Identity Goods, Positional Goods and Style PDF
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Uploaded by ChampionSerpentine6531
University of Amsterdam
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Summary
This document explores the concepts of identity goods, positional goods, and style in consumer behavior. It examines fashion paradoxes, herd behavior, and the Matthew effect. The document also discusses self-fulfilling prophecies and cultural consumption, which is particularly relevant for understanding status signaling in the workplace.
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# Identity Goods, Positional Goods and Style ## Identity Goods - Are goods that are more likely to be consumed by individuals “with taste” more likely to be identity goods? ## Positional Goods - Signal owners' high relative standing with society, and so they usually exhibit superior quality & f...
# Identity Goods, Positional Goods and Style ## Identity Goods - Are goods that are more likely to be consumed by individuals “with taste” more likely to be identity goods? ## Positional Goods - Signal owners' high relative standing with society, and so they usually exhibit superior quality & features, but value comes from their level of reliability to signal their status. - Are goods that are more likely to be consumed by upper/lower class individuals more likely to be positional goods? ## Style - The way something is done/made, which necessarily means that there is choice, and that no one way is clearly and always better than the others, which means that style shows something about the one doing/making it and/or the one consuming it. - Stylistic innovations = non-technological = not necessary to achieve a particular technical effect. ## Fashion Paradoxes - **Fashionable:** what many want to imitate it, but when this is achieved it becomes less fashionable. - **Imitation is the sincerest flattery:** increasing the legitimacy and popularity of the product - BUT to keep competitive advantage, you want to decrease imitation to defend product profit (as long as it is fashionable). ## Herd Behavior - Being in a herd is an advantage. - The herd moves together. - Each individual animal will try to stay in the center of the herd, regardless of where the optimal direction actually is. - The way the herd is going becomes the optimal direction, regardless of anything else. ## Matthew Effects (“the rich get richer; the poor get poorer”) 1. **Self-Fulfilling Prophecies:** expectations about future events lead to behaviors that cause those expectations to become true. - Certain individuals (e.g., influencers) are perceived as knowledgeable about trends, and their endorsement can help solidify a trend. - Doubting an influencer's authority or predictions can lead to the opposite effect, where the anticipated trend fails to materialize. 2. **Self-Reinforcing Processes:** initial actions create feedback loops that reinforce the original state. - Something becomes fashionable as more people adopt it. ## 4.1 Self-fulfilling prophecies in cultural markets. - This study examines the influence of perceived popularity on consumer choices, particularly in the context of cultural markets (e.g., music), and how false perceptions of popularity can manipulate behavior. ### Key Terms - **Self-Fulfilling Prophecy:** A (false) perception that leads to its own fulfillment over time. - **Popularity as Proxy for Quality:** Consumers rely on popularity indicators when they lack direct knowledge about a product's quality, using rankings as a signal of what might be worth trying. ### Key Findings 1. **Short-Term Effects:** Perception of Popularity as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy → Songs falsely labeled as > popular saw > downloads, demonstrating the social influence of popularity. 2. **Long-Term Effects:** Restoration of True Popularity → Over time, the original rankings of songs, especially those with higher inherent appeal, were restored to their expected positions. - Individual preferences reasserted themselves. 3. **Prisoner's Dilemma Effect:** While one producer might benefit by spreading false information about popularity, if everyone does this, the entire market suffers due to a loss of consumer trust. This ultimately reduces overall demand and downloads. ### Limitations of the Study - Artificial Nature of Experiment: complete inversion of popularity rankings is unlikely in reality. - Single source of Information (popularity) is a oversimplification of the market, where in reality there are multiple sources, such as reviews & endorsements. - Only looking at the decision of final consumers, not the many middlemen like gatekeepers. - Only applicable to Mass Market Goods where popularity is crucial in consumer choices. - Popularity does not always make a good more valuable. ## 4.2 Cultural consumption and status at work - Signals such as highbrow consumption reflect social status which are associated with significant costs (time, effort, money). ### Status Signaling - **3rd Party Signal:** reviews from an expert/external - **2nd party Signal:** the producer themselves, where > cost of production = > trustworthy - **1st Party Signal:** from the consumer - Address information asymmetries-where the signaler knows more about their status than the receiver (e.g., coworkers). - Costs of signals (money, opportunity costs) make them > trustworthy and valuable. ### (Highbrow Art) Cultural Consumption as Status Signal: - Highbrow cultural consumption signals status > in non-profits, especially for higher-ranking employees, than in for-profits. - **For-profit organizations:** offer multiple other status signals (e.g., luxury cars, offices, perks), so cultural consumption is a less common status signal. - **Non-profit organizations:** = egalitarian, so they lack overt status symbols. - Explicit status markers are discouraged (e.g., luxury cars seen as inappropriate for NGO directors), so highbrow consumption is used more frequently as a subtle, prestigious signal of status. - **Workplace status:** is a stronger driver of cultural consumption than broader societal status. An employee's span of control significantly affects their likelihood to engage in highbrow cultural activities. ### Cost-Benefit Perspective - The attractiveness of a given signal depends on which other signals are available. - **Conspicuous Consumption:** purchasing a good with the primary goal of showing status to others. - **Cheap signaling:** High-cost items (e.g. designer goods) may serve as cheaper /alternative status symbols . ## 4.3 Cloak or flaunt? Fashion dilemma. ### Standard Marketing Theory on Competitive Advantage - Produce a lof of signals to potential consumers so they: - Know about your product. - Are able to find you and your product. - Believe your product is popular with others. ### Fashion Firms Trade Off - Consumers derive utility from fashion by: 1. **Conforming with peers** → flaunting, widespread access. 2. **Differentiating themselves from peers** by signaling their good taste, knowledge or wealth. ### Popularity effects in Fashion 1. **Snob effect:** > popular = < exclusive → signaling value decreases. 2. **Bandwagon Effect:** > popular - > adoption to fit in → signaling value increases. ### Flaunting: - A marketing strategy where firms openly promote their products to a wide audience. - Increases demand and social interaction by making it highly accessible. - Undermines product's value to signal consumer taste/sophistication (i.e., no differentiation). ### Cloaking: - A marketing strategy where firms are strategically uninformative about their products. - Cloaking does not work in mass-market products where visibility and accessibility (like popular music) drive success. - > exclusive & hard to find product = < often used as a signaling device, but a stronger signal. ### Firms adopt cloaking when: - Their good lends itself to conspicuous consumption (i.e., signaling status). - There exists a small group of consumers willing to pay a premium for exclusivity. - These consumers want to distinguish themselves from the larger mass market. ## 4.4 Reputational sanctions and imitation in firms - Investigates how reputational sanctions and inter-firm linkages act as deterrents to imitative behavior in design-innovative firms, particularly in the furniture industry. - **Main Claim:** Reputational sanctions are an effective deterrent to imitation, especially when firms value their reputation for innovation and operate in networks with strong inter-firm connections. ### Imitation as a Problem - The threat of imitation is significant because perceived newness and innovation are primary indicators of value in these cultural (e.g. fashion or desgin furniture) markets. - **Imitation as Flattery:** For top-tier firms, being copied by lower-tier firms can enhance their reputation as market leaders and innovators. ### Protection Against Imitation - **Intellectual Property Rights (IPR):** Legal mechanisms such as patents, copyrights, and models that protect innovations. - **Appropriability:** The ability of firms to reap profits from their innovations. - **Informal Mechanisms like secrecy, continuous rapid innovation, & reputational mechanisms in networks:** - **Reputation Mechanisms as a Deterrent to Imitation:** firms that place high value on their reputation for innovation are less likely to copy competitors, fearing damage to their reputational capital. - **Inter-firm Linkages:** firms in tight-knit networks share information, making it easier to detect and discourage imitation. Opening up to competitors during early stages of product development allows for innovation without the fear of imitation. ### Propositions: 1. **Value of Reputational Capital:** Firms that value > design-innovation → > effective reputational sanctions as imitation deterrent. 2. **Network Linkages:** Firms with tight inter-firm linkages → > competitive strength and innovation → Stronger reputational sanctions. 3. **IPR Regimes:** Firms in weaker IPR environments rely more heavily on reputational sanctions than those in stronger IPR regimes to protect their innovations.