Unification Of India 2 (PDF)

Unification of India  Junagadh  Junagadh was the premier State in the group of Kathiawar States.  The State had no contiguity with Pakistan by land and its distance by sea, from Port Veraval to Karachi, was about 300 miles. The population of Junagadh was 6,70,719 of whom over 80 p...

Unification of India  Junagadh  Junagadh was the premier State in the group of Kathiawar States.  The State had no contiguity with Pakistan by land and its distance by sea, from Port Veraval to Karachi, was about 300 miles. The population of Junagadh was 6,70,719 of whom over 80 percent were Hindus.  Parts of States which had acceded to the Indian Dominion were interspersed with Junagadh territory.  Access to these as well as to certain areas belonging to Baroda State was only possible through Junagadh.  Within its borders were Hindu and Jain religious shrines which have attracted pilgrims from all over India.  Its railways and posts and telegraphs were an integral part of the Indian system. The railway police, telegraph and telephones were administered by the Government of India.  The Nawab was Mahabat khan. He was an eccentric of rare vintage.  His chief preoccupation in life was dogs, of which he owned hundreds.  He carried his love for dogs to such lengths that he once organized a wedding of two of his pets, over which he spent a huge sum of money and in honor of which he proclaimed a State holiday.  At the meeting of rulers on 25 July which was addressed by Lord Mountbatten, Junagadh was represented by Nabi Baksh, the Constitutional Adviser to the Nawab and brother of the Dewan.  He put several questions to Lord Mountbatten which were answered fully and frankly. Nabi Baksh told Lord Mountbatten, whom he met privately afterwards, that his intention was to advise the Nawab that Junagadh should accede to India. He gave the same impression to the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar and to Sardar whom he met during his stay in Delhi.  Gradually Shah Nawaz Bhutto, a Muslim League politician of Karachi, became the Dewan of Junagadh. The Nawab soon came under the influence of the Muslim League.  The Instrument of Accession was sent to the Nawab for signature; when India received no reply up to 12 August 1947, telegrams were sent to the Nawab and the Dewan reminding them that the last date for the receipt of intimation of signing of the Instrument of Accession was 14 August, and requesting an immediate reply.  On 13 August, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, replied that the matter was under consideration.  Shah Nawaz called a conference of leading citizens.  The memorandum analyzed the dangers that would accrue to the State if it decided to accede to Pakistan.  Apart from its geographical position and the fact that the overwhelming majority of the people were Hindus, the premier status of Junagadh in Kathiawar would be lost  the trade routes would be circumscribed; commerce and industry would be crippled and there would be an immense loss of revenue to the State.  After this drama, Junagadh declared on 15th August their decision to join Pakistan. The Government of Junagadh has during the past few weeks been faced with the problem of making its choice between accession to the Dominion of India and accession to the Dominion of Pakistan……After anxious consideration and the careful balancing of all factors the Government of the State has decided to accede to Pakistan and hereby announces its decision to that effect. The State is confident that its decision will be welcomed by all loyal subjects of the State who have its real welfare and prosperity at heart.  The decision was not even communicated to the Government of India. The first intimation was a report appearing in the newspapers of 17 August. GOI wired immediately to the Dewan for confirmation and the next day he telegraphed that Junagadh had acceded to Pakistan.  This came as a surprise to the Government of India.  The Nawab's action would have undesirable effects on law and order in Kathiawar as a whole.  It would extend the communal trouble to areas where at present there was peace.  It would embolden Hyderabad also as Kasim Razvi, the Razakar leader of Hyderabad, said: 'Why is Sardar thundering about Hyderabad when he cannot control even little Junagadh?'  India contacted the High Commissioner of Pakistan in India pointing out the considerations of Junagadh's geographical contiguity, the composition of its population, and the need for consulting the views of the people with regard to accession.  Pakistan did not reply for 15 days. A reminder was sent on 6 September but even that brought no response.  On 12 September Nehru suggested that a telegram be sent to Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, indicating the Government of India's willingness to accept and abide by the verdict of the people of Junagadh in respect of the accession of the State to either of the Dominions. Mountbatten also sent his concerns.  Nevertheless, the Government of Pakistan telegraphed on 13 September that they had accepted Junagadh's accession and had also signed a Standstill Agreement.  Why was Junagadh so bold?  Jinnah had assured that he would not allow Junagadh to starve as 'Veraval is not far from Karachi.’  The rulers of the other States in Kathiawar condemned the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan with one voice.  The Jam Saheb of Nawanagar issued a number of statements condemning the accession and stressing the integrity of Kathiawar.  The rulers of Bhavnagar, Morbi, Gondal, Dhrangadhra, Porbander and Wankaner also made spirited protests.  The Nawab replied after a few days: The Indian Independence Act did not and does not require a ruler to consult his people before deciding on Accession. I think we are making an unnecessary fetish of the argument of geographical contiguity. Even then, this is sufficiently provided by Junagadh's sea coast with several ports which can keep connection with Pakistan.  The Jam Saheb of Nawanagar came to Delhi and made it quite clear to the States Ministry that the rulers and people of Kathiawar were greatly agitated over this attempt on the part of Pakistan to encroach into Indian territory.  He brought many stories of harassment of the Hindu population of Junagadh and he said how difficult it was to restrain the people of Kathiawar from retaliation.  The States in Kathiawar had so far been able to maintain peace and order but their patience was already overstrained.  The Jam Saheb pointed out that, unless the Government of India took immediate and effective steps to assure continued protection to the Kathiawar States, they would lose faith in the will and ability of the Indian Dominion to carry out all the obligations arising from their accession to India.  There was also a possibility that Pakistan was playing games. Victim Card.  Therefore, Lord Mountbatten, Nehru, Sardar and Menon talked.  On 17 September the Cabinet decided that, with a view to ensuring the security of the country and to maintaining law and order in Kathiawar, Indian troops and troops of acceding States should be suitably dispersed around Junagadh, but should not occupy Junagadh territory.  It was also decided that Menon should visit Junagadh and make a final attempt to persuade the Nawab.  As Menon reached Junagadh, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, came to see him.  He told him that he had an important personal message for the Nawab from the Indian Cabinet. The Dewan said that the Nawab had been in bed for the past ten days and was not fit to see anyone.  Menon again emphasized that the message was most important and was meant to be delivered personally to the Nawab and that even if he was indisposed he would like to see him for a few minutes.  Sir Shah Nawaz replied that the Nawab's condition was such that it was absolutely impossible for to see him.  It did not come as a surprise, as Menon had been warned at Rajkot that the Nawab would avoid meeting him.  As the next best thing, menon tried to see the heir-apparent, but Sir Shah Nawaz said that even this was not possible, because the Prince was very busy with a cricket match!  Menon felt that it was useless to continue the conversation further and that he was merely wasting his time. He told Shah Nawaz that the people of Kathiawar decided to take the law into their own hands it would mean the end of the Nawab's dynasty.  Menon then went to Mumbai where he met U N Dhebar and Samaldas Gandhi.  They stressed that the Junagadh issue was a most vital one. The whole prestige of the Government would suffer badly.  Dhebar told that the situation in Kathiawar was highly explosive and that none of the leaders were in a position to hold the people in leash for long.  Samaldas Gandhi said that the people were prepared to take the law into their own hands and that they would organize themselves and march on Junagadh.  Menon explained to them the difficulties of the Government of India and how any action on their part would affect Indo-Pakistan relations.  On Menon’s return to Delhi, Buch telephoned from Rajkot and conveyed that Junagadh sent troops into Babariawad.  Lord Mountbatten, Nehru, Sardar, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy resolved that a telegram should be sent to the Dewan of Junagadh pointing out the constitutional position of Babariawad and Mangrol and demanding that Junagadh troops should be withdrawn forthwith from Babariawad. The telegram was sent the same day.  The Commanders-in-Chief were asked to prepare of an operation designed to occupy.  On 25 September, a telegram was received from the Prime Minister of Pakistan re- asserting that the Nawab of Junagadh had every right to accede to Pakistan regardless of the State's territorial location.  Regarding a plebiscite, the telegram said it was a matter between the Nawab of Junagadh and his subjects.  Simultaneously, the Dewan refused to withdraw the Junagadh forces from Babariawad.  Sardar's view of the matter was that Junagadh's action in sending troops to Babariawad and refusing to withdraw them was no less than an act of aggression which must be met by a show of strength.  Lord Mountbatten suggested that the question might be referred to the United Nations Organization, but Sardar was opposed to the idea.  It was finally decided that the military movements to the borders should be undertaken but within Indian territory.  The situation in Junagadh had worsened by now. More than a hundred thousand Hindus had already fled from the State.  Brigadier Gurdial Singh was in command of the force, which was known as the Kathiawar Defence Force (or K.D.F.).  The States of Nawanagar, Bhavnagar and Porbander had agreed to our request to place their State forces under the command of Gurdial Singh.  The Army Commander had strict orders not to violate Junagadh territory in any way.  Days and Months were passing by, Pakistan was biding time. It was neither asking the Junagadh troops to step back from Mangrol and Babariawad nor talking about plebiscite.  In the unsettled conditions, the traders refused to risk any business with Junagadh.  The food situation had deteriorated considerably in spite of some help given by Pakistan. The revenues of the State had also substantially decreased.  The Nawab realized that events were not going as he had anticipated; and he decided on flight.  Towards the end of October, he left for Karachi with most of the members of his family, some of his dogs and much of the family jewellery.  He was in such a hurry that he left behind one his begums and his son.  The Nawab took with him the entire cash balances of the State and all the shares and securities in the treasury.  On 27 October, Shah Nawaz Bhutto wrote a letter to Jinnah, describing Junagadh’s condition. Our principal sources of revenue, railways and customs, have gone to the bottom. Food situation is terribly embarrassing though Pakistan has come to our rescue with a generous allotment of food grains…... Muslims of Kathiawar seem to have lost all enthusiasm for Pakistan.  On 5 November the Junagadh State Council held a meeting and it was decided that they need to rethink their decision and if possible reverse their decision.  The Dewan was authorized 'to negotiate with the proper authorities.'  Finally, on 8 November, Shah Nawaz wrote the following letter ……The Junagadh Government, therefore, have requested that in order to avoid bloodshed, hardship, loss of life and property and to preserve the dynasty, you should be approached to give your assistance to the administration….  On 9 November, Resident Buch was asked to take over the administration.  The administration was handed over peacefully at 6 p.m. on 9 November.  The Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, had left for Karachi the previous day.  Civil officers, accompanied by detachments of police or troops, went to important places in the State and took over control peacefully.  There was not a single untoward incident.  As soon as normal conditions were restored, the Government of India decided to hold a referendum.  The polling took place on 20 February 1948 and out of the total of 2,01,457 registered voters, 1,90,870 exercised their franchise.  Of this number only 91 cast their votes in favour of accession to Pakistan.  Jammu and Kashmir  Lt.-General Maharajah Sir Hari Singh, who was the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir at the time of the transfer of power, ascended the gaddi on 23 September 1925.  At the time of the partition, the State had important international boundaries.  To the east was Tibet, to the north-east lay the Sinkiang province of China and to the north- west was Afghanistan.  Though the Muslims formed the largest community in the State, there were complaints that the majority of the posts both in the Government and the Army were being held by Hindus.  In 1932, the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, with Sheikh Abdullah as its moving spirit, was established to fight for the rights of the Muslim community.  By 1939 this body shed its communal complexion and changed its name into the 'National Conference'  After the announcement of the June 3rd plan, when Lord Mountbatten was discussing the policy of accession of the Indian States to one Dominion or the other, he became particularly concerned about Kashmir.  Here was a State with the biggest area in India, with a population predominantly Muslim, ruled over by a Hindu Maharajah.  The Government of Jammu and Kashmir then announced their intention of negotiating Standstill Agreements with both India and Pakistan. Pakistan signed a Standstill Agreement.  But India wanted time to examine its implications. The state was left alone.  The Maharajah was not asked to accede, though, at that time, as a result of the Radcliffe Award, the State had become connected by road with India.  Even after the execution of the Standstill Agreement, the relations between Kashmir and Pakistan were far from cordial.  The Government of Jammu and Kashmir complained that, in an effort to coerce the State into acceding, the Pakistan authorities had cut off the supply of food, petrol and other essential commodities, and hindered the free transit of travelers between Kashmir and Pakistan.  In fact, India sent essential supplies to survive.  Military pressure was also applied by Pakistan in the form of hit-and-run border raids.  Kashmir state troops was not adequate to resist the Pakistani attack.  The all-out invasion of Kashmir started on 22 October 1947.  The main attackers group had approximately two hundred to three hundred trucks/lorries, and which consisted of frontier tribesmen estimated at five thousand — Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Swathis, and soldiers of the Pakistan Army 'on leave'—led by some regular officers who knew Kashmir well advanced from Abbottabad in the N.W.F.P. along the Jhelum Valley Road.  They arrived at the gates of Muzaffarabad.  The State battalion, consisting of Muslims and Dogras stationed at Muzaffarabad, was commanded by Lt.-Colonel Narain Singh.  All the Muslims in the battalion deserted; shot Narain Singh and joined the raiders, and acted as advance-guard for the attackers.  Interestingly, only a few days before Lt.-Colonel Narain Singh had been asked by the Maharajah whether he could rely on the loyalty of the Muslim half of his battalion. He unhesitatingly answered, 'More than on the Dogras'.  The raiders then marched towards Baramula along the road leading to Srinagar, their next destination being Uri.  By now, all the Muslims in the State Forces had deserted and many had joined the raiders.  When Brigadier Rajinder Singh, the Chief of Staff of the State Forces, heard of the desertion of the Muslim personnel and the advance of the raiders, he gathered together approximately 150 men and moved towards Uri.  There he engaged the raiders for two days and destroyed the Uri bridge. The Brigadier himself and all his men were cut to pieces in this action  The raiders continued to advance and on 24 October they captured the Mahura Power House, which supplied electricity to Srinagar.  Srinagar was plunged in darkness.  The raiders had announced that they would reach Srinagar on 26 October in time for the Id celebrations at the Srinagar mosque.  On the evening of 24 October the Government of India received a desperate appeal for help from the Maharajah.  On the morning of 25 October a meeting of the Defence Committee was held, presided over by Lord Mountbatten.  This Committee considered the request of the Maharajah for arms and ammunition as also for reinforcements of troops.  Lord Mountbatten emphasized that no reactionary action should be taken until the Government of India had fuller information.  To take stock of the situation, Menon was sent to Kashmir.  When the plane carrying Menon and Army Chiefs landed, the atmosphere in Srinagar was gloomy.  The delegation went to meet Prime Minister Mehar Chand Mahajan of Kashmir. He pleaded for the Government of India to come to the rescue of the State.  All of them then went to meet the Maharaja Hari Singh  Maharaja was also helpless as practically no State Force was left and the raiders had almost reached the outskirts of Baramula. At this rate they would be in Srinagar in another day or two.  The first thing to be done was to get the Maharajah and his family out of Srinagar because the Maharajah was helpless and if the Government of India decided not to go to his rescue, there was no doubt that he would be killed.  Maharaja was asked to leave immediately for Jammu and to take with him his family and his valuable possessions.  That night as Menon was going for rest at the state guest house, Prime Minister Mahajan rang him up to say that there were rumors that the raiders had infiltrated into Srinagar and that it would be unsafe for them to remain any longer in the city.  The Maharajah had taken away all the available cars and the only transport available was an old jeep. In this jeep, Prime Minister Mahajan, Menon and six or seven air crew travelled to the airport.  The team arrived at Delhi and went straight to a meeting of the Defence Committee.  The report to save Kashmir from the attackers was presented.  Lord Mountbatten said that it would be improper to move Indian troops into what was at the moment an independent country, as Kashmir had not yet decided to accede to either India or Pakistan.  If it were true that the Maharajah was now anxious to accede to India, then Jammu and Kashmir should become part of Indian territory.  This was the only basis on which Indian troops could be sent to the rescue of the State from further pillaging by the aggressors.  The delegation again flew to Jammu where the Maharaja was staying. Maharaja was asleep and he was informed about the decision taken by the defense committee in Delhi.  He was ready to accede at once. He also signed the Instrument of Accession.  With the Instrument of Accession menon flew back to Delhi. Sardar was waiting at the aerodrome and both went straight to a meeting of the Defence Committee which was arranged for that evening.  There was a long discussion, at the end of which it was decided that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted, subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in the State when the law and order situation allowed.  It was further decided that an infantry battalion should be flown to Srinagar the next day.  Never in the history of warfare has there been an operation like the airlift of Indian troops to Srinagar on 27 October and on subsequent days, an operation put through with no previous thought, let alone organized planning, and at such remarkably short notice.  The Defence Headquarters consisting of British and Indian officers worked almost non-stop from 26 October.  The lack of adequate lines of communication and of intelligence of the enemy strength and dispositions made planning very difficult.  In the early hours of the morning of 27 October over a hundred civilian aircraft and R.I.A.F. planes were mobilized to fly troops, equipment and supplies to Srinagar.  Lord Mountbatten, who had been Chief of Combined Operations and Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia, said that in all his war experience he had never heard of an airlift of this nature being put into operation at such short notice and he complimented all concerned on the astonishing performance.  The immediately available unit was a Sikh battalion stationed in Gurgaon. The Commander of this battalion was Lt.-Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai.  The tasks assigned to him were to secure the airfield in Srinagar, to render assistance to the Government of Kashmir in maintaining law and order in Srinagar and, if possible, to drive away any tribesmen who might have entered the city.  Firstly, as proper information was not available regarding how many attackers were there or airport was under attack or not, the army was told to circle above it and, if there was any doubt, not to land but to fly back to Jammu.  At 10-30 a.m. after tense suspense, a wireless flash from Srinagar airfield announced the safe landing of the first of our troops.  The airfield was now in India’s hands.  Lt.-Colonel Rai found on landing that the enemy was at Baramula, the strategic bottle- neck which opens into the Srinagar Valley.  Once the raiders were allowed to enter and spread out into the Srinagar plain, all would be lost.  Lt.-Colonel Rai therefore decided to advance to Baramula with a view to stopping the raiders there.  Meanwhile, at Lahore, Jinnah was getting impatient.  The moment Jinnah heard that India had accepted the accession of Jammu and Kashmir and that Indian troops had been air borne to Srinagar, he gave orders to rush troops to Kashmir.  Field Marshal Auchinleck explained to Jinnah that, in the event of Pakistan troops entering Kashmir, which was now legally a part of India, every British officer serving in the Pakistan Army would automatically and immediately be withdrawn.  Jinnah therefore cancelled his order for Pakistan troops to march into Kashmir.  On 2 November, Nehru in a broadcast speech said that every step in regard to Kashmir had been taken after the fullest thought and consideration of the consequences.  He declared his readiness, when peace and the rule of law had been established, to have a referendum held under some such international auspices as that of the United Nations.  Sardar Patel and Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister, visited Srinagar on 3 November. They discussed the political and military situation in Kashmir.  Major General Kalwant Singh was made the commander of the army in Kashmir and was asked to recapture Baramulla, because it was an entrance to Kashmir Valley  Major-General Kalwant Singh left for Srinagar the next day. On 8 November his forces occupied Baramula.  When the Indian troops entered the city they found that it had been stripped by the attackers of its beauty, wealth and its women.  Out of a normal population of 14,000 only one thousand were left.  Meanwhile, meetings between Nehru, Liaqat Ali and Mountbatten followed. But no solution could be achieved.  Mountbatten feared that the fighting in Kashmir might degenerate into open war between the two countries  He therefore pressed both Gandhiji and Nehru to adopt his original suggestion to invoke the good offices of the United Nations Organization. Nehru ultimately accepted the suggestion, though some doubted this  On 31 December 1947, the Government of India formally appealed to the United Nations Organization.  Hyderabad  In population, revenue and importance Hyderabad was the premier State in the country.  The population was nearly sixteen million and the annual revenue Rs 26 crore. Hyderabad had its own coinage, paper currency and stamps.  The population of Hyderabad was over 85 percent Hindu. But the civil services, the police and the army positions were held by the Muslims.  Regarding the unification, the Nizam of Hyderabad initially was ready to develop a relationship with India on three issues: defence, external affairs and communication.  It was proposed that since Hyderabad was not ready to accede, so instead of the ‘Instrument of Accession’ a different document ‘Articles of Association’ can offered to Hyderabad.  Sardar Patel was strongly against this. He argues that this is injustice with others. Osman Ali  During the negotiations between the Indian Union and the delegation of Hyderabad, a draft was finally prepared which was to be signed by Nizam.  The Nizam was supposed to sign the documents on 25 th October but surprisingly delayed the signing till next day. He again delayed the sign on 26th October for the next day. On this day, the documents were to be sent to Delhi with the delegation.  Interestingly, at 3 AM in the morning next day, the muslim crowd surrounded the houses of the delegation and threatened. The police also did not turn up.  Nizam telegrammed the govt. that due to unforeseen circumstances, the delegation cannot come to Delhi.