Daniel H. Levine, Dawn Nagar _eds._ - Region-Building in Africa_ Political and Economic Challenges-Palgra.pdf

REGION-BUILDING IN AFRICA This page intentionally left blank  Region-Building in Africa Political and Economic Challenges Edited by Daniel H. Levine and Dawn Nagar REGION-BUILDING IN AFRICA Selection and editorial content © Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Afr...

REGION-BUILDING IN AFRICA This page intentionally left blank  Region-Building in Africa Political and Economic Challenges Edited by Daniel H. Levine and Dawn Nagar REGION-BUILDING IN AFRICA Selection and editorial content © Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa 2016 Individual chapters © their respective contributors 2016 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission. In accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 2016 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of Nature America, Inc., One New York Plaza, Suite 4500, New York, NY 10004-1562. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. ISBN 978–1–137–60157–5 E-PDF ISBN: 978–1–137–58611–7 DOI: 10.1057/9781137586117 Distribution in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world is by Palgrave Macmillan®, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Levine, Daniel H., editor. | Nagar, Dawn, editor. Title: Region-building in Africa : Political and Economic Challenges / edited by Daniel H. Levine and Dawn Nagar. Description: New York City : Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015036164| ISBN 9781137586100 | ISBN 1137586109 | ISBN 9781137601575 | ISBN 1137601574 Subjects: LCSH: Regionalism—Africa. | International economic integration. | Africa—Economic integration. Classification: LCC JQ1873.5.R43.R44 2016 | DDC 320.54096—dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015036164 A catalogue record for the book is available from the British Library.  This book is dedicated to Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) from 1975 to 1991, and the “Father of Regional Integration in Africa.” This page intentionally left blank  Contents List of Figures xi List of Tables xiii Acknowledgments xv List of Abbreviations xvii Introduction 1 Daniel H. Levine and Dawn Nagar Part I Themes and Concepts of Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa Chapter 1 Region-Building Debates in a Global Context 21 Louise Fawcett Chapter 2 Regional Integration in Africa: Theory and Practice 37 John Ravenhill Chapter 3 A Tale of Three Cassandras: Jean Monnet, Raúl Prebisch, and Adebayo Adedeji 53 Adekeye Adebajo Part II The Political Economy of Africa’s Region-Building and Regional Integration Initiatives Chapter 4 Cross-Border Interactions and Regionalism 71 Daniel C. Bach Chapter 5 Infrastructure and Regional Integration in Africa 89 Afeikhena Jerome and David Nabena viii C O N T EN T S Chapter 6 African Agency Post-2015: The Roles of Regional Powers and Developmental States in Regional Integration 109 Timothy M. Shaw Chapter 7 The Political Economy of Africa’s Region-Building and Regional Integration 127 Samuel K. B. Asante Part III The African Union (AU) and Subregional Organizations and Initiatives Chapter 8 The African Union and Regional Integration in Africa 143 Kasaija Phillip Apuuli Chapter 9 Region-Building in Southern Africa 157 Scott Taylor Chapter 10 Region-Building in Eastern Africa 175 Gilbert M. Khadiagala Chapter 11 COMESA and SADC: The Era of Convergence 191 Dawn Nagar Chapter 12 Region-Building in West Africa 213 Said Adejumobi Chapter 13 Region-Building in Central Africa 231 René Lemarchand Chapter 14 Region-Building in North Africa 245 Azzedine Layachi Part IV Comparative Regional Schemes: Lessons for Africa Chapter 15 Necessary but Not Automatic: How Europe Learned to Integrate 267 N. Piers Ludlow  C O N T EN T S ix Chapter 16 Lessons from Asia: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 283 Mely Caballero-Anthony Chapter 17 Lessons from Latin America: MERCOSUR 297 Laura Gómez-Mera Conclusion 313 Daniel H. Levine Notes on Contributors 325 Index 329 This page intentionally left blank  Figures 2.1 Regionalism and state autonomy “smile curve” 39 5.1 African Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI) scores for 2010 91 5.2 African trends in information and communications technology 95 5.3 Africa’s undersea cables 96 11.1 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), 2005–13 199 11.2 Total trade of SACU member states, 2005–13 200 11.3 Trade growth of SACU member states, 2005–12 200 11.4 Trade growth convergence of Botswana and South Africa, 2005–12 201 11.5 Trade growth convergence of Lesotho and South Africa, 2005–12 201 11.6 Trade growth convergence of Namibia and South Africa, 2005–12 202 11.7 Trade growth convergence of Swaziland and South Africa, 2005–12 202 11.8 Total GDP of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (BLNS) member states, 2005–13 204 11.9 South Africa’s total trade with Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) states, 2010–14 205 12.1 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 214 12.2 ECOWAS normative framework for peace-building 218 12.3 ECOWAS institutional architecture for peace-building 220 14.1 The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 246 14.2 Comparison of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in states of the Arab Maghreb Union, 1980–2012 259 16.1 Human Development Index (HDI) in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 2008–12 291 17.1 Multiple memberships and overlapping agreements in Latin America 305 This page intentionally left blank  Tables 5.1 Projects approved by the Dakar Financing Conference 98 5.2 Regional Economic Community (REC) infrastructure indicators, 2011 99 5.3 Cost to export and import containers, 2014 100 8.1 Stages of African Economic Community (AEC) implementation 148 11.1 Membership in regional economic communities (RECs) and free trade agreements in the Tripartite bloc 195 14.1 Gross domestic product (GDP) of Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) states, 2013 246 14.2 Evolution and distribution of commodity exports in North Africa, 2001–11 252 14.3 Selected demographic indicators in the Maghreb 253 14.4 Maghrebi trade with the European Union (EU), 2008 258 14.5 Overview of foreign direct investment (FDI) in states of the Arab Maghreb Union, 2008 259 16.1 Income inequality in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 292 This page intentionally left blank  Acknowledgments This volume is one of the products of a four-year project on “Peacebuilding and Region-building in Africa” undertaken by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), in Cape Town, South Africa. The project explored the various processes involved in region-building and regional integration in all five subregions of Africa, from organizations and institutions, to issues of inequality, agency, and human security. We would like to thank all those who participated in the pro- ject; their comments were tremendously helpful in shaping this publication. Regional integration in Africa has recently been gaining increased scholarly attention, from both the continent and beyond. This book aims to make a dis- tinctive contribution to that conversation by taking a synoptic look at all five subregions of Africa and the African Union (AU), and at all aspects of inte- gration: economic, political, and security. It brings a diverse set of voices to that conversation, both African and global, with authors from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, the United States, Argentina, Indonesia, Britain, Canada, and France. We thank them all for their dedication and for responding to our many queries so promptly, kindly, and efficiently. We would like to convey particular thanks to Adekeye Adebajo, executive director of CCR, for his guidance, enthusiasm, and perseverance throughout the time it took to prepare this publication. We would particularly like to thank CCR staff, research assistant Jill Kronenberg and administrative assistant Liliane Limenyande for their invaluable support on this project. We would also like to thank Jason Cook for his help in copyediting the book, and our colleagues at CCR for their support and administrative assistance. We are grateful to all the contributors for their commitment to this project, and we thank Palgrave Macmillan, and particularly Sara Doskow, International Relations, Regional Politics, and Development Studies editor, and her colleagues for their close collaboration throughout the publishing process. We hope the book will take forward the lively debates on how effective region-building can be achieved in Africa and beyond. DANIEL H. LEVINE and DAWN NAGAR , July 2015 This page intentionally left blank  Abbreviations 3Ts Tin, Tantalum (Coltan), and Tungsten AAF-SAP Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation ACB African Central Bank ACBF African Capacity Building Foundation ACM African Common Market ACN Andean Community of Nations ACP African, Caribbean, and Pacific (Group of States) ACUSE Action Committee for the United States of Europe ACWC Association of Southeast Asian Nations Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children ADF-NALU Allied Democratic Forces—National Army for the Liberation of Uganda AEC African Economic Community (African Union) AEC Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic Community (ASEAN) AERC African Economic Research Consortium AFCAC African Civil Aviation Commission AfDB African Development Bank AFISMA African-led International Support Mission in Mali AFR AA African Airlines Association AFTA Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area AGF African Governance Forum AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act AGR Africa Governance Report AGR A Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa AIB African Investment Bank AICHR Association of Southeast Asian Nations Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights AIDI African Infrastructure Development Index AIMS American Institute of Maghribi Studies AKF Aga Khan Foundation xviii A B B R E V I AT I O N S ALADI Asociación Latino Americana de Integración (Latin American Integration Association) ALBA Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) ALTID Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development AMF African Monetary Fund AMIB African Union Mission in Burundi AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan AMISEC African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia AMU Arab Maghreb Union AMV Africa Mining Vision ANC African National Congress ANU Australian National University APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APRM African Peer Review Mechanism APSA African Peace and Security Architecture APSC Association of Southeast Asian Nations Political and Security Community APT Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ARF Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum ASC Association of Southeast Asian Nations Security Community ASCC Association of Southeast Asian Nations Socio-Cultural Community ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASF African Standby Force ATT Arms Trade Treaty AU African Union BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India, China BITs Bilateral Investment Treaties BLNS Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China (bloc) BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa CACO Central Asian Cooperation Organization CAM Competitive Adaptation Mechanism CAP Common Agricultural Policy CAPP Central Africa Power Pool CAR Central African Republic CARICOM Caribbean Community CCR Centre for Conflict Resolution CCT Technical Coordination Committee CCU Continental Customs Union CDC Congress for Democratic Change CEEAC Communauté Économique des États de l’ Afrique Centrale (Economic Community of Central African States)  A B B R E V I AT I O N S xix CEI Centro de Economía Internacional (Center for International Economics) CEMAC Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States CENTO Central Treaty Organization CEO Chief Executive Officer CEPGL Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries) CEPT Common External Preferential Tariff CET Common External Tariff CFA Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community) CFTA Continental Free Trade Area CGD Center for Global Development CIA Central Intelligence Agency (United States) CIC Center on International Cooperation CISSM Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland CNDP Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People) CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation CNRS Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (National Centre for Scientific Research) CODESRIA Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa COP Conference of Parties COPAX Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l’Afrique Centrale (Peace and Security Council of Central Africa) CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Liberia) CPA Coutonou Partnership Agreement CPCM Conseil Permanent Consultatif du Maghreb (Permanent Consultative Council of the Maghreb) CRIA Centre for Regional Integration in Africa CRS Catholic Relief Services CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CZI Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries DFI Development Finance Institution DFQF Duty-Free and Quota-Free DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo DSC Defence and Security Commission DSM Dispute Settlement Mechanism DTI Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) EAC East African Community EACJ East African Court of Justice xx A B B R E V I AT I O N S EALA East African Legislative Assembly EAOGS East Africa Oil and Gas Summit EAPS East African Payment System EAS East Asia Summit EASF East African Standby Force EBA Everything But Arms EBID Economic Community of West African States Bank for Investment and Development EC European Community ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States ECLA Economic Commission for Latin America (United Nations) ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (United Nations) ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group ECOWARN Economic Community of West African States Early Warning System ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDC European Defence Community EEC European Economic Community EIGA Economic Community of West African States Investment Guarantee Agency EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EMU Economic and Monetary Union EPA Economic Partnership Agreement EPZ Export-Processing Zone ERP Economic Recovery (Adjustment) Programme ESA Eastern and Southern Africa ESC Executive Steering Committee ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (United Nations) ETF Exchange-Traded Fund ETLS Economic Community of West African States Trade Liberalisation Scheme EU European Union Euratom European Atomic Energy Community FCS Forestry Certification Scheme FDI Foreign Direct Investment FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) FES Friedrich Ebert Stiftung FLACSO Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Social Sciences Institute) FLS Frontline States  A B B R E V I AT I O N S xxi FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation FOMAC Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale (Central African Multinational Force) Fonplata Fondo Financiero para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Plata (Financial Fund for the Development of the River Plate Basin) FRIDGE Fund for Research into Industrial Development, Growth, and Equity FSC Fisheries Stewardship Council FTA Free Trade Area FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas G20 Group of 20 G-77 Group of 77 G8 Group of Eight GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GAVI Vaccine Alliance GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product GEF Global Environment Facility GNI Gross National Income GTE Executive Technical Group HDI Human Development Index HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome IAI Initiative for Association of Southeast Asian Nations Integration IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms IATA International Air Transport Association IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IBSA India, Brazil, and South Africa ICA Infrastructure Consortium for Africa ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines ICC International Criminal Court ICG International Crisis Group ICGL International Contact Group on Liberia ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region ICT Information and Communications Technology IDA International Development Association IDB Inter-American Development Bank IDEA Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IEPA Interim Economic Partnership Agreement IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development IIAG Ibrahim Index for African Governance IIRSA Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America ILO International Labour Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund xxii A B B R E V I AT I O N S INEA Innovation and Networks Executive Agency ISEAL International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (Alliance) ISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian Studies ISS Institute for Security Studies IT Information Technology ITU International Telecommunications Union JCIE Japan Centre for International Exchange JSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange LAS League of Arab States LDCs Least-developed Countries LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (persons) LPA Lagos Plan of Action (for the Development of Africa) LSE London School of Economics LWR Lutheran World Relief M23 March 23 Movement MAES African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros MAR AC Mécanisme d’Alerte Rapide de l’Afrique Centrale (Central African Early Warning System) MCS Marine Certification Scheme MDC Maputo Development Corridor MDG Millennium Development Goal MENA Middle East and North Africa MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market) MFN Most-Favored Nation MICOPAX Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique (Central African Peace Consolidation Mission) MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MINUSCA Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Centrafricaine (United Nations Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic) MISCA African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic MIST Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey MLTSF Medium- to Long-Term Strategic Framework MNCs Multinational Corporations MONUSCO Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) MSC Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS) MSC Marine Stewardship Council NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NAM Non-aligned Movement  A B B R E V I AT I O N S xxiii NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCRE National Centre for Research on Europe NDB New Development Bank (of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa bloc) NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NGF Nigeria Governors’ Forum NGO Non-governmental Organisation NIEO New International Economic Order NLD National League for Democracy NOR AD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation NRC Natural Resource Charter NSW National Single Window NTBs Non-tariff Barriers NTS Non-traditional Security NTUC National Trades Union Congress OAPEC Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OAS Organization of American States OAU Organisation of African Unity OCP Office Chérifien des Phosphates (Sharifian Phosphate Office) ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OEEC Organisation for European Economic Cooperation OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights OIC Organisation of Islamic Cooperation OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OSBP One-Stop Border Post PAIGC Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) PAPED Programme Accords de Partenariat Économique pour le Développement (Economic Partnership for Development Agreement Programme) PICE Programa de Intercambio y Cooperación Económica (Exchange Programme and Economic Cooperation) PIDA Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa PIIGS Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain Polisario Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro) PSC Peace and Security Council PTA Preferential Trade Agreement R2P Responsibility to Protect R ATS Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) RCD Rally for Congolese Democracy REC Regional Economic Community xxiv A B B R E V I AT I O N S RISDP Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan ROOs Rules of Origin RTA Regional Trade Agreement SAAC Southern African Aid Coordination Conference SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SACN South American Community of Nations SACU Southern African Customs Union SACU+ Southern African Customs Union Plus SADC Southern African Development Community SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference SADR Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic SAFPI South African Foreign Policy Initiative SAIIA South African Institute for International Affairs SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SAPs Structural Adjustment Programs SAPP Southern Africa Power Pool SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SDGs Sustainable Development Goals SDIs Spatial Development Initiatives SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SID Society for International Development SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SMEs Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises SNCs Southern African Development Community National Committees SOE State-Owned Enterprise SPRM State Peer Review Mechanism (Nigeria) STAP Short-Term Action Plan TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation TAH Trans-African Highway TEN-E Trans-European Energy Network TEN-T Trans-European Transport Network T-FTA Tripartite Free Trade Agreement TMEA TradeMark East Africa TMSA TradeMark Southern Africa TOA Treaty of Asunción TPD Tous pour le Développement (All for Development) TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership TR ALAC Trade Law Centre (South Africa) TTF Tripartite Task Force TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership TWh Terawatt-Hour UCT University of Cape Town UDEAC Union Douanière des États d’Afrique Centrale (Customs Union of Central African States)  A B B R E V I AT I O N S xxv UGTT Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (Tunisian General Labour Union) UN United Nations UNAMID United Nations/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur UNASUR Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations) UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSC United Nations Security Council UNU-CRIS United Nations University Centre for Regional Integration Studies US United States USAID United States Institute for International Development USTR United States Trade Representative VSO Voluntary Service Overseas WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union WAMA West African Monetary Agency WAMI West African Monetary Institute WAMZ West African Monetary Zone WANEP West African Network for Peace WEF World Economic Forum WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WTO World Trade Organization ZNCC Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality  Introduction Daniel H. Levine and Dawn Nagar What have African region-building and regional integration efforts achieved in nearly six decades of independence? This book is a comprehensive effort to answer that question as it relates to all five African subregions. Recent global changes have created an urgent need, and an audience, for more scholarly attention to regional integration, especially in the global South. Region-building has often been central to Africa’s development plans, and as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN) are implemented, new assessments are needed of the successes and failures of development in Africa. In addition, the 2008–9 global financial crisis has raised both theoretical and practical concerns about the value of economic integration. If integration is not a panacea for weaker economies and can expose those economies to greater economic risk (an issue seen both in Africa and in Europe), new attention must be focused on the ques- tions of when, whether, and how to pursue regional integration. Regional economic integration holds the promise of dramatic growth for African economies, as well as increased clout for the continent in global markets. However, historical divisions have worked against achieving regional integra- tion, leaving the majority of African economies weak, and institutional capac- ity lacking for the promotion of region-building in national, subregional, and continental bodies. Africa lags behind other regions in integration: intraregional exports in Africa in 2013 constituted only 14 percent of total exports, compared to about 16 percent in Latin America’s Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), 26 percent in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) area, and 61 percent within the European Union (EU).1 The high transaction costs caused by overlapping regional memberships and the failure to improve the continent’s inadequate infrastructure, as well as other trade and nontrade barriers, have had deleterious consequences for region-building and regional integration in Africa. Other emerging factors have also impacted negatively on Africa’s region-building efforts: food, energy, and water insecurity; arms and drug trafficking; HIV/ AIDS and other health threats; migration and xenophobia; terrorism; and climate change. At the same time, the African Union (AU) and major regional economic communities (RECs)—including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the 2 D A N I E L H. L E V I N E A N D D AW N N AG A R Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)—have been finding ways to adapt to the continent’s challenges. Substate actors, such as rising African multinational corporations (MNCs) and informal or clandestine economic networks, have also been creating new and sometimes unexpected forms of regional integration. About the Book This book is a project by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), based in Cape Town, South Africa, to address Africa’s progress in region-building and regional integration.2 Contributors were invited to explore issues of enhancing understanding of region-building and regional integration processes in Africa; advancing African efforts to promote peace, security, and socioeconomic devel- opment; and strengthening the capacities of institutional frameworks for intra- continental trade, including through improved coordination between the AU and the continent’s subregional bodies. The centre has published five previous books on related topics: Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (2012); The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa (2012); The African Union and Its Institutions (2008); Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War (2008); and South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era (2007).3 This experience allowed CCR to bring together a diverse group of scholars, from both Africa and around the world—including authors from both the global South and the industrialized North—to examine African regional integration. The literature on regional integration in Africa has grown substantially in recent years. But as British scholar Timothy Shaw notes in his contribution to this volume (chapter 6), regional integration in Africa has not garnered the same attention that regional integration in Southeast Asia or the EU has. Much recent literature has tended to focus on individual subregions of Africa, in contrast to this book’s continental scope. CCR’s own 2012 book on region- building in Southern Africa is a significant contribution of this type, covering theories of region-building and assessing how far the region still has to go in order to achieve sustainable economic growth, political stability, and democratic governance. That volume explores the inherited divisions that have thwarted united action in Southern Africa and kept the institutions necessary to support a regional political, socioeconomic, and security framework weak. Other African scholars have produced work on Southern Africa as well, including Moses Tekere in his 2012 edited volume on poverty reduction and economic integration.4 Economic growth is a major concern of the literature on West Africa (as in Elias Ayuk and Samuel Kaboré’s 2013 book on regional integration and pov- erty reduction), but given the region’s history, security integration looms large as well (as in a 2011 Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa [CODESRIA] volume on ECOWAS and peacebuilding).5 The politics of East African integration is the subject of a 2012 book by Juma Mwapachu, a former secretary-general of the EAC, while another 2012 volume by Redie Bereketeab and Kidane Mengisteab examines the politics of regionalism in the  INTRODUCTION 3 Horn of Africa.6 Central African integration has received relatively little atten- tion, but its prospects for political and economic region-building are the subject of a 2005 CODESRIA volume, and of 2008 reports by both the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).7 North Africa has often not been treated as part of Africa as a whole in the literature on regional integration. Assessments of regional integration in North Africa have tended to emphasize its connection to the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, rather than to the rest of Africa—Algerian scholar Azzedine Layachi’s con- tribution to this volume is an exception to the trend. For example, a 2012 anthol- ogy edited by Dimitar Bechev and Kalypso Nicolaïdis examines the ways in which regional identities and politics cut across state borders in the Mediterranean, and the World Bank has published reports examining economic integration in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.8 These subregion-specific works are joined by a few pieces of more continental scope, but limited to a particular sector, such as Iwa Salami’s 2012 book on financial integration.9 The most substantial and sustained series of studies on Africa’s overall region- building and regional integration efforts are those in the UNECA series Assessing Regional Integration in Africa. To date, UNECA has published six volumes in this series, starting in 2004.10 The most recent volume, published in 2013, focuses on the need to harmonize trade policies, rules, and procedures across countries to facilitate trade—recognizing, as many contributors to this volume do, that traditional concerns about tariffs are only one of the pressing issues for economic integration in Africa. In addition to these UNECA reports, there have been a few volumes in recent years that address general issues of regional integra- tion in Africa, including a collection edited by Ulrike Lorenz-Carl and Martin Rempe in 2013 on the variety of regionalisms on the continent, and an edited volume in 2013 by Emmanuel Fanta, Timothy Shaw, and Vanessa Tang that addresses regionalism in the global South generally, but with significant focus on Africa.11 However, the UNECA volumes are primarily aimed at an audience of economists and policymakers, tending to be technically and economically focused rather than providing a broad discussion, as this volume does, of the economics, politics, and theoretical basis of region-building efforts.12 Academic volumes rarely include strong African voices, like those in this volume, who can also speak from experiences on the ground. With this book, CCR aims to add to the growing conversation about both Africa in its own right, and the lessons that African integration might be able to take from, and bring to, the world at large. This volume makes a unique contribution by providing a contemporary, comprehensive, scholarly assess- ment of regional integration processes in Africa. The book brings together scholars and practitioners, both African and non-African, from a diversity of backgrounds: Ghanaian, Kenyan, Nigerian, South African, Ugandan, African- American, Argentine, Indonesian, American, British, Canadian, French, and French American. Their individual chapters not only draw on this diversity of experience, but also represent the outcome of discussions and cross-pollination of ideas that took place among these authors at the 2014 CCR seminar where most of the chapters were commissioned.13 4 D A N I E L H. L E V I N E A N D D AW N N AG A R The Rationale of Region-Building in Africa The economic rationale for regional integration in Africa, as reflected explicitly in the chapters by Ghanaian scholar Samuel K. B. Asante, Nigerian economists Afeikhena Jerome and David Nabena, Kenyan scholar Gilbert Khadiagala, South African political scientist Dawn Nagar, and Canadian scholar John Ravenhill (and implicit in most other chapters), is straightforward. With a few exceptions, such as Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, African countries and their economies are small. In larger economies, there are more natural resources to be utilized, more workers to employ, and more consumers to purchase the end products of industry. Removing political barriers to the movement of goods, services, and factors of production would allow these to be allocated more effi- ciently and would also permit African firms to take advantage of economies of scale. In addition, the creation of larger unified markets would make foreign trade and investment in those markets more attractive.14 This core economic argument for regional integration is characteristic, as Asante argues in his chapter, of the current “wave” of regionalism that began in the 1990s. As Nigerian scholar Adekeye Adebajo, Ugandan academic Kasaija Apuuli, and Asante and Khadiagala all discuss in their chapters, however, the regional and continental aspirations for unity that emerged at independence were rooted as much (if not more so) in political Pan-Africanism as they were in a desire for economic efficiency. Solidarity across the continent and with the diaspora was encouraged by the political and security practicalities of the liberation move- ments. Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, noted that many anticolonial leaders garnered support and exchanged ideas at the five international Pan- African Congresses that were held between 1919 and 1945.15 The congresses initially brought together members of the diaspora primarily, though leaders from the continent took charge at the fifth congress in Manchester, England, in October 1945.16 In addition, liberation movements that used armed guerrilla tactics required rear bases where they could escape pressure from colonial forces; many were found in neighboring colonies or in newly independent states.17 One example of liberation necessity ultimately leading to broader regional integra- tion is the case of the Front Line States (FLS), originally comprising Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. The FLS supported liberation movements and opposed white minority rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa, and South-West Africa (now Namibia). In 1980, after Zimbabwe achieved majority rule and joined the grouping, the FLS created the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), along with Lesotho and Swaziland. SADCC was transformed into SADC in 1992, adding Namibia, and South Africa joined after its first democratic elections in 1994.18 For Pan-Africanists, the economic was also political. Reducing the need for African countries to export primary commodities to the West and import manu- factured goods was seen by Nkrumah as a key element in the full liberation of Africa,19 and Nigeria’s Adebajo Adedeji, executive secretary of UNECA from 1975 to 1991, argued that sluggish economic growth in Africa after independence was the “result of the continued operation of the African economies within the  INTRODUCTION 5 framework of the inherited colonial economic legacy.”20 Regional or continental integration would provide the size and diversity that African economies needed to be self-sustaining.21 Some even more radical thinkers expected political and economic borders between African states to be destroyed as a by-product of the destruction of capitalist economic organization. For example, Amilcar Cabral, one of the founders of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), argued that national liberation should be seen as a necessary precursor to a process of class struggle that would culminate in the destruction of capitalism and statist forms of organization. 22 Afro-Trinidadian communist C. L. R. James dismissed statist approaches to political and economic liberation as “bureaucratic balderdash” and advocated continued revolt against states that simply put Africans in charge of colonial state structures.23 The conviction that some form of socialist transformation of the economy was a political necessity, and was connected to a Pan-African identity, was widely held. 24 While solidarity was widespread during and after the struggle against colo- nialism, differences over the details of the Pan-African project caused divisions as newly independent states tried to implement concrete integration projects. Nkrumah’s views were typical of the “Casablanca group” of more radical Pan- Africanists, which also included the leaders of Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco.25 He argued for a single “United States of Africa” with a unified political, military, and economic structure, to be implemented as soon as practicable, building on initial federations of a few states each. In particular, eco- nomic integration would be facilitated as a consequence of political integration into a single continental state. By contrast, members of the “Monrovia group,” to which most African states belonged, pressed for slower integration, based first on building economic links between countries while maintaining national sov- ereignty. Members of the Monrovia group also tended to favor capitalist econo- mies that maintained links with former European colonial powers.26 The tensions between ideals of radical solidarity and practical pressures toward a more conservative approach were eloquently described by Tanzania’s first pres- ident, Julius Nyerere, in a 1966 speech. He called the national (rather than con- tinental) struggle against colonialism “merely a tactical necessity.”27 However, whereas some Pan-Africanists regarded the artificiality of colonial borders as a reason to dissolve them, 28 Nyerere argued that unless strong state structures were built within the colonial borders, and national identities inculcated, Africa would become further subdivided into even smaller, more easily manipulated political entities based on ethnic identities.29 He granted that building strong nation-states would inevitably force African states into competition with each other, and create political and economic inequities between them. He further noted, however, that he could see no other practical option—his recommenda- tion was that African leaders remain “loyal to each other” while recognizing that Pan-African unity must be put off for several decades in favor of national and regional development. Asante, in his contribution to this volume, argues that the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 represented a compromise between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups. While the OAU maintained an aspiration 6 D A N I E L H. L E V I N E A N D D AW N N AG A R for continental unity, it put a strong emphasis on state sovereignty, the mainte- nance of colonial borders, and mutual noninterference. As time wore on, the compromise seemed increasingly to favor the Monrovia approach.30 Nkrumah continued to campaign unsuccessfully for a continental state at the OAU until his ouster in a 1966 coup.31 In his later writings from political exile, Nkrumah argued that the OAU provided a cover for “pro-imperialist” African states, and called instead for the creation of a Pan-African, grassroots, paramilitary move- ment to overthrow such states.32 Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya, once a supporter of Pan-Arabism, later became the best-known standard-bearer for complete continental political integration. The Sirte Declaration, which laid some of the groundwork for the creation of the AU, was adopted under his lead- ership of the OAU in 1999.33 However, if other African leaders had been suspi- cious of Nkrumah’s personal ambitions within his proposed super-state, they were doubly so of Gaddafi’s plans, and the association of Pan-African ideals with the Libyan leader tainted them in many eyes.34 As Asante further notes, the eco- nomic crisis of the 1980s caused African states to turn to individual structural adjustment programs (SAPs) under World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidance, and away from regional integration. When an integration agenda was given new impetus in the 1990s, it took a broadly functionalist and subregionalist form.35 This represented changing intellectual trends in reaction to the events of the first four decades of African independence. As Ali Mazrui had predicted, apartheid in South Africa was ultimately not defeated by a socialist revolution (though trade unions played a significant role).36 South Africa emerged as an economic powerhouse, but one that sought to build black economic empowerment by integrating the majority population and the region with global capitalism.37 Regional economic integra- tion projects, similarly, have focused on the creation of freer trade and increased per-capita incomes as a way of promoting the welfare of citizens. Movements toward political integration are also less comprehensive, and tend to take the form of promulgation of cosmopolitan norms—such as those regarding democ- racy and human rights that Adejumobi discusses in the case of West Africa, and Khadiagala in the case of East Africa, in this volume—rather than efforts toward the creation of full-fledged super-states. States give up some sovereignty to the extent that they are bound by regional or continental political norms, but this is a very different, more liberal, variety of political integration than the forms some of the earlier Pan-Africanists envisaged. As Khadiagala notes in his chapter, the EAC still aims to create a political federation, but radical political-economic restructuring at either the regional or the continental level is, for the most part, currently relegated to thought experiments by Pan-African intellectuals.38 The Political Economy of Region-Building While the grand political designs of some of the Pan-Africanists may no longer be at the center of debates on region-building in Africa, the more liberal con- cerns of contemporary region-builders should not be taken to imply that the underlying political issues for regional integration have faded or been solved. If  INTRODUCTION 7 there is one thread that runs through all the chapters in this volume, it is the idea that region-building must be understood not as a technical project just waiting for the political will and competence to implement it, but as deeply tied up with both Africa’s economic relations and the political struggles behind them. Regionalization, Sovereignty, and Hegemony The tension between a cosmopolitan, Pan-African vision for the continent and the fact that state sovereignty represented the hard-won prize of independence from European colonialism has not completely subsided. While many con- tributors to this volume (including Adebajo, French American scholar René Lemarchand, Nagar, and African-American academic Scott Taylor) lament the weakness of regional and continental institutions, the concern that yielding sov- ereignty to supranational institutions will expose states to dominance by stronger actors, particularly regional hegemons that could wield disproportionate power within such institutions, cannot simply be dismissed. For example, South Africa accounts for about three-quarters of Southern Africa’s economic activity. While contemporary South Africa has not been the openly malicious actor that it once was under apartheid (1948–90), Taylor calls our attention to the phenomenon of “corporate colonialism” by South African firms, which often enter other African markets, displace local competitors, and then link their supply chains back to the South African metropole. Argentine scholar Laura Gómez-Mera describes how Brazil—also responsible for about 75 percent of its region’s economy—has both led regional integration there and caused its neighbors to seek economic links outside the region to balance its power. Adejumobi regards Nigeria’s influence in West Africa as largely positive, but security and governance issues in the country could pose problems for the region. Nigeria has faced two major insurgencies— one in the Niger Delta over how oil revenues should be distributed in the coun- try, and the increasingly regionalized Boko Haram movement in the north that has rejected the legitimacy of Nigeria’s secular democracy and sought to impose Islamic law throughout the country.39 Nigeria has also long struggled with illicit markets and the scourge of corruption.40 Europe’s experience also offers some democratic reasons for concern about moving decision-making to a supranational level. Some of the dissatisfaction of European citizens with the EU stems from the perception that the organization is run by unaccountable technocratic elites.41 States may also, of course, resist subordinating themselves to regional institu- tions for more venal reasons—French scholar Daniel Bach discusses the case of West African states (such as Benin, Gambia, and Togo) that resisted integration so that gray-market actors could continue to take advantage of arbitrage, while Taylor describes how the rhetoric of sovereignty and solidarity was used to shield Zimbabwe from legal sanction. State sovereignty can also face pressure “from below.” Ravenhill, in his chap- ter, argues that global firms in the twenty-first century are often less interested in negotiating with states for market access than they are in being allowed to cre- ate value-chains that ignore state and geographic boundaries in favor of regions 8 D A N I E L H. L E V I N E A N D D AW N N AG A R that make sense to the firm—such as mobile calling plan regions, or networks of knowledge workers based in far-flung cities.42 Bach, Shaw, and Taylor each discuss the ways that illicit economic actors can build their own forms of clan- destine “regional integration.” Geopolitical Context Global forces can undermine regionalism. Asante and Bach argue, for example, that the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that African governments have been under pressure to conclude with Europe will isolate African countries from each other, carving them up into regional groupings that favor European inter- ests over African ones. The United States pursues a similar unilateral economic agenda through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) agreements, and now China has become the largest individual trade partner of Africa.43 The EU, in particular, has exerted a strong influence on region-building in Africa, as Asante and Ravenhill discuss—and about which British scholar Piers Ludlow raises some concerns. For example, SADCC began in 1978 as the Southern African Aid Coordination Conference (SAAC), operating from an office in London, with funding from the European Economic Community (EEC) and Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation.44 We need not necessarily imagine any malice on the part of European backers to realize that their conception of what was “good” for Africa was going to be tied up with a desire to maintain an environment conducive to the continued operation of their extensive economic interests on the continent. On the other hand, these same pressures can also bring about a realization that regional integration can provide necessary global political clout. As Adebajo notes in his chapter, one of Adedeji’s primary concerns in pressing for regional integration in Africa was to resist economic dominance by Europe. Gómez-Mera, in her chapter, argues that the need to balance against the political and economic power of the United States was a significant factor in region-building efforts in Latin America. Effective region-building in Africa would similarly allow smaller African states and economies to negotiate their interests as a bloc. Regionalization and Inequality As Adejumobi notes, while Nigeria’s per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) is respectable ($3,006 in 2013), inequality in the country is extreme. In 2010, 46 percent of Nigeria’s population lived below the national poverty line, and the country had a Gini coefficient of 43.0 (by contrast, the highest Gini coefficient of any Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] nation was Italy’s, 35.5 in 2010).45 The picture in Africa’s other large economies is similarly disturbing. For example, South Africa is one of the most unequal nations in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 65.0 and 46 percent of its popu- lation living in poverty in 2011.46 Inequality is not just a problem in Africa, of course—as Indonesian scholar Mely Caballero-Anthony points out in her contribution, it is also of concern for the ASEAN region. Aside from the moral  INTRODUCTION 9 scandal it represents in its own right, high levels of inequality seem to undercut one of the core goals of regional integration—economic growth.47 One manifestation of the social instability that inequality can bring is the xenophobic violence that peaked in South Africa in May 2008, and resurged in April 2015.48 Cross-border flows of people are nothing new in Africa (many migration patterns predate state borders), and some state policies have encour- aged migration (e.g., South Africa’s migrant-worker policies, based on those established during the nineteenth century to provide cheap labor for the mines).49 But inequality and globalization can turn these flows into “centrifugal” regional forces, as Taylor notes in his contribution. According to this view, xenophobia in South Africa is rooted in the economic conditions facing the poorest indi- viduals in South African society: severe competition for jobs and in the retail sector (especially for small sellers in poor areas), tight housing, and high levels of crime and corruption.50 Under such pressures, many poor South Africans see poor migrants as threats to their already precarious well-being, and this fear can lead to violence. We should also not forget that economic distress, along with democratic shortfalls, can contribute to violence directed against women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons.51 A high-inequality growth strategy that relies on exploiting the poor throughout the region as a source of cheap labor will tend to reinforce the demonization of outsiders, in a sense integrating regional (exploitative) economies at the cost of fragmenting regional social and political solidarity.52 Security, Conflict, and Regionalization We cannot ignore the fact that African regions are trying to build economic cooperation in a context of ongoing conflicts and their resulting human insecu- rity. Many analysts (including Adejumobi and British scholar Louise Fawcett in this volume) have noted that security and economic development are inextrica- bly linked—it is difficult to build the economy when people are being displaced and killed, infrastructure is being destroyed, and outside investors are nervous. For example, Layachi describes the ways in which regional cooperation in North Africa has long been stalled by deep political and ideological divides. Algeria and Libya (the latter at least under Gaddafi between 1969 and 2011), whose governments saw themselves as popular socialist regimes, were ideologi- cally opposed to Morocco’s monarchy, and Algeria has had disputes over terri- tory with Morocco as well. Gaddafi’s ambitions for a wider and deeper African and Arab union were at odds with the more modest and sovereignty-protecting attitudes of many of his neighbors. After the Arab Spring uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East beginning in 2011, the political situation has become even more unsettled. Successful integration may even provide new vectors for insecurity. Freer trade can open up weaker economies to deindustrialization, destroying economic and social networks. In addition, while trade is often touted as a solution to violent conflicts, some economic actors are also in the business of violence. For example, South Africa has a significant arms industry. In 2013, the South African 10 D A N I E L H. L E V I N E A N D D AW N N AG A R government authorized exports of 3.2 billion rand in conventional weapons and military equipment (a figure that excludes small arms).53 While these figures are for legal sales, in 2011 the South African nongovernmental organization (NGO) Ceasefire Campaign reported that 15.5 billion rand in South African military equipment had been sold from 2000 to 2010 to countries with human rights records or active conflicts that, it was argued, should have prohibited sales, including Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.54 South Africa has been actively working to increase its currently small share of the con- tinental arms market.55 Economic integration could therefore expand the reach of weapons suppliers as well as more innocuous firms. Structure of the Book The book is divided into four sections, each focusing on a different aspect of regional integration in Africa. Part I: Themes and Concepts of Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa Region-building in Africa needs to be understood in the context of global changes in regionalism, the theoretical frameworks that have been mobilized to understand integration processes, and the visions for the future that major regional projects represent. Louise Fawcett (chapter 1) provides an overview of how region-building in Africa fits into the global context. She situates the cur- rent set of African region-building projects in the wide variety of region-building processes attempted globally, from highly formal and legalized unions like the EU to informal conferences and contact groups, and from small subregions to continental unions. She also discusses the heterogeneous aims of regional organizations, from single-sector economic arrangements, to mutual defense pacts, to complex organizations with both economic and security roles. Next, John Ravenhill (chapter 2) elaborates a theoretical framework for understanding regional integration in Africa and elsewhere, and for understanding why prog- ress has in many ways been limited. Ravenhill identifies three major challenges to effective regionalism in Africa: the pursuit of forms of integration (inspired by European models) that impose stronger constraints on state sovereignty than states are actually willing to accept; the lack of domestic policies or material infrastructure to take full advantage of trade liberalization; and the inheritance of an outdated, twentieth-century form of regionalism that is not well-adapted to the challenges of the twenty-first. Finally, Adekeye Adebajo (chapter 3) provides a different sort of context, illuminating how region-building in Africa, Europe, and Latin America has been driven by political vision, not just economic ratio- nale. He considers the case of three “Cassandras” of region-building: Nigeria’s Adebayo Adedeji, Argentina’s Raúl Prebisch, and France’s Jean Monnet. Each of these men was a driving force behind regional integration on his continent, and each saw reality fall short of his vision.  INTRODUCTION 11 Part II: The Political Economy of Africa’s Region-Building and Regional Integration Initiatives The book’s discussion of the material and political underpinnings of regional integration in Africa opens with Daniel Bach’s discussion of the ways in which informal regional processes have developed alongside and beneath formal region- building efforts in Africa (chapter 4). He argues that “borderlands” in which the state is only partially able to enforce its rules, and where individuals share trans- border identities and networks, are potential “resources” for regional integration in the sense that they link political, social, and economic activity across state boundaries but often threaten formal state-based attempts at region-building. The section then turns to Afeikhena Jerome and David Nabena’s overview of the state of infrastructure on the continent and the challenges that infrastruc- ture gaps pose for regional integration in Africa (chapter 5). Next, Timothy Shaw (chapter 6) calls our attention to the varied and com- plex forms of African agency at play in regional processes on the continent. And finally, Samuel K. B. Asante (chapter 7) provides a historical examination of the political factors that have shaped region-building efforts in Africa, beginning with Pan-African goals at independence in the 1960s, and continuing through the African financial collapse in the 1980s that ended these initial aspirations. He then discusses how, from the 1990s on, the second wave of African regionalism has followed more traditional economic principles of efficiency and openness. Part III: The African Union and Subregional Organizations and Initiatives Kasaija Phillip Apuuli (chapter 8) opens the book’s discussion of the state of affairs in current continental and regional institutions with an analysis of the contribution of the AU to regional integration in Africa, particularly its support to Africa’s regional economic communities. The book then turns to a discussion of progress and challenges in Africa’s five regions. Scott Taylor (chapter 9) describes a number of social, political, and eco- nomic forces that simultaneously serve to bind Southern Africa together and to fragment it, such as South Africa’s dominant position, regional migration, and the region’s revolutionary history. SADC could be an institution for enhanc- ing the region-building aspects of Southern Africa and suppressing tendencies toward fragmentation. However, it is hampered by severe lack of resources and its members’ weak commitments to regional and international norms. Gilbert Khadiagala (chapter 10) discusses the evolution and successes of regional inte- gration in the EAC, as well as how a resurgent faith in the functionalist mantra that economic cooperation will trump political divisions may be masking serious differences over governance and security challenges that could undermine the region’s goal of creating a political federation. Dawn Nagar (chapter 11) then discusses the 2008 tripartite agreement of COMESA, EAC, and SADC, tak- ing a neoclassical economic approach. Nagar argues that trade liberalization in regional blocs with a hegemonic partner—such as the Southern African Customs 12 D A N I E L H. L E V I N E A N D D AW N N AG A R Union (SACU), which includes South Africa along with the smaller economies of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland—can cause economies to con- verge over the long run, considering that there is a compensating mechanism attached, such as the disbursement mechanism for customs revenue generated in the SACU bloc. Nagar identifies SACU as becoming the new regional integra- tion frontier and expanding its regional trade partners in Africa. Said Adejumobi (chapter 12) then discusses the successes and challenges of region-building in West Africa, particularly regarding human security and the rule of law. Adejumobi argues that ECOWAS has been quite successful in help- ing to turn West Africa from a conflict-affected neighborhood into a region in which human security and democratic governance are being firmly established, though economic integration has lagged. René Lemarchand (chapter 13) next draws on his firsthand experiences as an EU consultant assessing governance programs in ECCAS to analyze region-building in Central Africa. He argues that the chief obstacle to integration in Central Africa is the fragile situation in the DRC, which has been perpetuated by its neighbors, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, and which has prevented Congo from establishing itself as a responsible power. In addition, he describes ECCAS as weakened by ongoing conflicts in the region, and more focused on creating the appearance of progress on region- building, so as to keep donor money flowing to corrupt state bureaucracies, than on actually addressing the region’s problems. Finally, Azzedine Layachi (chapter 14) explores the tensions over ideology, economics, and territory that have undermined region-building efforts in North Africa. Part IV: Comparative Regional Schemes: Lessons for Africa Though actors pursuing regional integration in Africa can learn much from suc- cesses and failures in other regions, one important lesson is that region-building in Africa should not necessarily try to replicate the forms of integration pur- sued elsewhere. Piers Ludlow (chapter 15) explores the historical contingen- cies that led to relatively successful region-building efforts in Europe. He warns that the European template is not a foolproof recipe for success elsewhere, and that even its success in Europe is far from automatic. Mely Caballero-Anthony (chapter 16) then draws our attention to how ASEAN’s priority has shifted from “region-building” to “community-building,” an approach that focuses on deep- ening democratic inclusion and broadening the notion of security from state sta- bility to human security—even though ASEAN faces challenges in the form of high inequality, marginalization of minority groups, and the need to respond to natural disasters. Finally, Laura Gómez-Mera (chapter 17) examines how, after a promising start, MERCOSUR in Latin America faltered in many of its aims after the early 1990s, as well as the history of attempts to relaunch and “re-relaunch” integration in the region. The presence of the external economic threat posed by the United States was an impetus for early region-building efforts, but once “defensive” measures had succeeded in part, powerful economies such as Brazil began looking outside the continent for alliances, while weaker Latin American economies, such as Paraguay and Uruguay, formed subregional alliances to balance  INTRODUCTION 13 the power of the stronger ones. If Africa continues down the road that Latin America has followed, with multiple overlapping and sometimes incompatible regimes, regional integration will be all the more difficult. None of the contributors to this volume view regional integration in Africa as having entirely succeeded to date, and none of them think that the barriers to an ideal form of integration are easily removed, or susceptible to merely techni- cal policy fixes. All, however, continue to see regional integration as a goal that could greatly benefit Africa, and several identify its successes amid great chal- lenges. Together, the contributors to this volume provide a wealth of material for careful reflection about how Africa has arrived at the place in which it finds itself, and how the continent, its one billion people, and its regional organiza- tions can ultimately build effective regions. Notes 1. Data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) international trade indicators database, http://unctad.org/en/Pages /Statistics.aspx (accessed June 1, 2015). 2. Portions of this discussion are drawn from Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), “Concept Note for a Policy Research Seminar on Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa,” http://ccr.org.za/images/pdfs/concept_note_region -building_apr2014.pdf (accessed October 14, 2014). 3. Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, and Dawn Nagar (eds.), Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (London: Zed, 2012); Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (eds.), The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa (London: Hurst, 2012); John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, and Tim Murithi (eds.), The African Union and Its Institutions (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2008); Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (eds.), Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008); Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji, and Chris Landsberg (eds.), South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007). 4. Moses Tekere (ed.), Regional Trade Integration, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction in Southern Africa (Oxford: African Books Collective, 2012). 5. Elias T. Ayuk and Samuel T. Kaboré, Wealth through Integration: Regional Integration and Poverty-Reduction Strategies in West Africa (New York: Springer, 2013); Thomas Jaye, Dauda Garuba, and Stella Amadi (eds.), ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peace-Building (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa [CODESRIA], 2011). 6. Redie Bereketeab and Kidane Mengisteab (eds.), Regional Integration, Identity, and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa (London: James Currey, 2012); Juma V. Mwapachu, Challenging the Frontiers of African Integration: The Dynamics of Policies, Politics, and Transformation in the East African Community (Dar es Salaam: E&D Vision, 2012). 7. E. S. D. Fomin and John W. Forje (eds.), Central Africa: Crises, Reform, and Reconstruction (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005); United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Prospectus sur l’État de l’Intégration en Afrique Centrale, 2008, http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/14994 /bib.%2057956.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed January 9, 2015); Chrysantus Ayangafac 14 D A N I E L H. L E V I N E A N D D AW N N AG A R (ed.), Political Economy of Regionalisation in Central Africa, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Monograph no. 155, 2008, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads /M155FULL.PDF (accessed January 9, 2015). 8. Dimitar Bechev and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (eds.), Mediterranean Frontiers: Borders, Conflict, and Memory in a Transnational World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Mustapha Rouis and Steven R. Tabor, Regional Economic Integration in the Middle East and North Africa: Beyond Trade Reform, World Bank, 2013, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12220 /NonAsciiFileName0.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed January 9, 2015). 9. Iwa Salami, Financial Regulation in Africa: An Assessment of Financial Integration Arrangements in African Emerging and Frontier Markets (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012). 10. UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa, 2004, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria1english_full.pdf (accessed January 5, 2015); UNECA and African Union (AU), Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities, 2006, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria2_eng.pdf (accessed January 29, 015); UNECA and AU, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa III: Towards Monetary and Financial Integration in Africa, 2008, http://www.uneca.org /sites/default/files/publications/aria3_eng.pdf (accessed September 5, 2014); UNECA, AU, and African Development Bank (AfDB), Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-African Trade, 2010, http://vi.unctad.org/digital-library/?task=dl_doc&doc_name=546-assessing-re (accessed September 1, 2014); UNECA, AU, and AfDB, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa V: Towards an African Continental Free Trade Area, 2012, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria5_print_uneca_fin_20_july_1.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014); UNECA, AU, and AfDB, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VI: Harmonizing Policies to Transform the Trading Environment, 2013, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/aria _vi_english_full.pdf (accessed September 1, 2014). 11. Ulrike Lorenz-Carl and Martin Rempe (eds.), Mapping Agency: Comparing Regionalisms in Africa (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013); Emmanuel Fanta, Timothy M. Shaw, and Vanessa T. Tang (eds.), Comparative Regionalisms for Development in the 21st Century: Insights from the Global South (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013). 12. Similarly, the Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa yearbook, on which the South African Trade Law Centre (TR ALAC) and the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung have collaborated for more than a decade, is a highly regarded technical resource, but serves a different role than broader academic discussions on Southern Africa. The most recent TR ALAC yearbook at the time of writing is André du Pisani, Gerhard Erasmus, Trudi Hartzenberg, and Colin McCarthy (eds.), Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Yearbook 2013/2014, March 12, 2015, http://www.tralac.org/publications/article/7132 -monitoring-regional-integration-in-southern-africa-yearbook-2013-2014.html (accessed April 20, 2015). 13. A report from the seminar is available online: CCR, Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa, Cape Town, South Africa, October 2014, http://ccr.org.za /images/pdfs/vol49_region_building_29sep2014.pdf (accessed October 14, 2014). 14. For one argument for integration along these lines, aside from those in this volume, see Percy S. Mistry, “Africa’s Record of Regional Co-operation and Integration,” African Affairs 99, no. 397 (2000), 554–6.  INTRODUCTION 15 15. Conventions for numbering the Pan-African Congresses differ, with some writ- ers counting the 1900 Pan-African Conference as the first congress (see, e.g., chapter 8 in this volume). 16. Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 132–5. 17. See, for example, John Fobanjong, “Articulating Cabral’s Regionalist and Pan-African Visions,” African Identities 4, no. 1 (2006), 118–19. 18. See, for example, Gilbert M. Khadiagla, Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994); Abillah H. Omari and Paulino Macaringue, “Southern African Security in Historical Perspective,” in Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani, and Abillah H. Omari (eds.), Security and Democracy in Southern Africa (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007), pp. 45–60. 19. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, pp. 111–12. 20. Adebayo Adedeji, “Comparative Strategies of Economic Decolonization in Africa,” in Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji (eds.), General History of Africa VIII: Africa Since 1935 (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 1993), p. 393. 21. Ibid., pp. 407–408. 22. Amilcar Cabral, “Presuppositions and Objectives of National Liberation in Relation to Social Structure,” in Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar, trans. Michael Wolfers (New York: Monthly Review, 1979), pp. 130–3. See also Fobanjong, “Articulating Cabral’s Regionalist and Pan-African Visions.” 23. C. L. R. James, A History of Pan-African Revolt (Oakland: PM, 2012), pp. 117–18, 132. 24. See, for example, Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Léopold Sédar Senghor, On African Socialism, trans. Mercer Cook (New York: Praeger, 1964). 25. On the Casablanca and Monrovia groups, see Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, pp. 143–7; Edem Kodjo and David Chanaiwa, “Pan-Africanism and Liberation,” in Mazrui and Wondji, General History of Africa VIII, pp. 748–9; S. K. B. Asante in collaboration with David Chanaiwa, “Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration,” in Mazrui and Wondji, General History of Africa VIII, pp. 727–8. See also chapters 7 and 8 in this volume. 26. Tirfe Mammo, The Paradox of Africa’s Poverty: The Role of Indigenous Knowledge, Traditional Practices, and Local Institutions—The Case of Ethiopia (Lawrenceville: Red Sea, 1999), p. 36. On capitalism in Africa in general, see Chinweizu, “Africa and the Capitalist Countries,” in Mazrui and Wondji, General History of Africa VIII, pp. 769–7. 27. All quotations and references to Nyerere’s thought in this paragraph are from Julius Nyerere, “The Dilemma of the Pan-Africanist,” transcript of a speech given July 13, 1966, http://www.blackpast.org/1966-julius-kambarage-nyerere -dilemma-pan-africanist (accessed May 1, 2015). 28. See, for example, Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution, US ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1969), pp. 24–6. 29. In addition to Nyerere’s comments, see Asante and Chanaiwa, “Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration,” pp. 730–1. 30. See, for example, Guy Martin, “Dream of Unity: From the United States of Africa to the Federation of African States,” African and Asian Studies 12, no. 3 (2013), 176–7. 16 D A N I E L H. L E V I N E A N D D AW N N AG A R 31. Asante and Chanaiwa, “Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration,” p. 728. 32. Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare, pp. 32–8, 56–78. See also Paulin J. Hountondji, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, trans. Henri Evans in col- laboration with Jonathan Rée, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 138–9. 33. Organisation of African Unity (OAU), “Sirte Declaration,” EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev. 1, adopted at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of Heads of State and Government, September 9, 1999, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/sirte.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015). 34. See, for example, Adekeye Adebajo, “Gaddafi: The Man Who Would Be King of Africa,” Guardian (London), August 26, 2011; Martin, “Dream of Unity,” pp. 170–1, 175; Maano Ramutsindela, “Gaddafi, Continentalism, and Sovereignty in Africa,” South African Geographical Journal 91, no. 1 (2009), 1–3. 35. See, for example, Asante and Chanaiwa, “Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration,” pp. 728–30. See also chapters 7 and 10 in this volume. 36. Ali A. Mazrui, “Seek Ye First the Political Kingdom,” in Mazrui and Wondji, General History of Africa VIII, pp. 122–5; Sam Mbah and I. E. Igariwey, African Anarchism: The History of a Movement (Tucson: See Sharp, 1997), pp. 73–5. 37. See Khelha Shubane, “Black Economic Empowerment: Myths and Realities,” in Adebajo, Adedeji, and Landsberg, South Africa in Africa, pp. 63–77; Hein Marias, South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change (London: Zed, 2011), esp. Chapter 4. 38. Pan-African scholar Guy Martin provides a survey of some recent proposals in Martin, “Dream of Unity,” pp. 177–85. See also Mueni wa Muiu and Guy Martin, A New Paradigm of the African State: Fundi wa Afrika (New York: Palgrave, 2009). 39. On Boko Haram, see, for example, International Crisis Group (ICG), Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, April 3, 2014, http:// w w w.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing -violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.aspx (accessed April 20, 2015). The violence in the Niger Delta region has been reduced from its peak levels, especially since a 2009 amnesty, but it has not been eliminated. See, for example, the reports on individual states available at Fund for Peace, “Nigeria Conflict Bulletins,” http://library.fundforpeace.org/conflictbulletin (accessed April 20, 2015). On the Niger Delta conflict in general, see, for example, Ike Okonta, “The Disease of Elephants: Oil-Rich ‘Minority’ Areas, Shell, and International NGOs,” in Adebajo and Mustapha, Gulliver’s Troubles, pp. 116–37. 40. See, for example, Daniel Jordan Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 41. CCR, Region-Building, p. 31. 42. For a brief discussion of the latter, see Richard Florida, “The World Is Spiky,” The Atlantic, October 2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/images /issues/200510/world-is-spiky.pdf (accessed January 9, 2015), pp. 50–1. 43. See, for example, Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds.), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008). 44. See Ibbo Mandaza and Arne Tostensen, Southern Africa in Search of a Common Future: From the Conference to a Community (Gaborone: Southern African Development Community [SADC] Secretariat, 1994), pp. 3–4; Ibbo Mandaza,  INTRODUCTION 17 “SADCC: Problems of Regional, Political, and Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: An Overview,” in Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o (ed.), Regional Integration in Africa: Unfinished Agenda (Nairobi: Academy Science, 1990), p. 149. 45. World Bank, “Gini Index (World Bank Estimate),” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI (accessed April 20, 2015); World Bank, “Poverty Headcount Ratio at National Poverty Lines (% of Population),” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries (accessed April 20, 2015). All poverty figures in this paragraph are based on national poverty lines, and the numbers may be different if poverty is defined at international standards of $1.25 per day or $2 per day. Figures are the most recent available from the World Bank at the time of writing. 46. World Bank, “Gini Index”; World Bank, “Poverty Headcount Ratio.” 47. See, for example, Jonathan D. Ostry, Andrew Berg, and Charlambos G. Tsangarides, “Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth,” International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff Discussion Note SDN/14/02, April 2014, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1402.pdf (accessed April 20, 2015). For a more popularized summary of recent literature, see “Inequality v Growth,” The Economist, March 1, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and -economics/21597931-up-point-redistributing-income-fight-inequality-can-lift -growth-inequality (accessed October 13, 2014). 48. On the 2008 violence and xenophobia, see Francis Nyamnjoh and Patience Mususa, “Migration and Xenophobia,” in Saunders, Dzinesa, and Nagar, Region- Building in Southern Africa, pp. 215–29. 49. Nicos Trimikliniotis, Steven Gordon, and Brian Zondo, “Globalisation and Migrant Labour in a ‘Rainbow Nation’: A Fortress South Africa?,” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 7 (2008), 1324–6. 50. Baruti Amisi, Patrick Bond, Nokuthula Cele, and Trevor Ngwane, “Xenophobia and Civil Society: Durban’s Structured Social Divisions,” Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 38, no. 1 (2011), 63–4. 51. See, for example, Shireen Hassim, “After Apartheid: Consensus, Contention, and Gender in South Africa’s Public Sphere,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 22, no. 4 (2009), 453–64. 52. Trimikliniotis, Gordon, and Zondo, “Globalisation and Migrant Labour,” esp. pp. 1329–31. 53. South Africa National Arms Control Committee, 2013 Annual Report, AC 5/1/9A, April 3, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers /transparency/national_reports/south_africa/SA_2013.pdf (accessed June 1, 2015), Annex A. 54. Ceasefire Campaign, Ceasefire Campaign Dossier: South African Arms Exports, 2000–2010, October 31, 2011, http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/doc/2012/Dossier-SA-A rms-Exports2000 –10%20%282011%29.pdf (accessed June 1, 2015). 55. Pieter D. Wezeman, “South African Arms Supplies to Sub-Saharan Africa,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Background Paper, January 2011, http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP1101.pdf (accessed October 13, 2014), pp. 5–6.  Part I Themes and Concepts of Region-Building and Regional Integration in Africa  Chapter 1 Region-Building Debates in a Global Context Louise Fawcett Introduction A starting point of this introductory chapter is that region-building debates nec- essarily take place within a global context and are informed by wider patterns and trends, so it is important to examine this wider context and how it develops over time. At the same time, region-building is also intimately connected with the specifics of a particular region; hence a parallel study of regional particularities and variants is also needed. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of the African continent, as different chapters in this volume show. However, if we also consider the parallel cases of Western Europe, Asia, and Latin America since World War II, we will see that we cannot understand region-building without juxtaposing the global and the local. All these regions developed alongside and in response to major changes in the international system: the Cold War and its ending, or the pro- cesses of decolonization and globalization. Yet each region also developed in a unique way, responding to local circumstances informed by geography and history. In this respect, any informed study of region-building from the per- spective of international relations also demands a view from the perspective of area studies—something that is often lacking in attempts to construct a general theory of regionalism. General Features and Theories of Region-Building Some Definitions While this chapter focuses primarily on region-building as a policy linked to formal organizations comprised of states, it is also important to note that the activities clustered under the term “region-building” occupy a wide spectrum of activity, from integration and cooperation within regional institutions, to more informal or ad hoc processes and practices. Regional integration, at one end of the spectrum, denotes a process whereby previously disparate units become 22 L O U I S E FAW C E T T united, implying the surrender of state authority to some supranational body. “Region-building,” like the associated term “regionalism,” is a looser term that is understood here as the promotion of regionally based policies and practices. It could be as much about fostering shared ideas, a dialogue, or regional awareness as it is about building formal institutions. “Regionalization” is another widely used term that needs to be distinguished from “regionalism” and “region- building,” because it can refer to spontaneous or undirected regional activity. Regionalization, the process, may drive and flow from regionalism, the policy, but it is not a conscious project.1 The Formal-Informal Divide Within regionalism and region-building processes there are sharp divides over levels of legalization and institutionalization. As regards this formal- informal divide, some states evidently prefer the greater flexibility and opt-out that informal arrangements allow, and this is reflected in looser institutional arrangements. 2 The Central American peace process was initiated in the infor- mal Contadora grouping of the 1980s, rather than in the more formal setting of the Organization of American States (OAS). At the United Nations (UN) level, the preference for informality is evident in the Security Council’s frequent use of ad hoc coalitions or groups of friends as means of conflict mediation. 3 Others like the tie-in of formality, which offers harder contractual obligations or guarantees. Here the hard-soft law analogy regarding state preferences is helpful in showing under which conditions states might prefer hard over soft regionalism.4 Contrast the development of the European Union (EU), a highly legalized institution, with that of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), both of which commenced as a conference rather than as a formal organization. So did the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) of 1980, which aimed to finally dismantle apartheid South Africa in the early 1990s and only became a community in 1992 with the formation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The early activities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were largely informal, based around the principles of dialogue and consensus building, reflecting the limits of cooperation in a conflict-prone region.5 ASEAN did not formally adopt a charter—an important constitutional development—until 2008.6 Though this chapter focuses principally on region-building as a policy linked to formal orga- nizations, it recognizes the important roles that informal processes can play in the start-up and evolution of cooperation. Geography and Territory Apart from these definitional questions, there are also various types and sizes of regions that can be built depending on the designs and intentions of the build- ers. Efforts at region-building usually conform to a combination of geographical, political, or cultural logics, though not in equal measure, and scholars disagree  R E G I O N - B U I L D I N G D E B AT E S I N A G L O B A L C O N T E X T 23 on the hierarchy of factors that drive regionalism.7 The League of Arab States (LAS) is an example of an organization applying linguistic-cultural rather than purely geographical conditions for inclusion: only the 22 Arab-speaking states are eligible, so Iran, Israel, and Turkey are excluded (Turkey has recently been granted observer status).8 The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is another example of religious identity, rather than geography, defining member- ship. History and politics explain the start-up and consolidation of an organiza- tion like the Commonwealth, though for some the idea of the Commonwealth as a regional organization is stretching the definition too far, because from a simple geographical perspective Commonwealth countries are widely dispersed across five major regions. From a geographical and territorial perspective, international (as opposed to subnational) region-building also occupies a wide spectrum. It includes large, continental-scale projects, covering contiguous territorial areas, or smaller regional units, sometimes called subregions, with the latter denoting fewer member states and occupying a smaller territorial space. The names of such orga- nizations usually indicate their size and reach: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), SADC, or the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) all occupy sub- regions within their wider regions—the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, respectively. It should be noted that size, in itself, is not necessarily a facilitator of region-building; often the reverse is true. The potential collective weight of a larger number of states is balanced by their diversity and the difficulty of reach- ing common agreement.9 Indeed, large-scale region-building is notoriously hard to achieve beyond advancing dialogue and confidence-building measures. In this respect it experiences similar obstacles to those faced by universal organi- zations like the UN, while lacking the equivalent authority and legitimacy.10 Smaller, more compact institutions with one or more powerful players, despite their more limited resources, may be more effective in taking the lead in and promoting region-building. The start-up of the European Community (EC) as well as the activities of the GCC, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or MERCOSUR all depended on strong regional players. In Africa, a recent innovation to maximize efficiency is the aspiration to bring regional organizations under a single umbrella in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) initiative.11 The wider ASEAN network is another example, with the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Plus Three constituting the ASEAN “family” of institutions.12 Functions and Purposes Region-building also serves different functions and purposes. Some regions are constructed for the purpose of fulfilling a specific function, whether security, development, or economic. Many early organizations followed the EU’s lead in proposing to create free trade areas and common markets.13 Some organizations today remain principally focused on economic integration, like APEC or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Some are self-consciously security-oriented, like the long-established North Atlantic Treaty Organization 24 L O U I S E FAW C E T T (NATO) or the more recently established Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which has prioritized cooperation against terrorist threats. Others are multipurpose, as was the case with a number of the early continental or “pan” associations like the OAS, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), or the LAS. An interesting feature of region-building is how the emphasis and func- tions can shift depending on changing external and internal factors. Some orga- nizations that started life promising economic integration have moved toward promoting security tasks: ECOWAS is one such case. Others have experienced sustained institutional deepening and accordingly expanded their repertoires to take on both economic and security roles: the EU is the most obvious example, but there are others, like MERCOSUR. Drivers Finally, and reflecting its global and local ori