Unit 2 - ELS/Constit Law Prep Notes PDF

**[Unit 2 -- ELS/Constit Law -- English Legal System and Case Law]** **Principles of law (ratio** **decidendi)** - Found within the judgements and how these can be distinguished from less important aspects of the judges comments - Very clear rules which judges have to abide by when formu...

**[Unit 2 -- ELS/Constit Law -- English Legal System and Case Law]** **Principles of law (ratio** **decidendi)** - Found within the judgements and how these can be distinguished from less important aspects of the judges comments - Very clear rules which judges have to abide by when formulation their decisions **Doctrine of Precedent (stare decisis)** - Requires that in certain circumstances English courts are bound to follow decisions which have been reached in previous cases - Important to common law but also to the interpretation of legislation by the judges - When does the doctrine apply? - A proposition stated in one case is binding in a later case if it is: a. A proposition of law b. Part of the ratio decidendi of a case c. Decided in a court whose decisions are binding on the present court and d. There are no relevant distinctions between the two cases **What is a Proposition of Law?** - Must be one of law, not fact - One way of deciding whether something is a fact is to consider whether it can be proved, or at least inferred from the evidence - Oualcast Ltd v Haynes (1959) -- separating law from fact - Employer provided protecting clothing and informed the workers that it was available but did not ensure they wore it. A worker was injured while working and sued for negligence - At first instance, the judge said that he was bound by a previous decision to hold that the employer was negligent - The House of Lords held that whether an employer who did not ensure that workers used protective clothing was negligent was a question of fact in each case and not proposition of law - Is clear when you look at the decision of the case: employer was not negligent as the risk was obvious, the injury unlikely to be serious, and the worker experience. However, on a different set of fact, an employer could be negligent **Matters of law and Fact** - DPP v Johnson (1995) -- illustrate the distinction between matters of law and fact - Deals with Section 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 which provides that 'if a person drives \... a motor vehicle on a road.. after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath... exceeds the prescribed limit, he is guilty of an offence' - Facts: - Mr Johnson was stopped by the police, breathalysed and charged under s5(1) as the breathalyser showed that he was above the limit - A month previously, Mr Johnson's doctor injected him with a pain-relieving drug containing a preservative, benzyl alcohol, which was released intermittently and unevenly, directly into the lunges and which could have affected the breathalyser - Neither Mr Johnson or his doctor knew of the presence of alcohol in his body emanating from the injection -- in effect, it was the injection that had caused him to be over the limit - For the prosecution to succeed, it would be necessary for the court ot make the following findings: - \(1) That the proportion of alcohol in Mr Johns breath exceeded the prescribed limit contrary to s 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 - \(2) That the injection of alcohol into the body is a mode of consumption of alcohol within the definition of s 5 - Proposition 1 is a matter of fact and depends upon the reading (in this case he was given a breathalyser and he was above the limit - **A fact is a statement which depends on the evidence** - Proposition 2 is a point of law, as it determines what constitutes a mode of consumption for the purposes of the Act - **A point of law is a matter of statutory interpretation** (meaning of consumption in this case) - It was held that the meaning of consuming was consuming by mouth but was capable of a variety of meanings **Ratio Decidendi** - Forms part of the judgement of a case and is a proposition of law that is binding - **The Judgement** - Corkery v Carpenter (1951) - Defendant had been pushing their bicycle home along the street while drunk and was convicted of the offence of being drunk in charge of a carriage on the public highway pursuant to s 12 of the Licensing Act 1872 - It is generally necessary for the judge to find **three** things - Decide what the legally relevant or material facts are (ex. defendant was drunk while in charge of a bicycle on a public highway) - State the relevant law (ex. that s 12 of the Licensing Act 1872 makes it an offence to be drunk whole in charge of and 'carriage' on a public highway - Apply the law to the facts in order to decide the outcome of the case (ex. that the defendant was drunk while in charge of a carriage so had committed an offence) - the legal principle in this case that become binding is that a bicycle is a carriage for the purposes of the Licensing Act 1872 and accordingly a person who is in charge of a bicycle while drunk, is guilt of an offence **How to Find the Ratio of a Case** - the proposition of law is the application of the law to the material facts (material facts is the essential facts) - examining Corkery v Carpenter 1951 -- it was material fact that he was in charge of a bicycle - the structure of the judgement will be an important factor in deciding what is the ratio - judges have alternative lines of argument and the ones which they decide to adopt will be an important factor in deciding the ratio - example: - Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) -- claimant's friend bought a bottle of ginger beer in an opaque bottle. Claimant drank some before realising there was a decomposing snail in the bottle. Claimant suffered shock and was later ill. Claimant could not sue for breach of contract as she did not purchase the ginger beer and had no contract with the café. - It was decided that the claimant was entitled to damages from the manufacturer - What is the ratio of this case - The manufacturer owes a duty to take reasonable care that the consumer is not injured by a snail in the bottle of ginger beer - The manufacturer owes a duty to take reasonable care that the consumer is not injured by a foreign body in a container - The manufacturer owes a duty to take reasonable care that the consumer is not injured by defective products - A person owes a duty to take reasonable care that they do not commit any act which they could reasonably foresee as injuring another person - You may have regarded the last one as too wide -- however this is the 'wide ratio' which was actually followed in later cases and formed the basis of the law of negligence - Alternative view is the second last was actually the ratio at the time oof the case - It is not the second one as it makes no different where the snail was **Narrow v Wide** - Rylands v Fletcher (1868) -- material facts and narrow and wide ratios 1. The defendant had a reservoir built on his land 2. A contractor who carried out the work was negligent 3. Water escaped and flooded the claimants mine - Defendant was liable to the claimant for damages - Facts to be considered are 1 and 3, fact 2 is immaterial and by discounting it the House of Lords formulated a **[wide ratio]** based on strict liability for the escape of water - This means that it is irrelevant that the defendant was not at fault in any way for the water escaping and the damages were due to the negligence of the contractor **Difficulties in finding the Ratio** - Very old cases may state no reason for their decision and their authority is then weak - Not all the reasons given for a decision are essential -- subsequent cases may help clarify what is considered to be essential - A subsequent case may decide that there were more than one ratio -- this can occur for one of two reasons - A judge may give more than one reason for their decision because there ar a number of points of law at issue - The court is an appellate court with more than one judge - Another reason why a case may have more than one ratio is that the judges may have reached the same decision (may be a majority decision) but for different reasons - Esso v Commissioners for Customs and Excise (1976) - Majority decision of 4:1 and no more than two of the other judges delivered similar ratio on any point **Obiter Dictum** - A proposition of law stated by the judge which is not necessary for their conclusion - Not binding on future courts but may be persuasive - Proposition may be obiter if it is wider than necessary to decide the particular case - Proposition may be obiter if a judge speculates about the decision they would have made if the facts of the case had been different - Case: Crossley v Rawlinson (1982) - Defendant was driving down the highway, his lorry caught on fire due to his negligence. Defendant pulled over on the roadside. The plaintiff (now claimant), nearby AA patrolman, saw it and ran over to help. While running along a path by the road, the plaintiff tripped over a concealed hole and fell injuring himself. He claimed damages. As the plaintiffs claim as based on the tort of negligence, he had to show that the injuries he suffered were reasonably foreseeable - In the judgement the following is most likely obiter - "thus, if I were answering the question whether in the present case the plaintiffs damage is too remote, my instinctive feeling would be that it is" - The judge was not answering the question whether the damage was too remote; he had to answer the question whether it was reasonably foreseeable -- therefore sentence is obiter - Proposition may be obiter if the judge says what their decision would have been if they had not been bound by judicial precedent - A proposition will generally be regarded as obiter if it forms part of a dissenting judgement **Which courts decisions are binding** - General principle is that all courts are bound by superior courts - Some courts are bound by previous decisions of their own courts - The Supreme Court use to be binding upon itself until the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) 1966 - Austin v Southwark (2011) -- Practice Statement has the same effect in the Supreemt Court as it had in the House of Lords - Miliangos v George Frank Textiles (1976) -- the Practice Statement does not mean that whenever we think a previous decision was wrong we should reverse it - It has been used where the previous decision causes injustice or impedes the development of the law, or itself caused uncertainty. Even where it concludes that the law should be changes, the Supreme Court considers whether departure from the previous decision is the appropriate remedy rather than legislation - R v G (2003) the House of Lords decides that its previous decision in the case of Metropolitan Police Commissioners v Caldwell (1982) was unjust and needed to be changed - Metropolitan Police Commissioners v Caldwell (1982) defendant could be convicted of criminal damage even if they had not foreseen the damage -- House of Lords R v G though that this was unjust stating that conviction of serious crime should depend on proof not simply that the defendant causes an injurious result to another but that their state of mind when so acting was culpable - Austin v Southwark LBC -- Supreme Court refused to depart from a decision of the Court of Appeal in Thompson v Elmbridge Borough Council (1987) which the Supreme Court had upheld in R v Knowsley (2009) **Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd** - Court of Appeal is bound by its own decisions subject to three (3) exceptions - Where its own previous decisions conflict - Where its previous decision has been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court - Where its previous decisions was made per incuriam - **Two further exceptions have been added** - Where it was an interim decision by two judges - Where one of its previous decisions is inconsistent with a subsequent decision of the European Court of Human Rights - Where its own previous decisions conflict - There should never be two or more previous decisions which conflict - Can arise from: - Second case may not be aware of the first case - One of the cases mat have itself been decided per incuriam - Where its previous decision has been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court - This could happen where a case had bypassed the Court of Appeal and gone straight to the Supreme Court (leapfrog) - Where another Court of Appeal case has been expressly overruled without the case in question being cited to the Supreme Court - Where its previous decision was made per incuriam - Per incuriam means **through carelessness --** it is not enough for the previous decision to be wrong - Duke v Reliance Systems Ltd (1988) -- a decision is per incuriam if the court **[must]** have reached a different conclusion not might - Williams v Fawcett (1986) -- the Court of Appeal declared per incuriam several of its previous decisions - Where it was an interim decision by two judges - Boys v Chaplin (1968) - It must be an interim decision -- not a final one - Where one of its previous decisions is inconsistent with the subsequent decision of the European Court of Human Rights - Court of Appeal is free (not obliged) to depart from its decision **Distinguishing cases** - A proposition stated in one case will be binding in a later case only if there are no relevant distinctions between two cases - It is the lkater court which determines for itself both what is the ratio of the earlier case and what are the material facts of the alter case - If a court considers a case before it to be difffernet in some material way from the precedent cited, either on the facts or the law, the earlier case need not be followed - The present case will be distinguished and as a consequence, the later court could decide not to apply the ratio of the earlier case - Corkery v Carpenter 1951 -- used two cases in the judgement where the courts concerned had interpreted the word carriage to exclude bicycles and went on to distinguish them -- Williams v Ellis and Simpson v Teignmouth and Sheldon Bridge Co (1903) - Williams v Ellis - Imposed tolls for 'every horse, mule or other beast drawing any coach, sociable, chariot, berlin, landau, vis-à-vis, phaeton, curricle.. and every carriage of whatever description and for whatever purpose which shall be drawn or impelled or set or kept in motion by steam or other power or agency' -- the court held that bicycle was not caught by those particular words which had to be construed ejusdem generis with the carriages previously specified - Simpson Teignmouth and Sheldon Bridge Co (1903) - Concerned an Act of 1825 which provided for a toll to be paid by 'every coach, chariot, hearse, chaise, berlin, landau. And phaeton, gig. Whiskey, car, chair, or Coburg and every other carriage hung on springs' using a particular bridge -- the court came to the conclusion that a bicycle did not come within any of the words in that section - Able to distinguish both cases by relying on the wording of the statutes, as those case relating to different states from the one which he was considering - The words of the Licensing Act were also wide enough to embrace a bicycle under the expression carriage **Applying and distinguishing a ratio in a subsequent case** - It is essential for any legal system to be able to develop to meet such changes and the judge shave an important role to play in this - Doctrine of Consideration -- established. The principle that a promise will create an enforceable contractual obligation only if something of value is offered in return for that promise - Stilk v Myrick (1809) established that important principle that performance of an existing contractual duty is not good consideration - Plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant who was the ships captain, to sail a ship from London to the Baltic and back -- lost crew members and those remaining were promised by the captain that they'd be paid additional wages if they sail the ship back short-handed. Upon returning to London, the captain refused to pay the plaintiff the additional wages on the basis that the plaintiff had not given any consideration for the promise because he was only doing what he was already contractually obliged to do - Plaintiff sues for extra wages and the court found in the captains favour on the grounds that performance of an existing contractual duty is not good consideration - The Court of Appeal affirmed the earlier case but stated that this decision was a refinement of the principle. Businesses nowadays need to be able to effectively renegotiate terms of a contract -- if a party sees a real practical benefit in the other contracting party performing its contractual obligations and is prepared to pay extra for it , why should that agreed variation not be binding **Avoiding awkward precedents** - Overruling - This occurs when a principle laid down by a lower court is declared incorrect and not followed by a high court in a different later case -- higher court will set a new 'correct' precedent - Departing - A court can depart from an earlier case -- usually occurs where the House of Lords Practice Statement is used or the Court of Appeal applies one of the exceptions set out in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd - Reversing - The occurs where the decision of a court in the same case is altered by a higher court on appeal **Persuasive Decisions** - If a court is not bound by any previous decisions on a point then it is free to reach its own decision however it is entitled to consider that authority and may be persuaded by the reasoning - Decisions of non-binding courts - Obiter dicta - Decisions of the Privy Council - Extremely influential Privy Council decision is that of Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley (2005) - Decisions of foreign courts - Persuasive authority is the US case of Shuey v United States (1874) - Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights - Statements in legal textbooks or periodicals - R v G (2003) -- referred to the work of seven different academic writers