NGOs in Global Environmental Governance PDF

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global Environmental Governance 1  Introduction Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are private (international) and non-profit organizations that have legal personalit...

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global Environmental Governance 1  Introduction Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are private (international) and non-profit organizations that have legal personality recognized by at least one country but do not belong to or are affiliated with official governmental entities, although they generally pursue an official policy goal. NGOs: − comprise of individuals or national groupings that are not official representatives of official entities (e.g., governments). − cut across national boundaries. − seek to affect changes in policy. Other terms: civil society and advocacy networks. Local social movements, foundations, members of the media, churches, and even parts of executive or parliamentary branches. 2 Introduction 3  The Role of NGOs in Environmental Governance (overview) Civil society groups do not exist/operate in a vacuum: − not fully independent from the state − continued hegemony of the nation state − NGOs interact with the state, and they are permeated by domestic laws and governmental organizations − governments realized that they can gain from the activities of NGOs States’ capacity to meet the needs of their population declined over the years due to globalization and denationalization forces. An active civil society could here: − bridge the “democracy gap” that emerged from the shifting of political decision-making processes from a national to an international level − enhance the legitimacy of governmental policies − make governmental policies more likely to be implemented − exert pressure on governments to agree to more (in-) effective solutions for global problems such as climate change 4  The Role of NGOs in Environmental Governance (specifics) 1. NGOs can help to set the international agenda and raise awareness: “popularizers” of many problems; conduit between experts and the public; stimulate political action 2. NGOs provide information about policy options in issue areas with much uncertainty and complexity: help states maximize policy information and research; minimize expenditures, especially for small, less developed states lack resources and expertise in issue areas 3. NGOs can monitor the actions of state delegations (during negotiations): international negotiations are a “two-level game” i.e. monitoring is one way by which principals can control agents; “fire alarms,” i.e., outside parties alert them in case of undesired delegation actions 4. NGOs can inform state delegations during negotiations about the actions of other delegations and publish reports of negotiations: alleviate this problem of information overload by supplying daily bulletins 5 The Role of NGOs in Environmental Governance (specifics cont.) 5. NGOs can provide reliable assessments of individual states’ compliance: states repeatedly lie or distort the information they provide and often even fail to report anything at all; provide independent assessments 6. NGOs can enhance domestic signaling: aware of the shape and location of the “win-set,” i.e., the set of points acceptable to all parties; reveal the structure of the international bargaining game; help governments to convince their domestic constituencies that governments cannot be blamed for an unsatisfactory agreement or policy gridlock 7. NGOs can facilitate the ratification of international agreements: bring some of the important domestic players directly to the international table; “bridge” the two levels; gauge the likely outcome of the domestic-level and adjusts accordingly; co-opt critical NGOs, e.g., key firms participated in the Tokyo Round of the GATT 6 Are NGOs Effective in Exerting Influence and Pursuing Policies? The positive view Short answer: yes!!!! The reasons: – Due to NGOs’ and economic actors’ − utilitarian preferences, i.e., both are assumed to be rational and to be motivated by self-interest maximization − activities, such as lobbying and providing information to negotiators − access to negotiations, i.e., such as the number of NGOs attending negotiations and the rules of participation − resources, i.e., knowledge and financial assets 7  Are NGOs Effective in Exerting Influence and Pursuing Policies? The dubious view NGOs do not have untrammeled access to negotiations and decision-making centers. - NGOs are often denied access to decision-making processes at international fora - NGOs are only allowed to participate as observers, i.e., they are not permitted to express their positions during the negotiating process NGOs generally operate with the consent of states’ governments. Their input is accepted or rejected at the discretion of the involved governments. Example: when governments desire secrecy, they minimize NGO access by holding talks and making key decisions during “informal-informals” from which NGOs are excluded. 8  Patterns and Trends in NGO Participation (cont.) Observation: there is a significant variation among international institutions, and even greater variation among NGOs. States vary in their preferences toward the terms and modalities of environmental cooperation. ❖ developing countries seem to support wide-scale NGO participation − they are most in need of NGO expertise due to a lack of resources − NGOs frequently support developing country requests for resource transfers ❖ developed countries face political and technocratic pressures more directly − most prominent NGOs are based in liberal democracies Not all NGOs participate in environmental diplomacy and not all states benefit from NGO participation at all times. 9 Patterns and Trends in NGO Participation: The UNFCCC 10 Patterns and Trends in NGO Participation: The UNFCCC 11 Patterns and Trends in NGO Participation: The UNFCCC 12 Do ENGOs induce stronger environmental commitments? Expectations a) a higher degree of ENGO access to official negotiations and a larger number of ENGOs actively participating during bargaining processes can facilitate outcomes of environmental negotiations. b) the more ENGOs actively participating have a higher degree of access in international environmental negotiations, the higher the commitment level of states afterward. Empirical evaluation: impact of ENGOs in 23 environmental regimes using quantitative data from 1946 to 1998. 13 The impact of ENGOs on environmental commitment levels 14 Conditional marginal effects of ENGO access on depth of cooperation Dashed lines show 90% confidence intervals 15 Facts: Civil Society on States’ National Delegations at the UNFCCC CoPs, 1995–2011 16 Reasons for the inclusion of CSOs in national delegations Most governments include of civil society organizations (CSOs) in their national delegations at global climate negotiations. Inclusion of CSOs in national delegations −benefits governments in terms of information provision and legitimacy −offers greater opportunities for CSOs to influence governmental policy–makers But a Puzzle CSOs constrain government autonomy in the sense of affecting the traditional prerogative of the national government to negotiate international agreements. In light of this trade–off, it is not obvious ex–ante, but somewhat puzzling why governments formally include CSOs. 17  Theoretical Argument: Social Networks, Legitimacy, and Civil Society Participation ▪ Governments that are more strongly embedded in global governance networks benefit from a higher flow of information therein, and are then more likely to be influenced by the practices of other governments with respect to CSOs.  Governments that are more central to the global governance network are, therefore, more likely to include CSOs if their counterparts do so in order to avoid a potential legitimacy or information advantage of their counterparts. Empirical evaluation: time–series cross–section data of UNFCCC negotiations for the period 1995–2005, and newly compiled survey data from the UNFCCC conference of the parties (CoP) in Durban (2011). 18  Results The likelihood of CSO inclusion increases (by about 5% – 7%) if a state is very central in the global governance network and if the other country in a given dyad with that country has included CSO representatives in its national delegation before. This finding supports the theoretical argument that countries include CSOs to19 enhance procedural (input) legitimacy. Additional evidence for the legitimacy reason Evidence from a survey conducted with government representatives from 50 national delegations to the 2011 climate CoP in Durban lines up well with the underlying theoretical assumption that the ‘contagion’ effect traveling through the global IGO network is driven by government considerations of legitimacy. Policy implications Those interested in increasing civil society involvement in global governance should try and motivate as many states as possible to include CSO representatives in their national delegations because this would facilitate the diffusion of CSO involvement to other countries. = since each country is free to decide on its own how its national delegation is composed, civil society involvement could be promoted quite effectively via unilateral national steps that have ripple effects through the global governance network. 20  Epistemic Communities as Special Civil Society Actors Loose frame of knowledge-based experts in a particular issue-area. − network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain − authoritative claim on policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area − they are not formal organizations − identifying an epistemic community is never easy or noncontroversial Although epistemic communities may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have: − a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members − shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a certain set of problems in their domain − these beliefs then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes - shared notions of validity, i.e., inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in their domain of expertise − a common policy enterprise, i.e., a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. 21  Epistemic Communities as Special Civil Society Actors Epistemic Communities can: 1. Elucidate the cause-and-effect relationships and provide advice about the likely results of various courses of action (even identify winners and losers of a particular action or even-climate change). 2. Shed light on the nature of complex interlinkages between issues and on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to take action or from instituting a particular policy. 3. Help defining self-interests of a state or factions within it, i.e., elucidation of cause-and-effect relationship could lead to the redefinition of pre-conceived interests or to the identification of new ones. 4. Frame the issues for collective debate. 5. Help formulating policies (exact role depends on the reasons for which their advice is sought more or less politically motivated cases). 22  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Formed in November 1988 as an “epistemic community” to: − organize the assessment of global climate change as a scientific phenomenon − centralize/formalize the interaction between science and politics − at the same time: governments stay in charge Although IPCC’s methods have been heavily criticized, its credibility has not yet been questioned. IPCC is divided into three working groups. − climate science (2009-2013, Prof. Stocker and the Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research) − impacts − response strategies The scientific information provided by IPCC has altered many governments’ perceptions regarding climate change and has contributed toward enhancing their willingness to engage in negotiations. 23 18 European Journal of Political Research 53: 18–36, 2014 doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12016 Civil society participation in global governance: Insights from climate politics TOBIAS BÖHMELT,1 VALLY KOUBI1,2 & THOMAS BERNAUER1 1 ETH Zurich, Switzerland; 2University of Bern, Switzerland Abstract. A rather unique feature of global climate negotiations is that most governments allow repre- sentatives of civil society organisations to be part of their national delegation. It remains unclear, however, why states grant such access in the first place. While there are likely to be benefits from formally including civil society, there are also substantial costs stemming from constraints on sovereignty. In light of this tradeoff, this article argues for a ‘contagion’ effect that explains this phenomenon besides domestic deter- minants. In particular, states, which are more central to the broader network of global governance, are more likely to be informed of and influenced by other states’ actions and policies toward civil society. In turn, more central governments are likely to include civil society actors if other governments do so as well. This argument is tested with data on the participation of civil society organisations in national delegations to global climate negotiations between 1995 and 2005. To further uncover the underlying mechanisms, the article also provides an analysis of survey data collected at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Durban in 2011. Keywords: civil society; climate change; global governance; social network analysis Introduction Civil society organisations (CSOs)1 have become increasingly important in world politics over the past few decades. Academic interest in the drivers of this development has grown accordingly, with a strong focus on policy areas such as human rights and environmental protection where the involvement of CSOs is particularly pronounced (e.g., Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Raustiala 1997; Clark et al. 1998; Bernauer & Betzold 2012). Much of the existing research concentrates on whether and how CSOs are able to influence interna- tional policy making and its outcomes (e.g., Paterson 1996; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004; Betsill & Corell 2008). However, one aspect of this issue has received rather little attention to date: why do governments frequently include CSOs formally in international policy making? This question is fundamental because most scholars agree that states were, and generally still are, in control of international policy-making processes. Why, to what extent and in what form could states accept relinquishing some control over policy making? The over- whelming majority of global governance sectors (e.g., trade liberalisation, monetary policy and security policy) is strictly intergovernmental (Thomann 2007), but CSOs participate in a few areas of international politics.2 In particular, the policy-making process in global climate policy is characterised by the presence of numerous civil society observers and an impressive number of CSOs that are formally included in national delegations which negotiate on behalf of their respective countries. For example, during the 2011 round of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, © 2013 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2013 European Consortium for Political Research Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd  CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 19 about the same number of civil society and government representatives participated; more than 70 per cent of the 193 countries present formally granted at least one CSO repre- sentative access to their national delegations, and about 18 per cent of all members of national delegations were CSO representatives (Böhmelt 2013). The formal inclusion of CSOs in national delegations generally offers greater opportu- nities for these actors to influence governmental decision making (Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Raustiala 1997; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 59; Steffek & Nanz 2007: 11; Thomann 2007; Böhmelt 2013).3 CSOs are not excluded from the unofficial sessions between govern- ments, and actively participate in informal backdoor diplomacy, receive official state docu- ments and present proposals (Raustiala 1997; Clark et al. 1998: 18). Gulbrandsen & Andresen (2004: 73) conclude accordingly that CSOs are likely to ‘have the most far- reaching influence on... negotiations if they foster ways to work closely and collabora- tively with key negotiators’. While it seems apparent why CSOs would welcome their inclusion in national delega- tions, it is more difficult to see why governments would want to grant CSOs access in the first place.4 First and foremost, formally including CSOs is likely to constrain governmental autonomy or sovereignty, which we define as ‘the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains’ (Ruggie 1986: 143), in the sense that this cuts into the traditional prerogative of the nation-state to negotiate international agree- ments (Clark et al. 1998; Clark 1995; Stasavage 2004). Consequently, states determine which nongovernmental actors may participate and CSOs are often denied access to policy- making processes or are only allowed to participate as observers – that is, they are not permitted to participate in the decision making during the negotiations per se (Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Raustiala 1997; Thomann 2007). In light of this, it is rather puzzling why governments formally include CSOs since sovereignty is normally seen as one of the most valuable goods for states (see Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1856). Nonetheless, the literature (Grant & Keohane 2005; Biermann & Gupta 2011; Böhmelt 2013; for an overview, see Bernauer & Betzold 2012) highlights one motiva- tion of governments to involve CSOs: legitimacy – that is, governments may opt for civil society participation as a means to mitigate the ‘democracy deficit’ and enhance the legiti- macy of global governance (e.g., Bernstein 2005; Grant & Keohane 2005; Betsill & Corell 2008; Steffek & Ferretti 2009; Biermann & Gupta 2011; Keohane 2011; Dryzek 2012). In this article, we focus on the legitimacy argument, which we combine with a social network perspective to explain formal CSO inclusion in global climate governance. We argue that governments are a priori hesitant to formally include CSOs in international policy-making processes. However, countries are embedded in broader networks of interstate relations, and those that are more strongly embedded in these networks benefit from a higher flow of information and are more likely to be influenced by the practices of other governments with respect to CSOs.We ultimately argue that states are more likely to formally include CSOs in order to avoid a potential legitimacy advantage of their counterparts and to enhance domestic legitimacy if the following two conditions apply: first, if they are more central to the global governance network; and second, if other states formally include CSOs as well. Thus, while government choices concerning whether to involve formally CSOs in global climate policy are obviously driven to a considerable degree by domestic factors, we concentrate on a less obvious but potentially also important factor: international network effects.5 © 2013 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2013 European Consortium for Political Research 20 TOBIAS BÖHMELT, VALLY KOUBI & THOMAS BERNAUER We test our hypothesis with data on formal CSO inclusion in national delegations to the UNFCCC negotiations between 1995 and 2005. Quantitative statistical analyses offer strong support for the hypothesised contagion effect. Evidence from a survey of fifty delegation representatives to the 2011 UNFCCC conference in Durban further suggests that governments do indeed reflect on the benefits and costs of formal CSO inclusion when deciding upon whether to involve them, and that considerations on both domestic and international legitimacy are important. The academic and practical relevance of our research might extend beyond the specific case of climate policy in the sense that it contributes to ‘identifying sources and mechanisms that can contribute to enhanced accountability and legitimacy of governance arrangements’ (Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1856; see also Kingsbury 2007; Mason 2008). Social networks, legitimacy and formal civil society participation: Theory We develop our theoretical argument by first elaborating on social networks and how they can affect the evolution of shared norms and practices. We then discuss the reasons why states may want to grant CSOs formal access to global governance efforts more thoroughly, with an emphasis on the legitimacy enhancing effects of such an involvement. In a third step, we connect the network and civil society arguments to hypothesise that states, which are more central to the global governance network, are more likely to include CSOs in response to other governments adopting this practice. Social networks: The role of ties and centrality In general, a social network is characterised by a set of actors and the relations between them (e.g., Borgatti et al. 2009; Hafner-Burton et al. 2009; Maoz 2010; Bodin & Prell 2011; Ward et al. 2011). Actors can be individuals, groups of people or states that are connected by specific types of relationships. Each kind of resource exchange is considered a network relation and actors experiencing such a relation are said to maintain a tie (or link). The strength of a tie may range from weak to strong, depending on the quantity, quality or frequency of exchanges between actors. Patterns of who is tied to whom, and how, reveal the structure of the underlying network. Mutual memberships of two states in intergovern- mental organisations (IGOs), which will be of particular interest in this article, provide one example of a tie linking countries. Ties in networks facilitate the transmission of information about interests and inten- tions, and they tend to promote a common understanding (Dorussen & Ward 2008: 192ff). Links that are shorter and denser enable actors to convey information at lower cost, with more precision and quicker. Denser networks can thus help reduce uncertainty, increase trust and facilitate the development of mutually accepted norms (Ward 2006: 151ff; see also Hafner-Burton & Montgomery 2006; Dorussen & Ward 2008: 194ff; Hafner-Burton et al. 2009: 569). In other words, the interaction through network ties influences the behaviour of actors by ‘endowing some with greater social power and by shaping common beliefs about behavior’ (Hafner-Burton & Montgomery 2006: 8). © 2013 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2013 European Consortium for Political Research  CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 21 Ward (2006: 151ff) and others (e.g., Bodin & Prell 2011; for an overview, see Hafner-Burton et al. 2009) emphasise that countries with more numerous ties to other countries are more central in a network. Greater network centrality increases opportunities for knowledge sharing and more frequent encounters provide more prospects for face-to- face contact that facilitate the diffusion of ideas, norms and practices. IGO networks, on which we focus, can thus form the basis for a normative influence between states (Torfason & Ingram 2010). For example, Von Stein (2008) finds that states’ level of centrality in the global IGO network has a positive effect on their participation in international climate agreements.The recent literature also shows that mutual IGO membership affects domestic policy choices since connections in the network of IGOs can provide countries with infor- mation that fosters policy learning and socialisation (e.g., Hafner-Burton et al. 2008; Cao 2009, 2010) Costs and benefits of formal civil society involvement As noted above, states should be generally unwilling to involve CSOs in global governance as this imposes constraints on their behaviour (Clark 1995; Stasavage 2004). In the words of Clark et al. (1998: 29): ‘[W]hile governments have agreed to a certain level of NGO [civil society] involvement at the international level, they still bar NGO [civil society] participa- tion in procedures or issues that in some way restrict state sovereignty.’ Such restrictions and constraints are particularly pronounced if CSOs are formally included in delegations at international negotiations. Even if governments carefully select civil society representa- tives, giving CSOs a ‘seat at the table’ may result in considerable cost since they might use the improved opportunity for direct access to influence a state’s bargaining position in ways that could be undesirable from the government’s point of view. For instance, they may openly voice dissent vis à vis the government’s position at the bargaining table and hence weaken a state’s negotiating position. The possibility also exists that they leak confidential information to the press and the public. The literature highlights two potential reasons for why states may nevertheless, despite the costs, be interested in formally involving CSOs in global governance efforts. First, governments may expect to obtain additional useful information and expertise (Raustiala 1997; Betsill & Corell 2008). Raustiala (1997), for example, notes that civil society can help governments to obtain policy-relevant information at low cost, which can be important given the high level of uncertainty and complexity that characterizes environmental issues. However, recent research does not find support for the empirical implications of this information argument in the context of the UNFCCC: Böhmelt (2013: 75) observes that civil society actors are more often included in delegations of countries with a higher bureaucratic quality, which ‘are least in need of expertise and information provision’. Bernauer and Betzold (2012: 64) have challenged the information argument on empirical grounds as they find that the ‘existing research offers episodic, but not systematic and strong empirical evidence that more civil society participation has contributed to more effective agreements’. Second, governments may want to formally include CSOs for enhancing the legitimacy of global governance. Legitimacy commonly describes © 2013 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2013 European Consortium for Political Research 22 TOBIAS BÖHMELT, VALLY KOUBI & THOMAS BERNAUER the state or quality of being legitimate, i.e., of being in accord with established legal norms and requirements, or conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards of behavior. Core elements of the concept of legitimacy are the acceptance and justification of authority. Acceptance relates to the way in which rules or institu- tions are accepted by a community as being authoritative. Justification relates to the reasons that justify the authority of certain rules or institutions. (Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1858; see also Bernstein 2005; Keohane 2011) According to Lipset (1983: 64), ‘legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropri- ate and proper ones for the society’. In this article, we concentrate on external legitimacy – that is, the acceptance of rules or norms by non-members or non-participants at interna- tional and domestic levels (Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1858). States may opt for civil society participation as a means to enhance legitimacy of global governance at international and national levels (Bernauer & Betzold 2012: 63; see also, e.g., Bernstein 2005; Grant & Keohane 2005; Betsill & Corell 2008; Steffek & Ferretti 2009; Biermann & Gupta 2011; Dryzek 2012). There is a widespread perception among elector- ates in many countries that international politics suffers from a lack of legitimacy and is characterised by a ‘democratic deficit’ (e.g., Nye 2001; Bernstein 2005; Steffek & Nanz 2007; Steffek & Ferretti 2009). Many observers of global governance thus call for ‘opening up the intergovernmental system to institutionalized balanced involvement of non-state actors’ (Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1862). According to this logic, granting CSOs access to states’ negotiation delegations should improve political responsiveness, transparency, accountabil- ity and, ultimately, legitimacy in the sense of international and domestic public support (Clark et al. 1998: 2; see also Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 59f; Grant & Keohane 2005; Steffek & Nanz 2007: 3; Steffek & Ferretti 2009; Dombrowski 2010; Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1858; Bernauer & Betzold 2012).6 In fact, Haas (1999: 103) and Bernstein (2005: 148) state that nongovernmental organi- sations (NGOs) improve the legitimacy of global policy making through their inclusion in states’ negotiation delegations. Bernauer & Betzold (2012: 63) conclude that more civil society participation ‘will result in more legitimate global environmental agreements’. For empirical evidence of the legitimising force of civil society groups, Dellas (2011) and Schouten and Glasbergen (2011) demonstrate that CSOs were able to enhance legitimacy via their participation in the decision-making processes of the UN Commission on Sustain- able Development or the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, respectively. Moreover, according to Economy (2004: 126), the Chinese delegation at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 was ‘embarrassed’ by its lack of civil society representation as compared to other countries and perceived this as a disadvantage with respect to legitimacy and public support at the national and international levels. This case illustrates that legitimacy considerations are not purely a function of domestic pressures, but can also emanate from international processes in which any given govern- ment encounters new information on the preferences and practices of other states. It also shows, however, that concerns over legitimacy alone may not necessarily be enough; the Chinese delegation became only aware of its ‘disadvantage’ when realising what other states did.7 © 2013 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2013 European Consortium for Political Research  CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23 Network centrality and civil society inclusion The existing evidence seems to favour the legitimacy argument and we thus focus on this. Specifically, consensual knowledge, the evolvement of norms and, ultimately, the degree of centrality in a network can shape actors’ behaviour toward CSOs. If governments are well connected to other states – that is, they experience a higher flow of communication in the overall state network due to a more central position – then they are more aware of other countries’ position and preferences toward civil society. However, we do not claim that a more central position per se increases the likelihood that states formally include CSOs. Instead, while upholding the claim that states generally have concerns over legitimacy (Bierman & Gupta 2011; Bernauer & Betzold 2012), we argue that they might value these concerns higher than those about governmental autonomy and sovereignty if two condi- tions are met. The first condition is that other countries demonstrate a ‘positive behaviour’ toward CSOs by, for example, granting them access formally, while the second condition is that a state is aware of this. In other words, the likelihood of formally including CSOs in a national delegation depends on the degree of the respective country’s network centrality and the behaviour of other governments vis à vis CSOs. Under these circumstances, states will be more likely to grant CSO representatives access if their counterparts do so as well, in order to avoid potential legitimacy advantages of those counterparts and to enhance domestic legitimacy. For illustrative purposes, consider the decisions of countries i and j in this respect. If j decides to involve CSOs, i has a stronger incentive to do the same for two closely related, but distinct reasons. First, i learns that j came to the conclusion that the advantages of including CSO may outweigh the costs. This reduces uncertainty for i in respect to the costs and benefits of CSO inclusion and motivates inclusion of CSOs on the part of i. Second, CSO inclusion by j but not by i could become disadvantageous for i both domestically and internationally. Domestically, CSOs in country i are likely to use CSO inclusion by j to urge the former to involve CSOs as well. Internationally, i may also have to justify vis à vis j and other states why it is not involving CSOs. At either level, however, given the definition and importance of ‘legitimacy’ given above, j is likely to have a legitimacy advantage over i. Greater network centrality is important in this respect since it leads to more information on government preferences and behaviour traveling both ways: to the respective government, and from it to other governments. Hence, we formulate the main hypothesis as a contagion effect: States more central to the global governance network are more likely to formally include CSOs when other states do so. Conversely, states that are peripheral to the global governance network are unlikely to include CSOs even if other states in the network do so. Research design We first use quantitative analyses to examine whether the empirical evidence is consistent with our theoretical argument. This approach cannot, however, directly tell us whether © 2013 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2013 European Consortium for Political Research 24 TOBIAS BÖHMELT, VALLY KOUBI & THOMAS BERNAUER legitimacy considerations and the tradeoff between sovereignty constraints and legitimacy gains are in fact part of the underlying driving forces in governmental decisions on CSO involvement. To enhance confidence in our quantitative findings, we thus add insights from a survey conducted at the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC in Durban. Dependent variable and methodology The dependent variable for our quantitative analyses measures whether a country included at least one CSO representative in its national delegation to a given COP to the UNFCCC (1) or not (0). These panel data cover the period 1995–2011 (Böhmelt 2013). Consistent with the UNFCCC definition applied to participants in COPs, our measure of CSO repre- sentatives captures persons who are not employed or affiliated with a government/state or an IGO but pursue interests in global climate politics – for example, environmental NGOs, business groups or scientific institutions (see also Steffek & Nanz 2007). We merged these data on CSO inclusion into a dataset that has the directed country–dyad–year as unit of analysis (e.g., the data include both the country–pair France–Brazil in 1998 and the country–pair Brazil–France in 1998).This data structure seems necessary given the inherent directed logic of our theory (i.e., Brazil’s inclusion of CSOs could affect the probability of France also including CSOs – and vice versa). Because we lack data for most of our covariates after 2005, the combined dataset covers the period 1995–2005. We use probit regression models since the dependent variable is dichotomous, and robust standard errors are clustered on each dyad to account for intragroup correlations or other forms of cross- section heterogeneity. Finally, we control for temporal dependencies by including a civil– society–years variable and different sets of cubic splines (Beck et al. 1998). Main explanatory variables The main explanatory variables according to our argument are the behaviour of other governments vis à vis CSOs and network centrality. With regard to the former, we use data on CSO inclusion by other countries as a proxy. These data are taken from the same source (Böhmelt 2013) as that used for the dependent variable – however, now focusing on a state’s counterpart in a dyad. To avoid potential problems with endogeneity, this ‘Civil society – Dyadic counterpart’ variable is lagged by one year. For network centrality, we consider a country’s whole range and any strength of all ties to the entire IGO network (Freeman et al. 1991; Dorussen & Ward 2008; Hafner-Burton et al. 2009: 563ff) and calculate it in terms of the reduction in total information flow in the network that would occur if a respective state did not exist. Put differently, we focus on the degree to which the maximum flow between all unordered pairs of points depends on i by, n n Network centrality = ∑ ∑m jk ( xi ) j