The Economics of Sports PDF

The Economics of Sports 6TH EDITION Michael E. Leeds, Peter Von Allman, and Victor A. Matheson CHAPTER 11 Economics of...

The Economics of Sports 6TH EDITION Michael E. Leeds, Peter Von Allman, and Victor A. Matheson CHAPTER 11 Economics of discrimination in sports 1 IN THIS CHAPTER Grasp the evidence of the presence or absence of discrimination in professional sports Understand the economic theory of discrimination Describe the different forms of discrimination and how they affect employment and pay Appreciate how gender discrimination differs from racial discrimination © 2024 Taylor & Francis®. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website or school-approved learning management system for classroom use. 2 Why study discrimination in sports? Sports in a reflection of society as a whole. If we are seeing discrimination in sports heroes, likely that discrimination is occurring in society at large. Availability of data in sports. Here is income data for US: Education Whites Blacks Hispanics Less than HS 10.8% 12.0% 35.8% HS degree 30.2% 36.7% 29.5% Some college 29.6% 31.3% 22.8% College grad 19.5% 14.5% 8.8% Masters + 10.0% 5.4% 3.1% Avg. Income $48,824 $35,493 $32,633 Is there discrimination here? Hard to disentangle pay, race, and skills in society overall. Not so in sports. © 2024 Taylor & Francis®. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website or school-approved learning management system for classroom use. 3 Discrimination through the lens of economics Are people of different demographic groups are evaluated and rewarded solely on the basis of their productivity? Two aspects of discrimination in sport. Unequal access to work. Do equally qualified people have equal access to labor markets? (Inclusion) Are black football players are systematically drafted in lower rounds than whites? Unequal pay for equal work. Are equally productive workers in identical positions are paid the same? (Equity) Are foreign NBA or NHL players are paid less than otherwise identical U.S.-born players. USWNT soccer vs. USMNT © 2024 Taylor & Francis®. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website or school-approved learning management system for classroom use. 4 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination The economic approach to discrimination differs from that of other disciplines because economists focus much more on the outcome of discrimination than its origin. Economists distinguish between prejudice, which is a feeling or emotion, and discrimination, which is an action. Becker’s theory begins with prejudice in that it rests on the concept of a taste for discrimination. Becker’s central insight was that people can have a taste for discrimination just like they can have a taste for a specific flavor of ice cream. People have a taste for discrimination if they act as if they are willing to pay to associate with one group rather than another. People may have a preference for hiring, watching, or working with players of a particular race, ethnicity, language, or country of origin. This “taste” is not necessarily explainable. If this taste is widespread, it will cause wages of the preferred group to rise and non-preferred group to fall. 5 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Employer Discrimination Becker’s model takes a broader view of the firm than simple profit maximization, assuming that an employer may be willing to sacrifice profits to avoid associating with a group of people that reduces his or her utility. Consider the experience of European hockey players in the National Hockey League. Although European-born players had played in the NHL since its inception in 1917, no player trained in Europe played in the NHL until 1965. As recently as the 2000s, some teams avoided European players Several researchers have asked whether European players have been the victims of discrimination by the NHL, particularly by Canadian teams. If this were the case, employers might prefer not to associate with “foreign” players. Assume that there are only two groups of players, North American (NA) and European (E) and that all players are equally productive. In the absence of discrimination, demand for the two types of players would be equal. 6 How to measure discrimination The magnitude of a taste for discrimination measured by a discrimination coefficient (dε). dε is the additional amount people are willing to pay to engage with the preferred group. If an employer is willing to pay w for the non-preferred group, they will be willing to pay w(1+ dε) for the preferred group. The taste for discrimination leads to higher demand and higher wages (wNA) for the preferred group (North Americans) vs. wages for the other group (wE) (Europeans) in the graph for NHL players. © 2024 Taylor & Francis®. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website or school-approved learning management system for classroom use. 7 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Employer Discrimination If the supply of North Americans or the taste for discrimination is great enough, then teams will hire no Europeans (unequal access to work). The National and American Leagues in baseball hired no blacks at all between 1888 and 1947. To make this more concrete, suppose the owner of an NHL club is comparing two players who perform identically on every skill test, play the same position, and have identical past experience. Either player would sign a contract for $500,000 per season. However, one player, Eddie is from Toronto, and the other, Jiri, is from Prague. The owner now separates the prospects into two groups: Eddie is an NA, and Jiri is an E. Because the owner has a taste for discrimination against all E’s, his discrimination coefficient is positive, say 0.2. He feels as if he pays Eddie 𝑊𝑁𝐴 = $500,000 and pays Jiri 𝑊𝐸 = $500,000(1+0.2) = $600,000. The owner does not actually pay the extra $100,000, but his desire not to associate with European players makes him feel as though he were paying the extra, psychological cost. 8 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Employer Discrimination The owner does incur additional costs if the increase in demand for NA’s increases their pay above $500,000. If enough owners have a taste for discrimination against E’s, the market for players resembles that shown in the first panel of the previous figure, and owners with a taste for discrimination pay higher salaries than those without. In this case, discriminating makes the team owner worse off financially. Even prejudiced owners employ E’s if the players are willing to work for wages that are low enough. In the previous example, a discrimination coefficient of 0.2 means the owner feels that he is paying E’s a premium of 20 percent. If the E’s are willing to work for 20 percent less than NA’s, the owner is willing to hire them. In this case, E’s receive unequal pay for equal work. 9 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Employer Discrimination Discrimination makes E players worse off. E’s receive no offers as long as employers feel they pay them more than they pay otherwise equivalent NA’s. Even if E’s are hired, they receive lower offers than equally productive NA’s. NA’s are better off as a group because their chances of making the team, and their pay if they do, both increase. Although owners avoid associating with E’s, they pay for the privilege in the form of reduced profits. We stress that owners are worse off financially, not worse off overall. Discriminatory owners are maximizing their utility. In this case, utility maximization comes at the cost of reduced profit. 10 Discrimination in practice Study of Swiss amateur football clubs 11 Discrimination in practice Individuals with foreign names, as well as individuals with Swiss names from some other native groups, received significantly fewer responses 12 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Employer Discrimination: Statistical Discrimination To this point, we have assumed that there are no systematic differences between E and NA players. However, it has been noted that that Czech, Slovak, and Russian players are generally better offensive players than North Americans. An NHL team might therefore conclude that any Czech player will be a top goal- scorer but weak on defense. But group averages are just that, and they mask the individual variation within groups. Each player should be judged on his own merits, rather than those of the group to which he belongs. The use of group averages to judge individual productivity levels is called statistical discrimination. Differs from ordinary discrimination because it is based on incomplete information rather than on the preferences of people with full information. Can have a strong impact on a team’s hiring practices. 13 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Employer Discrimination: Statistical Discrimination Statistical discrimination is troublesome for two reasons. 1. It may be profit-maximizing behavior on the part of firms. Even though assuming that each European player is weaker defensively than each North American is not always accurate, teams may be correct on average if they always use this assumption when choosing players. Thus, they may feel their actions are justified. 2. Second, statistical discrimination can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If offensive-minded European forwards are drafted and defensive-minded ones are not, over time, league statistics will reflect that Europeans are offensive- minded. This means that statistical discrimination can persist even if the initial difference in offensive versus defensive ability stemmed from inaccurate perceptions. 14 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Does Anyone Win With Employer Discrimination? Consider the case of racial discrimination in Major League Baseball. Blacks were effectively barred from organized baseball from 1888 to 1947 by a “gentlemen’s agreement”, and black players who were good enough to play in the major leagues were confined to the so-called Negro Leagues. One group that benefited from discrimination was white players of that era. Because blacks were excluded, more white players played in MLB than would have been possible otherwise. Assume that player productivity is the same and that 30% of prospective players are black. If there is a very large pool of available labor, the market supply curve (S) of players is a horizontal line, and players receive the market wage (w). In this case, the labor force is so large relative to demand that restricting the market to white players results in the same wage, but all players will be white, rather than 30% black. 15 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination How Competition Can Eliminate Discrimination Becker’s theory implies that less-discriminatory employers will be more successful than highly discriminatory employers. Suppose that discriminatory employers are willing to pay blacks $30 per hour and whites $40 per hour. An unprejudiced employer can enter and undercut any employer who uses white labor by hiring only blacks and paying them $32 per hour. Continued entry by unprejudiced employers increases the wage paid to black workers, eventually driving profits to zero. At that point, any discriminatory employers who continue to pay higher wages to white workers are driven from the market because of their higher costs. Discriminators must eventually pay all workers the same wage if they stay in the market. Although professional sports markets are not perfectly competitive, the pressure to win games and championships is a powerful motivation for owners to overcome their prejudices. 17 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination When Markets Are Not Competitive An important weakness of Becker’s theory is that the penalty for discriminating employers comes from competitive markets. If markets are not competitive, firms may be able to discriminate indefinitely, as workers have nowhere else to sell their services. When the market power of a monopolist or monopsonist breaks down, the ability to discriminate often breaks down as well. NHL’s disdain for European hockey players was undermined by the play of European stars signed by the upstart league World Hockey Association in the 1970s. European representation in the NHL went from 0 in 1970 to 5.7 percent in 1980 to 20.5 percent in 2000. 2015-16 was the first season in which a majority of NHL players was not Canadian, and by 2021 27.7 percent of the NHL was European. 18 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Employee Discrimination Employees with a taste for discrimination against their coworkers regard the market wage w as (𝑤 − 𝑑𝑗 ), where 𝑑𝑗 represents the coefficient of discrimination. In the 1880s, a few black baseball players played in the American Association, then a “major” league. Several blacks also played in the International League, which was a minor league. Some white players refused to play for teams that hired blacks, and others played only grudgingly. Cap Anson, a star white player of the time with a well-known dislike for black players, threatened not to play against blacks (though he did play when he learned he would not be paid otherwise) and his opposition prevented the New York Giants’ from signing black pitcher George Stovey in 1887. Such behavior persisted even though the few blacks who were in the game, such as Fleetwood Walker and Frank Grant, were among the top players in their leagues. 20 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Employee Discrimination If markets are perfectly competitive, and players of different groups are perfect substitutes for one another, those with a taste for discrimination are driven from the market. Becker argued that this should eliminate employee discrimination from the market in the long run. Although employer and/or employee discrimination may have significantly depressed salaries of minorities as recently as the mid-1980s, most studies of the NFL, NBA, and MLB, find no wage differentials based on race. If Becker’s theory is correct, there are two explanations for why this has happened. 1. The competition among teams could have driven out discriminatory owners and players. 2. Alternatively, the utility derived from the economic gains could be so much greater than the utility derived from discriminating that those with a taste for discrimination choose to stay in the market and bear the disutility of playing with groups they do not like. 21 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Consumer Discrimination George Preston Marshall, the former owner of the then all-white Washington Redskins: “Recruiting Southern white players was not prejudice … but a business decision. As an owner, I do not want to offend my Southern white radio and television audience by playing blacks.” Consumers have a taste for discrimination if they prefer not to purchase goods or services from members of a specific group. A football fan with a taste for discrimination against black players perceives the price of admission to a game with only white players to be p and the price of admission to a game that includes blacks to be p(1 + 𝑑𝑘 ). Consumer discrimination can be difficult to isolate in sports because so many factors affect consumer demand. Evidence from empirical research on TV ratings is mixed. Other researchers have abstracted from other demand factors by analyzing the market for trading cards, also with mixed results. Unfortunately, market forces do not eliminate consumer discrimination over time. If consumers have a taste for discrimination against a particular group, and employers maximize profit, even unprejudiced employers will not hire any members of that group. 22 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Consumer Discrimination Evidence suggests that consumer discrimination continued in the NBA until the early 1990s and that discriminatory consumers were the source of the differential. Kahn and Sherer found that blacks in the NBA earned about 20 percent less than equally productive white players in the mid-1980s. A later study by Hamilton found that the average salaries of black and white players had become virtually identical by the 1994–1995 season, but this was because white players were overrepresented at both ends of the pay distribution. White stars were paid 19 percent more than black stars, while marginal white players displaced marginal black players at the bottom of the pay scale. US sports fans’ taste for discrimination appears to be declining. Hansen and Anderson find from the results of fan voting for MLB All-Stars that consumer discrimination has declined sharply since the 1970s. Gius and Johnson use salaries of NBA players from the 1995–1996 season to show no evidence of discrimination, contradicting Hamilton’s findings from just one year earlier. 23 11.2 An Economic Theory of Discrimination Consumer Discrimination However, in international football, the story is different. Black players have been subjected to “monkey chants” and been pelted with bananas in stadiums throughout Europe. Games have been played before empty stadiums from Bergamo, Italy (home of Atalanta, B.C.) to Urawa, Japan (home of the Urawa Reds) because of the racist behavior of home fans. A BBC program advised fans to stay away from the 2012 European Championships after a visit to matches in Poland and Ukraine, the co-hosts of Euro 2012 documented “Nazi salutes from the terraces, black players being taunted with monkey chants, rampant anti-Semitism and a vicious assault on a group of Asian students.” 24 11.3 Toward Equal Access While the overall evidence is mixed, the Racial and Gender Report Cards, which are published annually by The Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sport (TIDES) at the University of Central Florida, find that racial discrimination is no longer a significant factor for professional athletes in the US. There is much work left to do to increase gender diversity in management. Only the WNBA earns a grade above C- for gender inclusion in senior administration. Beyond the front office, women have made almost no progress in coaching and officiating. MLS leads the way in hiring female officials, with nine women refereeing in 2020. As of 2021, five women refereed in the NBA, two in the NFL, and none in MLB or the NHL. 25 European football Stephanie Frappart became the first woman to: referee a major men's European match and a French Ligue 1 match, both in 2019 officiate a UEFA Champions League match in 2020. take charge of a men's World Cup qualifying match in 2021. one of the three women referees selected to officiate at the men’s 2022 World Cup, referee a men's World Cup match in an all-female referee team. 26 11.3 Toward Equal Access The Troubling Case of NFL Head Coaches Compared to players, whites are disproportionately represented among owners, coaches, and assistant coaches. Research by Janice Madden shows that between 1990 and 2001, minority head coaches in the NFL were significantly more successful than their white counterparts, raising the question of whether black coaches must perform better to keep their jobs. By 2003, the NFL had become so alarmed at the lack of black head coaches that it adopted the “Rooney Rule”, which requires teams to interview minority candidates for head coaching and other senior administrative openings. Studies of the NBA find that race plays no role in the performance or dismissal of head coaches. Serious doubt has been cast upon the efficacy of the Rooney rule for three reasons: the number of black head coaches in the NFL has dwindled from 22 percent in 2011 to 9.4 percent in 2020; the rule does not consider all marginalized groups; several black coaches felt that they were interviewed simply to satisfy the rule, with no legitimate chance at the position. Eugene Chung, a Korean American, reported that a team had told him that he was “not really a minority,” to which the interviewer added, he was “not the right minority.” 27 11.3 Toward Equal Access The Troubling Case of NFL Head Coaches For all leagues except the WNBA, women do not appear at all in the coaching ranks. The absence of women suggests that they may too be the victims of statistical discrimination. If, on average, women do not know as much as men about football, they could be systematically discouraged from pursuing roles as coaches. The problem is that uncertainty causes employers to attribute the characteristics of the average person in the group to each member of the group. If discrimination occurs early in the screening process, qualified women may never get the opportunity to reveal their skills. Interestingly, the NFL leads the way among men’s sports with 12 female assistant coaches as of 2020. 15 different women have served as assistant coaches in the NBA, with seven active members of coaching staffs in 2021. 28 11.3 Toward Equal Access Meaningful Progress: Women in Broadcasting Historically, men have completely dominated the role of play-by-play announcer and analyst. While women have long been part of broadcast teams in the NFL as sideline reporters, they have only recently begun to appear in the broadcast booth. But in some leagues, that is changing. For the 2021–2022 NBA season, nearly 20 percent of local broadcast teams are women. MLB has begun to see similar changes. In July 2021, in a game aired on ESPN, five women made history as the first all-female broadcast crew. Also in 2021, Leah Hextall became the first woman to call National Hockey League games in the NHL. 29 11.3 Toward Equal Access Role Discrimination Economists call the systematic steering of minorities to specific positions role discrimination. Positional discrimination When this occurs among the ranks of players, we refer to it as positional discrimination or stacking. This type of discrimination has long been an issue in both the NFL and MLB. Since about 2/3 of the players in the NFL are black, one would expect about 2/3 of the players at each position and 2/3 of the coaches to be black, but this is not the case. Whites dominate at some positions while blacks dominate at others. In 2014, 81 percent of NFL quarterbacks were white, as were 75 percent of the centers and 55 percent of the tight ends. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 86 percent of the running backs, 91 percent of wide receivers, 78.9 percent of the safeties, and 99.4 of the cornerbacks were black. In general, white players are more likely to be found on offense than on defense. Berri and Simmons find evidence of discrimination against black quarterbacks in the NFL, and show that, controlling for this measure, black quarterbacks at the upper half of the salary scale are paid less than equally productive white quarterbacks. 30 11.3 Toward Equal Access Discrimination by Officials Joseph Price and Justin Wolfers find that black players are assessed 4– 4.5% more fouls per 48 minutes than white players when the referees are white. Probability of victory for the team with more white players rises by about 3 percentage points as the referee crew changes from all black to all white. Equal Pay Yang and Yu find that foreign players in the NBA are paid as much as 17.4 percent less than otherwise identical U.S. natives. However, a recent study by Hoffer and Freidel finds no such gap. 31  11.4 Gender Equity in Competitive Sports In March 2016, five members of the US Women’s National Soccer Team filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, accusing the US Soccer Federation of discrimination against members of the women’s national team. To justify their claims, they pointed to disparities in both performance and pay. USWNT – WWC (9): 4 golds, 1 silver, 3 bronze Olympics (8) : 4 golds, 1 silver, 2 bronze USMNT - WC (21): 1 bronze, 1 QF, 4 round of 16, 4 group, 11 DNQ Olympics: Failed to qualify for last 3, 4th place best finish. However, US men earned more for finishing 15th in the men’s World Cup competition 2014 than the US women did for winning the women’s World Cup in 2015. 32 History of discrimination US Soccer (and FIFA) have a long history of discrimination. Dick, Kerr’s Ladies in England around 1920 drew crowds of up to 50,000. The English Football Association then banned women’s teams from all FA grounds from 1921-1971. FIFA didn’t organize a Women’s World Cup until 1991, 61 years after the Men’s World Cup and 71 years after first FIFA championship at Olympics. (And even then as a afterthought.) © 2024 Taylor & Francis®. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website or school-approved learning management system for classroom use. 33 Rise of “the Girls of Summer” Women’s soccer added to Olympics in 1996. (76,000 fans attend gold-medal match in Athens, GA.) US hosts 1999 World Cup in major stadiums (against wishes of FIFA). 32 matches with avg. attendance of 37,000+. Final has 90,000+ and 18 million tv viewers (more than any NBA finals game that year and most watched soccer game in US history to that point.) © 2024 Taylor & Francis®. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website 3 or school-approved learning management system for classroom use. 4 35 11.4 Gender Equity in Competitive Sports March 2019: members of the USWNT sued the US Soccer Federation (USSF), alleging that the USSF had violated Civil Rights Act, which guarantees equal pay. February 2022: the suit was settled for $24 million. While it stood as a significant victory for the USWNT, the settlement was only between them and US Soccer and did not resolve the massive disparity in World Cup payments, which are set by FIFA. May 2022: US Soccer agreed to a new labor deal with both men’s and women’s soccer that guarantees a 50–50 split of all revenues and equal pay for both teams. Importantly, this includes all payments from FIFA prize money. The settlement represents an enormous and hard- fought victory for women’s soccer. While there is no question about the USWNT’s performance and their popularity in the US, World Cup figures tell a more complex story. The difference in prize money can be traced directly to the difference in sponsorship: $529 million to $17 million. As a result, the 2023 Women’s World Cup generated about $570 million in revenue, while the 2022 men’s tournament generated about $6.3 billion. It is much more difficult to test whether claims like the USWNT’s are valid than it is to test for racial discrimination because women and men rarely compete together. Differences in venues, times, and conditions make it much harder to hold “all else equal” and isolate the role played by gender. 36 11.4 Gender Equity in Competitive Sports When “Open tennis” first allowed professionals to participate in the 1970s, men’s prize money was approximately 10 times that of women. In November 1972, the Women’s U.S. Open champion, Billie Jean King, threatened to lead a boycott of the 1973 Open unless the prize money was equalized. Her protest succeeded, and prize money was soon equalized. Gender differences in prize money persisted, with Wimbledon not awarding equal prizes until 2007. Prize differences by themselves are not sufficient for most economists to conclude that discrimination exists. Even today, some claim that men should be paid more because (at least in Grand Slam tournaments) men play longer matches and because, allegedly, men’s tennis is more popular. This latter claim is questionable. Women’s matches for the 2013 and 2014 US Open garnered higher TV ratings than men’s matches, and the 2015 women’s US Open sold out more quickly than the men’s tournament. 37 11.4 Gender Equity in Competitive Sports Trans, Nonbinary, and Intersexed Athletes To provide separate but equal athletic opportunities, sports authorities, from high schools to the International Olympic Committee, must first define gender. This has proven so complex that the IOC essentially gave up trying to do so before the 2016 Rio Games. The first Olympic gender controversy came in the 1936 Berlin Games, when Helen Stephens of the US was accused of being a man after she upset the favored Stella Walsh (Stanisława Walasiewicz) of Poland. At first, the IOC tried to resolve this by directly examining women’s anatomies. It soon became clear that direct examination was not always effective because as many as 1 in 1500 people are born with “atypical genitalia.” Thus, in 1968, chromosome tests replaced the so-called “nude parades.” These, too, proved inadequate, as the authorities discovered that anatomy sometimes does not match genetics. 38 11.4 Gender Equity in Competitive Sports Trans, Nonbinary, and Intersexed Athletes In 1985, officials from the International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF) informed Spanish hurdler Maria José Martínez-Patiño that they considered her to be a man. The IAAF-mandated tests showed that she did not have XX chromosomes in her 23 pairs and had testes (which were internal and had never been detected), and she produced levels of testosterone that were consistent with being a man. Martínez-Patiño’s body could not process the testosterone, so it could not affect her physique, and she had developed as a woman. Still, denied her “certificate of femininity,” Martinez-Patiño’s career as a hurdler came to an end. In 2000, the IAAF and IOC replaced chromosome tests with measurements of testosterone. This test was challenged by lawyers representing Duttee Chand, a runner from India, whose gender had been challenged on this basis. In 2015 the Court of Arbitration of Sports struck down this test, claiming that the IAAF and IOC had not proven that Chand had an advantage that surpassed other natural advantages, such as height (Chand is only five feet tall). Caster Semenya was banned in participating in 2020 Olympics in 400m, 800m, 1500m races unless she takes medication to suppress their testosterone levels. In 2021 IOC released a framework which allowed sports federations to freely set gender rules under their guidelines. 39 40 End of chapter questions 1) Suppose that the competitive wage in a football league is $20,000 per season. One team owner has a taste for discrimination against all nonwhite players. His coefficient of discrimination against Hispanics is 0.20, and his coefficient of discrimination against blacks is 0.18. a. What would he consider the wages of people who are members of these two groups to be? b. If the supply of players were perfectly elastic, what would happen to the representation of blacks, Hispanics, and non-Hispanics on the team? 2) A football midfielder comes to you, claiming that black midfielders are the victims of racial discrimination by teams. How would you test his claim? What finding would prove (or disprove) his claim? 3) Under what circumstances would market forces fail to eliminate discrimination? 4) A professional sports team refuses to hire women as executives because it feels their family duties do not allow them to devote adequate time to the team. Is this discrimination? Justify your answer. 5) In 2016, the British Open awarded about $8.5 million in prize money while the British Women’s Open awarded only $3 million. Is this evidence of gender discrimination in golf? Why or why not? 6) Use what you know about the prisoner’s dilemma to explain why the English Premier League teams such as Arsenal have so many foreign players even when, as a group, the Premier League teams agree that they want to limit the number of foreign-born players. 41