Distributive Justice PDF

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10/16/24 X THE P U LNAI V C EE RO THE S FI T U Y SOE FF USLT R UNIVERSITY LEAT OF AHRC N LI N YG STRATHCLYDE DE www.strath.ac.uk 1 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Justice I: John Rawls and A Theory of Justice Dr Johann Go Topic 4 – L2235 Political Philosophy 2 1  10/16/24 X Mid-Semester Module Evaluation T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Please scan the QR code to complete the survey 3 X Attendance Monitoring: QR Code T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Please scan the QR code to log your attendance on MyPlace: 4 2 10/16/24 3 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E 5 6  10/16/24 X Lectures 7 & 8 T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Lecture 7: Rawls and Justice As Fairness What is justice? The Original Position and Veil of Ignorance Rawls’ Two Principles of Justice The Site of Justice and the Basic Structure Rawlsian Assumptions and Limitations Lecture 8: Rawls and His Critics Egalitarian, Anti-Egalitarian, Feminist, Race, Disability, and Communitarian Critiques 7 X John Rawls (1921-2002) T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E 8 4  10/16/24 X John Rawls T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E John Rawls is widely considered the most influential political philosopher of the past century. He is often credited with reviving normative political philosophy. He is hugely influential across political philosophy, as well as the cognate disciplines of moral philosophy, philosophy of law, social theory, and economic theory. 9 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E The most relevant works for understanding John Rawls’ theory of justice are: A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition, 1999) Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition, 2005) Justice As Fairness: A Restatement (with Erin Kelly, 2001) These constitute the most definitive accounts of Rawls’ core views. 10 5 10/16/24 6 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E 11 12  10/16/24 X What is justice? T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Justice is about the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens. Benefits include rights, material possessions, self-respect, basic needs etc. Burdens are the opposite of benefits and include disadvantage, differential material prospects, punishment, etc. Justice is not just about the criminal justice system. Criminal justice is only a small part of what justice is about. 13 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Rawls provides a particular conception of justice called justice as fairness. A conception means that it is one account of what justice demands. There are other rival accounts, as we shall see. One of Rawls’ innovations was to give us a method for deciding what principles of justice we should adopt and how society should be designed in a way that is fair. This method is called the Original Position. 14 7  10/16/24 X The Original Position T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E One of Rawls’ most influential ideas is the Original Position. The Original Position is a hypothetical thought experiment to force us to consider what the right policies should be when we are fully unbiased. The answer is that these are the principles of justice that rational and reasonable people who are impartial would choose when placed in the Original Position behind the veil of ignorance. 15 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E We imagine that we have to decide what the laws and policies of society should be, but we do not know our class, level of wealth, education, or other social characteristics. We do not know what position we will come to occupy once we emerge from the Original Position. We do not know if we will be rich or poor, educated or uneducated. Analogy – How would you fairly divide a birthday cake if you did not know which piece you would get? 16 8  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Because of this, Rawls argues that we will reason in a way that is impartial and fair. We will support principles of justice that give us the best chance of a life that is decent, given that we might end up poor. This is known as the principle of maximin reasoning. We would want to maximise the minimum. 17 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E 18 9  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E From the Original Position, Rawls thinks that reasonable, rational and impartial people would support two principles of justice. This is Rawls’ normative blueprint for how society should be designed. 19 X Rawls’ Two Principles of Justice T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E First Principle of Justice: “Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.” This is known as the principle of equal basic liberties or the basic liberties principle. 20 10  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Second Principle of Justice: “Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; (b) They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least- advantaged members of society (the difference principle) (JF, 42–43)” (Wenar) 21 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Rawls supports two principles of justice (even though there are really three principles): The Principle of Equal Basic Liberties The Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity The Difference Principle 22 11  10/16/24 X Lexical Priority T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E The first principle of justice is lexically prior to fair equality of opportunity, and fair equality of opportunity is lexically prior to the difference principle. This means we cannot intrude upon the ideal of equal basic liberties even if doing so would improve fair equality of opportunity. Note, however, the emphasis on basic liberties (rather than all liberties). 23 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Let’s analyse what Rawlsian justice looks like in real life. Socioeconomic Inequalities Employment Educational Opportunities 24 12  10/16/24 X Rawlsian Constructivism T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E For Rawls, justice is about what rational, reasonable and impartial people would choose. It is constructivist but objective. What justice requires is not a matter of ‘opinion’. (cf. Onora O’Neill) Justice is also not about desert. Notions of desert are a poor guide to determining justice. 25 X The Site of Justice T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Rawls argues that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions” (ToJ Rev, p. 3). This statement is foundational to contemporary understandings of Rawls. We need to understand two things about this statement. 26 13  10/16/24 X The Primacy of Justice T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Justice is the first virtue. It holds a high level of significance. “Laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.” (ToJ Rev, p. 3) 27 X The Basic Structure T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E The subject of justice is social institutions. This is often known as the basic structure characterisation of justice. The subject of justice is the basic structure, not individual actions or interactions as such. “The primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.” (ToJ Rev, p. 6) 28 14  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E By the basic structure, Rawls means the major social, political, and economic institutions such as the constitution, the law, government ministries and departments, the economy, and social institutions. The basic structure is the subject of justice because its effects are “so profound and pervasive, present from birth” (ToJ Rev, p. 82). 29 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E What this means is that individual actions do not matter directly for Rawlsian justice. All we need to do is abide by the rules of the game. Even if we could bring about more justice by improving our individual behaviours (for example, asking for a lower wage to reduce income inequality), we are not obligated to do so. Another Scenario: Discriminating when it comes to choosing flatmates? 30 15  10/16/24 X Cohen’s Critique T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E G. A. Cohen argues that Rawls is wrong to limit justice to the basic structure in the way conventionally characterised. Cohen argues that the personal is political, and individual actions and ethos must feature in our theory of justice. We will return to this issue in the second lecture, when we deal with critiques of Rawls. 31 X The Rawlsian Assumptions and T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Limitations Rawls assumes: That the society in question is closed (there is no entry or exit, except through birth and death) There is moderate scarcity (there is not quite enough to go around but absolute scarcity is not present) People are engaged in mutually beneficial cooperation. 32 16  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E People are rational and reasonable; People are in perfect health throughout their entire lives (!); and There is reasonable compliance, or a desire for reasonable compliance, with the demands of justice. These are the assumptions upon which justice as fairness is based, but what happens when these assumptions do not hold? 33 X Justice and Moderate Scarcity T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Justice arises only in the specific instance of moderate scarcity. If things were hugely abundant or highly scarce, then Rawls’ theory may not apply. e.g. famine vs current scarcity vs utopian abundance This aligns with what David Hume called the circumstances of justice. 34 17  10/16/24 X Global Justice T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Because Rawls assumes a closed society that is mutually cooperating, his theory does not apply globally. Rawls therefore rejects global justice – the idea that we have obligations of justice beyond our immediate borders and fellow citizens. (See The Law of Peoples) Many (perhaps most) contemporary egalitarian theorists of justice, however, argue that we do have obligations of global justice. 35 X Health Justice T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Early on, theorists noticed that Rawls’ assumption of perfect health throughout the life-course meant that he could not account for justice in health. Norman Daniels has proposed some notable amendments and extensions to Rawls’ theory to create a Rawlsian theory of health justice. Disability justice theorists have also extended Rawls’ theory where they can. 36 18 10/16/24 19 Please scan the QR code to complete the survey Mid-Semester Module Evaluation Break X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E 37 38  10/16/24 X Critiques of Rawls T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E We will now explore a number of different critiques of Rawls. 1. Egalitarian and Anti-Egalitarian Critiques 2. Basic Structure Limitation 3. Race and Rawls 4. Disability and Rawls 5. Feminist Critiques 6. Communitarian Critique 39 X 1. Egalitarian and Anti-Egalitarian T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Critiques Robert Nozick famously criticises Rawls in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. He objects to Rawls’ egalitarianism, arguing that this is illegitimate. For Nozick, all a society is permitted to do is protect people against force and fraud, and to uphold contracts. Nozick defends a minimal state. This is a view known as libertarianism. 40 20  10/16/24 X Libertarianism and Nozick’s Critique T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick argues that Rawls’ conception of justice is mistaken. As long as we start with a just starting point, then any resulting patterns or inequalities are not unjust. Starting-Gate Theory / Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Scenario. Nozick argues that our rights to private property are so strong that they place into question what, if anything, the state may do about any kind of taxation or redistribution. 41 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E “Political philosophers now must either work within Rawls's theory or explain why not.” (Nozick, 1974: 183) 42 21  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Rawlsian Responses: 1. Nozick’s account ignores the way a just society enables free market transactions. 2. Libertarianism does not guarantee individual freedom. 3. Rationally minded people would actually consent to a comprehensive justice system. It need not be imposed on them. 4. Nozick’s theory does not accord with our considered moral judgements and intuitions – i.e. no one could accept libertarianism. 43 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Others argue that Rawls is not egalitarian enough, especially at the global sphere. Simon Caney rejects the Rawlsian account for its anti-global justice implications. He defends an egalitarian cosmopolitan position. Charles Beitz offers a reconstruction of Rawls that can be applied to the global sphere. He defends a global difference principle. 44 22  10/16/24 X Rawlsian Responses: T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E 1. Justice is a specifically domestic virtue. We could voluntarily help those outside our borders, but it is not an obligation of justice. BUT: Does this seem plausible when we think about simple rescue cases like Peter Singer’s Pond Scenario? 2. Rawls’ assumptions might not even apply within countries. Does this mean we only have duties of justice at a very local level? We deal with these problems in more detail in Week 6 (Global Justice and Immigration). 45 X 2. Basic Structure Limitation T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Critics argue that Rawls is wrong to limit justice to the basic structure. Justice is not just about regulating the rules of major institutions but also how people interact within that structure. 46 23  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E G. A. Cohen, for example, argues that justice must also be concerned with the social ethos of society. This has important implications, including the fact that the Difference Principle must be stricter than what Rawls is prepared to defend. Example: Doctors’ salaries, economic incentives, and the Difference Principle 47 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Rawlsian Responses: 1. Cohen may be right in an ideal world, but people are naturally selfish. Market incentives need to be designed with people’s psychological qualities in mind. 2. The Difference Principle is already very demanding. 3. An overly strict Difference Principle may be counter- productive and cause more harm to those who are worst off (cf. the Laffer Curve) 48 24  10/16/24 X The Laffer Curve T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E 49 X 3. Race and Rawls T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Rawls does not initially mention race in the features that we are meant to be blind to in the Original Position and his treatment of the topic is undeveloped in his broader work. We are blind to class, wealth, education etc. but not, it seems, to our racial identity. 50 25  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E “Rawls’s work and the secondary literature it has generated has long been deeply frustrating. … Here is a huge body of work focused on questions of social justice— seemingly the natural place to look for guidance on normative issues related to race—which has nothing to say about racial injustice, the distinctive injustice of the modern world.” (Charles Mills, p. 139) 51 X Rawsian Responses: T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E 1. Revise the Original Position. 2. Make it more explicit that race is one of the features that people are blind to behind the veil of ignorance. 3. This means people need to reason about justice as if they do not know what race or ethnicity they will come to occupy when the veil of ignorance is lifted. 52 26  10/16/24 X 4. Disability and Rawls T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Because Rawls assumes that parties in the Original Position are rational and reasonable, he is unable to include (intellectually) disabled people in coming up with the principles of justice. The mutually cooperative nature of society is also such that, for Rawls, he would struggle to include ‘unproductive’ members of society who cannot work (such as those with physical disabilities) within justice as fairness. 53 X Stacy Clifford Simplican argues more strongly that Rawls’ T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E “construction of personhood leaves him unable to recognize people with intellectual disabilities as people.” (p. 73) Norman Daniels has sought to extend Rawls’ theory to justice in health (i.e. breaking the assumption that we are in perfect health throughout our lives). See his Just Health (2011). Eva Feder Kittay has presented influential critiques of Rawls’ theory from the perspective of disability. 54 27  10/16/24 X Rawlsian Responses T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E 1. Bite the bullet. Admit that Rawls’ theory of justice does not apply directly to disabled people. 2. Accept the problem but deny the implications: Justice may not apply directly to disabled people, but justice would still apply to them indirectly (through others caring about them). 3. Revise who occupies the original position. Under the veil of ignorance, we do not know if we will be disabled or not. BUT: This might work for physical disabilities, but it cannot deal with intellectual disabilities in a way that maintains Rawlsian assumptions. 55 X 5. Feminist Critiques T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Liberal feminists such as Martha Nussbaum are critical of Rawls but ultimately defend the general approach. More radical feminists argue that Rawls’ starting point is incompatible with gender justice. Most critiques centre around the role Rawls gives to the family and whether or not justice applies within it. 56 28  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Feminist critics such as Susan Moller Okin have pointed out that Rawls is ambiguous about whether the family is part of the basic structure or not. The impact of the family is similarly profound, pervasive, and present from birth. If the family is not part of the basic structure, then justice does not apply to it and equality between partners would not apply. Injustice could proliferate undeterred. 57 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Who occupies the original position? In the original edition of A Theory of Justice, Rawls says that the parties in the Original Position are “heads of families”. Liberal feminists such as Okin have said this implicitly assumes male heads of families, and that women are therefore excluded. Why did Rawls want the heads of families to be the ones to reason about justice in the Original Position? Children and Future Generations 58 29  10/16/24 X Rawlsian Responses: T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E 1. Rawls says while the family is not directly part of the basic structure, it still operates within the basic structure. Justice constrains what can be done within families. 2. Freedom of association is important, to allow married couples and families to divide household labour. This is local justice that we should not intrude upon. 59 X 6. Communitarian Critique T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Communitarian theorists argue that justice as fairness assumes individuals are atomistic, isolated, and not sufficiently embedded within the social context. The Original Position, some argue, forces them to reason as individuals devoid of wider communitarian considerations. In more formal language, the charge is that Rawls has an untenable conception of the metaphysics of the self. 60 30  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Michael Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice is an influential work advancing this view. However, the communitarian critique is no longer taken seriously by most contemporary (analytic) philosophers, who generally agree that it relies upon a strawman or a misunderstanding. 61 X The Future of Rawlsianism T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Rawls’ theory of justice revived contemporary political philosophy and remains hugely influential. As Nozick, one of Rawls’ foremost critics, says this: “Political philosophers now must either work within Rawls’ theory or explain why not.” (ASU, p. 183). We can disagree with Rawls, but his influence is such that we often need to justify why we are disagreeing with him. 62 31  10/16/24 X Sample Exam Questions T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Is justice limited to the basic structure of society? What is Nozick’s critique of Rawls? Does he succeed? 63 X Summary T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Justice is about the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens in society. Rawls proposes an important theory called justice as fairness, comprising ‘two’ principles: the Principle of Equal Basic Liberties; and the Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity and the Difference Principle. These principles are derived from what reasonable, rational, and impartial people would choose in the Original Position. 64 32  10/16/24 X T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S T R AT H C LY D E Because of Rawls’ assumptions and limitations, his views have been subject to critiques along different fronts. These include criticisms along feminist and race lines, as well as on the basis of disability, communitarianism, and egalitarianism. Rawls retains huge influence in philosophy, politics, economic theory, social theory, and other fields. 65 X THE P U LNAI V C EE RO S FI T U Y SOE FF USLT R LEAT AHRC N LI N YGDE 66 33