English Legal Method I - Fall 2024-2025 Past Paper PDF

English Legal Method I B ELKIS ŞAH İNOĞ LU FA LL 2024 - 2025  Contents What is Statutory Interpretation? Why do we need Statutory Interpretation? The three approaches: Literal, Golden and Mischief Which one to use? Discussion of the purposive approach O...

English Legal Method I B ELKIS ŞAH İNOĞ LU FA LL 2024 - 2025  Contents What is Statutory Interpretation? Why do we need Statutory Interpretation? The three approaches: Literal, Golden and Mischief Which one to use? Discussion of the purposive approach Other aids: Intrinsic Aids External aids Presumptions Rules of Language  Statutory Interpretation Separation of powers & the role of judges = applying the law In order to apply the law, they need to understand To understand*, interpretation is needed. So… statutory interpretation = rules of identifying the meaning of statutory provisions *Approaches have been developed by judges – not statute It can be argued that it is historically more important - because Parliament is more expressive (definitions etc.) Cases show that interpretation and use of approaches is still discussed today  Why do we need statutory interpretation? Francis Bennion, Statute law (1990) - drafting 1. When drafting, certain words may be omitted because they are implied - but it may not be realised by users that they were implied! 2. Laws are drafted generally. Broad terms are therefore used to try to encompass an much as possible and leave it to the user to identify what situations fall within it. What is a vehicle? (tool e.g. studying is a vehicle for success...or car) Who is a family member? 3. Language is flexible – may be unclear or have more than one meaning 4. Unforeseen developments (development of technology – tort and drones?), social understandings that change meaning of words (e.g. ‘mischief’) 5. The drafting of Laws may be inadequate or errors in printing. e.g. error in printing, reference to sections – but they do not exist  Importance - way of interpretation may make the difference between a defendant in a criminal trial being found innocent or guilty. Three approaches : ✓ Literal ✓ Golden ✓ Mischief  Literal Rule A strict view of the words found in statutes is used - the ordinary meaning Generated in the the 18th and 19th century – the approach most used. Sussex Peerage Case (1844) R v The Judge of the City of London Court (1892) If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity. i.e. If the case before them was not exactly covered then they were not prepared to add to the statutory language. London & North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman (1946) Mr Berriman, a railway worker was hit and killed by a train while doing maintenance work. Fatal Accidents Act stated that a look-out should be provided for men working on or near the railway line ‘for the purposes of relaying or repairing’ it. His widow claimed compensation for his death because the railway company had not provided a look-out man while Mr Berriman had to work on the line. Mr Berriman was not relaying or repairing the line; he was maintaining it. It was held that the relevant regulation did not cover maintenance work, so Mrs Berriman’s claim failed. Whiteley v Chappel (1868) It is an offence to impersonate a person entitled to vote. He impersonated a dead man. A dead man is not entitled to vote. Therefore no offence was committed. R v Harris (1836) It is an offence to ‘unlawfully and maliciously stab, cut or wound any person’. The court decided that a defendant who bit off the end of the victim’s nose had not committed the offence. The court held that the words in the statute indicated that for the offence to be committed some form of instrument had to be used. R v Maginnis (1987) s.5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 - It is an offence for a person to have a controlled drug in his possession with intent to supply it to another The police found a package of cannabis in the defendant’s car. The defendant said that the package did not belong to him, and that he would return it to the owner later. The defendant was convicted even though he argued that intending to return to the owner was not an intention to supply. HOL upheld the conviction. But Dissenting judgement of Lord Goff. “… I do not feel able to say that either the delivery of goods by a depositor to a depositee, or the redelivery of goods by a depositee to a depositor, can sensibly be described as an act of supplying goods to another. I certainly cannot conceive of myself using the word ‘supply’ in this context in ordinary speech. In ordinary language the cloakroom attendant, the left luggage officer, the warehouseman and the shoe mender do not ‘supply’ to their customers the articles which those customers have left with them.” R v Brown (1996) s.5(2)(b) of the Data Protection Act 1984 : It is an offence knowingly or recklessly to use personal data other than for the purpose described in the relevant entry in the register of data users … A police officer used the police national computer to check the registration numbers of vehicles owned by people that owed money to his friend’s debt collection company. He did not pass the information to his friend. Adopting a literal approach held that the offence was not committed by a person who merely accesses information. Data are only ‘used’, and the offence committed if the defendant goes on to make unauthorised use of it, for example by passing it on to someone else. The court held that they had reached this conclusion by giving the word ‘use’ its ordinary meaning. However, the dissenting minority adopting a more ‘purposive’ approach (i.e. looking behind the words to the intention of the legislation) held that the word ‘use’ should be given a broad construction in order to achieve the purpose of Act, which was the protection of citizens against invasions of privacy. R v Goodwin (2005) The driver of a jet-ski crashed into another jet-ski causing serious injuries s.58 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 – it is an offence for the master of a UK ship to negligently do any act which causes or is likely to cause serious injury to any person. The Act defines a ship as including every description of vessel ‘used in navigation’. At first instance it was decided that a jet-ski was a ship. The COA deciding that a jet-ski is not ‘used in navigation’. The section applies to ‘sea-going’ vessels, which a jet-ski is not. Owens v Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council (2011) Claimant was employed as a special needs teacher and counsellor. Her contract of employment described her as a teacher, her employer claimed that she was not in fact a teacher and consequently could not be a member of the Teachers’ Pension Scheme. High Court held that she was not a teacher as she merely provided services ancillary to teaching. COA held that the ordinary meaning is used – the dictionary definition was wide and went beyond people who stand in front of pupils in a classroom, the claimant was held to come within the definition. Law Commission noted advantages of the approach: ✓Encouraged precision in drafting ✓Other approaches bear the risk that judges (non-elected) take over Parliament as law-makers through essentially ‘rewriting’ the law The negative aspects of the approach mentioned were: It ignored the limitations of language and ambiguities! Excessive use by the judiciary - without giving due weight to their meaning in wider contexts (absurdities) Placing undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words is to assume an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship  Golden Rule Seen as an extension and modification of the literal rule Judges use the ordinary literal meaning as a starting point but depart from the ordinary meaning where it would lead to absurdity First established in Grey v. Pearson (1857): “..the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.” Applies only where the words are ambiguous. An interpretation that is not absurd is to be preferred to one that is. R v Allen (1872) The defendant was charged with the offence of bigamy under s.57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 - 'whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime of the former husband or wife is guilty of an offence'. Under a literal interpretation of this section the offence would be impossible to commit - since law will not recognise a second marriage any attempt to marry in such circumstances would not be recognised as a valid marriage. The court applied the golden rule and held that the word 'marry' should be interpreted as 'to go through a marriage ceremony'. The defendant's conviction was upheld. Adler v George (1964) s.3 of the Official Secrets Act 1920 – it is offence to obstruct Her Majesty’s Forces in the vicinity of a prohibited place. Adler was arrested for obstructing forces in a prohibited place. The court applied the golden rule to extend the literal wording of the statute to cover the action committed. Had the literal rule had been applied, it would have produced absurdity, since someone protesting near the base would be committing an offence whereas someone protesting in the base would not.  Mischief Rule Established at the time when statute was a minor source of law in comparison to common law. Drafting was not an exact process and before the supremacy of Parliament. It is the oldest approach – established in Heydon’s Case (1584) 1. What was the common law before making of the Act 2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide 3. What remedy parliament appointed to cure the disease (* when Heydon’s Case was decided, it was the practice to cite in the preamble of legislation the purpose for its enactment, including the mischief at which it was aimed.) 4. The true reason for the remedy The function of the judge is to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Smith v Hughes (1960) s.1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 - It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purposes of prostitution. The accused was in a house, tapping on the window to attract attention of passers- by. She argued that she was not ‘in the street’. “For my part I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that it was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested by common prostitutes.” Lord Parker also found a secondary meaning in the words. It was the ‘solicitation’ which must take place in the street, not the person who does the soliciting. Corkery v Carpenter (1950) A man was found guilty of being drunk in charge of a ‘carriage’, although he was in fact only in charge of a bicycle.  Which to use? Literal rule is used most frequently. But all are valid and judges use them as the case demands. Often the approach selected is the one that GIVES AFFECT TO PARLIAMENT’S INTENTION IN THE BEST WAY  PURPOSIVE APPROACH The judges look at the spirit of the Act overall, its historical context etc. and reads words into or out of the Act when this is necessary. Put forward by Denning – but criticised Magor & St Mellons RDC v Newport Corporation (1950) ‘a naked usurpation of the legislative function.’ Now courts are more comfortable in their approach to interpretation and using this to apply best approach that gives affect to intentions of Parliament **NOTE!! It is not the mischief rule – can be seen as a modern approach to mischief - Mischief rule looks at the GAP that the Act tried to fix - Purposive approach says use whichever would give effect to P’s intention (which can include the mischief rule) It looks at a BROADER CONTEXT outside of the Act too! R v Secretary of State for Health ex parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) (2003) The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 granted the Authority the right to licence research with regards to embryos. An embryo was defined in the Act as ‘a live human embryo where fertilisation is complete’. The Pro Life Alliance argued that the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did not have authority to licence research with regards to cloning because embryos created using cloning are not fertilised. The House of Lords held that the cloned embryos were covered by the statute taking a purposive approach to statutory interpretation. Lord Bingham: "The court's task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament's purpose. So the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment….While it is impermissible to ask what Parliament would have done if the facts had been before it, there is one important question which may permissibly be asked: it is whether Parliament, faced with the taxing task of enacting a legislative solution to the difficult religious, moral and scientific issues mentioned above, could rationally have intended to leave live human embryos created by cloning outside the scope of regulation had it known of them as a scientific possibility. There is only one possible answer to this question and it is negative." R v Z and others (2005) Four men were charged with being members of a proscribed organisation contrary to s.11(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000. Schedule 2 of the Act listed the organisations proscribed under the Act. It referred to the IRA but did not specifically mention the ‘Real IRA’, which the men were allegedly members of. The court concluded that it was the intention of the legislature to include the ‘Real IRA’ within the term ‘the IRA’ and that the legislation therefore had to be construed in such a way as to include that organisation. The historical context of the legislation was of fundamental importance. It decided that all the statutes were directed towards the elimination of Irish-related terrorism and that the general approach in legislation had been to proscribe the IRA, using that title as a blanket description that ‘embraced all emanations, manifestations and representations of the IRA, whatever their relationship to each other’. “No animals are allowed on school grounds”  “No animals are allowed on school grounds” A teacher wants to bring in mice for a science project. The mice would be kept in the classroom in a cage. A parent walks her child to school each day and brings their Yorkshire Terrier on a leash. They walk onto school grounds so that the parent can make sure the child enters the school safely. A visually impaired student brings their companion dog to school to help get from class to class. A student brings a stuffed animal to school for show and tell. A police dog comes on campus with a police officer to investigate a crime. A student brings a frog to school in his lunch box to scare the other students. A hungry, abandoned dog wanders on campus and a student feeds him leftovers from the cafeteria. Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States of America The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  Intrinsic Aids – within Statute 1. Definitions section X means ABC (comprehensive) X includes ABC – partially 2. Short and Long title 3. Preamble  External Aids 1. Reports of commissions or other bodies 2. Reports of debates in Parliament – Hansard Previously, courts were not permitted to use these reports. Beswick v Beswick (1968) For purely practical reasons we do not permit debates in either House to be cited. It would add greatly to the time and expense involved in preparing cases... moreover, in a very large proportion of cases [Hansard] would throw no light on the question before the court. Despite the prohibition on the use of Hansard, in the case of Davis v Johnson (1978) Lord Denning confessed that he had reached his view on the interpretation of the relevant statute by reading what had been said in Parliament when the Act was being debated. In Pepper v Hart (1993) it was decided that construction should be relaxed so as to permit reference to parliamentary materials where: 1. the legislation was ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning led to an absurdity 2. the material relied on consisted of statements by a minister or other promoter of the Bill, and 3. the statements relied on were clear.  Presumptions 1. Presumption against the alteration of common law. Parliament is supreme and can change common law. But it should do so clearly. Where not clear – common law rules apply Where various interpretations can arise, the one that does not change common law applies Leach v R (1912) Question of whether a wife could be made to give evidence against her husband - Since the Act did not specifically say that this should happen, it was held that the common law rule that a wife couldn't be compelled to give evidence should stand. - if there were specific words stating the wife is compelled, the old law would have been void. 2. Presumption that Statutes do not have retrospective effect Unless exceptions are stated in the law. Home Secretary v Wainwright (2002). Two relatives visiting a prisoner were strip-searched as a condition of entry to the prison, and subsequently claimed a violation of their right to respect for private life. The court held that since the events in question had happened before the HRA 1998 came into force, s.3 of that Act could not be relied on. As Parliament had expressly made s.22(4) of the Act retroactive, its failure to do the same for s 3 must be taken to have been intentional. 3. Presumption of mens rea requirement Interpreted according to this, where not clear (where clear, Act is applied e.g. strict liability) Any - intention, negligence, knowledge, reckless Sweet v Parsley (1970) : whenever a section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that we must read in words appropriate to require mens rea. 4. Presumption against the ousting of the court's jurisdiction.  Rules of Language Ejusdem generis (‘of the same class’) General words which follow specific words must be read in the light of those specific words, provided that the specific words are examples of some particular class e.g. Sunday Observance Act 1677 provides that:... no tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer or other person whatsoever, [shall work on Sundays]. Not just ‘any other person’ including everyone (easier to say noone) – reference to workers And not all occupations to be covered by the Act…but similar to those tradesmen and labourers Powell v Kempton Park Race Course (1899) D was charged with keeping a ‘house, office, room or other place for betting’. He had been operating betting outdoors. The House of Lords decided that the general words ‘other place’ had to refer to indoor places since all the words in the list were indoor places and so the defendant was not guilty. Noscitur a sociis (a word is known by the company it keeps) words derive their meaning from their immediate context. Pengelly v Bell Punch Co Ltd (1964) s.28 of the Factories Act 1961 provided that: ‘Floors, steps, stairs passageways and gangways [must be kept free from obstruction].’ The court held that ‘floors’ did not include areas designed and used for the storage of goods.