Domestic Politics and War PDF

4 Domestic Politics and War THE PUZZLE War is costly for states, but what if there are actors within the state—such as politicians, businesses, or the military—who see war as beneficial and who expect to pay few or none of its costs? Do states fight wars to satisfy influential domestic interests?...

4 Domestic Politics and War THE PUZZLE War is costly for states, but what if there are actors within the state—such as politicians, businesses, or the military—who see war as beneficial and who expect to pay few or none of its costs? Do states fight wars to satisfy influential domestic interests? Above: In democratic systems, voters can influence foreign policy by removing (or threatening to remove) leaders who make unpopular decisions. In 2014, thousands of protesters in London let their government know how they felt about renewing military engagement in Iraq. 138 On March 30, 1982, thousands of demonstrators marched American company. Arbenz offered to compensate in the streets of Buenos Aires, the capital of Argentina, United Fruit to the tune of $1.2 million, the value of the denouncing the country’s military government for its land that the company claimed for tax purposes. The U.S. harsh economic policies and oppressive rule. Riot government insisted on behalf of United Fruit that the police used tear gas, rubber bullets, and water can- company be paid almost $16 million. In June of that year, nons to break up the protests, and over 2,000 people rebels armed and trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence were arrested. A week later, the streets of Buenos Aires Agency (CIA) invaded Guatemala. Fearing a full-scale filled with demonstrators once more, but this time the American invasion, parts of the Guatemalan military demonstrations voiced enthusiastic support for the mili- revolted, Arbenz resigned from office and fled the coun- tary regime, as many of those who had earlier called for try, and a pro-American leader was installed. The oper- the government’s ouster now joined in the outpouring of ation cost the CIA just under $3 million.1 Did the United praise. What changed in the course of a week? On April 2, States overthrow a foreign leader to benefit a single com- Argentine naval forces invaded a small group of islands pany at the expense of American taxpayers? 300 miles off the Argentine coast that were the subject of Our first look at the puzzle of war in Chapter 3 con- a long-standing dispute between Argentina and Britain. sidered this problem from the perspective of states. We Is there any connection between these events? Did the assumed two states in conflict over a particular good, such Argentine government provoke a war with Britain in as a piece of territory, and trying to arrive at a settlement order to revive its popularity with its people? that would avoid the costs of war. This kind of analysis is In 1954, representatives of the United Fruit Com- very common in international relations scholarship, where pany went to Washington, D.C., to voice concerns about the leader of Guatemala, a man named Jacobo Arbenz. 1. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA’s Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz had pushed a land reform program that led to Arbenz,” Job 79-01025A, Box 153, Folder 3, www.state.gov/r/pa/ the seizure of almost 400,000 acres belonging to the ho/frus/ike/guat/20181.htm (accessed 11/07/07). 139 it is often referred to as the unitary state assumption: the from war. Others may see the costs of war in economic treatment of states as coherent actors with a set of inter- terms, if the need to finance the conflict leads to higher ests that belong to the state. While this assumption can taxes. In contrast, there are some groups within a coun- be a useful starting place for analysis, we must remember try that may profit from war financially or professionally: that states are legal and political constructs, not beings arms manufacturers benefit from increased purchases capable of taking actions. The choices and actions of states of their products; for military officers, combat experi- are made by people. Decisions about waging war are made ence leads to opportunities for medals and promotions; by a state’s political leaders. Military plans are drawn up and for unpopular governments, such as the Argentine by military officials and carried out by soldiers. junta in 1982, war can build support domestically and Others within the country may also be able to influ- solidify their hold on power. ence foreign policy choices, even if they have no direct These observations raise a number of questions: To say over them. There may be interest groups such as what extent is war rooted not in the information and com- business or ethnic lobbies that influence decision mak- mitment problems discussed in Chapter 3, but rather in the ing through their organizational and financial resources. interests of domestic actors who see personal benefit and In democratic systems, voters influence policy decisions little or no cost to war? Do wars serve the national inter- because of their ability to remove leaders who make est or the narrow interests of office-hungry politicians, unpopular choices. Looking inside the state reveals new multinational companies, and/or a “military-industrial actors with varied interests, as well as variation across complex” composed of glory-seeking militaries and profit- states in the political institutions that determine who seeking arms merchants? How do domestic institutions, affects decision making. such as democracy, influence a government’s decisions How does our understanding of the causes of war and the likelihood of war between states? change when we look inside the state and consider the interests, interactions, and institutions within it? In Chapter 3, we argued that to understand why wars hap- pen, we need to understand why states at times cannot solve their conflicts peacefully, in a way that avoids the Thinking Analytically about costs associated with fighting. This argument rested on Domestic Politics and War the assumption that war is costly to those engaged in the interaction. These costs create a bargaining range, To answer the questions posed here, we must con- or a set of deals that both states prefer over fighting. sider the different interests that domestic actors have The assumption that war is costly makes sense when in terms of war and peace. Simply identifying these we think of the state as a unitary actor, but once we look interests is not enough, however, since not all actors inside the state, it is clear that the costs and benefits of within the state have equal say over foreign policy war are not distributed equally within the country. choices and hence not all interests are represented Different actors within the state may place more or equally. Which domestic interests drive foreign policy less value on the issue in dispute. A disputed territory choices depends on two factors: the strategic inter- might represent a source of livelihood, profit, or national actions between actors, which determine which indi- pride to some, a tract of worthless land to others. The viduals and groups can exert effective influence and persecution of a minority group in a foreign country might which cannot; and the institutions within the state, arouse outrage in some, perhaps owing to ethnic attach- which determine how different actors have access ment to the victims, while others greet it with indiffer- to the decision-making process. Further, we have ence. Most Americans in 1954 had little or no stake in the to recall that war is not the choice of a single state, land reform policies of the Guatemalan government; to but rather an outcome of the interaction between the United Fruit Company, however, millions of dollars’ or among multiple states. Hence, as we consider worth of land were at risk. domestic influences on foreign policy, we need to The costs of war are also distributed unevenly. Some examine how these factors shape bargaining at the people, such as those who might be drafted to serve in international level. the military, can expect to pay very high and direct costs 140 Whose Interests Count in Matters of War and Peace? In the previous chapter, we observed that international disputes generally arise over territory, policies, and the characteristics of countries’ domestic regimes. Why these conflicts of interest arise in the first place is a complicated question with no single answer. One view, referred to in this book’s Introduction as realism, is that states’ interests are largely, if not entirely, dictated by external factors. States want to preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity. To do so, they need power—primarily, military power. Hence, they seek opportunities to expand their own power and/or to diminish the power of those that threaten them. In this view, states’ interests are fixed, determined largely by their material resources and geo- graphic position, and they are not shaped by domestic factors. Although this argument is sometimes useful in understanding sources of con- flict in the world, it is also overly simplistic. The interactions among states at the international level can be fundamentally affected by interactions among actors at the domestic level.2 Look inside any country, and there are a large number of indi- viduals and groups motivated by a variety of different interests: workers who want a job and secure income, companies that want to increase their profits, organizations that want to further a cause they care about or extend the reach of their ideology or religion, and politicians who want to wield political power for personal or ideologi­ cal ends. The interaction of these interests within the context of domestic political institutions can fundamentally affect the interests that the national government pursues and the choices it makes when dealing with other countries. National versus Particularistic Interests In considering the kinds of domestic interests that can influence foreign policy, it is useful to distinguish between general interests and narrow or particularistic inter- ests. A general interest is something that most, if not all, actors within the country share. For example, virtually everyone has an interest in the country’s physical secu- rity and economic well-being. If most people within the state share a common reli- gious or ethnic identity, then the state’s foreign policy interests likely reflect those identities. It makes sense to refer to such interests as national interests, or interests that are so widely shared that they can be attributed to the state as a whole. Narrow or particularistic interests are those held by only a relatively small number of actors within the country, such as a particular business, an ethnic minority group, or indi- viduals within government. To make this distinction concrete, consider the case of oil. The United States has long professed, and acted on, an interest in ensuring a steady supply of oil, 2. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (1988): 427–60. Whose Interests Count in Matters of War and Peace? 141  particularly from the oil-rich countries in the Middle East. In 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt declared that the defense of Saudi Arabia was vital to the defense of the United States, and an American com- pany, the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco), became the main player in developing and exploiting the oil fields there. The commitment to defend Saudi Arabia was reinforced on a number of occasions. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, putting Soviet forces on the doorstep of the Middle East and American allies in the Persian Gulf. President Jimmy Carter responded by articulating what became known as the Carter Doctrine: “Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, When the Guatemalan government seized including military force.” And the need to preserve property belonging to the United Fruit Company stability and American influence in this region was in 1954, arguing that it belonged to the workers cited to justify both the 1991 Persian Gulf War and of Guatemala, United Fruit asked the U.S. the 2003 Iraq War.3 government to intervene. Here, a banner by Why has the United States had such a consistent Guatemala’s General Confederation of Workers interest in oil and the Middle East? A national interest– hangs in front of a United Fruit hiring hall. based argument hinges on the observation that oil is vital to U.S. power because a modern military of tanks and airplanes consumes large quantities of fuel. It is no coincidence that Roosevelt’s concern for Saudi Arabia arose during World War II, at a time when American war planners were worried about running out of gas. The Cold War that followed did nothing to alleviate concerns about maintain- ing access to this strategically valuable material that was crucial to the economic and military might of the United States and its allies. In this view, the U.S. interest in oil stems from a national interest in ensuring its military power and security. An alternative argument, also based on general interests, revolves around the U.S. economy’s dependence on stable and plentiful oil supplies. The U.S. economy runs on oil—to fuel cars, to transport goods around the country, to heat homes and power businesses. Shocks to the price of oil can thus have substantial effects on the economic welfare of U.S. citizens, influencing inflation, unemployment, and dispos- able income. As Figure 4.1 shows, the price of oil over time has been highly sensi- tive to events in the Middle East, with major spikes occurring during times of war and revolution. Such dramatic price increases can affect people in a variety of ways, sparking inflation and unemployment and eating into consumers’ pocketbooks. 3. For a comprehensive history of the role of oil in international politics, see Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Free Press, 1991). 142 Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War FIGURE 4.1 The Price of Oil, 1960–2018 160 Arab Spring 140 uprisings 120 Iraq invasion of Kuwait/ 100 Persian Gulf War Onset of Iranian revolution/ 80 Onset of Iran-Iraq War Iraq War 60 Yom Kippur War/ Arab oil embargo 40 20 0 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 Year Hence, American citizens have a general interest in ensuring stability in the Middle Figure source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Spot Crude Oil East in order to prevent oil price shocks that would hurt the economy. Price: West Texas Intermediate (WTI) [WTISPLC], retrieved Set against these views of the United States’ national interest is one that sees the from FRED, Federal Reserve pursuit of oil as benefiting a small group of businesses: oil companies. After World Bank of St. Louis; https://fred. stlouisfed.org/series/WTISPLC, War II, U.S. companies like Aramco played a direct role in pumping and selling Mid- March 19, 2018. dle Eastern oil, making huge profits. Since the 1960s and 1970s, producer countries * In 2017 U.S. dollars. have generally nationalized their oil industries, meaning that oil companies have to negotiate deals with these governments. U.S. firms like ExxonMobil profit from their participation in the exploration, drilling, refining, and marketing of oil, but their access to these activities depends on the willingness of foreign governments to do business with them. It is possible, then, that U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East is driven by these companies’ desire to expand and protect their profits. In this view, firms use their influence over policy makers to ensure that the United States defends friendly regimes (like that of Saudi Arabia) and undermines hostile regimes (like that of Iraq under Saddam Hussein) that are bad for business. Because these policies can impose costs on American soldiers and taxpayers, this view sees U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East as benefiting a narrow set of inter- ests within the country at the expense of everyone else. As this discussion suggests, the distinction between national and particularistic interests is easy to make in the abstract but harder to observe in practice. While oil clearly influences U.S. policy in the Middle East, it is difficult to say with confidence whether the general or narrow interests are more important. Nonetheless, the distinction is crucial for thinking about what causes war. Recall from Chapter 2 that an actor is a group of individuals with similar interests. To the extent that groups or individuals within the state have different interests over the outcomes of international bargaining, the analytical utility of assuming that the state is an actor diminishes—and we have to start looking within the state for new actors. Whose Interests Count in Matters of War and Peace? 143  This quest is important because the analysis of war presented in Chapter 3 assumed that war is a costly outcome for the actors engaged in inter- national bargaining. These costs ensure the exis- tence of deals that all sides prefer over war, and they underpin an understanding of war that focuses on the information, commitment, and divisibility problems that can prevent such deals from being reached. If, however, the benefits of war are enjoyed by a different set of actors from those that pay the costs, then this view may need to be revised. Does In 1973 and 1979, conflicts in the Middle East war arise not because of obstacles to the bargaining led to gasoline shortages in the United States, interaction, but because war furthers the interests and some stations ran out of gas entirely. The of particular actors within the country? dependence of the U.S. economy on gasoline means that American consumers have an economic interest in the stability of the oil-rich Interactions, Institutions, Middle East. and Influence When we drop the unitary actor assumption and look within states, an enormous number of individ- uals and groups, with a variety of interests, come into focus. Which actors matter, and which interests are likely to influence foreign policy decisions? The answer lies in institutions and interactions. Recall from Chapter 2 that institutions are sets of rules and decision-making procedures. Within each country, domestic institutions help determine who runs the gov- ernment, how decisions are made, and how disputes are resolved. In a monarchy, for example, the ruler is determined through a system of succession often based on birth order. In other systems, the leader is the person who commands the great- est support within the military and therefore can repress challengers with force. In democratic political systems, leaders are selected through regular elections in which winners are decided by the amount of popular support they can muster. Domestic institutions also determine how much power an individual leader has to make decisions. In some political systems, rulers can dictate the state’s policies on their own or with the support of a relatively small number of key actors. In other systems, the institutions of government may distribute decision-making power among more than one body, such as a president and a legislature. By shaping how leaders obtain power and make decisions, domestic institu- tions determine which actors’ interests are taken into account. Leaders whose hold on power is unchallenged may not have to consider the interests of anyone else, and they can act on the basis of their personal interests or whims. More commonly, a ruler may only have to worry about maintaining the loyalty of the military by cater- ing to that organization’s interests. In democratic political institutions, by contrast, the need to win elections forces leaders to think about how the voting public will respond to their policy choices. It also makes them dependent on organized groups that are willing to donate money 144 Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War and time to election campaigns. Although voters and organized interest groups are not literally in the room when decisions are made, democratic institutions force those who are in the room to take those actors’ interests into account. Thus, institu- tions determine which actors and interests have a (figurative) seat at the table. Some domestic actors may also have strategic advantages that magnify their influence. In Chapter 2 we introduced a strategic dilemma known as the collective action problem. This problem arises when a group of individuals with common interests seeks to act collectively to further that interest. As we saw, such efforts can fall short if each individual prefers to free ride on the efforts of others. One implication of this insight is that relatively small groups can be more effective at cooperating to further common interests than large groups are. Indeed, small groups of highly motivated and informed individuals are better able to organize and coordinate their activities and prevent others from free riding. By contrast, large, dispersed groups in which each individual has only a small stake in or knowledge about the policy decision are generally very hard to organize. For example, whereas United Fruit stood to lose millions of dollars of property in Guatemala, the inter- vention cost each U.S. taxpayer only a few pennies. Had taxpayers been opposed to having their money spent this way, they would have had a hard time cooperating, since no individual had any incentive to spend time and money on such an effort. To the extent that a group’s political influence depends on the ability of its members to cooperate, this strategic problem favors the few over the many. Thus, a relatively narrow interest group can successfully demand a policy that benefits that group at the expense of everyone else. Appreciating the role of institutions and interactions, we can organize a discus- sion of domestic interests around four different kinds of actors, depicted in Figure 4.2. FIGURE 4.2 Key Domestic Actors in Foreign Policy Leaders Bureaucracy Interest Groups General Public Whose Interests Count in Matters of War and Peace? 145  The first type consists of the leaders who make foreign policy decisions. State leaders decide when to make threats, what demands to issue, and ultimately, whether to wage war. These individuals matter the most because, by whatever rules of politics operate in their country, they have the authority to make these decisions. The next type com- prises organized groups that have sufficient resources and information to influence the decisions made by the political leaders. Two such groups are of particular rele- vance: bureaucratic actors and interest groups. The state apparatus is made up of a variety of different organizations collec- bureaucracy tively known as the bureaucracy. These organizations—which include the mili- The collection of tary, diplomatic corps, and intelligence agencies—may wield considerable influence organizations—including the because of their institutional resources and knowledge. The military in particular, military, diplomatic corps, and intelligence agencies— by virtue of its coercive power, organizational discipline, and expertise in war fight- that carry out most tasks of ing, can shape decisions about the use of force both through its role in implementa- governance within the state. tion and through its influence over political leaders. Interest groups are groups of individuals with common interests that organize interest groups in order to push for policies that benefit their members. Of particular importance Groups of individuals with in the present context are economic interest groups, such as companies or groups common interests that organize to influence public of companies, and ethnic lobbies comprising people with similar policy interests policy in a manner that owing to their common ethnic background. In later chapters, when we turn to benefits their members. issues like human rights (Chapter 12) and the environment (Chapter 13), interest groups that organize around other principles will come to the fore. The final type of actor to consider is the most numerous but rarely the most powerful: the general public. As already suggested, the influence of ordinary citi- zens varies considerably with domestic institutions. In democratic countries, free and fair elections provide individuals with a low-cost way to participate in deciding who governs. In other kinds of countries, it is harder for individual citizens to have much influence, since political leaders do not depend on their support. As long as the regime can count on the repressive power of the police and military, general- public interests can be ignored. Given this situation, the question of how the general public matters is largely a question of how democracy matters. As we proceed through this chapter, we will walk down the pyramid in Figure 4.2 and consider arguments and evidence about the behavior of actors at each level. Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold On to Power at Home? As noted earlier in this chapter, Argentina sparked a war with Great Britain in 1982 when it invaded a set of nearby islands that had been in dispute for a century and a half: the “Falkland Islands” to the British, the “Malvinas” to Argentines. This war was surprising in a number of respects. First, the islands were not particularly valuable pieces of territory. At the time of the war, the islands had a population of less than 2,000, and their primary source of income was sheep farming. Indeed, 146 Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War just prior to the war, Britain had taken steps to weaken its hold over the islands. In 1981, Britain readied plans to withdraw the last of its naval vessels in the region and passed an act that stripped the islanders of full British citizenship. Second, the war was surprising because of the imbalance in military power between the two states. Though separated from the islands by a larger distance, Britain had a far superior naval force. After Argentina invaded and occupied the Falklands on April 2, 1982, it took only 74 days for British forces to retake the islands. There were 255 dead on the British side, 635 on the Argentine side. So why did Argentina pick a fight with such a formidable foe, and why did Britain react so strongly to defend its right to islands that seemed to be of diminishing importance? A large part of the answer to this puzzle lies not in international considerations, but in the domestic political interests of the countries’ governments. At the time, leaders in both countries had pressing domestic problems to which military conflict may have seemed the perfect solution. The Argentine government—a group of mili­ tary officers known as a junta—had seized power in 1976, and its rule had become increasingly repressive and unpopular over time. In the early 1980s, Argentina suffered a severe economic downturn, which led to civil unrest and splits within the ruling group. Facing a dire threat to its rule, the junta leader, General Leopoldo Galtieri, decided that an attack on the Malvinas might help solve its problem. Knowing that most Argentines resented British control of the islands, Galtieri hoped that a bold move to seize the islands would stir up nationalist sentiment, distract people from their economic hardships, and give the military government a popular achievement that would bolster its prestige and legitimacy. Indeed, the invasion of the Malvinas had precisely this effect. Hence, Galtieri was seeking more than just territory when he seized the islands; he was also looking to solidify his hold on power.4 On the British side, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also had to worry about her political survival. Like Argentina, Britain in 1982 was in the midst of a severe recession. With unemployment soaring, Thatcher’s popularity dropped precipi- tously. In February 1982, the month before the invasion, only 29 percent of Britons said that they approved of the job she was doing. Thatcher’s firm response to the Falkland Islands crisis caused her poll numbers to soar. By May, with British operations to retake the Falklands under way, Thatcher’s approval rating jumped to 44 percent. By the end of the war, her approval stood at 51 percent. The Brit- ish prime minister rode this wave of popularity to electoral victory a year later. Hence, Thatcher’s unexpectedly strong response to the Argentine invasion not only restored British control over the Falklands, but also revived her political fortunes.5 4. Jack Levy and Lily Vakily, “External Scapegoating in Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case,” in The Internationalization of Communal Strife, ed. Manus Midlarski, 118–46 (London: Routledge, 1992). 5. Approval figures are from David Butler and Gareth Butler, eds., British Political Fact 1900–1994, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1994), 256. There is some controversy over how much the Falklands War contributed to the Conservative victory in 1983. See Harold D. Clarke, William Mishler, and Paul Whiteley, “Recapturing the Falklands: Models of Conservative Popularity, 1979–83,” British Journal of Political Science 20, no 1. (January 1990): 63–81. Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold On to Power at Home? 147  What Do Leaders Want? The leaders of states are not solely, if at all, statesmen or stateswomen looking out for the best interests of the nation; they are also individuals with many var- ied interests of their own. Some may have very strong ideological beliefs that increase their willingness to pay costs or run risks in foreign policy. It is hard to understand World War II, for example, without ref- erence to German leader Adolf Hitler’s extreme ide- ology, which motivated him to seek out Lebensraum (“living space”) for the German people by attack- British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, here ing Poland and then the Soviet Union.6 Even in the visiting troops in the Falkland Islands, benefited absence of such extreme motivations, different lead- politically from the Falklands War. Before the ers may come into office with different ideas or prior war, poor economic conditions in Britain had helped bring Thatcher’s public approval rating life experiences that shape how they think about down to just 29 percent. Once the war began, the foreign policy, including the desirability of using mil- British public rallied behind their leader, sending itary force (see “How Do We Know?” on p. 149).7 her approval rating up to 51 percent. State leaders may also have more prosaic per- sonal motivations. As the story of the Falklands War reminds us, leaders are also politicians, people who benefit from holding political office. Being in office confers all manner of benefits: the ego boost of having power, opportunities to enrich oneself and one’s friends, the ability to shape policy in desired ways. As a result, politicians think a lot about how to obtain office and, once in power, how to secure their hold on it. This means that political leaders make choices with an eye toward how those choices will influence their chances of staying in power. How could these motivations affect leaders’ decisions about war and peace? At the most general level, the desire to stay in power means that leaders have to be responsive to the interests of those who control their political fate, whether voters, organized interest groups, the military, or other groups. As a result, the assumption that political leaders want to remain in office plays a key role in almost every aspect of this chapter, since it helps account for the influence of special interest groups that can provide resources useful for maintaining power; it contributes to an under- standing of the role of the military, whose support is often necessary for a govern- ment to stay in power; and it is a necessary element in arguments about the effects of accountability in democratic political systems. In short, leaders’ desire to hold office explains how the interests of actors within the country can matter at the level of policy making. 6. There is a debate among historians about how much of Hitler’s foreign policy is explained by his personal ideology. For a balanced view, which ultimately concludes that ideology played an important role, see Allan Bullock, “Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War,” in The Origins of the Second World War: A. J. P. Taylor and His Critics, ed. William Roger Louis, 117–45 (New York: Wiley, 1972). 7. See, for example, Elizabeth N. Saunders, Leaders at War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); and Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis, Why Leaders Fight (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 148 Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War  HOW DO WE KNOW? Are Women Leaders More Peaceful than Men? A remarkable global trend in recent decades has been the What might explain this result? One explanation is that, increasing number of countries led by women. While his- even if there are differences across men and women in the tory provides examples of queens and empresses, female general population, those differences do not hold among heads of state have been rare in the modern era, with the the subset of individuals who become heads of state. The numbers taking off only since the 1980s (see Figure A). The process of leader selection may penalize women who are figures are still low in absolute terms—in 2018, only 13 seen as insufficiently “tough.” Particularly when voters of the 193 countries in the world had a woman chief are concerned about foreign threats, women candidates executive—but the recent growth is part of a broader trend face a disadvantage, forcing them to compensate by acting that has also seen increased representation of women in in a manner that runs counter to the gender stereotype.d legislatures and militaries. What impact does the gender A second explanation hinges on the beliefs and behav- of the leader have on a state’s foreign policy? ior of other states when confronting a female leader. Military A wealth of research on the general population shows conflict is the outcome of a strategic interaction between that, on average, women are less aggressive than men and at least two states, not the choice of a single individual. If more likely to seek compromise solutions to disputes. Sur- adversaries expect female leaders to be more dovish, then vey data show that women are less likely than men, partic- they will make greater demands on them, thus increasing ularly in Western countries, to support the use of military the risk of conflict. Women may also need to use greater force. Evidence also suggests that states with more gen- levels of force to persuade opponents of their resolve.e der equality domestically, including more women in the Overall, then, while the literature suggests that legislature, use less violence in international crises and increasing gender equality has a number of beneficial spend less on their militaries.a effects, the rising prevalence of female heads of state does So, does having a female leader make a state less not necessarily portend a more peaceful world. likely to wage war? To answer this question, Michael d. See, for example, Jennifer L. Lawless, “Women, War, and Winning Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis collected informa- Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era,” tion on all heads of state from 1875 to 2004. They then Political Research Quarterly 57 (2004): 479–90. examined whether leaders’ propensity to threaten or use e. Caprioli and Boyer, “Gender, Violence, and International Crisis,” 508. military force against other states depends on a variety of personal characteristics. The authors found that, on FIGURE A  umber of States with Female N average, gender has little effect on dispute behavior, and Leaders, 1900–2018 if anything, women are more conflict-prone than men. 20 While 30 percent of male leaders initiated at least one mil- itarized conflict during their tenure, 36 percent of female 15 leaders did.b This finding replicates earlier work, focused on democratic countries, indicating that female presidents 10 and prime ministers engage in more conflictual behavior internationally than men do.c 5 a. For a review of findings on gender effects on international relations, 0 see Dan Reiter, “The Positivist Study of Gender and International 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2018 Relations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (2015): 1301–26. Year b. Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis, Why Leaders Fight (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 158–77. Source: Archigos: A Database of Political Leaders, version 4.1; c. Michael T. Koch and Sarah A. Fulton, “In the Defense of Women: Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in Established “Introducing Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders,” Journal of Democracies,” Journal of Politics 73 (2001): 1–16; see also Mary Peace Research 49 (2009): 269–83. Updated to 2018 by Curtis Bell, Caprioli and Mark A. Boyer, “Gender, Violence, and International The Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance Dataset (REIGN) Crisis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (2001): 503–18. (Broomfield, CO: OEF Research, 2018). Available at oefresearch.org.  But an interest in holding on to power does not turn political leaders into mere instruments of other actors. Strategic politicians can use their control of policy to shape their political environment, rather than just respond to it. In the case of war and peace, a common argument is that leaders sometimes use force abroad not to further any national interest, but rather to enhance their hold on power at home. The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive The idea that leaders can further their own political interests by fighting a war flows from the rally-’round-the-flag effect, or rally effect for short. The term rally effect rally effect refers to people’s tendency to become more supportive of their coun- The tendency for people to try’s government when it experiences dramatic international events, such as wars. become more supportive of This effect is most apparent in countries in which public opinion polling regularly their country’s government in response to dramatic measures the level of support for a leader. international events, such Often, approval ratings jump up at the onset of a war or some other inter- as crises or wars. national crisis, as in the case of Thatcher’s approval ratings at the outset of the Falklands War. The most dramatic rally event ever recorded followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which caused President George W. Bush’s approval rating to jump immediately from 51 to 86 percent, eventually reaching as high as 90 percent. Even in countries without opinion polls and approval ratings, we see cases in which the start of war caused an upsurge of national unity and support for the government. As we noted at the outset of this chapter, in 1982, Argentina’s mili- tary government reversed a tide of public discontent by invading the Falkland Islands. Why do people rally around the flag at times of international crisis? There are a number of explanations. Social psychologists have shown that members of a group often feel greater attachment and loyalty to the group when they experience conflict with outsiders.8 Hence, international conflict can cause an upwelling of patriotism, and the leader derives increased support as the protector of the group’s interests. At the same time, political opponents may decide to dampen their criti- cism of the government at a time of national crisis, and the government may use the emergency to crack down on dissent. This means that the government dominates the political discourse and can frame the public’s evaluation of its policies without fear that opposing voices will split public opinion.9 International conflict can also create a diversion from problems that might otherwise drag down a leader’s popularity, such as economic troubles or scandals. Foreign policy crises tend to drive other issues out of the news headlines, redirect- ing people’s attention away from the domestic issues that divide and disappoint them and toward the more unifying challenge of meeting a foreign threat. Finally, international conflict may give embattled leaders an opportunity to blame foreign- ers for the country’s problems—a phenomenon known as scapegoating. 8. See, for example, Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956). The pioneering work of the rally effect in the United States is John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973). 9. Richard A. Brody and Catherine R. Shapiro, “A Reconsideration of the Rally Phenomenon in Public Opinion,” in Political Behavior Annual, ed. S. Long, 77–102 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989). 150 Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War  Just a few days before invading the Falkland Islands, the Argentine government faced massive protests and calls for the overthrow of the ruling junta. Rioters confronted police, and thousands were arrested. The war with Britain provided the Argentine junta a (temporary) reprieve from these problems by shifting the public’s attention away from domestic issues. The existence of rally effects suggests that political leaders may at times face a diversionary incentive: a temptation to spark an international crisis in order to diversionary incentive rally public support at home. This idea was popularized in the 1997 movie Wag the The incentive that state leaders have to start Dog, in which a scandal-plagued national leader hires a movie director to produce international crises in order news footage of a fake war in order to boost his approval ratings. The logic, how- to rally public support at ever, long precedes Hollywood. In William Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part II, a dying home. King Henry advises his son, Prince Hal, that to prevent plots against him he needs to “busy giddy minds / With foreign quarrels.” This advice echoes in the words of a Russian minister who, during a 1904 dispute with Japan, reportedly told the tsar, “What this country needs is a short, victorious war to stem the tide of revolution.”10 Whether the tsar found this argument persuasive or not, Russia and Japan declared war on each other on February 10, 1904. The danger posed by the rally effect should be clear from the discussion in Chapter 3. There, it was assumed that a state’s first-best outcome in a crisis is to get its way without having to fight. Fighting, after all, imposes costs that the state should prefer to avoid. A diversionary temptation could alter the balance of costs and benefits. If those who control the state’s foreign policy think that using force abroad would greatly improve their chances of staying in power, then they may prefer war over a negotiated settlement, even one that gives them most of what they want. 10. This quotation is attributed to Russian interior minister Vladimir Plehve. However, the authenticity of the quotation is unclear, and it has been suggested that it was attributed to Plehve only later by his political enemies. Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold On to Power at Home? 151  These benefits may be particularly tempting to leaders who are insecure domestically because of discontent with their policies or hard economic times. Such a leader may decide that doing nothing would mean losing office, so waging war and invoking the rally effect may be an appealing gamble. This phenomenon has been called gambling for resurrection: taking a risky action, such as starting a war, when the alternative is certain to be very bad. A sports analogy is useful here. Hockey teams trailing in the final minutes of a game sometimes pull their goalie in order to replace him with an additional attacker. Doing so increases the chances that they can even the score, but it also makes it easier for the other team to score against their undefended net. The gam- ble makes sense because a loss is a loss regardless of whether a team loses by one goal or by many. Consequently, the downside risk of pulling the goalie is small com- pared to the upside potential of tying the game. Political leaders who are certain they will lose office because of poor economic conditions, such as the Argentine junta in 1982, might similarly see a large upside to starting a war and gambling that the outcome will be positive. Do Leaders “Wag the Dog”? Do leaders routinely gamble for resurrection by starting wars abroad at times of political need? Given the intuitive nature of this argument, it may come as a sur- prise to learn that scholars have found little consistent support for the hypothesis that leaders systematically resort to force when they are in trouble domestically. Numerous studies have sought to determine whether the likelihood that a state will get involved in military conflict increases when the leader is unpopular, the country is in a recession, or citizens face high unemployment or inflation, or, in the case of democratic countries, when a well-timed rally shortly before an election could be particularly useful. Although some studies have shown such effects, the results have been neither consistent nor particularly strong. Rather than a straightforward rela- tionship between, say, economic problems and international conflict, effects tend to depend on a number of factors; that is, some kinds of governments may be sensitive to certain kinds of economic conditions at some times.11 In addition, some research suggests that the relationship between international conflict and leaders’ political security is the opposite of what diversionary theory suggests: international conflict is more likely to be initiated by leaders whose hold on office is relatively strong.12 For example, in democratic systems, leaders are more likely to start wars right after elections, not right before them as diversionary theory would suggest. A democratic leader is most secure just after an election, since the next election is, at that point, several years away.13 11. See, for example, Philip Arena and Glenn Palmer, “Politics or the Economy? Domestic Correlates of Dispute Involvement in Developed Democracies,” International Studies Quarterly 53 (December 2009): 955–75; and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (December 2004): 937–61. 12. See Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, “Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (August 2003): 443–67. 13. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Election Cycles and War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 212–44. 152 Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War  This is not to say that diversionary incentives never play a role in particular cases; in fact, historians cite many examples in which such logic contributed to the onset of war. What these results do suggest, however, is that leaders do not system- atically use international conflict for diversionary purposes or to gamble for resur- rection. In other words, even if diversionary incentives have contributed to war in some cases, they account for only a portion of the conflict behavior we observe. Why might this be the case? If sparking international conflict serves leaders’ political interests, why do we not see stronger evidence of this effect? One possible answer is that most political leaders are not as cynical as we assume and they would not actually start a war simply to maintain their hold on power. Although we can- not rule out this possibility, there are other conceivable explanations for why even cynical leaders might not start a war to further their own political interests. The first explanation is that the domestic political benefits of war relative to peace have to be large—perhaps unrealistically large—in order to eliminate the pos- sibility of a peaceful bargain. Recall the simple bargaining framework we illustrated in the previous chapter, now depicted in Figure 4.3. As shown in the top panel, the size of the bargaining range is determined by the sum of the war costs to both sides. Now imagine that the leader of State A expects to reap political benefits from waging war. This benefit increases the value of war to the leader as indicated in the FIGURE 4.3 Rally Effects and the Bargaining Range The top panel shows the expected outcome of a war between State A and State B, as well as the resulting bargaining range. The lower panel shows how the bargaining range shrinks if the leader of State A expects political benefits, in the form of a rally, as a result of war. This benefit increases the value of war to A, offsetting some or all of its costs, but as long as the benefit does not exceed the costs of war to both states, a bargaining range still exists. WAR OUTCOME A BARGAINING RANGE B VALUE OF WAR TO A COSTS TO A COSTS TO B VALUE OF WAR TO B STATE A’S BENEFIT FROM A RALLY A BARGAINING B RANGE VALUE OF WAR TO A COSTS TO B VALUE OF WAR TO B WAR OUTCOME Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold On to Power at Home? 153  lower panel. This added benefit shrinks the bargaining range, but even if this benefit is greater than the costs to State A—so that the leader sees a net benefit rather than a net cost to war—a bargaining range could still exist, as shown. The size of this new bargaining range is given by the sum of the net costs (the total costs to both states minus the additional political benefit). Only if this benefit exceeds the sum of the war costs to both states does the bargaining range vanish, making war inevitable. Hence, even if the leader of one state expected large politi- cal benefits from waging war, these benefits would be sufficient to cause war only if they outweighed the war costs to both sides. This condition becomes more likely if the leaders of both states expect political benefits from war, as was the case in the Falklands War. Notice also that the political benefits from war mean that State A can demand a better deal from State B than it otherwise could. Knowing this, poten- tial targets might avoid picking fights with politically vulnerable leaders, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to use force opportunistically.14 These observa- tions remind us that war is the product of an interaction between at least two actors and not the choice of a single actor. The Political Costs of War A second reason why diversionary effects might be weak is that war can impose domestic political costs in addition to promising benefits. This is evident from the Falklands case as well. While Thatcher rode her postwar wave of support to a resounding electoral victory in Britain, the Argentine junta that lost the war met a very different fate. Following Argentina’s defeat, angry protesters once again filled the streets. Galtieri and other members of the junta resigned or were stripped of their posts, and several went to prison. The story of the Russo-Japanese War has a similar ending. Far from the short, victorious war the Russians hoped for, the war actually lasted almost two years, and the Russians suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Japanese. Rather than stemming the tide of revolution, as the Russian minister reportedly predicted, successive defeats on the battlefield increased unhappiness with the tsar’s regime and helped usher in the revolution of 1905, when the tsar was forced to make polit- ical concessions to his opponents. Full-scale revolution would hit Russia in 1917, in the midst of yet more battlefield defeats in World War I. Indeed, the initial surge of patriotism that generally accompanies the onset of war can quickly give way to discontent and rebellion if the war goes badly. One way to see the relationship between the costs of war and its domestic political repercussions is to consider how public support for war changes as the costs mount. Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between public support and battle deaths for major U.S. military operations since and including World War II. As the graph shows, most operations started with very high levels of public support, but 14. See, for example, Benjamin O. Fordham, “Strategic Conflict Avoidance and the Diversionary Use of Force,” Journal of Politics 67 (February 2005): 132–53; and Brett Ashley Leeds and David R. Davis, “Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (December 1997): 814–34. 154 Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War FIGURE 4.4 U.S. Battle Deaths and Public Support for War 100 War in Afghanistan (2001-14) World War II 90 Percentage of Survey Respondents (1941–45) 80 70 Persian Gulf War (1991) Korean War (1950–53) Supporting War 60 50 40 30 Iraq War Intervention in (2003–10) Vietnam War 20 Somalia (1993) (1965–73) 10 0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000 U.S. Battle Deaths this support generally fell off as the number of U.S. battle deaths mounted. The only Figure sources: Numbers for World War II, Korea, Vietnam, wars that remained popular throughout were World War II—a war of national sur- the Gulf War, and Somalia come from Eric V. Larson, Casualties vival that followed the Japanese attack on the U.S. homeland—and the Persian Gulf and Consensus (Santa Monica, War, which caused relatively few deaths on the American side. CA: RAND, 1996). Other poll numbers come from Gallup, Moreover, in cases in which support for the war collapsed, the presidents’ http://www.gallup.com/file/ approval ratings also suffered. During the Korean War, President Truman saw his poll/183590/Mistake_Going_ into_Iraq_and_Afghanistan_ approval rating fall to as low as 22 percent, and he declined to run for reelection 150612.pdf (accessed 11/22/17). Casualty figures for Iraq and in 1952. The unpopularity of the Vietnam War similarly doomed the presidency of Afghanistan are from www Lyndon Johnson, who dropped his bid for reelection in March 1968. The Iraq War.icasualties.org (accessed 01/20/15). dragged down President Bush’s approval ratings, causing his Republican Party to lose control of Congress in 2006 and contributing to the election of Democrat Barack Obama in 2008. More generally, research has shown that leaders who fight losing or costly wars are more likely to be removed from office than those who win wars.15 The evidence suggests that in terms of their political interests, leaders should see war not as a pure opportunity, but as a gamble—and one that has a downside risk. Hence, in thinking about how reelection incentives influence the way leaders think about war and peace, we need to set the costs of losing a war against the potential benefits of the rally effect. These costs may explain why we do not see strong or sys- tematic evidence that politically insecure politicians engage in diversionary conflict. In light of this observation, it is worth recalling that the scandal-plagued leader in the movie Wag the Dog does not start an actual war; instead, he hires a movie producer to stage a fake war for public consumption. The attraction of doing this is clear: when you script the war yourself, you can make sure the right side wins. In the real world, war is a risky gamble—not just for the state, but also for the political interests of its leaders. 15. See, for example, Hein Goemans, War and Punishment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold On to Power at Home? 155  Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military or Special Interest Groups? From 1898 to 1902, Great Britain engaged in a costly and divisive war with the Boer states in South Africa. The Boer War, which lasted three years and claimed about 50,000 lives, was a climactic episode of a larger process in which the European states carved up and colonized the continent of Africa, as described in Chapter 1. To the British economist J. A. Hobson, this scramble for colonies and the bloody wars that it gave rise to presented a puzzle. Why had Britain expended so many young lives and so much money to acquire and defend an empire in Africa, as well as in Asia and the Americas? The answer that Hobson arrived at was unsettling. He calculated that although imperialism did not benefit the British nation as a whole, it was extremely profi­ table for a few small groups within the country. The primary beneficiaries, he argued, were rich people with the ability to invest overseas. With colonial posses- sions came many opportunities for profitable investments. Wealthy people could invest in railroads, mines, and other properties and receive very high rates of return. They could lend money to colonial governments at favorable interest rates. In pushing for colonial possessions, Hobson argued, financial interests found allies in powerful places: military leaders seeking glory and larger budgets, and arms man- ufacturers seeking profits. In his view, these groups used their power and influence to force British governments to pursue a policy that benefited them at the expense of the greater good.16 Hobson’s theory of imperialism is not without critics, but the general thesis— that wars are fought to benefit military and business interests—is a familiar one. It echoes famously in the words of U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower, who military-industrial warned of the influence of a military-industrial complex, an alliance of military complex leaders and arms manufacturers that presumably have an interest in an aggressive An alliance between foreign policy. military leaders and the In this section we consider the influence of the military and interest groups industries that benefit from international conflict, such with respect to questions of war and peace. As we will see, there are times when as arms manufacturers. these actors might be expected to have hawkish interests, because they antici- pate benefits from war and/or pay few of the costs. These two sets of actors also have strategic advantages that they can exploit in their interaction with politi- cal leaders and others within the country. That said, we will see that the primary effect of hawkish actors is not to cause wars per se—by eliminating the bargaining range—but rather to expand the scope of the state’s ambitions and to increase the conditions under which the state would consider fighting a war. Hence, hawkish domestic interests do not lead directly to the breakdown of bargaining, but they do create more opportunities for such failures to occur. 16. J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: James Nisbet, 1902). 156 Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War Bureaucratic Politics and the Military Although the ultimate decision to wage war may lie in the hands of a few individ- uals, the actual machinery of government that deals with matters of war and peace is much larger and more complex. The leader of a modern state sits atop a large bureaucratic apparatus: a collection of organizations that manage many of the details of governance. Wars are planned and implemented by the state’s military— usually a massive organization with thousands and, in some cases, millions of indi- viduals. Negotiations with other countries are conducted by a host of diplomats around the world, typically overseen by a ministry of foreign affairs (known in the United States as the State Department). Information about other countries’ military capabilities and intentions are collected and analyzed by intelligence organizations, like the United States’ CIA, Britain’s MI6 (Military Intelligence, Section 6), or Russia’s SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service). Given all the tasks that governments have to perform and all the individuals that are needed to carry out those tasks, such organizations are a necessary part of any modern state. This observation opens up the possibility that decisions about war and peace are shaped not only by state leaders, but also by the interests of the bureaucratic organizations involved in the decision-making process.17 While such organizations care about what is best for the country, they may also care about the resources that they control and the influence that they themselves wield. They generally seek bigger budgets, more input on policy making, and opportunities for personal promotion. As a result, they may press for policies that boost their own status or fit their own worldview. For example, prior to the 2003 Iraq War there were serious disagreements within the U.S. government between the Defense Department and the State Depart- ment. Civilian leaders at the Pentagon generally expected war to be easy, while those at the State Department were more cautious and emphasized the need for international diplomacy. There were also disagreements over which agency should take the lead role in rebuilding Iraq politically and economically in the aftermath of the conflict. These debates reflect a common aphorism about bureaucratic politics that “where you stand depends on where you sit”—that is, the leaders of bureau- cratic agencies often take policy stands that reflect their own organizations’ needs. In the end, the Defense Department won these scuffles.18 As this example suggests, the military is usually the most influential bureau- cratic actor in matters of war and peace. Up to now, our discussion has treated the military as an instrument of the state—a tool that states use to increase their lever- age in international bargaining. What happens when we think about the military as an actor in its own right? There is a compelling—although, as we will see, incomplete—argument to be made that the more influence the military has over foreign policy decision making, 17. The classic investigation of bureaucratic politics is Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). 18. See, for example, Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military or Special Interest Groups? 157  the more aggressive the state will be. This argument rests on the assumption that members of the military have ideological, organizational, and professional inter- ests in policies that make war more likely. Ideologically, leaders in the armed forces may be predisposed to seeing military solutions to foreign policy problems, overes- timating the effectiveness of force relative to other alternatives. As an organization, the military can demand larger budgets and more personnel when the state is fre- quently engaged in international conflict than when it is at peace. And profession- ally, military officers find that combat experience is crucial to being promoted to the highest ranks. All these considerations suggest that the military sees benefits to war that other actors may not. Perhaps the most dramatic example of how military influence can lead to aggressive foreign policy is the case of Japan in the 1930s. During this period, Japan pursued a relentless campaign of expansion against its neighbors, ultimately bringing the country into war with China, France, Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. This aggressive turn in foreign policy coincided with a creeping takeover by the military, which undermined the democratic system that had been developing in the country. In 1931, elements of the Japanese military provoked a war with China and seized a region known as Manchuria, which military leaders prized for its coal and iron. A year later, the prime minister of Japan was assassinated by a group of naval officers—an event that ushered in the end of civilian control of Japanese politics. The Japanese military became the main instigator of that country’s expansionist policies. This case is an extreme example, but there is broader evidence to sug- gest that countries in which civilian leadership has weak control of the military are more likely to initiate militarized conflicts.19 (See “What Shaped Our World?” on p. 159 for another example.) Nevertheless, it is important not to automatically equate the military with militarism. One study examined the advice that military leaders gave U.S. decision makers in about 20 key crises during the Cold War, comparing how aggressive the officers were relative to the president’s civilian advisers. The study found that mili- tary advisers were no more likely than civilians to advocate the use of force in a cri- sis; rather, the main difference between the two groups was over the level of force that should be used in the event of an operation, with military advisers consistently preferring larger deployments. The author concluded that the “stereotype of a bel- ligerent chorus of generals and admirals intimidating a pacific civilian establish- ment is not supported by the evidence.”20 Similarly, a study of elite opinion in the United States shows that military leaders are inclined to advocate the use of force in a narrower set of cases than 19. Todd S. Sechser, “Are Soldiers Less War-Prone than Statesmen?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (2004): 746–74. The idea that civilians can lose control of the military also plays a large role in explanations of World War I. See Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 58–107; and Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Russel Van Wyk, July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War (Boston: Bedford/ St. Martin’s, 2003). 20. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 4. 158 Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War  WHAT SHAPED OUR WORLD? The Kargil War and Military Influence in War One of the more dangerous episodes in modern history started rather quietly in April 1999, when Pakistani military forces secretly infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) that separates the Pakistani- and Indian-controlled areas of the disputed Kashmir region. When the incursion was dis- covered, India mobilized to repel the attack. Over the next several weeks, the two countries fought a war in the high mountains near the town of Kargil. This was neither the first nor the bloodiest war between the two countries, but it was the first that took place under the specter of nuclear war. Only a year earlier, the two countries had openly tested nuclear devices. It was also a rare example of war between two democratic countries. How can we explain this episode? elected government, its military is very powerful and has Interests At the root of the conflict is a long-standing on several occasions ousted civilian leaders that it did not territorial dispute over the region of Kashmir, which both like. Indeed, shortly after the Kargil War, the prime minis- India and Pakistan claim on historical and religious grounds ter, Nawaz Sharif, was deposed and replaced by the army’s (see Map 3.1 on p. 94). But even while both states want to chief of staff, General Pervez Musharraf. The danger of possess the entire region, actors within each country place removal by the military has led to weak civilian control and different values on it and are willing to pay different costs oversight of that organization. to obtain it. In particular, the military in Pakistan has gen- Although there are many unknowns about Pakistan’s erally been more willing than the country’s civilian leaders decision making in the lead-up to the war, there is good to run a risk of war with India. reason to believe that the military command manipulated Sharif into starting a conflict he did not fully understand.a Interactions The conflict over Kashmir has led to repeated When India accused Pakistan of crossing the LoC in May episodes of bargaining in which force has been threatened 1999, Sharif claimed that the invaders were local Kashmiri and used, including full-scale wars in 1947, 1965, and insurgents operating on their own initiative. Sharif and 1971. Even so, only weeks before the Kargil War broke out, others claim that when he was briefed on the plan to sup- the countries’ leaders had met to affirm their desire for port the insurgency, he was not told that Pakistani military a peaceful resolution. The infiltration of Pakistani forces forces would cross the LoC in large numbers. In addition, across the LoC thus represented an unexpected escala- U.S. officials reportedly believed that the move to put Paki- tion, designed to bolster Pakistan’s bargaining power. stani nuclear forces on alert during the war was done Once India responded, the subsequent fighting took place without Sharif’s knowledge. in the shadow of deterrent threats. Pakistan put its nuclear As this episode suggests, military organizations forces on alert and threatened to use every weapon in its may sometimes be willing to run greater risks than are arsenal if India invaded; India responded by putting its own the civilian authorities whom they are supposed to serve. missiles on alert. With the risks so high and foreign pres- When the military wields enormous influence and civilian sure mounting, Pakistan had little choice but to pull its control is weak, this behavior can have dangerous conse- forces back behind the LoC. So why did Pakistan initiate quences for the country, its neighbors, and the world. such a dangerous gamble? Institutions The answer lies in the country’s domestic polit- a. This discussion is based on Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the ical institutions. Even though Pakistan has a democratically Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 87–109. 159  are civilian leaders without any military experience.21 Indeed, by all accounts, U.S. military officers were much more reluctant to go to war against Iraq in 2003 than was the civilian leadership at the Pentagon and White House. Many top command- ers thought that war with Iraq would be costly and that conducting it successfully would require larger commitments of manpower and money than the civilian lead- ership was willing to make.22 Such observations suggest that, in some contexts at least, the military’s interests push in a conservative direction—more appreciative of the limits of what can be achieved through force and more sensitive to the human costs of war, which are, after all, borne by its personnel. Interest Groups: Economic and Ethnic Lobbies The possibility that special interest groups can influence foreign policy in a man- ner that furthers their particular interests is familiar to most people. In the wake of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Vice President Richard Cheney’s former com- pany, Halliburton, was awarded contracts worth billions of dollars to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure and supply American troops. By the end of 2006, the company’s stock was worth four times its value when the war started. Consid- ering also that President Bush himself had once been an oil industry executive, some observers speculated that the Iraq War was fought at the behest of oil companies interested in Iraq’s oil and of military contractors interested in taxpayer dollars. Such charges are not new. U.S. interventions in Latin American countries have often been ascribed to the influence of American businesses whose properties in those countries were at risk. The previously mentioned case of Guatemala, where United Fruit feared a major loss at the hands of an unfriendly government, was by no means unique. The United States also intervened in Cuba (1961), the Domin- ican Republic (1965), and Chile (1973)—all places where American investors had substantial assets. Although economic actors such as companies and industries figure most prom- inently in such stories, not all interest groups organize around economic motives. Interest groups that organize around ethnic ties are another influence on foreign policy. For example, governments may respond to pressure from politically power- ful ethnic groups to intervene in neighbors’ civil wars on behalf of ethnic kin who live across the border.23 In the United States, two particularly influential groups stand out. One is the pro-Israel lobby: a collection of individuals and groups who want the U.S. govern- ment to support and defend the state of Israel—a stance that often brings the United States into conflict with Israel’s adversaries in the region. The main lobbying arm of 21. See Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 22. See, for example, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006). 23. Stephen M. Saideman, The Ties that Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 160 Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War this group is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which is con- sidered one of the most effective lobbying groups in Washington.24 The second standout is the anti-Castro lobby—groups that represent Cuban Americans opposed to the communist regime in Cuba. A large number of Cubans fled after Fidel Castro took over in 1959 and seized their property. Cuban American groups have lobbied the U.S. government to take strong actions to contain and undermine the Castro regime, including supporting a failed invasion by exiles in 1961 and imposing a strict economic embargo on the country. In 2014, President Barack Obama announced that he would restore some diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba, arguing that more than five decades of isolation had failed to change the regime. Nonetheless, the effort to lift the embargo faced resistance from the Cuban American lobby and its supporters in the U.S. Congress, and President Donald Trump took steps to reverse the opening after he came into office in 2017. Why do interest groups care about the state’s foreign policy? In cases like the pro-Israel and anti-Castro lobbies, group members are motivated by ethnic attach- ment or ideological interests to support or oppose a particular country or regime. In the case of economic actors, preferences over foreign policy arise whenever an actor’s income depends on events in other countries or on the relationship between countries. A multinational company like United Fruit may have production facili- ties in numerous countries. If those countries experience political instability that threatens to disrupt the company’s business, or if they have unfriendly regimes that might confiscate the company’s property, then the company might lobby for some form of intervention to protect its interests. Similarly, an investor that owns stock in a foreign company or a bank that has lent money to a foreign government might lobby its own government to use mili- tary force to ensure the return on its investment or the repayment of its loan. Such lobbying could lead to intervention against unstable or unfriendly regimes. In the extreme case that Hobson considered, economic actors with international invest- ments might even lobby their governments to extend direct imperial control over other countries. Although establishing and maintaining such control was costly, imperialism made it safer to invest overseas, since there was less danger that invest- ments would be wiped out by instability or hostile governments. A smaller set of economic actors, primarily those that make and sell military armaments, also have a direct interest in their country’s foreign policy, since a belligerent foreign policy keeps them in business. However, the interests of economic actors need not always lead to a preference for aggressive policies. Indeed, economic actors who depend on peaceful rela- tions with other countries in order to do business could press their governments to pursue friendly relations or even formal alliances with profitable partners. For 24. For a recent study arguing that the pro-Israel lobby wields a great deal of influence on U.S. foreign policy, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2007). This book generated a great deal of controversy not only because of the content of the claims, but also because of concerns about the quality of the evidence. For a sample of the dispute, see Robert C. Lieberman, “The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 7 (2009): 235–57, as well as the response by Mearsheimer and Walt in the same issue. Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military or Special Interest Groups? 161  example, American banks and companies that had important trade, financial, and investment interests in Western Europe played a significant role in lobbying for a strong U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe at the outset of the Cold War. Similarly, banks that depended heavily on loans to Asia lobbied for strong alliance commitments to Japan and South Korea.25 More recently, U.S. corporations interested in selling goods to China have been a political force lobbying for more cooperative relations with that country. In fact, an extensive literature suggests that trade between countries decreases the likeli- hood of war between them, in part because businesses that profit from the trade lobby against policies that could lead to conflict.26 In sum, depending on where and how they do business, economic actors can have an interest in peaceful relations with some countries and/or hostile relations with others. How Can Small Groups Have a Big Influence on Policy? We have seen that militaries seeking budgets and prestige, businesses seeking profits, and ethnic groups looking out for their kin may all, at times, see particular benefits to war. What is remarkable about each of these actors is how small they are relative to those who pay the costs of war. The generals and admirals who run military organizations are greatly outnumbered by the enlisted personnel who bear the brunt of the fighting, as well as by the rest of the population. Multinational com- panies and ethnic lobbies tend to make up a small fraction of society. Given how extensively they are outnumbered, when and how can these narrow interests pre- vail? The answer lies in the nature of the interactions between these different actors and the institutions that regulate their relations. The military’s influence on foreign policy decision making derives from the fact that it controls a large number of guns and people trained to use them. While militaries are generally created in order to defend a state from foreign threats, their capabilities inevitably make them key players domestically as well. In many states, the military plays a direct role in ensuring the continuation of the government. This role can either be very explicit (as with military dictatorships, in which military officers take direct control of executive power) or more subtle but no less potent. In many countries, the military is able and willing to intervene in politics to ensure that the government is to its liking; as a result, a civilian government may have to cater to the military’s interests in order to avoid being ousted in a coup d’état. A number of countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia have experienced fre