Political Participation PDF

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Introduction ❑ Participation covers a wide range of activities: conventional forms (e.g., voting at elections and joining political parties) and less conventional (e.g., as attending demonstrations or collecting signatures) ❑ Mass participation in elections and other...

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Introduction ❑ Participation covers a wide range of activities: conventional forms (e.g., voting at elections and joining political parties) and less conventional (e.g., as attending demonstrations or collecting signatures) ❑ Mass participation in elections and other forms of political engagement is the ‘lifeblood of representative democracy’ ❑ Accordingly, there is a widespread concern about citizens’ withdrawal from active political involvement in European societies (declining electoral turnout, rising anti-party sentiment, waning of civic organizations, etc.)  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Lecture outline 1. Modes of citizen participation ▪ Voting (conventional) ▪ Protesting (non-conventional) 2. Theories of political participation 3. What explains the decline in participation? 4. What lies ahead: new opportunities for participation?  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 1. Modes of citizens participation ❑ Political participation refers to the activities of citizens intended to influence public bodies, their composition, or the decisions they make ❑ By influencing who gets to sit in parliament and government, voting affects political decision-making only indirectly and in rather broad terms ❑ Other activities include writing a petition or attending a demonstration in relation to a specific cause - these forms of political participation are often on a much smaller scale than elections (protest participation) ▪ However they convey much richer information concerning the reasons behind them and the demands of the participants, often identifying very specific problems and making very specific demands  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION i. Voter turnout ❑ Average turnout for 35 European countries (2010-2019) is 67% (calculated as the percentage of those who vote among the registered voters) ❑ Considerable variation: very high in Malta (93%), very low in Romania (40%) ❑ In younger democracies of Eastern Europe it averages around 65% ❑ Overall, turnout declined in most European countries from the 1960s to 1990s ❑ Decline is sharper in central and eastern Europe after 1990 (11%) than in western Europe (5%) ❑ Sharper drop in turn out in countries more severely hit by the economic crisis (Cyprus, Greece and Italy) – but not all (see Ireland and Spain)  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ii. Protest participation ❑ For example, anti-austerity demonstrations (indignados, yellow vests, etc.) ❑ Most protests are not widely reported in the media: many are small and non-violent (scarcity of systematic data and information)  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ❑ Data from the European Values Study in a time span of 30 years show: ▪ Participation in three types of activities (signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations and joining unofficial strikes) incurred slight drops - in all three activities participation levels rebounded by 2018 ▪ People joining boycotts increased gradually from 1999 to 2018, suggesting that political consumerism is gaining in importance ▪ The East-West difference in protest participation is even bigger than for voter turnout: 66% of people in Western Europe claimed in 2018 to have engaged in at least one of the possible protest activities; twice as big as the respective share is central and east Europe  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ❑ Why do we have such differences? ▪ Some believe is due to a weakness in civil society in post-communist countries and a bigger lack of trust in political institutions ▪ Others, suggest that is a consequence of the sudden transition to democracy and market capitalism and the painful comprehensive reforms which led them disengage from political activities and focus in their personal circumstances  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ❑ Voting Vs protest? ▪ Some suggest that voting decline (traditional mode of participation) will be substituted by increased protesting (new mode of participation) ▪ An alternative view sees protest activity as an extension of, rather than an alternative to, the more institutionalized channels of political participation (e.g., voting) ▪ Indeed, data suggest that there is a strong correlation between them: high turnout goes hand in hand with high protest participation and vice versa  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 2. Theories of political participation a) Individual level (micro) determinants of political participation ❑ A number of factors account for differences in participation between individual citizens or group of citizens ❑ Above all, people with lower income and lower education are less likely to participate in politics than others ❑ There is a threefold answer to this (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995): ❑ Because they can’t (resources) ❑ Because they don’t want to (values and attitudes) ❑ Because nobody asked them (mobilizing contexts)  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION i. Resources ❑ It refers to social-demographic factors such as age, gender, education, and social class ❑ Men, people of higher social background, and those with higher education are more inclined to participate in politics ❑ An exception is age: with increasing age, people are more likely to vote but less willing to turn up at a demonstration ❑ Data show that people are more likely to vote and to protest the better they are equipped with politically relevant resources  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ii. Values and attitudes ❑ People who are overall fairly satisfied with the democratic system are more likely to vote, while dissatisfied people would be more likely to withdraw from politics ❑ Interestingly, being satisfied with democracy is also associated with an increased propensity to protest (!) ❑ Data show that post-materialist value orientations foster participation: voting, as well as protest ❑ The difference is more pronounced for protest participation than for voter turnout, with post-materialists almost twice as likely as materialist to partake in a protest activity  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION iii. Mobilizing contexts ❑ Individuals’ social environment can encourage them to a greater or lesser extent to take part in politics ❑ Discussing political matters with family members, friends, or neighbors may affect an individual’s propensity to become politically active ❑ Members of political organizations and trade unions are also more likely to protest and to vote than non-members ❑ There are positive externalities for political participation flowing from widespread activism of citizens in all sorts of organizations, from churches to sports clubs ❑ In this context, people develop their social skills and reinforce trust in one another, as well as widen their cognitive capacities, scope of interest, and other civic virtues  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION b) Macro-level determinants of political participation ❑ Participation is shaped by characteristics of large-scale processes and the political system ❑ It is useful to think of political participation as a form of collective action ❑ When people participate in collective action they contribute to the provision of a public good ❑ Public goods are desired by many and can be consumed by many without making the goods scarcer for others ❑ Examples of a public goods include clean air, national security, and the democratic legitimacy that mass political participation confers  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ❑ Institutions and other contextual factors affect the cost-benefit calculus of potential participants i. The electoral systems differ in respect to the expected costs and benefits attached to voting - systems of proportional representation are expected to mobilize voters better than majority systems ii. Compulsory voting makes participation relatively more attractive by increasing the cost of abstaining iii. Electoral competition matters: individual voters expect their vote to make a difference if the election promises to be close race iv. Individual voters might perceive the importance of their own contributions higher if the electorate is small v. Not all elections are equally important, and rational citizens are more willing to incur the cost of voting if something significant is at stake (presidential elections)  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 3. What explains the decline in participation? ❑ Theories can explain the decline if considered together with the age factor: voter turnout is declining primarily among the younger cohorts ❑ Some scholars argue that a broader cultural value change is underway, with younger generations being less interested in politics, as well as less likely to conceive voting as a civic duty ❑ Others, argue that lower levels of voting among younger cohorts constitute a persistent footprint of particular elections (less competitive ones) ❑ Changes in the voting age can also have an effect: when less competitive elections coincided with the lowering of the voting age, these younger cohorts experienced their first election under unfavorable circumstances - as a result, many of these young voters failed to develop a habit of participation  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 4. What lies ahead: democratic innovations in local politics? ❑ Some scholars look for answers in increasing citizens’ participation in political decision-making via new or additional opportunities especially at the level of local politics as a means to compensate for a loss of control over national politics in times of globalization ❑ Such innovations at local politics may include: referendums, direct elections to public offices, and deliberative formats of participation like mini-publics, citizen forums or roundtables  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU Introduction ❑ Countries joined the EU to benefit from regional integration ❑ But it comes with challenges for democracy ▪ Transfer of powers and authority to ‘Brussels’ and concerns about national democracy ▪ Unelected technocrats making the decisions ❑ Others advise for more European integration and more direct accountability of European bodies (Commission) ❑ Dilemma: does democracy work better in smaller scale contexts?  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU What do we examine 1. Democratic Deficit? ▪ Output and input legitimacy 2. Representation through national institutions ▪ National elections; National parliaments; Referendums 3. Emerging supranational democracy ▪ European Parliament elections and European party groups  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU 1. Democratic Deficit? ❑ In the context of European integration, the term ‘democratic deficit’ refers broadly to the weak role of citizens in EU decision-making ❑ A narrower definition focuses on parliaments, pointing to the limited powers of domestic legislatures, and the European Parliament ❑ However, there is no consensus among politicians or scholars about how to address the ‘democratic deficit’ ❑ Much depends on whether one believes that the legitimacy of European integration flows from the participation of citizens (input) or from delivering policies that are supported by the people (output)  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU a) Output legitimacy ❑ Based on the ‘no demos’ argument: EU citizens luck the kind of common identity and political culture found in individual EU m/s ❑ There is no EU-wide language, media, or even party system despite the emergence of ‘Europarties’ and there is no single European public sphere where politicians and citizens can deliberate on issues ❑ Hence, the success of European integration depends on its ability to produce ‘outputs’, public goods or policies that receive support among the public ❑ Moravcsik (2002): the EU is in fact already quite democratic and certainly more democratic than other regional intergovernmental organizations  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ The empowerment of the EP and the central role of national governments in EU decision-making enable citizens to influence decisions, while delegating power to independent central banks, courts, and various regulatory agencies is common also in national politics ❑ Division of authority: Moravcsik also argues that issues important to voters (e.g., taxation, employment, education, social and health services, etc.) remain in the competence of the m/s ❑ As a result, the strengthening of supranational democracy would not necessarily bring about more active participation, as long as matters decided by the EU are of secondary importance to the citizens ❑ However, the powers of the EU cover all policy areas from the funding of cultural projects, to the monitoring of the national budgets, which makes the argument much weaker  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU b) Input legitimacy ❑ According to this perspective, citizens do not have sufficient possibilities for influencing the direction of European integration or daily EU decisions ❑ Democracy entails the idea of accountability, with decision makers accountable to the voters; in representative democracies this accountability is based first and foremost on regular and free elections ❑ As the EU already possesses significant policy-making authority, it is argued that the link between citizens preferences and EU policies should become more direct ❑ This will also increase citizens knowledge of EU issues and even contribute to the emergence of a European identity and a European public sphere  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ European integration undermines national democracy ❑ With many issues now decided at the European level failure and unwillingness (by national politicians) to discuss EU issues in domestic debates increases the democratic deficit ❑ Mair: EU ‘hollows out’ (depoliticizes) competition ❑ Schmidt: at the level of m/s there is ‘politics without policy’ (important policy decisions are made elsewhere) and at the EU level there is ‘policy without politics’ (important policy decisions are made but this is not shaped by competitive elections and party politics) ❑ The multi-level structure of European governance, and the interdependence between national and European levels of decision-making, leaves little room for genuine debates about alternative policy choices  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU How to address the democratic deficit? ❑ The million-dollar question… ❑ Those in favour of European integration support the strengthening of EU level democracy ❑ Those opposed to the EU argue that the solution lies in improving democratic accountability at the level of m/s ❑ What matters for democratic representation is that citizens are offered choices about EU issues in elections and the mechanism for holding the EU executive accountable  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU 2. Representation through national institutions a. National elections ❑ Existing research indicates that parties do a poor job of offering competing visions of Europe to voters in national elections: why? ❑ Explanatory factors include (inter alia): ▪ Mainstream parties are often internally divided on EU questions ▪ Parties are more supportive of integration than their electorates ❑ Hence, mainstream parties have an incentive to contest the elections along the familiar and safer left-right dimension and to downplay contestation over the EU ❑ Where such debates do take place, this contestation has often benefited smaller parties, including Eurosceptics, at the expense of mainstream governing parties  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ However, the recent politicization (i.e., growing political importance) of European integration has at least partially changed the situation ❑ The ‘permissive consensus’ where citizens passively support integration, leaving EU issues to their elected leaders had given way to ‘constraining dissensus’, where elites, that is, party leaders in positions of authority must ‘look over their shoulders’ when negotiating European issues  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ EU questions became considerably more prominent in national elections held in the 2010s, although it might be better to speak of selective politicization as the debates focused on the Euro area bailout packages, the refugee crisis, or, in the case of the UK, Brexit ❑ Much of this politicization has been driven by various nationalists or populist Eurosceptical parties that have shaken the pro-EU consensus of traditional mainstream parties ❑ As a result, many national governments have found their freedom of manoeuvre in negotiations to be much smaller than before, with the consequence that compromises have been harder to achieve in Brussels  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU b. National parliaments ❑ It is common to argue that domestic legislatures are the cornerstones of European representative democracy, and given their close links with citizens, national MPs more than MEPs can contribute to narrowing the gap between ‘Brussels’ and European voters ❑ Deparliamentarization thesis: the gradual deepening of European integration has led to the erosion of parliamentary control over the executive branch ❑ The EU m/s have transferred policy-making powers to the European level in a significant number of areas, and as a result, national governments have directly lost influence  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ Domestic legislatures become involved in EU affairs primarily through scrutinizing the Commission’s initiatives and through influencing the government that represents the country at the European level, but it can be difficult for national parliaments to force governments to make detailed commitments before taking decision in Brussels ❑ It is not surprising that national legislatures were often branded as the main losers or victims of European integration ❑ National parliaments throughout the EU have nonetheless gradually gained stronger rights in EU governance, both in the context of their own national polities and at the EU level  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ Parliamentary committees become more involved in EU affairs ❑ There are, however, significant differences between countries in terms of the power of national parliament’s vis- a-vis the executive and the strength of the committee system, and this shapes the role of national parliaments in EU affairs ❑ For instance, some national assemblies such as the Danish Folketinget require ministers to appear before the respective European committee in advance of attending Council meetings, while others focus more on the scrutiny of draft legislative documents  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) - introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (2009) ❑ National parliaments are assigned the right to monitor the compliance of proposed EU laws with the principle of subsidiarity ❑ Accordingly, the Commission should only introduce legislation when EU-level action is more effective than national measures ❑ The subsidiarity principle applies to policy areas where decision making powers are shared between the EU and its m/s ❑ If national parliaments feel that an initiative for a new EU law violates the subsidiarity principle, they can submit reasoned opinions to the Commission ❑ If 1/3 of national legislatures submit opinions (the so-called ‘yellow card’) the Commission must review the proposal  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU c. Referendums ❑ A direct national channel for citizens to influence European integration ❑ In two m/s, Denmark and Ireland, it is compulsory to hold a referendum when power is transferred to the European level ❑ In other m/s referendums are essentially called by national governments, and they have been held only in connection with major integration questions: EU membership, joining the euro area, and some treaty reforms ❑ One lesson learned from past EU referendums is their unpredictability: voters across Europe have produced major upheavals for both their own governments and for the EU as a whole, and in many cases major embarrassment for political scientists and polling agencies that failed to predict the outcomes  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ Norwegians have twice rejected EU membership (1972 and 1994) ❑ The Danes (2000) and the Swedes 2003 voted against their countries adopting the euro currency ❑ Similarly, the Irish voted twice against treaty reforms (2001 and 2008) ❑ The Dutch and the French voted against the constitutional treaty (2005) ❑ In 2016 Britain chose to exit the EU ❑ It is thus no surprise that particularly Eurosceptical political forces have called for more active use of referendums in key EU decisions  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU 3. Emerging supranational democracy ❑ Given the lack of contestation over Europe in national politics, advocates of supranational democracy have, in turn, argued that the solution lies in offering citizens genuine choices at the European level ❑ Elections to the EP is the most obvious way ❑ However, this is not enough: European voters should have more say about who yields executive power at the EU level  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU a. European Parliament elections ❑ EP powers: undoubtedly, it’s the EU institution that has changed most over the decades ❑ It has evolved from a purely consultative body with members seconded from national parliaments to a directly elected chamber vested with significant legislative, scrutiny, and budgetary powers ▪ The EP is involved in the appointment and oversight of the Commission ❑ It is directly elected since 1979, with 705 seats following UK’s formal exit in 2020  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ European elections have largely been based on the ‘second-order election’ model: they are considered less important than first-order elections (i.e., domestic parliamentary and presidential elections) ❑ Hence, citizens’ voting behaviour is more affected by the national first-order context than by factors related to the EP or the EU ❑ The model thus suggests that the EP elections do not really provide an effective link between citizens and EU policy making ❑ Turnout is substantially lower than in national parliamentary elections ❑ Lack of common European identity, lower awareness of EU issues, and in general the feeling of distance between voters and ‘Brussels’ influence turnout ❑ Central and Eastern European m/s, in particular, are characterised by lower electoral participation: e.g., Slovakia (2014) → 13%  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ Turnout has also varied quite strongly over time within individual m/s, depending on the particular context ❑ In terms of how parties perform, incumbent parties and larger parties have, in line with the second order model, suffered losses in EP elections ▪ Voters may experiment with new parties in EP elections ▪ Alternatively, citizens might use EP elections to protest (‘punish’) against established mainstream parties ❑ These effects have also spilled-over in national elections ❑ European elections have therefore contributed to the fragmentation of the National Party systems  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU b. European Party groups ❑ MEPs sit in transnational party groups, which structure decision-making within the EP ❑ The EP party system has been, in practice, dominated by the centre-right EPP and the centre-left party of the European Socialists ❑ Other groupings include the liberals, the greens, the radical left, the conservatives, the far right and the Eurosceptics ❑ While the number of Eurosceptic MEPs has grown over time, they remain very much in the minority in the parliament ❑ Party groups are generally quite cohesive when it comes to voting in the EP  DEMOCRACY AND THE EU ❑ As no party group has ever held the majority of seats in the parliament, coalitions among different groups are needed to pass legislation ❑ Usually coalitions form along left-right lines, although pro, and anti-European integration alignments are also common ❑ While party groups dominate decision-making in the EP, national interests do nonetheless matter ❑ National party leaders typically meet under the umbrella of their Europarties in advance of European Council summits, in order to coordinate their positions ❑ In this way, Europarties have influenced many important EU policy decisions ❑ The failed experiment of the Spitzenkandidat  EUROSCEPTICISM 1. Origins and meanings of Euroscepticism ❑ A relatively recent concept first used to describe M. Thatcher’s speech in Bruges in 1988 ❑ ‘That is not to say that our future lies only in Europe, but nor does that of France or Spain or, indeed, of any other member […] The Community is not an end in itself […] Let me say bluntly on behalf of Britain: we have not embarked on the business of throwing back the frontiers of the state at home, only to see a European super-state getting ready to exercise a new dominance from Brussels’  EUROSCEPTICISM ❑ It is employed as a synonym for any form of opposition or dissatisfaction with the EU ❑ The meaning of Euroscepticism varies depending on the national context within which is used each time ❑ The degree of hostility towards the EU also varies: not all dimensions of European integration receive the same degree of resentment  EUROSCEPTICISM ❑ Euroscepticism acquires different meanings according to the historical period and the way the EU itself develops ❑ It is a term that was invented by the press and can attach to any ideology ❑ It is not an ideology per se but as all ideologies it has a normative perspective about the EU ❑ The literal meaning of Euroscepticism suggests the submission of European integration into a more sceptical and thorough examination  EUROSCEPTICISM 2. Types of Euroscepticism ❑ The most basic distinction of Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 1997) is the one that differentiates between hard and soft Euroscepticism ▪ Hard Euroscepticism: principled opposition to the EU and the idea of European integration ▪ Soft Euroscepticism: opposition to particular policies and/or institutions and the current form of the EU  EUROSCEPTICISM Other classifications include ❑ Categorization based on two axes: support for the idea of European integration and support for the EU in particular (Kopecky and Mudde 2002) i. Euro-enthusiasts: they support both ii. Euro-rejectionists: they reject both iii. Euro-pragmatists: they accept the current EU but not the idea of European integration iv. Eurosceptics: they accept the idea of European integration but not the current EU  EUROSCEPTICISM Categorization based on the varieties of Euroscepticism ▪ Utilitarian: it asks what are the direct benefits for the country and the citizens from the EU – it increased as a result of enlargement waves and the economic crisis – they demand renationalizations ▪ Political: it expresses concern about the impact of European integration on national sovereignty and national identity – it opposes supranationalism and the concentration of more powers in Brussels ▪ Value-based: it opposes the interference of the EU in normative issues such as the model of economy, abortion rights, etc. ▪ Cultural: it expresses a wider hostility towards Europe as a cultural entity and social model (is essentially anti-Europeanism)  EUROSCEPTICISM What Eurosceptics want ❑ Soft Eurosceptics: they oppose the European super-state and the creation of a federal EU; they want to limit the powers of the Commission; they want the empowerment of the European Council as a means to strengthen intergovernmental elements ❑ Hard Eurosceptics: disengagement from the EU, complete opposition to the European project  EUROSCEPTICISM Hard Eurosceptics in Europe ❑ Northern League (Italy) ❑ Vlaams Belang (Belgium) ❑ Front National (France) ❑ UKIP (UK) (now Reform) ❑ Freedom Party (Austria) ❑ Party for Freedom (Netherlands)  EUROSCEPTICISM Soft Eurosceptics in Europe ❑ Union of Popular Movement (France) ❑ SYRIZA (Greece) ❑ National Alliance (Italy)  EUROSCEPTICISM 3. Where can we trace Euroscepticism? ❑ In the rejection of treaty reforms ❑ Low and decreasing voting turnout in European elections ❑ Increased rates of rejection of the EU and/or fundamental policies and institutions of the EU ❑ Low trust in European institutions ❑ The emergence of anti-EU parties, movements, etc. ❑ Voices for exiting the EU (Brexit!)  EUROSCEPTICISM 4. Impact of Euroscepticism ❑ Euroscepticism has a limited impact in the EU institutions ❑ Euroscepticism is almost inexistent in the Commission; it has small but increasing influence in the EP; but it exerts more influence among the European public ❑ In the Council its impact in limited and for two reasons: ▪ Hard Eurosceptic parties are rarely represented in governments ▪ Most of the work of the Council is done by technocrats that are stationed in Brussels and are therefore immune to the pressures of domestic politics  EUROSCEPTICISM ❑ Eurosceptics channel their influence on the EU mostly via their national governments and in three ways: i. Eurosceptic factions within existing, mainstream parties ii. When Eurosceptic parties participate in coalition governments iii. When governing parties harden their position towards the EU because they face hard opposition from Eurosceptic parties domestically  EUROSCEPTICISM 5. Causes of Euroscepticism a) Internal factors ❑ Party ideology: Left Vs Right, Libertarian Vs Authoritarian ❑ Party competition: opposition Vs government ❑ National character: nationalist tradition (e.g., in France and Britain) ❑ Religion: e.g., strong Catholic tradition in Poland  EUROSCEPTICISM b) External triggers ❑ Eurozone crisis: increased distrust of EU institutions, eurosceptic governments in power, Brexit ❑ Refugee crisis: serious disagreements among m/s (e.g., opposition to the EU refugee plan from Hungary, Poland, etc.), disillusionment with the EU  EUROSCEPTICISM 6. Euroscepticism and democracy ❑ Important democratic institutional reforms were implemented because of their critique ❑ The empowerment of the EP is attributed to their critique and their demands ❑ It places an important question for the EU regarding the role of politics and political conflicts in a political system marked by apolitical and consensual procedures – it is ultimately a question of democracy ❑ They helped the EU to introduce more transparent processes throughout  THE EXECUTIVE Introduction ❑ The executive branch is composed of two different types of actors: those who are part of the political executive and those who form part of the civil service ❑ The role of the political executive is to govern a country by making policy ❑ Its tasks include: setting strategic priorities, developing policy initiatives, drafting corresponding legislation, issuing government orders, mobilizing support, and overseeing policy implementation ❑ Consistently, it takes decisions that have far-reaching consequences for every group in society: e.g., taxation and spending  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ In European democracies the political executive comprises the prime minister, cabinet, and, where applicable, the president ❑ It is supported by non-elected civil servants who staff government departments and implement government policy ❑ Unlike cabinet ministers, the bulk of the civil service remains in position after general elections and after government changes ❑ Civil servants are expected to serve multiple governments of different political orientations professionally and impartially  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ The context in which executives work has evolved over time, with implications for the power to govern ❑ In particular, power has gradually shifted from parliaments to executives ❑ These power shifts have given rise to contemporary debates about executive autonomy ▪ Has the modern executive grown too powerful and autonomous? ▪ What are the merits and demerits of the concentration of power within the executive? ▪ What factors contribute to the empowerment of executives? ▪ Should some powers of executives be constrained, and if so, which?  THE EXECUTIVE 1. The constitutional position of the political executive ❑ The political executive the institution that translates voter choices into policy ❑ It is the link by which democracies turn representation into governance ❑ Cabinets and presidents that form part of the executive are electorally legitimated and accountable in all European democracies ❑ The political executive’s composition differs by constitutional format ❑ In Europe two constitutional formats are prevalent: parliamentary and semi-presidential democracy  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Under both types of constitutions, the political executive includes a government (headed by a prime minister) that is responsible to a democratically elected parliament ❑ Voters in parliamentary democracies are represented by parliament alone, to which the government is exclusively responsible ▪ Examples: Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK ❑ In parliamentary democracies governments are negotiated, formed and broken by legislative parties  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Semi-presidential democracies can be defined as systems where a popularly elected president, complements the government and the PM who are responsible to parliament ▪ Examples: Austria, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Latvia, Poland, and Portugal ❑ There is enormous variation in the powers of directly elected presidents in Europe: in some cases, such as France, the president is the most important political leader in the country, while in others, such as Ireland, the president has a very restricted range of powers and generally fulfills a more ceremonial role, while real political power lies with the PM  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Presidents may also have some executive powers, although these powers are less extensive, on average, than those of popularly elected presidents in semi-presidential democracies ❑ In contrast, the Queens or Kings who serve as head of state in parliamentary constitutional monarchies (e.g., UK and Sweden), do not form part of the political executive because they have purely ceremonial functions ❑ In parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies, the government is dependent on the confidence of parliament ❑ If a government loses a vote of no confidence in parliament, it must resign  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Principal-agent relationship: the institutional device of the confidence relationship ensures that governments have a principal-agent relationship with parliament ❑ In a principal-agent relationship, one person or group, called the agent, makes decisions on behalf of another person or group, called the principal ❑ The delegation of power from the principal to the agent is the defining feature of the relationship ❑ In the relationship between parliament and government, parliament is the democratically elected principal and government is the agent of the parliament ❑ Parliament delegates to government the power to devise policy and oversee its implementation, subject to parliamentary accountability  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ The confidence relationship between parliament and government has three consequences 1. It makes political parties’ central actors in government formation and termination 2. It ensures that most governments are party-based 3. Relatedly, most governments (around 2/3) have majority status in parliament, in the sense that they are formed by parties that control a majority of the parliamentary seats ❑ However, around 1/3 of all European governments have minority status  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ In semi-presidential democracies, the government may additionally be accountable to the president ▪ For instance, following Portugal’s transition to democracy, the Portuguese constitution initially empowered the president to dismiss the cabinet ❑ In Europe most semi-presidential constitutions do not grant the president formal authority to dismiss the cabinet, ❑ In sum, the power to dismiss the cabinet is central in understanding the principal- agent relationships between parliament, president, and the cabinet ❑ Caution: even presidents who are not formally principals of the cabinet can have significant influence on the governance of the country by virtue of their other powers  THE EXECUTIVE The presidentialization of politics ❑ The power and institutional capabilities of political executives have grown with the expanding functions of the modern European state (e.g., size of bureaucracy, transfer of powers to the executive, etc.) ❑ Political developments since 1945 have further strengthened the executive vis-a-vis the parliament and the prime minister within the executive, a process to which we refer as presidentialization ❑ In addition, European integration resulted in elements of domestic politics to be decided through international negotiations, which is traditionally the domain of leaders  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Along with changes in the media and weakening party loyalties, they have led to more leader-centric electoral campaigns and growing leader effects in voting behavior ❑ Jointly all these developments have enhanced the autonomy of prime ministers from the cabinet, their party, and the parliament ❑ There has been a shift from collective to individual power and accountability, which has been induced not by legal or constitutional modifications, but by political change within the unchanged frameworks of parliamentary semi-presidential constitutions  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ This concentration of power in the hands of the prime ministers has two major drawbacks for democracy i. It gives rise to an elitism which contradicts the aspirations of many voters in developed democracies to participate in politics and to influence political decisions ii. The empowerment of prime ministers at the cost of cabinet and political parties has left democracies more vulnerable to variations in individual leadership talent by reducing the number of actors who shape and define key strategic political decisions  THE EXECUTIVE 2. The structure and make-up of the political executive ❑ The government is made-up of the prime minister and the cabinet ❑ The PM goes under different names: e.g., chancellor in Germany and Austria ❑ PMs are the heads of governments and therefore the political chief executives ❑ What PMs do: set the strategic direction for government policy; chair cabinet meetings; coordinate ministers; represent the government domestically and internationally in meetings with other heads of governments at the European level and beyond, etc.  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Unlike presidents, prime ministers are not subject to constitutional term limits ❑ As a result, it is possible for them to serve multiple successive terms in office ▪ For example, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel served four consecutive terms ❑ Usually, but not always, the PM is the leader of the largest parliamentary party, and in coalitions, the premiership is usually claimed by the largest coalition partners  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ The cabinet is composed of those ministers that head the most important government departments; e.g., finance, foreign policy, interior affairs, etc. ❑ They represent the political party or parties that have formed the government ❑ In coalitions, governing parties typically occupy a share of cabinet posts that closely corresponds to the share of legislative support that they contribute to the government ❑ Most ministers are drawn from the parliamentary party, though there can be exceptions to this rule  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ The role of cabinet ministers is to develop policy proposals and to oversee their implementation ❑ In a modern executive, the cabinet does not take collective decisions with respect to everyday policy issues because the government’s functions are too broad and the issues are technically too complex for non-specialists ❑ However, cabinet ministers propose and influence government decisions not only through their own portfolio but also through cabinet discussions, in which major disagreements can arise and policy battles fought ❑ Once cabinet agreement is achieved, ministers guide the policy through the legislative process to ensure that it is enacted as legislation  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ The principle of collective cabinet responsibility for government decisions ❑ It requires cabinet ministers to back and defend government policy, even if in private they disagree with that policy ❑ In practice, however, collective cabinet responsibility depends on the prime minister’s ability to enforce it ❑ The PM who cannot afford to lose the support of critical factions within his or her party or a critical coalition partner may not be in a position to enforce this type of discipline on ministerial colleagues  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Parliamentary republics (e.g., Germany) and semi-presidential republics (e.g., Portugal) complement the cabinet and PM with a presidential head of state who forms part of the executive and represents the country diplomatically ❑ Domestically, such presidents are often expected to be a moderating force in national politics and to act as guardians of the constitution ❑ To fulfill their international and domestic roles, presidents can be invested with a range of powers: ▪ They often have a role in the resolution of conflicts within the political system: through their involvement in scheduling referendums, their emergency powers, or powers to decide whether or not parliament should be dissolved and early elections scheduled  THE EXECUTIVE 3. The institutional powers of the prime minister, cabinet, and president a) The prime ministers (PMs) ❑ They are often invested with extensive powers vis-a-vis cabinet and parliament ❑ In relation to the cabinet, PMs typically have powers to appoint and dismiss cabinet members ❑ Of course, their choices must be made within the context of the government’s dependence on parliamentary confidence: i.e., to have the support of parliament ❑ They chair cabinet meetings and they have the discretion to determine the number of ministerial departments and their scope of activity ❑ They also appoint top civil servants  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Premiers are supported by a dedicated administration of their own and by a team of personal advisors ❑ They have the power to dissolve parliament and to request a vote of confidence in the government ❑ These powers allow chief executives to structure bargaining within government and between government and parliament ❑ By threatening an early election, they can extract concessions from their own back-benchers, from coalition partners, or from parliamentary parties that fear an early election or the fall of the government ❑ The PMs influence is often heightened in the field of foreign policy, where they represent the country diplomatically  THE EXECUTIVE b) The cabinet ❑ The cabinet has a lot of formal powers ❑ The policy-making function of government is underpinned by the right of legislative initiative ❑ Once the cabinet has developed its legislative program, individual pieces of legislation are introduced to parliament by ministers ❑ Some constitutions also delegate the power to dissolve parliament and to invoke a vote of confidence to the cabinet collectively ❑ These legislative powers make the government the agenda-setter in the legislative process  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ The policy implementation functions of cabinets are supported by the regulatory powers of governments; that is, the right to issue the directions that are needed to implement legislation ❑ Moreover, laws may delegate to cabinet powers to interpret and make policy within the framework of the law through government regulations ❑ Some constitutions also grant governments powers to make policy by ordinance or decree in certain areas ❑ The cabinet is assisted by their civil service departments ❑ The autonomy of the cabinet in shaping legislation and policy may be balanced by other institutions, most notably the countervailing powers of parliament and sometimes by the president  THE EXECUTIVE c) The president ❑ Presidential legislative powers may include privileges: to veto legislation; the need for presidential approval to enact legislation or government ordinances; the president’s right to introduce legislation; and presidential influence on the process of initiating a referendum ❑ All of these powers give presidents opportunities to shape policy ❑ In addition, presidents may have constitutional powers to affect the formation and termination of the cabinet: this can include the right to name the person designated to form a government (e.g., Poland) ❑ Often presidents also have an influence on the process of dissolving the assembly and calling early elections  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Presidents are also heads of state who represent the country diplomatically ❑ Several European presidents additionally have the role of commander-in-chief of the armed forces ❑ By virtue of these roles, presidents often have a larger degree of influence on foreign and defense policy than on domestic policy ❑ Some semi-presidential democracies make the president so powerful that he/she has constitutional primacy over the PM as formal head of the executive (e.g., France) ❑ The norm in Europe, however, is that presidents are a moderating force: they influence the work of governments and the policy process but do not dominate it  THE EXECUTIVE 4. The political implications of the powers of premiers, cabinets and presidents ❑ The institutional powers available to premiers, cabinets, and presidents shape their opportunities to pursue their goals in three areas: a. Holding office b. Shaping policy c. Pursuing their electoral goals  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ The precise balance of power between the three actors is therefore enormously important ▪ It shapes who is appointed to ministerial and top civil service positions ▪ It conditions the policy directions that are chosen ▪ It has an impact on how the executive manages elections and its accountability relationship with voters ▪ It affects the risk of conflict between different actors within the executive  THE EXECUTIVE 1. Office holding: the relative powers of different actors within the executive over ministerial appointments can shape who gets the chance to form a government and who is appointed to ministerial positions 2. Bargaining over policy: equally shaped by the constitutional powers of executive actors ▪ For instance, a popular PM who has constitutional discretion to call snap elections can, to a certain extent, compensate for weak parliamentary support by using the threat of an early election as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from parties that fear early elections  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ How constitutional power is distributed among different actors within the political executive has consequences for the representativeness and effectiveness of the executive ❑ Political executives that concentrate extensive power in the hands of a single political actor -in Europe this is most likely to be the PM- generate governments and policy outcomes that tend to reflect a narrower, less representative range of interests, because the formal powers of the PM enable him/her to avoid compromise and to extract concessions from other parties ❑ PMs are able to conclude policy negotiations faster which can make them more effective (e.g., UK)  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Conversely, constitutions that disperse the power to bargain over office and policy among multiple actors within the executive (e.g., Italy), tend to produce more representative outcomes that reflect a broader range of political interests ❑ By the same token, however, they also tend to make policy process somewhat less effective because it takes longer on average, to negotiate policy compromise among a broader range of actors and interests  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ The dispersion or concentration of power within the executive also has implications for the probability of intra-executive conflict ❑ Constitutions that give a president significant powers to temper the PM or the government may generate incentives for compromise ❑ However, this situation can also endanger conflict regarding government composition, policy selection, etc. ❑ The risk of intra-executive conflict increases when the president and government come from different parties (cohabitation)  THE EXECUTIVE 3. Electoral goals: election-related constitutional powers may additionally give the prime minister, cabinet, or president opportunities to influence the timing of elections ❑ The ability to call snap elections gives politicians the opportunity to seek a new mandate in the context of particularly favourable circumstances ▪ For instance, when the economy is performing particularly well or when the opposition is unpopular, divided, or unprepared for an election ❑ This works in favour of the incumbent and disadvantages opposition parties  THE EXECUTIVE 5. The relationship between the political executive and the civil service ❑ The political executive requires the support of the civil service in order to transform its goals into policy and to ensure their implementation ❑ Two views on the civil service a) Weber’s seminal analysis of the bureaucracy stresses this essential function of the civil service in facilitating and implementing the decisions of politicians ❑ His work gives an idealized picture of civil servants, recruited on merit, as faithful instruments that serve politicians to achieve the application of laws and government decrees in an effective and efficient manner  THE EXECUTIVE b) Subsequent work on the civil service has instead focused on problems that may detract from the efficiency and effectiveness of the bureaucracy as a tool of policy development and implementation i. The potential divergence of bureaucrats’ interest from those of their political masters ii. Adverse selection: refers to the appointment of individuals who may lack the motivation or confidence or qualities to be effective servants of their political masters iii. Moral hazard: arises when civil servants pursue their personal political interests ahead of acting in the interest of their political masters because the political executive is unable to fully observe the actions of the bureaucracy  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Difficulties in the working relationship between bureaucrats and politicians do not inevitably have their origin in the bureaucracy ❑ They may also lie with the decisions of politicians ❑ Politicians may, for instance, choose to leave the civil service under-resourced and mandates unfunded, or they may issue contradictory policy guidance to civil servants ❑ New Public Management (NPM): from the 1980s onward, electoral commitments to improve economic performance and to contain public sector expansion, as well as a growing perception of public bureaucracies as inefficient, have motivated the introduction of NPM as an approach to control the bureaucracy in many European countries  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ NPM reforms: decentralized the provision of services and aimed to introduce managerialism, competition, and entrepreneurship into the work of the civil service ❑ How? ▪ In part by creating internal markets, splitting up larger agencies into a competing set of smaller ones, and opening up the provision of public services to private providers ❑ Under NPM, performance is assessed against budgetary targets, with audits, benchmarks, and evaluations  THE EXECUTIVE Critiques of the NPM reforms ❑ Marketization and privatization are often ineffective ways of providing public goods ❑ The fragmentation and privatization of services through NPM has reduced transparency and generated a democratic deficit in the design and provision of services ❑ The overriding important that has been placed on controlling costs in the civil service, and the importance of the profit motive for private providers, can compromise the delivery of actual services  THE EXECUTIVE 6. Executive autonomy and power ❑ There are pros and cons of the concentration of power within the executive ❑ Pros: the concentration of power in modern executives is a necessary response to the demands of governing a state with an extensive range of policy and administrative functions in an increasingly globalized world ❑ Without a political executive and civil service with extensive capabilities, it would simply not be possible to develop coordinated government policies to regulate areas as distinct as education, transport, health, social security, pensions, justice, finance, etc.  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Cons: it gives rise to executive autonomy which creates challenges in ensuring that governments, presidents, and the civil service are subject to appropriate democratic control ❑ Effective controls can ensure that executives act in the interest of citizens rather than pursuing their own personal or political goals ❑ The challenge in designing such controls is to strike a balance so that the controls constrain the executives’ ability to act opportunistically in its own interest without compromising its ability to govern effectively  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ As the capabilities of executives have grown, parliaments, too, have adapted as institutions to retain effective oversight and democratic control over the executive ❑ Constitutional reform initiatives have aimed to rebalance the powers of parliament and the executive ❑ For example, the introduction of the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act (2011) in the UK removed the PM’s power to call early elections at will and placed this power instead in the hands of parliament ❑ The French constitutional court has granted parliament the right to amend government decrees  THE EXECUTIVE ❑ Similar reforms have been applied to address the principal-agent problems that can arise from executive autonomy in relation to the interests of the electorate ❑ A well-known problem is the government’s ability to manipulate economic policy to improve voter welfare prior to elections ❑ In Europe, successive waves of reforms have progressively constrained the executive’s scope to act in this self-interested manner ❑ Notably, the introduction of central bank independence and the Euro have limited the scope for governments to manipulate monetary policy ❑ Fiscal reforms such as the creation of independent fiscal watchdogs, domestic debt ceilings, and balanced budget rules increase fiscal transparency and make it harder for governments to engage in self-interested manipulation of the economy