PLSC 300D Fall 2024 Final Exam Study Guide PDF

Summary

This is a study guide for a political science final exam, PLSC 300D, Fall 2024. It covers topics like leadership, international relations, and public policy.

Full Transcript

## Final Exam Study Guide ### Week 6: Leaders 1. When do leaders and leaders' personality traits matter most? * Leaders personality traits matter the most for: * New or changing institutions - the person at the top has most influence because checks and balances are not established....

## Final Exam Study Guide ### Week 6: Leaders 1. When do leaders and leaders' personality traits matter most? * Leaders personality traits matter the most for: * New or changing institutions - the person at the top has most influence because checks and balances are not established. * When there are few institutional constraints - personality of leader matters. * During crises or unprecedented moments - leader interprets situation and responds. 2. What personality traits are relevant for understanding the effect of leaders? * This questions the rational actor assumption because the rational actor assumption says that leaders don't matter and everyone would make the same choices. * Leader changes outcome changes. * Different risk perceptions matter the most: * Risk propensity: fixed personality trait. * Prospect theory: risk depends on context, willing to do more to recover a loss than get something framed as a gain. * Middle ground: risk behavior = situation + individual, ex. Bush and Obama using drones in Afghanistan. Obama more risk adverse Bush changed his mind across context before and after 9/11. * Source of threats matter as well as gender. * Women have an incentive to show they are strong and effective leaders by being more hawkish. 3. How can interpersonal interactions influence international security? * When leaders are able to sit down with one another they look at verbal and nonverbal signals. Some leaders are better at reading other people than other leaders. This is most influential when both leaders have room to make the final policy decision. * Leaders are able to determine sincerity. Leaders think they are really good reading these cues but they are often wrong. Leaders have a lot of confidence in this. 4. What are issue-image trade-offs? Why do they matter? How are they related to defense spending? * Issue image trade-off - a leader will take a policy position that is not popular but crafts a favorable image. * The public wants strong leaders with good judgment but if forced to choose strong leadership matters more. * Leaders care a lot about what the public thinks so they will do things that make them more likeable despite what they actually want to do. * Increasing defense spending is not popular but will make you look like a strong leader. Shows that you will be competent in foreign policy. The "have your cake and eat it too" of hawkish behaviour. ### Week 7: Civilians, Experts and Elites 1. What is the unitary actor assumption? * States are single entities with central national interest. States as one person. National security policy = goals. Look at actions to figure out interests of the state. * One central national interest. POTUS is decision maker and decisions are rational reflections of intent. 2. Describe the differences between the rational policy, organizational process, and bureaucratic politics models of decision making. How does each model relate to the unitary actor assumption? * **Rational policy model:** * Purposive choices of consistent actors. The actors are a unified government. Wanted to reach a goal and do what they need to get there. One actor, one decision, one goal. This is basically the unitary actor assumption. * **Organization process:** * Multiple actors complex problems, complex routines, lots of coordinating is necessary. There are standard operating procedures and a chain of command. Things are slow to change. They are not choosing the best thing in an ideal world but what they are prepared to do and what has already been planned for. * The president cannot just do what he thinks is best but input form organizations as well as what has already been planned for matters * **Bureaucratic politics:** * Actions are the result of bargains made between multiple actors. Usually not anyone's first choice but what everyone could agree on. Depends on personalities and organizations at play. * This also goes against the unitary actor assumption because there are a lot of voices trying to get their opinions heard and their plan implemented. 3. What is an elite cue? Which elite cues matter the most? How do leaders respond to the risk of elite cues? * An elite cue tells the public what to pay attention to and what to care about. They act as a fire alarm because the public usually does not care about foreign policy so when elites voice their concern they know to pay attention. * When a cue is against type so a dovish elite takes a hawkish position or a hawkish elite takes a dovish position. It is most important for the latter. When someone who you would expect to want to use force comes out and says that it is a bad idea this matters across political party. * Leaders try to avoid elite cues so they do concede more to hawkish elites who want to be dovish than others in the room to avoid that elite cue. * Institutional are cues based on the organization that someone is in. Substantive are cues based on the person's personality or what they did before their advisor role. When people know these factors they are able to see if someone is sending an against-type cue. 4. What is the difference between a dove and a hawk? Which "type" has the most influence in bureaucratic politics? * **Hawks** want to use military force and find it effective for achieving national security goals. * **Doves** are skeptical of military force and prefer diplomacy. * Both are interventionalists. * **Hawks** have the most influence because their elite cues hold the most weight when they are against type. ### Week 8: Parties and Legislators + The Public 1. What power does Congress have over national security decisions? * The war powers resolution dictated the length and content of operations. It limits the power of the president and acts as a formal authority on constraints. * Congress has the power of the purse. Decides when and how money is appropriated. * Hearings and public appeals raise the political profile of an issue and influence public perception. * They show other countries credibility when Congress is with the president. The opposite is also true. Congress can undermine what the president wants to do. 2. When is Congress most likely to use its powers? * Congress will use its powers to block what the president is doing when there are more members of the opposition party. The president can anticipate what the opposition party will do and leads to the president using less force and makes the president more likely to do what they don't want to do. * Congress is less likely to use its power when the same party is in power as the party of the president because they are more likely to have credible communication between party leadership and the president. They don't have to question why the president wants to do something because they are in on these decisions. 3. What is the party brand, why does it matter, and what are its limits? * Party brand is presenting a unified message from a party. How the public views the party. The need to criticize the other party whenever possible to hurt the other party's brand. * Matters because members of the opposite party of the president will criticize what they are doing as much as possible to harm the other parties brand. * People will not go along with their party when it goes against the wants of their constituents. If your district is paying a high cost then you will be more likely to respond to local concerns and ignore party brand. 4. What is issue ownership? * Parties have certain issues that the public feels they do better at solving than the other party. People are more likely to vote for the party they think will be more competent on their issues than on what the policy is going to be. * Ex: Dems own civil rights and social welfare, Reps own economy and immigration. 5. What is significant about Germany's actions in Kosovo in 1999? What does this case tell us about the importance of party ideology? * Germany had not used military force since WWII. There was a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and the Green party had run on no military combat missions. The Green party knew from past crises they needed to use military force so they changed their party ideology to align with the need to use military force on humanitarian issues then they changed their foreign policy. * Party ideologies have to be coherent to work; they had to change party ideology before changing policy. 6. What's unique about humanitarian interventions? * Humanitarian crises create a space where people who are usually doves will want military intervention to stop a humanitarian crisis. * Inclusive foreign policy is the promotion of human rights and liberal values while being skeptical of the use of force and militarism. * Creates a value trade-off for some people when doves want to use military force. 7. How can the public influence national security decisions? * They are voters, the person in office makes policy so who is voted in matters, retrospective voters will vote you out because of something you did and not because they like the other person more. * Protests in authoritarian regimes and movements in democracies. * Public opinion is factored in when making deciding policy. * Public vetting avoids bad policy, have to justify policy ahead of time. 8. Compare and contrast the Almond-Lippmann, rational public, and emotional public views of public opinion. How does recent evidence challenge the idea that an emotional public is impulsive? * **Almond-Lippmann:** Public is volatile and emotional. Incoherent and inconsequential. Public doesn't actually have views and ideologies. * **Rational public:** It's not that the public is informed about foreign policy and you shouldn't just look at one person but in the aggregate people have consensus and are stable. The public wants to see a balance between the costs of something and its success. * **The emotional public:** People will see images of human suffering and want their government to do something about everything they see. The CNN effect. * Recent evidence suggests that people's morality fits into the rational public model and happens systematically for individuals. People have preexisting value systems that impact what they think. 9. How are individualizing and binding moral foundations related to foreign policy predispositions? * **Individualizing** predicts cooperative internationalism/doves: * Harm and care and fairness. * **Binding** predicts militant internationalists/hawks: * Doing things that may not be great for the individual but better for the whole society. 10. What's unique about moralized attitudes? * When attitudes take on moral content it effects how strong the attitude is and changes how that attitude is held. People assume that their view is universal. More difficult to change your mind or compromise. Increased political engagement. ### Week 9: Transnational Networks + Civil-Military Relations 1. What is a transnational advocacy network? Where does their power come from? * Network of activists centered around a principle idea or value. They are not associated with a state which gives them the ability to work across countries. * Power from framing and information gathering. They have access to information that others do not have and they have that access first. 2. What is the boomerang model? * Developed in the human rights context. Country A is repressing its people committing human rights violation. If an NGO goes to the govt of country A they will not be listened to. The NGO has access to information on the ground of country A so they can take that information to NGOs in country B and then country B will have pressure to do something about country A. 3. What issues are most likely to be influenced by transnational advocacy networks? * Issues where there isn't much information or the government would have an incentive to hide information then NGOs would be able to influence the issue. * They are able to frame the issues and show people who is to blame and what to do about it. 4. According to Evangelista, what is the conventional argument about the effect of transnational networks on nuclear security? How is his argument different from the conventional wisdom? * Evangelista argued that in authoritative states it is harder to have your voice heard but once it is heard you have more influence. In democracies everyone is fighting to be heard because everyone has more or less the same access to influencing the government. * Conventionally, it has been thought that authoritarian regimes would not listen to transnational networks at all. Overall it is thought that transnational advocacy networks do not have any impact on govts. 5. Why were transnational groups able to have a greater impact on nuclear policy in the Soviet Union compared to the United States? * They were able to influence the Soviet Union because once they were in people trusted them and actually listened to them. In the US everyone was fighting for access to lawmakers and there were lots of voices that lawmakers had to weigh. 6. In the US government, which actors are civilians and which are military officials? * The president, secretary of defense, and secretary of state have to be civilians. * The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Branch Chiefs of Staff have to be active-duty military. * The National Security Advisor can be civilian or military. 7. What is civilian control? Why is it important for democracy? * There is a clear distinction between political and military responsibilities. White house goals are what matter. * This is important because its what makes a democracy a democracy. The elected leaders have to be in charge and able to be held accountable for military actions. 8. What is Huntington's model of civil-military relations? What are Brooks' critiques of Huntington's model? * **Huntington:** Objective civilian control and apolitical military. Civilians should come up with goals and military just have to figure out tactical and implement. * **Brooks:** Makes it seem like certain things military officials do are not political but they are sending consequential political signals. There should be conversations between civilian and military. Recognizes that both sides need to have a say and that things don't always have to be separate. Military can be less effective when there aren't those conversations. 9. What is the difference between the professional supremacist and civilian supremacist schools of civil-military relations? How well do these schools explain the 2007 Iraq surge decision? * **Professional supremacists:** ensure military voice, avoid civilian micromanaging. Military has expertise and know limits and strengths of force. * **Civilian supremacists:** doesn't happen in a vacuum. Executive branch is better equipped to understand big picture and national interest. Civilian strategic guidance is key. * The Iraq surge supports a hybrid model where Bush was able to look at what military officials said he should do and consider the pig picture. ### Week 10: Civilian and Military Attitudes + The Risks of a Politicized Military 1. What is the Powell-Albright pattern? * People in the military are more likely to understand the limitations to force than civilians. Military less likely to want to use for but when they want to use force they want few restraints. Civilians are more likely to want to use military force but with lots of restraints. 2. According to Gelpi and Feaver, how are civilian and military attitudes different? Why does this matter? * Goes back to Powell-Albright pattern. When it is decided to use force the question becomes how much. Civilians more interventionalist. * This matters because when there are more veterans in Congress the likelihood that the US will initiate conflict declines. This matters for what leaders will want to do as well based on if they are in the military or not. 3. How does public confidence in the military compare to confidence in other government actors? How has confidence changed over time? * People are very confident in the military. The trust in the military has remained higher than other institutions and has not decreased as much as the presidency and Congress in recent years. 4. What effect do military endorsements have on public attitudes? How does public confidence in the military change the political incentives for elected leaders? * Because the military is held in high esteem by the public, military endorsements will be very credible. * Opposition matters more than support so elected leaders will try harder to get support from military leads to prevent negative elite cues. * If the military endorses a position then the public is more accepting of failure when the policy followed military advice. 5. What are the arguments for and against allowing members of the military to take political actions? * **Pro:** It can shed light on issues that the military is focused on. They can act as a check on the decisions of the president. * **Cons:** It can undermine the military's reputation, can send confusing signals to junior officers, can be a concern that advice is partisan, military advice isn't always right, and civilian isn't always wrong. ### Week 11: Domestic Consequences of War 1. According to Krebs, what is the difference between threat, mobilization, and warfare? * War can be broken up into smaller parts. Mobilization asks a lot of citizens. 2. What are the potential short- and long-run domestic consequences of war? * **Short-run:** immediate consequences of war, challenges to democracy. * **Long-run:** consequences that happen later on. More desirable changes. Can resolidify gender norms but there are ways that it can create equality. 3. What is the Cold War Consensus? How was this affected by the Vietnam War? * Because of the threat of war there was a consensus of deferring to the white house. Presidential dominance over Congress. Expansion of executive branch foreign and defense policy. * Vietnam was the backlash. There was an initial surge in support but then gradual backlash. 4. How did the 9/11 attacks and war on terror change public attitudes? Did these changes last? * People thought it was necessary to give up civil liberties to fight terrorism but that goes back down. Those changes do not last. ### Week 12: Secrets and Deception + Social Media 1. What is the tension between secrecy and democracy? * In a democracy there is democratic accountability where the public needs access to information to judge and constrain leaders. Secrecy is the intentional concealment from one or more audiences. This is necessary at times but means that the public does not have access to information. 2. What types of secrets can and cannot be classified? * Things that are part of national security do not have to be disclosed to the public. * Limits: violation of law, inefficiency or administrative error, preventing embarrassment, restraining competition, information not related to national security. * Cannot classify things just to prevent the public from finding out something that could harm your presidency. 3. How has classification changed over time? * There have been increases to classification aided by digitalization. There is not challenge to over classification but there can be dangerous consequences to under classification. 4. Does the public tolerate secrecy? Under what conditions? * Yes but it has to be justified. Supportive when it improves success and can be justified as highly sensitive. 5. What is covert action? What are states most likely to use covert versus overt action? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach? * Covert actions are actions in which the intervening state does not acknowledge its role publicly. * Democracies are more likely to use covert action because they don't have to justify it to the public. * **Strengths:** Less political risk. Avoid domestic constrains. A direct policy match. * **Weaknesses:** Backlash and international consequences. Incentivizes unnecessary risk. Loss in public trust. 6. Are leaders punished for deceiving their publics? Under what circumstances? * As long as it worked then it doesn't matter if you lied to the public so either make sure it works or don't get caught. 7. What's unique about social media? * Open access, anyone can post and goal is to distribute information, people are less concerned about long-term credibility. Misinformation spreads faster because of the emotions it creates. Regulation is difficult and AI makes it more challenging. 8. What makes democracies more vulnerable to the threats posed by social media? * Democracies already have a free press and freedom of speech as central aspects. They do not have to tools in place to censor miss information like authoritarian regimes. 9. What makes cybersecurity different? * It is digital targets and digital means. Can harm critical infrastructure from anywhere in the world. 10. What is an attribution problem? * Cyberattacks mean the most you will know is what computer the attack came from but not who was behind it. Have to weigh the need to do something and who is actually behind the attack. 11. Does the public support going to war over cyberattacks? Over foreign electoral intervention? * Overall support for military responses to cyberattacks is lower than conventional attacks. ### Week 14: Borders and Boundaries 1. What does it mean to be a sovereign state? * The political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory. * Have to keep other states out and maintain control over the govt. 2. What is the territorial integrity norm? * States have the right to protect their borders. 3. What has changed over time about: a) the number of borders in the world, and b) the number of border disputes that are settled peacefully? * There are more borders in the world now but the number of border disputes that are settled peacefully has also increased. 4. Compare and contrast skeptic, enthusiast, and supraterritorial views of globalization. * **Skeptic** - don't really believe in globalization. States are the biggest players. Increased reliance is abnormal and we should see it decline. * **Enthusiast** - states still key player. Easier for states to work together. States will remain relevant but globalization is here to stay. * **Supraterritorialists** - Not just about goods and amount of traffic but speed and ease of movement. Makes states less relevant. Where you are no longer defines what is possible. 5. How does globalization influence the relevance of borders? * Increases immigration, changes how states think about border security, economic competition, transnational crime has expanded. 6. What is ontological security? How do borders help achieve it? * The security of being. You know how the world works and where you belong in the world. Things will stay stable. * Globalization threatens that and makes people concerned things will change. National security can help address these concerns. * Borders help people think things are stable and that what is happening in your country won't change. 7. What is the difference between a permissive and controlling border orientation? What are the trends in border orientations over time? * **Permissive boarder orientation** is when there isn't much in the way of people crossing the border, there isn't evidence of government buildings or law enforcement that detain people who should not be in the country. * **Controlling border orientation** is when there is lots of infrastructure to prevent just any movement and evidence of government and law enforcement presence. 8. How did border orientations shape reactions to the Covid-19 pandemic? * In places with high border orientation they were more likely to close the border and keep it closed because they had that infrastructure in place even if this wouldn't really do anything for the pandemic. ### Week 15: Great Power Politics at Home 1. What is the second image reversed? * National security influencing domestic policy. * Late industrialization means centralized state control because they would have needed that control to be able to industrialize when there was more competition. 2. How does the relative power of a country affect public attitudes? * The idea that my state is stronger than your state. Makes individuals more militant. The more power they think their country has the more hawkish they become. 3. What is the difference between objective decline and declinism? * **Objective decline** is measured decline like military, economic, or prestige. * **Declinism** is rhetoric around decline where the opposition party is able to say that things are bad under the current government and they will change things. 4. When are narratives of decline most likely to be influential? * Declinism narratives are only going to work when it is someone that is far enough away from the government that they can't be asked why they didn't do anything to fix things when they were in office. There have to be salient events to point to. 5. What are the consequences of declinism? * Can increase ontological insecurity and cause an increase in border protection. Border becomes a stop instead of a filter. More clear lines between inside and outside.

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