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T h e Moral Judgment of the Child By JEAN PIAGET Doctor of Science, Professor at the University of Geneva, Director of the International Bureau of Education, Co-Director of the Institut /. /. Rousseau, Geneva; Author of " L...

T h e Moral Judgment of the Child By JEAN PIAGET Doctor of Science, Professor at the University of Geneva, Director of the International Bureau of Education, Co-Director of the Institut /. /. Rousseau, Geneva; Author of " Language and Thought o f the C h i l d “ Judgment and Reasoning in the C hild " tl The Child's Conception o f the World," “ The Child?s Conception of Causality ” W IT H TH E A S S IS T A N C E OF SEVEN COLLABORATORS T H E FREE PRESS G L E N C O E , ILLIN O IS  Translated by MARJORlti GABAIN Printed in U.S.A.  CONTENTS PAGE F orew ord........ vii C h apter I.— T he R ules of the G am e.. 1 § i. The rules of the game of marbles, p. 4.— § 2. The interrogatory and its general results, p. 13.— § 3. The practice of rules. I. The first two stages, p. 19.— § 4. The practice of rules. II. Third and fourth stages, p. 32.— § 5. Consciousness of rules. I. The first two stages, p. 41.— § 6. The consciousness of rules. II. Third stage, p. 56.— § 7. A girls' game : " tle t cachant ", p. 69.— § 8. Conclusion : I. Motor rules and the two kinds of respect, p. 76.— § 9. Conclusion : II. Respect for the group or respect for persons. Search for a guiding hypothesis, p. 95. C hapter I I.— A dult C o n s t r a in t and Moral R e a l is m..... 104 § 1. The method, p. 107.— § 2. O bjective responsibility. I. Clumsiness and stealing, p. 116.— § 3. O bjective responsibility. II. Lyin g, p. 135.— § 4. L y in g and the two kinds of respect, p. 159.— § 5. Conclusion. Moral realism, p. 171. General conclusion, p. 192. C h apter I I I.— C o o p e r a t io n and the D evelop­ m ent of th e Idea of J u s t ic e. 195 § i. The problem of punishments and retributive justice, p. 197.— § 2. Collective and communicable responsibility, p. 231.— § 3. Im manent Justice, p. 250.— § 4. Retributive justice and distributive justicc, p. 262.— § 5. E q u ality and authority, p. 275.— § 6. Justice between children, p. 297.— § 7. Conclusion : the idea of justice, p. 312. C h a p t e r IV.— T he T wo M o r a l it ie s of the C h il d and T ypes of So c ia l R e l a t io n s 326 § I. The theories of Durkheim and Fauconnet on respon­ sibility, p. 327.— § 2. Durkheim 's doctrine of moral authority. I. Introduction. Durkheim's, p. 341.-— § 3. The theory of authority according to Durkheim. II. Moral education, p. 355.— § 4. M. Pierre Bo vet's theory, p. 375.— -§ 5. The point of view of J. M. Baldwin, p. 392.**— § 6. General conclusions, p. 401. Index of Su bjects...... 415 In d ex of N am es........................................................... 418 r. 3, a ;> 3 4 a  FOREWORD R eaders will find in this book no direct analysis of child morality as it is practised in home and school life or in children’s societies. It is the moral judgment that we propose to investigate, not moral behaviour or sentiments. With this aim in view we questioned a large number of children from the Geneva and Neuch&tel schools and held conversations with them, similar to those we had had before on their conception of the world and of causality. The present volume contains the results of these conversations. First we had to establish what was meant by respect for rules from the child’s point of view. This is why we have begun with an analysis of the rules of a social game in the obligatory aspect which these possess for a bona fide player. From the rules of games we have passed to the specifically moral rules laid down by adults and we have tried to see what idea the child forms of these particular duties. Children’s ideas on lying were selected as being a privileged example. Finally we have examined the notions that arose out of the relations in which the children stood to each other and we were thus led to discuss the idea of justice as our special theme. Having reached this point, our results seemed to us sufficiently consistent to be compared to some of the hypotheses now in favour among sociologists and writers on the psychology of morals. It is to this final task that we have devoted our fourth chapter. We are more conscious than anybody of the defects as of the advantages of the method we have used. The great danger, especially in matters of morality, is that of making the child say whatever one wants him to say. vil viii forew ord There is no infallible remedy for th is; neither the good faith of the questioner nor the precautionary methods which we have laid stress upon elsewhere 1 are sufficient. The only safeguard lies in the collaboration of other investigators. If other psychologists take up our questions from different view-points and put them to children of differing social environment, it will be possible sooner or later to separate the objective from the arbitrary elements in the results which we bring forward in this work. An analogous task has been undertaken in various countries with regard to child logic and children’s ideas on causality ; and while certain exaggerations of which we had been guilty came to light in this way, the results up to date in no way tend to discourage us in the use of the method we have adopted. The advantages of this method seem to us to be that it makes evident what observation left to itself can only surmise. During the last few years, for example, I have been engaged in taking down the spontaneous remarks made by my two little girls, to whom I have never set the questions examined in The Child’s Conception of the World or in The Child’s Conception of Causality. Now,.broadly speaking, the tendencies to Realism, Animism, Artificialism and dynamic Causality, etc., come very clearly to light, but the meaning of these children's most interesting " whys ", as of many of their chance remarks, would have almost completely eluded me if I had not in the past questioned hundreds of children personally on the same subjects. A child’s spontaneous remark is, of course, more valuable than all the questioning in the world. But in child psychology such a remark cannot be seen in its right perspective without the work of preparation constituted by those very interrogatories. i See The Child's Conception of the World, Kegan Paul, which in the sequel will be designated by the letters C. W. My other books, Language and Thought in the Child, Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, and The Child's Conception of the World, will be referred to by the initials L.T., J.R., and C.W respectively.  FOREWORD ix The present book on child morality is just such a preliminary piece of work. It is my sincere hope tljat it may supply a scaffolding which those living with children and observing their spontaneous reactions can use in erecting the actual edifice. In a sense, child morality throws light on adult morality. If we want to form men and women nothing will fit us so well for the task as to study the laws that govern their formation. The Moral Judgment of the Child CHAPTER I THE RULES OF THE GAME 1 C h i l d r e n ’ s games constitute the most admirable social institutions. The game of marbles, for instance, as played by boys, contains an extremely complex system of rules, that is to say, a code of laws, a jurisprudence of its own. Only the psychologist, whose profession obliges him to become familiar with this instance of common law, and to get at the implicit morality underlying it, is in a position to estimate the extraordinary wealth of these rules by the difficulty he experiences in mastering their details. If we wish to gain any understanding of child morality, it is obviously with the analysis of such facts as these that we must begin. All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules. The reflective analysis of Kant, the sociology of Durkheim, or the individualistic psychology of Bovet all meet on this point. The doctrines begin to diverge only from the moment that it has to be explained how the mind comes to respect these rules. For our part, it will be in the domain of child psychology that we shall undertake the analysis of this “ how Now, most of the moral rules which the child learns to respect he receives from adults, which means that he 1 W ith the collaboration of Mme V. J. Piaget, MM M. Lambercier and L. Martinez. A I 2 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD receives them after they have been fully elaborated, and often elaborated, not in relation to him and as they are needed, but once and for all and through an uninterrupted succession of earlier adult generations. In the case of the very simplest social games, on the contrary, we are in the presence of rules which have been elaborated by the children alone. It is of no moment whether these games strike us as “ moral ” or not in their contents. As psychologists we must ourselves adopt the point of view, not of the adult conscience, but of child morality. Now, the rules of the game of marbles are handed down, just like so-called moral realities, from one generation to another, and are preserved solely b y the respect that is-felt for them b y individuals. The sole difference is that the relations in this case are only those that exist between children. The little boys who are beginning to play are gradually trained b y the older ones in respect for the la w ; and in any case they aspire from their hearts to the virtue, supremely characteristic of human dignity, which consists in making a correct use of the customary practices of a game. As to the older ones, it is in their power to alter the rules. If this is not “ morality ” , then where does morality begin ? A t least, it is respect for rules, and it appertains to an enquiry like ours to begin with the study of facts of this order. Of course the phenomena relating to the game of marbles are not among the most primitive. Before playing with his equals, the child is influenced b y his parents. He is subj ected from his cradle to a multiplicity of regulations, and even before language he becomes conscious of certain obligations. These circumstances even exercise, as we shall see, an undeniable influence upon the way in which the rules of games are elaborated. But in the case of play institutions, adult intervention is at any rate reduced to the minimum. We are therefore in the presence here of realities which, if not amongst the most elementary, should be classed nevertheless amongst the most spon­ taneous and the most instructive.  THE RULES OF THE GAME With regard to game rules there are two phenomena which it is particularly easy to study: first the practice of rules, i.e. the way in which children of different ages effectively apply rules: second the consciousness of rules, i.e. the idea which children of different ages form of the character of these game rules, whether of something obligatory and sacred or of something subject to their own choice, whether of heteronomy or autonomy. It is the comparison of these two groups of data which constitutes the real aim of this chapter. For the relations which exist between the practice and the consciousness of rules are those which will best enable us to define the psychological nature of moral realities. One word more. Before embarking upon an analysis of the practice or of the consciousness of rules, we must first give some account of the actual content of these rules. We must therefore establish the social data of the problem. But we shall confine ourselves only to what is indispensable. We have not attempted to establish the sociology of the game of marbles; this would have meant finding out how this game was played in the past and how it is now played in different parts of the world (it is actually played by negro children). Even confining ourselves to French Switzerland, we believe it would need several years of research to discover all the local variants of the game and, above all, to outline the history of these variants throughout the last few generations. Such an enquiry, which might be useful to the sociologist, is superfluous for the psychologist. AH the latter needs in order to study how rules are learned is a thorough knowledge of a given custom in actual use, just as in order to study child language, all he needs is to know a given dialect, however localized, without troubling to reconstruct all its semantic and phonetic changes in time and space. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a short analysis of the content of the game as it is played in Geneva and Neuchatel, in the districts where we conducted our work. 4 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD § i. T h e rules of the game of m arbles.— Three essential facts must be noted if we wish to analyse simultaneously the practice and the consciousness of rules. The first is that among children of a given generation and in a given locality, however small, there is never one single way of playing marbles, there are quantities of ways. There is the “ square game ” with which we shall occupy ourselves more especially. A square is drawn on the ground and a number of marbles placed within i t ; the game consists in aiming at these from a distance and driving them out of the enclosure. There is the game of “ courate ” where two players aim at each other’s marble in indefinite pursuit. There is the game of " troyat ” from " trou ” (=hole) or " creux ” (= hollow), where the marbles are piled into a hole and have to be dislodged by means of a heavier marble, and so on. Every child is familiar with several games, a fact that may help according to his age to reinforce or to weaken his belief in the sacred character of rules. In the second place, one and the same game, such as the Square game, admits of fairly important variations according to when and where it is played. As we had occasion to verify, the rules of the Square game are not the same in four of the communes of NeucMtel1 situated at 2-3 kilometres from each other. They are not the same in Geneva and in Neuch&tel. They differ, on certain points, from one district to another, from one school to another in the same town. In addition to this, as through our collaborators’ kindness we were able to establish, variations occur from one generation to another. A student of twenty assured us that in his village the game is no longer played as it was " in his days These variations according to time and place are important, because children are often aware of their existence. A child who has moved from one town, or merely from one school building to another will often explain to, us that such and such a rule is in force in one place but not in 1 Neuch&tel, La Coudre, Hauterive and Saint-Blaise.  THE RULES OF THE GAME 5 the other. Very often, too, a child will tell us that his father played differently from him. Last of all, there is the boy of 14 who has given up playing because he is beginning to feel superior to the little ones, and who, according to his temperament, ,laughs or mourns over the fact that the customs of his generation are going by the board instead of being piously preserved by the rising generation. Finally, and clearly as a result of the convergence of these local or historical currents, it will happen that one and the same game (like the Square game) played in the playground of one and the same school admits on certain points of several different rules. Children of 11 to 13 are familiar with these variants, and they generally agree before or during the game to choose a given usage to the exclusion of others. These facts must therefore be borne in mind, for they undoubtedly condition the judgment which the child will make on the value of rules. Having mentioned these points, we shall give a brief exposition of the rules of the Square game, which will serve as a prototype, and we shall begin by fixing the child's language so as to be able to understand the reports of the conversations which will be quoted later on. Besides, as is so often the case in child psychology, some aspects of this language are in themselves highly in­ structive. A marble is called " un marbre ” in NeucMtel and “ un coeillu ” or " un mapis ” in Geneva. There are marbles of different value. The cement marble has the place of honour. The " carron ” which is smaller and made of the more brittle clay is of less value because it costs less. The marbles that are used for throwing 1 and are not placed inside the square are called according to their consistency " coma ” (if incamelian), “ ago ” , or “ agathe ” , 1 The English technical equivalent is the generic term " shooter ” which we shall use in the interrogatories given below. For the rest we have generally retained the French words as one cannot be sure that the English terms mean exactly the same. [Trans.) 6 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD “ cassine” (glass ball with coloured veins), “ plomb ” (large marble containing lead), etc. Each is worth so many marbles or so many “ canons To throw a marble is to “ tirer ** (shoot) and to touch another marble with ones own is to “ tanner ” (hit). Then corfies a set of terms of ritual consecration, that is, of expressions which the player uses in order to announce that he is going to perform such-and-such an operation and which thus consecrate it ritually as an accomplished fact. For, once these words have been uttered, the opponent is powerless against his partner's decision; whereas if he takes the initiative by means of the terms of ritual interdiction, which we shall examine in a moment, he will in this way prevent the operation which he fears. For example, in order to play first in circumstances when it is possible to do so, the child will say (at NeucMtel) prems ”— obviously a corruption of the word “ premier ” (first). If he wants to go back to the line that all the players start from at their first turn and which is called the “ coche ’V he simply says “ coche If he wishes to advance or retreat to a distance twice as great, he says “ deux coches ” , or if to a distance of one, two, or three hand-breadths he says “ one (or two, or three) empans ” (spans). If he wishes to place himself in relation to the square at a distance equal to that at which he finds himself at a given moment, but in another direction (so as to avoid the probable attacks of his opponent) he says “ du mien ” (mine), and if he wishes to prevent his opponent from doing the same thing he says “ du tien” (yours). This applies to Neuchatel. In Geneva these displacements are expressed by the terms " faire une entasse ” or “ entorse ” (to make a twist). If you wish to give up your turn and be “ dead ” until your opponent has moved, you say coup passe ” (my turn passed). As soon as these terms have been uttered in circum­ stances which of course are carefully regulated by a 1 English, pitch-line (sometimes). [Trans.] The Moral Judgment of the Child By JEAN PIAGET Doctor o f Science, Professor at the University of Geneva, Director o f the International Bureau o f Education, Co-Director o f the Institut /. /. Rousseau, Geneva; A uthor o f " Language and Thought o f the C h i l d “ Judgment and Reasoning in the C h ild " tl The Child's Conception o f the W orld," “ The Child?s Conception o f Causality ” W IT H THE A S S IS T A N C E OF SEVEN COLLABORATORS THE FREE PRESS GLENCOE, ILLINOIS  Translated by MARJORlti GABAIN Printed in U.S.A.  CONTENTS PAGE F orew ord........ vii Chapter I.— T h e R ules of th e Gam e.. 1 § i. T he rules o f th e gam e o f m arbles, p. 4.— § 2. T h e in terro ga to ry and its gen eral results, p. 13.— § 3. T h e p ractice of rules. I. T he first tw o stages, p. 19.— § 4. T he p ractice o f rules. I I. T h ird a n d fou rth stages, p. 32.— § 5. Consciousness o f rules. I. T h e first tw o stages, p. 4 1.— § 6. T h e consciousness o f rules. I I. T h ird stage, p. 56.— § 7. A girls' gam e : " tle t ca ch a n t " , p. 69.— § 8. Conclusion : I. M otor rules and th e tw o kin ds o f respect, p. 76.— § 9. C onclusion : I I. R e sp e ct for the group o r resp ect for persons. S earch for a gu id in g hyp oth esis, p. 95. C h apter I I.— A d u l t C o n s t r a in t and Moral R e a l is m..... 104 § 1. The m ethod, p. 107.— § 2. O b je c tiv e resp on sib ility. I. Clum siness and stealin g, p. 116.— § 3. O b je c tiv e resp on sib ility. II. L y in g , p. 135.— § 4. L y in g and the tw o kinds o f respect, p. 159.— § 5. Conclusion. M oral realism , p. 17 1. G en eral conclusion, p. 192. Chapter II I.— C o o p e r a t io n and the D evelop­ m ent of th e Idea of J u s t ic e. 195 § i. The problem o f p u nishm en ts and re trib u tiv e justice, p. 197.— § 2. C o llectiv e and com m un icable resp on sib ility, p. 231.— § 3. Im m an en t Ju stice , p. 250.— § 4. R e trib u tiv e ju stice and d is trib u tiv e ju s tic c, p. 262.— § 5. E q u a lity and au th o rity , p. 275.— § 6. J u stice betw een children, p. 297.— § 7. Conclusion : the id e a o f ju stice, p. 312. C h a p t e r I V.— T h e T w o M o r a l i t ie s o f t h e C h il d and T ypes of So c ia l R e l a t io n s 326 § I. T he th eories of D u rk h e im and F au con n et on respon­ sib ility , p. 327.— § 2. D u rk h e im 's do ctrin e o f m oral a u th o rity. I. In tro d u ctio n. D u rkh eim 's, p. 341.-— § 3. The th eo ry o f a u th o r ity a ccord in g to D urkheim. II. M oral edu catio n , p. 355.— § 4. M. P ierre Bo v e t's th eo ry, p. 375.— -§ 5. T h e p o in t o f v ie w o f J. M. B ald w in , p. 392.**— § 6. G en eral conclusions, p. 401. Index of Su bjects...... 415 In d ex of N am es................................................................ 418 r. 3, a ;> 3 4 a  FOREWORD R ead ers will find in this book no direct analysis of child morality as it is practised in home and school life or in children’s societies. It is the moral judgment that we propose to investigate, not moral behaviour or sentiments. With this aim in view we questioned a large number of children from the Geneva and Neuch&tel schools and held conversations with them, similar to those we had had before on their conception of the world and of causality. The present volume contains the results of these conversations. First we had to establish what was meant by respect for rules from the child’s point of view. This is why we have begun with an analysis of the rules of a social game in the obligatory aspect which these possess for a bona fide player. From the rules of games we have passed to the specifically moral rules laid down by adults and we have tried to see what idea the child forms of these particular duties. Children’s ideas on lying were selected as being a privileged example. Finally we have examined the notions that arose out of the relations in which the children stood to each other and we were thus led to discuss the idea of justice as our special theme. Having reached this point, our results seemed to us sufficiently consistent to be compared to some of the hypotheses now in favour among sociologists and writers on the psychology of morals. It is to this final task that we have devoted our fourth chapter. We are more conscious than anybody of the defects as of the advantages of the method we have used. The great danger, especially in matters of morality, is that of making the child say whatever one wants him to say. vil viii forew ord There is no infallible remedy for th is; neither the good faith of the questioner nor the precautionary methods which we have laid stress upon elsewhere 1 are sufficient. The only safeguard lies in the collaboration of other investigators. If other psychologists take up our questions from different view-points and put them to children of differing social environment, it will be possible sooner or later to separate the objective from the arbitrary elements in the results which we bring forward in this work. An analogous task has been undertaken in various countries with regard to child logic and children’s ideas on causality ; and while certain exaggerations of which we had been guilty came to light in this way, the results up to date in no way tend to discourage us in the use of the method we have adopted. The advantages of this method seem to us to be that it makes evident what observation left to itself can only surmise. During the last few years, for example, I have been engaged in taking down the spontaneous remarks made by my two little girls, to whom I have never set the questions examined in The Child’s Conception of the World or in The Child’s Conception of Causality. Now,.broadly speaking, the tendencies to Realism, Animism, Artificialism and dynamic Causality, etc., come very clearly to light, but the meaning of these children's most interesting " whys ", as of many of their chance remarks, would have almost completely eluded me if I had not in the past questioned hundreds of children personally on the same subjects. A child’s spontaneous remark is, of course, more valuable than all the questioning in the world. But in child psychology such a remark cannot be seen in its right perspective without the work of preparation constituted by those very interrogatories. i See The Child's Conception of the World, Kegan Paul, which in the C. W. M y other books, Language sequel will be designated b y the letters and Thought in the Child, Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, and The Child's Conception of the World, will be referred to b y the initials L.T., J.R., and C.W respectively.  FOREWORD ix The present book on child morality is just such a preliminary piece of work. It is m y sincere hope tljat it may supply a scaffolding which those living with children and observing their spontaneous reactions can use in erecting the actual edifice. In a sense, child morality throws light on adult morality. If we want to form men and women nothing will fit us so well for the task as to study the laws that govern their formation. The Moral Judgment of the Child CH APTER I THE RULES OF THE G A M E 1 C h i l d r e n ’ s games constitute the most admirable social institutions. The game of marbles, for instance, as played by boys, contains an extremely complex system of rules, that is to say, a code of laws, a jurisprudence of its own. Only the psychologist, whose profession obliges him to become familiar with this instance of common law, and to get at the implicit morality underlying it, is in a position to estimate the extraordinary wealth of these rules by the difficulty he experiences in mastering their details. If we wish to gain any understanding of child morality, it is obviously with the analysis of such facts as these that we must begin. All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules. The reflective analysis of Kant, the sociology of Durkheim, or the individualistic psychology of Bovet all meet on this point. The doctrines begin to diverge only from the moment that it has to be explained how the mind comes to respect these rules. For our part, it will be in the domain of child psychology that we shall undertake the analysis of this “ how Now, most of the moral rules which the child learns to respect he receives from adults, which means that he 1 W ith the collaboration of Mme V. J. Piaget, M M M. Lambercier and L. Martinez. A I 2 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD receives them after they have been fully elaborated, and often elaborated, not in relation to him and as they are needed, but once and for all and through an uninterrupted succession of earlier adult generations. In the case of the very simplest social games, on the contrary, we are in the presence of rules which have been elaborated by the children alone. It is of no moment whether these games strike us as “ moral ” or not in their contents. As psychologists we must ourselves adopt the point of view, not of the adult conscience, but of child morality. Now, the rules of the game of marbles are handed down, just like so-called moral realities, from one generation to another, and are preserved solely by the respect that is-felt for them by individuals. The sole difference is that the relations in this case are only those that exist between children. The little boys who are beginning to play are gradually trained by the older ones in respect for the la w ; and in any case they aspire from their hearts to the virtue, supremely characteristic of human dignity, which consists in making a correct use of the customary practices of a game. As to the older ones, it is in their power to alter the rules. If this is not “ morality ” , then where does morality begin ? At least, it is respect for rules, and it appertains to an enquiry like ours to begin with the study of facts of this order. Of course the phenomena relating to the game of marbles are not among the most primitive. Before playing with his equals, the child is influenced by his parents. He is subj ected from his cradle to a multiplicity of regulations, and even before language he becomes conscious of certain obligations. These circumstances even exercise, as we shall see, an undeniable influence upon the way in which the rules of games are elaborated. But in the case of play institutions, adult intervention is at any rate reduced to the minimum. We are therefore in the presence here of realities which, if not amongst the most elementary, should be classed nevertheless amongst the most spon­ taneous and the most instructive.  THE RULES OF THE GAME With regard to game rules there are two phenomena which it is particularly easy to stu d y : first the practice of rules, i.e. the way in which children of different ages effectively apply rules: second the consciousness of rules, i.e. the idea which children of different ages form of the character of these game rules, whether of something obligatory and sacred or of something subject to their own choice, whether of heteronomy or autonomy. It is the comparison of these two groups of data which constitutes the real aim of this chapter. For the relations which exist between the practice and the consciousness of rules are those which will best enable us to define the psychological nature of moral realities. One word more. Before embarking upon an analysis of the practice or of the consciousness of rules, we must first give some account of the actual content of these rules. We must therefore establish the social data of the problem. But we shall confine ourselves only to what is indispensable. We have not attempted to establish the sociology of the game of marbles; this would have meant finding out how this game was played in the past and how it is now played in different parts of the world (it is actually played by negro children). Even confining ourselves to French Switzerland, we believe it would need several years of research to discover all the local variants of the game and, above all, to outline the history of these variants throughout the last few generations. Such an enquiry, which might be useful to the sociologist, is superfluous for the psychologist. AH the latter needs in order to study how rules are learned is a thorough knowledge of a given custom in actual use, just as in order to study child language, all he needs is to know a given dialect, however localized, without troubling to reconstruct all its semantic and phonetic changes in time and space. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a short analysis of the content of the game as it is played in Geneva and Neuchatel, in the districts where we conducted our work. 4 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD § i. T he ru les of th e game of m ar bles.— T hree essential facts must be noted if we wish to analyse simultaneously the practice and the consciousness of rules. The first is that among children of a given generation and in a given locality, however small, there is never one single way of playing marbles, there are quantities of ways. There is the “ square game ” with which we shall occupy ourselves more especially. A square is drawn on the ground and a number of marbles placed within i t ; the game consists in aiming at these from a distance and driving them out of the enclosure. There is the game of “ courate ” where two players aim at each other’s marble in indefinite pursuit. There is the game of " troyat ” from " trou ” (=hole) or " creux ” ( = hollow), where the marbles are piled into a hole and have to be dislodged b y means of a heavier marble, and so on. E very child is familiar with several games, a fact that m ay help according to his age to reinforce or to weaken his belief in the sacred character of rules. In the second place, one and the same game, such as the Square game, admits of fairly important variations according to when and where it is played. As we had occasion to verify, the rules of the Square game are not the same in four of the communes of NeucM tel1 situated at 2-3 kilometres from each other. They are not the same in Geneva and in Neuch&tel. They differ, on certain points, from one district to another, from one school to another in the same town. In addition to this, as through our collaborators’ kindness we were able to establish, variations occur from one generation to another. A student of twenty assured us that in his village the game is no longer played as it was " in his days These variations according to time and place are important, because children are often aware of their existence. A child who has moved from one town, or merely from one school building to another will often explain to, us that such and such a rule is in force in one place but not in 1 Neuch&tel, L a Coudre, Hauterive and Saint-Blaise.  THE RULES OF THE GAME 5 the other. Very often, too, a child will tell us that his father played differently from him. Last of all, there is the boy of 14 who has given up playing because he is beginning to feel superior to the little ones, and who, according to his temperament, ,laughs or mourns over the fact that the customs of his generation are going by the board instead of being piously preserved by the rising generation. Finally, and clearly as a result of the convergence of these local or historical currents, it will happen that one and the same game (like the Square game) played in the playground of one and the same school admits on certain points of several different rules. Children of 11 to 13 are familiar with these variants, and they generally agree before or dining the game to choose a given usage to the exclusion of others. These facts must therefore be borne in mind, for they undoubtedly condition the judgment which the child will make on the value of rules. Having mentioned these points, we shall give a brief exposition of the rules of the Square game, which will serve as a prototype, and we shall begin by fixing the child's language so as to be able to understand the reports of the conversations which will be quoted later on. Besides, as is so often the case in child psychology, some aspects of this language are in themselves highly in­ structive. A marble is called " un marbre ” in NeucMteJ and “ un coeillu '' or " un mapis ” in Geneva. There are marbles of different value. The cement marble has the place of honour. The " carron ” which is smaller and made of the more brittle clay is of less value because it costs less. The marbles that are used for throwing 1 and are not placed inside the square are called according to their consistency " coma ” (if incamelian), “ ago ” , or “ agathe ” , 1 T he E nglish technical equivalent is the generic term " shooter ” which we shall use in the interrogatories given below. For the rest we have generally retained the French words as one cannot be sure th a t the E nglish terms mean ex actly the same. [Trans.) 6 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD “ cassine” (glass ball with coloured veins), “ plomb ” (large marble containing lead), etc. Each is worth so many marbles or so many “ canons To throw a marble is to “ tirer ** (shoot) and to touch another marble with ones own is to “ tanner ” (hit). Then corfies a set of terms of ritual consecration, that is, of expressions which the player uses in order to announce that he is going to perform such-and-such an operation and which thus consecrate it ritually as an accomplished fact. For, once these words have been uttered, the opponent is powerless against his partner's decision; whereas if he takes the initiative by means of the terms of ritual interdiction, which we shall examine in a moment, he will in this way prevent the operation which he fears. For example, in order to play first in circumstances when it is possible to do so, the child will say (at NeucMtel) prems ”— obviously a corruption of the word “ premier ” (first). If he wants to go back to the line that all the players start from at {heir first turn and which is called the “ coche ’V he simply says “ coche If he wishes to advance or retreat to a distance twice as great, he says “ deux coches ” , or if to a distance of one, two, or three hand-breadths he says “ one (or two, or three) empans ” (spans). If he wishes to place himself in relation to the square at a distance equal to that at which he finds himself at a given moment, but in another direction (so as to avoid the probable attacks of his opponent) he says “ du mien ” (mine), and if he wishes to prevent his opponent from doing the same thing he says “ du tie n ” (yours). This applies to Neuchatel. In Geneva these displacements are expressed by the terms " faire une entasse ” or “ entorse ” (to make a twist). If you wish to give up your turn and be “ dead ” until your opponent has moved, you say coup passe ” (my turn passed). As soon as these terms have been uttered in circum­ stances which of course are carefully regulated by a 1 English, pitch-line (sometimes). [Trans.]  THE RULES OF THE GAME 7 whole juridical system, the opponent has to submit. But if the opponent wishes to anticipate these operations, it is sufficient for him to pronounce the terms of ritual interdiction, which at Neuchatel are simply the same terms but preceded by the prefix “ fan ” , from " defendu ” (forbidden). For example, “ fan-du-mien ” , “ fan-du- tien ” , “ fan-coche ” , “ fan-coup-passe ” , etc. Some children, not having understood this prefix, which does not, after all, correspond with anything in the speech they hear around them, say “ femme-du-tien ” , " femme- coche ” , etc. Two more particularly suggestive terms of consecration should be noted, which are.current among the little Genevans : “ glaine ” and “ toumike When a player places a marble of superior value in the square, thinking that he has put down an ordinary marble (say an “ ago ” instead of a “ coeillu ” ) he is naturally allowed, if he has noticed his mistake, to pick up his “ ago ” and put an ordinary marble in its place. Only a dishonest opponent would take advantage of his partner's absent-mindedness and pocket this " ago ” after having hit it. The children we questioned on this point were unanimous in pronounc­ ing such procedure equivalent to stealing. But if, on the other hand, the opponent spots his partner's mistake in time and utters the word “ toumike ” or (by doubling the last syllable) “ toumikemik ” , then the absent-minded player no longer has the right to pick up his “ ago ” ; he must leave it on the ground like a common-or-garden " coeillu ” , and if one of the players succeeds in hitting it, this player will be allowed in all fairness to take possession of it. This shows us a very interesting example of a word consecrating a mistake and by doing so changing a dishonest action into one that is legitimate and recognized as such by all. We have here for the first time an example of that formalism, which belongs to certain aspects of childish morality, and into whose nature we shall go more deeply in the sequel in connection with objective responsibility. 8 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD In the same way, the word “ glaine ” legitimatizes piracy in certain well-defined conditions. When one of the players has succeeded, either by luck or by skill, in winning all his partners’ marbles, it is a point of honour similar to that which sociologists designate with the term “ potlatch ” that he should offer to play a fresh set and should himself place in the square the necessary marbles, so as to give his less fortunate playmates the chance of recovering a portion of their possessions. If he refuses, of course no law can force him to do this ; he has won and there is the end of it. If, however, one of the players pronounces the word “ glaine ” then the whole gang falls- upon the miser, throws him down, empties his pockets and shares the booty. This act of piracy which in normal times is profoundly contrary to morality (since the marbles collected by the winner constitute his lawfully acquired possession) is thus changed into a legitimate act and even into an act of retributive justice approved by the general conscience when the word " glaine ” has been pronounced.1 A t NeucMtel we noticed neither " glaine ” nor " tou- mike ", but, on the other hand, we found " cougac When one of the players has won too much (therefore in the situation just described) his defeated partner can force him to offer to play another set by uttering the word " cougac " (probably derived from coup-gagne just as " prems ” was from premier). If the winner wishes to evade the obligation laid upon him by the fateful word, he has only to anticipate the blow by saying " fan-cougac Our reason for emphasizing these linguistic peculiarities is only to show from the first the juridical complexity of game rules. It is obvious that these facts could be analysed more fundamentally from other points of view. 1 This word, " glaine ” really has a wider sense. According to several children it entitles whoever pronounces it sim ply to pick up all the marbles th at are on the ground when a discussion arises about them , or if a player forgets to take possession of w hat is his due. I t is in this sense th at the word is taken, for instance, in Philippe Monnier's, L* Livre de Blaise (3rd ed., p. 135).  THE RULES OF THE GAME 9 One could, for example, work out the whole psychology of consecration and interdiction in connection with the child and, above all, the psychology of social games. But these questions are really outside our scope.1 Let us therefore return to what is the essential point so far as we are concerned, namely, the rules themselves. The Square game thus consists, in a word, in putting a few marbles in a square, and in taking possession of them by dislodging them with a special marble, bigger than the rest. But when it comes to details this simple schema contains an indefinite series of complications. Let us take them in order, so as to get some idea of their richness. First of all, there is the “ pose ” or outlay. One of the players draws a square and then each places his “ pose If there are two players, each one puts down two, three, or four marbles. If there are three players, each puts down two marbles. If there are four or more players, it is customary to put down only one marble each. The main thing is equality: each one puts down what the others do. But in order to reach equality the relative value of the marbles must be taken into account. For an ordinary marble, you must put down eight “ carrons A little “ coma ” is worth eight " marbres ", sixteen “ carrons ” , and so on. The values are carefully regulated and correspond roughly to the price paid at the shop round the corner. But alongside of financial operations proper, there are between children various exchanges in kind which appreciably alter current values. Then the game begins. A certain distance is agreed upon where the “ coche ” is drawn ; this is the line from which the players start. It is drawn parallel to and generally one or two metres away from one of the sides of the square, and from it each player will fire his first shot. 1 W ith regard to social games we are aw aitin g the publication of R. Cousinet's book which will incorporate all the valuable material which this author has been accum ulating for so m an y years. 10 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (To “ fire ” is to throw one’s shooter-—" agathe ” or " comaline ”— into the square.) All, therefore, start from the coche. In some games you return to the coche at each fresh turn, but it is more usual after the first shot to play from the place that your marble has rolled to. Sometimes this rule is limited by saying that the marble must not be further removed from the square than the coche. Thus if your marble has rolled two metres away from the square in any direction whatsoever, you bring it back to a distance of im. 50 if this is the distance at which the coche itself stands. But before the game begins you must settle who is to play first. For the first player has the advantage of “ firing ” into a square full of marbles, whereas.those who follow are faced only with what is left after the gains of the preceding players. In order to know who is to begin, a series of well-known rites are put in action. Two children walk towards each other stepping heel to toe, and whichever steps on the other’s toe has the right to begin. Or else rhymed formulas or even syllables devoid of any meaning are recited in sacramental order. Each syllable corresponds to a player, and he on whom the last syllable falls is the lucky one. In addition to these customary usages there is a method of procedure peculiar to the game of marbles. Each boy throws his “ shooter ” in the direction of the coche or of a line specially traced for the purpose. Whoever comes nearest up to the line begins. The others follow in order of their nearness up to the line. The last to play is the boy who has gone beyond the coche, and if several have gone beyond it, the last to play will be the boy whose marble has gone furthest. The order of the players having been settled in this way, the game begins. Each player in turn stands behind the coche and " fires ” into the square. There are three ways of throwing one’s marble : " Piquette ” (Engl., " shooting ” ) which consists in projecting the marble by  THE RULES OF THE GAME n a jerk of the thumb, the marble being placed against the thumb-nail and kept in place by the first finger; “ Rou­ lette ” (Engl., " bowling ” ) which consists simply in rolling your marble along the ground, and “ Poussette ” (EngL, “ hunching ” ) which consists in addition in carrying your hand along with it over a sufficient distance to correct the initial direction. Poussette is always banned and may in this connection be compared to the push stroke of a bad billiard player. A t Neuchatel it is customary to say “ fan-poussette ” or again “ femme-poussette In Geneva, the simpler expression “ defendu de trainer ” (dragging forbidden) is in use. Roulette (" bowling ” ) is also generally banned (“ fan-roulette ” ) but is at times tolerated, in which case everyone will of course have the right to play in this way, and absolute equality before the law will even be agreed upon at the beginning of the game. The players are therefore throwing in the manner that has been agreed upon. Suppose one of the marbles included in the square has been hit. If it has gone outside the square it becomes the property of the boy who has dislodged it. If it remains inside the enclosure it cannot be taken. If, finally, it remains on the line the case is judged by the partners : a marble which is half outside is regarded as out, not otherwise. Here, naturally, a whole lot of subsidiary rules will establish the procedure in disputed cases. There remains the case of the marble with which one shoots (the shooter, or taw, etc.) remaining in the square or failing to lie beyond one of the lines of the square by at least half of its diameter: its owner is “ cuit. ” (dished), i.e. he cannot play any more. If this marble is projected outside the square by that of another player, it becomes, like the others, the latter's property, except in the case of special conventions generally agreed upon at the beginning of the game. Finally, there are the possible complications arising from cases of rebounding marbles. A marble that bounces out of the square off another is sometimes not held to be won, and a fortiori 12 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD in the case of a marble of value.1 In other cases, every­ thing that goes outside the enclosure belongs to the player who has expelled it. The particular cases that arise in this way are settled in conformity with principles that are established either before or during the game by mutual agreement between all the participants. Then comes the question of the number of " shots ” to be allowed to each. The player who has succeeded in winning one or more marbles has the right to play again, and so on, for as long as he wins. But sometimes the following reservation is made : for the first round in each game every player plays once in turn, independently of gains or losses. Here again, therefore, it is a matter of previous arrangement. In addition— and this is an essential rule— everyone has the right not only to “ fire ” at the marbles in the square, but also to " tanner ” (hit) his neighbour’s shooter, even outside the enclosure and indeed wherever it may happen to be in the course of the game. And of course the great difficulty is to shoot at the square without placing yourself within reach of your partners. This is why, when a shot would involve too many risks, you are allowed to say “ coup-passe ” and to remain where you are, provided, of course, that no one has foreseen this decision and said “ fan-coup-passe ”. And this, really, is why you axe allowed to change your position provided you place yourself at the same distance from the square as before, and provided you first say “ du mien ” (mine), unless, once again, your opponent has anticipated your move by saying " du tien ” (yours). Finally, a series of special rules deserves mention, the observance of which depends upon the particular town or school in question. The first player who says " place- pour-moi ” (place for me) is not obliged to take up his position at one of the comers of the square. Any player who has succeeded in winning the equivalent of his " pose ” (i.e. two marbles if he has placed two in the 1 This is expressed b y saying that the '' revenette ” does not count.  THE RULES OF THE GAME square, and so on) can say " queue-de-pose ” which will allow him.to have the first shot from the coche in the next game, and so on. The game, regulated in this way by an indefinite number of rules, is carried on until the square is empty. The boy who has pocketed the largest number of marbles has won. § 2. T h e interrogato ry an d its g en er a l r e su lts.— The rules that we have outlined above constitute a well- marked social reality, “ independent of individuals ” (in Durkheim’s sense) and transmitted, like a language, from one generation to another. This set of customs is obviously more or less plastic. But individual innovations, just as in the case of language, succeed only when they meet a general need and when they are collectively sanctioned as being in conformity with the “ spirit of the game But while fully recognizing the interest attaching to this sociological aspect of the problem, it was from a different standpoint that we raised the questions which we are now going to study. We simply asked ourselves (i6) how the individuals adapt themselves to these rales, i.e. how they observe rules at each age and level of mental development; (20) how far they become conscious of rules, in other words, what types of obligation result (always according to the children’s ages) from the increasing ascendancy exercised by rules. The interrogatory is therefore easy to carry out. During the first part, it is sufficient to ask the children (we questioned about 20 boys ranging from 4 to 12-13) how one plays marbles. The experimenter speaks more or less as follows. “ Here-are some marbles (The marbles are placed on a large baize-covered table beside a piece of chalk.) “ You must show me how to play. When I was little I used to play a lot, but now I ’ve quite for­ gotten how to. I’d like to play again. Let’s play together. You’ll teach me the rules and I ’ll play with you.” The rhilrl then draws a square, takes half the marbles, puts 14 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD down his “ pose ” , and the game begins. It is important to bear in mind all possible contingencies of the game and to ask the child about each. This means that you must avoid making any sort of suggestions. All you need do is to appear completely ignorant, and even to make intentional mistakes so that the child may each time point out clearly what the rule is. Naturally, you must take the whole thing very seriously, all through the game. Then you ask who has won and why, and if everything is not quite clear, you begin a new set. It is of paramount importance during this first half of the interrogatory to play your part in a simple spirit and to let the child feel a certain superiority at the game (while not omitting to show by an occasional good shot that you are not a complete duffer). In this way the child is put at his ease, and the information he gives as to how he plays is all the more conclusive. Many of our children became absorbed in the game to the extent of treat­ ing me completely as one of them. “ You are dished ! cries Ben (10 years) when my marble stops inside the square. In the case of the little ones, who find difficulty in formulating the rules which they observe in practice, the best way is to make them play in pairs. You begin by playing with one of them in the manner described above, and ask him to tell you all the rules he knows. Then you make the same request of the second boy (the first being no longer present), and finally you bring the two together and ask them to have a game. This control experiment is not needed for older children, except in doubtful cases. Then comes the second part of the interrogatory, that, namely, which bears upon the consciousness of rules. You begin by asking the child if he could invent a new rule. He generally does this easily enough, but it is advisable to make sure that it really is a new rule and not one of the many existing variants of which this particular child may already have knowledge. “ I want a rule that is only by you, a rule that you've made up  THE RULES OF THE GAME yourself and that no one else knows— the rule of N----- (the child's name).” Once the new rule has been formu­ lated, you ask the child whether it could give rise to a new game : “ Would it be all right to play like that with your pals ? Would they want to play that way ? etc.” The child either agrees to the suggestion or disputes it. If he agrees, you immediately ask him whether the new rule is a fair ” rule, a “ real ” rule, one 41 like the others ” , and try to get at the various motives that enter into the answers. If, on the other hand, the child dis­ agrees with all this, you ask him whether the new rule, could not by being generalized become a real rule. “ When you are a big boy, suppose you tell your new rule to a lot of children, then perhaps they'll all play that way and everyone will forget the old rules. Then which rule will be fairest— yours that everyone knows, or the old one that everyone has forgotten ? ” The formula can naturally be altered in accordance with the turn which the conversation is taking, but the main point is to find out whether one may legitimately alter rules and whether a rule is fair or just because it conforms to general usage (even newly introduced), or because it is endowed with an intrinsic and eternal value. Having cleared up this point it will be easy enough to ask the two following questions. (i°) Have people always played as they do to-day : “ Did your daddy play this way when he was little, and your grand-dad, and children in the time of William Tell, Noah, and Adam and Eve, etc., did they all play the way you showed me, or differently ? ” (20) What is the origin of rules : Are they invented by children or laid down by parents and grown-ups in general ? Sometimes it is best to begin by these last two questions before asking whether rules can be changed ; this avoids perseveration, or rather reverses its direction, and so facilitates the interpretation of the answers. All this part of the interrogatory, moreover, requires extremely delicate handling; suggestion is always ready to occur, 16 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD and the danger of romancing is ever present. B ut it goes without saying that the main thing is simply to grasp the child’s mental orientation. Does he believe in the mystical virtue of rules or in their finality ? Does he subscribe to a heteronomy of divine law, or is he conscious of his own autonomy ? This is the only question that interests us. The child has naturally got no ready­ made beliefs on the origin and endurance of the rules of his games; the ideas which he invents then and there are only indices' of his fundamental attitude, and this must be steadily borne in mind throughout the whole of the interrogatory. _ The results which we obtained from this double inter­ rogatory and which we shall examine in greater detail later on, are roughly the following. From the point of view of the practice or application of rules four successive stages can be distinguished. A first stage of a purely motor and individual character, during which the child handles the marbles at the dictation of his desires and motor habits. This leads to the for­ mation of more or less ritualized schemas, but since play is still purely individual, one can only talk of motor rules and not of truly collective rules. The second may be called egocentric for the following reasons. This stage begins at the moment when the rbild receives from outside the example of codified rules, that is to say, some time between the ages of two and five. But though the child imitates this example, he continues to play either by himself without bothering to find play-fellows, or with others, but without trying to win, and therefore without attempting to unify the different ways of playing. In other words, children of this stage, even when they are playing together, play each one " o n his own” (everyone can win at once) and without regard for any codification of rules. This dual character, combining imitation of others with a purely individual use of the examples received, we have designated by the term Egocentrism.  THE RULES OF THE GAME 17 A third stage appears between 7 and 8, which we shall call the stage of incipient cooperation. Each player now tries to win, and all, therefore, begin to concern themselves with the question of mutual control and of unification of the rules. But while a certain agreement may be reached in the course of one game, ideas about the rules in general are still rather vague. In other words, children of 7—8, who belong to the same class at school and are therefore constantly playing with each other, give, when they are questioned separately, disparate and often entirely contradictory accounts of the rules observed in playing marbles. Finally, between the years of 11 and 12, appears a fourth stage, which is that of the codification of rules. Not only is every detail of procedure in the game fixed, but the actual code of rules to be observed is known to the whole society. There is remarkable concordance in the information given by children of 10-12 belonging to the same class at school, when they are questioned on the rules of the game and their possible variations. These stages must of course be taken only for what they are worth. It is convenient for the purposes of exposition to divide the children up in age-classes or stages, but the facts present themselves as a continuum which cannot be cut up into sections. This continuum, moreover, is not linear in character, and its general direction can only be observed by schematizing the material and ignoring the minor oscillations which render it infinitely complicated in detail. So that ten children chosen at random will perhaps not give the impression' of a steady advance which gradually emerges from the interrogatory put to the hundred odd subjects examined by us at Geneva and NeucMtel. If, now, we turn to the consciousness of rules we shall find a progression that is even more elusive in detail, but no less clearly marked if taken on a big scale. We may express this by saying that the progression runs through three stages, of which the second begins during B 18 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD the egocentric stage and ends towards the middle of the stage of cooperation (9—xo), and of which the third covers the remainder of this co-operating stage and the whole of the stage marked by the codification of rules. During the first stage rules are not yet coercive in character, either because they are purely motor, or else (at the beginning of the egocentric stage) because they are received, as it were, unconsciously, and as interesting examples rather than as obligatory realities. During the second stage (apogee of egocentric and first half of cooperating stage) rules are regarded as sacred and untouchable, emanating from adults and lasting forever. Every suggested alteration strikes the child as a transgression. Finally, during the third stage, a rule is looked upon as a law due to mutual consent, which you must respect if you want to be loyal but which it is permissible to alter on the condition of enlisting general opinion on your side. The correlation between the three stages in the develop­ ment of the consciousness of rules and the four stages relating to their practical observance is of course only a statistical correlation and therefore very crude. But broadly speaking the relation seems to us indisputable. The collective rule is at first something external to the individual and consequently sacred to him ; then, as he gradually makes it his own, it comes to that extent to be felt as the free product of mutual agreement and an autonomous conscience. And with regard to practical use, it is only natural that a mystical respect for laws should be accompanied by a rudimentary knowledge and application of their contents, while a rational and well- founded respect is accompanied by an effective application of each rule in detail. There would therefore seem to be two types of respect for rules corresponding to two types of social behaviour. This conclusion deserves to be closely examined, for if it holds good, it should be of the greatest value to the  THE RULES OF THE GAME 19 analysis of child morality. One can see at once all that it suggests in regard to the relation between child and adult. Take the insubordination of the child towards its parents and teachers, joined to its sincere respect for the commands it receives and its extraordinary mental docility. Could not this be due to that complex of attitudes which we can observe during the egocentric stage and which combines so paradoxically an unstable practice of the law with a mystical attitude towards it ? And will not cooperation between adult and child, in so far as it can be realized and in so far as it is facilitated by co-operation between children themselves, supply the key to the interiorization of commands and to the auto­ nomy of, the moral consciousness ? Let us therefore not be afraid of devoting a certain amount of time to the patient analysis of the rules of a game, for we are here in possession of a method infinitely more supple, and consequently more sure, than that of merely questioning children about little stories, a method which we shall be obliged to adopt in the latter part of this book. § 3.— T h e practice o f r u le s. I. T he first two stag es.— We need not dwell at any length upon the first stage, as it is not directly connected with our subject. At the same time, it is important that we should know whether the rules which come into being previous to any collaboration between children are of the same type as collective rules. Let us give a handful of ten marbles to a child of three years and four months and take note of its reactions : Jacqueline has the marbles in her hands and looks at them with curiosity (it is the first time she has seen any) ; then she lets them drop on to the carpet. After this she puts them in the hollow of an arm-chair. “ Aren't they animals ?— Oh, no.— Are they balls?— Yes.” She puts them back on the carpet and lets them drop from a certain height. She sits on the carpet with her legs apart and throws the marbles a few inches in front 20 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD of her. She then picks them up and puts them on the arm-chair and in the same hole as before. (The arm­ chair is studded with buttons which create depressions in the material.) Then she collects the lot and lets them drop, first all together, then one by one. After this she replaces them in the arm-chair, first in the same place and then in the other holes. Then she piles them up in a pyramid : “ What are marbles ?— What do you think- ? _.. She puts them on the floor, then back on to the aim-chair, in the same holes.— We both go out on to the balcony: she lets the marbles drop from a height to make them bounce. The following days, Jacqueline again places the marbles on the chairs and arm-chairs, or puts them into her little sauce-pan to cook dinner. Or else she simply repeats the behaviour described above. Three points should be noted with regard to facts such as these. In the first place, the lack of continuity and direction in the sequence of behaviour. The child is undoubtedly trying first and foremost to understand the nature of marbles and to adapt its motor schemas to this novel reality. This is why it tries one experiment after another: throwing them, heaping them into pyramids or nests, letting them drop, making them bounce, etc. But once it has got over the first moments of astonish­ ment, the game still remains incoherent, or rather still subject to the whim of the moment. On days when the child plays at cooking dinner, the marbles serve as food to be stewed in a pot. On days when it is interested in classifying and arranging, the marbles are put in heaps in the holes of arm-chairs, and so on. In the general manner in which the game is carried on there are therefore no rules. The second thing to note is that there are certain regularities of detail, for it is remarkable how quickly certain particular acts in the child’s behaviour become schematized and even ritualized. The act of collect­ ing the marbles in the hollow of an arm-chair is at first simply an experiment, but it immediately becomes a motor schema bound up with the perception of the  THE RULES OF THE GAME 21 marbles. After a few days it is merely a rite, still per­ formed with interest, but without any fresh effort of adaptation. In the third place, it is important to note the symbolism 1 that immediately becomes grafted upon the child’s motor schemas. These symbols are undoubtedly enacted in play rather than thought out, but they imply a certain amount of imagination : the marbles are food to be cooked, eggs in a nest, etc. This being so, the rules of games might be thought to derive either from rites analogous to those we have just examined or from a symbolism that has become collective. Let us briefly examine the genesis and ultimate'destiny of these modes of behaviour. Genetically speaking, the explanation both of rites and of symbols would seem to lie in the conditions of pre­ verbal motor intelligence. When it is presented with any new thing, a baby of 5 to 8 months will respond with a dual reaction; it will accommodate itself to the new object and it will assimilate the object to earlier motor schemas. Give the baby a marble, and it will explore its surface and consistency, but will at the same time use it as something to grasp, to suck, to rub against the sides of its cradle, and so on. This assimilation of every fresh object to already existing motor schemas may be conceived of as the starting point of ritual acts and symbols, at any rate from the moment that assimilation becomes stronger than actual accommodation itself. With regard to ritual acts, indeed, one is struck by the fact that from the age of about 8 to 10 months all the child’s motor schemas, apart from moments of adaptation in the real sense, give rise to a sort of functioning in the void, in which the child takes pleasure as in a game. Thus, after having contracted the habit of pressing her face 1 W e use the term “ sym bol " in the sense given to it in the linguistic school of Saussure, as the contrary of sign. A sign is arbitrary, a symbol is m otivated. I t is in this sense, too, th a t Freud speaks of symbolic thought. 22 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD against her parents' cheeks, crumpling up her nose and breathing deeply the while, Jacqueline began to perform this rite as a joke, crumpling up her nose and breathing deeply in advance, merely suggesting contact with another person's face, but without, as before, expressing any particular affection by the act. Thus from being actual, and incorporated in an effective adaptation this schema has become ritualized and serves only as a game.1 Or again, Jacqueline in her bath is engaged in rubbing her hair ; she lets go of it to splash the water. Immediately, she repeats the movement, touching her hair and the water alternately, and during the next few days the schema has become ritualized to such an extent that she cannot strike the surface of the water without first out­ lining the movement of smoothing her hair.2 In no way automatic, this rite is a game that amuses her by its very regularity. Anyone observing a baby of 10 to 12 months will notice a number of these rites which undoubtedly anticipate the rules of future games. As for symbols, they appear towards the end of the first year and in consequence of the ritual acts. For the habit of repeating a given gesture ritually, gradually leads to the consciousness of “ pretending The ritual of going to bed, for instance (laying down one's head and arranging the corner of the pillow with the hundred and one complications which every baby invents), is sooner or later utilized “ in the void ", and the smile of the child as it shuts its eyes in carrying out this rite is enough to show that it is perfectly conscious of “ pretending ” to go to sleep. Here already we have a symbol, but a “ played ” symbol. Finally, when language and imagery come to be added to motor intelligence, the symbol becomes an object of thought. The child who pushes a box along saying “ tuff-tuff ” is assimilating in imagination the box's movement to that of a motor-car: the play symbol has definitely come into being. This being so, can one seek among rites and symbols 1 Age : io months. 2 Age : 12 months.  THE RULES OF THE GAME 23 for the origin of the actual rules of games ? Can the game of marbles, with its infinite complexity both with regard to the actual rules and to all that relates to the verbo-motor system of signs in use— can the game of marbles, then, be conceived simply as the result of an accumulation of individual rites and symbols ? We do not think that it can. We believe that the individual rite and the individual symbol constitute the substructure for the development of rules and collective signs, its necessary, but not its sufficient condition. There is something more in the collective rule than in the motor rule or the individual ritual, just as there is something more in the sign than in the symbol. With regard to motor or ritualistic rules, there can be no doubt that they have something in common with rules in the ordinary sense, namely the consciousness of regularity. When we see the delight taken by a baby of 10 to 12 months or a child of 2-3 in reproducing a given behaviour in all its details, and the scrupulous attention with which it observes the right order in these operations, we cannot help recognizing the Regelbewusstsein of which Biihler speaks. But we must distinguish care­ fully between the behaviour into which there enters only the pleasure of regularity, and that into which there enters an element of obligation. It is this consciousness of obligation which seems to us, as to Durkheim 1 and Bovet,2 to distinguish a rule in the true sense from mere regularity. Now this element of obligation, or, to confine ourselves to the question of the practice of rules, this element of obedience intervenes as soon as there is a society, i.e. a relation between at least two individuals. As soon as a ritual is imposed upon a child by adults or seniors for whom he has respect (Bovet), or as soon, we would add, as a ritual comes into being as the result of the collaboration 1 V E d u ca tio n Morale. 2 " Les Conditions de I'Obligation de la Conscience ” , A nnie Psychol.» 1912. 24 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD of two children, it acquires in the subject’s mind a new character which is precisely that of a rule. This character may vary according to the type of respect which predominates (respect for the senior or mutual respect) but in all cases there enters an element of sub­ mission which was not contained in the rite pure and simple. In actual fact, of course, there is every degree of variety between the simple regularity discovered by the individual and the "rule to which a whole social group submits itself. Thus during the egocentric stage we can observe a whole series of cases in which the child will use a rule as a mere rite, to be bent and modified at will, while at the same time he already tries to submit to the common laws. Just as the child very soon acquires the use of language and of the abstract and general concepts while retaining in his attitude to these much that still belongs to ego­ centric modes of thought and even to the methods peculiar to symbolic and play thought, so, under the rules that are imposed upon him, he will for a long time contrive (in all good faith, needless to say) to maintain his own phantasy in the matter of personal decisions. But this factual continuity between ritual and rule does not exclude a qualitative difference between the two types of behaviour. Let us not, however, anticipate what will be said in our analysis of the consciousness of rules, but return to the matter of ritual. The individual rite develops quite naturally, as we have just shown, into a more or less complex symbolism. Can this symbolism be regarded as the starting point of that system of obligatory verbo- motor signs which are connected with the rules of every collective game ? As with the previous problem, we believe that the symbol is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of the appearance of signs. The sign is general and abstract (arbitrary), the symbol is individual and motivated. If the sign is to follow upon the symbol, a group must therefore strip the individual’s imagination of aU its personal fantasy and then elaborate a common  THE RULES OF THE GAME and obligatory imagery which will go hand in hand with the code of rules itself. Here is an observation showing how far removed are individual rites and symbols from rules and signs, though moving towards these realities in so far as collaboration between children becomes established. Jacqueline (after the observations given above) is playing with Jacques (2 years, ix months and 15 days), who sees marbles for the first time. I. Jacques takes the marbles and lets them drop from a height one after another. After which he picks them up and goes away. II- Jacques arranges them on the ground, in a hollow and says, “ I ’m making a little nest Jacqueline takes one and sticks it in the ground in imitation. III. Jacques also takes one, buries it and makes a mud-pie above it. He digs it up and begins over again. Then he takes 2 at a time which he buries. Then 3, 4, 5 and up to 6 at a time, increasing the number of marbles systematically each time by one. Jacqueline imitates h im : she first puts one marble down and makes a mud-pie over it, then two or three at random and without adopting a fixed system of progression. IV. Jacques puts all the marbles on a pile, then he places an india-rubber ball beside them and sa y s: “ That’s the Mummy ball and the baby balls.” V. He piles them together again and covers them up with earth which he levels down. Jacqueline imitates him but with only one marble which she covers up without levelling the earth. She adds : “ It’s lost ” , then digs it up and begins over again. This example shows very clearly how all the elements of individual fantasy or symbolism remain uncom­ municated ; as soon as the game takes on an imaginative turn each child evokes its favourite images without paying any attention to anyone else’s. It will also be observed how totally devoid of any general direction are the ritualized schemas successively tried. But as soon as there is reciprocal imitation (end of II and whole of III) we have the beginnings of a ru le : each child tries to bury the marbles in the same way as the other, in a common order only more or less successfully adhered to. In bringing out this aspect, the observation leads us 26 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD to the stage of egocentrism during which the child learns other peoples’ rules but practises them in accordance with his own fantasy. We shah conclude this analysis of the first stage by repeating that before games are played in common, no rules in the proper sense can come into existence. Regularities and ritualized schemas are already there, but these rites, being the work of the individual, cannot call forth that submission to something superior to the self which characterizes the appearance of any rule. The second stage is the stage of egocentrism. In studying the practice of rules we shall make use of a notion which has served on earlier occasions in the descriptions we have given of the child’s intellectual behaviour; and, in both cases, indeed, the phenomenon is of exactly the same order. Egocentrism appears to us as a form of behaviour intermediate between purely individual and socialized behaviour. Through imitation and language, as also through the whole content of adult thought which exercises pressure on the child’s mind as soon as verbal intercourse has become possible, the child begins, in a sense, to be socialized from the end of its first year. But the very nature of the relations which the child sustains with the adults around him prevents this socialization for the moment from reaching that state of equilibrium which is propitious to the development of reason. We mean, of course, the state of cooperation, in which the individuals, regarding each other as equals, can exercise a mutual control and thus attain to objectivity. In other words, the very nature of the relation between rhild and adult places the child apart, so that his thought is isolated, and while he believes himself to be sharing the point of view of the world at large he is really still shut up in his own point of view. The social bond itself, by which the child is held, close as it may seem when viewed from outside, thus implies an unconscious in­ tellectual egocentrism which is further promoted by the  THE RULES OF THE GAME 27 Similarly, with regard to the rules of games, it is easy to see, and greater authorities than ourselves1 have already pointed out that the beginnings of children's games are characterized by long periods of egocentrism. The child is dominated on the one hand by a whole set of rules and examples that are imposed upon him from outside. But unable as he is, on the other hand, to place himself on a level of equality with regard to his seniors, he utilizes for his own ends, unaware even of his own isolation, all that he has succeeded in grasping of the social realities that surround him. To confine ourselves to the game of marbles, the child of 3 to 5 years old will discover, according to what other children he may happen to come across, that in order to play this game one must trace a square, put the marbles inside it, try to expel the marbles from the square by hitting them with another marble, start from a line that has been drawn beforehand, and so on. But though he imitates what he observes, and believes in perfect good faith that he is playing like the others, the child thinks of nothing at first but of utilizing these new acquisitions for himself. He plays in an individualistic manner with material that is social. Such is egocentrism. Let us analyse the facts of the case. M a r (6) 2 seizes hold of the marbles we offer him, and without bothering to make a square he heaps them up together and begins to hit the pile. He removes the marbles he has displaced and puts them aside or re­ places them immediately without any method. “ Do you always play like that ?— In the street you make a square.— Well, you do the same as they do in the street.— I'm making a square, I a m (He draws the square, places the marbles inside it and begins to play again.) I play 1 Stem in his Psychology of Early Childhood notes the iden tity of the stages we have established in children's conversations w ith those he has himself established with regard to play, pp. 177 and 332. 2 The numbers in brackets give the child's age. The words of the child are in italics, those of the examiner in Roman lettering. Inverted commas mark the beginning and end of a conversation reported verbatim. All the subjects are boys unless the letter G. is added, indicating that the subject is a girl. 28 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD with him, imitating1 each of his movements. “ Who has won?— We’ve both won.— But who has won most?... — (Mar does not understand.) Baum (61) begins b y making a square and puts down three marbles, adding : “ Sometimes you put 4, or 3 > Or 5 ?— No, not 5, but sometimes 6 or 8.— Who begins when you play with the boys ?— Sometimes me, sometimes the other one.— Isn't there a dodge for knowing who is to begin ?— No.— Do you know what a coche is ? Rather ! " But the sequel shows that he knows nothing about the coche and thinks of this word as designating another game. “ And which of us will begin ? You. W h y ?— I want to see how you do it.” We play for a while and I ask who has won : “ The one who has hit a mib,1 well, he has won.— W ell! who has won i— J have, and then you.” I then arrange things so as to take 4 while he takes 2 : " Who has won ?— I have, and then you.” We begin again. He takes two, I none. '* Who has won ?— I have.— And I ?— You’ve lost.” L o e ff (6) often pretends to be playing with Mae, of whom we shall speak later. He knows neither how to make a square nor to draw a coche. He immediately begins to " f i r e ” at the marbles assembled in a heap and plays without either stopping or paying any attention to us. " Have you won ?— I don’t know. I think I have.— Why ?— Yes, because I threw the tnibs.1— And I ? Yes, because you threw the mibs.” D e s a r z (6): “ Do you play often ?— Yes, rather! With whom 1— All by myself.— Do you like playing alone best ?— You don’t need two. You can play only one.” He gathers the marbles together without a square and " fires ” into the heap. Let us now see how two children, who have grown accustomed to playing together, set about it when they are left alone. They are two boys of whom one (Mae) is a very representative example of the present stage, while the other (Wid) stands at the border line between the present stage and the next. The analyses of these cases will be all the more conclusive as the children in question are no mere beginners at the game. Ma e (6) and W id (7) declare that they are always playing together. Mae tells us that they both “ played 1 EngUsh equivalent for “ marbre ". [Trans.]  THE RULES OF THE GAME 29 again, yesterday I first examine Mae by himself* He piles Ms marbles in a comer without counting them and throws his shooter into the pile. He then places 4 marbles close together and puts a fifth on top (in a pyramid). Mae denies that a square is ever drawn. Then he corrects himself and affirms that he always does s o : " How do you and Wid know which is to begin ?— One of the two throws his shooter and the other tries to hit it. I f he hits it, he begins.” Mae then shows us what the game consists i n : he throws his shooter without taking into account the distances or the manner of playing (“ piquette ” ), and when he succeeds in driving a marble out of the square he immediately puts it back. Thus the game has no end. “ Does it go on like that all the time ?— You take one away to make a change (he takes a marble out of the square, but not the one that he has touched). I f 11 only be finished when there's only one left (he ‘ fires ' again twice). One more shot, and then you take one away” Then he affirms: “ every third shot you take one away” He does so. Mae removes a marble every third shot independently of whether he has hit or missed, which is completely irregular and corresponds to nothing in the game as habitually played, or as we have seen it played in Neuchatel or Geneva. It is therefore a rule which he has invented then and there but which he has the impression of remembering because it presents a vague analogy with what really happens when the player removes the marble he has just “ hit ” (touched). This game of Mae's is therefore a characteristic game of the second stage, an egocentric game in which “ to win ” does not mean getting the better of the others, but simply playing on one's own. Wid, whom I now prepare to question and who has not assisted at Mae's interrogatory, begins by making a square. He places 4 marbles at the 4 comers and one in the middle (the same disposition as Mae's, which was probably a deformation of it). Wid does not know what to do to decide which is to begin, and declares that he understands nothing of the method which Mae had shewn me as being familiar to both of them (trying to hit one's partner's shooter). Wid then throws his shooter in the direction of the square, knocking out one marble which he puts in his pocket. Then I take my turn, but fail to touch anything. He plays again and wins all the marbles, one after the other, keeping them each time. He also declares that when you have knocked a 3o THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD marble out, you have the right to play another shot straight away. After having taken everything he says : “ I ’ve won.” Wid therefore belongs to the third stage if this explanation is taken as a whole, but the sequel will show that he takes no notice of Mae’s doings when they are playing together. Wid stands therefore at the boundary line which separates the stage of egocentrism from the stage of cooperation. I then tell Mae to come into the room and the two children begin to play with each other. Mae draws a square and Wid disposes the marbles in accordance with his habitual schema. Mae begins (he plays “ Roulette ” whereas Wid most of the time plays “ Piquette ) and dislodges four marbles. “ I can play jour times, now ” , adds Mae. This is contrary to all the rules, but Wid finds the statement quite natural. So one game succeeds another. But the marbles are placed in the square by one child or the other as the spirit moves them (according to the rules each must put his “ pose ” ) and the dis­ lodged marbles are sometimes put straight back into the square, sometimes retained by the boy who has won them. Each plays from whatever place he chooses, unchecked by his partner, and each “ fires ” as many timpg as he likes (it thus often happens that Mae and Wid are playing at the same time). I now send Wid out of the room and ask Mae to explain the game to us for a last time. Mae places 16 marbles in the middle of the square. “ Why so many as that ?— So as to win.— How many do you put down at home with Wid ?— I put five, but when I ’m alone, I put lots.” Mae then begins to play and dislodges a marble which he puts on one side. I do the same. The game continues in this way, each playing one shot at a time without taking the dislodged marbles into account (which is contrary to what Mae was doing a moment ago). Mae then places five marbles in the square, like Wid. This time I arrange the five marbles as Mae himself had done at the beginning of the interrogatoiy (four close together and one on top) but Mae seems to have forgotten this way of doing things. In the end Mae plays by taking away a marble every three shots, as before, and says to us : " It’s so that it should stop." We have quoted the whole of this example in order to show how little two children from the same class at  THE RULES OF THE GAME 31 school, living in the same house, and accustomed to playing with each other, are able to understand each other at this age. Not only do they tell us of totally different rules (this still occurs throughout the third stage), but when they play together they do not watch each other and do not unify their respective rules even for the duration of one game. The fact of the matter is that neither is trying to get the better of the other: each is merely having a game on his own, trying to hit the marbles in the square, i.e. trying to “ win ” from his own point of view. This shows the characteristics of the stage. The child plays for himself. His interest does not in any way consist in competing with his companions and in binding himself by common rules so as to see who will get the better of the others. His aims are different. They are indeed dual, and it is this mixed behaviour that really defines egocentrism. On the one hand, the child feels very strongly the desire to play like the other boys, and especially like those older than himself; he longs, that is to say, to feel himself a member of the very honourable fraternity of those who know how to play marbles correctly. But quickly persuading himself, on the other hand, that his playing is “ right ” (he can convince himself as easily on this point as in all his attempts to imitate adult behaviour) the child thinks only of utilizing these acquisitions for himself: his pleasure still consists in the mere development of skill, in carrying out the strokes he sets himself to play. It is, as in the previous stage, essentially a motor pleasure, not a social one. The true " socius ” of the player who has reached this stage is not the flesh and blood partner but the ideal and abstract elder whom one inwardly strives to imitate and who sums up all the examples one has ever received. It little matters, therefore, what one’s companion is doing, since one is not trying to contend against him. It little matters what the details of the rides may be, 32 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD since there is no real contact between the players. This is why the child, as soon as he can schematically copy the big boys’ game, believes himself to be in possession of the whole truth. Each for himself, and all in com­ munion with the “ Elder ” : such might be the formula of egocentric play. It is striking to note the affinity between this attitude of children of 4 to 6 in the game of marbles and the attitude of those same children in their conversations with each other. For alongside of the rare cases of true conversation where there is a genuine interchange of opinions or commands, one can observe in children between 2 and 6 a characteristic type of pseudo-conver­ sation or " collective monologue ” , during which the children speak only for themselves, although they wish to be in the presence of interlocutors who will serve as a stimulus. Now here again, each feels himself to be in communion with the group because he is inwardly address­ ing the Adult who knows and understands everything, but here again, each is only concerned with himself, for lack of having dissociated the “ ego ” from the “ socius ”. These features of the egocentric stage will not, how­ ever, appear in their full light until we come to analyse the consciousness of rules which accompanies this type of conduct. § 4. T he II. T hird and fourth practice of r u l e s. stages.— Towards the age of 7-8 appears the desire for mutual understanding in the sphere of play (as also, indeed, in the conversations between children). This felt need for understanding is what defines the third stage. As a criterion of the appearance of this stage we shall take the moment when by “ winning ” the child refers to the fact of getting the better of the others, therefore of gaining more marbles than the others, and when he no longer says he has won when he has done no more than to knock a marble out of the square, regardless of what his partners have done. As a matter of fact,  THE RULES OF THE GAME 33 no child, even from among the older ones, ever attributes very great importance to the fact of knocking out a few more marbles than Ms opponents. Mere competition is therefore not what constitutes the affective motive-power of the game. In seeking to win the child is trying above all to contend with his partners while observing common rules. The specific pleasure of the game thus ceases to be muscular and egocentric, and becomes social. Henceforth, a game of marbles constitutes the equivalent in action of what takes place in discussion in words: a mutual evaluation of the competing powers which leads, thanks to the observation of common rules, to a conclusion that is accepted by all. As to the difference between the third and fourth stages, it is only one of degree. The children of about f to 10 (third stage) do not yet know the rules in detail. They try to learn them owing to their increasing interest in the game played in common, but when different children of the same class at school are questioned on the subject the discrepancies are still considerable in the information obtained. It is only when they are at play that these same children succeed in understanding each other, either by copying the boy who seems to know most about it, or, more frequently, by ’omitting any usage that might be disputed. In this way they play a sort of simplified game. Children of the fourth stage, on the contrary, have thoroughly mastered their code and even take pleasure in juridical discussions, whether of principle or merely of procedure, which may at times arise out of the points in dispute. Let us examine some examples of the third stage, and, in order to point more clearly to the differentiating characters of this stage, let us begin by setting side by side the answers of two little boys attending the same class at school and accustomed to playing together. (The children were naturally questioned separately in order to avoid any suggestion between them, but we afterwards compared their answers with one another.) c 34 THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD B en (io ) and Nus ( n , backward, one year below the school standard) are both in the fourth year of the lower school and both play marbles a great deal. They agree in regarding the square as necessary. Nus declares that y