Ethics in Public Relations Theory and Practice PDF

# Chapter 33: Ethics in Public Relations ## Theory and Practice **Patricia A. Curtin** **Lois A. Boynton** Few fields can invoke as much debate over ethics as can public relations. In Toxic Sludge Is Good for You, Stauber and Rampton (1995) labeled much public relations "contrived," "undemocratic...

# Chapter 33: Ethics in Public Relations ## Theory and Practice **Patricia A. Curtin** **Lois A. Boynton** Few fields can invoke as much debate over ethics as can public relations. In Toxic Sludge Is Good for You, Stauber and Rampton (1995) labeled much public relations "contrived," "undemocratic," "manipulative," "misleading," and "phony." That the book is in its third printing, however, might testify more to the vibrancy of the discussion about public relations ethics today than to the accuracy of its claims. In just the past 5 years, public relations ethics has been the topic of more than 10 professional seminars and more than 20 articles and books. Because how one defines public relations in part determines how one defines ethical public relations practice, much of the contemporary discussion originates in the debate about the function of public relations. Is public relations a profession and, therefore, bound by professional codes? Is its primary function to inform, to persuade, or to negotiate and accommodate? What weight should be given to conflicting individual, group, and societal obligations? This chapter outlines the philosophical principles underlying ethics and relates them to models of public relations practice to demonstrate how form and function mutually inform public relations ethics. ## Philosophical and Theoretical Bases of Ethical Decision Making **Teleological versus Deontological Reasoning** Broadly speaking, ethical though can be divided into teleological and deontological approaches. Teleology emphasizes outcomes; simply put, the ends justify the means. Ethical actions are those that result in the greatest good. Restricted forms of teleology calculate the consequences only for a particular person or group such as family or firm. Universal teleology, or utilitarianism, stresses consequences to society as a whole – the greatest good for the greatest number. Critics of teleology note that knowing the consequences of actions before the fact can be difficult, that not all things can be assigned a numerical value (e.g., human life), and that looking only at short-term consequences can be shortsighted. Deontologists believe that good consequences are not in and of themselves sufficient to guarantee good actions; some acts be done regardless of their consequences. Rule deontology stresses following rules when making ethical decisions such as the Golden Rule, the Ten Commandments, or a professional code of ethics. Critics note, however, that sometimes correct actions have disastrous consequences. For example, some individuals would not lie when asked by Nazi interrogators where Jews were hidden. Act (or mixed) deontology weighs both acts and their consequences to determine ethical action, relying on rigorous application of concepts of duty, justice, and rights. This approach is inherently difficult to apply, however, and often results instead in ethical relativism, where each situation is approached individually and no consistent guidelines are applied. ## A Typology of Moral Decision Making and Public Relations Models Kohlberg’s (1981b, 1984) typology of six stages of moral reasoning provides a useful basis for discussion of the differing approaches to public relations ethics. Kohlberg’s preconventional level (Stages 1 and 2) comprises a restricted teleological view focusing on self-interest. Persons who employ Stage 1 reasoning act out of fear of reprisal, obeying those who have power over them such as practitioners who comply with all management orders for no reason other than fear of losing their jobs if they do not. This type of thinking is characterized by commitment to personal goals rather than societal ones, use of situational consequences rather than universal principles, and emotional reaction rather than reasoned action (Kohlberg, 1981b, 1984). Persons using Stage 2 reasoning exploit situations for personal gain. Individuals act for personal reward, using manipulation and deception as necessary to achieve the desired end. Short-term rewards are emphasized over long-term consequences (Kohlberg, 1981b, 1984). Practitioners employing this type of moral reasoning would exploit situations to achieve promotion within their firm or organization such as the promotional activity often associated with P.T. Barnum. In terms of J. Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) four models of public relations, the propaganda model, with its emphasis on personal gain over societal well-being, equates with Kohlberg’s typology at this level. At the conventional level (Stages 3 and 4), principles are based on conformity to commonly accepted expectations or standards. Individuals using Stage 3 reasoning promote the interests of their culture, peer group, or organization such as practitioners who place the goals of their company or organization above all else. The reasoning may encompass both deontological and teleological principles provided that they are principles held by the group or result in actions that benefit the group (Kohlberg, 1981b, 1984). Persons employing Stage 4 reasoning obey the letter of the law because it represents legitimate power accruing from position or legal standing. Correct action consists of obeying the laws and fulfilling duties to maintain the group and allow it to function, a form of rule deontology (Kohlberg, 1981b, 1984). Practitioners employing such reasoning would rely on written codes, such as those of the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) or International Association of Business Communicators (IABC), because they represent legitimate authority within the profession. With their emphasis on promoting the interests of the primary reference group, J. Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) journalist-in-residence and two-way asymmetric models align roughly with Kohlberg’s typology at the conventional level (Stages 3 and 4) of moral reasoning. The postconventional level (Stages 5 and 6) is marked by personal autonomy and critical reflection. Stage 5 reasoning is universal teleology or utilitarianism; consequences for general societal well-being are crucial to ethical decision making (Kohlberg, 1981b, 1984). Practitioners using this reasoning make ethical decisions based on the overall consequences for society and not based solely on the benefits to their client or organization. J. Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) two-way symmetric model, based on equality among organizations and their publics, roughly aligns with Kohlberg’s postconventional type of reasoning. Stage 6 principled reasoning is a form of act deontology in which each decision is weighed based on its benefit to society in terms of universal principles such as equity, justice, and fairness. People are seen as ends in themselves, not as a means to an end or even as the ends of society as a whole. Decisions are made based on principles freely chosen but that the chooser would be willing for everyone to live by as well (French & Granrose, 1995). Kohlberg, a developmental psychologist, termed true Stage 6 reasoning theoretical only; he believed that most people could not achieve the rigor of thought necessary to employ it with any consistency (Colby, Gibbs, Kohlberg, Dubin-Speicher, & Candee, 1980). Relating J. Grunig and Hunt’s models to Kohlberg’s typology, based on the relevant domain of validity for both, illustrates how differing views of the function of public relations equate with differing types of ethical reasoning. It must be stressed, however, that the models are used here as a typology only and not to argue, as J. Grunig (1992c) did, that one model represents a better form of practice than does another model. Similarly, Kohlberg’s numbered stages represent a typology only and do not indicate that one stage is better than another stage (Colby et al., 1980). Empirical tests of Kohlberg’s typology demonstrate that although individuals rely predominantly on one type of moral reasoning, they use a combination of types to a certain extent (Colby et al., 1980), much as J. Grunig (1992c) found that organizations use a combination of models of public relations, with one model often predominating. Kohlberg also found that most adults use conventional-level reasoning predominantly, much as J. Grunig (1992c) found that the corresponding journalist-in-residence and two-way asymmetric models predominate in practice. This interrelated structure of ethical theory and public relations function provides a basis for the examination of different schools of thought in public relations ethics. ## Schools of Thought in Public Relations Ethics ### Coorientation The coorientation model uses teleological reasoning; practitioners should strive to achieve a convergence of perspectives between an organization and its key publics (Broom, 1977). The emphasis on shared group norms makes coorientation theory consistent with Kohlberg’s Stage 3 reasoning. Much of the literature has emphasized the media relations function and defined journalists as the key public. Aronoff (1975) found that journalists typically do not view practitioners as credible. Journalists, however, have greater respect for practitioners with whom they regularly work than for the public relations profession in general. How journalists classify practitioners differs based on whether the image was formed from general perception (social norm level) or through personal experience (functional level) (Jeffers, 1977). Conversely, practitioners typically have a better image of the journalism profession than of individual reporters. Journalists and practitioners define lying similarly and agree that declining comment or being evasive does not equate with telling a lie (Ryan & Martinson, 1991). Because both journalists and practitioners view practitioners as less forthright due to their advocacy role, journalists might believe that public relations professionals are less trustworthy. The coorientation model assumes convergent norms, but public relations practitioners often are measured against the journalistic standard as an absolute. This inequality may be attributed to the large number of practitioners who began their careers as journalists (Meyer, 1983). Some fear that by not embracing journalistic ethics, they will alienate those who control important news channels (Nayman, McKee, & Lattimore, 1977; Seib & Fitzpatrick, 1995), a form of Kohlberg’s Stage 3 reasoning. Because coorientation theory is based on the presupposition that journalists and practitioners perform similar job functions and, therefore, should follow similar professional norms, the theory is applicable only to those practitioners working in media relations and following a journalist-in-residence model of practice. In addition, because the emphasis has been placed on journalistic norms rather than on a convergence of perspectives, critics argue that the coorientation model will forever condemn public relations to being perceived as inherently unethical (McBride, 1989). For example, journalists justify the use of unethical practices as a means of obtaining truth and serving the public interest, but they perceive practitioners as roadblocks to the public interest, serving the corporate interest instead (Bishop, 1988; Ryan & Martinson, 1991). If, however, publics other than the media are the ends in question, then advocacy can be viewed as an ethical function. ### Advocacy Advocacy ethics stems from the social responsibility theory of the press and from persuasion, rooted in Greek philosophy as a legitimate means of conveying a position or argument (Heath, 1997; Toth & Heath, 1992). The approach is primarily teleological, valuing organizational goals, but fundamental, rules-based guidelines may be applied (Nelson, 1994), consistent with Kohlberg’s (1981b, 1984) conventional-level reasoning. The social responsibility theory of the press (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956) has implications for all communicators because of its emphasis on the necessity of allowing all ideas to compete in the free marketplace of ideas. Some even suggest that public relations arose from a lack of media responsibility (Wright, 1976) because of the need for practitioners to make public information that otherwise was going unpublished during the public-be-damned business era. Since Ivy Lee, many practitioners consider social responsibility not only to make good business sense but also be a categorical imperative (Seib & Fitzpatrick, 1995). Whereas Lee emphasized the public’s right to know, Edward Bernays stressed the advocacy nature of public relations, thereby sharply differentiating it from the journalistic function in the minds of many journalists, as noted in the previous subsection (McBride, 1989). Proponents of advocacy theory note that in a democratic society based on free expression, a persuasion ethic is both acceptable and necessary for the emergence of truth (Barney & Black, 1994; Bernays, 1986). Much like attorneys, who function as advocates for their clients, practitioners serve as organizational advocates, whether presenting the benefits of products or designing persuasive healthcare messages (Wallack, Dorfman, Jernigan, & Themba, 1993; Witte, 1994). Advocacy allows members of the public to make informed decisions of their own free will, permitting “voluntary change” in attitudes or behaviors (Nelson, 1994). Final responsibility for informed choice, then, lies not with the practitioner but rather with the public. Persuasion is considered unethical, however, when deliberate lying, distortion, or deception is used to mask intentions such as in the case of blatantly irresponsible communication campaigns (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Nelson, 1994; Olasky, 1985a, 1985b), but at times the ethical implications might be difficult to discern (Guttman, 1997). Critics argue that persuasion never can be considered a sound ethical basis because the true end is not public welfare but rather organizational profit. Thus, J. Grunig (1992c) argued in excellence theory that only a two-way symmetrical public relations approach that gives equal weight to company/client and public interests, as opposed to manipulative one-way techniques, can guide ethical practice. Such an approach might be naïve because in practice most employers expect practitioners to be organizational advocates as part of their contractual work. Although practitioners also may function as the organizational conscience, with socially responsible practitioners guiding management toward strategies that reflect the public interest (Theus, 1995), employers often equate advocacy with loyalty (Spicer, 1997). Many practitioners rank responsibility to the public above their responsibility to the organization (Judd, 1989), but they also find that ethical demands of the employing organization, the society, and the self might contradict, creating confusion within the public relations profession as well as misunderstanding and mistrust among the public (Parsons, 1993; Shamir, Reed, & Connell, 1990; Stacks & Wright, 1989; Wright, 1989). A more fundamental critique stems from the critical/cultural paradigm, which brands social libertarianism as a hegemonic notion, encouraging the idea of a free marketplace of ideas and informed citizenry while in fact promoting the status quo to maintain inherent power differentials. Under this view, the public relations practitioner is not the champion of the activist voice unheard by journalists but rather the source of expertise available only to those who can afford it, meaning that many voices remain relatively unheard (L’Etang, 1996a). ### Professionalism Professionalism typically employs rule deontology (Kohlberg’s Stage 4 reasoning) to determine the scope of acceptable principles through codes, accreditation, and licensing. Professional associations and a growing number of companies have codified ethics to define daily decision-making standards and reflect practitioner responsibility to the public (Bovet, 1993; Hunt & Tirpok, 1993; Jurgensen & Lukaszewski, 1988; Seib & Fitzpatrick, 1995). Codes also may reinforce ethical expectations to public relations novices and deter government intervention, thereby enhancing professionalism (Wright, 1993). Many industry associations, including the IABC and International Public Relations Association (IPRA), have member codes. The PRSA formalized ethics standards nearly a half century ago and has updated its Code of Professional Standards every decade since. The code addresses public interest, honesty, integrity, accuracy, truth, disclosure, conflict of interest, gifts, confidence and privacy, professional reputation, and enforcement terms (Bovet, 1993). Professional organizations also have instituted a universal accreditation process, formally acknowledging mastery of public relations practices and ethics, to signal greater professionalism (Marston, 1968; Pavlik, 1987). Practitioner dedication to professional norms, however, is relatively unsubstantiated (Cameron, Sallot, & Curtin, 1997). Although some evidence exists that accredited PRSA members show greater professional orientation than do non-accredited members regarding some occupation values, results are not conclusive (Wright, 1981). Accreditation of individual practitioners is not enough to ensure societal acceptance of the value of public relations (Jackson, 1988. Sharpe, 1986) or to ensure accountability (Wright, 1993). Proponents of licensing point to the need to advance beyond codes and accreditation to enable performance standards to be enforced extensively and uniformly (Forbes, 1986), a move that most practitioners resist as inviting government interference (Hunt & Tirpok, 1993). Promoting codes beyond the public relations ranks might help engender public acceptance of professionalism, with or without licensing. Reliance on professional ethics codes leads to criticisms that they are vague, unenforceable, or applied inconsistently (Hunt & Tirpok, 1993; Kruckeberg, 1993b; Seib & Fitzpatrick, 1995; Wright, 1993). For example, the PRSA code clearly proscribes lying, but it does not give clear guidance on when withholding information is justified, an ethical dilemma experienced by most practitioners (Ryan & Martinson, 1984; Saunders, 1989). Calls have been made to give elements of the PRSA code operational definitions to make the standards less vague (Sharpe, 1986), but doing so could make the code so situationally specific as to render it useless in practice and legally problematic (Seib & Fitzpatrick, 1995). As globalization has evolved, others have suggested the development of universal or international codes based on belief that certain moral elements are basic to all humanity despite cultural difference (Kruckeberg, 1989, 1993b; Sharpe, 1986). Many cultures, however, do not embrace written codes of ethics, making such a code unlikely to gain wide acceptance and necessarily so broad as to lack pragmatic application (French & Granrose, 1995). Codes of ethics, then, might be better at providing an image of professionalism than at actually guiding action (Wright, 1993). In fact, in one study practitioners who said that they relied on codes of ethics also believed that they did not face ethical dilemmas in their work, suggesting that codes might be applied more as a professional prop than as a tool for thoughtful decision making (Saunders, 1989). ### Game Theory Game theory proposes that social interactions can be analyzed using mathematics to determine beneficial actions (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Applied to public relations, game theory expands Ehling’s (1984, 1985) decision theory model, in which individuals identify possible actions and weigh their outcomes to resolve conflict, by placing individual decision strategies in the context of other players (Murphy, 1989). The resulting purely teleological ethics, a type of cost-benefit analysis, weighs the consequences of possible actions by all actors by assigning numerical values to each. Much as individuals often use simple cost-benefit analysis to make decisions about everyday things such as consumer purchases (French & Granrose, 1995), proponents of game theory stress the ability of this more complex form of cost-benefit analysis to allow practitioners to make systematic rational decisions not just based on the organizations for which they work but also taking into account their publics, particularly in instances where clear-cut choices might not be obvious (Murphy, 1989). By weighing the “what ifs” for all players, game theory enables practitioners to better understand coalition formation and behavior and to proceed with more confidence in strategic planning (Folger, Poole, & Stutman, 1993). Critics of game theory point to the problems inherent in any purely teleological approach. Determining all possible consequences and players beforehand can be difficult (if not impossible), assigning numeric values to all possible actions and outcomes can be arbitrary at best, and achieving the best outcome might require inherently unethical action such as lying. In addition, although true game theory requires that all players be considered, cost-benefit analysis often is used in a restricted teleological form. For example, Ford Motor Company analysts used cost-benefit analysis in their decision not to recall the Pinto and fix its gas tank despite the hazard to human life. Management, then, may stress the financial bottom line over intangibles such as public faith and goodwill, to which it is inherently more difficult to assign a dollar value, when calculating outcomes, particularly in times of crisis (French & Granrose, 1995; Rest, 1979). If not carefully applied, game theory degenerates into gamesmanship in which personal assertiveness is high, cooperation is low, and other players are disempowered (Folger et al., 1993). Depending on the breadth of application, then, game theory can embody Kohlberg’s (1981b, 1984) Stage 2, Stage 3, or Stage 5 reasoning. ### Corporate Responsibility Corporate responsibility has been approached from two different theoretical backgrounds. One is enlightened self-interest, a restricted form of teleology consistent with Kohlberg’s Stage 3 reasoning. A corporation recognizes that doing good results in doing well, and being seen as a responsible corporate citizen benefits the bottom line (Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 1994; K. Leeper, 1996). Consumer advocacy and awareness have forced businesses to be more accountable to society (Wright, 1976). Thus, corporate philanthropy represents good action because of the resulting goodwill that it buys for the company or organization. Ethical action is determined using cost-benefit analysis to further the company’s goals in the belief that what benefits the organization will have wider consequences and eventually will benefit society as well. Recently, this approach to corporate responsibility has fallen in favor of an approach based in social contract theory and the notion that social responsibility goes beyond good business practice; it encompasses the rights of publics and corporations’ duties to those publics (Heath, 1997; Martinson, 1994, 1995-1996). As such, this formulation combines aspects of coorientation, advocacy, professionalism, and game theory, culminating in a form of act deontology in which principles are delineated to guide actions and communications with publics. Publics themselves are viewed as stakeholders and are treated as ends in themselves and not as means to ends (L’Etang, 1996a). Stakeholder ethics emphasizes an organization’s obligations to both internal and external publics, with the realization that these interests often will conflict and that principles of balancing these interests, such as not harming others, must be developed (Cunningham & Haley, 1998; Heath, 1997). Ethical action, then, involves respecting the rights of others and upholding the organizational duty to those others by not compromising ethical principles. Proponents point to the process of issues management to demonstrate stakeholder ethics and corporate responsibility in action. Organizations monitor their environments and identify publics and their interests to determine courses of action that will respect the rights of all stakeholders (Heath, 1997; Heath & Ryan, 1989; L’Etang, 1996a). In practice, however, this approach often is not easy to achieve, in large part because public relations practitioners frequently are left out of organizational ethical decision making, leaving them powerless to enact corporate philosophies (Fitzpatrick, 1996b; Heath & Ryan, 1989). Because it requires changes in organizational behavior, it is easier to practice socially responsible public relations when that already is management’s philosophy (Heath, 1997; Wright, 1976). Empirical studies suggest that external publics all too often are discounted, and corporate responsibility reverts from actions performed out of obligation to publics and long-term planning to those performed in enlightened self-interest serving the short-term bottom line (Heath & Ryan, 1989; L’Etang, 1996a; Martinson, 1995-1996). Critics suggest that major social reform is necessary to strengthen the relational links among individuals, organizations, and their shared environments. Such approaches often are based in communitarian ethics, which stresses the role of the community in forging ethical people and organizations as well as the equal empowerment of all members of the community-individual, corporate, and otherwise—consonant with J. Grunig’s (1992c) excellence theory of public relations (Culbertson & Chen, 1997b; K. Leeper, 1996). Other approaches suggest that such change can originate within corporations themselves (Heath, 1997) and that most successful businesses already are using self-regulation to operate under such a model. Lacking a clear strong motivation for corporate responsibility, however, equal empowerment of stakeholders probably will remain an ideal but not a functional norm (L’Etang, 1996a). ### Structural/Functional Approach A structural/functional approach to public relations ethics is based in systems theory, which stresses the role of organizational environment and purpose, to delineate differing ethical standards according to job function (Bivins, 1987, 1989a. 1989b; Judd, 1989) based on Dozier’s (1983) identification of two main public relations roles: communication technician and communication manager. This division results in an ethical decision-making hierarchy in which technicians, functioning as advocates for their organization, first employ rule deontological principles such as codes of ethics; if codes are unavailable or incomplete, then practitioners turn to teleological principles (Bivins, 1989a, 1989b, 1992). But because managers function as advisers, they follow the opposite route, as befits a more autonomous and objective status. Both approaches fall within Kohlberg’s (1981b, 1984) conventional-level reasoning. A strength of this approach is its ability to provide a unified ethical system for differing public relations functions. Although the oder of application varies, the same principles are sued by advocates and advisers, resulting in similar outcomes (Bivins, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1992). Empirical tests have found a significant correlation between the adviser function and an emphasis on social responsibility (Judd, 1989), although it is unclear whether this relationship is a result of job role, age, or experience. However, professionals rank the public image of practitioners’ sense of social responsibility as poor (Judd, 1989; Pratt, 1991b). Thus, a functional basis for ethical development could be inadequate if a shared notion of the adviser function is not publicly held, which might reduce motivation to conform to its standards. Additional lack of motivation stems from the hierarchical ordering of the functions, which makes ethics a luxury of those with autonomy. Because the technician functions as an advocate whose primary loyalty is to the employer, questioning the employer’s ethics can result in loss of employment, leading proponents of this approach to suggest that these types of ethical calls are best left to advisers (Bivins, 1987, 1989a, 1989b). Thus, the approach assumes that, at the technician level at least, professional norms can be separated from personal values, an assumption not supported by empirical tests (Shamir et al., 1990; Stacks & Wright, 1989; Wright, 1989). Those who propose that advocates should hold to personal principles despite company loyalty suggest that such individuals become whistle-blowers as necessary (Schick, 1996)—a course of action that lacks inherent motivation. The fundamental critique of structural/functional approaches, then, is their assumption that the function is inherently ethical rather than examining the ethical basis of the function itself. ### Accommodation/Discursive Approach Whereas the structural/functionalist approach emphasizes the strategic goal achievement aspects of systems theory, the accommodation/discursive approach emphasizes the relational aspects. Sullivan (1965a, 1965b) outlined three types of public relations values: technical, which he viewed as morally neutral; partisan, comprising commitment, loyalty, and trust in the organization; and mutual, comprising institutional obligations to the public based on principles of mutuality and rationality. Sullivan placed the locus of ethical issues at the intersection of partisan and mutual values, highlighting the tension that often exists in practice between organizational and broader societal interests, and stressed the need for practitioners to facilitate communication between the two (Pearson, 1989c). In addition, the approach employs the discourse ethics of Habermas (1979a, 1996) to resituate ethics in the process of communication rather than in communication outcomes. Building on Kohlberg’s typology of moral reasoning, Habermas (1979a) specified discourse rules ensuring that discussion participants are best able to advance their interests and weigh them critically against those of the larger community (Huspek, 1997). This philosophy is embodied in Item 7 of the IPRA code of ethics: Members “shall undertake to establish the moral, psychological, and intellectual conditions for dialogue in its true sense.” Pearson (1989a) and R. Leeper (1996) outlined a communication system that promotes negotiation between equal and rational communicators, equating it with J. Grunig’s ideal model of public relations practice, the two-way symmetrical communication model. The role of the practitioner is to ensure the possibility of and enactment through a collaborative decision-making process within the systems perspective (Pearson, 1990). Under this approach, advocacy is inherently unethical because it is based on content, not process, and on monologue, not dialogue (J. Grunig, 1993d; J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1992). The approach makes moot the question of whether clients are so unethical that a practitioner cannot represent them in good faith (J. Grunig, 1993d) because unethical clients often refuse to submit to such a process. Critics note that the process requires rational application of procedural rules, yet not all organizations are interested in rational decision making, leaving open the question of whether using persuasion to convince them to enter into negotiation would not be more ethical than simply leaving them outside the bounds of practice (Cheney & Dionisopoulos, 1989). In addition, empirical evidence suggests that few employers are willing to pay practitioners to perform as negotiators for equally empowered conflicting publics, a condition termed managerial bias in organizational communications (Hellweg, 1989). One answer to these difficulties has been suggested by development of the mixed-motives model of public relations practice, in which elements of game theory and systems theory are combined to suggest a continuum between the two-way asymmetric and two-way symmetric models (Dozier, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1995; J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1992; Murphy, 1991; Pavlik, 1989). Within this model, organizations strive to forward their own interests and increase their autonomy while reaching results acceptable to their publics (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1992). Excellent or normative public relations practice, however, still is equated with the two-way symmetric model despite admissions that the model contains some asymmetric elements (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1992; Dozier et al., 1995). The result of the mixed-motives theoretical development is to once again stress the functional elements of systems theory over relational aspects, reducing it to a hierarchical structural/functional approach in which persuasion is applied first, followed by negotiation if persuasion fails. Again, ethics becomes a privilege of the few practitioners who have managed to acquire advisor roles in socially responsible companies. For the majority of practitioners, the model may serve instead as an excuse for always falling short of ethical action. ### Contingency Theory Contingency theory, a relatively new development in public relations theory, arose from perceived difficulties with J. Grunig’s excellence theory of public relations as outlined earlier. Recognizing that many internal and external factors could constrain relations with publics, contingency theory suggests that organizations weigh these factors to determine which style of public relations practice is most appropriate under the circumstances (Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997; Leichty & Springston, 1993). Accommodation, then, is not always possible or even desirable. Instead, a large number of factors must be carefully weighed and systematically applied in any given situation. To date, limited empirical testing of the model has been performed (e.g., Cameron, Mitrook, & Cancel, 1997), and full ethical development has yet to take place. A decision-making framework consonant with a contingency approach expands on the Potter Box, in which agents prioritize values and publics by defining the situation, identifying values, selecting principles, and choosing loyalties (McElreath, 1996). This approach, rather than forcing a choice, combines deontological and teleological principles in a similar four-step framework: 1. Confront ethical dilemma. 2. Determine individual motivation act. 3. Consider rules, principles, and duties as well as predictions concerning causes and consequences of actions. 4. Reach decision and take appropriate action. The result suggests a true situation ethics in which moral decisions are based on detailed knowledge of each relevant situation and both principled action and a weighing of consequences (Vasquez, 1996). Care should be taken here to distinguish true situation ethics, comprising Stage 6 reasoning in Kohlberg’s typology and requiring the most cognitive effort (French & Granrose, 1995), from situational ethics, which often is misused as a synonym for ethical relativism (see, e.g., Jurgensen & Lukaszewski, 1988). Empirical work has found that practitioners find both strict teleological and strict (rule) deontological approaches to be insufficient in and of themselves, preferring a true situation ethic (Englehardt & Evans, 1994). Pratt (1993), after reviewing classic utilitarian and deontological approaches, also espoused what he termed an “eclectic ethical approach” in which each situation is carefully weighed against principles of duty and justice and in terms of their consequences to decide what constitutes ethical action in that instance. Because both are forms of act deontology, the contingency approach suggests an ethics similar to that formulated by Heath (1997; see also Toth & Heath, 1992) under the corporate responsibility model, attributable in large part to the fact that both approaches treat public relations not as a singular function or set of discrete functions but rather as a multifaceted process. Further testing of contingency theory is necessary, however, to determine whether the two approaches are fully consonant. As noted earlier, however, act deontological principles are difficult to apply consistently, and Kohlberg believed that most people were incapable of the sustained cognitive effort that such reasoning requires. When not consistently applied, situation ethics degenerates into ethical relativism. Thus, it might be no accident that empirical research to date, including interviews, experiments, and surveys, suggests that ethical relativism predominates in the profession, with no one set of ethical principles applied consistently (Olasky, 1985a, 1985b; Ryan & Martinson, 1984; Saunders, 1989). When situation ethics degenerates into ethical relativism, it allows practitioners to rationalize inappropriate behaviors (Jurgensen & Lukaszewski, 1988). ## Implications for Public Relations Practice ### Responding to Environmental Factors As the preceding discussion illustrates, the definitions of the function of public relations and ethical public relations practice are mutually informative. Empirical research demonstrates that no one ethical approach dominates in practice, in large part because no one functional definition of public relations exists (Pratt, 1994). What is evident, however, is that public relations is operating in an increasingly complex environment, and as in any robust profession, new environmental factors renew debate. Witness the medical profession’s attempts to distribute donated organs fairly or to conduct genetic research. Similarly, many environmental factors have contributed to the recent development of public relations—information overload and new technology, the increasing emphasis on public opinion for policy formation, the global economy, the rise of consumerism and environmentalism, increasing government regulation, and the proliferation of publics and decline of mass media (Heath, 1997; Wilcox, Ault, & Agee, 1998). From these trends, a clear ethical directive has emerged. Organizations no longer can hold onto the false belief that they can function as independent entities divorced from society at large. Unidimensional ethical theories that take only the organization into account, such as simple forms of coorientation, advocacy, professionalism, or corporate social responsibility, are not adequate to inform modern practice. As interior and exterior publics become more diverse and more empowered, public relations practice must embrace new techniques and expand its ethical reasoning to handle conflicting stakeholder claims while defining and redefining organizational relations on an ongoing bias (Vasquez, 1996). Thus, public relations practice must become more proactive, engaging in environmental scanning and issues management to gauge and meet the changing needs of the organization and its publics. To reach the ever-increasing diversity of publics, practitioners must engage in narrowcasting and develop new technology channels as a means of empowering publics through two-way information and communication flow. To support public relations as a proactive management function, a more complex ethical framework is required, one that expands from organizational to societal viewpoints—or, in Kohlberg’s terms, from conventional to postconventional thought—such as those suggested by the relational dynamics of contingency theory and more complex forms of corporate social responsibility. ### Reconciling Normative Theory With Practical Application If management