Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism PDF

Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism PART I: FOUNDATIONS OF RADICAL BEHAVIORISM PART II: REALIZATION OF THE RADICAL BEHAVIORIST PROGRAM PART III: COMPARISON AND CONTRAST WITH ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINTS PART IV: CONCLUSION Jay Moore The Cambridge Cente...

Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism PART I: FOUNDATIONS OF RADICAL BEHAVIORISM PART II: REALIZATION OF THE RADICAL BEHAVIORIST PROGRAM PART III: COMPARISON AND CONTRAST WITH ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINTS PART IV: CONCLUSION Jay Moore The Cambridge Center-Sloan Century Series in Behavior Analysis Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism Jay Moore University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee 2008 Sloan Publishing Cornwall-on-Hudson, NY 12520  Library of Congress Control Number: 2007921516 Moore, Jay Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism Table of Contents p, cm. Includes bibliographic references and index. ISBN 1-59738-011-3 Preface Cover designer: Amy Rosen 1 Radical Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Science What Arc the Domains of Behavior Analysis'.' 2 Radical Behaviorism as the Philosophy of Science Underlying Behavior Analysis 4 Behavior as a Subject Matter in Its Own Right 4 Internal Explanations, Causes, and Dimensions 5 ( Radical Behaviorism as Epistemology ) The Sense of "Radical" in Radical Behaviorism 10 Summary 11 References 12 Study Questions 12 ©2008 Stoan Publishing, LLC 220 Maple Road Cornwall-on-Hudson, NY 12520 Section 1: The Foundations of Radical Behaviorism 13 2 History of Behaviorism and Behavior Analysis: 1800-1930 15 Psycluflog)' and the Science of the "Mental" 16 Emerging Concerns with Mental Kvperience as a Subject Matter and Introspection as a Method 22 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be The Contrihution of Post-Darwinian Comparative Psychology: reproduced, in any form or by any means, without "Animal Psychology" 23 permission in writing from the publisher. The Contribution of Reflexology 24 Printed in Canada The First Phase of the Behavioral \hwment: 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Classical S R Behaviorism 25 ISBN 1-59738-011-3 vi Contents Contents vii References 34 6 Consequences and Concepts in the Analysis of Behavior 108 Study Questions 35 To Reinforce: The Root Term and Its Cognates 109 To Punish: The Root Term and Its Cognates 113 3 History of Behaviorism and Behavior Analysis: 1930-1980 37 Overview of Reinforcement and Punishment 117 The Second Phase of the Behavioral Movement; Mediational Other Combinations and Categories Involving Consequences 118 S - 0 - R Behaviorism 38 Is the Definition of Reinforcement Circular? 122 Theoretical Terms as Intervening Variables or Hypothetical Constructs? 42 Self-Reinforcement? 124 Recapitulation 44 Extinction 125 The Contributions ofB, F. Skinner 45 Superstition 126 Two Ways of Representing the Relation Between Radical Behaviorism and Motivative Operations 128 Other Forms of Psychology 50 Summary 131. References 54 References 134 Study Questions 54 Study Questions 134 4 Behavior as a Subject Matter in Its Own Right 56 7 Selection by Consequences 136 Htymology of "Behavior" 57 Selection by Consequences: Cycles of Variation, Interaction, and Some Representative Definitions of Behavior 57 Differential Replication 136 Issues Raised By the Above Definitions 61 Natural Selection 137 Analysis of the ISMICS 64 "Selection For" versus "Selection Of 139 77/f Ri'lation Between Behavior Analysis and Neuroscience 68 Review 141 Summary and Conclusions: The Complementarity of Behavior Analysis The Evolution of Behavior: Selection By Consequences as a tinJ Behavioral Neuroscienee 75 Causal Mode 142 References 78 Some Further Considerations Regarding Selection of Behavior By Its Study Questions 79 Consequences.. 146 Contingencies of Survival 148 5 Categories of Behavior 81 Selection by Consequences: Darwinian or Lamarckian ? 148 Stimulus Presentations and Innate Behavior 82.More on Cultural Selection i 50 Signaling Operations, Consequents! Operations, and [.earned Behavior 87 Summary and Conclusions 154 (Conditioned Respondent Behavior 89 References 156 Assessing Conditioned Respondent functional Relations 90 Study Questions 157 Operant Behavior 91 Sourees of Operant Behavior 95 Section Two: The Realization of the Radical Behaviorist Program 159 Some Further ('onunents on I'nderstanding When Behavior is Opera tit Behavior 96 8 Verbal Behavior 1: Elementary Verbal Relations 161 Stimulus Control 98 The Definition of Verbal Behavior 162 Molar and Molecular Analyses of Behavior 101 Elements of a Behavioral Approach to Verbal Behavior 165 Summary 104 Differences Between a "Traditional" Account and That of Radical References 106 Behaviorism 166 Study Questions 106 Differences Between Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior 172 viii Contents Contents ix Extensions 176 Theories as I erbal Behavior 271 Classification System for Elementary Verbal Relations 176 Multiple ('ontrol 275 A utoclitic A ctivity 180 Theories: Instminentalism or Realism? 277 Summary and Conclusions 184 Summary and Conclusions 283 References 185 References 286 Study Questions 186 Study Questions 287 9 Verbal Behavior 2: Complex Verbal Relations 188 13 Scientific Verbal Behavior: Explanations 289 Complex Verbal Relations: Derived Relational Responding 189 Two Prominent Explanatory Strategies in Traditional The Conditional Discrimination Procedure and Representative Research 193 AV< >heha viorism 290 Verbal Regulation 197 77k' Relation Among Expatriation, Description, and Theory in Instructions 202 Behavior Analysis 294 Awareness 203 Causal Explanation, Prediction, and Description 296 Selj-Reporting 207 rhe Causal Explanation of Behavior 298 Summary and Conclusions 208 Epistemological Dualism and Other Mischievous Sources of Control Over the Verbal Behavior of the Scientist 302 References 210 Interpretation 306 Study Questions 211 Summary and Conclusions 308 10 Private Events 213 References 309 J. B. Watson on Implicit Stimuli and Responses 214 Study Questions 311 B. F, Skinner and Private Events 215 Radical Behaviorism: Feelings and Sensed Conditions of the Body 217 Section Three: Comparison and Contrast with Alternative 313 Covert Operant Activity 223 Viewpoints Sensations and Traditional Experimental Psychology 230 14 Opposition to Mentalism 315 Ideas 233.-J Definition of Mentalism 316 Radical Behaviorism and the Charge of the "Empty Organism" 233 Examples of Mcntiilism 319 References 237 Sources of Control Over Mentalistic Talk 326 Study Questions 237 77if Historical Origin of Mentalism 329 Summary and Conclusions: 11 Methods in a Science of Behavior 239 fic/iavior-Analytie Ohjcctions to Mentalism 331 The Nature of Science and Scientific Research 240 References 334 A Behavior-Analytic Assessment of Traditional Research Methods 250 Study Questions 334 Behavior-Analytic Research Methods 254 References 262 15 The Challenge of Cognitive Psychology 336 Study Questions 263 77«' Mature of Cognitive Systems 337 Precursors 339 12 Scientific Verbal Behavior: Theories 265 Some Common Assumptions About the Relation Between Behaviorism and The Traditional View 267 Cognitive Psychology 341 x Contents Contents xi 1, Behaviorism ]s (\wcerned With Observable Phenomena, by Finite of References 400 Its Relation With Logical Positivism 342 Study Questions 401 2, Behaviorism Is Descriptive, Whereas (Cognitive Psychology is Theoretical ami Explanatory 343 18 Radical Behaviorism and Traditional Philosophical Issues-2 403 3, Behaviorist Theoretical Concepts An' Inadequate Because They Are Mind and Body 404 Defined in Terms ofPuhlicly (thservahle Stimuli and Responses 343 Radical Behaviorist Perspective on the Mind-Body Problem and Reconsidering the Relation 344 Phiiosopliv of Mind 408 77k' Natuir of the I Differences 347 An Interpretation ot'Dispositional Approaches From the Standpoint oj Are Behaviorism and ('ognitive Psychology Complementary? 348 Radical Behaviorism 412 Summary and (Conclusions 350 Mechanistic Analyses and Intentionality 417 References 352 Interisionality 420 Study Questions 353 Summary and Conclusions 422 References 425 16 The Challenge of Psycholinguistics 354 Study Questions 426 Psych(>linguistics and Language 355 The Charge Thai Sequential Processes Cannot Adequately Explain Section Four: Conclusion 427 Language 357 A Radical Behaviorist Reply to a Charge Based on Sequential Analyses and 19 Radical Behaviorism as Epistemology 429 Mediation 362 The Definition of Genuine Behaviorism 430 77/i' Charge That Direct Interaction With the Environment Cannot Radical Behaviorism as an Epistemology 432 Adequately Explain the Development of Such Linguistic Processes as References 438 (inimmar and Syntax 364 Study Questions 438 A Radical Behaviorist Reply to the Charge That Direct Interaction With the Environment Cannot Adequately Explain the Development of 441 Acknowledgements Such Linguistic Processes as (irammar and Syntax 365 Chomsky versus Behavior Analysis 367 Name Index 443 Stimmtny and Conclusions 372 447 Subject Index References 375 Study Questions 376 17 Radical Behaviorism and Traditional Philosophical Issues-l 377 Forms oj Philosophical Psychology Carrying the Designation "Behaviorism" 378 Logical Behaviorism 37S (Conceptual Analysis 37') Metaphysical Behaviorism 384 Methodological Behaviorism 3X5 Methodological Behaviorism and the Ontohgical Status of the "Mental" 391 Pragmatism 3l)3 Pragmatism and St ienttfie I'erhai Behavior 3^4  Preface This book is about the conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism. Radical behav- iorism is the underlying philosophical perspective of behavior analysis, an approach to the science of behavior and its application associated with B, F. Skinner. The initial chapter outlines the four domains of behavior analysis: the experimental analysis of behavior, applied behavior analysis, service delivery, and radical behavior- ism. The next 17 chapters are divided into tliree sections. The first section is concerned with the foundations of behavior analysis. Chapters in this section deal with the history of behaviorism and behavior analysis, behavior as a subject matter in its own right (and as distinct from the subject matter of such other dis- ciplines as neuroscience), the categories and concepts that are deployed in behavior analysis, and an examination of selection by consequences as a causal mode across the three levels of phytogeny, ontogeny, and culture. The second section is concerned with the realisation of the radical behaviorist pro- gram in areas traditionally regarded as important in psychology. Chapters in this sec- tion deal with verbal behavior, private behavioral events, methods in a science of behavior, and the nature, origin, and validity of scientific language, such as found in theories and explanations. The third section compares and contrasts radical behaviorism with alternative view- points. Chapters in this section deal with mentalism, cognitive psychology. psycholinguistics, and selected traditional issues in philosophy, including a position known genetically us "methodological behaviorism," which by some accounts is the orthodox position in contemporary psychology. xiv Preface The final chapter is concerned with radical behaviorism as epistemology. This chap- ter reviews how the perspective of radical behaviorism allows one to profitably engage the question of knowledge in light of the concept of operant behavior and within human operant behavior, verbal behavior. The chapters are not specifically concerned with research issues in the experimental analysis of behavior (e.g., research on schedules of reinforcement), applied behavior 1 analysis (e.g., research on the best way to teach language to autistic children), or the de- livery of behavior analytic professional services (e.g., case histories in education, de- velopmental disabilities, or business). Rather, the chapters present the radical behaviorist perspective on an important: theoretical, philosophical, or conceptual topic in a science of behavior, and then contrast the radical behaviorist perspective with that of other forms of behaviorism, as well as other forms of psychology. Also included for each chapter is a brief study guide to focus student attention on relevant issues. The Radical Behaviorism as a book is intended for advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students, in Philosophy of Science courses within behavior analytic curricula dealing with conceptual foundations and radical behaviorism as a philosophy. This book is dedicated to the memory of Willard F. Day, Jr. Synopsis of Chapter I: This hook is about radical behaviorism as the philosophy of science un- derlying behavior analysis, the science of behavior and its application. Chapter 1 considers some implications of the radical behaviorist perspective for the science of behavior, contrast- ing it with traditional perspectives. An important goal of radical behaviorism is to foster effec- tive explanations of behavior, so that others may act productively on the basis of the explanation. For radical behaviorism, to explain behavior is to specify the functional relation between behavior and the environmental circumstances in which it occurs. The elements of such explanations are all part of the one dimension in which behavior takes place. Radical be- haviorism typically objects to explanations of behavior that appeal to carnal powers and forces in otherDimensions, such as the mental because they interfere with explanations in terms of environmental relations. In thefinal analysis, radical behaviorism is interested in pro- viding comprehensive explanatory statements about the causes of anyone s behavior, and espe- cially instances when individuals are said to "know" something. This interest includes instances when scientists are said to know something in a way that enables them to explain an event. Thus, radical behaviorism is ultimately an epistemological statement. Behavior analysis is the science of behavior and its application. As a science, it has a two-fold goal: (a) to increase the scientific understanding of behavior as a subject mat- ter in its own right, and (b) to promote the application of science-based behavioral prin- ciples to improve the quality of human life. Behavior analysis is based on ideas developed by B. F. Skinner (1904-1990) early in his professional career, and then ex- tended by Skinner during the remainder of his professional career, as well as by many others. Individuals who work in behavior analysis are known as "behavior analysts,"  Radical Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Science 3 and because of their association with Skinner's ideas, sometimes by such other names also take the form of clinical behavior analysis and assess ways to alleviate anxiety disor- as "Skinnerians" or "operant conditioners." ders, mood disorders, or one of the other standard classifications of psychopathology. Behavior analysts who work in service delivery earn their living in professional practice. They deploy behavioral technologies to effect changes in socially significant WHAT ARE THE DOMAINS OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS? behavior in the world outside the laboratory. Typically, the changes involve increasing the rate of some beneficial behavior or decreasing the rate of some maladaptive behav- There are four domains of behavior analysis: (1) the experimental analysis of behavior, ior. Many of the areas in which service providers work follow from those of applied be- (2) applied behavior analysis, (3) behavior-analytic service delivery, and (4) radical be- havior analysis. However, in service delivery the emphasis is on solving problems in haviorism. Many behavior analysts work in more than one domain during their careers, the world at large for clients. Although data-based decision making clearly plays an im- and a few work in all four (Hawkins & Anderson, 2002). portant role in service delivery, the activity remains focused on delivering behav- Behavior analysts who work in the experimental analysts of behavior conduct basic ior-analytic services to clients, rather than on research activity aimed at developing research. This research elucidates fundamental principles of behavior. In the early new technologies, identifying best practices, or communicating results to an audience years of the field, the experimental analysis of behavior was concerned mainly with ba- via the process of peer review. sic laboratory research examining the behavior of relatively uncomplicated nonhuman Behavior analysts who work in radical behaviorism seek to clarify the philosophical animals, such as white rats and pigeons. In recent years, the experimental analysis of implications of the behavioristic approach to experimental research, applied research, behavior has become increasingly concerned with complex questions, such as those in- and service delivery. When addressing scientific matters, radical behaviorism is con- volving human behavior and the role of language. In all cases, the experimental analy- cerned with the nature and purpose of a scientific analysis of behavior and the critical ex- sis of behavior is concerned with the extensive, intensive laboratory-based analysis of amination of traditional approaches to the subject matter and methods of a science of basic, fundamental processes (e.g., reinforcement, punishment, avoidance, escape, behavior (Skinner, 1974/college edition, p. xiii). I lence, radical behaviorism is particu- discrimination, generalization, acquisition, extinction) influencing the behavior of in- larly concerned with verbal behavior, the relation between verbal behavior and knowl- dividual organisms. Questions of generality and reliability are addressed by the careful edge, and the nature of the intellectual activity that underlies science and its application. demonstration of the control of behavior, such as through a series of repeated exposures Figure 1 presents an overview of the four domains and shows the continuity of be- to experimental conditions that replicate data. The research does not usually entail ag- havior-analytic activity across the experimental analysis of behavior, applied behavior gregating data across groups of subjects and conducting tests of statistical inference on the aggregated data. In addition, the research is typically concerned with understanding Fundamental -* Research Socially Professional the effects of various environmental relations on behavior, rather than with cataloging Principles Significant Practice the derived, actuarial effects of those relations within a population. Behavior Behavior analysts who work in applied behavior analysis conduct applied research. This research develops and evaluates practices aimed at remedying problems associated Experimental Analysis with socially significant behavior. In the process, new principles for applications are of Behavior sometimes discovered. Consequently, applied behavior analysis is sometimes close to the experimental analysis of behavior by virtue of its concern with research and discover- Applied ing new ideas, and sometimes close to service delivery by virtue of its concern with Behavior strengthening socially significant behavior. Nevertheless, the primary emphasis in ap- Analysis plied behavior analysis remains with developing and evaluating a technology that seeks Service Delivery to solve problems related to socially significant behavior, rather than with deriving new principles of behavior. The technology may focus on many different kinds of behavioral problems, ranging from: (a) those occurring in particular settings, such as an institution Radical Behaviorism or classroom; to (b) those associated with particular populations, such as children with autism or eating disorders; to (c) those embedded in a broader social context, such as a Figure 1.1 The domains of radical behaviorism: experimental analysis of behavior, ap- community recycling program or an energy conservation program. The technology may plied behavior analysis, service delivery, and radical behaviorism. 4 Chapter "l Radical Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Science 5 analysis, and professional practice. The experimental analysis of behavior focuses on science of mental life, but rather to downplay introspection and develop new methods fundamental principles of behavior; the research it conducts is basic research. Applied to investigate mental life. How, then, can mental life be respectably engaged? Tradi- behavior analysis focuses on socially significant behavior; the research it conducts is tionally, the answer was that mental life could be engagjd^inferentially, on the basis of applied research. Service delivery also focuses on socially significant behavior. How- "evidence" provided by behavior. In sum, the assumption remained that mental life ever, it provides services to clients regarding socially significant behavior; it does not was what was really important. Mental phenomena caused behavior, such that behav- carry out research concerning that behavior. Radical behaviorism guides behavior ana- ior was regarded as only an expression or manifestation of mental life, necessary to val- lysts as they cany out experimental and applied analyses of behavior, or as they deliver idate inferences about it. professional services to clients. For radical behaviorism, this matter is extraordinarily complex. An important prin- ciple for radical behaviorism is that behavior is a subject matter in its own right. At is- RADICAL BEHAVIORISM AS THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE sue is what counts as behavior. Radical behaviorism does accept that individuals have UNDERLYING BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS important experiences that are personal and private and to which they alone have ac- cess. Thus, radical behaviorism recognizes the relevance to an understanding of behav- This book is about radical behaviorism as the philosophy of science underlying behav- ior of both independent and dependent variables "within an organism's skin" and not ior analysis, the science of behavior and its application. Skinner (1989) explicitly em- accessible to anyone other than the person who is behaving. However, the way these phasized the relation between his ideas and the philosophy of science when lie defined variables are relevant, even though they are not publicly observable, distinguishes radi- radical behaviorism in the following way; cal behaviorism from other approaches. It views these variables and the relations in which they participate as part of the behavioral dimension, rather than part of a sup- 1 don'l believe I coined the term radical behaviorism, but when asked what I mean by it, I have always said, "the philosophy of a science of behavior treated as a subject matter in its own right , posed mental dimension. Their importance arises from the way they are linked with the apart from internal explanations, mental or physiological." (P- 122) environment. Consequently, radical behaviorism does not accept the traditional view that events going on inside the skin are of a dimension that supposedly differs qualita- Several phrases within this definition may now be more closely examined. tively from a dimension outside the skin. The net result for radical behaviorism is that behavior, whether inside or outside the skin, may be usefully regarded as a phenome- Behavior as a Subject Matter in Its Own Right non directly related to the circumstances in which it occurs, rather than as merely an ex- pression or manifestation of an inner or mental life. One important phrase in Skinner's definition is "behavior treated as a subject matter in In sum, radical behaviorism emphasizes the study of behavior because it is a legiti- its own right." However, the grounds for this position need to be clearly understood, as mate subject matter in its own right, irrespective of how many persons have contact the position differs a great deal from a more traditional view. In a traditional view, the with it or with the variables that influence it. The study of behavior is not emphasized subject matter of psychology is assumed to be mental life. According to this traditional because it is evidence of events somewhere else, in some other dimension, and for view, an understanding of mental life, such as an understanding of how the mind works, which behavior is merely evidence to justify inferences about those events. Thjts point provides the basis for understanding the human condition in all its complexities, where is visited extensively throughout this book. those complexities range from thoughts and beliefs to ideas, feelings, and emotions. t Importantly, answers to any questions concerning the causes of behavior are also to be Internal Explanations, Causes, and Dimensions found in mental life. Early versions of psychology sought to investigate mental life through introspection, or looking inward to "observe" what one was feeling or think- A second important phrase in Skinner's definition of radical behaviorism is "apart from ing. Eventually, however, this approach was regarded as unsatisfactory. Many people internal explanations, mental or physiological." Again, the topic of explanation is com- could not agree on its supposed findings, and practical applications were limited at plex. Different forms of psychology take different approaches to the nature of explana- best. Further, critics argued that science can only deal with a publicly observable sub- tion. For some, an event is explained when some internal mechanism or entity with ject matter. Mental life is not publicly observable. How can psychology become an ef- some sort of inferred causal power is proposed. The internal mechanism or entity and fective science if it focuses on introspective statements about mental life? Interestingly, its inferred powers could be mental, conceptual, or at the level of physiology. For oth- the answer was not to re-examine the fundamental assumption that psychology was the ers, an event is explained when its features can be described as a specific instance of a 6 Chapter I Radical Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Science 7 mathematical expression. For still others, an event is explained when it is deduced from Of course, another sense of ""internal" is physiological, as Skinner's definition sug- an existing law or theory. For radical behaviorism, explanation means specifying func- gests. Hence, radical behaviorism is also concerned about the way some explanations tional relations between behavior and the environmental circumstances in which it oc- of behavior appeal to physiological variables. As before, the grounds for this concern curs. However, more needs to be said about the implications of the radical behaviorist need to be clearly understood. From the perspective of radical behaviorism, a knowl- approach to explanation. edge of underlying physiology is clearly relevant in a science of behavior. After all, an For example, related to explanation is the topic of causation. Radical behaviorism is organism's physiology participates in every behavioral event, and the nature of the par- explicitly concerned with identifying the causes of behavior. For radical behaviorism, ticipation by that physiology in the event is something that can be known about. Thus, then, one important sense of the causes of behavior is'the totality of the variables and re-. one can predict an organism's behavior by knowing either (a) the history of the organ- lations of which the behavior is a function. A sense of cause to which radical behavior- ism's interaction with features of the environment, or (b) the physiological state that ism objects is that of push-pull causation, in which the postulation of a presumed those interactions have produced. Moreover, a knowledge of the underlying physiol- antecedent causal entity with a set of presumed mechaniealjcausal powers is held to be ogy may yield new possibilities for interventions that will control the behavior. Never- sufficient to explain the event in question. theless, the radical behaviorist perspective differs greatly from a traditional view, in Related in turn lo causation is the dimension in which the causes are taken to reside, which physiological variables are endowed with some sort of intrinsic power or force Radical behaviorism is concerned about the dimension of an explanation when the ex- to cause the behavior in question. Radical behaviorism objects to this traditional sense planation includes elements thatsire not expressed in the sameterms and cannot be con- of physiological variables as exerting some kind of internal power or force, even firrned with the same methods of observation and analysis)as the facts they are said to though the variables appear to be legitimate because they are physiological. A common address (e.g., Catania & Hamad, 1988, p. 88). In particular, Skinner's definition raises example in everyday language is when someone cites the brain as causing a given in- concerns about explanations that appeal to "internal" or "inner" causes and dimen- stance of behavior. The brain is obviously involved in a great deal of behavior. How- sions. As discussed in the section above in which behavior is regarded as a subject mat- ever, radical behaviorists become concerned when physiological structures are ter in its own right, one sense of "internal" is mental, or psychic, or spiritual. Radical invoked in explanations because they are assumed to have some internal power that behaviorism is concerned about talk of mental causes and dimensions because it is fan- causes behavior. Such a viewpoint distorts the legitimate role of physiological vari- ciful to think there is such a qualitatively different dimension with qualitatively differ- \ ables in explanations. It also deflects attention away from other variables, such as envi- ent causes. To state the matter somewhat starkly, there is no such dimension and there ronmental, that participate in the event. are no such causes. They are fictions, talk of which is a product of nonscientific influ-^ In addition, radical behaviorism is concerned about the appeal to physiological vari- ences. The properties with which the mental causes are supposedly endowed ultimately ables in explanations because those variables are sometimes taken as evidence to legiti- sidetrack more effective analyses in terms of causal relations in the one dimension in 1 mize inferences about mental causes. Accordingly, just because an explanation which behavior takes place. happens to appeal to physiology in some fashion doesn't automatically mean the expla- Again, the grounds,for concern about explanations appealing to causal entities from nation is going to be useful or effective. An appeal to physiology could be just a surro- a supposed different dimension need to be clearly understood. Radical behaviorism ar- gate for an appeal to a mental cause, and therefore just as troublesome. gues that these explanations are attributable Uxmisehievous and deceptive cultural tra- Finally, radical behaviorism is concerned about the appeal to physiological vari- ditions and linguistic practices"",-Hence, radical behaviorism rejects these sorts of ables in some explanations because of reductionist!!. Reduetionism is roughly the posi- explanations because they are not primarily based tin anything factual, and do not ulti- tion that something is held to be explained when it is reduced to the subject matter of a mately lead to effective prediction and control. In light of their origin, such explana- science at a lower level. With regard to a science of behavior, reductionist!! is the posi- tions represent an unwarranted diversion from more effective concerns. It is not merely tion that a behavioral event can only be considered to be genuinely explained when that an explanation should only include certain features (e.g., those that are publicly ob- some underlying physiological mechanism, structure, or pathway with some sort of servable) and not others (e.g., those that are mental and unobservable) to be respect- causally effective power or force has been identified. Radical behaviorism rejects this able. Rather, the rejection of mental causes is directly related to the view that the interpretation of reductionist!! because it violates the concern with the dimensional appropriate subject matter of psychology is behavior, as opposed to mental life. There question, in addition to raising questions about the nature of causation. Suppose one ac- is no mental life in the sense implied by traditional psychology because^nere is no men- cepts the proposition that behavior is only properly explained in terms of physiology. tal dimension that differs from a behavioral dimension. Wouldn't one then have to explain physiology in terms of biology, chemistry in terms  8 Chapter I Radical Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Science 9 of physics, and so on? At the very leas!, reductionism creates an infinite regress of ex- cessible to only the behaving individual. Others may have to be dealt with inferentially, planations. Again, the way that physiology is relevant in a science of behavior is an im- but for the behaving individual, they are no inference. portant topic, and is dealt with later in this book, as is the topic of explanation. Clearly, knowledge of physiology is important in a science of behavior, but traditional ap- Radical Behaviorism as Epistemology proaches have miscast the contribution of physiology to causal knowledge and expla- nations, with the result that researchers and theorists have neglected the larger picture A final comment concerns the initial phrase in Skinner's definition, namely, that radi- regarding the causal analysis of behavior. cal behaviorism is "a philosophy of a science of behavior." The philosophy of science is The emphasis that radical behaviorism places on explanations that identi fy causes at the branch of philosophy that critically examines the philosophical foundations, as- a consistent level of observation and analysis is not simply a matter of style or prefer- sumptions, and implications'-of activity and findings in both the natural sciences, like ence. Even the briefest survey of Western culture reveals that it generally favors expla- physics, chemistry, and biology, and the social sciences, like psychology, sociology, nations of human psychological phenomena that appeal to causes from a dimension and economics. It addresses such topics as; (a) the nature, origin, and validity of scien- that supposedly differs from the one in which observation and analysis take place. For tific language (e.g., scientific terms, concepts, statements, laws, theories, and other example, when psychology began to he distinguished as a relatively independent sci- sorts of knowledge claims); (b) the nature of scientific explanationand prediction; (c) ence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its practitioners accepted the the means by which science mediates the harnessing of nature; (d) the means by which fundamental premise that the appropriate subject matter for psychology was in another the validity of scientific information is determined; (e) the types of reason ing used to dimension: the content and structure of mental life. Because the mental was presumed arrive at scientific conclusions; and (f) the implications of scientific methods and mod- to be in another dimension, it had to be studied according to introspective methods, and els for the sciences, as well as for society at large»;Xhe philosophy of science is closely researchers then had to make inferences about mental life. linked with epistemology, or the study of the nature and limits of knowledge, as well as Many concerns were raised at the time about the reliability and validity of introspec- with ontology, or the critical examination of the nature of whatexists, though some phi- tion and inferences about mental life, with or without presumed physiological corre- losophers of science disparage the latter as unfounded metaphysical speculation/ lates of that Hie, and in many ways these concerns contributed to the development of Skinner's phrase highlights that as a philosophy of science, radical behaviorism is behaviorism. Rarly versions of behaviorism sought to clarify and refine both the sub- also an epistemological statement, As discussed throughout this book, radical behav- ject matter and methods of psychology, so that a genuine science of behavior could be iorism is interested in providing comprehensive, explanatory statements about the realized and contribute to improving the human condition. A fundamental concern of causes of anyone's behavior, and especially instances when individuals are said to these early versions was practical: What could be manipulated in time and space to pre- "know" something. This interest includes instances when scientists are said to know dict and control behavior as a subject matter? Hence, early versions of behaviorism something in a way that enables them to explain an event. As an epistemological state- came to be viewed as a significant departure from introspective approaches, and cor- ment, radical behaviorism is therefore intimately concerned with explaining the behav- rectly so. Radical behaviorism continues this trend. ior of the observing individuals—the scientists themselves. As a result, radical In its endeavors, radical behaviorism therefore seeks answers to questions about the behaviorism is intimately concerned with how scientists talk about behavioral events, causes of behavior in terms of behavioral processes in the behavioral dimension, rather and why they talk as they dovBy virtue of its fundamental concern with verbal behavior than in terms of supposed mental processes in a supposed mental dimension. As noted and knowledge claims, radical behaviorism is in a unique position: It is based on the earlier in this chapter, however,.radical behaviorism can include variables within the science for which it stands as a foundation. Importantly, then, radical behaviorism ad- skin., Thus, in certain instances radical behaviorism is not restricted to the consider- mits no discontinuity between the behavior being explained and the behavior of ex- ,tion of publicly observable variables. Nevertheless, when radical behaviorism does plaining it. Neither is caused by mental states or other forms of internal entities from insider variables inside the skin, it conceives of their origin, nature, and function in another dimension. > >..:vioral events quite differently from traditional psychology, and even from other To be sure, radical behaviorism is concerned with how to make sense out of a wide ^ si'>ns of psychology nominally identified as behavioral. They are behavioral vari- variety of knowledge claims on the part of observing scientists. Nevertheless, appeals ' \s, not mental. Consequently, radical behaviorism does not invest them with origi- to such phenomena as mental states in knowledge claims are not regarded as identify- * vT initiating mechanical power to cause behavioral events. Rather, it regards ing anything that is literally mental, bccauseihere is literally no mental dimension. As a.action of events in the world outside the skin, but in their current form ac- suggested earlier in this chapter, talk of a mental dimension is regarded as a function of 10 Chapter I social practices, rather than anything having to do with an actual dimension that is real- Behavior and the variables of which it is a function may be inside or outside the skin ized apart from the behavioral dimension>Consequently, a particular emphasis for rad- of the behaving organism, but they are all in the behavioral dimension. In short, radi- ical behaviorism is the analysis of verbal behavior, the relation between verbal cal behaviorism rejects the all too common distinction between mental and behav- behavior and knowledge, the nature of the intellectual activity that underlies science, ioral, within or across the behavior of either the subject, the research scientist, the and the application of science-based principles to phenomena outside the laboratory service provider, or the client. It formulates answers to questions about behavior in for the benefit of humankind. Skinner (1957) addressed this very important point in the thoroughgoing behavioral terms. Behavior-analytic approaches run decidedly con- following way: trary to well-established intellectual traditions in Western culture, and arc often dis- paraged as merely descriptive or even as dangerously aberrant. Behavior analysts, of The verbal processes of logical and scientific thought deserve and require a more precise analy- course, take exception to the disparaging treatments by others, and point to the effec- sis than they have yet received. One of the ultimate accomplishments of a science of verbal be- tiveness of their approach: If behavior-analytic approaches work so well, and tradi- havior may be an empirical logic, or a descriptive and analytical scientific epistemology, the terms and practices of which will be adapted to human behavior as a subject matter, (p. 431) tional approaches based on an assumption of mental life do not, behavior analysts ask on what basis are behavior analytic approaches so lightly dismissed, and traditional Clearly, then, just as radical behaviorism conceives of the causes of the mcntalistic approaches so heavily embraced? The present book explores answers to "to-be-explained" behavior on the part of the observed individual in behavioral terms, this question as well. so also does it conceive of the causes of the "explanatory" behavior on the part of the observing individual in comparable and compatible terms, at a comparable and com- SUMMARY patible level. In the final analysis, not only are mental variables rejected as causes for the behavior of the subject or participant; they are also not readmitted in a formulation In summary, the main function of radical behaviorism is to monitor and analyze the na- of the scientist's scientific behavior, as scientists seek to explain the basis of their ture of knowledge claims in a science of behavior and its technological applications. knowledge. Zuriff (1985) describes this relation well in the following passage, when he Radical behaviorism is the domain that underlies the other domains of behavior analy- speaks of behaviorism as a "philosophy of mind"(to use a currently popular descriptor) sis, and that makes behavior analysis a coherent whole. The present book also takes the as well as a philosophy of science: position that although behavior analysis and radical behaviorism are often classified as variants of traditional behaviorism, an examination of the conceptual foundations of [BJehaviorism is also a philosophy of mind with certain assumptions about human nature.,,. radical behaviorism reveals that it differs enough from other forms of psychology, in- This philosophy of mind is interdependent with behaviorist philosophy of science; each justi- fies the other. Given the assumptions of the behaviorist philosophy of mind, the kinds of meth- cluding many of those traditionally identified as behavioral, that it is usefully regarded ods, theories, and explanations favored by behaviorist philosophy of science appear most as an unique and independent perspective. This book explores those foundations. The appropriate. Conversely, the behaviorist philosophy of science supports its philosophy of first section of the book consists of six chapters outlining the basic features of radical mind. (p. 2) behaviorism. Chapters 2 and 3 present some historical background. TABLE 1-1 THE SENSE OF "RADICAL" IN RADICAL BEHAVIORISM Radical Behaviorism What, then, is the sense of the term "radical" in radical behaviorism? Sometimes radi- Critical examination of subject matter, methods, and knowledge claims of cal behaviorism is taken as an "extreme" or even "fanatical" form of behaviorism, behavioral science, as well as the application of its findings wherein only publicly observable stimuli and responses are allowed, and direct consid- Theoretical, philosophical, or conceptual questions asked by radical behav- eration of a purported internal phenomenon is rejected because it is unobservable or iorists: cannot be agreed upon by two or more people. Some early versions of behavioral psy- a. Why do scientists examine and explore a given subject? chology did in fact adopt this perspective, but radical behaviorism is not extreme in the b. What rate of discovery will sustain their behavior in doing so? limiting or restricting sense of the word radical'. Rather, a more appropriate synonym c. What precurrent behaviors will improve their chances of success and for radical is "thoroughgoing." Radical behaviorism argues for a thoroughgoing, com- extend the adequacy and scope of their descriptions? prehensive explanation of behavior at the descriptively consistent level of behavior. 12 Chapter 1 d. What steps do they take in moving from protocol to general statement? e. What aspects of behavior are significant? f. Of what variables are changes in these aspects a function? g. How are the relations among behavior and its controlling variables to be brought together in characterizing the organism as a system? h. What methods are appropriate in studying such a system experimen- tally? i. tinder what conditions does such an analysis yield a technology of be- havior, and what issues arise in its application to socially significant be- havior? (e.g.. Skinner, l%9, pp. x, xii) Section 1 REFERENCES Catania, A. ('., & Hamad, S. (Vds.). (1988). J'he selection of behavior; The ofwrant behaviorism ofB. The Foundations of Radical F. Skinner; Comments and controversies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. i hvwkins, R. P., & Anderson, C. M. (2(H)2), In response: On the distinction between science and prac- Behaviorism tice: A reply to Thyer and Adkins. 77k1 Behavior Analyst. JJ, 1 1 5 - 1 1 9 , Skinner, H, F. (1957). lerbul hchavittr New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Skinner, B. F, (19(>9). Contingencies of reinforcement. New York: Apploton-Ccntury-Crofts. Skinner, H. F. (1974). About behaviorism (college edition). New York: Knopf, Skinner, B. V. (1989). Recent issues in the. analysis of behavior. Columbus, OH: Merrill, ZuritT, Ci. E. (1985). Behaviorism: -I conceptual reconstructit>n. New York: Columbia University Chapters 2 through 7 make up Section 1 of this book. These chapters lay out the founda- Press. tions of radical behaviorism. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the historical context for the de- velopment of radical behaviorism. Chapter 4 looks to a principal thesis of radical STUDY QUESTIONS behaviorism—behavior as a subject matter in its own right—and distinguishes the analysis of behavior frojrh neuroscience. Chapter 5 outlines a taxonomy of behavior, 1. In one sentence, define behavior analysis, based on the environmental conditions of which a given instance of behavior is a func- tion. Chapter 6 presents a vocabulary for the analysis of behavior, emphasizing the 2. In one or two sentences each, describe the four domains of radical behaviorism function of consequences. Chapter 7 examines selection by consequences as the appro- 3. In one or two sentences, state or paraphrase Skinner's definition of radical behav- priate causal mode for radical behaviorism. iorism. 4. In three or four sentences, describe the nature of radical behaviorism's concerns with explanations that appeal to causes of behavior from the mental dimension. 5. In three or four sentences, describe the nature of radical behaviorism's concerns with explanations that appeal to physiological causes of behavior. 6. Describe the sense of "radical" in radical behaviorism. 13  2 History of Behaviorism and Behavior Analysis: 1800-1930 Synopsis of Chapter 2: Chapter 2 is the first of two chapters that examine the historical devel- opment of behaviorism. It seeks to identify the major trends in the development of psychology generally, and then moves to the development of classical S- R behaviorism specifically, from roughly 1800 to 1930. It is intended its a brief review of relevant milestones, rather than as a comprehensive history ofpsychology during this period. The chapter argues that behaviorism devel(>ped in two phases. The first phase was that of classical S R behaviorism, which emerged from influences in functionalism, animal psychology, and refle.wlog\'. A convenient date by which to mark the advent of classical behaviorism is 1^13. Classical behaviorism at- tempted to he objective, empirical, reliable, and to generate agreement bv accounting for all forms of behavior in terms of immediate antet -cdent < 'ansation and the generalized S R refli 35 that stimuli and responses weren't al- Pennypacker (1993) define behavior as follows: ways independent entities, unrelated to other stimuli and responses. Rather, stimuli and responses could be grouped into classes according to the environmental circumstances The behavior of an organism is that portion of the organism's interaction with its environment of which they were a function. For example, responses that were a function of one set of that is characterized by detectable displacement in space through time of some part of the or- ganism and that results in a measurable change in at least one aspect of the environment (p. 23) environmental conditions belonged to one class, whereas responses that were a func- tion of another set of conditions belonged to another class. The topography or form of This definition, characterized as a woiking definition for its practical benefits, is laud- the responses might vary, but so long as the responses were caused by the same envi- able in that it emphasizes the interactive character of behavior. Nevertheless, it still ronmental conditions, the responses belonged to the same class. Thus, Skinner empha- contains the physjej.il ist elements of Skinner's earlier definitions, by virtue of its appeal sized that one member of an operant class is equivalent to any other, hence the phrase to detectajblejjisplacemcnts and measurable changes. In some cases, such as events "quantitatively mutually replaceable." As reviewed earlier in the present book. Skinner within the skin, the authors acknowledge that the technological sophistication may be sought to come to grips with the apparent variability and spontaneity of behavior that required to extend the sensitivity of the observational process. troubled classical S-R behaviorism. The generic nature of stimuli and responses al- lowed him to do so, provide an orderly arrangement of facts, and escape the thankless task of botanizing re flexes (Skinner, 1938, p. 10). ISSUES RAISED BY THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS InScience and Human fiefuivior. Skinner (1953) provided a slightly different wording: To their credit, the definitions reviewed above emphasize the interactive nature of be- The term [operant 1 emphasizes the tact that the behavior operates upon the environment to havior, involving a real organism as it lives and interacts with a real environment. generate consequences.1,.. In this sense an operant is defined by an effect which may be speci- fied in physical terms... (p. 65) Prototypical cases in behavior analysis are: rats that press levers in experimental cham- bers and produce 45-mg food pellets, or pigeons that peck keys in experimental cham- The interesting feature of this definition is not so much a distinction between operants bers and get access to an elevated food hopper filled with mixed grain for 3 s. Other and respondents, but rather with the way the particular kind of behavior, an "operant," cases may now be considered. 62 Chapter 4 Behavior ax a Subject Mutur in Its Own Right 63 Physiological Responses Do we see red as a property of an object, as a retinal response to a given frequency of radiation, as nerve impulses in the optie tract, or as activity in the occipital cortex? As a behaviorist, I must re- ply that what is happening in retina, optic tract, and occipital cortex are part of seeing red. As a be - Is a heartbeat an instance of behavior? Is digestion? They are both certainly instances of haviorist, I leave that to the physiologist, who has more appropriate instruments and methods. As an organism's activity. a hehaviorist, I am concerned only with the way in which a discriminative response (\v hether it he One way of talking about these instances is to say that they do not become cases that key press, saying "red," or stepping on the brake of a car) is brought under the control of red ob- interest radical behaviorists until they are shown to be functionally related to environ- jects. As a behaviorist, I am concerned with how a person learns to say "I see red" in both the pres- ence and absence of red objects. (Skinner in Catania & Hamad, 1988, p. 206) mental circumstances in some way,'For example, events associated with noxious stim- Behaviorists often say that perceiving is behaving. Hut that is not quite right.-j'erceiving is only uli may make the heart beat fester or impede digestion, in which case it is useful to part of behaving,.Seeing a tree is a common part of what happens when we respond to trees in conceive of these aspects of an organism's functioning as behavior. many different ways. Whatever it is physiologically (and only a physiologist will be able to tell us that), it cannot have been strengthened by reinforcing consequences until behavior fol- lowed. But it can occur whether action follows or not. In other words, seeing is responding up Novel Behavior to the point of specific action; it is the product of many instances in which action has followed. (Skinner, 1985, p. 76) The term behavior is also used to characterize novel activity. For example, porpoises have been trained to emit a series of jumps, flips, and turns that had not been previously Is the eyeball analogous in a mysterious way to some kind of musculature that presses observed (Pryor, Haag, & O'Reilly, 1969). Similarly, rats and pigeons have been a lever in the optic tract? Presumably, seeing red when red is actually present is some- trained to emit a sequence of responses on two response devices that differs from some thing that the visual system does, just as absorbing oxygen is something that the lungs do, number of prior sequences (Bryant & Church, 1974; Page & Neuringer, 1985), In addi- or absorbing nutrients from food is something that the digestive system does. At issue is tion, humans have learned to type numbers at a computer keyboard that are as "ran- the extent to which this sort of process is modified by behavioral contact with the envi- dom" as those produced by the computer's random number generator (Neuringer, ronment, at which point it becomes of interest to behaviorism.T'or example, direction of 1986). At issue is how to define such responses, as there does not seem to be a common ga/e and accommodation (i.e., focus) require experience that involves consequences. physical property across the various instances that defines class membership. Similarly, instances of perception, such as seeing red, clearly become of interest when One way to make sense out of such cases is to understand that behavior at one time be- they are followed by other instances of behavior, such as stepping on the brake of a car. comes part of the environment that contributes to the determination of behavior at some They also become of interest when other stimuli control the "perception of red." Individ- future time. For example, a subject can easily be trained to make one of two responses on uals shown a playing card that has the shape of the suit called a "liearf'but is actually col- one trial, and then the opposite response on the next trial. In this case, given that one re- ored black might say they see red. In this latter example, the behavior of seeing red was sponse is made at time (T - 1), that response enters into the determination of the next re- initially established by seeing a red heart. The same behavior was later occasioned by sponse, such that a different response is made at time T. Novel behavior is defined by its simply the shape of a heart, independently of the actual color of the object present in the relation to one or more instances of prior behavior. In the ease of responding in a se- visual field. Many optical illusions can be understood in this same way. quence of randomly varying responses (i.e., responding on the left but not the right of two In more complex examples, individuals might well be able to see something that is response devices) or typing a sequence of random numbers, the responses are novel in the not actually there, given an appropriate history. An experienced chess player may be sense that the environment requires that any given response differ in some specified way able to look at the arrangement of pieces on a board and imagine what would happen if a from some number of prior responses, not just one, and the number is usually fairly large. pawn were moved here or a rook there. This behavior develops after a lengthy history Worth noting, however, is that when subjects are required to type random numbers, the of actually seeing chess boards with the pieces in \ arious positions, and then experienc- environment isn't so accommodating that typing letters counts as an acceptable response, ing the consequences of moving the pieces to different positions. Again, the behavior even though typing letters rather than numbers is surely novel. of seeing in the absence of things seen is a function of environmental circumstances. Perceptual Behavior Covert Behavior The relation between perception and various definitions of behavior is particularly im- Interestingly, various other forms of activity, such as thinking or imagining, may be re- portant. Consider the following passages from Skinner's writings: ferred to as private or covert forms of behav ior. Pri\ ate behavior is taken up in greater 64 Chapter 4 Behavior as a Subject Matter in Its Own Right 65 detail in Chapter 10, but relevant at this point is the sense in which private events like ily have the same physical topography. The operant class ot'a lever press is defined as thinking or imagining involve producing effects on the environment that may be speci- "whatever depresses the lever sufficiently to operate the microswitch," given that op- fied in physical terms, such as movements or displacements of the body in space and eration of the microswitch then produced a food pellet. The operant class was not de- time. What is the physical effect when one listens selectively to the strings during a fined in terms of a contraction of specific musculature. Of course, if whatever was symphony? What is the phvsical effect when thinking is defined as "behaving which required to produce a food pellet was the contraction of specific musculature, so be it, automatically affects the behaver and is reinforcing because it does so" (Skinner, 1957, but the response class was still defined in terms of what was required to produce rein- p. 438). forcement. A remaining question is whether the boundaries of a class pf responses are A first concern here is just how physiealistic one wants to be when one talks about determined by events during the lifetime of the species ("phylogenic") or during the behavior that involves detectable movement in space and time. A second concern is lifetime of the individual organism ("ontogenic"). Presumably, that question is to be how to define "effects on the environment," such as environmental consequences, in answered empirically, through the analysis of many different responses within and physiealistic terms. A response inevitably has a consequence, if only because the envi- between species ronment after the response differs from the environment before the response. The envi- Must an event be publicly observable for it to count as an instance of behavior? To be ronment before the response did not include the response, because it hadn't yet been sure, in most cases behavior analysts are interested in publicly observable behavior, if made!.,The environment after the response does include the response. The implication only from a pragmatic perspective. In addition, behavior analysts subscribe enough to is that it is presumably not necessary to be as physicalistie as many definitions seem in- the philosophical thesis of physicalism to believe that-something is physically or physi- clined to be. Nevertheless, the behavior analyst must take care to specify the functional ologically different after a response than before, even though one may not be able to relation between response and environment; other stimuli in an organism's environ- provide a publicly observable measure of it., However, not all behavior involves a pub- ment might also change after the response, although those stimuli might not influence licly observable movement, and not all publicly observable movements count as be- the response. havior (e.g., Catania, 2007, p. 11). In any case, regardless of whether the boundaries of a class of behavior are phylogenic or ontogenie, it seems reasonable that a definition of behavior retain lan- ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES guage that specifies interaction with the environment. In this view, the term behavior is Some consideration of the factors that led to the framing of the formal definitions of be- an abstraction that concerns a particular sort of functional relation between the activity havior cited earlier in this chapter may help analy/e the issues associated with those of an organism and its environment.:The task is not to specify a Platonic or metaphysi- definitions. After all, the definitions are instances of verbal behavior. That is, they are cal "essence" that when-present means some activity counts as behavior, and when ab- behavioral products of real people acting with respect to a particular set of factors. Pre- sent means it does not. The task does not mean that the job of the behavioral scientist is sumably, the definitions served some purpose. to divine whether such an essence is present or absent. Is a heartbeat behavior? It de- Chapter 2 pointed out that early behaviorists such as Watson were concerned with pends. Changes in the beating of the heart as a function of coming into contact with establishing a genuine science of behavior, in contrast to the prevailing attempts to es- some biologically relevant stimulus such as a shock would seem to count as behavior. tablish a science of mental life by making inferences about consciousness on the basis As Skinner said, seeing what is there when it is there is £art of many instances of behav- of introspective reports and reaction times. The early behaviorists chose to make their ior. In addition, seeing modifications of what is there, as in an optical illusion, or seeing case by emphasi/ing a subject matter that was publicly observable. Behavior was pub- in the absence of the thing seen, as an image, would presumably count as behavior, licly observable, whereas conscious experience was not. Only if their subject matter when the seeing is a function of the environment. was publicly observable could it be considered scientific. By this criterion, the intro- The cases mentioned above suggest the definition of the term hehavior might be use- spective study of conscious experience could not be regarded as a science. fully interpreted to reflect the wide range of circumstances in which it is used. In partic- For Skinner, stimuli and responses were generic, rather than isolated instances. That ular, certain aspects of existing definitions, such as public observability and is, stimuli and responses were members of classes. Importantly, the classes were de- specification of its physical dimensions, are less important in today's intellectual cli- fined functionally, rather than in terms of their topographical properties. Thus, an oper- mate than relatively early in the twentieth century, when Watson and Skinner first ad- ant was a class of responses that had the same effect on the environment. Despite vocated behavior as a subject matter in its own right. Indeed, Skinner said: "I see no tendencies toward physiealistic definitions, the members of that class did not neeessar- reason why we should not also call the action of efferent nerves behavior if no muscular 66 Chapter 4 Behavior as a Subject Matter in //.v Own Right 67 response is needed for reinforcement" (Skinner in Catania & Hamad, 1988, p. 485). responds, and the systems that do the responding. The behaving organism is the locus Are muscles necessary? Probably not, if one wants to count perceptual responses as be- or the host of this entire process (Baer, 1976). havior. Is movement necessary? Again, probably not. For that matter, standing still Some behavior analysts apply the "Dead Man's Test" to determine whether an event could conceivably count as behavior: "It is sometimes necessary... to regard doing is behavior. By this test is meant that behavior should be regarded as something active nothing as a response if it has identifiable reinforcing_cpnsequences" (Skinner, 1957, p. or present: if something is passive or absent, such that a dead man could do it, then it isn't 379). As suggested earlier^iot all movements need be instances of behavior, and not all behavior. To be sure, such a conception can be valuable, as it focuses on the interactive instances of behavior need be movements'. What matters is whether a specific instance sense of behavior. However, one might also take care that the conception doesn't limit of behavior is with respect to the environmental circumstances, given the broad inter- practical action. For example, if individuals are troubled because they bite their finger- pretation of environment that behaviorists use. Behavioral scientists have distin- nails and can't seem to stop, then presumably the goal of a therapeutic intervention is to guished among a number of categories of behavior, which will be discussed in Chapter get the individuals to not bite their fingernails. ('learly, dead men don't bite their finger- 5. The categories are distinguished by the nature of the interaction between organism nails. Nevertheless, it would seem that getting live individuals to not bite their finger- and environment. I nails is a meaningful objective. One can salvage an active sense of behavior implied by In sum, behavior is one of the primary characteristics of life. It consists of*an organ- the Dead Man's Test by stating the objective of the therapeutic intervention in an alter- ism's interactions that are with respect to, and influenced by, the environment in partic- native and positive way, as "growing one's fingernails." Presumably, the fingernails of ular ways] In this view, the organism is understood as a complex life form that carries dead men don't grow, but then what is useful is some specification of how long they on the functions of life by means of the functioning of its separate but interdependent must grow for the live individual, in what time frame, and so on. organs and systerns'(Jolinston & Pennypacker, 1993, p. 28). The environment consists What, then, about the nature of the functional relations between behavior and envi- of the sum total of objects, circumstances, and stimulus properties that constitute the ronment? A response is an event that has taken place in a particular setting at a partic- occasion to which behavior is functionally reiated/The environment can be past or ular time.T he event involves an interaction between the organism and its stimulating present. It can be inside the skin, accessible to only the behaving individual, or outside environment. SA variety of descriptors may be applied to characterize events as be- the skin, accessible to others. It can be exteroceptive, interoceptive, proprioeeptive, havioral events, rather than events appropriate for other sciences (e.g., (Cantor & hormonal, and so on.'The environment of which a response is a function is outside of Smith, 1975). the response at the time the response occurs, but not necessarily outside of the skin. Moreover, behavior and its consequences at a given time are part of the environment 1. Behavioral events are variable and differential, as a function of the occasion on that can enter into a functional relation \\ ith subsequent behavior. Analysis determines which they occur. That is, they are conditional on and modifiable by the properties the nature of the functional relation between behavior and environment. Implicit in this of the environment to which they are related. view is that the organism is in "contact" with the environment. This contact is a neces- 2. Behavioral events are developmental and integrative. That is, they represent ad- sary but not sufficient condition for an organism to respond with respect to it. To cite a justments that have taken place over the lifetime of the species or the lifetime of common example, given that the upper range of human hearing is 20,000 Hz, an audi- the individual organism to its environment, and they have served the species or the tory stimulus of 30,0001 Iz is not a feature of the environment with v\ hieh a human's be- organism as it adapts to its environment. havior is in contact. In this view, behavior may be viewed as an event wherein a causal relation exists be- (Hven these considerations, how does behavior as conceived by radical behaviorists tween (a) the functioning of one or more of an organism's neural or muscular systems differ from events studied in other sciences? responsible for movement or posture (including standing still); and (b) the environ- ('onsider the following simple example: Person A pushes person B, who then falls ment. The functioning of the systems can be at any point along the continuum labeled down. When pet son B falls down, is this event behavior? A radical behaviorist would central to peripheral. In addition, the environment with respect to which the function- say the movement of person B is not behavior. Rather, this event would be the subject ing is causally related can be inside or outside the skin. The environment is that which is matter of physics. Consider what would happen if -\ pushed B harder: Presumably, B outside behavior (Hayes, 1984). Behavior is, then, an event that occurs when many dif- would fall faster. This event entails a kind oftommutative and mechanical interaction in- ferent variables come together. The organism's genetics are to be included because volving the transfer of energy that causes matter to be in motion,, As such, the event is the they determine the receptivity to the environment with respect to which the organism subject matter of physics. The falling doesn't develop over the history of the species or 68 Chapter 4 Behavior as a Subject Matter in Its Own Right 69 the individual, and is conditional only in the sense that it depends on the transfer of en- ganism's behavior, as measured on a future occasion. Here, contact with the ergy by the push. Adjectives such as differential, integrative, variable, delayable, and environment on one day may cause a response to increase or decrease in similar cir- even inhibitive don't meaningfully apply to tailing down. If person B extended a hand to cumstances on a subsequent day. break the fall, the movement of the hand would be behavior, but not the fall itself. A science that differs from behavior analysis is needed to deal with the second ques- Thus, the sense of behavior that is relevant to radical behaviorism is that it is'an inter- tion and fill the two gaps (Donahoe, 1996; Reese, 1996). Behavioral neuroscience is action between organism and environment that has particular properties as a result of just that different science. It is concerned with the operating characteristics of the un- certain functional relations that obtain between the features of the behavior and fea- derlying neural, muscular, and hormonal systems (a) within a behavioral event and (b) tures of the environment. The interaction may have developed phylogenieally or between one behavioral event and the next. For example, within a behavioral event, be-, ontogenically, and represents a central characteristic of the organism as it progresses havioral neuroseientists might be interested in how an organism's neural, muscular, through its life cycle. i and hormonal systems provide continuity from the time the organism comes into con- tact with an antecedent stimulus through the time the response occurs. Alternatively, between behavioral events, behavioral neuroseientists might be interested in how an THE RELATION BETWEEN BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND NEUROSCiENCE organism's neural, muscular, and hormonal systems provide continuity from one event to the effects of that