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West Nottinghamshire College

2024

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law criminal law defenses legal studies

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This document discusses necessity defenses in law, contrasting them with capacity defenses. It covers self-defense, duress, and duress of circumstances, examining cases like R v Gladstone Williams (1987) and R v Seon Oye (2013). Key aspects include the subjective and objective tests for necessity, considerations for intoxication and psychiatric conditions, and the implications of preemptive strikes and the duty to retreat.

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Tuesday 19 November 2024 **Necessity defences** Law **What Are Defences?** - A defence is an explanation of the defendant\'s actions. This explanation may try to legally excuse or justify their conduct. - This defence may seek to negate some (reducing their conviction and/or sentenc...

Tuesday 19 November 2024 **Necessity defences** Law **What Are Defences?** - A defence is an explanation of the defendant\'s actions. This explanation may try to legally excuse or justify their conduct. - This defence may seek to negate some (reducing their conviction and/or sentence) or all elements of a crime (aiming to be acquitted). - In our specification, we cover the following defences: Specific defences - voluntary manslaughter General defences - necessity defences and capacity defences **Necessity versus Capacity:** **Necessity Defences** - These defences can be used where the defendant can justify or excuse why they themselves have broken the law. - Self defence - Duress - Duress of Circumstances **Capacity Defences** - These defences can be used where the defendant can show their mental functions (their mental capacity) was \"diminished\" or impaired. - Insanity - Automatism - Intoxication **Self-Defence - Definition:** Section 76(1) and (2) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 Self-defence can be used by a defendant to: - Defend themselves. - Defend another. - Defend their own property (S.76(5A) of the CJIA 2008). - Prevent a crime (S.3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967). 1. Was it necessary to use force? (Subjective Test) 2. Was that force proportionate or reasonable in comparison to the harm that was threatened? (Objective Test) Olivia was on the bus home. It was late and the bus was empty. At a stop, a man got on; he was wearing dark clothes and had this hood up. He sat one seat in front of Olivia. Olivia was concerned why he decided to sit so close to her. She then noticed a shiny object in his pocket, which she thought was a knife. The man started to turn around towards her, so Olivia punched him and ran off the bus. The man had actually turned around to ask for the time and the shiny item in his pocket was a mirror. Advise Olivia on whether she could successfully plead the defence of self-defence. **1. Was it Necessary to Use Force?** - This is the subjective element of the test for self-defence. - These cases provide you with different features that are essential at tackling \'was is necessary to use force\'. How do the judges decide what is necessary? **R v Gladstone Williams (1987) - main test.** **Statute: Section 76(3) and (4) of the CJIA 2008** - Whether the force was necessary is based on what the defendant genuinely believed were the facts. It does not matter whether if their belief was mistaken. - The defendant thought that a man was attacking a young person. Despite the man claiming to be a police officer, the defendant ended up tackling the man; the man ended up injured. The defendant\'s original charge of S. 47 OAPA 1861 was overturned because the jury should consider whether they thought the defendant\'s mistaken view of the facts was genuine. If so, then a defendant should be judged against this mistaken view, regardless of whether this view was reasonable or not. **Statute: Section 76(5) of the CJIA 2008** - If the defendant made the mistake because they were voluntary intoxicated (i.e., from drugs or alcohol), then they cannot rely on their mistaken belief and therefore cannot use the defence of self-defence. For example: - The defendant has had lots of beer. They start hallucinating that person X is a trying to harm them. Defendant then hits person X with a sword. The defendant cannot use the defence of self-defence here because their mistaken belief was brought on by voluntary intoxication. **R v Seon Oye (2013) - psychiatric conditions.** - If the defendant made a mistake because of a psychiatric condition (i.e., delusions), this condition should not be considered when assessing whether the force is necessary. This is a public policy reason to avoid justifications for extreme violence. - The defendant attacked the police, believing they were evil spirits. - Psychiatric experts agreed that the defendant was legally insane. The Court\'s commented that allowing a self-defence defence would be justifying violence. Also, allowing the defence would mean the defendant would be acquitted, meaning the Courts would be unable to impose any hospital or supervision orders on dangerous individuals. **R v Deana (1909) - preemptive strikes.** - Pre-emptive strikes are where the defendant attacks another person first. These are allowed in criminal law, providing it was necessary. - A police officer approached the defendant in connection with an investigation. The defendant genuinely believed that the officer was about to hit him, therefore the defendant struck the police officer first. The Courts held that a preemptive strike could be justified as long as it was necessary (i.e., the defendant genuinely believed this was necessary). **R v Bird (1986) - preemptive strikes and the duty to retreat.** Statute: Section 76(6A) of the CJIA 2008 - There is no duty to retreat, meaning the defendant does not have to try and avoid conflict. This backs up R v Deana (1909) and provides a more recent example of pre-emptive strikes being admissible. - The defendant asking their ex to leave a party, but they soon returned. - The defendant poured a drink over him. The ex then pinned her against a wall. The defendant then punched him. She forgot that she had a pint glass in her hand, and this caused the ex to lose an eye. Her initial charge of a S. 20 OAPA 1861 was dropped because the Court found evidence of the defendant initially showing unwillingness to fight, and there was no duty on the defendant to retreat. **R v Rashford (2005) - inciting violence and acting in revenge.** - Inciting violence typically prevents a defendant from using the defence. However, if during an act of revenge, the victim\'s reaction is disproportionate, it may be necessary for the defendant to use self-defence. - The defendant wanted to get revenge on the victim, following an earlier dispute. Whilst doing so, the victim responding disproportionately by bringing group of friends to rally against the defendant. The defendant had now switched from the initial aggressor to defending himself. The Courts stated that defendants can rely on self-defence if they find they are now in a situation where they it was necessary to preserve their own life and safety. **Prevention of a Crime:** Statute: Section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 - If a defendant is preventing a crime e.g., defending themselves from a criminal attack, preventing an attack on another person etc., then the same tests for self-defence apply to them. **2. Was That Force Proportionate or Reasonable in Comparison to the Harm That Was Threatened?** - The following cases provide us with the legal rule on the limits of what force the defendant can use. R v Clegg (1995) - standard self-defence. R (Denby Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice (2016) - householder cases. **Statute: Section 76(6) and (7) of the CJIA 2008** - Force that is disproportionate will not be reasonable. This objective test needs to balance the risk of harm to the defendant and the risk of harm to the victim. We can consider the following: - The defendant may not be in a situation where they can apply the same force as was received (i.e., 'fists has to be with fists'). - Force can still be proportionate if a weapon was used (however this is for extreme cases) - Although force may initially be proportionate, this could become disproportionate (i.e., a defendant continues using force after danger has passed). - If the force used is disproportionate (excessive) then the defence of self-defence cannot be used. **Case - R v Clegg (1995):** - Force that is disproportionate will not be reasonable. This is especially so when the danger has already passed. - The defendant was on duty at a vehicle checkpoint. A car came speeding towards the checkpoint. Despite shouting for the car to stop, it did not stop. The defendant fired three shots at the windscreen, and another shot as the car passed. This final shot killed the passenger at the back of the car. The defendant tried to rely on self-defence, but as the car was already passing, the danger therefore had passed, and excessive force was used **Statute: Section 76(5A) of the CJIA 2008** - If a defendant is wanting to defend their property, then the second test for self-defence is modified. The defendant must make sure that the force they use is not grossly disproportionate. **Case - R (Denby Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice (2016):** - The defendant put the intruder in a headlock. The CPS decided not to prosecute the defendant as the force used was not grossly disproportionate (due to the \'shock factor\', time of day, family present etc.), meaning the jury could conclude that the force was reasonable. Grossly disproportionate would include going over the top\", which would not be reasonable. **Self-Defence - the Verdict:** - If the defendant successfully proves that their conduct was done in self-defence, then they can be acquitted of all the charges, meaning that no sentence is required. - This is a complete defence. **Duress - Definition:** - where the defendant has been forced to commit a crime against their will. They have been forced through threats. - The defence is not available to murder (R v Howe 1987) or attempted murder (R v Gotts 1992) or treason. - This is a common law defence, meaning that its entire definition is based on judgements. - The case (R v Hasan 2005) can be used as an example. This case listed all 6 tests for duress. 1. **There must be a threat to cause death or serious injury** - Only a threat of death or serious injury (GBH) towards the defendant is allowed for duress. R v Valderrama-Vega (1985) - a cumulative effect of threats can be considered, but there must still be a threat of death or serious injury R v Hudson and Taylor (1971) - these threats be operative and have a significant impact on the defendants state of mind. The threat does not need to be carried out immediately 1. 2. **The threat must be against the defendant, defendants immediate family or someone close to the defendant.** - the threats do not have to just be made to the defendant themselves, these threats can expand beyond the defendant. - Defendant, Defendants immediate family, someone close to the defendant, and someone whose safety relies on the defendant. R v Wright (2000) - The person to who the threat. Is made to can expand outside of the defendant themselves. 3. **Has the defendant acted reasonably in light of the threats?** R v Grahams (1982) 1. Did the defendant commit the conduct because they reasonably believed they had a good cause to fear death or serious injury? 2. If test 1 is satisfied, would a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the same characteristics of the defendant have responded in the same way? R v Bowen (1996) Characteristics include: Age, pregnancy, serious physical disability, recognised medical illness or psychiatric disorder, and gender. 4. **Do the threats relate to the crime the defendant committed?** - there must be a nexus (link) between the crime that has been nominated and the crime that the defendant committed. R v Cole (1994) - The course of action threatened was to repay debt; there was no threat telling the defendant that he must commit a robbery. 5. **Was there any 'safe avenue of escape'?** - duress can only be used if there was no 'safe avenue of escape'. If there was an opportunity for a safe escape, and the defendant did not take this, they cannot rely on the defence of duress. R v Gill (1963) - the defendant had a possibility of a 'safe avenue of escape' (e.g. they could have raised an alarm) but did not pursue this. 6. **Did the defendant voluntarily leave themselves open to those threats?** - the defence of duress cannot be relied upon if the defendant associates themselves with people or situations that are known to make threats (i.e. gangs or terrorists). R v Sharp (1987) - voluntarily, and with knowledge of its nature, joined organisation knowing it might bring pressure on him to commit an offence and was an active member when put under such pressure. - Therefore, as long as the defendant foresaw, or ought reasonably to have foreseen, the risk ion ebbing subjected to any compulsion by threats of violence, then the defence is not available. R v Hasan (2005) - if defendant "voluntarily becomes or remains associated with others engaged in criminal activity in a situation where he knows or ought reasonably to know that he may be the subject of compulsion by them... he cannot rely on the defence of duress to excuse any act" **The verdict:** - if the defendant successfully proves that their conduct was done in duress, then they can be acquitted of all the charges, meaning that no sentence is required. - This is a complete defence **Duress of circumstances** Definition: - this is where the defendant commits a crime because of the circumstances in which they perceivably find themselves in. - The defence is not available to murder or attempted murder or treason (R v Pommell 1995) - This is a common law defence, meaning that its entire definition is based on judgements. - The defence was evolved out of the restrict nature of 'duress by threats' - The case of R v Abdul-Hussain (1999) can be used as an example. This case listed all 4 tests for duress of circumstances. 1. **There must be an immediate peril of death or serious injury** R v Abdul-Hussain (1999) - the defendant may react in circumstances to avoid a threat of death or serious injury (GBH). - The perceived threats need to be operative and have a significant impact on the defendant's state of mind. The threat does not need to be carried out immediately (but must be imminently). R v Willer - Defendant was forced into and felt 'under compulsion' 2. **Which is either against the defendant, defendants immediate family or someone close to the defendant** - the threats do not have to just be made to the defendant themselves, these threats can expand beyond the defendant. - Defendant, Defendants immediate family, someone close to the defendant, and someone whose safety relies on the defendant. R v Conway (1988) - Defendant was acting in order to avoid a threat of death or serious injury. 3. **Has the defendant acted reasonably in light of the threats?** R v Martin (1989) - This case clarified the \"two-part test\" for assessing whether a defendant acted reasonably under duress of circumstances: - First part: The defendant must genuinely and reasonably believe that the threat they face involves death or serious physical injury. - Second part: A \"sober person of reasonable firmness,\" sharing the defendant\'s characteristics, would have responded in the same way. This test incorporates an objective standard while considering certain personal characteristics of the defendant R v Cairns (1999) - The Court of Appeal held that for the defence of duress, it is not necessary for the threat to be real or actual. - Instead, the defendant's reasonable belief in the threat suffices. - In this case, the defendant mistakenly believed he was in danger when the victim acted aggressively, leading him to act out of fear. This highlights the focus on the defendant\'s perception rather than the actual existence of the threat R v Bowen (1996) - The court addressed which characteristics of a defendant could be relevant in determining their response to a threat under duress: Relevant characteristics: - Age (young or elderly individuals may be more susceptible). - Gender (though not automatically significant). - Pregnancy (fear for an unborn child could be considered). - Serious physical disability (e.g., inability to escape easily). - Recognised mental illness or psychiatric conditions. - Irrelevant characteristics: Low intelligence (IQ) was deemed irrelevant as it does not affect a person\'s capacity for courage or firmness 4. **Was there any 'safe avenue of escape'?** - The defendant can only be used if there was no 'safe avenue of escape'. The defendant's circumstances will have caused the reaction of trying to get to a safe avenue R V Abdul-Hassain - They hijacked the plane in order to get to a safe venue **The Verdict:** - If the defendant successfully proves that their conduct was done in duress then they can be acquitted of all the charges, meaning that no sentence is required - This is a complete defence  ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Aspect** **Duress** **Duress of circumstances** **Similarities** **Definition** A defense where a person is forced to commit a crime due to threats of death or serious injury. A defense where a person commits a crime due to an immediate danger arising from circumstances. Both involve external pressure forcing the defendant to commit a crime. **Source of threat** Comes from another person (e.g., physical threats). Comes from the situation or circumstances (e.g., natural disasters, emergencies). Both involve a threat of death or serious injury. **Key case example** *Hasan* (2005) *Willer* (1986), *Cairns* (1999) Both are evaluated using objective and subjective tests. **Requirement of threat** Requires a direct threat of death or serious injury. Requires immediate danger or harm from circumstances. Both require the threat/danger to be immediate and unavoidable. **Voluntary exposure** Defense fails if the defendant voluntarily associated with criminals (*Hasan*). Not applicable---focus is on the emergency rather than relationships. Both fail if the response to the threat/danger is disproportionate or unnecessary **Scope of crimes defended** Rarely applies to murder or attempted murder. Generally does not apply to murder or attempted murder. Both share limitations regarding serious offenses like murder. ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Friday 29 November 2024 **Capacity defences** Law **Insanity** **Definition**: D must have had a defect of reason as a result of a disease of the mind which caused D to not know the nature or quality of their act or not knowing what they were doing was wrong. **[M'Naghten (1843)]** - extreme paranoia, thought he was being prosecuted by the 'Tories' - Tried to kill a member of parliament (Sir Robert Peel) but instead ended up killing his secretary. - **Defect of reason;** [R v Clarke (1972):] - defendant must be deprived of their powers of reasoning. This does not include absentmindedness or being confused. - **As a result of a disease of the mind;** [R v Kemp (1956)] 3. 'disease of the mind' is a legal term and not a medical one. 4. This can include mental or physical diseases, but they must affect the operation of the mind. This must be supported by medical evidence. 5. The effect of the mind must be impacted by an internal factor existing at the time of the act. [R v Hennessy (1989)] - Diabetes leading to hyperglycaemia (high blood sugar) due to not taking insulin. - Internal. The court held that hyperglycaemia caused by the diabetes itself (not medication) was a disease of the mind under the legal definition of insanity [R v Quick (1973)] - Hypoglycaemia (low blood sugar) caused by external factors---taking insulin but failing to eat properly afterward. - External. The cause was the insulin, an external factor, making this a case of automatism rather than insanity [R v Burgess (1991)] - Sleepwalking, attributed to a sleep disorder. - Internal. The sleep disorder was considered an internal factor, classifying it as a disease of the mind under insanity rules [R v Coley (2013)] - A psychotic episode triggered by voluntary cannabis use. - External. Since the episode resulted from voluntary intoxication, it was not considered insanity, and no defence of automatism or insanity applied. - **Which caused the defendant to not know the nature or quality of their act; or not knowing what they were doing was wrong.** Final test can be approached via two avenues: - The defendant does not know the nature and quality of their action - Or if they know it but doesn't know that the action is wrong [R v Seon oye] - this refers to the physical quality of their act, rather than the moral quality. The defendant may 'not know' because they are in the state [R v Windle (1952)] - this refers to the moral quality of the act. If the defendant is aware that it is legally wrong, they cannot use the defence of insanity. This is still the case even when the defendant is suffering from a mental illness. **The verdict:** - 'not guilty by reason of insanity' Judge can impose: - A hospital order (with or without restrictions as to when the defendant may be released) - A supervision order - An absolute discharge. **Automatism** **[Definition: Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland (1963)]** "An act done by the muscles without any control of the mind and it is done by a person who is not conscious of what they are doing." - **Is the cause of the automatism external?** An external factor will reduce the fault of the defendant as it could render their conduct involuntary. [1. Hill v Baxter (1958)] - Key Point: Automatism was illustrated with hypothetical scenarios. - External Factors: The case includes examples such as being attacked by a swarm of bees, being hit on the head by a stone, or sudden illness that causes a loss of control. These external factors could result in an individual acting involuntarily. - Outcome: While this case didn't involve a direct external factor, it served as a benchmark for discussing situations where automatism might apply. [2. R v T (1990)] - Key Point: PTSD as a result of external trauma. - External Factor: The defendant experienced a traumatic rape, which led to PTSD and a dissociative state when committing the offence. This trauma was classified as an external factor leading to automatism. - Outcome: The court accepted that PTSD could constitute an external factor; however, automatism required a complete lack of control. [3. R v Ecott (2007)] - Key Point: Sleepwalking and external triggers. - External Factor: Although not directly related to automatism, the defence attempted to argue involuntary action caused by an external trigger such as stress or alcohol affecting the defendant's sleep. - Outcome: The automatism defence was not fully successful as sleepwalking is often linked to internal rather than external causes. [4. R v Quick (1973)] - Key Point: Hypoglycaemia caused by insulin treatment. - External Factor: The defendant, a diabetic, took insulin but did not eat enough food, leading to hypoglycaemia. The hypoglycaemia (low blood sugar) was considered an external factor resulting from insulin intake. - Outcome: The court held that automatism could be argued because the condition was induced by the external factor of insulin, not the internal condition of diabetes. 2. **Did the defendant have a total loss of voluntary control?** There must be a total loss of voluntary control, as a reduced or partial loss of control of ones actions is not enough to show automatism [Attorney Generals Reference (No. 2 of 1992) (1993):] [Broome v Perkins (1987)] - driving without awareness, Only causes a partial loss of control, Not enough to amount to automatism - **Was the automatism self-induced?** If not self-induced skip straight to conclusion. - Automatism will not be successful as a defence if the defendant knows (recklessness) their conduct will bring about automatic state. - This is dependent on the type of crime that has been committed and whether there is an exception. Specific intent - intention is the only form of mens rea accepted (murder, s.18) Basic intent - recklessness is part of the mens rea (s.47, assault, battery) [R v McGhee (2013)] Automatism is not successful as defence for basic intent offences because they have voluntarily placed themselves in that situation (reckless) 3. defence would have failed because it was self-induced and there was proof he had some voluntary control left 4. Defendant was well aware of the dangers of taking the two drugs together. [R v Coley (2013)] This is prevalent in cases of voluntary intoxication [R v Bailey (1983)] For specific intent offences, a self-induced automatism could potentially be a defence because the defendant lacks the required mens rea for the offence. [R v Hardie (1984)] the exception is where the self-induced automatism leads to unanticipated consequences. In this case, both specific and basic intent offences can rely on the defence, as the courts cannot view the defendants actions as being reckless. **The verdict** - if successful then they can be acquitted of all charges meaning no sentence is required. **Intoxication** **[Definition: DPP v Beard (1920)]** "If D was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the intent required, he could not be convicted of a crime which was committed only if the intent was proved" - Is offence charged a specific intent or basic intent offence? - Was the intoxication voluntary or involuntary? ------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------- **Specific intent** **Basic intent** Offences where 'intention' is the only form of mens rea accepted Offences where 'recklessness' can be part of the mens rea E.g murder, S.18 OAPA 1861, theft E.g. manslaughter, assault, battery, s.47 OAPA 1861, s.20 ------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------- 4. **Is the offence charged a specific or basic intent offence?** [Attorney General for Northern Ireland v Gallaher (1963)] 3. if the mens rea can be found, as it was formed prior to getting intoxicated, then the defence of intoxication cannot be used. 5. **Was the intoxication voluntary or involuntary?** ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Voluntary intoxication** **Involuntary intoxication** This is where the defendant chooses to take an intoxicating substance. This is where the defendant was unaware they were taking an intoxicating substance. They may claim they have been 'spiked'. This includes situations where the defendant is aware of the dangerousness, unpredictability and/or aggressiveness of taking that substance. This could also include unexpected or unforeseen effects on the defendant. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [DPP v Majewski (1977):] - Outcome: Unsuccessful use of the defence. - Reason: This case established that voluntary intoxication is not a defence for crimes requiring basic intent (e.g., assault). The defendant voluntarily consumed drugs and alcohol, leading to aggressive behaviour. The court ruled that his intoxication was self-induced, so he remained responsible. Basic intent offence + voluntary intoxication this will not be a defence because voluntary intoxication is seen as being 'reckless' which would meet the mens rea of basic intent offences. [R v Sheehan and Moore (1975) & R v Lipman (1970):] - Sheehan and Moore (1975): Successful defence for specific intent crimes. The defendants, intoxicated, committed arson but lacked the intention to kill. Their intoxication prevented them from forming the required specific intent for murder. Specific intent offence + voluntary intoxication this can be a complete defence because 'recklessness' would not be enough to form the mens rea of the specific intent offence. However the defendant could be charged with a basic intent offence instead. 6. Lipman (1970): Unsuccessful defence. Lipman voluntarily took LSD and killed someone while hallucinating. The court ruled that intoxication could not excuse his reckless behaviour, relevant to the basic intent crime of manslaughter. Specific intent offence + voluntary intoxication This can be a complete defence because 'recklessness' would not be enough to form the mens rea of the specific intent offence. However the defendant could be charged with a basic intent offence instead. [R v Hardie (1984):] - Outcome: Successful use of the defence. - Reason: The defendant took valium (a sedative) believing it would calm him down. Instead, it had an unusual effect, leading to criminal behaviour. The court held that this was involuntary intoxication, as Hardie did not know the drug would cause such effects. Basic intent offence + involuntary intoxication This may be able to be a defence, but only if the defendant was unable to form the mens rea. [R v Kingston (1994):] - Outcome: Unsuccessful use of the defence. - Reason: Kingston was drugged involuntarily and then acted on pedophilic tendencies. The court ruled that involuntary intoxication did not excuse criminal behaviour when the defendant retained the mens rea (intent) to commit the crime. Specific intent offence + involuntary intoxication This may be able to be a defence, but only if the defendant was unable to form the mens rea. **The verdict** 7. Involuntary intoxication if successful acquitted of all charges (only if the mens rea is not formed) 8. Dependant on type of offence they were charged with for voluntary intoxication. Intoxication with self defence: When assessing whether it was necessary to use force, as part of self-defence, the defendants genuine belief of the situation can be a mistaken belief. However, if this mistaken belief was due to voluntary intoxication, the defendant will not have a defence. [R v O'Grady (1987)] - a mistaken belief cannot be relied upon, for self defence, where it has been induced by voluntary intoxication. R v Hatton (2005) - Like basic intent offences, specific intent offences cannot rely on a drunken mistake as a defence to the amount of force required in self-defence. Tuesday 5 November 2024 **Robbery** Law Property Offences: - Property Offences refer to the **unlawful taking** (or destruction) of **someone else's property.** This may **involve force or a threat of force** - For your specification, we will be learning the actus reus ad mens rea of the following two property offences: - Theft - Robbery What is Robbery? - If a person has committed a robbery, this means that they have been successful in dishonestly appropriating property belonging to another, with intention to permanently deprive the other of it. - However, they have done this alongside using violence. Robbery can also be described as 'theft with violence' - Section 8 of the Theft Act 1968: - **Actus Reus:** There must be a complete theft - **Actus Reus:** There is a level of force which must be used alongside the theft - **Expansion of the actus reus:** there are two conditions regarding the use of force a) it must be immediately before of at the time of the theft and b) it must be in order to steal - **Mens Rea:** The defendant must have the mens rea for theft and that they intended to use force to steal **Step 1: A Completed theft** - There must be a completed theft. This means that all elements of theft (actus reus and mens rea) must present as part of the robbery. - Statute: Sections 1-6 of the Theft Act 1968 - There **must be a completed theft**. If any elements of theft are missing, it cannot be a robbery, even if force was used R V Waters - There was not enough evidence to establish an 'intention to permanently deprive'. Therefore, because there were missing elements to the theft, it could not be classed as a robbery Step One: Actus Reus- A completed theft 6. If we have a situation where there has been force but the theft was not completed, then potentially you could charge a defendant with attempted theft, and by default an attempted robbery if force was still present Corcoran V Anderton - There was a completed theft, and therefore the defendant could be guilty of a robbery. If in the situation the woman had not let go of the bag, then it could be charged as an attempted theft and dude to the force and attempted robbery **Step 2 (pt 1): force or threat of force** Clauden (1987) - The amount of force used/threatened can be small - level of 'force' is up to the jury to decide. RP v DPP (2012) - where no direct contact between v and d, it will be unlikely for a jury to find that force has been used. - Force must be used 'on a person' (the person that has been threatened does not need to be the same person that has experienced the threat. B and R v DPP (2007) - Robbery allows for threat of force. - V does not actually need to fear force, just need to consider D's point of view. **Step 2 (pt 2): Immediately before or at the time of the theft** Hale (1979) - force or threat must occur immediately before or during the theft - Need to consider whether theft was still ongoing (continuing act) **Step 2 (pt 3): in order to do so (steal)** - the force that was used must relate to the stealing. **Step 3: Mens rea of theft** - S2 and S6 of the theft act 1968 - defendant must have mens rea of theft - "The mens rea of theft has already been proven through the completed theft" **Step 4: Mens Rea of Robbery** - Direct intention (Mohan) - Oblique intention (Woollin) "A person is guilty of robbery, or of an assault with intent to rob, shall on conviction on indictment be liable for a life imprisonment" Wednesday 9 October 2024 **Theft** Law **Actus reus** - Appropriation - Property - Belonging to another **Mens rea** - Dishonesty - Intention to permanently deprive **Defences** - Capacity and necessity **S.1 - Definition** - "a person is guilty of theft if they dishonestly (S.2) appropriate (S.3) property (S.4) belonging to another (S.5) with intention of permanently depriving (S.6) them of it"(Theft act, S.1(1) 1968) **S.3 - Appropriate** 7. "assuming the rights of an owner" (e.g. selling (Pitham and Hehl), destroying, taking etc) (R v Vinall 2011) 8. Appropriation occurs at the first moment a defendant assumes the rights of an owner. (Atakpu and Abrahams 1994) 9. There can be a later assumption of rights. (If there has been a later assumption then the courts can find appropriation at the point the defendants chose to 'keep' or 'deal' the property.) 10. Assumption of rights - doesn't need to include all of the rights (R v Morris 1983) 11. Consent is irrelevant for appropriation because we will test consent issues in other elements (mens rea) (Lawrence, Gomez, Hinks) **S.4 - Property** - money, real (land and buildings), personal (all moveable items), things in action (credit/debit cards, cheques), other intangible property (things with no physical presence) - S.4(1) states that almost anything can be stolen - S.4(2) states that real property can only be stolen in three circumstances. (Real property can be stolen when: 1. A person entrusted with land breaches this trust by appropriating the land themselves, 2. A person appropriates land by severing something that formed part of the land, 3. A tenant appropriates any fixtures that were just for let.) - Personal property refers to all 'moveable' items, dead bodies and body parts along with illegal drugs are classified (R v Kelly and Lindsay 1998) - Other intangible property refers to rights that can be stolen but have no physical presence. Good examples of this are WiFi, electricity and subscription accounts. Confidential information is not deemed to be 'property' - Confidential information are not classified as property. S.4(3) and S.4(4) indicates certain exceptions (taking plants that are growing in the wild is not theft however if they are being grown for commercial purposes then it will be) **S.5 - Belonging to another** - where someone was in possession or control of the property - If another person is in possession or control of an item (even if temporary), then if that item is appropriated, we can say it did belong to another. This technically means that the original owner of an item could be charged with theft. (R v Turner) - Even if the person in possession or control does not realise that they are in possession or control, we can still argue that the item belongs to another. (Woodman) - Items left unattended, for someone else, are still seen to be in possession or control of the original owner until the new owner takes possession of them. (Ricketts V Basildon) - Where someone had a proprietary interest in the property - a person still has legal rights over an item, even though they may not be in possession right now control of that item anymore. (Webster 2006) - Where property was received under an obligation - property is passed over for someone else to handle on behalf of the owner. As the property still 'belongs to another', the person with temporary possession or control will be obligated to fulfil certain duties/actions with this property. (R v Hall 1972) (Klineberg and Marsden) - An obligation can be created in an informal way such as agreeing to pay a bill on behalf of the rest of your roommates. (Davidge V Bunnett 1984) - Where property was received by mistake - once they notice the mistake, they must return the property (if there is a legal obligation to do so) (Attorney general's reference) - Must be a legal obligation to restore the money (Gilks 1972) **S.2 - Dishonesty** Where the defendant has appropriated property belonging to another, we need to check that they had done this conduct dishonestly. - the courts do not care about the defendants motive - We assess if their conduct falls under any exceptions and test them for their dishonesty. This is the key point in which we can distinguish a thief from an honest appropriator. 1\) Exemptions: Section 2(1)(a) -- Legal Right The defendant must believe they have a legal right to take the property. Robinson - D had a genuine belief they had a right in law. Section 2(1)(b) -- Belief in Owner's Consent Defendant believes that the owner would consent to them taking the property, if the owner knew about the circumstances. Holden - D had a genuine belief that they had consent Section 2(1)(c) -- Finding Property with Belief That the Owner Cannot Be Found The defendant must believe the owner of the property cannot be found even if they make reasonable efforts. Small - D has a genuine belief that the owner cannot be found 2\) test for dishonesty Ivey v Gentings Casinos (uk) Ltd t/a Crockfords (2017) - What was the defendant\'s genuine knowledge or belief as to the facts? (Subjective) - Would the ordinary and reasonable person, believing the same facts as the defendant, consider them to be dishonest? (Objective) The Barton & Booth Test: - Due to the Ivey Test being delivered in the civil division, this means that the comments given are in obiter with respect to the criminal division. This was the case until R v Barton and Booth (2020). **S.6 - Intention of Permanently depriving** Intention of permanently depriving the other of it. - We finally must assess whether the defendant has an intention of treating the property as their own. - This can be shown through taking, selling, damaging, dealing or disposing the property, but looking more at the defendant\'s state of mind towards this property. R v Velumyl (1989) - It is typically obvious that there has been intention to permanently deprive e.g., an item is sold or damaged etc. - Even if the defendant replaces the original item with a replica/equal amount, this will still be an intention of permanently depriving the other. DPP v Lavender (1994) - Intending to treat an item as your own (\"disposal\") can meet the mens rea of theft. R v Vinall (2011) 3. A later disposal of the property may be evidence of an intention of permanently depriving if there is evidence of treating the property as your own regardless of the owner\'s rights. R v Lloyd (1985) - Although, borrowing or lending would not suggest an intention to permanently deprive, if the period of time and circumstances change, regarding the borrowing/lending, then this meets the mens rea e.g., borrowing a book for 1 month instead of the allowed time of 1 week. Case - Attorney-General\'s Reference (No. 1 and 2 of 1979) (1979): - Useful for attempted offences: if the defendant examines property to see if there is anything worth stealing, this is classed as \'conditional intent\'. Direct Intention R v Mohan (1975) This is where our defendant\'s main aim/purpose matches the desired consequences. Oblique Intention R v Woollin (1998) This is where our defendant\'s main aim/purpose does not match the consequences.
Therefore, we need to test whether 1) the consequence was virtually certain, and 2) whether the defendant foresaw Tuesday 24 September 2024 **Involuntary manslaughter** Law -------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Type of involuntary manslaughter** **Key elements** **Case law** **Additional notes** **Unlawful act manslaughter** 1\. **Unlawful Act**: The defendant must commit a criminal act that is \- *R v Lamb* (No unlawful act) The act must be a crime (not civil wrong) and cannot be a lawful omission. unlawful, dangerous, and leads to death. 2\. **Dangerous Act**: The act must be dangerous, meaning a reasonable \- *R v Church* (Reasonable person test for danger) It's about whether the act is dangerous, not whether the defendant foresaw the danger. person would foresee the risk of some harm from it. 3\. **Causation**: The unlawful act must cause the death. This includes \- *R v Kennedy* (Drugs -- chain of causation broken) Consider factual causation (*but for test*) and legal causation (significant cause of death). both factual and legal causation. 4\. **Mens Rea of the Unlawful Act**: The defendant must have the mens \- *DPP v Newbury and Jones* (Teenagers pushing concrete slab -- no need for intent to kill) Mens rea is for the unlawful act, not for causing death or harm. rea for the original unlawful act (not for the death). **Gross negligence manslaughter** 1\. **Duty of Care**: The defendant must owe the victim a duty of care. \- *R v Adomako* (Anaesthetist failed to notice disconnection of oxygen tube) Duty of care arises in similar situations to negligence in civil law, including omissions. 2\. **Breach of Duty**: The defendant breaches that duty of care through \- *R v Stone and Dobinson* (Failure to care for sister led to her death) The breach must involve a failure to act as a reasonable person would in the circumstances. an act or omission. 3\. **Gross Negligence**: The breach must be so gross that it warrants \- *R v Bateman* (Gross negligence defined) Gross negligence means that the defendant's conduct departs significantly from the standard expected. criminal liability. 4\. **Causation**: The breach must cause the death (both factual and \- *R v Misra and Srivastava* (Confirmed that the breach must cause a risk of death, not just harm) The breach must pose a serious and obvious risk of death, not merely injury. legal causation required). 5\. **Mens Rea**: No specific mens rea is needed beyond the gross \- *R v Singh* (Landlord failed to prevent carbon monoxide poisoning) There must be a risk of death that was foreseeable at the time of the breach. negligence, but the defendant's conduct must be regarded as criminal. **Key feature** **Unlawful act manslaughter** **Gross negligence manslaughter** **Mens rea** Required for the unlawful act, but not for causing death. No specific mens rea; negligence must be grossly criminal **Type of act** Must involve a criminal act Can involve an act or omission, breach of duty of care **Focus** Dangerousness of the act itself Degree of negligence and risk of death **Examples** Drug supply leading to death (R V Kennedy) Medical negligence (R v Adomako), failure to prevent harm. **Element** **Explanation** **Key cases** **Additional notes** **1. Unlawful act** The defendant must have committed a **criminal act** (not a civil wrong) that is unlawful. \- *R v Lamb* (No unlawful act) The act must be a crime. Omissions cannot form the basis of unlawful act manslaughter. The act can range from minor assaults to serious offences, but it must be inherently unlawful. \- *R v Franklin* (Civil wrong insufficient) Example: throwing a heavy object off a pier can be unlawful if it's a criminal offence, not if it's a civil wrong. **2. Dangerous act** The unlawful act must be **dangerous**. This means a **reasonable person** would foresee that it poses a risk of **some physical harm**. \- R v Church (Dangerousness test) The test is objective: Would a sober and reasonable person, witnessing the same act, foresee the risk of harm? It does not require foresight of serious harm or death. It doesn't need to be aimed at the victim, as long as it creates a general danger to others. \- *R v Larkin* (Threat with razor) Even if the defendant did not realise the act was dangerous, it can still be unlawful act manslaughter if the reasonable person would have foreseen a risk of some harm. **3. Causation** The unlawful act must **cause the death** of the victim. This includes both **factual causation** ("but for" test) and **legal causation**. \- *R v Kennedy* (Drug supply -- chain broken) Factual causation: Would the victim have died \"but for\" the unlawful act? Legal causation: Was the act a significant contributing cause of death, or was it broken by novus actus? An intervening act (e.g., victim's own voluntary actions) can break the chain of causation. \- *R v Cato* (Heroin injection) If the victim voluntarily administers a drug, it can break the chain of causation (*R v Kennedy*). **4. Mens rea for unlawful act** The defendant must have the **mens rea** (guilty mind) for the unlawful act, but **not for causing death**. \- DPP v Newbury and Jones (Teenagers and slab) The mens rea is only for the unlawful act (e.g., intention or recklessness for the underlying crime), not the death or harm. -------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Involuntary Manslaughter:** - Involuntary Manslaughter is charged when the defendant has committed an unlawful killing, because they do not have the mens rea for murder - These offences are charged when the mens rea of murder cannot be satisfied but a lower level of mens rea does exist **Involuntary Manslaughter- The importance of alternative fatal offences to murder:** - The mens rea of murder is 'intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. This is a high level of mens rea and requires a significant amount of evidence to prove - With involuntary manslaughter the judge can acknowledge a lower level of mens rea and have more discretion on what sentence to impose - The judge can impose a lesser sentence of up to a maximum life sentence **Unlawful act manslaughter- Definition:** - This is where a defendant has committed an unlawful and dangerous act (A crime) which has caused a death of a victim. The defendant can still be liable even if they did not realise that death or injury might be a result - The elements of unlawful act manslaughter are: - There was an 'unlawful act' 2\. The act was 'objectively dangerous' 3.The act must 'cause' death 4.The defendant has the 'mens rea of the unlawful act' **The defendant has committed an unlawful act:** 12. The death of the victim must be caused by an unlawful act. The unlawful act must be a criminal offence **R V Franklin (1883)** - The defendant threw a box off the West Pier of Brighton. They were aiming to throw the box in the sea. The box hit and killed a swimmer. The Courts determined that this was a civil wrong and therefore will not be an issue to be discussed under unlawful act manslaughter  **1. R v Lowe (1973)** In this case, the defendant, Lowe, was convicted of manslaughter after he neglected to care for his infant son, which resulted in the child's death. Lowe was charged with both wilful neglect (under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933) and manslaughter. **Can an omission (failure to act) form the basis of unlawful act manslaughter?** The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction for unlawful act manslaughter. The court ruled that **an omission or failure to act cannot amount to an unlawful act** for the purposes of unlawful act manslaughter. - **An omission cannot be an unlawful act.** There must be a positive act that is criminal in nature. Unlawful act manslaughter requires a criminal action, not just a failure to act. **2. R v Lamb (1967)** In this case, two boys were playing with a revolver. Lamb, the defendant, pointed the gun at his friend as a joke, believing it wouldn't fire because the chambers were not aligned. Lamb pulled the trigger, and the gun went off, killing his friend. Lamb was charged with manslaughter. **Did the defendant commit an unlawful act sufficient to constitute manslaughter?** The court held that Lamb was not guilty of unlawful act manslaughter because there was **no unlawful act**. For the act to be unlawful, there must be mens rea (guilty mind) for the crime. Since Lamb did not have the intent to harm and his actions did not constitute an assault (since both boys were playing and there was no fear of harm), the court ruled that there was no criminal assault. As there was no unlawful act, Lamb could not be convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. - There must be a complete criminal offence (actus reus and mens rea) for unlawful act manslaughter to apply. In this case, without the mens rea for the unlawful act (assault), no unlawful act manslaughter can arise. **R v JM and SM (2012)** - **Facts**: The defendants (JM and SM) got into a fight with nightclub bouncers. One bouncer died from a ruptured artery during the altercation, though this specific injury was not foreseen. - **Rule**: The Court of Appeal held that **it is not necessary for the defendant to foresee the specific type of harm**, only that **some harm** was likely to result from the unlawful act. The ruptured artery was not predictable, but the unlawful act of fighting posed a risk of some harm. - **Key Principle**: A reasonable person does **not need to foresee the exact type of harm**, but **some physical harm** must be foreseeable. The specific harm (in this case, a ruptured artery) was irrelevant as long as some harm was foreseeable. **R v Dawson (1985)** - **Facts**: The defendants attempted to rob a petrol station, and the victim, a 60-year-old man, suffered a fatal heart attack due to the shock. The defendants had no knowledge of the victim's heart condition. - **Rule**: The court ruled that emotional disturbance or fear on its own is not sufficient for **Unlawful Act Manslaughter** unless it causes physical harm. Here, the **act would not be seen as dangerous by a reasonable person** because the defendants were unaware of the victim\'s heart condition. There was **no foreseeable physical harm** to a healthy person. - **Key Principle**: The defendant must foresee a risk of **physical harm**, and if no physical harm is foreseeable to a reasonable person, the act is not dangerous. The court stated that the reasonable person could not foresee that the victim would suffer a heart attack just from the fear of being robbed. **R v Watson (1989)** - **Facts**: The defendants burgled an elderly man\'s house. During the burglary, they verbally abused the 87-year-old victim, who died of a heart attack shortly afterward. Unlike **Dawson**, the defendants became aware of the victim's frailty and age during the burglary. - **Rule**: The court ruled that once the defendants became aware of the victim's **frailty and age**, the unlawful act became dangerous because a reasonable person would foresee **some physical harm** to such a vulnerable person. - **Key Principle**: **If the defendant is aware of facts that make physical harm foreseeable**, like the frailty of a victim, the unlawful act can be deemed dangerous. The age and vulnerability of the victim must be considered when assessing foreseeability of harm. Tuesday 1 October 2024 **Gross Negligence Manslaughter** Law - involuntary manslaughter is charged when the defendant has committed an unlawful killing, because they do not have the mens rea for murder. - This is charged when the mens rea of murder cannot be satisfied, but a lower level of mens rea does exist. - The defendant must owe a '**duty of care**' to the victim - The defendant must '**breach**' that duty - There must be a '**serious and obvious risk of death**' - The serious and obvious risk of death must be '**foreseeable**' - The breach must '**cause**' the death of the victim - The breach is so '**gross**', that it must be criminal - The defendant meets the mens rea of '**negligence**' R V Adomako (1994) - defines the above. R V Broughton (2020) - current leading case for the above. - **Step 1: defendant must owe a duty of care** **Neighbour principle - Donoghue v Stevenson** The principle states that you owe a duty of care to anyone who could be **directly affected by your actions or omissions**---essentially, your \"neighbour.\" As explained by Lord Atkin: \"You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.\" **Existing Duty - Robinson** - is there a duty that exists already through statute? R V Wacker (2002) - Duty of care existing between 2 criminals. 13. Is there a duty by reason of analogy? (Compare case to similar case) - **Contractual duty**: A duty arises due to a contract or formal agreement. For example, if a person is hired to perform a task, they may owe a duty of care to others affected by their work. - **Duty because of a relationship**: Certain relationships automatically impose a duty of care, such as between parents and children or doctors and patients. - **Duty taken on voluntarily**: If someone voluntarily assumes responsibility for another person\'s welfare, they may owe a duty of care. For example, taking care of an ill person creates a duty to provide adequate care. - **Duty through official position**: People in specific roles, such as police officers or lifeguards, have a duty of care because of their positions. - **Duty arising from creating a dangerous situation**: If a person creates a dangerous situation, they may have a duty to act to prevent harm. To test for a **duty of care** in criminal law, follow the **three-part test** from **Caparo v Dickman (1990)**: - Was the harm reasonably foreseeable? (Kent V Griffiths) - Was there proximity between the defendant and the victim? (Bourhill V Young) - Is it fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty? (Hill V Chief Constable of west Yorkshire) +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Case** | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Donoghue V Stevenson | For a duty of care, we need to | | | establish a 'legal relationship | | | | | | Between the two parties (the | | | neighbour principle) | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Robinson V Chief Constable of | Existing Duty | | West Yorkshire | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Caparo V Dickman | New Duty | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ - **step 2: Breach of duty** ----------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Factors** **Explanation** **Example** **Special characteristic** If the victim is vulnerable (e.g., children, elderly, or disabled) or if the defendant has special skills or a professional role, a higher standard of care is required. *R v Stone and Dobinson* (1977) -- Defendants assumed responsibility for a vulnerable person and failed to provide care. **Size of risk** The greater the risk, the more precautions are needed. A minor risk requires fewer precautions than a high risk of severe harm or death. *Bolton v Stone* (1951) -- Low risk of harm from a cricket ball; precautions (high fence) were sufficient, so no breach occurred. **Appropriate precautions** Assess if reasonable steps were taken to prevent harm. If the precautions are simple and inexpensive, failure to implement them is more likely to be a breach. *Latimer v AEC Ltd* (1953) -- Precaution (sawdust on the floor) was adequate given the circumstances. **Knowledge of risk** If the risk was known or should have been known, more care is required. Ignorance of an obvious risk is not a defence. *Roe v Minister of Health* (1954) -- Risk was not foreseeable with the knowledge at the time, so no breach was found. **Public benefit** If the defendant's conduct serves a high social utility (e.g., emergency response), minor risks might be acceptable. *Watt v Hertfordshire County Council* (1954) -- Risk in transporting equipment was justified by the emergency situation. ----------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - **Step 3: Serious and obvious risk of death** - Cardiac arrest, lack of treatment, serious car crash. - Common cold symptoms, rare lung disease. - Severe nut allergy, was not informed which meals contain nuts. - She was informed that treatment might not work. **R V Misra and Srivastava (2004)** - the test for gross negligence manslaughter involves a risk of death. It is not sufficient to show a risk of bodily injury or injury to health. - When assessing for a 'serious and obvious' risk of death we look for: - '**Serious'-** A risk of injury (Even serious injury) or illness is not enough, the risk of death itself is something much more than minimal - **'Obvious'-** the risk is present, clear, and unambiguous, it cannot be a risk that would only become apparent on further investigation  - **Step Four: The Serious and Obvious Risk of death must be foreseeable** - It must be reasonably foreseeable at the time of the breach of the duty that there is a serious and obvious risk of death arising from the defendant's conduct - R V Broughton - This is an objective test: - Is the risk obvious to a reasonable person in the defendant's position? - It does not matter that the defendant themselves did not foresee a risk - **step five: the breach must cause the death** - Factual causation: "but for" (Pagett, White) - Legal causation: "more than minimal" (Kimsey, Hughes) - Intervening acts: Victims own act "reasonably foreseeable" (Robinson) Medical intervention (Jordan) Thin skull rule "take your victim as you find them" (Blaue) - **Step six: The breach is so "gross" that it must be criminal.** - R V Bateman (1925) - To decide if something was 'gross', that was up to the opinion of the jury. - Must be truly exceptionally bad and that it justifies a criminal sanction. - **step 7: the defendant meets the Mens Rea of negligence** - Negligence is the failure to meet the standards of a reasonable person. - Defendants mens rea is judged by behaviour rather than the state of mind, therefore the behaviour is negligent. - (Already proven) R V Adomako 1994 +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Murder** | **'Consider the criminal | | | liability of Adam for the murder | | | of Ben'** | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Involuntary Manslaughter** | Gross Negligence, Unlawful Act | | | | | | 'Consider the criminal liability | | | of Carol for the **involuntary | | | manslaughter** of death' | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Manslaughter** | Loss of Control, Diminished | | | Responsibility, Murder | | | | | | 'Consider the criminal liability | | | of Emma the **manslaughter** of | | | Fran' | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Death** | Murder, Unlawful Act, Gross | | | Negligence | | | | | | 'Consider the criminal liability | | | of George for the **death** of | | | Harry' | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ Tuesday 17 September 2024 **Diminished responsibility** Law ------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Element** **Description** **Cases** **Definition** Diminished responsibility is a partial defense to murder, reducing a conviction to manslaughter if successful. It is found under **s.2 of the Homicide Act 1957** as amended by the **Coroners and Justice Act 2009**. \- **Abnormality of mental functioning** The defendant must be suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning. This means their mental state is \"so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal.\" **R v Byrne (1960)** -- Sexual psychopath unable to control his perverted desires. **Recognised medical condition (RMC)** The abnormality must arise from a recognized medical condition, which could be either physical or psychological (e.g., schizophrenia, depression). **R v Seers (1984)** -- Depression is a recognised medical condition. **Substantial impairment** The abnormality must substantially impair the defendant's ability to do one of the following: (1) understand the nature of their conduct; (2) form a rational judgment; or (3) exercise self-control. **R v Golds (2016)** -- \"Substantial\" means more than trivial but not necessarily total impairment. **Causal link** The abnormality of mental functioning must provide an explanation for the defendant's acts and omissions in doing or being involved in the killing. It doesn\'t need to be the sole cause, but it must be a significant factor. **R v Dietschmann (2003)** -- The defendant's abnormality must substantially impair the killing, even if intoxicated. **Intoxication and diminished responsibility** Intoxication alone cannot support diminished responsibility. However, if the defendant has an abnormality of mental functioning and is intoxicated, the abnormality must still substantially impair their responsibility. **R v Wood (2008)** -- Alcohol dependence syndrome can be a recognized medical condition. **Burden of proof** The burden of proof is on the **defendant** to prove diminished responsibility on the **balance of probabilities** (more likely than not). \- ------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **R v Byrne (1960)** **Facts:** - The defendant, a sexual psychopath, strangled a young woman and mutilated her body. - He admitted to the killing but argued that his mental condition, which caused violent perverted sexual desires, made it difficult for him to control his actions. **Legal Principle:** - The **Court of Appeal** defined "abnormality of mind" as a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that a reasonable person would term it abnormal. **Importance:** - This case set a precedent by broadening the concept of mental abnormalities to include psychopathic conditions. - The case clarified that \"abnormality of mind\" doesn't just refer to a total inability to understand or reason but includes an inability to control impulses. **Outcome:** - Byrne\'s conviction was reduced to **manslaughter** on the grounds of diminished responsibility because his mental condition substantially impaired his ability to exercise self-control. **R v Seers (1984)** **Facts:** 14. The defendant stabbed his estranged wife to death after their relationship broke down. He claimed to be suffering from severe depression at the time of the killing. **Legal Principle:** - The **Court of Appeal** confirmed that **clinical depression** is a recognised medical condition that can support a defence of diminished responsibility. **Importance:** - The case established that **severe depression** could impair a person's mental functioning enough to reduce murder to manslaughter. - It demonstrated that the abnormality doesn't have to be extreme or dramatic, as long as it's a recognised condition and substantially impairs the defendant's mental functioning. **Outcome:** - Seers' conviction was reduced to **manslaughter** after evidence was provided that his depression impaired his ability to form a rational judgment at the time of the killing. **R v Golds (2016)** **Facts:** - The defendant killed his partner and admitted to the killing but claimed to be suffering from a mental illness. - The case revolved around the interpretation of the term "substantial impairment" in diminished responsibility. **Legal Principle:** - The **Supreme Court** held that \"substantial\" means an impairment that is **important or weighty**, but not necessarily total. **Importance**: - Clarified the meaning of "substantial" in the context of diminished responsibility, specifying that while it must be significant, it does not need to amount to a complete inability to understand or control one's actions. **Outcome**: - The conviction of murder was upheld, as it was found that while Golds had a mental abnormality, it did not substantially impair his ability to form a rational judgment or control his actions. **R v Dietschmann (2003)** **Facts:** - The defendant, suffering from depression following the death of his aunt, was heavily intoxicated when he killed a man in a violent outburst. - He claimed that his **depressive grief reaction** (a recognised medical condition) impaired his mental functioning, even though he was also intoxicated. **Legal Principle**: - The **House of Lords** ruled that the defence of diminished responsibility can succeed even if the defendant was intoxicated at the time, as long as the abnormality of mental functioning itself substantially impaired their ability. - It emphasised that the abnormality does not need to be the sole cause of the killing, but it must still play a **significant role** in causing the defendant to commit the act. **Importance**: - Established that intoxication does not automatically disqualify the defence of diminished responsibility, as long as the defendant's mental abnormality would have substantially impaired their responsibility for the killing without the intoxication. **Outcome**: - Dietschmann's conviction was reduced to **manslaughter** because his depressive condition was deemed to have substantially impaired his responsibility for the killing, independent of his intoxicated state. **R v Wood (2008)** **Facts:** - The defendant, a chronic alcoholic, killed a man during a drunken argument and claimed diminished responsibility, arguing that he was suffering from **Alcohol Dependency Syndrome (ADS)**. - The issue was whether alcohol dependency could be considered a recognised medical condition under diminished responsibility. **Legal Principle**: - The **Court of Appeal** accepted that **Alcohol Dependency Syndrome** is a recognised medical condition that can impair a person's ability to control their drinking and, consequently, their actions. - The court emphasised that even though Wood voluntarily consumed alcohol, if his syndrome caused a substantial impairment, the defence could be valid. **Importance**: - Expanded the range of recognised medical conditions to include **alcoholism** or alcohol dependency, provided the syndrome substantially impaired the defendant's mental functioning. - The case also distinguished between voluntary and involuntary drinking -- only the involuntary nature caused by alcohol dependency was relevant to the defence. **Outcome**: - Wood's conviction was reduced to **manslaughter**, as his alcohol dependency syndrome was found to have substantially impaired his responsibility for the killing. Miller 4. Paranoia/jealousy 5. Mental breakdown Vinagre - Othello syndrome - Impulsive and irrational behaviour Hobson - battered woman syndrome - Heightened fear and irrational responses **R v Byrne (1960):**
This case established that \"substantial impairment\" does not mean total impairment, but something more than trivial or minimal. It suggests a significant degree of impairment, where a person\'s ability to control themselves is seriously affected. **R v Lloyd (1967):**
This case further clarified that \"substantial\" is not an absolute term. The impairment does not have to be complete, but it must be important or serious. It should go beyond something minor but doesn\'t have to be a total loss of control. **R v Golds (2016):**
The court in *R v Golds* confirmed that \"substantial\" means the impairment must be \"important or weighty.\" It should be significant enough to impact the defendant\'s ability to understand their actions, make rational judgments, or control themselves. ---------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ **Case** **Affect Diminished responsibility?** **Key points** **R V Tandy (1989)** Yes Intoxication can prevent the use of diminished responsibility unless the alcohol consumption is involuntary or due to alcoholism as a disease. **R V Dowds (2012)** Yes Voluntary acute intoxication (such as binge drinking) is not sufficient to use diminished responsibility. **R V Dietschmann (2003)** No (if there is another abnormality of mind) If there is an abnormality of mental functioning (e.g., depression) not caused by intoxication, diminished responsibility can still be used. **R V Wood (2008)** No (if alcoholism is a recognised condition) If the defendant suffers from Alcohol Dependency Syndrome (ADS), the defence can be used, even with voluntary drinking. **R V Stewart (2009)** No (in cases of severe alcoholism) The court must assess if the alcohol dependency caused abnormal mental functioning; if so, diminished responsibility can apply. ---------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+ | | **Assault | **Battery | **S.47 | **S.20 | **S.18 | | | ** | ** | OAPA | OAPA | OAPA | | | | | 1861** | 1861** | 1861** | +===========+===========+===========+===========+===========+===========+ | **Definit | An | The | An | Whosoever | Whosoever | | ion** | assault | intention | assault | shall | shall | | | is an act | al | or | unlawfull | unlawfull | | | which | or | battery | y | y | | | causes | reckless | which | and | and | | | the | inflictio | causes | malicious | malicious | | | victim to | n | actual | ly | ly | | | apprehend | of | bodily | wound or | by any | | | the | unlawful | harm to V | inflict | means | | | inflictio | physical | and D | any | whatsoeve | | | n | force | intends | grievous | r | | | of | upon the | or is | bodily | wound or | | | immediate | victim by | subjectiv | harm upon | cause any | | | , | the | ely | any other | grievous | | | unlawful | defendant | reckless | person, | bodily | | | force |. | as to | either | harm to | | | with | | whether | with or | any | | | either an | | the | without a | person, | | | intention | | victim | weapon or | with | | | to cause | | fears | instrumen | intent to | | | another | | unlawful | t, | do some | | | to fear | | force or | shall be | grievous | | | immediate | | is | guilty of | bodily | | | unlawful | | subjected | an | harm to | | | personal | | to | offence | any | | | violence | | unlawful | and shall | person, | | | of | | force.  | be | or with | | | recklessn | | | liable\.. | intent to | | | ess | | |. | resist or | | | as to | | | to | prevent | | | whether | | | imprisonm | the | | | such fear | | | ent | lawful | | | is | | | for not | apprehens | | | caused. | | | more than | ion | | | | | | five | or | | | | | | years. | detainer | | | | | | | of any | | | | | | | person | | | | | | | shall be | | | | | | | guilty | | | | | | | of... an | | | | | | | offence. | +-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+ | **Actus | An act | Actus | - An | **Wound** | Can be | | reus** | | reus | assau | | committed | | | Causes | | lt | - This | in 2 | | | | applicati | is | means | ways: | | | Apprehens | on | suffi | a cut | | | | ion | of  | cient | or | - **wou | | | | | if | break | nding | | | Unlawful | unlawful | the | in | or ** | | | personal | | defen | the | | | | violence | Force | dant | conti | - **Cau | | | | | hadn' | nuity | sing | | | An act | This can | t | of | griev | | | (whatever | include | touch | the | ous | | | it may | the | ed | whole | bodil | | | be) must | slightest | the | skin, | y | | | cause the | touch. | victi | a cut | harm. | | | victim to | | m | of | ** | | | apprehend | Omissions | but | the | | | | that | | still | inter | '**Wound* | | | immediate | In | cause | nal | *' | | | force is | contract | d | skin | means a | | | going to | to | the | such | cut or | | | be used | assault, | actua | as | break in | | | against | you can | l | cheek | the | | | them. | commit | bodil |.  | continuit | | | | battery | y | | y | | | There is | through | harm. | - Inter | of the | | | no | an |   | nal | whole | | | assault | omission. | | bleed | skin. | | | if the | | - A | ing | | | | situation | | batte | where | '**Grievo | | | is | | ry | there | us | | | obvious | | can | is no | bodily | | | that the | | also | cut | harm**' | | | defendant | | be | of | means | | | cannot | | suffi | the | 'really | | | actually | | cient | skin | serious | | | use | | if | is | harm' | | | force. | | the | not | (DPP v | | | | | actua | suffi | Smith | | | For | | l | cient. | 1961) | | | example: | | bodil | | does not | | | where the | | y | - Broke | need to | | | Defendant | | harm | n | be life | | | shouts | | appli | oner | threateni | | | threats | | ed | is | ng. | | | from a | | physi | not | Severity | | | passing | | cal | suffi | of | | | train. | | force | cient | injuries | | | There is | | by | unles | should be | | | no | | the | s | assessed | | | possibili | | defen | skin | according | | | ty | | dant.  | is | to | | | that he | | | also | victims | | | can carry | | | broke | age and | | | out the | | | n | health (R | | | threats | | | (R V | v Bollom | | | in the | | | Wood) | 2004) | | | immediate | | | | | | | future. | | | **OR | '**Cause* | | | | | | Grievous | *' | | | | | | bodily | means | | | | | | harm** | very | | | | | | | wide, so | | | | | | - Griev | it is | | | | | | ous | only | | | | | | bodil | necessary | | | | | | y | to prove | | | | | | harm | the | | | | | | means | defendant | | | | | | 'real | s | | | | | | ly | act was a | | | | | | serio | substanti | | | | | | us | al | | | | | | harm' | cause. | | | | | |. | | | | | | | | "A direct | | | | | | - This | or | | | | | | doesn | indirect | | | | | | 't | act or | | | | | | need | omission | | | | | | to be | which | | | | | | life | causes | | | | | | threa | V's | | | | | | tening. | injury". | | | | | | | | | | | | | - It | **Consequ | | | | | | was | ence**: | | | | | | held | **"A | | | | | | in R | wound or | | | | | | v | grievous | | | | | | Bollo | bodily | | | | | | m (2004) | harm | | | | | | that | (really | | | | | | the | serious | | | | | | sever | harm | | | | | | ity | including | | | | | | of | psychiatr | | | | | | the | ic | | | | | | injur | harm | | | | | | ies | (Burstow | | | | | | shoul | 1998))"** | | | | | | d | | | | | | | take | | | | | | | into | | | | | | | accou | | | | | | | nt | | | | | | | the | | | | | | | victi | | | | | | | m | | | | | | | age | | | | | | | and | | | | | | | healt | | | | | | | h. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Bruis | | | | | | | ing | | | | | | | may | | | | | | | be | | | | | | | less | | | | | | | serio | | | | | | | us | | | | | | | on an | | | | | | | adult | | | | | | | than | | | | | | | on a | | | | | | | child | | | | | | |. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | '**Inflic | | | | | | | t**' | | | | | | | was | | | | | | | originall | | | | | | | y | | | | | | | taken as | | | | | | | meaning | | | | | | | there has | | | | | | | to be a | | | | | | | technical | | | | | | | assault | | | | | | | or | | | | | | | battery. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This | | | | | | | section | | | | | | | can be | | | | | | | interpret | | | | | | | ed | | | | | | | very | | | | | | | widely as | | | | | | | there is | | | | | | | no | | | | | | | particula | | | | | | | r | | | | | | | meaning | | | | | | | as to the | | | | | | | word | | | | | | | 'inflict' | | | | | | |. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In R v | | | | | | | Burstow | | | | | | | (1997) | | | | | |

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