TCWD-SCRIPT - Lesson 1 & 2 - Globalization and Trade

**LESSON 1** **UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHIES OF** **THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION** **GLOBALIZATION DEFINED** The term ***globalization*** is not new in the modern context. Many researches, debates and discussions were made as to the meaning of the word. Cuturela (2012) cited a published work, *Towards N...

**LESSON 1** **UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHIES OF** **THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION** **GLOBALIZATION DEFINED** The term ***globalization*** is not new in the modern context. Many researches, debates and discussions were made as to the meaning of the word. Cuturela (2012) cited a published work, *Towards New Education*, which used the term "globalization" in 1930. Globalization means to designate an overview of the human experience in education. On the other hand, Inosemtsev (2008) distinguished globalization as one of the most known social studies, but is still a hollow terminology. However, after the Cold War the term was already used to define an interdependent world when it comes to its economical and informational dimensions. As it is defined by Webster, globalization is the development of an increasingly integrated global economy marked by free trade, free flow of capital, and the tapping of cheaper foreign labor markets. Robertson (1992), in his article, **Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture,** defined globalization as the "understanding of the world and the increased perception of the world as a whole." Therefore, the term has a rich concept that people need to have deliberate grasp in order to fully understand the term. In fact, Albrow and King (1990) defined globalization as "all those processes by which the people of the world are incorporated into a single world society. This only means that peoples around the globe live in a borderless community. It is, however, significant to say that globalization has exerted a tremendously serious impact on each sovereign state. The transnational spread of capital and the formation of the global markets have replaced the disintegrated economies of various countries. The work of Giddens (1991) has supported this claim when he highlighted in his definition that globalization is the process of intensifying social relationships among countries around the world connecting separate localities in a manner in which local events are formed as a result of happenings that have occurred from afar. There is a rapid interconnection worldwide that links among people in the local, national and even in regional context. This interconnectedness is created because of social and economic relationships and networks which are relevant in the global interactions. Steger (2005) cited Freeden (2003) who pointed out that globalization denotes not an ideology, but 'a range of processes nesting under one rather unwieldy epithet. He furthered that global flows occur in different physical and mental dimensions. Steger (2005), on the other hand, opined that globalization should be confined to a set of complex, social processes that are changing out current social condition derived from the modern independence of nation-states. He furthered that key concepts of globalization have been defined such as multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensity worldwide social interdependencies and exchange while making people aware of connections between the local and the distant. The term globalization should be confined to a set of complex, sometimes contradictory, social processes that are changing our current social condition based on the modern system of independent nation-states. Indeed, most scholars of globalization have defined their key concept along those lines as a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant. The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2000) identified some overviews of various areas of globalization. Globalization 'offers extensive opportunities for truly worldwide development, but it is not progressing evenly'. IMF conveyed that there are some countries that have been able to integrate into the global market rapidly, yet there are also some that have not yet integrated. Those countries that were able to integrate in the global market are growing fast and are able to reduce problems of poverty. To reiterate, globalization is not a recent phenomenon and there is nothing mystifying about it. In the 1980's, the term "globalization" has become a common word manifesting advances in modern technologies that have made international transactions, in both trade and finances, convenient, accessible, and easy. IMF (2000) noted that globalization refers to an extension beyond national borders of the same market forces that have operated for centuries at all levels of human economic activity which includes village markets, urban industries, or financial centers. Conversely, Hutton & Giddens, as cited by Cuturela (2009) emphasized that globalization is the interplay of extraordinary technological innovation mixed with influence of the world that gives today's changing its complexity. They expressed that the balance between science or knowledge and resources has changed in such a way that science and knowledge have become perhaps the most significant factor in the determination of the country/s standard of living. Truly, the countries with the most advanced economies are the countries with the most modern technology based on science and knowledge. **THE FIVE CORE CLAIMS OF MARKET GLOBALISM** Steger (2014) pointed out that in the mid-1990's, more population in the global north and south had accepted globalism's core claims, thus internalizing large parts of its overarching neo-liberal framework that advocated the deregulation of markets, the liberalization of trade, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and, after 9/11, the qualified support of the global 'War on Terror' under US leadership. The five core claims of market globalism are as follows: First claim is that, ***Globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of market.*** This is absolutely anchored in the neo---liberal ideal of self-regulating market as the normative basis for a future global order. This perspective explains the relevant functions of free market-its rationality and efficiency, as well as its alleged ability to bring about greater social integration and material progress-can only be realized in a democratic society that values and protects individual freedom. The second claim is that, ***Globalization is inevitable and irreversible.*** The market-globalist perspective sees globalization as the spread of irreversible market forces driven by technological innovations that make the global integration of national economies inevitable. As a matter of fact, market globalism is always interlaced with a belief that markets have the capacity to use new technologies to solve social problems. ***Nobody is in charge of globalization*** is the third claim. This claim highlights the semantic link between 'globalization-market' and the adjacent idea of 'leaderlessness'. Robert Hormats (1998) opined that 'The great beauty of globalization is that no one is in control.' This only means that no individual, no government or no institution has the control over globalization. Similarly, Thomas Friedman (1999:112-3) emphasized that the most basic truth about globalization is this: 'No one is in charge...But the global marketplace today is an Electronic Herd of often anonymous stock, bond, and currency traders and multinational investors, connected by screens and networks.' The next claim is that, ***Globalization benefits everyone.*** This lies at the heart of market globalism and represents a 'good' phenomenon. AT the 19986 G-7 Summit in Lyons, France, the heads of state and government of the world's seven most powerful industrialized nations issued a joint Economic Communique (1996) that exemplifies the principal meaning of this claim: Economic growth and progress in today's interdependent world is bound up with the process of globalization. Globalization provides great opportunities for the future, not only for our countries, but for all others, too. Its many positive aspects include an unprecedented expansion of investment and trade; the opening up to international trade of the world's most populous regions and opportunities for more developing countries to improve their standards of living; the increasingly rapid dissemination of information, technological innovation, and the proliferation of skilled jobs. The fifth and the last claim is that, ***Globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world.*** Francis Fukuyama (2000) stressed that there exists a 'clear correlation' between the country's level of economic development and successful democracy. While globalization and capital development do not automatically produce democracies, 'the level of economic development resulting from globalization is conducive to the creation of complex civil societies with a powerful middle class. It is this class and societal structure that facilitates democracy'. The former First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton (1999) praised the Eastern Europe's economic transition towards capitalism by saying, "The emergence of new businesses and shopping centers in former communist countries should be seen as the 'backbone of democracy.' **LESSON 2** **Trade takes center stage** President Trump made it clear during the 2016 presidential campaign that he intended to either renegotiate or withdraw from most of the United States' international trade agreements. In 2018, he may finally focus his energy on these campaign promises, which would put our prosperity at risk. Early on in 2017, he announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. We're already beginning to see the negative impact of that decision. Our economic and political influence in Asia may decline in 2018 and the years ahead. He has also set his sights on the North American Free Trade Agreement and began renegotiating its terms. Talks are likely to accelerate in 2018, with the pact's unraveling a real possibility. And in interviews, he has declared the World Trade Organization "a disaster." International trade deals are an often misunderstood part of U.S. economic policy. However, they can have a large impact on the economy. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has taken the lead in setting up a multilateral, rules-based system of international trade. Central to this system was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In 1994, this agreement was transformed into the WTO. Under this system, world trade has expanded dramatically over the last 70 years. In 1947, trade accounted for approximately 6 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, whereas it now accounts for approximately 15 percent. Today, U.S. exports support over 11 million jobs, while imports of many staples from overseas increase the purchasing power of domestic households. A retreat from a multilateral rules-based system of trade brings with it many problems. Domestically, it increases the probability of "trade wars" with our major trading partners. Relatively minor disputes could easily escalate into trade sanctions and counter-sanctions, like in the aftermath of the Depression-era Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which raised tariffs on hundreds of imports. Internationally, it could make it more difficult for developing countries to engage in trade relations with their much larger and wealthier counterparts. While the Trump administration has drawn attention to the U.S.'s large trade deficit, most economists agree that trade agreements have little to no effect on that. Certainly, some aspects of institutions such as NAFTA and the WTO can be questioned. However, a general retreat from the postwar system of trade could be a dangerous path for both the U.S. and the broader world economy. **THE GLOBAL ECONOMY** The discussion will primary be guided by this question: "Why the regions around the globe are have glaring differences when it comes to economy?" For the past centuries, the global economy has significantly changed. In the 11^th^ century, the long distance trading flourished between Venice and the Netherlands. The woolen industry in the 13^th^ century in Flanders and in 14^th^ century in Florence can also be an example of a sustained economic growth throughout history. Those global changes have contributed much to the economy of the world. There was the birth of capitalism. Conversely, the standards of living of most of the population in the globe have remained at the subsistence levels until in the middle of 18^th^ century. In Gary Gereffi's journal, *The Global Economy: Organization, Governance, and Development,* he mentioned that the global changes are attributed to how the global economy is organized and governed. He furthered that these changes give impact not only to the flow of goods and services across national borders, but also the implications of these processes for how a particular country move up or down in the international scene. Nowadays, the various countries' strategies on development are influenced by the new degree on how industries are organized. These development strategies are manifested in a shift in theoretical frameworks from those centered on the legacies and actors of nation-states to a greater concern with supranational institutions and transnational organizations. Developed countries and developing countries like the Philippines have to fully understand the impact of the contemporary global economy to improve their position in the global system. There is no singular academic field that can completely explain the topic of global economy because it is inherently interdisciplinary. According to Gereffi, the global economy can be studied at different levels of analysis. First is at the *macro level* in which this includes the international organizations and regimes that establish rules and norms for the global community. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the International Labor Organization are the existing international organizations that make impact to the economy of the world. The regional integration schemes like the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement are also part of these organizations. Since these regimes blend both the rules and resources, they substantiate the widest parameters within which the global economy operates. Next is the *meso level* in which it is believed that the building blocks for the global economy are the countries and firms. The global economy is seen as the arena in which countries compete in different product markets. The last is at the *micro level*. There is a growing literature on the resistance to globalization by consumer groups, activists, and transnational social movements. Therborn (2000) expressed, *"There are many theories related to economic sociology incorporate the global economy in their frameworks, but they differ in the degree to which it is conceptualized as a system that shapes the behavior and motivation of actors inside it, or as an arena where nationally determined actors meet, interact, and influence each other."* The development of a world trading system over a period of several centuries helped to create the tripartite structure of core, semi peripheral, and peripheral economic areas. According to world-systems theory, the upward or downward mobility of nations in the core, semi periphery, and periphery is determined by a country's mode of incorporation in the capitalist world-economy, and these shifts can only be accurately portrayed by an in-depth analysis of the cycles of capitalist accumulation in the *longue durée* of history (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989; Arrighi 1994). The foundation for a process of industrialization and new international divisions of labor on a global scale is attributed to the dynamics of the capitalist world-system. Adam Smith, an eighteenth-century political economist, defined "division of labor" as the specialization of workers in different parts of the production process, usually in factory setting. Gereffi stressed that the division of labor also acquired a geographical dimension during the influx of industrial economies as evolved. In a global scope, the "classic" international division of labor was between the industrial countries producing manufactured goods and the non-industrialized economies that supplied raw materials and agricultural products to the industrial nations which became a market for basic manufacturers. Years after World War II, trade flows have become far more complex, and so have the relationships between the developed and the developing nations of the global economy. **LESSON 3** **MARKET INTEGRATION** **Globalization and Labor Market Integration in Late** **Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Asia** (Excerpted from the article.Retrieved from:.) Beginning in the late nineteenth century, globalization swept through Asia, transforming its product and labor markets. By the 1880s steamships had largely replaced sailing vessels for transport within Asia as well as to Western markets, and shipping fares had begun to fall sharply. Also already underway was the mass migration of Indian and Chinese workers, principally from the labor-abundant areas of Madras in India and the provinces of Kwangtung (Guangdong) and Fukien (Fujian) in Southeastern China, to land-abundant but labor-scarce parts of Asia. Chief among the immigrant-receiving countries were Burma, Malaya and Thailand (Siam) in Southeast Asia. Indian and Chinese labor inflows to these countries constituted the bulk of two of three main late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century global migration movements, the other being European immigration to the New World. Immigration to Southeast Asia was almost entirely in response to its growing demand for workers which, in turn, derived from rapidly expanding demand in core industrial countries for Southeast Asian exports. Studies by Latham and Neal (1983) and by Brandt (1985, 1989) establish the development of an integrated Asian rice market beginning in the latter part of the nineteenth century (see also,.Myung, 2000). Furthermore, a series of articles and books by Williamson and his co-authors reveal internationally integrated commodity markets and relative factor price convergence in conjunction with pre-World War II globalization. ( Williamson, 2000, 2002; O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Hatton and Williamson, 2005). But in contrast to work on product market integration, the possible emergence of an integrated Asian labor market has attracted less attention. In part this reflects the lack of Asian wage data. As Harley (2000, p. 928) observes, "Analysis of the low-wage periphery, which is most relevant to modern \[globalization\] debate, is restricted by data availability". This article makes available for the first time the data needed to test for labor market integration over a large part of Asia. The article has two main aims. One is to analyze whether as part of pre-World War II globalization an integrated Asian market for unskilled labor existed to encompass Asia's chief emigrant-sending regions of South India and Southeastern China and the principal Southeast Asian receiving countries for Indian and Chinese immigrants. Our metric for integration, following both econometric works on GDP convergence and Robertson's recent analysis of integrated labor markets, comprises three complementary criteria: (i) that wages do not diverge from a common trend; (ii) that over time wage dispersion does not increase; and (iii) that a correction mechanism pushes wages towards equilibrium relationship aftershocks. It can be misleading, as Robertson (2000, p.728) warns, to rely on price as a criterion for integration. Markets are integrated if adjustment mechanisms operate to correct deviations from a wage differential or "gap". Second, the article aims to compare wage trends in the area of Asia from South India to South China and including Burma, Malaya and Thailand with an industrial core of the global economy, defined as the United Kingdom, United States, Germany and France. Were unskilled labor markets in Asia and the industrial core similarly affected by globalization such that in these two parts of the world wages followed a common trend? Or, in contrast to commodity markets, was globalization in Asia and the industrial core associated with a drifting apart of real unskilled wages? We argue that by the late nineteenth century South India, Southeastern China and the three Southeast Asian countries had become integrated and constituted a unified labor market. Furthermore, Asian evidence reveals a period of real wage convergence prior to the 1930s. But labor market integration that characterized Asia, and also obtained in the industrial core, stopped at the geographical frontiers of each of these two regions. Unlike Asia's export of primary commodities, flows of Asian labor hardly penetrated either the core industrial countries, or the wider Atlantic economy. The pre-World War II labor market pattern was, instead, one of strong divergence between Asia and the world's rapidly developing and industrializing core economies. **The Rise of the Global Corporation** By: Deane Neubauer Part One: The historic rise of the global corporation---three periods As indicated throughout this text, global corporations are inseparable from the more general phenomenon of globalization itself. It follows that how one identifies globalization serves to "locate" global corporations, both in the complex interactive pattern defined by globalization and within given historical periods. The approach to the study of globalization sometimes termed "historical globalization" locates the phenomenon itself in early patterns of trade and exchange (Bentley, J. 2003; Gills, 2006; Moore and Lewis 2000.) In early historical periods as both cities and countries extended their reach beyond their own borders, this view holds, a form of globalization was initiated which then followed complex patterns of interactive engagements organized through trade and directly influenced by the emergent and subsequently dominant technologies, especially in shipping and navigation (Harvey, 1990). As Moore and Lewis contend, the entities operating within this environment were [functionally] and [organizationally] not so very different from contemporary organizations, being possessed of "head offices, foreign branch plants, corporate hierarchies, extraterritorial business law, and even a bit of foreign direct investment and value-added activity (Moore and Lewis, 2000; 31-32). The vast heterogeneity of this long period, however, leads a majority of scholars to situate the direct antecedents of the contemporary global corporation within the dynamics of a two plus-centuries long duration spanning the period prior to the end of WW II in which the modern nation state system emerged in ways that allowed invention and social organization to combine that vastly increased world capital and the wealth of nation states. Coupled with an extraordinary rise in global population that attended the industrial revolution, the societies that arose would invent new ways to organize the world itself through colonialism and imperialism that vastly attenuated their interactions between peoples, states and regions such that a clearly differentiated era of global interaction can be said to exist (Harvey, 1990). Many of the characteristics of the global corporation that we examine directly in this chapter date from this period (e.g. patterns of equity ownership, corporate ownership and management of subsidiaries, the relationship of "central" organizational functions to supply and distribution chains, etc.) as attributes of corporate structures in the most prosperous and globally-engaged nations (largely through colonial and imperialist relationships). As the world emerged from the vast destructions of WWII, economic recovery and expansion were led overwhelming by American corporations which for a period from the end of the war until the re-entry of Japanese and European corporations onto the global scene essentially stood for what by then had come by then to be viewed as multinational corporations (MNCs) (Barnet and Muller, 1974). This period from the end of WWII to the present can be viewed, therefore, as a third and distinct period in the transformation of the global corporation. As the next parts of this chapter detail, the transformations of the global corporation occurring within this third period have been far reaching and distinctive, reflecting changes taking place within the broader structural dimensions of globalization itself and at the same time significantly contributing to those continuing changes. Part Two: How do global corporations function? What constitutes a global corporation? The contemporary global corporation is simultaneously and commonly referred to either as a multinational corporation (MNC), a transnational corporation (TNC), an international company, or a global company. While much of the remainder of this chapter will serve to clarify some of these distinctions, those offered by Iwan (2012) are practically useful. International companies are importers and exporters, typically without investment outside of their home country; Multinational companies have investment in other countries, but do not have coordinated product offerings in each country. They are more focused on adapting their products and services to each individual local market. Global companies have invested in and are present in many countries. They typically market their products and services to each individual local market. Transnational companies are more complex organizations which have invested in foreign operations, have a central corporate facility but give decision-making, research and develop (R&D) and marketing powers to each individual foreign market. More formally the transnational corporation has been defined by the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) as an "enterprise that engages in activities which add value (manufacturing, extraction, services, marketing, etc) in more than one country (UCTC, 1991)." This chapter will employ the term "global corporation" to refer to all of these types, seeking within specific contexts to be clear about which usage most applies. As many of the citations employed below indicate, however, these distinctions are often not employed within the literature. An understanding of how global corporations operate within contemporary globalization requires a brief recounting of some of the major changes that have taken place over the almost seventy years since the end of WWII. As indicated above, US corporations operating internationally had enormous advantages in the immediate post-war period as they---virtually alone in the world---emerged from the war with their productive, organization and distributional capacities intact. What would take shape as the beginning of contemporary globalization, however, dates from the economic recovery of capital structures in Japan and Europe and the re-entry into global markets of their national corporations. By 1974 Barnet and Muller in a path-breaking volume could both define the MNC as a major economic global actor and begin an effective description of how this particular corporate form was coming to dominate various aspects of global production and exchange (Barnet and Muller, 1974). A considerable amount of other scholarly work documents various "waves" of global corporate development through the subsequent six decades to the present*.* The overall structure of this system would stay in place and continue to develop throughout the 1970s and 1980's---a period that stands chronologically just prior to three fundamental innovations that have substantially changed the character of the global corporation: the advent and impact of digitalization and instantaneous global communications; the structural transformation of global commerce from producer-driven commodity chains to buyer-driven; and the increasing role performed through the global system by financial elements and the emergence of the global financial firm. (The post-war period can be delineated in a number of ways. Geriffe for example emphasizes three structural periods: Investment-based globalization (1950-1970); Trade-based globalization (1970-1995); Digital globalization (1995 onwards.) Within this analysis the nature of the global corporation changes accordingly, being driven in each case by its evolving purposes and by its extended reach and abilities (Geriffe 2001: 1616-18). Another method of projecting this growth is to examine the sources and levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) most of which was of corporate origin. As Hedley indicates, in 1900 only European corporations were major investors, to be joined by some American firms in the 1930s. Citing UN data he dates 1960 as the major turning point for FDI as the major driver of extended global corporate development. In each subsequent decade until the turn of the century, FDI would triple (Hedley 1999). Throughout these periods economists, other scholars and government actors at both the national and transnational level tended to "frame" the progressive growth of the global corporate structure (again, referred to almost indiscriminately as either MNC's or TNC's) through efforts to define, measure and assess the extent and consequences of foreign direct investment, defined initially and primarily as the entry of private capital from a source external to a country into a receiving country. Usually referred to in terms of "out-ward" and "in-ward" flows, supplies of FDI were viewed as the major elements of global economic development, and during various policy periods as "essential" for the development of what was then viewed as the "third" world, even if in reality the vast majority of FDI into the 1990s was between countries of the "developed" world---primarily North America, Europe and Japan. Since 1964 the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has focused on the various roles that FDI plays in the development process and has maintained an extensive policy library of global FDI statistics as well as the dense structure of regulation that frame global corporate cross-border engagements (Fredriksson 2003). Periods of intense FDI changed the global corporate landscape. During the period 1985-1990 FDI grew at *an average rate of 30% a year*. One result, unsurprisingly, was the landscape of corporate units and their relationship to each other. DeAnne Julius indicates that the expansion of FDI, inter-corporate alliances, and intra-firm trade during this period reached a level at which "a qualitatively different set of linkages" was created among advanced economies (Julius 1990). It was estimated that some 20,000 new corporate alliances were formed just in the period 1996-1998 (Gilpin, 2000: 170). The investment-based period was dominated by producer-driven commodity or value chains, which in turn tended to be dominated by firms characterized by large amounts of concentrated capital focused on large-scale or capital-intensive manufacturing or extractive industries. The organization of the dominant global firms during this period was powerfully influenced by the transformation within national economies of the older manufacturing companies wrought by what was viewed as the progressive "de-industrialization" of these economies through wide-scale off-shoring of labor applications and its related costs. This progressive shift in the silting of manufacture transformed the dominant manufacturing firms of these older developed companies into more fully extended and integrated organizational forms that moved many such firms from a self-conscious understanding of themselves as "national firms operating internationally" into more authentically global firms that required extensive corporate integration of their activities throughout the world. Many corporate structures, especially those in the United States, operating within the frame of the producer-driven commodity chain had been organized by what came to be recognized as "fordist" management principles. U.S. firms in particular had sought to transport these models abroad to their international manufacturing holdings. The emergence of Japan as a major producer nation, especially of automobiles and consumer electronics from the 1970's on, brought onto the scene new models of effective production focused especially on quality and regimes of flexible production---a move that was echoed within European firms rejoining the global commodity chains. These activities were experienced by U.S. firms as unwelcome challenges to their previously virtually unchallenged positions on product design, production efficiency, and quality---and ultimately on the ability of these corporate structures to maintain their accustomed returns on investment. The result was a progressive "re-inventing" of the American business model, especially the industrial model---a challenge that would dominate the curricula of U.S. business schools for over two decades (Risi 2005) and which is also continuously associated with the global value shift from manufacturing capital to finance and human capital in progressively networking societies (Castells, 2009). Part Three: What is different about this phase of global corporate development? The so-called "developing economies", and especially those of Brazil, India and China---the so-called BRICS economies, have become the most dynamic sector of global corporate growth, represented in part by their significant FDI over the three decades. The relative size, growth and range of activity of global corporations from the emerging economies suggest that they are on a trajectory that will soon situate them firmly within those of the historically more developed economies. The number of global corporations from the emerging market economies listed in the Fortune Global 500, which ranks corporations by revenue, rose from 47 firms in 2005 to 95 in 2010. These companies have also become active in the broad pattern of global mergers and acquisitions (M&A), a primary vehicle by which corporate concentration takes place. To cite Ahern: "In 2010 these companies accounted for 2,447 acquisitions, or 22% of global M&A transactions, which is up from 661 acquisitions, or 9% of total M&A acquisitions, in 2001. Of the 11,113 M&A deals announced in 2010, 5,623 (50%) involved merging market companies, either as buyers or as take-over targets of MNCs in advanced countries" (Ahern 2011: 23). The fact that the global economic slowdown resulting from the financial crisis of 2007 has had a lesser impact on many developing economies, especially the BRICS, indicates the extent to which they have become a new and important source of capital within the global system. Capital flows in general over the past decade and a half have begun to change from the dominant North-North/North-South dynamic to one in which South-South and South-North capital flows are significant (Rajan 2010) with most of the South-North capital flows coming from China and India. Examples include China's Lenovo corporation's purchase of IBM's PC business and India's investment in various historically British firms including Jaguar Land Rover (Economist, 2011). Increased North-South investments during this period allowed global North corporations to rebound quickly from their profit losses and restore income growth. The relative robust nature of the emerging economies has continued to attract FDI and to create conditions leading to the rapid expansion of their nationally based global corporations (UNCTAD, 2011: 26). The importance of global corporations in Brazil, India and China to the current and projected global economy is singular. With 40% of the world's population the BRICS represent a primary force in both global production and consumption. Hawksworth and Cookson predict that "middle class" consumers in China and India will grow from some 1.8 billion in 2010 to 3.2 billion in 2020 and 4.9 billion by 2030 (2008). The relative import of their global corporate cultures can be gauged in part by the fact that in 2012 global corporations in China made up 73 of the largest in the Fortune 500 list (CNN Money 2012), and whereas Brazil and India with 8 apiece currently account for a small share of such corporations, emergent market countries are projected to account for a near doubling of their share of world trade over the next 40 years, reaching nearly 70% by 2050 (Ahern, 2011). In 1998 only one of the top 100 global corporations was located outside the US, Europe or Japan (Oatley 2008). (Excerpted from, *The Rise of the Global Corporation* by Deane Neubauer) **LESSON 4** **THE GLOBAL INTERSTATE SYSTEM** **An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism** **and the Crisis of the Mid-twentieth Century** By Mark Mazower (International Affairs 82, 3 (2006) 553--566, © The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2006) On 7 March 1934, an unusual event took place at Madison Square Garden in New York. Twenty thousand people attended a meeting there to hear speeches marking the Nazis' first year in power and denouncing the regime. The rally was organized as a mock trial and was advertised in the press as the 'Case of civilization against Hitler', with indictment, witnesses and, eventually, a judgment delivered by a Minister of the Community Church of New York City. 'Hitlerism denounced as a crime against civilization,' ran the headline in the New York Times the following day. Organized principally by the American Jewish Congress, the meeting anticipated Nuremberg in its consciousness of the power of what the scholar Louis Anthes calls 'publicly deliberative drama'. It looked forward, too, to the Cold War in its evocation of a joint Judeo-Christian civilization ranged against the threat of totalitarianism. But in its emphasis on that common 'civilization' it looked backwards, to the concept that lay at the heart of the claim to world leadership that Europeans had been advancing since at least the early nineteenth century. It was really after the defeat of Napoleon that the concept of a European civilization became fundamental to new understandings of international order and new techniques of international rule. In France, Guizot abandoned the Enlightenment project of fitting Europe into a scheme of universal history for the \[Herderian\] task of tracing the continent's own cultural roots. As he put it in his History of civilization in Europe: 'civilization is a sort of ocean, constituting the wealth of a people, and on whose bosom all the elements of the life of that people, all the powers supporting its existence, assemble and unite'. It was just possible, thought Guizot, to locate among the various civilizations of the world a specifically European variant: 'It is evident,' he wrote, 'that there is a European civilization; that a certain unity pervades the civilization of the various European states\...' In Britain, John Stuart Mill suggested by contrast that there was but a single model of civilization; but this too---in his 1836 essay on 'Civilization'---he located in Europe since 'all \[the elements of civilization\] exist in modern Europe, and especially in Great Britain, in a more eminent degree... than at any other place or time. Whether one believed like Mill that civilization was singular and hierarchical, or plural and historically relative---and as time went on Mill would win out over Guizot---what came to be seen as self-evident was civilization's location in Europe. One fertile intellectual elaboration of this belief was---as we have learned from the work of Martti Koskenniemi and Antony Anghie---the new discipline of (mostly positivist) international law. As a generalization and adaptation of the values of the Concert of Europe, international law was designed as an aid to the preservation of order among sovereign states, and its principles were explicitly stated as applying only to civilized states---much as Mill saw his principles of liberty as applying solely to members of 'a civilized community'. In 1845 the influential American international lawyer Henry Wheaton had actually talked in terms of the 'international law of Christianity' versus 'the law used by Mohammedan Powers'; but within twenty or thirty years, such pluralism had all but vanished. According to the late nineteenth century legal commentator, W. E. Hall, international law 'is a product of the special civilization of modern Europe and forms a highly artificial system of which the principles cannot be supposed to be understood or recognized by countries differently civilized... Such states only can be presumed to be subject to it as are inheritors of that civilization. Thus conceived, international law faced the issue of the relationship between a civilized Christendom and the non-civilized world. States could join the magic circle through the doctrine of international recognition, which took place when 'a state is brought by increasing civilization within the realm of law.' In the 1880s James Lorimer suggested there were three categories of humanity---civilized, barbaric and savage, and thus three corresponding grades of recognition (plenary political; partial political; natural, or mere human). Most Victorian commentators believed that barbaric states might be admitted gradually or in part. Westlake proposed, for instance, that: 'Our international society exercises the right of admitting outside states to parts of its international law without necessarily admitting them to the whole of it.' Others disagreed: entry 'into the circle of law-governed countries' was a formal matter, and 'full recognition' all but impossible. The case of the Ottoman Empire exemplified this ambivalent process. Of course European states had been making treaties with the sultans since the sixteenth century. But following the Crimean War the empire was declared as lying within the 'Public law of Europe'---a move which some commentators then and now saw as the moment when international law ceased to apply only to Christian states but which is perhaps better viewed as a warning to Russia to uphold the principles of collective consultation henceforth rather than trying to dictate unilaterally to the Turks. In fact, despite its internal administrative reforms, the empire was never regarded in Europe as being fully civilized, the capitulations remained in force, and throughout the nineteenth century the chief justification of the other Powers for supporting first autonomy and then independence for new Christian Balkan states was that removing them from Ottoman rule was the best means of civilizing them. We can see this clearly in contemporary attitudes towards the military occupation of Ottoman territory by European armies. After the Franco-Prussian War, international lawyers had devised the notion of belligerent occupation---a state of affairs in which a military occupant interfered as little as was compatible with military necessity in the internal affairs of the occupied country so as not to prejudice the rights of the former ruler of that territory who was regarded as remaining sovereign until a peace settlement might conclude otherwise. Belligerent occupation was, in other words, a compact between so-called civilized states not to unilaterally challenge each other's legitimate right to rule. In the case of Ottoman territory, the Powers felt no such inhibitions: the Russians in Bulgaria in 1877, the Habsburgs in Bosnia the following year, and the British in Egypt in 1882 all demonstrated through their extensive rearrangement of provincial administrations, that although they would allow the Ottoman sultan to retain a fig-leaf of formal sovereignty, in fact the theory of belligerent occupation did not apply in his lands. Thirty years later, the Austrians \[in 1908\] and the British \[in 1914\] went further: on both occasions they unilaterally declared Ottoman sovereignty over the territories they were occupying at an end, suggesting that whatever had or had not been agreed at Paris in 1856, by the early twentieth century, the Ottoman empire was regarded once again as lying outside the circle of civilization. \[The fact that it was a Muslim power was certainly not irrelevant to this. In 1915, when the French and Russians prepared a diplomatic protest at the mass murder of Ottoman Armenians, their initial draft condemned the massacres as 'crimes against Christendom'. Only when the British mentioned that they were worried over the possible impact of such a formulation on Indian Muslim opinion was the wording changed to 'crimes against humanity.' If the Ottoman Empire was, as it were, semi-civilized, then sub-Saharan Africa---site of the main European land-grab in the late nineteenth century--- was savage. European and American lawyers extended the notion of the protectorate---originally employed for new European states such as Greece---to the new colonial situation, ostensibly as a way of shielding vulnerable non-European states from the depredations of other European Powers, but more urgently, in order to avoid complications among the Powers which might trigger off further conflict. In the increasingly radicalized world-view of late nineteenth century European imperialism, protectorates might be a way of slowing down social transformation---in the interests of 'native customs'---as much as they were of introducing it. 'Much interest attaches to legislation for protectorates, in which the touch of civilization is cautiously applied to matters barbaric, 'wrote a commentator in the Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation in 1899. Yet the concept of civilization remained vital. The treaty that followed Berlin Colonial Conference of 1884--85, which marked the attempt to diplomatically manage the Scramble for Africa, talked of the need 'to initiate the indigenous populations into the advantages of civilization.' In this way, Victorian international law divided the world according to its standard of civilization. Inside Europe---and in other areas of the world colonized by Europeans---there was the sphere of civilized life: this meant---roughly---the protection of property; the rule of law on the basis---usually---of codes or constitutions; effective administration of its territory by a state; warfare conducted by a regular army; and freedom of conscience. The fundamental task of international law in this zone was to resolve conflicts between sovereign states in the absence of an overarching sovereign. Outside this sphere, the task was to define terms upon which sovereignty---full or partial---might be bestowed. It was thus in the non-European world that the enormity of the task required in acquiring sovereignty could best be grasped. There, too, the potential costs---in terms of legalized violence---of failing to attain the standard of civilization were most evident. The laws of war, codified by the Great Powers at length at the end of the nineteenth century, were designed to minimize the severity of conflicts between civilized states. But where no reciprocity of civilized behavior could be expected, European armies were taught they need not observe them---or indeed in some versions---any rules at all. Britain's General J.F.C. Fuller noted that 'in small wars against uncivilized nations, the form of warfare to be adopted must tone with the shade of culture existing in the land, by which I mean that, against people possessing a low civilization, war must be more brutal in type.' The 1914 British Manual of Military Law, too, emphasized that 'rules of International Law apply only to warfare between civilized nations... They do not apply in wars with uncivilized states and tribes.' After all, savages were impressed only by force; fanaticism could be stopped only through an awesome demonstration of technological superiority. 'A shell smashing into a putative inaccessible village stronghold is an indication of the relentless energy and superior skill of the well-equipped civilized foe. Instead of merely rousing his wrath, these acts are much more likely to make \[the fanatical savage\] raise his hands in surrender.' These were the words of Colonel Elbridge Colby, an interwar US advocate of air power in colonial insurgencies (and father of William Colby, future director of the CIA and architect of the Advanced Pacification Campaign in Vietnam). Until well after the First World War, it was axiomatic that 'international law is a product of the special civilization of modern Europe itself.' The United States was, by the century's end, regarded from this point of view as a European power, if not of the first rank. But Washington---which had stood on the sidelines during the carve-up of Africa, had achieved a special relationship to international law following the war with Spain. Through the Roosevelt Corollary, it toughened up its reading of the Monroe Doctrine, while at the same time encouraging the pan American codification of international law as a way of enshrining its own regional hegemony. Siam was admitted to the Hague conferences as a mark of respect; but in China, where the Boxer Rebellion was put down with enormous violence---on the grounds that it was 'an outrage against the comity of nations'---the unequal treaties remained in force. It was only the Japanese who seriously challenged the nineteenth century identification of civilization with Christendom. Having adhered to several international conventions, and revised their civil and criminal codes, they managed to negotiate the repeal of the unequal treaties from 1894 onwards, as well as to win back control over their tariffs, and their victory over Russia in 1905 simply confirmed their status as a major Power. Not surprisingly, the Young Turks---desperate to repeal the humiliating capitulations---could not hear enough of the Japanese success. The Japanese achievement confirmed that the standard of civilization being offered by the Powers was capable of being met by non-Christian, non-European states. But the Japanese achievement was also unique. After the ending of the Russo-Japanese war, the Second Hague Conference of 1907 talked of 'the interests of humanity, and the ever progressive needs of civilization.' But could civilization (with a capital C) really ever be universalized, and how far could it be extended? Many had their doubts. German and Italian jurists essentially ruled out any non-European power receiving full recognition; the prominent Russian jurist de Martens was equally emphatic. As for the empire-builders, in Africa, in particular, as well as in the Pacific, many liberals and Gladstonians came to terms with imperialism at century's end---as Saul Dubow has recently reminded us---because they thought in terms of a kind of an imperial cosmopolitanism or commonwealth, in which individual peoples might preserve their own distinctive cultures. Where necessary, of course, civilized powers had to rule others to ensure this. The idea of trusteeship, which was---with a slightly different coloration---to become the lynchpin of the League of Nations system of colonial rule, expressed a similar caution about the exportability of (European) civilization. Unilaterally abrogating Ottoman sovereignty in Egypt in December 1914, the British proclaimed that they regarded themselves as 'trustees for the inhabitants' of the country. Their unilateralism was only one sign of the death of the old Concert and its values. Blazing a trail that others would follow in the wars of the coming century, they tore up one of the fundamental axioms of the late-nineteenth century European order---that the basic legitimacy of the sovereign ruler would always be respected---and replaced it with a new understanding in which sovereignty inhered, not in the head of state, but in the people or nation. What Nehal Bhuta has recently---in the case of Iraq---called the doctrine of 'transformative occupation' thus makes its appearance. **LESSON 5** **CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL GOVERNANCE** **ICC Is Investigating Duterte, Who Suddenly Wants Out** **He says Philippines is withdrawing from the ICC, 'effective immediately'** By Kate Seamons, **Newser** Staff (Retrieved from: [**http://www.newser.com/story/256563/duterte-called-the-icc-bulls-now-he-wants-out.html**](http://www.newser.com/story/256563/duterte-called-the-icc-bulls-now-he-wants-out.html).) (NEWSER) -- Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has had a bumpy relationship with the International Criminal Court. He once described it as "bulls\-\--," then in February said he welcomed its preliminary investigation into allegations of crimes against humanity during Duterte's war on drugs. Now, he says he'll pull the Philippines from the court altogether, "effective immediately," though the BBC reports that formally withdrawing from the ICC is a year-long process. "It is apparent that the ICC is being utilized as a political tool against the Philippines," he said, while blasting the "baseless, unprecedented, and outrageous attacks" directed at him by the UN. The Guardian looks at the recent-most bad blood between the two that apparently spurred those comments. Duterte's government put a UN special rapporteur on a list of communist terrorists, leading the body's commissioner for human rights to say last week that Duterte needs "some sort of psychiatric examination." Should the Philippines successfully withdraw its ratification of the treaty that created the ICC, it would be only the second country to do so, after Burundi. But that wouldn't protect Duterte from a potential trial, as the treaty states "withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the court in connection with criminal investigations." Still, the BBC notes it could make the Philippines less cooperative. Speaking of cooperation, the country's Senate on Monday flagged the constitutional provision that requires the Senate to agree to the revocation of any international treaty. Duterte contends the Senate failed to publicize its 2011 ratification of the treaty as required by law, reports the Associated Press. Globalization is a rich and a broad concept and may be defined in various perspectives. It cannot be denied that globalization has made a tremendous impact on the sovereign state. Fowler and Bunck (1996) emphasized that a *sovereign state* has a territory, the people, and a government. Any state admitted as a member of the United Nations will be upon the decision of the General Assembly as recommended by the Security Council. The United Nations membership requirements are (1) the state must be a peace-loving state which accepts the obligations contained in the present Charter, and (2) in the judgment of the Organization, must be able and willing to carry out these obligations. Chapter 2, Article 4 of the United Nations Charter states that only sovereign states can become members of the United Nations. Although all UN members are fully sovereign states at the present, the Belarus, India, Philippines, and Ukraine- four of the original members- were not independent at the time of their admission in the organization. Even from the seventeenth century, the legal framework of a sovereign state has served as a definitive ground for political governance and economic system. Sovereignty has been constitutionally used both on national and international levels. The intercontinental spread of capital and the formation of global markets have eventually substituted the fragmented national economies. Sovereign states are experiencing increased difficulties in supplying regulatory and redistributive public goods and establishing and enforcing property rights in the face of relatively open trade, rapid information-technology advances, and considerable financial deregulation. Moreover, both market relations and political discontent with economic policies have virtually become "borderless." The international system has now become less state-centric that makes a way into the political constitution of domestic policies. Notably, the advancements in technology and its innovations have increased the speed of the migration and transplantation of legal rules and policies. The transnational actors, which are non-state, such as the intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), and transnational corporations (TNCs) have assumed relevant roles in global governance. They have created transnational law that runs many dimensions of the political economy that was once governed by the sovereign states. Sovereignty is at the heart of both public international law and the legal constitution of the state. Relevant changes in the international system definitely affect the shape of sovereignty and the future of the state law. However today, any sovereign state cannot just neglect issues that are related to the interests of the humanity, may they be within the borders or outside the borders of the state. Individuals and groups enjoy greater recognition as subjects of international law, as seen in the expansion of legal regimes and enforceable mechanisms in the fields of international human rights law, international refugee law, international criminal law, and the like. Victor Peskin observes that the United Nations Security Council\'s ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda *continued to trump state sovereignty insofar as targeted states and all other UN members were legally bound to comply.* However, the development of international criminal tribunals suggests a *changing balance of tribunal authority and state sovereignty*. He criticizes the *next generation* of war crimes tribunals as supporting the expansion of the influence of state judicial actors as well as the strengthening of the doctrine of sovereignty. The Rome statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) upholds the principle of complementarities and recognizes that states do not have to collaborate with the court unless they have ratified the statute. However, this is only part of the picture. The establishment of special hybrid courts in Cambodia, East Timor, Lebanon, and Sierra Leone means that states no longer see sovereign state law alone as a sufficient means of punishing serious war crimes. The decisions of international judges and prosecutors now permeate and shape the domestic criminal law of these countries. William Burke-White further asserts that the ICC has become *part of a system of multilevel global governance* through its alteration of state preferences and policies and its deterrence of future crimes through judicial and prosecutorial pronouncements. International law has evolved into a central framework for the *emergent system* of global governance. This system supplies the normative mechanisms for the establishment of IGOs and the facilitation of the international response to issues as diverse as nuclear proliferation, climate change, ocean use, and the functioning of the world trade system. Alexandra Khrebtukova insightfully points out, "\[n\]ational borders no longer confine the diverse views that prioritize subjects of international law.... different perspectives are often less identifiable with specific states than with discrete branches of the law, each manifesting separate functional perceptions of what that law should take as its primary focus. A sovereign state and its laws are changing; they are transforming according to their relevance to the international system. A state may, in some point in time, opt to comply with the international and transnational standards. However, the adaptive power of the state law should not be underestimated. Generally speaking, the laws that govern the sovereign state are strong and flexible enough to endure the many challenges along the way. Even with globalization around, the laws are here to stand firm on the political influence over the lives of sovereign state's people and the majority of peoples around the globe. **LESSON 6** **GLOBAL DIVIDES: THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH** CONFIGURING **UN\'s Human Rights Chief Just Went There on Myanmar** **\'Seems like a textbook example of ethnic cleansing\'** By John Johnson, Newser Staff Posted Sep 12, 2017 12:10 PM CDT (NEWSER) -- The top human rights official for the UN has dropped a damning charge on Myanmar: \"ethnic cleansing.\" Addressing the agency\'s Human Rights Council, Zeid Ra\'ad Al Hussein said that Myanmar will not allow investigators to fully assess what\'s happening to the Muslim Rohingya community,\"but the situation seems like a textbook example of ethnic cleansing,\" per France 24. He\'s referring to the bloody crackdown by government forces against militants in the western part of the country. The government of Aung San Suu Kyi swears troops are going after only \"terrorist\" militants and doing their best to spare civilians, but members of the ethnic group fleeing the country tell a much different story of scorched villages of mass killings. As of Tuesday, about 370,000 had crossed the border into Bangladesh. On Monday, the US joined those criticizing the military operation. \"The massive displacement and victimization of people \... shows that Burmese security forces are not protecting civilians,\" said White House press chief Sarah Huckabee Sanders, per the Washington Times. And on Tuesday, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visited refugees in makeshift camps and implored Myanmar to allow them to return safely, reports the BBC. \"Hundreds of years they are staying there,\" she said. \"How they can deny that they are not their citizens?\" Myanmar, however, got an important note of support from China, which said it backed the government\'s moves toward \"stability,\" per Reuters. Meanwhile, more than 400,000 people have signed a petition seeking to have Suu Kyi\'s Nobel Peace Prize withdrawn. (A columnist wrote a prescient piece back in 2014.) **ADVANCING** Source:. This map presents the literal division of the world- The Northern and the Southern Hemispheres. Can you identify the differences between countries in the Global North and Global South? +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Global North** | **Global South** | +===================================+===================================+ | 1\. Home to all the members of | 1\. Africa, Latin America | | G8 and to four of the five | | | permanent members of UN | | | Security Council | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | 2\. United States, Canada, | 2\. Developing Asia, including | | Western Europe | | | | Middle East | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | 3.Developed parts of Asia | | | Australia, and 4. New Zealand | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Resulta ng larawan para sa North | **Northern Hemisphere** | | and South Divide | | | | Rich, Industrialized, Wealthy | | | Nations | | | | | | Democratic Capitalist Countries | | | | | | **Southern Hemisphere** | | | | | | Developing Nations | | | | | | Non-Democratic Countries | +===================================+===================================+ | | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ **Concepts of Global Relations** **Major Premise** - The underdevelopment of certain states/peoples and their lack of representations in global political process is a reality **Prevalent** - Imbalances of Aggregate economics and political power between states Interstate dimensions **Locating the Global South** By Lisandro Claudio **The Starbucks and the Shanty** - There are markers of global interconnectedness, even global modernity - There are Starbucks branches in Melbourne and Manila, New York and New Delhi - All these branches look more or less the same - The sameness represents the cultural homogenization that many critics have associated with globalization - In Manila and New Delhi, there is a good chance that upon leaving the coffee shop, you will meet a child beggar in tattered clothes or walk a block or two, with your latte still hot, you will find a shanty town - Spaces of affluence in the developing world may mirror the Global North - Spaces of underdevelopment in developed countries may mirror the poverty of the Global South - There is something more confronting about poverty in the global south, and the north/south divide is as visible as the processes of globalization that engender it - The divide reminds us that globalization creates undersides **Major Lenses: International Relations** **Globalism (Steger):** Global economic integration is not only inevitable given the rise of new technologies; it is, more importantly, a normative international goal. To not partake to globality is backwards **Civilization Discourse:** Dominant ideology of colonialism and the logic that shaped the birth of international order **Modernization theory (Rostow):** Outlined the historical progression terms of a society's capacity to produce and consume material goods **LESSON 7** **ASIAN REGIONALISM** **Trade War Looms as China Hits Back at Trump Tariffs** **Beijing targets 3 biggest US imports** By Rob Quinn, Newser Staff Posted Apr 4, 2018 6:12 AM CDT Updated Apr 4, 2018 6:44 AM CDT (NEWSER) -- China says it doesn\'t want a trade war---but it\'s not going to back down if President Trump starts one. After the Trump administration recommended new 25% tariffs on \$50 billion in Chinese goods Tuesday. Beijing hit back within hours with its own proposed tariffs on 106 American products accounting for around \$50 billion in trade, raising fears of an all-out trade war between the world\'s two biggest economies, the New York Times reports. The new categories of American goods that would face tariffs under the move include aircraft, soybeans, and cars, which were last year\'s three biggest exports from the US to China, reports the Guardian. Other goods targeted include whisky, tobacco, cotton, wheat, and corn. As Asian markets tumbled, a Foreign Ministry spokesman in Beijing slammed Trump\'s approach to trade issues. \"Those who attempt to make China surrender through pressure or intimidation have never succeeded before, and will not succeed now,\" said Geng Shuang. Sources tell the Wall Street Journal that many of the 106 items on China\'s list, including sorghum and beef, were included in an attempt to target states that voted for Trump. But both sides still have a chance to back down from the brink of trade war. China hasn\'t said when its tariffs will take effect, and the US tariffs are not due to take effect until May 11 at the earliest. *(China announced new tariffs on another 128 US products earlier this week.)* **Towards Asian Regionalization** The center of gravity of the global economy is shifting to Asia. The region's economy is already similar in size to those of Europe and North America, and its influence in the world continues to increase. In many Asian countries, the cycle of poverty has been broken; in others, this historic aim is within sight. Asia's extraordinary success has brought new challenges---while rapid economic growth remains a priority, citizens demand that it also be sustainable and more inclusive. AndAsia is now so important to the world economy that it must also play a larger role in global economic leadership. Regional economic cooperation is essential for addressing these challenges. Asia's economic rise is unprecedented. The region is home toover half the world's population, produces three tenths of global output (in terms of purchasing power), and consistently records the world's highest economic growth rates. The Asian "miracle" (World Bank 1993) did not end with the 1997/98 financial crisis a decade ago; for some countries, it marked the beginning of renewed acceleration. The question is no longer whether Asia will be central to the 21^st^ century economy, but rather how it will exercise its prominent role and how its dependence on the rest of the world has decreased. Regionalism is a relatively new aspect of Asia's rise.Asia's economies are increasingly connected through trade, financial transactions, direct investment, technology, labor and tourist flows, and other economic relationships. Asian economies are principally connected through markets--- but where markets lead, governments are following. Asian leaders have committed to work together more closely and have already taken concrete steps in some areas. The 1997/98 financial crisis, in particular, was an important catalyst for this new regionalism and gave rise to a range of new initiatives. These have not sought to replicate the institutions of the European Union (EU), but have rather focused on finding new and flexible forms of cooperation that reflect the region's diversity and pragmatism nor are Asia's regional initiatives intended to replace global relationships, but rather to complement them. It is not a matter of pulling up the drawbridge, but of building bridges that connect Asian economies together as well as to the rest of the world. The stakes could not be higher. A dynamic and outward-looking Asian regionalism could bring huge benefits not just to Asia, but to the world. It could help sustain the region's growth, underpin its stability, and---with the right policies---reduce inequality. And it could help marshal a common response to major new challenges that often arise suddenly and unexpectedly. **How can regionalism benefit Asia?** - link the competitive strengths of its diverse economies in order to boost their productivity and sustain the region's exceptional growth; - connect the region's capital markets to enhance financial stability, reduce the cost of capital, and improve opportunities for sharing risks; - cooperate in setting exchange rate and macroeconomic policies in order to minimize the effects of global and regional shocks and to facilitate the resolution of global imbalances; - pool the region's foreign exchange reserves to make more resources available for investment and development; - exercise leadership in global decision making to sustain the open global trade and financial systems that have supported a half century of unparalleled economic development; - build connected infrastructure and collaborate on inclusive development to reduce inequalities within and across economies and thus to strengthen support for pro-growth policies; and - create regional mechanisms to manage cross-border health, safety, and environmental issues better. **How can Asian regionalism benefit the world?** - generate productivity gains, new ideas, and competition that boost economic growth and raise incomes across the world; - contribute to the efficiency and stability of global financial markets by making Asian capital markets stronger and safer, and by maximizing the productive use of Asian savings; - diversify sources of global demand, helping to stabilize the world economy and diminish the risks posed by global imbalances and downturns in other major economies; - provide leadership to help sustain open global trade and financial systems; and - create regional mechanisms to manage health, safety, and environmental issues better, and thus contribute to more effective global solutions of these problems. While Asian regionalism is primarily motivated by the desire to advance welfare in the region, it would not do so by detracting from development elsewhere. On the contrary, Asian regionalism can help to sustain global economic progress at a time when other major regions are reaching economic maturity. **The economics of Asian regionalism** The economics of regionalism have a complex and troubled history. In the 1930s, countries created preferential trade blocs in an attempt to shelter their economies from the Great Depression. Several countries established discriminatory currency blocs with strict exchange controls against outsiders. Far from helping, these arrangements led to the collapse of international trade and financial flows, accelerating the downward spiral of economic activity. This experience was foremost in the mind of the architects of the post-war global economic system as they adopted the principle of nondiscrimination as a central pillar of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the forerunner of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Many economists and policy makers remain skeptical about regionalism because of its potentially negative impact on the multilateral trade and financial system. The case for regionalism therefore has to be carefully formulated. Regionalism must not lead to protectionist blocs---a "fortress Asia" is no more desirable than a "fortress Europe" or a "fortress North America" would be. But the open, outward-oriented regionalism that is emerging in Asia can avoid posing such a threat. Just as the absence of barriers to commerce within national economies---that is, among the states and provinces of countries such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), India, Germany,and the United States (US)---is generally beneficial, so too is the creation of a market spanning several national economies. Much of the evidence assembled in this report suggests that Asia has---and will continue to have---a fundamental stake in both regional and global integration. Asia comprises several powerful countries and centers of economic activity, with many shared economic priorities, but also some diverging ones. At times, these differences are amplified by history and politics. The price of cooperation is the loss of some national sovereignty and the narrowing of policy options for pursuing purely national objectives. **LESSON 8** **GLOBAL MEDIA CULTURES**  **Globalization and Media** Cultural Imperialism and the Global Media Debate In international communication theory and research, cultural imperialism theory argued that audiences across the globe are heavily affected by media messages emanating from the Western industrialized countries. Although there are minor differences between \"media imperialism\" and \"cultural imperialism,\" most of the literature in international communication treats the former as a category of the latter. Grounded in an understanding of media as cultural industries, cultural imperialism is firmly rooted in a political-economy perspective on international communication. As a school of thought, political economy focuses on material issues such as capital, infrastructure, and political control as key determinants of international communication processes and effects. In the early stage of cultural imperialism, researchers focused their efforts mostly on nation-states as primary actors in international relations. They imputed rich, industrialized, and Western nation-states with intentions and actions by which they export their cultural products and impose their sociocultural values on poorer and weaker nations in the developing world. This argument was supported by a number of studies demonstrating that the flow of news and entertainment was biased in favor of industrialized countries. This bias was clear both in terms of quantity, because most media flows were exported by Western countries and imported by developing nations, and in terms of quality, because developing nations received scant and prejudicial coverage in Western media. These concerns led to the rise of the New World Information Order (NWIO) debate, later known as the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debate. Although the debate at first was concerned with news flows between the north and the south, it soon evolved to include all international media flows. This was due to the fact that inequality existed in news and entertainment programs alike, and to the advent of then-new media technologies such as communication satellites, which made the international media landscape more complex and therefore widened the scope of the debate about international flows. The global media debate was launched during the 1973 General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Nairobi, Kenya. As a specialized agency of the United Nations, the mission of UNESCO includes issues of communication and culture. During the conference, strong differences arose between Western industrialized nations and developing countries. Led by the United States, the first group insisted on the \"free flow of information\" doctrine, advocating \"free trade\" in information and media programs without any restrictions. The second group, concerned by the lack of balance in international media flows, accused Western countries of invoking the free flow of information ideology to justify their economic and cultural domination. They argued instead ·for a \"free and balanced flow\" of information. The chasm between the two groups was too wide to be reconciled. This eventually was one of the major reasons given for withdrawal from UNESCO by the United States and the United Kingdom-which resulted in the de facto fall of the global media debate. A second stage of research identified with cultural imperialism has been associated with calls to revive the New World Information and Communication Order debate. What differentiates this line of research from earlier cultural imperialism formulations is its emphasis on the commercialization of the sphere of culture. Research into this area had been a hallmark of cultural imperialism research, but now there is a deliberate focus on transnational corporations as actors, as opposed to nation-states, and on transnational capital flows, as opposed to image flows. Obviously, it is hard to separate the power of transnational corporations from that of nation-states, and it is difficult to distinguish clearly between capital flows and media flows. Therefore, the evolution of the debate is mainly a redirection of emphasis rather than a paradigm shift. It has become fashionable in some international communication circles to dismiss cultural imperialism as a monolithic theory that is lacking subtlety and increasingly questioned by empirical research. Cultural imperialism does have some weaknesses, but it also continues to be useful. Perhaps the most important contribution of cultural imperialism is the argument that international communication flows, processes, and effects are permeated by power. Nevertheless, it seems that the concept of globalization has in some ways replaced cultural imperialism as the main conceptual umbrella under which much research and theorizing in international communication have been conducted. **Media, Globalization, and Hybridization** Several reasons explain the analytical shift from cultural imperialism to globalization. First, the end of the Cold War as a global framework for ideological, geopolitical, and economic competition calls for a rethinking of the analytical categories and paradigms of thought. By giving rise to the United States as sole superpower and at the same time making the world more fragmented, the end of the Cold War ushered in an era of complexity between global forces of cohesion and local reactions of dispersal. In this complex era, the nation-state is no longer the sale or dominant player, since transnational transactions occur on sub national, national, and supranational levels. Conceptually, globalization appears to capture this complexity better than cultural imperialism. Second, according to John Tomlinson (1991), globalization replaced cultural imperialism because it conveys a process with less coherence and direction, which will weaken the cultural unity of all nation-states, not only those in the developing world. Finally, globalization has emerged as a key perspective across the humanities and social sciences, a current undoubtedly affecting the discipline of communication. In fact, the globalization of culture has become a conceptual magnet attracting research and theorizing efforts from a variety of disciplines and interdisciplinary formations such as anthropology, comparative literature, cultural studies, communication and media studies, geography, and sociology. International communication has been an active interlocutor in this debate because media and information technologies play an important role in the process of globalization. Although the media are undeniably one of the engines of cultural globalization, the size and intensity of the effect of the media on the globalization of culture is a contested issue revolving around the following question: Did the mass media trigger and create the globalization of culture? Or is the globalization of culture an old phenomenon that has only been intensified and made more obvious with the advent of transnational media technologies? Like the age-old question about whether the egg came before the chicken or vice versa, the question about the relationship between media and the globalization of culture is difficult to answer. One perspective on the globalization of culture, somewhat reminiscent of cultural imperialism in terms of the nature of the effect of media on culture, but somewhat different in its conceptualization of the issue, is the view that the media contribute to the homogenization of cultural differences across the planet. This view dominates conventional wisdom perspectives on cultural globalization conjuring up images of Planet Hollywood and the MTV generation. One of the most visible proponents of this perspective is political scientist Benjamin Barber, who formulated his theory about the globalization of culture in the book Jihad vs. McWorld (1996). The subtitle, \"How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World,\" betrays Barber\'s reliance on a binary opposition between the forces of modernity and liberal democracy with tradition and autocracy. Although Barber rightly points to transnational capitalism as the driving engine that brings Jihad and McWorld in contact and motivates their action, his model has two limitations. First, it is based on a binary opposition between Jihad, what he refers to as ethnic and religious tribalism, and McWorld, the capital-driven West. Barber (1996, p. 157) seemingly attempts to go beyond this binary opposition in a chapter titled "Jihad Via McWorld,\" in which he argues that Jihad stands in \"less of a stark opposition than a subtle counterpoint.\" However, the evidence offered in most of the book supports an oppositional rather than a contrapuntal perspective on the globalization of culture. The second limitation of Barber\'s book is that he privileges the global over the local, because, according to him, globalization rules via transnational capitalism. \"\[T\]o think that globalization and indigenization are entirely coequal forces that put Jihad and McWorld on an equal footing is to vastly underestimate the force of the new planetary markets \.... It\'s no contest\" (p. 12). Although it would be naive to argue that the local defeats the global, Barber\'s argument does not take into account the dynamic and resilient nature of cultures and their ability to negotiate foreign imports. Another perspective on globalization is cultural hybridity or hybridization. This view privileges an understanding of the interface of globalization and localization as a dynamic process and hybrid product of mixed traditions and cultural forms. As such, this perspective does not give prominence to globalization as a homogenizing force, nor does it believe in localization as a resistive process opposed to globalization. Rather, hybridization advocates an emphasis on processes of mediation that it views as central to cultural globalization. The concept of hybridization is the product of interdisciplinary work mostly based in intellectual projects such as post colonialism, cultural studies, and performance studies. Hybridization has been used in communication and media studies and appears to be a productive theoretical orientation as researchers in international media studies attempt to grasp the complex subtleties of the globalization of culture. One of the most influential voices in the debate about cultural hybridity is Argentinean Mexican cultural critic Nestor Garcia-Candini. In his book Hybrid Cultures (1995), Garcia-Candini advocates a theoretical understanding of Latin American nations as hybrid cultures. His analysis is both broad and incisive, covering a variety of cultural processes and institutions such as museums, television, film, universities, political cartoons, graffiti, and visual arts. According to Garcia-Candini, there are three main features of cultural hybridity. The first feature consists of mixing previously separate cultural systems, such as mixing the elite art of opera with popular music. The second feature of hybridity is the deterritorialization of cultural processes from their original physical environment to new and foreign contexts. Third, cultural hybridity entails impure cultural genres that are formed out of the mixture of several cultural domains. An example of these impure genres is when artisans in rural Mexico weave tapestries of masterpieces of European painters such as Joan Mira and Henri Matisse, mixing high art and folk artisanship into an impure genre. In media and communication research, the main question is \"Have transnational media made cultures across the globe hybrid by bringing into their midst foreign cultural elements, or have cultures always been to some extent hybrid, meaning that transnational mass media only strengthened an already-existing condition?\" There is no obvious or final answer to that question, because there is not enough empirical research about media and hybridity and because of the theoretical complexity of the issue. What does exist in terms of theoretical understanding and research results points to a middle ground? This position acknowledges that cultures have been in contact for a long time through warfare, trade, migration, and slavery. Therefore, a degree of hybridization in all cultures can be assumed. At the same time, this middle ground also recognizes that global media and information technologies have substantially increased contacts between cultures, both in terms of intensity and of the speed with which these contacts occur. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that transnational mass media intensify the hybridity that is already in existence in cultures across the globe. Consequently, the globalization of culture through the media is not a process of complete homogenization, but rather one where cohesion and fragmentation coexist. Source: Kraidy, M. (2002). Globalization of culture through the media. In J. R. Schement (Ed.),Encyclopedia of communication and information (Vol. 2, pp. 359-363). New York, NY: Macmillan Reference USA. Retrieved from. **LESSON 9** **THE GLOBALIZATION OF RELIGION** **Timeline: the Rise, Spread and Fall of the Islamic State** By Cameron Glenn Jul 5, 2016 Retrieved: **.** The Islamic State -- also known as ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh -- emerged from the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a local offshoot of al Qaeda founded by Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2004. It faded into obscurity for several years after the surge of U.S. troops to Iraq in 2007. But it began to reemerge in 2011. Over the next few years, it took advantage of growing instability in Iraq and Syria to carry out attacks and bolster its ranks. The group changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013. ISIS launched an offensive on Mosul and Tikrit in June 2014. On June 29, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced the formation of a caliphate stretching from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq, and renamed the group the Islamic State. A U.S.-led coalition began airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq on August 7, 2014, and expanded the campaign to Syria the following month. On October 15, the United States named the campaign "Operation Inherent Resolve." Over the next year, the United States conducted more than 8,000 airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. ISIS suffered key losses along Syria's border with Turkey, and by the end of 2015, Iraqi forces had made progress in recapturing Ramadi. But in Syria, ISIS made gains near Aleppo, and still firmly held Raqqa and other strongholds. In 2015, ISIS expanded into a network of affiliates in at least eight other countries. Its branches, supporters, and affiliates increasingly carried out attacks beyond the borders of its so-called caliphate. In October, ISIS's Egypt affiliate bombed a Russian airplane, killing 224 people. On November 13, 130 people were killed and more than 300 injured in a series of coordinated attacks in Paris. And in June 2016, a gunman who pledged support to ISIS killed at least four dozen people at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida.  By December 2017, the ISIS caliphate had lost 95 percent of its territory, including its two biggest properties, Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, and the northern Syrian city of Raqqa, its nominal capital. The Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi declared victory over the Islamic State in Iraq on December 9, 2017. But ISIS was still inspiring and carrying out attacks all over the world, including New York City. **Religion in the New Global War** Mark Juergensmeyer When Mohammed Atta boarded the airline on September 11, 2001 that soon thereafter slammed into the World Trade Center towers, he left behind a manual of instruction. Apparently prepared by his colleagues in the al Qaeda network, it instructed him and his fellow activists how to behave and what to do in preparation for their fateful act. What is interesting about this document is not only the text, but the subtext. Lying beneath the pious rhetoric of the manual and its eerie ties to the World Trade Center tragedy are hints about the perplexing issue of the role of religion in the contemporary world, and answers to the persistent question, how could religion be related to such vicious acts of political violence? The common sense way of putting this question about the September 11 attack and all of the other recent acts of religious terrorism is "what's religion got to do with it?" The common sense answers to this question are varied, and they are contradictory. On the one hand some political leaders---along with many scholars of comparative religion---have assured us that religion has had nothing to do with these vicious acts, and that religion's innocent images have been used in perverse ways by evil and essentially irreligious political actors. On the other hand there are the radio talk show hosts and even a few social scientists who affirm that religion, especially Islam, has had everything to do with it---and not just ordinary religion, but a perverse strain of fundamentalism that has infected normal religion and caused it to go bad. **The Role of Religion** What is odd about this new global war is not only the difficulty in defining it and the nonstate, transnational character of the opposition, but also the opponents\' ascription to ideologies based on religion. The tradition of secular politics from the time of the Enlightenment has comfortably ignored religion, marginalized its role in public life, and frequently co-opted it for its own civil religion of public religiosity. No one in the secular world could have predicted that the first confrontations of the 21st century would involve, of all things, religion\--secularism\'s old, long banished foe. Religious activists are puzzling anomalies in the secular world. Most religious people and their organizations are either firmly supportive of the secular state or quiescently uninterested in it. Osama bin Laden\'s al Qaeda network, like most of the new religious activists, comprise a small group at the extreme end of a hostile subculture that itself is a small minority within the larger world of their religious cultures. Osama bin Laden is no more representative of Islam than Timothy McVeigh is of Christianity, or Japan\'s Shoko Asahara is of Buddhism. Still one cannot deny that the ideals and ideas of activists like bin Laden are authentically and thoroughly religious and could conceivably become popular among their religious compatriots. The authority of religion has given bin Laden\'s cadres the moral legitimacy of employing violence in their assault on the very symbol of global economic power. It has also provided the metaphor of cosmic war, an image of spiritual struggle that every religion has within its repository of symbols\--the fight between good and bad, truth and evil. In this sense, then, the attack on the World Trade Center was very religious. It was meant to be catastrophic, an act of biblical proportions. Though the World Trade Center assault and many other recent acts of religious terrorism have no obvious military goal, they are meant to make a powerful impact on the public consciousness. These are acts meant for television. They are a kind of perverse performance of power meant to ennoble the perpetrators\' views of the world and to draw us into their notions of cosmic war. In my comparative study of cases of religious terrorism around the world I have found a strikingly familiar pattern. In all of these cases, concepts of cosmic war are accompanied by strong claims of moral justification and an enduring absolutism that transforms worldly struggles into sacred battles. It is not so much that religion has become politicized, but that politics have become religionized. Worldly struggles have been lifted into the high proscenium of sacred battle. **Global War** The September 11 attack and many other recent acts of religious terrorism are skirmishes in what their perpetrators conceive to be a global war. This battle is global in three senses. The choices of targets have often been transnational. The World Trade Center employees killed in the September 11 assault were citizens of 86 nations. The network of perpetrators was also transnational: the al Qaeda network that was implicated in the attack\--though consisting mostly of Saudis\--is also actively supported by Pakistanis, Egyptians, Palestinians, Sudanese, Algerians, Indonesians, Malaysians, Filipinos, and a smattering of British, French, Germans, Spanish and Americans. The incident was global in its impact, in large part because of the worldwide and instantaneous coverage of transnational news media. This has been terrorism meant not only for television but for global news networks such as CNN\--and especially for al Jazeera, the Qatar based news channel that beams its talk-show format throughout the Middle East. Increasingly terrorism has been performed for a televised audience around the world. In that sense it has been as real a global event as the transnational activities of the global economy and as vivid as the globalized forms of entertainment and information that crowd satellite television channels and the internet. Ironically, terrorism has become a more efficient global force than the organized political efforts to control and contain it. No single entity, including the United Nations, possesses the military capability and intelligence-gathering capacities to deal with worldwide terrorism. Instead, consortia of nations have been formed to handle the information-sharing and joint operations required to deal with forces of violence on an international scale. This global dimension of terrorism\'s organization and audience, and the transnational responses to it, gives special significance to the understanding of terrorism as a public performance of violence\--as a social event that has both real and symbolic aspects. As the late French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has observed, our public life is shaped by symbols as much as by institutions. For this reason, symbolic acts\--the \"rites of institution\"\--help to demarcate public space and indicate what is meaningful in the social world. In a striking imitation of such rites, terrorism has provided its own dramatic events. These rites of violence have signaled alternative views of public reality: not just a single society in transition, but a world challenged by strident religious visions of transforming change. **Empowering Religion** Such religious warfare not only gives individuals who have engaged in it the illusion of empowerment, it also gives religious organizations and ideas a public attention and importance that they have not enjoyed for many years. In modern America and Europe, the warfare has given religion a prominence in public life that it has not held since before the Enlightenment, more than two centuries ago. Although each of the violent religious movements around the world has its own distinctive culture and history, I have found that they have three things in common regarding their attitudes towards religion in society. First, they reject the compromises with liberal values and secular institutions that most mainstream religion has made, be it Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist. Second, radical religious movements refuse to observe the boundaries that secular society has set around religion\--keeping it private rather than allowing it to intrude into public spaces. And third, these movements try to create a new form of religiosity that rejects what they regard as weak modern substitutes for the more vibrant and demanding forms of religion that they imagine to be essential to their religion\'s origins. (Retrieved from:.) **Beyond the Secularization Debate** - There is a discontinuity between research agenda that focus on secularization and globalization. - Social Scientists have debated the scope, nature, extent and parameters of secularization in an effort to unveil the overall patterns and/or trajectories of the modern world. - Initially, secularization had a strong following but eventually it was superseded by re-evaluation. - Various debates lead to re-appraisal. - Secularization debates have been ref