Kippur War Arabs knew they could not win because they had failed to cooperate in the past and still lacked suffcient air defenses to counter Israeli airpower. A surprise Arab attack, even if repelled, could wound Israel psychologically and prompt international calls for cease-fres and diplomatic negotiations. 1989 German Unifcation East Germany could not unify with the West Germany against the wishes of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union—under Gorbachev—might not be prepared to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe as it had in the past. 1998 Indian Nuclear Test Conducting a nuclear test risked international condemnation and US sanctions and would threaten a newly elected coalition government. A successful and surprise nuclear test could boost Indian nationalist pride and solidify public support for a shaky coalition government. 2003 Iraq’s WMD Programs Saddam failed to cooperate with UN inspectors because he was continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction. If Iraqi authorities had destroyed their WMD stocks and abandoned their programs, they might refuse to fully acknowledge this to the UN to maintain Iraq’s regional status, deterrence, and internal regime stability. 3 4 H O W T O U S E T H E S E T E C H N I Q U E S The analytic techniques in this primer techniques aim at developing new are designed to help individual analysts, insights, different perspectives and/or as well as teams, explore and challenge develop alternative outcomes. In fact, their analytical arguments and mind- many of the techniques will do some sets. Some techniques are fairly simple combination of these functions. However, to understand and employ—such as analysts will want to select the tool that Brainstorming and Devil’s Advocacy. best accomplishes the specifc task Others are more complex and demand a they set out for themselves. Although greater degree of analytical sophistication, application of these techniques alone resource commitment, and time. All the is no guarantee of analytic precision or techniques are included because they accuracy of judgments, it does improve have helped other analysts avoid rigid the sophistication and credibility of ways of thinking or assisted them in intelligence assessments as well as their exploring new outcomes or implications usefulness to policymakers. As Richards of an intelligence problem. Heuer notes in his own work on cognitive bias, “analysis can be improved.”3 The techniques are grouped by their purpose: diagnostic techniques are primarily aimed at making analytic arguments, assumptions, or intelligence gaps more transparent; contrarian techniques explicitly challenge current thinking; and imaginative thinking 3 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 184. 5 D I A G N O S T I C T E C H N I Q U E S KEY ASSUMPTIONS CHECK conclusions about a potential Soviet offensive operation. Or when economists List and review the key working assess the prospects for foreign economic assumptions on which fundamental reforms, they may consciously, or not, judgments rest. assume a degree of political stability in those countries or the region that may WHEN TO USE or may not exist in the future. Likewise, political analysts reviewing a developing A Key Assumptions Check is most useful country’s domestic stability might at the beginning of an analytic project. An unconsciously assume stable oil prices, individual analyst or a team can spend when this key determinant of economic an hour or two articulating and reviewing performance and underlying social peace the key assumptions. Rechecking might fuctuate. All of these examples assumptions also can be valuable at highlight the fact that analysts often rely any time prior to fnalizing judgments, on stated and unstated assumptions to to insure that the assessment does not conduct their analysis. The goal is not to rest on fawed premises. Identifying undermine or abandon key assumptions; hidden assumptions can be one of the rather, it is to make them explicit and most diffcult challenges an analyst identify what information or developments faces, as they are ideas held—often would demand rethinking them. unconsciously—to be true and, therefore, are seldom examined and almost never VALUE ADDED challenged. Explicitly identifying working assumptions A key assumption is any hypothesis that during an analytic project helps: analysts have accepted to be true and which forms the basis of the assessment. Explain the logic of the analytic For example, military analysis may focus argument and expose faulty logic. exclusively on analyzing key technical and military variables (sometimes called Understand the key factors that shape factors) of a military force and “assume” an issue. that these forces will be operated in a particular environment (desert, open Stimulate thinking about an issue. plains, arctic conditions, etc.). Postulating other conditions or assumptions, Uncover hidden relationships and links however, could dramatically impact the between key factors. assessment. Historically, US analysis of Soviet-Warsaw Pact operations against Identify developments that would cause NATO had to “assume” a level of non- you to abandon an assumption. Soviet Warsaw Pact reliability (e.g., would these forces actually fght?). In this case, Prepare analysts for changed there was high uncertainty and depending circumstances that could surprise them. on what level of reliability one assumed, the analyst could arrive at very different 7  Key Assumptions Check: The 2002 DC Sniper Case The outbreak of sniper shootings in the Washington, DC area in the fall of 2002 provides a good example of how this technique could have been applied. After the initial furry of shootings, the operating assumption that quickly emerged was that the shootings were the work of a single, white male who had some military training and was driving a white van. If law enforcement offcials had conducted a Key Assumptions Check, they could have broken this statement into its key components and assessed the validity of each statement as follows: Key Assumption Assessment The sniper is a male. Highly likely (but not certain) given past precedent with serial killers. We are taking little risk by not looking for a female. The sniper is acting alone. Highly likely (but not certain) given past precedents. The sniper is white. Likely, but not as certain, given past precedents. We would be taking some risk if we rule out nonwhites as suspects. The sniper has military Possible, but not suffcient reason to exclude from training/experience. consideration potential suspects who have not had any military training. The sniper is driving a Possible because you have a credible eyewitness account white van. but worthy of continuing scrutiny given the number of white vans in the area (more than 70,000 registered in the Maryland suburbs of Metropolitan Washington, DC) and that different kinds of vehicles are being described. A Key Assumptions Check could have allowed law enforcement officials to: Avoid jumping to conclusions (the sniper is white, has military training, and is driving a white van) that did not hold up under closer scrutiny. By explicitly examining each assumption, offcials could have avoided prematurely narrowing down the potential pool of suspects to a group that did not include the actual perpetrator. Similarly, they might have been more cautious about accepting that the sniper was driving a white van. Be receptive to new leads and citizen tips, such as eyewitness reports that the sniper fled the scene driving a specifc model Chevrolet. More seriously consider evidence that subsequently became available, which contradicted a key assumption. If offcials had stated explicitly that they were assuming the sniper was acting alone, they might have been sensitive to new information that contradicted that key assumption. Often this type of information gets “lost in the noise” if the analyst has not already thought about what key assumptions he or she is making. 8 THE METHOD QUESTIONS TO ASK DURING THIS Checking for key assumptions requires PROCESS INCLUDE: analysts to consider how their analysis How much confidence exists that this depends on the validity of certain assumption is correct? premises, which they do not routinely question or believe to be in doubt. A four- What explains the degree of confidence step process will help analysts: in the assumption? 1. Review what the current analytic line on What circumstances or information this issue appears to be; write it down might undermine this assumption? for all to see. Is a key assumption more likely a key 2. Articulate all the premises, both stated uncertainty or key factor? and unstated in fnished intelligence, which are accepted as true for this Could the assumption have been true in analytic line to be valid. the past but less so now? 3. Challenge each assumption, asking If the assumption proves to be wrong, why it “must” be true and whether it would it signifcantly alter the analytic remains valid under all conditions. line? How? 4. Refne the list of key assumptions to Has this process identified new factors contain only those that “must be true” that need further analysis? to sustain your analytic line; consider under what conditions or in the face of what information these assumptions might not hold. 9  QUALITY OF INFORMATION CHECK VALUE ADDED A thorough review of information Evaluates completeness and soundness sources provides analysts—as well of available information sources. as policymakers—with an accurate assessment of “what we know” and “what WHEN TO USE we do not know.” It is also an opportunity Weighing the validity of sources is a key to confrm that sources have been cited feature of any critical thinking. Moreover, accurately. In the case of HUMINT, this will establishing how much confdence require extensive review of the sources’ one puts in analytic judgments should background information and access as well ultimately rest on how accurate and as his or her motivation for providing the reliable the information base is. Hence, information. Similarly, reviewing technical checking the quality of information used sourcing can sometimes reveal inadvertent in intelligence analysis is an ongoing, errors in processing, translation, or continuous process. Having multiple interpretation that otherwise might have sources on an issue is not a substitute gone unnoticed. for having good information that has been thoroughly examined. Analysts In addition, a quality of information check should perform periodic checks of can be valuable to both collectors and the information base for their analytic policymakers: judgments. Otherwise, important analytic judgments can become anchored to weak It can help to detect possible deception information, and any “caveats” attached and denial strategies by an adversary. to those judgments in the past can be forgotten or ignored over time. It can identify key intelligence gaps and new requirements for collectors. If a major analytic assessment is planned, analysts should individually or collectively It can assist policymakers in review the quality of their information understanding how much confdence and refresh their understanding of the analysts are placing on analytic strengths and weaknesses of past judgments. reporting on which an analytic line rests. Without understanding the context and conditions under which critical information has been provided, it will be diffcult for analysts to assess the information’s validity and establish a confdence level in an intelligence assessment. 10 THE METHOD Identify information sources that appear An analyst or a team might begin most critical or compelling. a quality of information check by developing a database in which Check for sufficient and strong information is stored according to source corroboration of critical reporting. type and date, with additional notations indicating strengths or weaknesses in Reexamine previously dismissed those sources.4 Ideally, analysts would information in light of new facts or have a retrieval and search capability on circumstances that cast it in a the database, so that periodic reviews different light. are less labor intensive and result in a more complete review of all sources Ensure that any recalled reporting is used in past analysis. For the information identifed and properly fagged for other review to be fully effective, analysts will analysts; analysis based on recalled need as much background information reporting should also be reviewed to on sources as is feasible. Knowing the determine if the reporting was essential circumstances in which reporting was to the judgments made. obtained is often critical to understanding its validity. With the data in hand, analysts Consider whether ambiguous can then: information has been interpreted and caveated properly. Review systematically all sources for accuracy. Indicate a level of confidence that analysts can place in sources, which 4 Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), are likely to fgure in future analytic discussed later in the primer, is a useful technique assessments. for exploring the possibility that deception could explain the absence of evidence. Quality of Information Problem on Iraq “... Analysts community wide are unable to make fully informed judgments on the information they received, relying instead on nonspecifc source lines to reach their assessments. Moreover, relevant operational data is nearly always withheld from analysts, putting them at a further analytical disadvantage...” —Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq “Analytic errors included over-reliance on a single, ambiguous source, [and, in addition to collection shortfalls] failure of analysts to understand fully the limitations of technical collection...” “The Intelligence Community relied too heavily on ambiguous imagery indicators...” —Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. 11  INDICATORS OR SIGNPOSTS OF in a fnished product also allows the CHANGE policymaker to track developments and builds a more concrete case for the analytic Periodically review a list of observable judgments. By laying out a list of critical events or trends to track events, monitor variables, analysts also will be generating targets, spot emerging trends, and warn hypotheses regarding why they expect of unanticipated change. to see the presence of such factors. In so doing, analysts make the analytic line much WHEN TO USE more transparent and available for scrutiny by others. An analyst or team can create an indicators or signposts list of observable THE METHOD events that one would expect to see if a postulated situation is developing; e.g., Whether used alone, or in combination with economic reform, military modernization, other structured analysis, the process is the political instability, or democratization. same: Constructing the list might require only a few hours or as much as several days to Identify a set of competing hypotheses or identify the critical variables associated scenarios. with the targeted issue. The technique can be used whenever an analyst needs Create separate lists of potential to track an event over time to monitor activities, statements, or events expected and evaluate changes. However, it can for each hypothesis or scenario. also be a very powerful aid in supporting other structured methods explained later Regularly review and update the in this primer. In those instances, analysts indicators lists to see which are changing. would be watching for mounting evidence to support a particular hypothesis, low- Identify the most likely or most correct probability event, or scenario. hypotheses or scenarios, based on the number of changed indicators that are When there are sharply divided views observed. on an issue, an indicators or signposts list can also “depersonalize” the Developing two lists of indicators for each argument by shifting analytic attention hypothesis or scenario may prove useful to a more objective set of criteria. Using to distinguish between indicators that a an indicators list can clarify substantive development is or is not emerging. This is disagreements, once all sides agree particularly useful in a “What If?” Analysis, on the set of objective criteria used to when it is important to make a case that a measure the topic under study. certain event is unlikely to happen. VALUE ADDED By providing an objective baseline for tracking events or targets, indicators instill rigor into the analytic process and enhance the credibility of analytic judgments. An indicators list included 12  Tracking the Potential for Political Instability in a Foreign Country Topics Indicators 1999 2000 I II III IV I II III Government Quality of leadership/organizational capabilities Capacity Responsiveness to popular demands Ability to deliver basic goods and services Internal Security Capabilities Effectiveness of civil/criminal justice systems Legitimacy of Breadth and depth of political participation Regime Perceived level of corruption Human rights violations Weakness of civil society Pervasiveness of transnational criminal organizations External support for government Opposition Ethnic/religious discontent Activity Military discontent with civilian government Popular demonstrations/strikes/riots Insurgent/separatist/terrorist group activity External support for opposition Threat of confict with or in neighboring state Economic Weakness of domestic economy/unemployment/ Factors infation Degree of income disparity Capital fight Decreased access to foreign funds Reduced trade openness Environmental Extent of environmental degradation Issues Food/energy shortages Ability to respond to natural disasters Presence of Trigger Mechanisms ( if present) Contested elections Unpopular changes in food/energy prices Sudden imposition of unpopular policies Serious concern Coup plotting Substantial concern Moderate concern Government mismanagement of natural disaster or national emergency Low concern Negligible concern Death of key fgure Tracking the Potential for Political Instability in an Indicators Matrix. Analysts tracked the potential for regime change in 2000 and identifed a list of indicators, to which they posed the question, “is this occurring or not? Analysts also went further and developed a list of “trigger mechanisms” that might bring about a political shift. 13  ANALYSIS OF COMPETING Analysts seldom generate a full set HYPOTHESES (ACH) of explanations or hypotheses at the outset of a project. Identifcation of alternative explanations (hypotheses) and evaluation of all Analysts often rely on evidence to evidence that will disconfrm rather than support their preferred hypothesis, confrm hypotheses. but which also is consistent with other explanations. WHEN TO USE In essence, ACH helps analysts to avoid Analysis of Competing Hypotheses picking the frst solution that seems (ACH) has proved to be a highly effective satisfactory instead of going through all technique when there is a large amount the possibilities to arrive at the very best of data to absorb and evaluate. While solution. a single analyst can use ACH, it is most effective with a small team that THE METHOD can challenge each other’s evaluation of the evidence. Developing a matrix ACH demands that analysts explicitly of hypotheses and loading already identify all the reasonable alternative collected information into the matrix can hypotheses, then array the evidence be accomplished in a day or less. If the against each hypothesis—rather than data must be reassembled, the initial evaluating the plausibility of each phases of the ACH process may require hypothesis one at a time. To create a level additional time. Sometimes a facilitator or playing feld, the process must: someone familiar with the technique can lead new analysts through this process Ensure that all the information and for the frst time. argumentation is evaluated and given equal treatment or weight when ACH is particularly appropriate for considering each hypothesis. controversial issues when analysts want to develop a clear record that shows Prevent the analyst from premature what theories they have considered and closure on a particular explanation or how they arrived at their judgments. hypothesis. Developing the ACH matrix allows other analysts (or even policymakers) Protect the analyst against innate to review their analysis and identify tendencies to ignore or discount areas of agreement and disagreement. information that does not ft Evidence can also be examined more comfortably with the preferred systematically, and analysts have found explanation at the time. that this makes the technique ideal for considering the possibility of deception To accomplish this, the process should and denial. follow these steps: Brainstorm among analysts with VALUE ADDED different perspectives to identify all ACH helps analysts overcome three possible hypotheses. common mistakes that can lead to inaccurate forecasts: List all significant evidence and arguments relevant to all the Analysts often are susceptible to being hypotheses. unduly infuenced by a frst impression, based on incomplete data, an existing analytic line, or a single explanation that seems to ft well enough. 14  Prepare a matrix with hypotheses Analyze how sensitive the ACH results across the top and each piece of are to a few critical items of evidence; evidence on the side. Determine should those pieces prove to be wrong, whether each piece of evidence misleading, or subject to deception, how is consistent, inconsistent, or not would it impact an explanation’s validity? applicable to each hypothesis.5 Ask what evidence is not being seen but Refine the matrix and reconsider the would be expected for a given hypothesis hypotheses—in some cases, analysts to be true. Is denial and deception a will need to add new hypotheses and possibility? re-examine the information available. Report all the conclusions, including the Focus on disproving hypotheses rather weaker hypotheses that should still be than proving one. Talley the pieces monitored as new information becomes of evidence that are inconsistent and available. consistent with each hypothesis to see which explanations are the weakest and Establish the relative likelihood for the strongest. hypotheses and report all the conclusions, including the weaker hypotheses that should still be monitored as new information becomes available. 5 The “diagnostic value” of the evidence will emerge as analysts determine whether a piece of evidence Identify and monitor indicators that would is found to be consistent with only one hypothesis, be both consistent and inconsistent with or could support more than one or indeed all hypotheses. In the latter case, the evidence can the full set of hypotheses. In the latter be judged as unimportant to determining which case, explore what could account for hypothesis is more likely correct. inconsistent data. Terrorism in Tokyo From Aum Shinrikyo Weight H: 1 H: 4 H: 2 H: 3 Kooky Terrorist Political Criminal Cult Group Movement Group Inconsistency Score -1.0 -1.0 -2.0 -3.0 E3 Attacks on Journalists MEDIUM I N I I E2 Religious Affliation MEDIUM C I I I E4 Established Party MEDIUM N N C I E1 Blind Leader Mastsumoto MEDIUM C C C C ACH Matrix of Terrorism in Tokyo. In March 1995, a largely unknown group attacked the Tokyo subways by using a highly lethal nerve agent known as sarin. ACH provides a mechanism to carefully examine all the evidence and possible explanations for understanding what type of group could have been responsible. In simplifed form, the above matrix arrays each piece of evidence on the vertical axis and then evaluates each in terms of the item’s consistency with four possible explanations for the terrorist attack in Tokyo (horizontal axis). Analysts rate a piece of evidence as consistent (C); inconsistent (I); or neutral (N). This process allows analysts to see that some evidence will be consistent with more than one hypothesis and be less valuable in disproving hypotheses. 15 C O N T R A R I A N T E C H N I Q U E S DEVIL’S ADVOCACY Identifying any faulty logic or information that would undermine the key analytic Challenging a single, strongly held judgments. view or consensus by building the best possible case for an alternative Presenting alternative hypotheses explanation. that would explain the current body of information available to analysts. WHEN TO USE Devil’s Advocacy is most effective when Its primary value is to serve as a check used to challenge an analytic consensus on a dominant mind-set that can develop or a key assumption regarding a critically over time among even the best analysts important intelligence question. On who have followed an issue and formed those issues that one cannot afford to strong consensus that there is only one get wrong, Devil’s Advocacy can provide way of looking at their issue. This mind- further confdence that the current analytic set phenomenon makes it more likely that line will hold up to close scrutiny. An contradictory evidence is dismissed or individual analyst can often assume the not given proper weight or consideration. role of the Devil’s Advocate if he or she An exercise aimed at highlighting such has some doubts about a widely held evidence and proposing another way of view, or a manager might designate a thinking about an issue can expose hidden courageous analyst to challenge the assumptions and compel analysts to review prevailing wisdom in order to reaffrm the their information with greater skepticism group’s confdence in those judgments. about their fndings. The analyst could In some cases, the analyst or a team come away from the exercise more certain can review a key assumption of a that: 1) the current analytic line was sound; critical judgment in the course of their 2) the argument is still the strongest, but work, or more likely, a separate analytic that there are areas where further analysis product can be generated that arrays is needed; or 3) some serious faws in logic all the arguments and data that support or supporting evidence suggest that the a contrary hypothesis. While this can analytic line needs to be changed or at involve some analytic time and effort, least caveated more heavily. when a group of analysts have worked on an issue for a long period of time, it THE METHOD is probably wise to assume that a strong To challenge the prevailing analytic line, the mind-set exists that deserves the closer Devil’s Advocate must: scrutiny provided by Devil’s Advocacy. Outline the mainline judgment and VALUE ADDED key assumptions and characterize the Analysts have an obligation to evidence supporting that current analytic policymakers to understand where view. their own analytic judgments might be weak and open to future challenge. Select one or more assumptions—stated Hence, the Devil’s Advocacy process or not—that appear the most susceptible can highlight weaknesses in a current to challenge. analytic judgment or alternatively help to reaffrm one’s confdence in the prevailing Review the information used to determine judgments by: whether any is of questionable validity, whether deception is possibly indicated, Explicitly challenging key assumptions or whether major gaps exist. to see if they will not hold up under some circumstances. 17  Highlight the evidence that could Be sure that any products generated support an alternative hypothesis or clearly lay out the conventional wisdom contradicts the current thinking. and are identifed as an explicitly “Devil’s Advocate” project; otherwise, Present to the group the findings the reader can become confused as to that demonstrate there are fawed the current offcial view on the issue. assumptions, poor quality evidence, or possible deception at work. Consider drafting a separate contrarian paper that lays out the arguments for a different analytic conclusion if the review uncovers major analytic faws. 18 TEAM A/TEAM B VALUE ADDED Managers have found that when there are Use of separate analytic teams that offce tensions among competing factions contrast two (or more) strongly held of analysts, a Team A/Team B approach can views or competing hypotheses. help opposing experts see the merit in the other group’s perspective. The process of WHEN TO USE conducting such an exercise can reduce A Team A/Team B approach is different the friction and even narrow the differences. from Devil’s Advocacy, where the purpose At a minimum, it allows those holding is to challenge a single dominant mind- opposing views to feel that their views have set. Instead, Team A/Team B recognizes been given equal attention. that there may be competing and possibly equally strong mind-sets held on an issue For the policymaker, this technique helps that need to be clarifed. Sometimes to surface and explain important analytic analysts confuse the two techniques by differences within the expert community. drafting a Team B exercise that is really a Often senior offcials can learn more by Devil’s Advocacy exercise. weighing well-argued conficting views than from reading an assessment that masks If there are at least two competing substantive differences or drives analysis views within an analytic offce or to the lowest common denominator. perhaps competing opinions within By making the key assumptions and the policymaking community on a key information used for each argument more issue, then Team A/Team B analysis can transparent, a policymaker can judge the be the appropriate technique to use. merits of each case, pose questions back Developing a full-blown Team A/Team B to the analysts, and reach an independent exercise requires a signifcant commitment judgment on which argument is the of analytic time and resources, so it is strongest. Moreover, highlighting alternative worthwhile considering if the analytic issue views puts collectors on notice that they merits this kind of attention. need to be searching for new information that can confrm or disconfrm a range of A longstanding policy issue, a critical hypotheses. decision that has far-reaching implications, or a dispute within the analytic community If opposing positions are well established, that has obstructed effective cross-agency it can be useful to place analysts on teams cooperation would be grounds for using that will advocate positions they normally Team A/Team B. If those circumstances do not support; forcing analysts to argue exist, then analysts will need to review all “the other side” can often make them more of the data to develop alternative papers aware of their own mind-set. that can capture the essential differences between the two viewpoints. 19  A Team A/Team B View: China’s Military A: China’s Hollow Military B: China’s Military: A Second by Bates Gill and Michael O’Hanlon Opinion by James Lilley and Carl Ford “... We believe that the recent clamor “... We think they got it half right. China over China’s strategic ambitions is greatly is no military superpower and will not overblown. Most of the Chinese aims that acquire that status for some years to run counter to US interests are in fact come. But measured in terms of its not global or ideological but territorial capacity to challenge key US allies in East in nature and confned primarily to the Asia, China’s capabilities have grown islands and waterways to China’s south exponentially... and southeast... By emphasizing direct comparisons An enormous gap separates China’s between the defense capabilities of the military capabilities from its aspirations. United States and the PRC, the authors The PRC’s armed forces are not very good create an artifcial and misleading and not getting better very fast. Whatever construct... What the regime gives China’s concerns and intentions, its every indication of striving for is suffcient capacity to act upon them in ways inimical military clout to achieve its aims in Asia. to US interests is severely limited, and will In the short term, it wishes to intimidate remain so for many years... Taiwan suffciently to bring about unifcation on Beijing’s terms... The PRC’s power projection capabilities, too, are constrained by huge weaknesses–... Investments of the sort Beijing is especially in areas such as aerial refueling, making can mean only one thing: China electronic warfare, command and control is determined to improve the PLA’s and amphibious and air assault assets. fghting capability. While most nations China owns considerably less top-level are reducing defense expenditures in the equipment than medium powers like Japan post–Cold War era, China is one of the few and Britain; it owns even less than smaller doing the opposite... Across the board, powers such as Italy, South Korea or The the PLA is engaged in a major spending Netherlands... The resources it devotes effort to upgrade weapons and equipment to acquiring modern weaponry are akin to and improve its operational capability. those of countries spending $10-20 billion According to the Pentagon, these efforts a year on defense...” have already enhanced China’s ability to project military power...” —Excerpted from journal articles found in The National Interest, Fall and Winter 2000/2001. 20 THE METHOD Debate Phase. An oral presentation of Analysis Phase. A Team A/Team B the alternative arguments and rebuttals in exercise can be conducted on an parallel fashion can then be organized for important issue to: the beneft of other analysts: Identify the two (or more) competing Set aside time for an oral presentation hypotheses or points of view. of the alternative team fndings; this can an informal brainstorming session or a Form teams or designate individuals to more formal “debate.” develop the best case that can be made for each hypothesis. Have an independent “jury of peers” listen to the oral presentation and Review all pertinent information that be prepared to question the teams supports their respective positions. regarding their assumptions, evidence, or logic. Identify missing information that would buttress their hypotheses. Allow each team to present their case, challenge the other team’s arguments, Structure each argument with an explicit and rebut the opponent’s critique of its presentation of key assumptions, case. key pieces of evidence, and careful articulation of the logic behind the Let the jury consider the strength of argument. each presentation and recommend possible next steps for further research and collection efforts. 21  HIGH-IMPACT/LOW-PROBABILITY THE METHOD ANALYSIS If there is a strongly held view that an event is unlikely, then postulating precisely the Highlights a seemingly unlikely opposite should not be diffcult. event that would have major policy consequences if it happened. Define the high-impact outcome clearly. This process is what will justify examining WHEN TO USE what most analysts believe to be a very unlikely development. High-Impact/Low-Probability Analysis is a contrarian technique that sensitizes Devise one or more plausible analysts to the potential impact of explanations for or “pathways” to the low seemingly low probability events that probability outcome. This should be as would have major repercussions on US precise as possible, as it can help identify interests. Using this technique is advisable possible indicators for later monitoring. when analysts and policymakers are convinced that an event is unlikely but Insert possible triggers or changes in have not given much thought to the momentum if appropriate. These can consequences of its occurrence. In be natural disasters, sudden health essence, this can be a warning that the problems of key leaders, or new intelligence and policy communities economic or political shocks that might must be alert to an unexpected but not have occurred historically or in other impossible event. For example, the fall parts of the world. of the Shah, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the reunifcation of Germany Brainstorm with analysts having a broad were all considered low probability events set of experiences to aid the development at one time; however, analysts might of plausible but unpredictable triggers of have benefted from considering the sudden change. consequences of such events and how they might plausibly have come about. Identify for each pathway a set of indicators or “observables” that would VALUE ADDED help you anticipate that events were Mapping out the course of an unlikely, beginning to play out this way. yet plausible, event can uncover hidden relationships between key factors and Identify factors that would deflect a assumptions; it also can alert analysts bad outcome or encourage a positive to oversights in the mainstream analytic outcome. line. In addition, an examination of the “unthinkable” allows analysts to develop signposts that may provide early warning of a shift in the situation. By periodically reviewing these indicators an analyst is more likely to counter any prevailing mind-set that such a development is highly unlikely. 22  High Impact of a Low-Probability Event: Pearl Harbor “... So far as relations directly between the United States and Japan are concerned, there is less reason today than there was a week ago for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make “war” on this country. Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of fve to one that the United States and Japan will not be at “war” on or before December 15; would wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at ‘war’ on or before the 15th of January (i.e, seven weeks from now); would wager even money that the United States and Japan will not be at “war” on or before March 1 (a date more than 90 days from now)...” —State Department Special Assessment, 27 November 1941 High-Impact/Low-Probability Analysis on 9/11 The 9/11 Commission report includes examination of speculative analysis that was provided to senior policymakers highlighting what were thought to be highly unlikely scenarios that would have a very high impact. One of those items was the 6 August 2001 President’s Daily Brief, which stated: Al-Qai’da members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qai‘da members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ [Egyptian Islamic Jihad] member lived in California in the mid-1990s. A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks. We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of “Blind Shaykh” ‘Umar Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists. —9/11 Commission Report, declassifed and approved for release 10 April 2004. 23  “WHAT IF?” ANALYSIS THE METHOD Like other contrarian methods, “What If?” Assumes that an event has occurred with analysis must begin by stating clearly potential (negative or positive) impact the conventional analytic line and then and explains how it might come about. stepping back to consider what alternative outcomes are too important to dismiss, WHEN TO USE even if unlikely. Brainstorming over a few “What If?” analysis is another contrarian days or weeks can develop one or more technique for challenging a strong mind- plausible scenarios by which the unlikely set that an event will not happen or that event occurs: a confdently made forecast may not be entirely justifed. It is similar to a High- Assume the event has happened. Impact/Low-Probability analysis, but it does not dwell on the consequences Select some triggering events that of the event as much as it accepts permitted the scenario to unfold to help the signifcance and moves directly to make the “what if” more plausible; for explaining how it might come about. example, analysts might postulate the death of a leader, a natural disaster, or VALUE ADDED some economic event that would start a chain of other events. By shifting the focus from whether an event could occur to how it may happen, Develop a chain of argumentation based analysts allow themselves to suspend as much on logic as evidence to explain judgment about the likelihood of the event how this outcome could have come and focus more on what developments— about. even unlikely ones—might enable such an outcome. An individual analyst or a team “Think backwards” from the event in might employ this technique and repeat concrete ways–that is, specifying what the exercise whenever a critical analytic must actually occur at each stage of the judgment is made. scenario is often very useful. Using this technique is particularly Identify one or more plausible pathways important when a judgment rests or scenarios to the unlikely event; very on limited information or unproven often more than one will appear possible. assumptions. Moreover, it can free analysts from arguing about the Generate a list of indicators or probability of an event to considering “observables” for each scenario that its consequences and developing some would help to detect the beginnings of indicators or signposts for its possible the event. emergence. It will help analysts address the impact of an event, the factors that Consider the scope of the positive and could cause—or alter—it, and likely negative consequences of each scenario signposts that an event is imminent. and their relative impacts. A “What If?” analysis can complement a Monitor the indicators developed on a diffcult judgment reached and provide periodic basis. the policymaker a thoughtful caution to accepting the conventional wisdom without considering the costs and risks of being wrong. This can help decision- makers consider ways to hedge their bets, even if they accept the analytic judgment that an event remains unlikely. 24  “What If?” Analysis: An Unlikely Outcome in Yugoslavia, 1990. The possibility of muddling through is very low. In the unlikely event that it happens, this is what it would look like. Memories of the internecine civil war during World War II and fear of another destructive confict would lead the two most numerous South Slav people—Serbs and Croats—to reach some political accommodation. A compromise that preserves Yugoslavia would include: Basic principles: -No change in existing Republic borders. -No change in Yugoslavia’s existing international status. -Mutually recognized sovereignty of each republic Confederal institutions: -A single foreign ministry, to which diplomatic representatives would be accredited. -A central military organization with a joint General Staff responsible for planning. -A central bank, determining macroeconomic policy, a common currency, Powers reserved to republics. -Veto over actions of the Confederal Authority. -Control of internal security, including guarantee of minority rights. -Operational control over some or all military units stationed on the republic’s territory. -Raising taxes and allocating funds to discharge mutually agreed confederal responsibilities. Only the Serbs can open the door to a confederal Yugoslavia, and Serbia’s leader, Slobodan Milosevic, holds the key. Some observers felt there are pressures on him to try. If he does not, he would give his opponents the leverage to remove him. The potential penalties of failure to compromise would be too great, in this view, for the peoples and leaders of Yugoslavia to forgo every effort to fnd a compromise. —Excerpts from the declassifed NIE: Prospects for Yugoslavia, October 1990. 25 I M A G I N A T I V E T H I N K I N G T E C H N I Q U E S BRAINSTORMING sourced, or seemingly irrelevant to the question at hand. Brainstorming gives An unconstrained group process permission to think more radically or designed to generate new ideas and “outside the box.” In particular, it can spark concepts. new ideas, ensure a comprehensive look at a problem or issues, raise unknowns, and WHEN TO USE prevent premature consensus around a Brainstorming is a widely used technique single hypothesis. for stimulating new thinking and it can be applied to virtually all of the other THE METHOD structured analysis techniques as an Paradoxically, brainstorming should be aid to thinking. Typically, analytic will a very structured process to be most brainstorm when they begin a project productive. An unconstrained, informal to help generate a range of hypotheses discussion might produce some interesting about their issue. ideas, but usually a more systematic process is the most effective way to Brainstorming, almost by defnition, break down mind-sets and produce new involves a group of analysts meeting to insights. In particular, the process involves discuss a common challenge; a modest a divergent thinking phase to generate and investment of time at the beginning collect new ideas and insights, followed or critical points of a project can take by a convergent phase in which ideas advantage of their different perspectives are grouped and organized around key to help structure a problem. This group concepts. Some of the simple rules to be process allows others to build on an followed include: initial idea suggested by a member of the brainstorming session. Never censor an analyst’s ideas no matter how unconventional they might An individual analyst also can brainstorm sound. to produce a wider range of ideas than a group might generate, without regard Rather find out what prompted the for other analysts’ egos, opinions, or thought, as it might contain the seeds objections. However, an individual will not of an important connection between the have the beneft of others’ perspectives to topic and an unstated assumption. help develop the ideas as fully. Moreover, an individual may have diffculty breaking Give yourself enough time to do free of his or her cognitive biases without brainstorming correctly. It usually takes the beneft of a diverse group. one hour to set the “rules” of the game, get the group comfortable, and exhaust VALUE ADDED the conventional wisdom on the topic. This technique can maximize creativity Only then will the truly creative ideas in the thinking process, force analysts begin to emerge. to step outside their normal analytic mind-sets, and suspend their typical Involve at least one “outsider” in the “good judgment” about the practicality process—that is, someone who does not of ideas or approaches. More generally, share the same educational background, brainstorming allows analysts to see a culture, technical knowledge or mind- wider range of factors that might bear set as the core group but has some on the topic than they would otherwise familiarity with the topic. consider. Analysts typically censor out ideas that seem farfetched, poorly A two-phase, twelve-step, structured process is often used to get the most out of the brainstorming sessions: 27  Brainstorming and Divergent Thinking: Perspectives of an Experienced Practitioner “... First, leave rank at the door and focus on “a democracy of ideas.” Thoughts from experts, senior offcers, and supervisors are of course, valuable and welcome, but such experts are not permitted to cut off debate by citing their seniority. In fact, it pays to invite junior offcers as well as senior ones who are not involved directly in working the issue under discussion. Some of the most creative ideas at brainstorming sessions frequently come from relatively junior people who can look at a problem with fresh perspective, or from senior ones who are not experts on the issue. Second, make sure there is no offcial analytic line. One of the most signifcant blocks to new thinking is the presence of a long held analytic line that analysts—and even more so managers—are reluctant to change. Rather than trying to ft ideas into the framework of “what we’ve said before,” analysts need to feel free to go wherever bits of the evidence and informed supposition take them. They must feel free to throw out seemingly strange but plausible ideas that might be based on historical precedent and instinct rather than on concrete information. Facilitators can stimulate this process by deliberately posing an alternative outcome to a problem that differs starkly from the accepted analysis or by proposing a contrary way to think about an issue. Third, don’t permit killer phrases like “that would not work” or “that could not happen” to be voiced out loud. Effective brainstorming starts with ideas and possibilities, not with practicalities and self-imposed obstacles to fresh perspectives. Force the group to get as wide a range of ideas out for discussion as possible. At some point, a set of ideas might be winnowed down and subject to tests of workability, but that comes later—not during brainstorming. Fourth, keep the brainstorming session to no more than 90 minutes. There is no hard and fast rule, but somewhere between 60 and 90 minutes, the idea stream starts to dry up, people repeat themselves, and jokes replace creative ideas. Fifth, record ideas in a visible way. Lots of people take notes at brainstorming sessions for their own use, and that is good. We have found it valuable to have someone jot down the ideas presented on large paste-a-note sheets that we put on the walls. This allows participants in brainstorming sessions to react to ideas generated earlier. Moreover, analysts are encouraged to participate in such exercises if they see their own ideas put down in writing. Having a notional record of brainstorming also helps the analyst who ends up writing a report based on the discussion. Ideas that may not be used in one report are invariably put to use later, so it is good to have a record of them...” 28 Divergent Thinking Phase: times as notes begin to cluster. Copying some notes is permitted to allow ideas Distribute “Post-It” notes and pens or to be included in more than one group. markers to all participants. Typically, 10-12 people works best. Select a word or phrase that characterizes each grouping or cluster Pose the problem in terms of a “focal once all the notes have been arranged. question.” Display it in one sentence on a large easel or whiteboard. Identify any notes that do not easily fit with others and consider them either Ask the group to write down responses useless noise or the beginning of an to the question, using key words that will idea that deserves further attention. ft on the small “Post-It” note. Assess what the group has Stick all the notes on a wall for all to accomplished in terms of new ideas see—treat all ideas the same. or concepts identifed or new areas that need more work or further When a pause follows the initial flow of brainstorming. ideas, the group is reaching the end of their conventional thinking and the Instruct each participant to select one new divergent ideas are then likely to or two areas that deserve the most emerge. attention. Tabulate the votes. End the “collection stage” of the Set the brainstorming group’s priorities brainstorming after two or three pauses. based on the voting and decide on the next steps for analysis. Convergent Thinking Phase: Ask the participants as a group to rearrange the notes on the wall according to their commonalities or similar concepts. No talking is permitted. Some notes may be moved several 29  OUTSIDE-IN THINKING and contextual framework. By recasting the problem in much broader and fundamental Used to identify the full range of basic terms, analysts are more likely to uncover forces, factors, and trends that would additional factors, an important dynamic, or indirectly shape an issue. a relevant alternative hypothesis. WHEN TO USE THE METHOD Analysts fnd this technique most useful The process begins by developing a at the conceptualization of an analytic generic description of the problem or the project, when the goal is to identify all the phenomenon under study. Then, analysts critical, external factors that could infuence should: how a particular situation will develop. It would work well for a group of analysts List all the key forces (social, responsible for a range of functional and/or technological, economic, environmental, regional issues. When assembling a large and political) that could have an impact database that must identify a number of on the topic, but over which one can information categories or database felds, exert little infuence (e.g., globalization, this technique can aid in visualizing the social stress, the Internet, or the global entire set of categories that might be economy). needed in a research effort. Often analysts realize only too late that some additional Focus next on key factors over which information categories will be needed and an actor or policymaker can exert some then must go back and review all previous infuence. In the business world this fles and recode the data. With a modest might be the market size, customers, the amount of effort, “Outside-in Thinking” competition, suppliers or partners; in the can reduce the risk of missing important government domain it might include the variables early in the analytic process. policy actions or the behavior of allies or adversaries. VALUE ADDED Assess how each of these forces could Most analysts spend their time concentrating affect the analytic problem. on familiar factors within their feld or analytic issue. That is, they think from the Determine whether these forces actually “inside”—namely, what they control—out do have an impact on the particular issue to the broader world. Conversely, “thinking based on the available evidence. from the outside-in” begins by considering the external changes that might, over time, profoundly affect the analysts’ own feld or issue. This technique encourages analysts to get away from their immediate analytic tasks (the so-called “inbox”) and think about their issues in a wider conceptual 30 RED TEAM ANALYSIS Often this technique can introduce new or different stimuli that might not have been Models the behavior of an individual factored into traditional analysis—such as or group by trying to replicate how an the target’s familial ties or the international adversary would think about an issue. political, economic, and military pressures felt by the individual. For example, Red WHEN TO USE Team participants might ask themselves: “What would my peers, family, or tribe Frequently, analysts face the challenge expect me to do? Alternatively, a Red of forecasting how a foreign leader or Team analyst might pose the question decisionmaking group may behave when to his colleagues: “How do we perceive it is clear that there is a risk of falling the external threats and opportunities?” into a “mirror-image” problem. That is, Finally, the Red Team technique can factor analysts can sometimes impute to a into its analysis the way in which personal foreign actor the same motives, values, or power and status might infuence a target’s understanding of an issue that they hold. behavior. Traditional analysis sometimes assumes that foreign leaders or groups will behave THE METHOD “rationally” and act as the analysts would if faced with the same threats or On issues that lend themselves to Red opportunities. History has shown that Team analysis, a manager needs to build foreign leaders often respond differently a team of experts with in-depth knowledge to events because of different cultural, of the operating environment, the target’s organizational, or personal experiences. personality, and the style of thinking used. The team should be populated not just Red Team analysis tries to consciously with those who understand the language, place analysts in the same cultural, but also with people who might have organizational, and personal setting experienced the culture, share the ethnic (“putting them in their shoes”) in which background, or have worked in a similar the target individual or group operates. operational environment. Once established Whereas analysts normally work from the and separated from traditional analysis, the position of the “blue” (friendly forces), a team members should: “red” team of analysts attempts to work in the environment of the hostile forces. Put themselves in the adversary’s circumstances and react to foreign stimuli VALUE ADDED as the target would. Like Devil’s Advocacy and Team A/Team B Develop a set of “first-person” questions techniques, Red Team analysis is aimed that the adversary would ask, such at freeing the analyst from the prison of a as: “How would I perceive incoming well-developed mind-set; in this case, the information; what would be my personal analyst’s own sense of rationality, cultural concerns; or to whom would I look for an norms, and personal values. Whereas opinion?” analysts usually operate as “observers” of a foreign adversary, the Red Team Draft a set of policy papers in which the technique transforms the analyst into an leader or group makes specifc decisions, “actor” operating within the adversary’s proposes recommendations, or lays culture and political milieu. This form of out courses of actions. The more these “role playing” is useful when trying to papers refect the cultural and personal replicate the mind-set of authoritarian norms of the target, the more they can leaders, terrorist cells, or other non- offer a different perspective on the Western groups that operate under very analytic problem. different codes of behavior or motivations. 31  A Red Team Perspective Iran’s Military Strategy Vis-a-vis the United States “... The United States and Israel may be contemplating military operations against Iran, as per recent media reports... A week-long combined air and ground maneuver has just concluded in fve of the southern and western provinces of Iran, mesmerizing foreign observers, who have described as ‘spectacular’ the massive display of high-tech, mobile operations, including rapid-deployment forces relying on squadrons of helicopters, air lifts, missiles, as well as hundreds of tanks and tens of thousands of well-coordinated personnel using live munitions. Learning from both the 2003 Iraq war and Iran’s own previous experiences of the 1980-88 war with Iraq and the 1987-88 confrontation with US forces in the Persian Gulf, Iranians have focused on the merits of a fuid and complex defensive strategy that seeks to take advantage of certain weaknesses in the US military superpower while maximizing the precious few areas where they may have the upper hand, e.g.; numerical superiority in ground forces, guerrilla tactics, terrain, etc. Any US attack on Iran will likely be met frst and foremost by missile counter-attacks engulfng the southern Persian Gulf states playing host to US forces, as well as any other country—e.g., Azerbaijan, Iraq, or Turkey allowing their territory or airspace to be used against Iran. The rationale for this strategy is precisely to pre-warn Iran’s neighbors of the dire consequences, with potential debilitating impacts on their economies for a long time, should they become accomplices of foreign invaders of Iran. Another key element of Iran’s strategy is to “increase the arch of crisis” in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where it has considerable infuence, to undermine the United States’ foothold in the region, hoping to create a counter-domino effect wherein instead of gaining inside Iran, the US would actually lose territory partly as a result of thinning its forces and military ‘overreach.’ Iran’s counter-psychological warfare, on the other hand, seeks to take advantage of the ‘death- fearing’ American soldiers who typically lack a strong motivation to fght wars not necessarily in defense of the homeland. A war with Iran would defnitely require establishing the draft in the US, without which it could not possibly protect its fanks in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a sense of national-security siege in Iran these days, in light of a tightening “security belt” by the US benefting from military bases in Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, as well as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the island- turned garrison of Diego Garcia. From Iran’s vantage point, the US, having won the Cold War, has turned into a ‘leviathan unhinged’ capable of manipulating and subverting the rule of international law and the United Nations with impunity, thus requiring a sophisticated Iranian strategy of deterrence, that, in the words of certain Iranian media pundits, would even include the use of nuclear weapons...” —Excerpts from Kaveh L. Afrasiabi (Tehran University), “How Iran Will Fight Back,” cited in Asia Times Online Ltd., 2004. 32 Red Team analysis is not easy to conduct. Red Team analysis avoids the use of It requires signifcant time to develop a caveats or qualifcations and assumes team of qualifed experts who can think like that the recipient understands that the adversary. The team has to distance the paper is aimed more at provoking itself from the normal analysis and work thought or challenging the conventional as though living in the target’s world. understanding of how an adversary Without a sophisticated understanding of thinks. the culture, operational environment, and personal histories of the foreign group, Such papers are rarely coordinated analysts will not be able to behave or think among other experts and do not purport like the enemy. Analysts can never truly to represent the consensus view on an escape their own experiences and mind- issue. sets, but this technique can at least prevent them from falling into “mirror-imaging” Red Team papers do not plot out all unconsciously. possible courses of action but seek to give a prediction based on the target’s The most novel feature of Red Team special personal, organizational, or analysis is its presentation. cultural experiences. The analysis is often in a “first person” format—that is, drafted as memos to or from a leader or group. 33 ALTERNATIVE FUTURES ANALYSIS Systematically explores multiple ways a VALUE ADDED Alternative futures analysis is extremely useful in highly ambiguous situations, when “—Peter Schwartz, author of The Art of ” The future is plural. situation can develop when there is high analysts confront not only a lot of “known the Long View and complexity and uncertainty. unknowns” but also “unknown unknowns.” a widely acclaimed What this means is that analysts recognize scenario developer. WHEN TO USE that there are factors, forces, and dynamics Alternative futures analysis (often referred among key actors that are diffcult to to as “scenarios”) is most useful when identify without the use of some structured a situation is viewed as too complex or technique that can model how they would the outcomes as too uncertain to trust interact or behave. As the outcomes are not a single outcome assessment. First, known prior to the futures exercise, analysts analysts must recognize that there is must be prepared for the unexpected and high uncertainty surrounding the topic in willing to engage in a more free-wheeling question. Second, they, and often their exchange of views than typically occurs customers, recognize that they need in order to “imagine the future.” Given to consider a wide range of factors that the time and resources involved, scenario might bear on the question. And third, analysis is best reserved for situations that they are prepared to explore a range of could potentially pose grave threats or outcomes and are not wedded to any otherwise have signifcant consequences. preconceived result. Depending on how elaborate the futures project, the effort From past experience, analysts have can amount to considerable investment in found that involving policymakers in the time, analytic resources, and money. alternative futures exercise is the most A team of analysts can spend several effective way to communicate the results of hours or days organizing, brainstorming, this exploration of alternative outcomes and and developing multiple futures; sensitize them to key uncertainties. Most alternatively, a larger-scale effort can participants fnd the process of developing require preparing a multi-day workshop such scenarios as useful as any fnished that brings together participants product that attempts to capture the results (including outside experts). Such an of the exercise. Analysts and policymakers undertaking often demands the special can beneft from this technique in several skills of trained scenario-development ways: facilitators and conferencing facilities. It provides an effective means of weighing This technique is a sharp contrast to multiple unknown or unknowable contrarian techniques, which try to factors and presenting a set of