Administrative Law Q&A Practice Questions PDF

PART 1 QUESTIONS 1.​ What does “the President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices” mean? -​ As Chief Executive he shall have the ultimate authority over the entire executive branch of the government. He can supervise, direct any executive...

PART 1 QUESTIONS 1.​ What does “the President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices” mean? -​ As Chief Executive he shall have the ultimate authority over the entire executive branch of the government. He can supervise, direct any executive branches under his jurisdiction to ensure that the laws are implemented and public policies are followed. It ensure the unified direction of the branch toward the same objective 2.​ Does the President exercise the power of supervision and control over LGUs? (Sec. 4, Art, X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) -​ No. SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 3.​ What is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency? -​ Doctrine of qualified political agency. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him. (Manubay v. Garilao, G.R. No. 140717, 16 April 2009) -​ General Rule: The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President. -​ PURPOSE: Practical Necessity. 4.​ What is the exception of the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency? -​ Exceptions are direct acts of the president such as the act of alter ego is unconstitutional, suspension writ of habeas corpus (PURPOSE: To protect individuals from unlawful detention or imprisonment), imposing martial law, pardoning powers, financial, technical agreement to explore and exploit natural resources of the philippines. 5.​ What are the instances when the 1987 Philippine Constitution requires the direct act of the President himself? -​ Acting according to the Acticle 7 Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the President requires to directly acts when shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. -​ The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call. -​ The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. -​ A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or the legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. -​ The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion. -​ During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. 6.​ How will you relate the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency to Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution? -​ The doctrine of qualified political agency gives power to act on behalf of the President as alter egos for continuous function of the branch and control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Ensuring that the law be faithfully executed by President under the Section 17 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution. 7.​ What is the second sentence of Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution? -​ He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. -​ This means that as a Chief Executive of the land. The president shall ensure that under his jurisdiction, the laws passed from the Legislative are carried out and implemented. 8.​ Under the Fisheries Code, who was entrusted to issue different rules and regulations? (Araneta v. Gatmaitan G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957) -​ The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 9.​ Can the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources? (Lacson-Magallanes vs. Paño, G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967) -​ YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the President holds constitutional authority to control executive departments. Thus, the President or his delegates (such as the Executive Secretary) can modify or reverse decisions made by department heads. 10.​What is an exception of the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency? -​ Exceptions are direct acts of the president such as the act of alter ego is unconstitutional, suspension writ of habeus corpus (PURPOSE: To protect individuals from unlawful detention or imprisonment), imposing martial law, pardoning powers, financial, technical agreement to explore and exploit natural resources of the philippines. 11.​What are the Powers of the President under the Administrative Code? (Book III, Title 1) POWER OF CONTROL, ORDINANCE POWER, POWER OVER ALIENS, POWERS OF EMINENT DOMAIN, ESCHEAT, POWER OF APPOINTMENT, AND OTHER POWERS. -​ POWER OF CONTROL. Sec. 1. Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. -​ ORDINANCE POWER. Executive Orders, Administrative Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circular, General or Special Orders. -​ POWER OVER ALIENS. ​ Sec. 8. Power to Deport. - The President shall have the power to deport aliens subject to the requirements of due process. Sec. 9. Power to Change Non-Immigrant Status of Aliens. The President, subject to the provisions of law, shall have the power to change the status of non-immigrants by allowing them to acquire permanent residence status without necessity of visa. ​ Sec. 10. Power to Countermand Decisions of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration. The decision of the Board of Commissioners which has jurisdiction over all deportation cases shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from promulgation, unless within such period the President shall order the contrary. Sec. 11. Power over Aliens under the General Principles of International Law. The President shall exercise with respect to aliens in the Philippines such powers as are recognized by the generally accepted principles of international law. POWERS OF EMINENT DOMAIN, ESCHEAT, Sec. 15. Power over Ill-gotten Wealth. The President shall direct the Solicitor General to institute proceedings to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees. ​ Within the period fixed in, or any extension thereof authorized by, the Constitution, the President shall have the authority to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. POWER OF APPOINTMENT ​ Sec. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws. Sec. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy;​ ​ (2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position, unless he is already in the government service in which case he shall receive only such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds appropriated for the office or agency concerned. ​ ​ (3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year OTHER POWERS ​ Sec. 19. Powers Under the Constitution. The President shall exercise such other powers as are provided for in the Constitution. ​ Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.​ 12.​Does the President exercise legislative power? [Can the President promulgate decrees that have the force and effect of the law?] (David vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006) -​ NO. Only calling out powers to use military. The President does not possess legislative power except when delegated by Congress during a state of emergency. 13.​What types of issuances may the President issue under the Admin Code? -​ Types of Issuance are Executive Orders, Administrative Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circular, General or Special Orders. 14.​What is an Executive Order? -​ According to Chapter 2 Section 2. SExecutive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. 15.​What is an Administrative Order? -​ Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. 16.​What is a Proclamation? -​ Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. 17.​What is a Memorandum Order? -​ Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. 18.​What is a Memorandum Circular? -​ Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. 19.​What is a General or Special Order? -​ Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders. 20.​What does A.O. 308 seek to establish? (Ople vs. Torres G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998) -​ It seeks to establish to adopt a national computerized identification reference system. -​ WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; -​ WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations; 21.​Was A.O. 308 in harmony with any law? (Ople vs. Torres G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998) -​ No. because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. The Court found that A.O. No. 308 failed to assure the protection of personal information, lacked safeguards and defined standards, which posed a significant threat to an individual’s right to privacy. -​ It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the  Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis- a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. 22.​Does the President have the power to create offices? (Birago vs. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010) -​ The Supreme Court ruled that the President does not have the authority to create public offices, such as the Truth Commission, without specific authorization from the Constitution or legislation. The Court held that the creation of such offices falls within the legislative powers of Congress. 23.​What is the legal basis for the power of the President to create offices? (Birago vs. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010) -​ E.O 1 issued by then President Benigno Aquino under Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. And Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 to delegate authority to the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the "Truth Commission." POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 1. What are the three major types of powers of an Administrative Agency?  -​ Investigatory Powers, Rule Making Powers, and Adjudicatory Powers. 2. What is Legislative Power? -​ Legislative power is the authority, under the constitution, to enact, amend, and repeal laws. Vested in congress which composed of 2 chambers, the senate and the house. 3. What is Quasi-Legislative or Rule-Making power? -​ Quasi-legislative power, a.k.a., power of subordinate legislation or rule-making power, is the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of law and implement legislative policy. -​ OR -​ It is the power may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body (THE CONGRESS) to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a law and implement legislative policy. 4. What are the classifications of administrative regulation? (Republic of the Philippines vs. Drugmaker’s Laboratories Inc., G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014) -​ An administrative regulation may be classified into (3) such as legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a contingent rule. As defined in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Drugmaker’s Laboratories Inc states that: -​ (1) Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.hey usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress32 and effect a change in existing law or policy which affects individual rights and obligations.33 -​ Meanwhile, (2) interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statute being administered and purport to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said rules.  -​ Finally, (3) contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends. 5. What are the limitations on the Rule-Making power? (De Leon) -​ (1) It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. -​ (2) It may not, by its rules and regulations, amend, alter, modify, supplant, enlarge or expand, restrict or limit the provisions or coverage of the statute as this power belongs to the legislature. It cannot engraft additional requirements or embrace matters not covered by the statute or contemplated by the legislature. The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute is necessarily defined by and limited to what is provided in the legislative enactment conferring the power. It is confined to putting the law into effect or carrying out the legislative purpose. 6. Does the rule-making power include the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same? (Cruz) -​ Yes, the rule-making power includes the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same rules it creates. 7. What does Sec. 1 Art. III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provide? -​ No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 8. What are the two concepts of due process? (Flores-Concepcion v. J. Liberty A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438 September 02, 2020 -​ Due process encompasses two concepts: substantial due process and procedural due process. 9. What is substantial due process? -​ Substantive due process is generally premised on the "freedom from arbitrariness" or "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play." It "inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property." 10. What is procedural due process?  -​ Procedural due process, on the other hand, "concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere." It is "[a]t its most basic... about fairness in the mode of procedure to be followed. 11. Is notice and hearing required before the exercise of Quasi-Legislative power? (Sec. 9, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code) -​ Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. -​ (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. 12. When is notice and hearing required? Notice and hearing are required when: 1.​ The law itself mandates it – If a specific statute requires public participation, such as public hearings, then these must be followed. 2.​ The rules or regulations will directly affect substantial rights or impose burdens – For example, if a rule imposes penalties, fees, or restricts rights, then notice and hearing may be constitutionally or legally required. 3.​ In quasi-judicial proceedings – Where the administrative agency exercises power to determine the rights of parties through an adjudicative process (like licensing, disciplinary cases, etc.), due process, including notice and hearing, is essential. 13. What does Art. 2 of the Civil Code provide? -​ Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a) 14. Are rules and regulations issued by Administrative Agencies required to be published in the Official Gazette? (Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code) -​ IT DEPENDS. If the IRR creates rights and obligation that afftect the public at large. Prior publication and filing of rules with the UP Law Center Office at the National Administrative Register. -​ Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.chan robles virtual law 15. Is dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of rules and regulations violative of procedural due process? (Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation, G.R. No. L-59234, September 30, 1982) -​ No. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of rules and regulations is neither violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banc. -​ Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. 16. When are issuances and rules not required to be published? EXECPTION. Interpretative, orders, instructions, or Internal rules for official employees.  2. internal regulations ( regulating only personnel of agency) 3. letters of instructions issued by administrative superior to their subordinates​ ​ According to jurisprudence (e.g., Tañada v. Tuvera) and supported by Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, not all administrative issuances require publication. If the issuance affects the public, imposes a burden, or creates rights or duties, then publication is required. 17. What does Art. 3 of the Civil Code provide? -​ Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2) 18. What does Art. 4 of the Civil Code provide? -​ Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. 19. What does Art. 5 of the Civil Code provide? -​ Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. 20. What does Art. 6 of the Civil Code provide? -​ Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 21. What does Art. 7 of the Civil Code provide? -​ Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. -​ When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter govern. -​ Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitutions. (5a) 22. Can Administrative Agencies make laws, alter, or repeal them?  -​ No, administrative agencies cannot make, alter, or repeal laws in the strict or formal sense—that power belongs exclusively to the legislative branch (Congress). However, they can issue rules and regulations under the power of delegated legislation, also known as quasi-legislative power. 23. What does Art. 8 of the Civil Code provide? -​ Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. 24.​What are the 2 fundamental tests for adequate legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making? (Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013) -​ The completeness test and sufficient standard test. 25.​What is the completeness test? (Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013) -​ The law is complete when it sets the policy to be executed leaving nothing to the delegate except to implement. -​ Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. 26.​What is the sufficient standard test? (Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013) -​ On the other hand, the law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. 27.​What does Section 8 of Presidential Decree 910 state? (Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013) -​ All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing  unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. 80 -​ the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree 81 No. (PD) 910, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976.In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth 28.​Was there undue delegation of legislative power in such Section? (Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013) -​ Yes. the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. 29.​What are the kinds/purposes of Administrative Rules and Regulations? (Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013) -​ (a) Filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as the supplementary rule-making, or -​ (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule making. 30.​What are the requisites for the validity of administrative rules and regulations? (Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.G.R. NO. 164171,  February 20, 2006) -​ Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy.To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following requisites: -​ (1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; -​ (2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; -​ (3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and -​ (4) It must be reasonable 31. What is the doctrine of Contemporaneous Construction? (Yaphockun v. PAREB G.R. No. 213314, March 23, 2021) -​ “The doctrine of contemporaneous construction dictates that courts should respect the interpretation placed by an executive or administrative agency on a law, especially when such interpretation was made soon after the enactment of the statute and has since been followed consistently.” -​ The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to a great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction that no jurisdiction that no authorities need be cited to support it. 32. Can the power to punish prohibited acts be delegated to Administrative Agencies? -​ No. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 1132). 33. How should a penal statute be construed? (People vs. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977) -​ A penal statute is strictly construed. While an admi­nistrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it  (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 SE 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jur. 2nd 129-130). 34. What are the special requisites for an penal administrative regulation be valid? (Cruz) -​ The law itself must make a violation of the administrative regulation punishable. -​ The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for the violation of the regulation. -​ The regulation must be punished. 35. What does Sec. 6 of Art. III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provide? -​ SECTION 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. 36. Can the DOJ impair the right to travel? (Genuino vs. de Lima G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018) -​ No. The DOJ cannot impair the right to travel by issuing issue Circular No. 41 and Hold Departure Order, Watchlist Orders (WLOs), and Allow Departure Orders (ADOs). It can be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. 37. How was there an invalid exercise of quasi-legislative power in PCAB vs. Manila Water Company, Inc. G.R. No. 217590, March 10, 2020 -​ There is an invalid exercise of quasi-legislative power. The Supreme Court found the Section 3 of the IRR of R.A. No. 4566 regulation inconsistent with the intent of the Constitution in no less than one aspect. Because the IRR are impose a restrictions to foreigners that hinders fair competition. PCAB created new restrictions beyond provided by the law. -​ RA 4566 only provides 3 classification for contractors such as: a. General Engeneering Contracing , b. General Building Contracting, and c. Specialty Contracting. However, PCAB went beyond the prescribed classification under the Section 16 of the R.A 4566 and proceeded to create the nationality-based license types under the Section 3.1. PCAB exceeded the confines of the delegating statute when it created the nationality-based license types under  Section 3.1. Basic rule is that “the clear letter to the law is to controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.”. It also creates undue resticition to foreign entities where R.A 4566 did not. 38. How was there an invalid exercise of quasi-legislative power in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque G.R. NO. 173034, October 09, 2007? -​ The Court found that certain provisions of the RIRR are not consistent with the Milk Code. Specifically, it held that: – Sections 4(f), 11, and 46 of the RIRR, which outrightly prohibit the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes and impose administrative sanctions, are ultra vires, meaning they were beyond the DOH’s authority to enact, thus null and void. -​ The Court explained that while the DOH has the mandate to regulate the marketing of breastmilk substitutes to ensure safe and adequate nutrition for infants, it cannot impose an absolute ban on advertising or enact provisions not supported by legislative enactment. -​ While agencies have the authority to promulgate rules to implement laws, they cannot go beyond what the law provides. Regulations that exceed statutory authority are ultra vires and thus invalid. -​ Essence lang ng case na to, mas mataas kasi yung legislative enactment kaysa sa power na meron yung DOH as administrative agency, dapat consistent sa statute yung procedure na ginagawa ng admin agency. -​ ULTRA VIRES: acting or done beyond one's legal power or authority Digest: Facts: – The case initiated from the issuance of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 by the Department of Health (DOH), otherwise known as the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code). – The Milk Code aims to protect and promote breastfeeding, through the regulation of the marketing of breastmilk substitutes, supplements, and other related products. – The RIRR was promulgated to enhance the regulation on the marketing of these products, invoking not just the Milk Code but also international agreements like the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes and various World Health Assembly Resolutions. – The Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines (PHCAP) challenged the RIRR’s validity, claiming it contains unconstitutional provisions and extends beyond the scope of the Milk Code. – The Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the RIRR’s implementation while the case was pending. Issues: 1. Whether the RIRR is constitutional and does not exceed the DOH’s rule-making authority. 2. If the RIRR provisions are consistent with the Milk Code. 3. Whether the RIRR provisions on advertising, donation, and the authority to impose sanctions are in accord with the Milk Code. Court’s Decision: 1. Standing: The Court recognized PHCAP as a real party-in-interest, capable of challenging the RIRR’s validity, as it represents the collective interests of its members who are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes. 2. Constitutionality and Authority: The Court found that certain provisions of the RIRR are not consistent with the Milk Code. Specifically, it held that: – Sections 4(f), 11, and 46 of the RIRR, which outrightly prohibit the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes and impose administrative sanctions, are ultra vires, meaning they were beyond the DOH’s authority to enact, thus null and void. – The rest of the RIRR provisions were generally consistent with the Milk Code and were within the DOH’s authority. – The Court explained that while the DOH has the mandate to regulate the marketing of breastmilk substitutes to ensure safe and adequate nutrition for infants, it cannot impose an absolute ban on advertising or enact provisions not supported by legislative enactment. Doctrine: The Court elucidated the doctrine of ultra vires actions by administrative bodies, emphasizing that while agencies have the authority to promulgate rules to implement laws, they cannot go beyond what the law provides. Regulations that exceed statutory authority are ultra vires and thus invalid. QUASI-JUDICIAL 1. What is quasi-judicial power? -is the power of the administrative agency to determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself. (Cruz) -Quasi-judicial power refers to the authority of administrative agencies to adjudicate disputes, make findings of fact, apply legal standards, and render decisions in a manner akin to courts.The decisions rendered by administrative agencies, in this regard, may be subject to the doctrine of res judicata. Is Notice and Hearing required in Quasi-Judicial Power? -​ YES. Adjudicatory power and determinative power, enabling power, directing power, dispensing power, examining power, and summary power. ADJUDICATORY POWER -​ The authority of admin agencies to make determination of facts in the performance of their official duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the facts so found. -​ The proceedings partake of the nature of judicial proceedings. DETERMINATIVE POWER -​ The authority granted to admin agencies to make final decisions or determinations in specific matters within the purview, such as issues , applications, etc. -​ It classified into: Enabling and directing powers. ENABLING POWER -​ The authority that permit the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate, and which would be unlawful without the government approval (Casino, license to operate liquor store, etc.) DIRECTING POWER -​ The authority to issue directives, orders, or instructions that guide into the actions and behaviour of individuals, organizations, or entities subject to their jurisdiction (e.g power of assessment of BIR) -​ This power includes: -​ Dispensing Power: Authority to provide exemptions, waivers, or variations from certain legal requirements or regulations in specific cases. (e.g exemptions from zoning restrictions)  -​ Examining Power: The authority to investigate, inspect, and scrutinize various matters within their jurisdiction (e.g DOLE’s inspection of workplace including book of the company) -​ Summary Power: The authority to make swift and concise decision or take immediate actions without going through lengthy formal procedures (e.g Abatement of nuisance) What are the two conditions required for the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power? (Cruz) 1. Jurisdiction must be properly acquired by the administrative body 2. Due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings 2. What are the two conditions required for the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power? (Cruz) -The proper exercise of the quasi-judicial power requires compliance with two conditions, to wit: (1) Jurisdiction must be properly acquired by the administrative body -may be simply defined as the competence of an office or body to act on a given matter or decide a certain question. -It is the legislature that has the power to confer jurisdiction upon the administrative body and so limit or expand its authority. -It can be said that each administrative body has its own peculiar jurisdiction as conferred upon it by the specific provisions of its charter.The law may allow some administrative bodies to award certain kinds of damages while denying the same power, for no apparent reason, to other administrative bodies. (2) Due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings Jurisdiction Jurisdiction: Defined by Law/ Charter (not by AA or consent of parties, not acquired through or waived by any act or omission of the parties; DOJ has jurisdiction over all disputes solely [i.e., all without exception] between GOCCS involving questions of law) 3. What is the effect if the two conditions are not present? -the decision rendered by the quasi-judicial body will be considered null and void. -Without jurisdiction, the determination made by the administrative bodies are absolutely null and without any legal effect whatsoever. 4. What does adjudicate mean? What do you do when you adjudicate? -To make a formal judgement or decision regarding disputes. -To stand as a mediator to mediate disputes between two parties and give a verdict on what is right and wrong. “adjudicate” means to settle in the exercise of judicial authority What does adjudicate mean? What do you do when you adjudicate? "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised:... to pass judgment on: settle judicially:... act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers:... to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy.... " 5. Distinguish judicial power from quasi-judicial power. (De Leon) -judicial power: judicial power is vested in courts and is used to adjudicate disputes according to law. This power is exclusively held by the judiciary, including courts at all levels, and involves the interpretation and application of laws to resolve disputes between parties. -quasi judicial power: Quasi-judicial power refers to the authority of administrative agencies to adjudicate disputes, make findings of fact, apply legal standards, and render decisions in a manner akin to courts. This power is delegated to administrative agencies to resolve matters in a manner similar to courts, allowing them to conduct hearings, issue subpoenas, take evidence, make findings of fact, apply law, and render binding decisions. -Judicial power is inherent, while quasi-judicial power is delegated to administrative agencies. judicial power; in the strict sense, is the power to hear, try and determine all sorts of cases at law and equity which are brought before the courts. It is the power and authority to make a final, rather than an initial determination, of what the law is and adjudicate the respective legal rights or liabilities of the contending parties with respect to the matter in controversy. Jurisdiction is limited Extent of powers depends largely on enabling act 6. What is a quasi-judicial body? (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. no. 83578, March 16, 1989) -A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." - It is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. IS PADS a quasi judicial body? No, its undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities". Facts: 1. Background of PADS Task Force: The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force was created to combat “dollar-salting,” involving blackmarket activities related to foreign exchange. Its powers were established by Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by PD No. 2002. 2. Issuance of Search Warrants: On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales of PADS issued six search warrants against various companies, including Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. The application for these warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan and supported by the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro, an investigator for PADS. 3. Case Filed in RTC: Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought relief from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, questioning the validity of the search warrants. On March 13, 1985, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order and later, on April 16, 1985, declared the warrants null and void, ordering the return of seized items. 4. RTC Reconsideration: On August 21, 1985, a motion for reconsideration filed by PADS was denied by the RTC. 5. Appeal to Court of Appeals: PADS contested the RTC’s decision by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) on April 4, 1986. Initially, CA sided with PADS, holding that PADS, being quasi-judicial, was co-equal with RTC and outside its jurisdiction. 6. CA Reverses Itself: Karamfil filed a motion for reconsideration, leading CA to reverse its prior decision on September 24, 1987, invalidating the search warrants, and further denied PADS’ motion for reconsideration on May 20, 1988. Issues: 1. Jurisdiction and Judicial Authority: Is PADS a quasi-judicial body, co-equal with the RTC, and is it empowered to issue search warrants under the Constitutional provisions? 2. Legality of Issued Search Warrants: Can PADS be considered a “responsible officer” with authority to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution? 3. whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals the Court of Appeals and this Court. Court’s Decision: 1. PADS as Quasi-Judicial Body: The Supreme Court decided that PADS is not a quasi-judicial entity. The statutes do not confer it authority to adjudicate and execute judgments, positioning it as an investigative and prosecutorial body akin to the fiscal’s office conducting preliminary investigation. 2. Authority to Issue Search Warrants: The Supreme Court affirmed that PADS cannot issue search warrants. It highlighted that the power to issue such warrants under the Constitution must be exercised by a neutral and detached judge, rather than an executive or prosecutorial body like PADS, making Presidential Decree No. 1936 unconstitutional to the extent that it permitted PADS to issue such warrants. Doctrine: 1. Judicial Powers of Authorities: Only judicial courts and certain responsible officers approximating judges’ neutrality can issue search warrants. 2. Separation of Powers: Prosecutorial bodies, while they may have quasi-judicial functions, cannot be vested with authority infringing on the judiciary’s power without clear legislative intent. Class Notes: – Constitutional Interpretation: Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution strictly reserves the issuance of search and seizure warrants to judges. – Separation of Powers: Reinforces checks and balances within government branches, critical in preventing abuses by executive bodies in violation of individual rights. – Statutory Authority: Any extension of judicial powers to non-judicial bodies must be supported by clear legislative intent and Constitutional authorization. 7. Do quasi-judicial bodies have the power to create its own Rules of Procedure? (Cruz) -Where an administrative body is expressly granted the power of adjudication, it is deemed also vested with the implied power to precribe the rules to be observed in the conduct of its proceedings. But to be valid, the rules must not violate fundamental rights or encroach upon constitutional prerogatives. 8. Do Rules of procedure grant jurisdiction to quasi-judicial bodies? (Cruz) -No. Administrative agencies cannot grant itself jurisdiction. Ordinarily conferred only by Constitution or by the law. 9. What are the requisites of due process in administrative proceedings? (Flores-Concepcion v. J. Liberty A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438 September 02, 2020) or (Ang Tibay v. CIR) Sevenc cardinal primary rights be present for the requirements of due process to be satisfied: -a. the right to a hearing; which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof b. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. c. the tribunal must have something to support its decision; "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. d. evidence must be substantial evidence – relevant evidence that a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion; Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." e. the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; f. the court must act on its or their own independent consideration of the law and facts of controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; g. the court should render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered Facts: The case revolves around Republic Act No. 10029, known as the Philippine Psychology Act of 2009, which necessitated a licensure exam for practicing psychologists but allowed for certain exemptions. Section 16 of RA No. 10029 detailed the criteria for psychologists to be registered without examination, contingent on educational attainment and work experience. Florentina Caoyong Soberejuanite-Flores applied for registration as a psychologist under this provision but was denied due to alleged insufficient work experience and failure to update her professional education. Despite several appeals to both the Professional Regulatory Board of Psychology (BOP) and the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), Soberejuanite-Flores’s application was rejected. The appeal noted discrepancies in recognizing her work experience and questioned the additional requirement of completing 100 hours of updating workshops and training programs as stipulated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 10029, claiming it was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals upheld the PRC and BOP’s decision, prompting Soberejuanite-Flores to elevate the case to the Supreme Court. Issues: 1. Whether the requirement of completing at least 100 hours of updating workshops and training programs as per the IRR of RA No. 10029 is constitutional. 2. Whether Soberejuanite-Flores was unjustly denied registration as a psychologist under the “grandfather clause” of RA No. 10029. Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed Soberejuanite-Flores’s petition for lack of merit, affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court ruled that: 1. The IRR’s provision on the completion of 100 hours of updating workshops and training programs was a valid exercise of legislative delegated power, adhering to both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test, thus constitutionally sound. The imposition of such requirements is within the regulatory discretion of the Professional Regulatory Board under the umbrella of protecting public welfare. 2. Soberejuanite-Flores did not meet the exemption criteria. Particularly, she failed to substantiate her claim of having met the requisite work experience and upgrade in professional education as mandated by the law and its IRR. G.R. No. 251816. November 23, 2021 Doctrine: This case reaffirms the principles of the validity of delegated legislation and the power of administrative agencies to issue rules and regulations for implementing laws, provided these adhere to the standards of completeness and sufficiency. Class Notes: – The principle of non-delegation of powers adheres to providing adequate standards to guide the discretion of agencies vested with regulation. – The completeness test and sufficient standard test are crucial in assessing the validity of delegated legislation. – The judicial system upholds administrative discretion in professional regulation, emphasizing public welfare over individual interests. Is a formal or trial-type hearing required in quasi-judicial proceedings? (Cruz) pp. 186  Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. 10. What does opportunity to be heard mean? (Cruz) -​ It is the opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. -It must be stressed that "[t]he essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, logically preconditioned on prior notice, before judgment is rendered." xxx. "Even the Republic as a litigant is entitled to this constitutional right, in the same manner and to the same extent that this right is guaranteed to private litigants. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 210233, February 15, 2016) -The opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process, it is the prior notice before judgement is rendered. -The affected party must be given a fair chance to present their case, submit evidence, and argue their position. (Respicio law) 11. Is a formal or trial-type hearing required in quasi-judicial proceedings? (Cruz) pp. 186 -​ Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. -​ -No. In administrative hearings, the right to be heard does not necessarily require a full-blown trial-type proceeding. What is required is a reasonable opportunity to present one’s case. 12. Is hearing required when an superior administrative agency reviews a subordinate administrative agency? (Caoile vs. Vivo, G.R. No. L-27602, October 15, 1983) -The law does not require notice and hearing for such a review. The petitioners were already heard when they presented their Evidence before the board of special inquiry. A review by the Commissioners of the board's decision is based on the Evidence already presented before the board. Hence, the immigrants seeking entry are not entitled to another hearing. ​ "(c) An alien excluded by a board of special inquiry or a dissenting member thereof may appeal to the Board of Commissioners, whose decision in the case shall be final. The decision on appeal shall be put in writing and promulgated not less than seven days from the time the case is submitted for decision. In appeal cases, the alien shall have the right to be represented by an attorney or counsel who shall have access to the record of the board of special inquiry in the particular case on appeal." -in administrative law, due process does not always require a trial-type hearing, and internal reviews within the administrative hierarchy may not necessitate another hearing if the party has already been heard at the initial level. DIGEST: Facts: ​ Issuance of Certificates and Entry of the Aliens ​ On May 30, 1961, Samson T. Sabalones, then Philippine consul at Hongkong, issued five certificates of registration and identity to the following persons: ​ Teban Caoile – employee, born November 4, 1932, in Amoy, Fukien, China. ​ Jose Caoile – private tutor, born June 25, 1934, in Amoy, Fukien, China. ​ Felipe Caoile – private tutor, born December 5, 1935, in Amoy, Fukien, China. ​ Vicente Caoile – private tutor, born August 20, 1937, in Amoy, Fukien, China. ​ Santos Caoile – student, born July 29, 1938, in Amoy, Fukien, China. ​ The certificates were issued to facilitate the aliens’ direct travel from Hongkong to the Philippines, claiming they were children of Antonio Caoile, a purported Filipino citizen. ​ The five individuals arrived on a Cathay Pacific Airways flight at Manila International Airport on various dates: ​ Teban and Vicente arrived on June 7, 1961. ​ Santos and Felipe arrived on June 11, 1961. ​ Jose arrived on June 20, 1961.  ​ Upon arrival, their admission as Filipino citizens was referred to the board of special inquiry to determine the veracity of their claim based on filiation and paternity, as the certificates themselves were deemed “not conclusive evidence.” ​ Proceedings before the Board of Special Inquiry ​ The board, composed of Edgardo R. Hojilla, Gerundio Umengan, and Tomas G. Montesines, conducted hearings on June 23 and June 26, 1961. ​ Testimonies were taken from the five alleged children as well as from Antonio Caoile, the putative father. ​ The board concluded that: ​ Antonio Caoile was born on July 3, 1913, in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, as the illegitimate child of Maria Caoile (a Filipino) and an unnamed Chinese father. ​ He had adopted Filipino citizenship through his mother. ​ Despite discrepancies (e.g., Antonio’s return to China, his subsequent marriage to Ong Siu Ty, and uncertainties raised later in his testimony regarding his relationship with one of the applicants), the board determined that all five applicants were his children and thus entitled to Filipino citizenship under the principle of jus sanguinis. ​ In support of its findings, the board relied on various evidences: ​ Blood tests of the children and Antonio. ​ Income tax returns of Antonio for selected years. ​ A statutory declaration made by a witness, Chan Wah Hing. ​ The oral testimonies of both the applicants and the alleged father. ​ Actions of the Board of Commissioners and Subsequent Developments ​ The decisions of the board of special inquiry were subjected to review by individual members of the Board of Commissioners of Immigration: ​ Commissioner Emilio L. Galang “excluded” the admissions on July 7, 1961. ​ Associate Commissioners Francisco de la Rosa and Felix Talabis merely “noted” the decisions on different dates, implying a lack of collective affirmation. ​ On June 21, 1962, a new Board of Immigration Commissioners (Martiniano P. Vivo, Marcial O. Ranola, and Virgilio N. Gaston) undertook a review. ​ An immigration officer, after conducting an ex parte investigation without notice or hearing the applicants, recommended reversing the board of special inquiry’s decision in the case of four of the applicants (Teban, Felipe, Vicente, and Santos).  ​ The new Commissioners, acting collectively on June 23, 1962, promulgated a decision reversing the prior board’s findings and ordering the exclusion and deportation of those four. ​ A corresponding warrant of exclusion was issued for these four; however, its service on some was ineffective (mail returned unclaimed) and only Teban was eventually served on March 10, 1964. ​ Notably, the case of Jose Caoile remained in abeyance since no warrant of exclusion was issued for him. ​ Litigation Arising from the Exclusion Orders ​ Teban Caoile, through Juan Garcia, filed a petition for habeas corpus when he was arrested and detained at Camp Crame following his exclusion order. ​ The petition was initially dismissed at the trial level, finding his detention legal. ​ The Court of Appeals later ordered his release on bail, which was subsequently challenged by the Commissioner of Immigration through certiorari. ​ In a prior case (Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez, L-22696, May 29, 1964), this matter was addressed, leading to further appellate review. ​ In response to the exclusion and pending arrest: ​ Santos, Felipe, and Vicente Caoile filed a petition for certiorari on June 8, 1964 to enjoin their deportation. ​ Jose Caoile also filed a similar petition on June 9, 1964. ​ The trial court decisions diverged: ​ In one set of proceedings, the trial court ruled that the certificate of registration should sustain the applicants’ claim of Filipino citizenship, based on the board of special inquiry’s findings. ​ In another, the trial court nullified the decision of the Board of Commissioners made on June 23, 1962, ruling that the exclusion order was rendered beyond the statutory one-year review period and that the petitioners were denied due process. ​ Review by the Supreme Court and Resolution of Issues ​ The Supreme Court, in addressing the related immigration cases (L-27602, L-27603, and L-28082), analyzed the conflicting actions: ​ Whether the individual annotations (“Noted” versus “Exclude”) by the Commissioners constituted a valid collective affirmation of the board of special inquiry’s decision. ​ Whether the review of the board’s decision ought to have been conducted collectively by the Board of Commissioners in accordance with statutory provisions and the Secretary of Justice’s memorandum. ​ The proper evidentiary standard on claims of filiation and Philippine citizenship.  ​ The Court considered established doctrines and prior cases regarding: ​ The finality of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry if not reversed collectively and within one year. ​ The principle that administrative findings should not be disturbed absent manifest abuse of discretion. ​ The deference owed to immigration authorities on factual matters, especially when administrative remedies had not been fully exhausted. ​ Finally, the Supreme Court: ​ Reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision in parts. ​ Affirmed the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated June 23, 1962. ​ Denied the motion for reconsideration in the case concerning Teban Caoile (L-28082) for lack of merit. Issue: ​ Due Process Considerations ​ Whether the review by the Board of Commissioners, conducted without a new hearing or notice to the applicants, violated the principles of due process. ​ Whether the administrative review adequately addressed the rights of the applicants even though they had already been heard by the board of special inquiry. 13. Is the right to counsel available in quasi-judicial bodies? -​ Yes, but it is not indispensable. -​ A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. -Representation by counsel is generally allowed, but in some informal administrative proceedings, parties may represent themselves. (Respicio Law) -Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. -In Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940), the SC emphasized the need for rudimentary due process in administrative proceedings, which can include the right to counsel depending on the circumstances 14. Distinguish investigatory power from adjudicatory power. (Carino vs CHR G.R. No. 96681. December 02, 1991) -Investigate: To receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. The court emphasized that investigation does not equate to adjudication, -Adjudicate: To render judgments or decisions that resolve the controversies involved. Such authority resides with courts and quasi-judicial bodies. In the case, it established that the Commission on Human Rights is empowered solely to investigate allegations of human rights violations involving civil and political rights but does not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate or make final determinations on these matters. The role of the CHR is investigative, not adjudicatory, emphasizing a clear delineation of powers between investigative bodies and judicial or quasi-judicial entities. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 15. What is the power to issue subpoena? -A subpoena is a formal directive that carries legal authority, obligating the recipient to comply or face potential legal sanctions. (Respicio Law) -A subpoena is a legal instrument issued by a court, tribunal, or other authorized body compelling a person to appear, testify, or produce evidence in a legal proceeding. In the Philippines, the issuance and compliance with subpoenas are governed by the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 21, and related jurisprudence. -To ensure the availability of necessary witnesses or evidence. A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. 16. What is subpoena duces tecum? -court order that requires a person to bring specific documents, books, or other evidence to a court hearing or deposition. -The primary goal of a subpoena duces tecum is to obtain evidence that is necessary for a legal proceeding. -This directs a person to produce documents, records, or tangible evidence pertinent to the case.  In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described in the subpoena. 17. Is the power to issue subpoena inherent in administrative agencies with quasi-judicial power? (Carmelo vs. Ramos, G.R. No. L-17778, November 30, 1962) -The power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum is not inherent in administrative bodies. (Cruz) It is settled that these bodies may summon witnesses and require the production of evidence only when duty allowed by law, and always only in connection with the matter they are authorized to investigate. -the power to subpoena and compel testimony under threat of contempt is fundamentally judicial and cannot be assumed by administrative bodies, including committees formed by municipal mayors, without explicit statutory authority. Digest: -On February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee to investigate anomalies involving the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and the License and Permits Division of the Mayor’s Office. -The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen employed as a bookkeeper at Casa de Alba. The subpoenas required Ramos to appear on several dates: June 3, 8, 9, 15, 16, and August 4 and 11, 1960, in connection with an administrative case against Crisanto Estanislao. Ramos, although duly served, refused to appear before the committee. -Claiming that Ramos’s refusal to appear impeded, obstructed, or degraded the administrative proceedings, the petitioner (Jesus L. Carmelo, in his capacity as chairman of the probe committee) filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to declare Ramos in contempt. The trial court dismissed the petition after determining that the committee lacked the express statutory authority to issue subpoenas and require testimony under oath. -The petitioner invoked Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides authority to administrative officers or bodies to take testimony or evidence, administer oaths, summon witnesses, and require the production of documents. The petitioner’s reliance on this statutory provision aimed to justify the committee’s power to issue subpoenas and secure witness testimony as analogous to the power exercised by judicial courts. -Whether a committee established by a municipal mayor possesses the authority to issue subpoenas. -the Court concluded that municipal mayors’ committees lack the authority to issue subpoenas. The executive order creating the committee did not expressly grant such power, which, even if implied from the mayor’s investigatory powers, cannot be delegated to a subsidiary body or subordinate individuals or committee. 18. Is contempt power an inherent power in an administrative body? Like the subpoena power, the power to punish for contempt is essentially judicial and cannot be claimed as an inherent right by the administrative body. (Cruz) 19. What is the quantum of evidence required in Administrative Cases? (Miro vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 172532, November 20, 2013) -Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe, based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. 20. What is the preponderance of evidence? -Preponderance of evidence is the standard of proof that requires a party’s evidence to be more convincing and of greater weight or probative value than that of the opposing party. (Respicio Law) -It does not necessarily refer to the quantity (number) of witnesses or exhibits alone, but rather the quality, credibility, and overall effect of the evidence presented. -In the case of Miro v. Mendoza, the CA held that the statements in the affidavits were hearsay and, thus, should not be given any evidentiary weight. 21. What is proof beyond reasonable doubt? -Unlike the substantial evidence standard, “proof beyond reasonable doubt” demands a degree of moral certainty sufficient to convince a prudent person that the accused is guilty. (Respicio Law) What is proof beyond reasonable doubt? The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt insists that every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence must be accounted for. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 22. What is substantial evidence? -defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Its standard is satisfied when there is a reasonable ground to believe based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for misconduct complained of. -the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings and certain special proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies. (Respicio Law) -Their factual findings are generally accorded with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute one. Despite the respect given to administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on record and reverse the administrative agency’s findings if not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe, based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. 23. What does Sec. 16 of Art. III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provide? Sec. 16, Art. III: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. 24. What is the doctrine of res judicata? (San Luis vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989) -​ (which means a "matter adjudged" The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,  executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503]. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. An existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. Requisites of Res Judicata The essential requisites for the existence of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions (a) identity of parties (b) identity of subject matter and (e) identity of cause of action 25. Can there be res judicata in the exercise of administrative powers other than quasi-judicial proceedings? (Montemayor vs. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335, July 1, 2003) -​ The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. -​ When the administrative proceedings are non-litigious and -​ summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law, such as labor relations proceedings, the doctrine may not be applied.  -​ Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC's investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. Digest: ​ Background of the Case ​ Edillo C. Montemayor, then Regional Director (and at one time OIC-Regional Director) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), was accused of amassing unexplained wealth. ​ His dismissal from service was ordered via Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the Office of the President, based on allegations of unexplained wealth in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. ​ The Complaint and Allegations ​ The administrative proceedings began with an unverified letter-complaint dated July 15, 1995, submitted by private respondent Luis Bundalian to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California. ​ The complaint alleged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot in Burbank, California by making a down payment of US$100,000.00, a sum allegedly disproportionate to his official income. ​ The allegation further charged that the funds used for the acquisition possibly originated from lahar funds and other government projects. ​ Attached to the complaint were documents including a copy of a Grant Deed, a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) naming petitioner’s sister-in-law Estela D. Fajardo to negotiate the purchase, and an excerpt from a newspaper column highlighting the case of unexplained wealth. ​ PCAGC Investigation and Petitioner’s Defense ​ The Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) conducted its investigation from May 29, 1996 until March 13, 1997 after receiving the complaint indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General. ​ Petitioner, through his counsel, filed a counter-affidavit claiming that the real owner of the Burbank property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo.  ​ He noted that similar charges had been previously filed before the Ombudsman and dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence. ​ During the investigation, petitioner was repeatedly instructed to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Income Tax Returns (ITRs), and Personal Data Sheet, but he only provided his Service Record and checks allegedly issued by Fajardo as payments for the property. ​ Findings and Administrative Action ​ The PCAGC found that the property, valued at US$195,000.00 (or approximately P3.9 million), was clearly disproportionate to petitioner’s reported annual income of P168,648.00 in 1993. ​ The explanation provided by petitioner was deemed unusual, unsubstantiated, and self-serving. ​ Emphasis was placed on petitioner’s failure to submit key documents (SALN and ITRs), and his counsel’s focus on challenging the proceedings on grounds of forum shopping. ​ Based on these findings, the PCAGC recommended petitioner’s dismissal. Subsequently, on August 24, 1998, the Office of the President adopted these recommendations and issued Administrative Order No. 12, which ordered his dismissal from service along with the forfeiture of government benefits. ​ Petitioner’s Arguments on Appeal ​ Petitioner challenged the investigation on due process grounds, arguing that the use of an unverified letter-complaint and lack of confrontation or cross-examination of the complainant deprived him of his rights. ​ He contended that the evidence against him was insufficient to prove his guilt by substantial evidence. ​ Additionally, he argued that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman should render the administrative case moot and academic. 26. When does the principle of Res Judicata do not apply? -​ The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. -​ 27. What is the doctrine of non-interference? (Freeman Inc. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 110265, July 7, 1994) -​ The doctrine of non-interference which should be regarded as highly important in judicial stability and in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court or tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. -​ The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court or tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. The SEC is at the very least co-equal with the Regional Trial Court. As such, one would have no power to control the other. Moreover, in the instant case, judgment was rendered by the trial court in Civil Case No. 88-44404 approving the compromise agreement between EQUITABLE on one hand, and FREEMAN and Saw Chiao Lian on the other. A writ of execution was issued against the defendants to enforce the judgment and two (2) properties of FREEMAN were levied upon and sold to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT as highest bidder in the public auction. Finally, the judgment was fully satisfied and a certificate of sale was issued to FREEMAN MANAGEMENT. It is axiomatic that after a judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and for all. It cannot be modified or altered. 28. Can the President overturn decisions of administrative agencies that already reached finality? (Peña vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006) -No. Because of the principle of res judicata. In this case, the SC held that both CA and Office of the President have no more jurisdiction to review much more to reverse the decision of the HLURB. -Since the case was already final and executory, no court, not even the highest court of the land, can revive, review, change or alter the same. It is already well settled in our jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. Having said that the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20 December 1995 had become final and executory, it was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals to affirm the Decision of the Office of the President reversing the HLURB Regional Office, because such Decision was rendered by the Office of the President without jurisdiction. Hence, when the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President, it likewise acted without jurisdiction. Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, no court, not even this Court, has the power to revive, review, change or alter the same. Primary purpose of judicial review for administrative actions to ensure that these agencies under executive department do not go beyond their statutory or constitutional powers in carrying out their tasks. Q: What are the issues which you can raise before the court from an administrative body? A: Issues involving (1) Questions of Fact and (2) Questions of Law Policy issues, political issues, purely administrative or internal matters cannot be subject of judicial review. QUESTION OF FACT vs. QUESTION OF LAW (Republic v. Caraig G.R. No. 197389, October 12, 2020) A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction Also known as Doctrine of Prior Resort When competence or jurisdiction is vested to an administrative agency, judicial resort is not allowed until acted upon by the administrative agency.  Rationale of the doctrine: based on public policy and practical considerations; because these agencies have expertise; to attain uniformity of application of regulatory laws because what if the case is both lodged with the court and administrative agency and the ruling of the two are conflicting. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Agencies Judicial recourse must not be initiated until such administrative remedy has been fully availed of. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 1. When there is a violation of due process 2.When the issue involved is purely a legal question 3. When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction 4.When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned 5.When there is irreparable injury 6.When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter 7.When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable 8.When it would amount to a nullification of a claim 9.When the subject matter is a private land in a land case proceedings 10. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy 11. When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention 12. When no administrative review is provided by law 13. Where the rule of qualified political agency applies 14. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot 15. When there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant. DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION GR: Courts of Justice will generally not interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies and their expertise (e.g. granting of licenses, permits, leases, and contracts of approving, rejecting, reinstating, or cancelling applications or deciding conflicting applications. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. EXCEPTION: When there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.