Summary Trial Procedure PDF

**BSB CENTRALLY SET ASSESSMENTS SYLLABUS COVERAGE FOR UNIT 10** **(PLEASE SEE SYLLABUS FOR FULL BCP REFERENCES):** **8. Summary trial procedure** 1. Pre-trial rulings 2. Proceeding in the absence of the defendant 3. Abuse of process in the magistrates' courts 4. Procedural steps in a summa...

**BSB CENTRALLY SET ASSESSMENTS SYLLABUS COVERAGE FOR UNIT 10** **(PLEASE SEE SYLLABUS FOR FULL BCP REFERENCES):** **8. Summary trial procedure** 1. Pre-trial rulings 2. Proceeding in the absence of the defendant 3. Abuse of process in the magistrates' courts 4. Procedural steps in a summary trial, including role of the authorised court officer, the procedure for raising points of law, and the different ways in which evidence may be presented or proved and speeches 5. Submission of no case to answer 6. Verdicts 8\. Summary trial procedure 1\. Examinable material on **pre-trial rulings** will consist of pre-trial hearings and pre-trial rulings. The relevant material is addressed in paragraph D21.35 of Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2025. **[Pre-trial Rulings]** **D21.35** The MCA 1980, s. 8A (see D21.37), applies to cases that are to be tried summarily where the accused has entered a not guilty plea (s. 8 A (1)). For these purposes, a pre-trial hearing is a hearing that takes place before the court begins to hear evidence from the prosecution at the trial. At a pre-trial hearing, the magistrates may decide any question as to the admissibility of evidence and any other question of law relating to the case (s. 8 A (4)). - Such rulings may be made only if the court has given the parties an opportunity to be heard and it appears to the court that it is in the interests of justice to make the ruling (s. 8A(3)(b) and (c)). - If the accused is unrepresented, he or she must be given the chance to apply for legal aid (s. 8 A (5)). - Pre-trial rulings may be made on the application of the defence or prosecution, or of the court\'s own motion (s. 8 A (6)). Under s. 8 B (1), a pre-trial ruling is binding until the case against the accused (or, where there is more than one, against each of them) is disposed of. The case is disposed of if the accused is acquitted or convicted, or the prosecutor decides not to proceed with the case, or the case is dismissed (s. 8 B (2)). However, under s. 8 B (3), the court may (on application by a party or of its own motion) discharge or vary a pre-trial ruling provided it appears to the court that it is in the interests of justice to do so, and the court has given the parties an opportunity to be heard. - A party can apply for the ruling to be discharged or varied only if there has been a material change of circumstances since the ruling was made or, if there has been a previous application under s. 8B, since that application was made (s. 8 B (5)). In *R (CPS) v Gloucester Justices* \[2008\] EWHC 1488 (Admin), MacKay J, considering the power of the magistrates\' court to vary the pre-trial ruling of its own motion, made the point that it is difficult to accept that it could be in the interests of justice for the court to annul or discharge its own ruling without a compelling reason to do so, such as changed circumstances or fresh evidence; it is not sufficient that a different bench reaches a different conclusion on the same material (at \[12\]). In Newham, McCullough J (at p. 947D--E) had also said that review of a decision \'will be permissible if a change of circumstances has occurred since the original decision was taken\' or \'if circumstances are brought to the attention of the court which, although existing when the original decision was taken, were not then drawn to the attention of the court\'. 2\. Examinable material on **proceeding to trial in the absence of the defendant** will consist of trial in the absence of the accused, failure of parties or witnesses to appear, power to adjourn, the court's powers and procedure with regard to trial in the absence of the accused, determining whether to proceed to trial in the accused's absence, and warrant for arrest. The relevant material is addressed in Crim PR rule 24.12 (procedure where a party is absent) and in paragraphs D5.46, D22.12, D22.14, D22.17 and D22.19 of Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2025. Crim PR Rule 24.12 **[Trial in the Absence of the Accused]** **D5.46** If the accused fails to appear for the trial in the magistrates\' court, the case may (if the accused is under 18) or must (if the accused has attained the age of 18 and it does not appear to the court to be contrary to the interests of justice to do so) proceed in the accused\'s absence (MCA 1980, s. 11(1); see also CrimPR 24.12(3): see Supplement, R24.12). However, where the prosecution commenced by issue of a summons or requisition, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court that either the summons (or requisition, as the case may be) was served a reasonable time before the hearing or the accused appeared on a previous occasion to answer the charge (MCA 1980, s. 11(2)). **[FAILURE OF PARTIES OR WITNESSES TO APPEAR: Power to ADJOURN]** **D22.12** If the one or both of the parties is absent, or witnesses fail to attend, the court must consider what action to take. If the trial does not proceed on the appointed day, the court may adjourn the case (under the MCA 1980, s. 10(1)). Under s. 10(2), the court may either set the date for the hearing to resume when it adjourns the case or, unless it also remands the accused (in which case a date must be fixed), leave the time and place to be determined. The trial can resume only where the court is satisfied that the parties have had adequate notice; if the accused was not present when the case was adjourned, it will therefore be necessary to send the accused an adjournment notice. **[Trial in the absence of the accused: POWERS AND PROCEDURE]** **D22.14** Under the MCA 1980, s. 11(1)(b), if, at the time and place appointed for the trial, the prosecutor appears but the accused does not, and the accused has attained the age of 18, the court must proceed in the absence of the accused \'unless it appears to the court to be contrary to the interests of justice to do so\'. However, where proceedings were commenced by summons or by written charge and requisition then (unless the accused has appeared on a previous occasion in answer to the summons or requisition) it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the summons (or requisition) was served on the accused a reasonable time before the hearing. Where the case has previously been adjourned (under the MCA 1980, s. 10(1)), it is necessary to satisfy the court that the accused has had \'adequate notice\' of the adjournment date (MCA 1980, s. 10(2)) or, as it is expressed in CrimPR 24.12(3)(b)(ii), \'reasonable notice\' of when and where the hearing would resume. If the accused does not appear and the conditions for proceeding in his or her absence are satisfied, a not guilty plea is entered on behalf of the accused (CrimPR 24.12(3). - The burden is then on the prosecution to prove the case to the normal criminal standard, whether by calling oral evidence or by reading statements served on the accused under the CJA 1967, s. 9. - Should the prosecution evidence turn out to be insufficient, the court is of course obliged to acquit the accused. - Assuming, however, that the case is proved, the court may either proceed immediately to sentence or, in certain circumstances, it may adjourn to give the accused notice to attend for sentencing (MCA 1980, s. 10(3)). **[Determining whether to proceed to trial in accused's absence]** **D22.17** Section 11(2A) makes it clear that \'the court shall not proceed in the absence of the accused if it considers that there is an acceptable reason for his failure to appear\'; however, s. 11(6) provides that the court is not required to inquire into the reasons for the accused\'s failure to appear before deciding whether to proceed in his or her absence. - Section 11(7) requires the court to state in open court its reasons for not proceeding in the absence of an accused who has attained the age of18 and who fails to attend (see also CrimPR 24.12(3)). The court should take into account: - any reasons for absence that are put forward; - the \'reliability of the information supplied in support of those reasons\'; - the date when the reasons for absence became known to the accused and what the accused did thereafter; - that trial in absence can and sometimes does result in acquittal; - that an accused who is convicted can ask (by applying under the MCA 1980, s. 142) that the conviction be reopened in the interests of justice, for example if absence was involuntary; - and that an accused who is convicted has a right to a rehearing on appeal to the Crown Court. **[Warrant for Arrest]** **D22.19** Under the MCA 1980, s. 13(1), where the court, instead of proceeding in the absence of the accused, adjourns or further adjourns the trial, it has the option of issuing an arrest warrant, provided that the offence in question is punishable with imprisonment, or the court, having convicted the accused, proposes to impose a disqualification. - For this provision to apply, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the summons or requisition was served on the accused within a reasonable time before the trial (s. 13(2A)), unless the current adjournment is a second or subsequent adjournment of the trial, the accused was present on the last occasion when the trial was adjourned and the date for the present hearing was fixed then (s. 13(2B)). 3\. Examinable material on **abuse of process in the magistrates' courts** will consist of the court's discretion not to proceed on account of delay, and the effect of delay. The relevant material is addressed in paragraph D21.21 of Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2025. **[Discretion not to proceed on account of delay: EFFECT OF DELAY]** **D21.21** Even where proceedings were commenced within time, a magistrates\' court has a discretion to refuse to try a case, and so to acquit the accused without trial, if there has been delay amounting to an abuse of the process of the court (Brentford Justices, ex parte Wong \[1981\] QB 445). Where the delay is deliberate, it is likely to amount to an abuse of process, as in *Brentford Justices, ex parte Wong,* where the prosecutor deliberately delayed in effecting service of the summons in order to gain more time in which to decide whether or not to continue the case against the accused. Where deliberate delay in bringing the case to court cannot be shown, the defence may nonetheless apply for the magistrates to exercise their discretion not to proceed if: i. there has been inordinate or unconscionable delay due to the prosecution\'s inefficiency, and ii. prejudice to the defence from the delay is either proved or to be inferred (per Lloyd LJ in Gateshead Justices, ex parte Smith (1985) 149 JP 681). If, however, the delay was in part attributable to the accused\'s own conduct, an application to stay is unlikely to succeed. 4\. Examinable material on the **procedural steps in a summary trial** will consist of procedure on plea of not guilty, the start of the trial, the prosecution opening speech, witnesses whom the prosecution must call, written evidence at summary trial, formal admissions, objections to prosecution evidence (including objections to admissibility under section 78 and section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984), closing speeches and the role of the justices' legal adviser. The relevant material is addressed in Crim PR rule 24.3, paragraphs D22.37, D22.38, D22.39, D22.40 (first four lines, up to "... under the CJA 1967, s.9."), D22.42-22.43, D22.45, D22.46 (first five lines of the first sub-paragraph up to "... on the obtaining of the confession."), D22.62 and D22.79-22.80 of Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2025. Crim PR rule 24.3 **[COURSE OF THE TRIAL: START of the Trial]** **D22.37** If a plea was not entered on an earlier occasion, the accused is asked to enter a plea. If the accused entered a not guilty plea on an earlier occasion, he or she will be asked to confirm that plea. **[The PROSECUTION case: OPENING SPEECH]** **D22.38** Assuming the accused pleads not guilty, the prosecution representative has the right to make an opening speech (CrimPR 24.3(3)(a); see Supplement, R24.3). The purpose of the prosecutor\'s summary of the prosecution case is to explain briefly what the case is about. CrimPR 24.3(3)(b) states that, in order to help the members of the court to understand the case and resolve any issue in it, the court (immediately after the prosecution opening) may invite the accused \'concisely to identify what is in issue\'. **[The PROSECUTION case: WITNESSES whom the PROSECUTION MUST CALL]** **D22.39** Where a prosecution witness attends court to give evidence in a summary trial, the prosecutor is obliged to call that witness to give evidence if the defence so requests, or at least tender the witness for cross-examination. If, as should happen, the prosecutor serves a bundle of witness statements on the defence prior to summary trial, the prosecution must call as witnesses all the people whose statements have been served, unless any of the exceptions which relate to Crown Court trials (see Russell-Jones \[1995\] 1 Cr App R 538)are applicable. If the prosecution choose not to call a particular witness, the court cannot compel the prosecutor to call that witness. However, if the court is satisfied that the prosecution are so conducting the case that the accused cannot obtain a fair trial, the court has the power to dismiss the case as an abuse of process. In Barton v DPP \[2024\] EWHC 1350 (Admin), Dame Victoria Sharp P said (at \[47\]) that: **[WRITTEN EVIDENCE AT SUMMARY TRIAL: CJA 1967 S9 -- FORMAL ADMISSIONS]** **D22.40 (first four lines, up to "... under the CJA 1967, s.9.")** A party wishing to tender a written statement as evidence at a summary trial rather than calling the maker of the statement may make use of the provisions of the CJA 1967, s. 9 (see D22.41). CrimPR Part 16 (see Supplement, R16.1 et seq.) governs the use of witness statements under the CJA 1967, s. 9. **[FORMAL ADMISSIONS]** **D22.42** Where a party introduces into evidence a fact admitted by another party or the parties jointly admit a fact (e.g., where a formal admission is made --- usually by the accused --- under the CJA 1967, s. 10 (see F1.2)), a written record must, unless the court otherwise directs, be made of the admission. In Drummond \[2020\] EWCA Crim 267, the Court of Appeal considered the difference between statements being read by consent (under the CJA 1967, s. 9) and formal admissions (under s. 10), observing (at \[58\]) that: **[OBJECTIONS TO PROSECUTION EVIDENCE]** **D22.43** The procedure to be followed where the defence object, during the course of a summary trial, to proposed prosecution evidence (or have some other preliminary point of law to argue before the magistrates) raises the difficulty that the magistrates are the judges of both fact and law. Especially if the issue is one of admissibility of evidence, there is a danger that the magistrates will learn the nature of the evidence in the course of hearing arguments about its admissibility. Should they then rule it inadmissible, they may have difficulty in ignoring it when reaching a verdict. This problem is mitigated to some extent by the availability of pre-trial rulings (see D21.35) but these will not avail where issues of admissibility are raised for the first time during the course of trial itself. The stage of the trial at which the magistrates rule upon a question of admissibility of evidence (or other incidental issue) is a matter for their discretion (F v Chief Constable of Kent \[1982\] Crim LR 682). - However, delaying the determination of a question of admissibility of a confession until after the conclusion of the prosecution evidence may be unfair to the defence, in that the accused will not be able to give evidence about alleged irregularities in the obtaining of the confession unless he or she testifies (thus becoming exposed to cross-examination about the general issues). **[POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984, S78]** **D22.45** Whereas under the PACE 1984, s. 76 (see D22.46), the court is obliged to hear evidence about the obtaining of the confession (as the prosecution have to prove that the confession was not obtained in the manner forbidden by s. 76), where the admissibility of prosecution evidence falls to be considered under the general exclusionary power in s. 78, the court has a discretion to hear evidence on the issue of admissibility but is not obliged to do so (and so may rule on the matter following submissions on behalf of the parties). In Vel v Chief Constable of North Wales (1987) 151 JP 510, Lloyd LJ said that, in some cases, the justices should deal with an application to exclude evidence when it arises, but in other cases they may leave the decision until the end of the hearing. Nonetheless, his lordship said that it was impossible to lay down any general rule, other than that \'the object should always be to secure a trial which is fair and just to both sides\'. In Halawa v Federation Against Copyright Theft \[1995\] 1 Cr App R 21, the Divisional Court said that, in most cases, it is generally better for the magistrates to hear all the prosecution evidence (including the disputed evidence) before considering an application to exclude evidence under s. 78 (per Gibson LJ at p. 34). This does of course leave the justices with the very difficult (some might say impossible) task of putting from their minds prejudicial evidence that they have heard but then decide is inadmissible. **[POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984, S76]** **D22.46 (first five lines of the first sub-paragraph up to "... on the obtaining of the confession.")** Where the defence object to the admissibility of a confession on the basis of the PACE 1984, s. 76, the **terms of s. 76 require that the court shall not admit the confession unless satisfied that it was not obtained by oppression or by words or conduct likely to render a confession unreliable**. It follows that magistrates (just like the Crown Court) are obliged to hear evidence on the obtaining of the confession. **[DEFENCE Case and Speeches: CLOSING SPEECHES]** **D22.62** CrimPR 24.3(3)(h) (see Supplement, R24.3) provides that (after the defence have adduced any evidence they wish and after any rebuttal evidence), the prosecutor \'may make final representations in support of the prosecution case\' (i.e. a closing speech) if the accused is represented or (whether represented or not) the accused has called evidence other than his or her own testimony. Under r. 24.3(3)(i), the accused may then \'make final representations in support of the defence case\' (in other words, make a closing speech). Thus, if any prosecution representations are made, the accused is given the chance to reply, and so will always have the last word before the magistrates consider their verdict. Rule 24.3(4), makes it clear that, if a party wishes to introduce evidence or make representations after the specified opportunity to do so under r. 24.3(3), the court is entitled to refuse to receive any such evidence or representations. It is submitted that the court should refuse to receive additional evidence or representations save in the most exceptional circumstances. **[ROLE OF JUSTICES' LEGAL ADVISER ]** **D22.79** To give effect to the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018, CrimPR 2.2 and 2.4 (see Supplement, R2.2 and R2.4) refer to an \'authorised court officer\'. The qualifications and appointment of authorised court officers are described at D3.28. However, CrimPR2.12 and 24.14 (see Supplement, R2.12 and R24.14) refer to the \'justice\' legal adviser\' (a title that is now used instead of the traditional expression, \'justices\' clerk\'). **D22.80** The statutory functions of justices\' legal advisers are set out in the Courts Act 2003, s. 28(1), which empowers the Lord Chief Justice to authorise a person:  (a)     to give advice to justices of the peace about matters of law (including procedure and practice) on questions arising in connection with the discharge of their functions, including questions arising when the person is not personally attending on them, and  (b)     to bring to the attention of justices of the peace, at any time when the person thinks appropriate, any point of law (including procedure and practice) that is or may be involved in any question so arising. The adviser should provide the court with any legal advice that it needs to carry out its functions (whether the court asks for that advice or not), including advice about: - questions of law, or of mixed law and fact; - matters of practice and procedure; - relevant judicial decisions that bind the court; - the process to be followed in order to reach a decision, and when sentencing; - the range of penalties and orders available when sentencing, and the matters to be taken into account, in accordance with any relevant sentencing guideline. The adviser may ask questions of a party or witness on the court\'s behalf to clarify representations and evidence. Where a party has no legal representative, the adviser should assist that party to understand what the court requires and why; to provide information required by the court to prepare for trial or to carry out its other functions; and (if necessary) to make representations to the court or to give evidence. Rule 2.12(5) makes the important point that in performing these functions, the adviser must avoid the appearance of advocacy for a party; and must \'adhere to the same principles that apply to courts of independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, competence, diligence and ensuring fair treatment\'. CrimPR 24.14 (see Supplement, R24.14) provides a further summary of the duties of the justices\' legal adviser during the trial and/or sentencing hearing. These include: - drawing the court\'s attention, before the hearing begins, to the prosecution allegations, what is agreed and what is in dispute, and what the parties have said about how they expect to present their cases; whenever necessary, giving the court legal advice (and, if necessary, attending the members of the court outside the courtroom to give such advice, so long as the parties are informed of any advice given outside the courtroom); - assisting the court in the formulation of its reasons and the recording of those reasons; - assisting the accused if unrepresented; - and assisting the court by making a note of the substance of any oral evidence or representations, marking as inadmissible any parts of written statements introduced in evidence that are ruled inadmissible; ensuring that a record is kept of the court\'s decisions and the reasons for them, and making any announcement (other than of the verdict or sentence). 5\. Examinable material on making a submission of no case to answer will consist of submissions of no case to answer, the extent to which the court may have regard to the credibility of prosecution witnesses, and the prosecution right of reply. The relevant material is addressed in paragraphs D22.51-22.53 of Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2025. **[SUBMISSION OF NO CASE TO ANSWER]** **D22.51** Under CrimPR 24.3(3)(d) (see Supplement, R24.3) the magistrates may acquit the accused on the ground that the prosecution evidence is insufficient for any reasonable court properly to convict. They may do so following an application by the defence or on their own initiative but, in either case, the prosecutor must be given an opportunity to make representations. Thus, at the close of the prosecution evidence, the defence may submit that there is no case to answer. Rule 24.3(3)(d) sets out the basis for the decision, namely that no reasonable court could properly convict. Thus, the decision depends not on whether the justices would at that stage convict or acquit but on whether the evidence is such that a reasonable tribunal might convict. If a reasonable tribunal might convict on the evidence so far laid before it, there is a case to answer. **[CREDIBILITY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ]** **D22.52** An important issue is the extent to which justices may have regard to the credibility of prosecution witnesses when considering a submission of no case to answer. In the Crown Court, the test to be applied by the judge when ruling on a submission of no case (set out in ***Galbraith*** \[1981\] 2 All ER 1060) is whether the prosecution evidence is so tenuous that, even taken at its highest, a jury properly directed could not properly convict on it. The requirement that the Crown Court judge should \'take the prosecution evidence at its highest\' is intended to leave questions of credibility to the jury. **[Submission of no case to answer -- PROSECUTION RIGHT OF REPLY ]** **D22.53** When the justices are provisionally minded to uphold the submission of no case to answer, they should first call on the prosecution to address them (Barking and Dagenham Justices, ex parte DPP (1995) 159 JP 373), so that the prosecutor has an opportunity to address the court to show why the case should not be dismissed. This means that the prosecution have the right to reply to the defence submission that there is no case to answer unless, having heard the defence submission, the magistrates decide to rule that there is a case to answer and indicate this fact to the prosecutor. 6\. Examinable material on verdicts will consist of the court's duty to give reasons, the circumstances in which the court may find the defendant guilty of a lesser offence, and alternative offences. The relevant material is addressed in paragraphs D22.69-22.71 (first sentence ending "\... should not convict of both offences.") of Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2025. **[DECIDING ON THE ISSUE OF GUILT: Manner of arriving at and announcing decision -- DUTY TO GIVE REASONS]** **D22.69** CrimPR 24.3(5) (see Supplement, R24.3) provides that the court, if it convicts the accused (or makes a hospital order instead of doing so), must give \'sufficient reasons to explain its decision\'. However, the justices are not required to state their reasons in the form of a judgment or to give reasons in any elaborate form. That can usually be done in a few simple sentences.\' However, great care must be taken when formulating those reasons. For example, in JS (A Child) v DPP \[2017\] EWHC 1162 (Admin), D was charged with the offence of tampering with a motor vehicle. The magistrates convicted him, saying that D \'did not say anything to persuade us that he did not tamper with the moped\' and they were therefore \'sure\' that he was guilty. The conviction was quashed. The words used by the magistrates created the impression that they had convicted D because he had not proved his innocence (thus reversing the burden of proof). If the court acquits the accused, it may (but is not required to) give an explanation of its decision (CrimPR 24.3(6)(a)). **[Guilty of a lesser offence]** **D22.70** The justices are restricted to reaching a decision of guilty or not guilty on the charge actually before them. They have no power to find an accused not guilty as charged but guilty of a lesser offence. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this rule. For example, the RTOA 1988, s. 24, enables magistrates, whenever trying certain driving offences, to find the accused not guilty of the offence charged, but guilty of another specified driving offence (e.g., convicting the accused of careless driving instead of dangerous driving, even though the only charge before the court is one of dangerous driving; see also C2.8). Similarly, the Theft Act 1968, s. 12A(5), provides that an accused who is charged with aggravated vehicle taking may instead be convicted of the lesser offence of vehicle taking contrary to s. 12; s. 12A(5) applies to summary trials as well as to trials on indictment **[Alternative offences]** **D22.71 (first sentence ending "\... should not convict of both offences.")** If the accused is charged with alternative offences at the outset and pleads not guilty to both, the magistrates should not convict of both offences. Note The following are the specific statutory provisions with which students should be familiar (and able to refer to by section number): sections 9 and 10 Criminal Justice Act 1967. The following is the specific leading case authority with which students should be familiar (and should be able to refer to by name): Galbraith \[1981\] 2 All ER 1060.