Semiotics the Basics PDF

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 INTRODUCTION 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1222 If you go into a bookshop and ask an assistant where to find a book 2 on semiotics, you are likely to meet with a blank look. Even worse, 3 you might be asked to define what semiotics is – whi...

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 INTRODUCTION 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1222 If you go into a bookshop and ask an assistant where to find a book 2 on semiotics, you are likely to meet with a blank look. Even worse, 3 you might be asked to define what semiotics is – which would be a 4 bit tricky if you were looking for a beginner’s guide. It’s worse still 5 if you do know a bit about semiotics, because it can be hard to offer 6 a simple definition which is of much use in the bookshop. If you’ve 7 ever been in such a situation, you’ll probably agree that it’s wise not 8 to ask. Semiotics could be anywhere. The shortest definition is that 9 it is the study of signs. But that doesn’t leave enquirers much wiser. 30 ‘What do you mean by a sign?’ people usually ask next. The kinds 1 of signs that are likely to spring immediately to mind are those which 2 we routinely refer to as ‘signs’ in everyday life, such as road signs, 3 pub signs and star signs. If you were to agree with them that semi- 4 otics can include the study of all these and more, people will probably 5 assume that semiotics is about ‘visual signs’. You would confirm 6 their hunch if you said that signs can also be drawings, paintings 7222 and photographs, and by now they’d be keen to direct you to the art 2 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS and photography sections. But if you are thick-skinned and tell them that it also includes words, sounds and ‘body language’, they may reasonably wonder what all these things have in common and how anyone could possibly study such disparate phenomena. If you get this far, they’ve probably already ‘read the signs’ which suggest that you are either eccentric or insane and communication may have ceased. DEFINITIONS Beyond the most basic definition as ‘the study of signs’, there is considerable variation among leading semioticians as to what semi- otics involves. One of the broadest definitions is that of Umberto Eco, who states that ‘semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign’ (Eco 1976, 7). Semiotics involves the study not only of what we refer to as ‘signs’ in everyday speech, but of anything which ‘stands for’ something else. In a semiotic sense, signs take the form of words, images, sounds, gestures and objects. Contemporary semioticians study signs not in isolation but as part of semiotic ‘sign-systems’ (such as a medium or genre). They study how meanings are made and how reality is represented. Theories of signs (or ‘symbols’) appear throughout the history of philosophy from ancient times onwards (see Todorov 1982), the first explicit reference to semiotics as a branch of philosophy appearing in John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). However, the two primary traditions in contemporary semi- otics stem respectively from the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) and the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (pronounced ‘purse’) (1839–1914). Saussure’s term sémiologie dates from a manuscript of 1894. The first edition of his Course in General Linguistics, published posthumously in 1916, contains the declara- tion that: It is... possible to conceive of a science which studies the role of signs as part of social life. It would form part of social psychology, and hence of general psychology. We shall call it  INTRODUCTION 3 1 semiology (from the Greek sēmeîon, ‘sign’). It would investigate 2 the nature of signs and the laws governing them. Since it does 3 not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it will exist. But it 4 has a right to exist, a place ready for it in advance. Linguistics 5 is only one branch of this general science. The laws which semi- 6 ology will discover will be laws applicable in linguistics, and 7 linguistics will thus be assigned to a clearly defined place in the 8222 field of human knowledge. 9 (Saussure 1983, 15–16) 10 1 While for the linguist Saussure ‘semiology’ was ‘a science which 2 studies the role of signs as part of social life’, to the philosopher 3 Charles Peirce the field of study which he called ‘semeiotic’ (or 4 ‘semiotic’) was the ‘formal doctrine of signs’, which was closely 5 related to logic (Peirce 1931–58, 2.227). Working quite indepen- 6 dently from Saussure across the Atlantic, Peirce borrowed his term 7 from Locke, declaring that: 8 9 Logic, in its general sense, is... only another name for semi- 20 otic (sémeiötiké), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of 1222 2 signs. By describing the doctrine as ‘quasi-necessary’, or 3 formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs 4 as we know, and... by a process which I will not object to 5 naming abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, 6 and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what 7 must be the characters of all signs used by a ‘scientific’ intelli- 8 gence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by 9 experience. 30 (Peirce 1931–58, 2.227) 1 2 Peirce and Saussure are widely regarded as the co-founders of what 3 is now more generally known as semiotics. They established two 4 major theoretical traditions. Saussure’s term ‘semiology’ is some- 5 times used to refer to the Saussurean tradition while the term 6 ‘semiotics’ sometimes refers to the Peircean tradition. However, 7222 nowadays the term ‘semiotics’ is widely used as an umbrella term 4 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS to embrace the whole field (Nöth 1990, 14). We will outline and discuss both the Saussurean and Peircean models of the sign in the next chapter. Some commentators adopt Charles W. Morris’s definition of semiotics (a reductive variant of Saussure’s definition) as ‘the science of signs’ (Morris 1938, 1–2). The term ‘science’ is misleading. As yet, semiotics involves no widely agreed theoretical assumptions, models or empirical methodologies. Semiotics has tended to be largely theoretical, many of its theorists seeking to establish its scope and general principles. Peirce and Saussure, for instance, were both concerned with the fundamental definition of the sign. Peirce developed logical taxonomies of types of signs. Many subsequent semioticians have sought to identify and categorize the codes or conventions according to which signs are organized. Clearly there is a need to establish a firm theoretical foundation for a subject which is currently characterized by a host of competing theoretical assump- tions. As for methodologies, Saussure’s theories constituted a starting point for the development of various structuralist methodologies for analysing texts and social practices. For Roman Jakobson, semiotics ‘deals with those general principles which underlie the structure of all signs whatever and with the character of their utilization within messages, as well as with the specifics of the various sign systems and of the diverse messages using those different kinds of signs’ (Jakobson 1968, 698). Structuralist methods have been very widely employed in the analysis of many cultural phenomena. However, they are not universally accepted: socially oriented theorists have criticized their exclusive focus on structure, and no alternative methodologies have as yet been widely adopted. Semiotics is not widely institutionalized as an academic disci- pline (although it does have its own associations, conferences and journals, and it exists as a department in a handful of universities). It is a field of study involving many different theoretical stances and methodological tools. Although there are some self-styled ‘semioti- cians’, those involved in semiotics include linguists, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, literary, aesthetic and media theorists, psychoanalysts and educationalists.  INTRODUCTION 5 1 RELATION TO LINGUISTICS 2 This book concentrates on structuralist semiotics (and its poststruc- 3 turalist critiques). It is difficult to disentangle European semiotics 4 from structuralism in its origins. Linguistic structuralism derived pri- 5 6 marily from Saussure, Hjelmslev and Jakobson. It was Jakobson who 7 first coined the term ‘structuralism’ in 1929 (Jakobson 1990, 6). 8222 Structuralism is an analytical method which involves the application 9 of the linguistic model to a much wider range of social phenomena. 10 Jakobson wrote that ‘Language is... a purely semiotic system... 1 The study of signs, however,... must take into consideration 2 also applied semiotic structures, as for instance, architecture, dress, 3 or cuisine... any edifice is simultaneously some sort of refuge and 4 a certain kind of message. Similarly, any garment responds to defin- 5 itely utilitarian requirements and at the same time exhibits various 6 semiotic properties’ (1968, 703). He identified ‘the cardinal functions 7 of language’ (see Chapter 6) and argued that this should lead to ‘an 8 analogous study of the other semiotic systems’ (ibid.). Structuralists 9 search for ‘deep structures’ underlying the ‘surface features’ of sign- 20 systems: Lévi-Strauss in myth, kinship rules and totemism; Lacan in 1222 the unconscious; Barthes and Greimas in the ‘grammar’ of narrative. 2 Julia Kristeva declared that ‘what semiotics has discovered... is that 3 the law governing or, if one prefers, the major constraint affect- 4 ing any social practice lies in the fact that it signifies; i.e. that it is 5 articulated like a language’ (Kristeva 1973, 1249). 6 Saussure argued that ‘nothing is more appropriate than the 7 study of languages to bring out the nature of the semiological prob- 8 lem’ (Saussure 1983, 16). Semiotics draws heavily on linguistic con- 9 cepts, partly because of his influence, and also because linguistics is 30 a more established discipline than the study of other sign-systems. 1 Saussure referred to language (his model being speech) as ‘the most 2 important’ of all of the systems of signs (Saussure 1983, 15). Many 3 other theorists have regarded language as fundamental. Roman 4 Jakobson insisted that ‘language is the central and most important 5 among all human semiotic systems’ (Jakobson 1970, 455). Émile 6 Benveniste observed that ‘language is the interpreting system of all 7222 other systems, linguistic and non-linguistic’ (Benveniste 1969, 239), 6 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS while Claude Lévi-Strauss noted that ‘language is the semiotic sys- tem par excellence; it cannot but signify, and exists only through sig- nification’ (Lévi-Strauss 1972, 48). Language is almost invariably regarded as the most powerful communication system by far. One of the most powerful ‘design features’ of language is called double articulation (or ‘duality of patterning’). Double artic- ulation enables a semiotic code to form an infinite number of meaningful combinations using a small number of low-level units which in themselves are meaningless (e.g. phonemes in speech or graphemes in writing). The infinite use of finite elements is a feature which in relation to media in general has been referred to as ‘semi- otic economy’. Traditional definitions ascribe double articulation only to human language, for which this is regarded as a key ‘design feature’ (Hockett 1958). Louis Hjelmslev regarded it as an essential and defining feature of language (Hjelmslev 1961). Jakobson asserted that ‘language is the only system which is composed of elements which are signifiers and yet at the same time signify nothing’ (Jakobson 1976, 230). Double articulation is seen as being largely responsible for the creative economy of language. The English language, for instance, has only about forty or fifty elements of second articulation (phonemes) but these can generate hundreds of thousands of words. Similarly, from a limited vocabulary we can generate an infinite number of sentences (subject to the constraint of syntax which governs structurally valid combinations). It is by combining words in multiple ways that we can seek to render the particularity of experience. If we had individual words to represent every particularity, we would have to have an infinite number of them, which would exceed our capability of learning, recalling and manipulating them. Double articulation does not seem to occur in the natural communication systems of animals other than humans. A key semi- otic debate is over whether or not semiotic systems such as photography, film or painting have double articulation. The philoso- pher Susanne Langer argued that while visual media such as photography, painting and drawing have lines, colours, shadings, shapes, proportions and so on which are ‘abstractable and combin- atory’, and which ‘are just as capable of articulation, i.e. of complex  INTRODUCTION 7 1 combination, as words’, they have no vocabulary of units with 2 independent meanings (Langer 1951, 86–7). 3 4 A symbolism with so many elements, such myriad relationships, 5 cannot be broken up into basic units. It is impossible to find 6 the smallest independent symbol, and recognize its identity 7 when the same unit is met in other contexts... There is, of 8222 course, a technique of picturing objects, but the laws governing 9 this technique cannot properly be called a ‘syntax’, since there 10 are no items that might be called, metaphorically, the ‘words’ 1 of portraiture. 2 (Langer 1951, 88) 3 4 Rather than dismissing ‘non-discursive’ media for their limitations, 5 however, Langer argues that they are more complex and subtle than 6 verbal language and are ‘peculiarly well-suited to the expression of 7 ideas that defy linguistic “projection” ’. She argues that we should 8 not seek to impose linguistic models upon other media since the 9 laws that govern their articulation ‘are altogether different from 20 the laws of syntax that govern language’. Treating them in linguistic 1222 terms leads us to ‘misconceive’ them: they resist ‘translation’ (ibid., 2 86–9). 3 Saussure saw linguistics as a branch of ‘semiology’: 4 5 Linguistics is only one branch of this general science [of semi- 6 ology]. The laws which semiology will discover will be laws 7 applicable in linguistics... As far as we are concerned... the 8 linguistic problem is first and foremost semiological... If one 9 wishes to discover the true nature of language systems, one 30 must first consider what they have in common with all other 1 systems of the same kind... In this way, light will be thrown 2 not only upon the linguistic problem. By considering rites, 3 customs etc. as signs, it will be possible, we believe, to see 4 them in a new perspective. The need will be felt to consider 5 them as semiological phenomena and to explain them in terms 6 of the laws of semiology. 7222 (Saussure 1983, 16–17) 8 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS While Roland Barthes (1967b, xi) declared that ‘perhaps we must invert Saussure’s formulation and assert that semiology is a branch of linguistics’, most of those who call themselves semioticians at least implicitly accept Saussure’s location of linguistics within semiotics. The linguist and semiotician Roman Jakobson was in no doubt that ‘language is a system of signs, and linguistics is part and parcel of the science of signs or semiotics’ (Jakobson 1949a, 50; cf. 1970, 454). However, even if we theoretically locate linguistics within semiotics it is difficult to avoid adopting the linguistic model in exploring other sign-systems. The American linguist Leonard Bloomfield asserted that ‘linguistics is the chief contributor to semiotics’ (Bloomfield 1939, 55). Jakobson defined semiotics as ‘the general science of signs which has as its basic discipline linguistics, the science of verbal signs’ (Jakobson 1963e, 289). Semioticians commonly refer to films, television and radio programmes, advertising posters and so on as ‘texts’, and to ‘reading television’ (Fiske and Hartley 1978). Media such as television and film are regarded by some semioticians as being in some respects like languages. The issue tends to revolve around whether such media are closer to what we treat as reality in the everyday world of our own experience or whether they have more in common with a symbolic system like writing. However, there is a danger of trying to force all media into a linguistic framework. Contemporary ‘social semiotics’ has moved beyond the structuralist focus on signifying systems as languages, seeking to explore the use of signs in specific social situations. LANGUE AND PAROLE We will shortly examine Saussure’s highly influential model of the sign, but before doing so it is important to understand something about the general framework within which he situated it. Saussure made what is now a famous distinction between langue (language) and parole (speech). Langue refers to the system of rules and conven- tions which is independent of, and pre-exists, individual users; parole refers to its use in particular instances. Applying the notion to semi- otic systems in general rather than simply to language, the distinction is one between system and usage, structure and event or code and  INTRODUCTION 9 1 message. According to the Saussurean distinction, in a semiotic 2 system such as cinema, for instance, individual films can be seen as 3 the parole of an underlying system of cinema ‘language’. Saussure 4 focused on langue rather than parole. To the Saussurean semioti- 5 cian, what matters most are the underlying structures and rules of a 6 semiotic system as a whole rather than specific performances or prac- 7 tices which are merely instances of its use. Saussure’s approach was 8222 to study the system ‘synchronically’ as if it were frozen in time (like 9 a photograph) – rather than ‘diachronically’ – in terms of its evolu- 10 tion over time (like a film). Some structuralist cultural theorists 1 subsequently adopted this Saussurean priority, focusing on the func- 2 tions of social and cultural phenomena within semiotic systems. 3 Theorists differ over whether the system precedes and determines 4 usage (structural determinism) or whether usage precedes and deter- 5 mines the system (social determinism) (although note that most 6 structuralists argue that the system constrains rather than completely 7 determines usage). 8 The structuralist dichotomy between usage and system has 9 been criticized for its rigidity, splitting process from product, subject 20 from structure (Coward and Ellis 1977, 4, 14; Csikszentmihalyi and 1222 Rochberg-Halton 1981, 44, 173–4). A fundamental objection is that 2 the prioritization of structure over usage fails to account for changes 3 in structure. Marxist theorists have been particularly critical. In the 4 late 1920s, Valentin Voloshinov rejected Saussure’s synchronic 5 approach and his emphasis on internal relations within the system 6 of language (Voloshinov 1973; Morris 1994). Voloshinov reversed 7 the Saussurean priority of langue over parole: ‘The sign is part of 8 organized social intercourse and cannot exist, as such, outside it, 9 reverting to a mere physical artifact’ (Voloshinov 1973, 21). The 30 meaning of a sign is not in its relationship to other signs within the 1 language system but rather in the social context of its use. Saussure 2 was criticized for ignoring historicity (ibid., 61). The Russian 3 linguists Roman Jakobson and Yuri Tynyanov declared in 1927 that 4 ‘pure synchronism now proves to be an illusion’, adding that ‘every 5 synchronic system has its past and its future as inseparable struc- 6 tural elements of the system’ (cited in Voloshinov 1973, 166). 7222 Writing in 1929, Voloshinov observed that ‘there is no real moment 10 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS in time when a synchronic system of language could be constructed... A synchronic system may be said to exist only from the point of view of the subjective consciousness of an individual speaker belonging to some particular language group at some particular moment of historical time’ (Voloshinov 1973, 66). While the French structuralist Claude Lévi-Strauss applied a synchronic approach in the domain of anthropology, most contemporary semioticians have sought to reprioritize historicity and social context. Language is seldom treated as a static, closed and stable system which is inher- ited from preceding generations but as constantly changing. The sign, as Voloshinov put it, is ‘an arena of the class struggle’ (ibid., 23). Seeking to establish a wholeheartedly ‘social semiotics’, Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress declare that ‘the social dimensions of semiotic systems are so intrinsic to their nature and function that the systems cannot be studied in isolation’ (Hodge and Kress 1988, 1). WHY STUDY SEMIOTICS? While Saussure may be hailed as a founder of semiotics, semiotics has become increasingly less Saussurean since the 1970s. While the current account of semiotics focuses primarily on its structuralist forms, we will also explore relevant critiques and subsequent devel- opments. But before launching on an exploration of this intriguing subject, let us consider why we should bother: why should we study semiotics? This is a pressing question in part because the writings of semioticians have a reputation for being dense with jargon: one critic wittily remarked that ‘semiotics tells us things we already know in a language we will never understand’ (Paddy Whannel, cited in Seiter 1992, 31). The semiotic establishment may seem to be a very exclusive club but its concerns are not confined to members. No one with an interest in how things are represented can afford to ignore an approach which focuses on, and problematizes, the process of repre- sentation. While we need not accept the postmodernist stance that there is no external reality beyond sign-systems, studying semiotics can assist us to become more aware of the mediating role of signs and of the roles played by ourselves and others in constructing social  INTRODUCTION 11 1 realities. It can make us less likely to take reality for granted as 2 something which is wholly independent of human interpretation. 3 Exploring semiotic perspectives, we may come to realize that infor- 4 mation or meaning is not ‘contained’ in the world or in books, 5 computers or audio-visual media. Meaning is not ‘transmitted’ to us 6 – we actively create it according to a complex interplay of codes or 7 conventions of which we are normally unaware. Becoming aware of 8222 such codes is both inherently fascinating and intellectually empow- 9 ering. We learn from semiotics that we live in a world of signs and 10 we have no way of understanding anything except through signs and 1 the codes into which they are organized. Through the study of semi- 2 otics, we become aware that these signs and codes are normally 3 transparent and disguise our task in reading them. Living in a world 4 of increasingly visual signs, we need to learn that even the most 5 realistic signs are not what they appear to be. By making more 6 explicit the codes by which signs are interpreted, we may perform 7 the valuable semiotic function of denaturalizing signs. This is not to 8 suggest that all representations of reality are of equal status – quite 9 the contrary. In defining realities signs serve ideological functions. 20 Deconstructing and contesting the realities of signs can reveal whose 1222 realities are privileged and whose are suppressed. Such a study 2 involves investigating the construction and maintenance of reality by 3 particular social groups. To decline the study of signs is to leave to 4 others the control of the world of meanings which we inhabit. 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7222 1 2 3 4 1 5 6 7 8222 MODELS OF THE 9 10 SIGN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 1222 We seem as a species to be driven by a desire to make meanings: 2 above all, we are surely homo significans – meaning-makers. Distinc- 3 tively, we make meanings through our creation and interpretation of 4 ‘signs’. Indeed, according to Peirce, ‘we think only in signs’ (Peirce 5 1931–58, 2.302). Signs take the form of words, images, sounds, 6 odours, flavours, acts or objects, but such things have no intrinsic 7 meaning and become signs only when we invest them with meaning. 8 ‘Nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign’, declares Peirce 9 (ibid., 2.172). Anything can be a sign as long as someone interprets 30 it as ‘signifying’ something – referring to or standing for something 1 other than itself. We interpret things as signs largely unconsciously 2 by relating them to familiar systems of conventions. It is this mean- 3 ingful use of signs which is at the heart of the concerns of semiotics. 4 The two dominant contemporary models of what constitutes a 5 sign are those of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and the 6 American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. These will be discussed 7222 in turn. 14 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS THE SAUSSUREAN MODEL Saussure’s model of the sign is in the dyadic tradition. Prior advo- cates of dyadic models, in which the two parts of a sign consist of a ‘sign vehicle’ and its meaning, included Augustine (397), Albertus Magnus and the Scholastics (13th century), Hobbes (1640) and Locke (1690) (see Nöth 1990, 88). Focusing on linguistic signs (such as words), Saussure defined a sign as being composed of a ‘signifier’ (signifiant) and a ‘signified’ (signifié) (see Figure 1.1). Contemporary commentators tend to describe the signifier as the form that the sign takes and the signified as the concept to which it refers. Saussure makes the distinction in these terms: A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept [signified] and a sound pattern [signifier]. The sound pattern is not actually a sound; for a sound is something physical. A sound pattern is the hearer’s psychological impres- sion of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of his senses. This sound pattern may be called a ‘material’ element only in that it is the representation of our sensory impressions. The sound pattern may thus be distinguished from the other element associated with it in a linguistic sign. This other element is generally of a more abstract kind: the concept. (Saussure 1983, 66) For Saussure, both the signifier (the ‘sound pattern’) and the signi- fied (the concept) were purely ‘psychological’ (ibid., 12, 14–15, 66). signified signifier F I G U R E 1. 1 Saussure’s model of the sign Source: Based on Saussure 1967, 158  MODELS OF THE SIGN 15 1 Both were non-material form rather than substance. Figure 1.2 may 2 help to clarify this aspect of Saussure’s own model. Nowadays, while 3 the basic ‘Saussurean’ model is commonly adopted, it tends to be a 4 more materialistic model than that of Saussure himself. The signi- 5 fier is now commonly interpreted as the material (or physical) form 6 of the sign – it is something which can be seen, heard, touched, 7 smelled or tasted – as with Roman Jakobson’s signans, which he 8222 described as the external and perceptible part of the sign (Jakobson 9 1963b, 111; 1984b, 98). 10 Within the Saussurean model, the sign is the whole that results 1 from the association of the signifier with the signified (ibid., 67). 2 The relationship between the signifier and the signified is referred 3 to as ‘signification’, and this is represented in the Saussurean diagram 4 by the arrows. The horizontal broken line marking the two elements 5 of the sign is referred to as ‘the bar’. 6 If we take a linguistic example, the word ‘open’ (when it is 7 invested with meaning by someone who encounters it on a shop 8 doorway) is a sign consisting of: 9 20 a signifier: the word ‘open’; 1222 a signified concept: that the shop is open for business. 2 3 A sign must have both a signifier and a signified. You cannot have 4 a totally meaningless signifier or a completely formless signified 5 6 7 8 9 30 1 2 3 tree 4 5 6 7222 F I G U R E 1. 2 Concept and sound pattern 16 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS (ibid., 101). A sign is a recognizable combination of a signifier with a particular signified. The same signifier (the word ‘open’) could stand for a different signified (and thus be a different sign) if it were on a push-button inside a lift (‘push to open door’). Similarly, many signifiers could stand for the concept ‘open’ (for instance, on top of a packing carton, a small outline of a box with an open flap for ‘open this end’) – again, with each unique pairing constituting a different sign. Saussure focused on the linguistic sign and he ‘phonocentri- cally’ privileged the spoken word. As we have noted, he referred specifically to the signifier as a ‘sound pattern’ (image acoustique). He saw writing as a separate, secondary, dependent but comparable sign-system (ibid., 15, 24–5, 117). Within the (‘separate’) system of written signs, a signifier such as the written letter ‘t’ signified a sound in the primary sign-system of language (and thus a written word would also signify a sound rather than a concept). Thus for Saussure, writing relates to speech as signifier to signified or, as Derrida puts it, for Saussure writing is ‘a sign of a sign’ (Derrida 1967a, 43). Most subsequent theorists who have adopted Saussure’s model tend to refer to the form of linguistic signs as either spoken or written (e.g. Jakobson 1970, 455–6 and 1984b, 98). We will return later to the issue of the post-Saussurean ‘rematerialization’ of the sign. As for the signified, Umberto Eco notes that it is somewhere between ‘a mental image, a concept and a psychological reality’ (Eco 1976, 14–15). Most commentators who adopt Saussure’s model still treat the signified as a mental construct, although they often note that it may nevertheless refer indirectly to things in the world. Saussure’s original model of the sign ‘brackets the referent’, excluding reference to objects existing in the world – somewhat iron- ically for one who defined semiotics as ‘a science which studies the role of signs as part of social life’ (Saussure 1983, 15). His signi- fied is not to be identified directly with such a referent but is a concept in the mind – not a thing but the notion of a thing. Some people may wonder why Saussure’s model of the sign refers only to a concept and not to a thing. An observation from Susanne Langer (who was not referring to Saussure’s theories) may be useful here. Note that like most contemporary commentators, Langer uses the  MODELS OF THE SIGN 17 1 term ‘symbol’ to refer to the linguistic sign (a term which Saussure 2 himself avoided): ‘Symbols are not proxy for their objects but are 3 vehicles for the conception of objects... In talking about things we 4 have conceptions of them, not the things themselves; and it is the 5 conceptions, not the things, that symbols directly mean. Behaviour 6 towards conceptions is what words normally evoke; this is the typical 7 process of thinking’. She adds that ‘If I say “Napoleon”, you do not 8222 bow to the conqueror of Europe as though I had introduced him, but 9 merely think of him’ (Langer 1951, 61). 10 Thus, for Saussure the linguistic sign is wholly immaterial – 1 although he disliked referring to it as ‘abstract’ (Saussure 1983, 15). 2 The immateriality of the Saussurean sign is a feature which tends 3 to be neglected in many popular commentaries. If the notion seems 4 strange, we need to remind ourselves that words have no value in 5 themselves – that is their value. Saussure noted that it is not the 6 metal in a coin that fixes its value (ibid., 117). Several reasons could 7 be offered for this. For instance, if linguistic signs drew attention to 8 their materiality this would hinder their communicative transparency. 9 Furthermore, being immaterial, language is an extraordinarily eco- 20 nomical medium and words are always ready to hand. Nevertheless, 1222 a principled argument can be made for the revaluation of the mater- 2 iality of the sign, as we shall see in due course. 3 4 TWO SIDES OF A PAGE 5 6 Saussure stressed that sound and thought (or the signifier and the sig- 7 nified) were as inseparable as the two sides of a piece of paper 8 (Saussure 1983, 111). They were ‘intimately linked’ in the mind ‘by 9 an associative link’ – ‘each triggers the other’ (ibid., 66). Saussure pre- 30 sented these elements as wholly interdependent, neither pre-existing 1 the other. Within the context of spoken language, a sign could not con- 2 sist of sound without sense or of sense without sound. He used the 3 two arrows in the diagram to suggest their interaction. The bar and the 4 opposition nevertheless suggest that the signifier and the signified can 5 be distinguished for analytical purposes. Poststructuralist theorists 6 criticize the clear distinction which the Saussurean bar seems to 7222 suggest between the signifier and the signified; they seek to blur or 18 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS erase it in order to reconfigure the sign. Common sense tends to insist that the signified takes precedence over, and pre-exists, the signifier: ‘look after the sense’, quipped Lewis Carroll, ‘and the sounds will take care of themselves’ (Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Chapter 9). However, in dramatic contrast, post-Saussurean theorists have seen the model as implicitly granting primacy to the signifier, thus reversing the commonsensical position. THE RELATIONAL SYSTEM Saussure argued that signs only make sense as part of a formal, generalized and abstract system. His conception of meaning was purely structural and relational rather than referential: primacy is given to relationships rather than to things (the meaning of signs was seen as lying in their systematic relation to each other rather than deriving from any inherent features of signifiers or any refer- ence to material things). Saussure did not define signs in terms of some essential or intrinsic nature. For Saussure, signs refer primarily to each other. Within the language system, ‘everything depends on relations’ (Saussure 1983, 121). No sign makes sense on its own but A B F I G U R E 1. 3 Planes of thought and sound Source: Based on Saussure 1967, 156  MODELS OF THE SIGN 19 1 only in relation to other signs. Both signifier and signified are purely 2 relational entities (ibid., 118). This notion can be hard to understand 3 since we may feel that an individual word such as ‘tree’ does have 4 some meaning for us, but Saussure’s argument is that its meaning 5 depends on its relation to other words within the system (such as 6 ‘bush’). 7 Together with the ‘vertical’ alignment of signifier and signified 8222 within each individual sign (suggesting two structural ‘levels’), the 9 emphasis on the relationship between signs defines what are in effect 10 two planes – that of the signifier and the signified. Later, Louis 1 Hjelmslev referred to the ‘expression plane’ and the ‘content plane’ 2 (Hjelmslev 1961, 59). Saussure himself referred to sound and thought 3 as two distinct but correlated planes (see Figure 1.3). ‘We can envis- 4 age... the language... as a series of adjoining subdivisions simul- 5 taneously imprinted both on the plane of vague, amorphous thought 6 (A), and on the equally featureless plane of sound (B)’ (Saussure 7 1983, 110–11). The arbitrary division of the two continua into signs 8 is suggested by the dotted lines while the wavy (rather than parallel) 9 edges of the two ‘amorphous’ masses suggest the lack of any natural 20 fit between them. The gulf and lack of fit between the two planes 1222 highlights their relative autonomy. While Saussure is careful not to 2 refer directly to reality, the American literary theorist Fredric Jameson 3 reads into this feature of Saussure’s system that: 4 5 it is not so much the individual word or sentence that ‘stands 6 for’ or ‘reflects’ the individual object or event in the real world, 7 but rather that the entire system of signs, the entire field of the 8 langue, lies parallel to reality itself; that it is the totality of system- 9 atic language, in other words, which is analogous to whatever 30 organized structures exist in the world of reality, and that our 1 understanding proceeds from one whole or Gestalt to the other, 2 rather than on a one-to-one basis. 3 (Jameson 1972, 32–3) 4 5 What Saussure refers to as the ‘value’ of a sign depends on its rela- 6 tions with other signs within the system (see Figure 1.4). A sign has 7222 no ‘absolute’ value independent of this context (Saussure 1983, 80). 20 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS signified signified signified signifier signifier signifier F I G U R E 1. 4 The relations between signs Source: Based on Saussure 1967, 159 Saussure uses an analogy with the game of chess, noting that the value of each piece depends on its position on the chessboard (ibid., 88). The sign is more than the sum of its parts. While signification – what is signified – clearly depends on the relationship between the two parts of the sign, the value of a sign is determined by the rela- tionships between the sign and other signs within the system as a whole (ibid., 112–13). The notion of value... shows us that it is a great mistake to consider a sign as nothing more than the combination of a certain sound and a certain concept. To think of a sign as nothing more would be to isolate it from the system to which it belongs. It would be to suppose that a start could be made with individual signs, and a system constructed by putting them together. On the contrary, the system as a united whole is the starting point, from which it becomes possible, by a process of analysis, to identify its constituent elements. (Saussure 1983, 112) As an example of the distinction between signification and value, Saussure notes that: The French word mouton may have the same meaning as the English word sheep; but it does not have the same value. There are various reasons for this, but in particular the fact that the English word for the meat of this animal, as prepared and served for a meal, is not sheep but mutton. The difference in value between sheep and mouton hinges on the fact that in English  MODELS OF THE SIGN 21 1 there is also another word mutton for the meat, whereas mouton 2 in French covers both. 3 (Saussure 1983, 114) 4 5 Saussure’s relational conception of meaning was specifically differ- 6 ential: he emphasized the differences between signs. Language for 7 him was a system of functional differences and oppositions. ‘In a 8222 language, as in every other semiological system, what distinguishes 9 a sign is what constitutes it’ (ibid., 119). It has been noted that ‘a 10 one-term language is an impossibility because its single term could 1 be applied to everything and differentiate nothing; it requires at least 2 one other term to give it definition’ (Sturrock 1979, 10). Advertising 3 furnishes a good example of this notion, since what matters in ‘posi- 4 tioning’ a product is not the relationship of advertising signifiers to 5 real-world referents, but the differentiation of each sign from the 6 others to which it is related. Saussure’s concept of the relational 7 identity of signs is at the heart of structuralist theory. 8 Saussure emphasized in particular negative, oppositional 9 differences between signs. He argued that ‘concepts... are defined 20 not positively, in terms of their content, but negatively by contrast 1222 with other items in the same system. What characterizes each most 2 exactly is being whatever the others are not’ (Saussure 1983, 115; 3 my emphasis). This notion may initially seem mystifying if not 4 perverse, but the concept of negative differentiation becomes clearer 5 if we consider how we might teach someone who did not share our 6 language what we mean by the term ‘red’. We would be unlikely to 7 make our point by simply showing that person a range of different 8 objects which all happened to be red – we would probably do better 9 to single out a red object from a set of objects which were identical 30 in all respects except colour. Although Saussure focuses on speech, 1 he also noted that in writing, ‘the values of the letter are purely nega- 2 tive and differential’ – all we need to be able to do is to distinguish 3 one letter from another (ibid., 118). As for his emphasis on nega- 4 tive differences, Saussure remarks that although both the signified 5 and the signifier are purely differential and negative when consid- 6 ered separately, the sign in which they are combined is a positive 7222 term. He adds that ‘the moment we compare one sign with another 22 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS as positive combinations, the term difference should be dropped... Two signs... are not different from each other, but only distinct. They are simply in opposition to each other. The entire mechanism of language... is based on oppositions of this kind and upon the phonic and conceptual differences they involve’ (ibid., 119). ARBITRARINESS Although the signifier is treated by its users as ‘standing for’ the signified, Saussurean semioticians emphasize that there is no neces- sary, intrinsic, direct or inevitable relationship between the signifier and the signified. Saussure stressed the arbitrariness of the sign (ibid., 67, 78) – more specifically the arbitrariness of the link between the signifier and the signified (ibid., 67). He was focusing on linguistic signs, seeing language as the most important sign-system; for Saussure, the arbitrary nature of the sign was the first principle of language (ibid., 67) – arbitrariness was identified later by Charles Hockett as a key ‘design feature’ of language (Hockett 1958). The feature of arbitrariness may indeed help to account for the extraor- dinary versatility of language (Lyons 1977, 71). In the context of natural language, Saussure stressed that there is no inherent, essen- tial, transparent, self-evident or natural connection between the signifier and the signified – between the sound of a word and the concept to which it refers (Saussure 1983, 67, 68–9, 76, 111, 117). Note that although Saussure prioritized speech, he also stressed that ‘the signs used in writing are arbitrary, The letter t, for instance, has no connection with the sound it denotes’ (Saussure 1983, 117). Saussure himself avoids directly relating the principle of arbitrari- ness to the relationship between language and an external world, but subsequent commentators often do. Indeed, lurking behind the purely conceptual ‘signified’ one can often detect Saussure’s allusion to real-world referents, as when he notes that ‘the street and the train are real enough. Their physical existence is essential to our under- standing of what they are’ (ibid., 107). In language, at least, the form of the signifier is not determined by what it signifies: there is nothing ‘treeish’ about the word ‘tree’. Languages differ, of course, in how they refer to the same referent. No specific signifier is naturally more  MODELS OF THE SIGN 23 1 suited to a signified than any other signifier; in principle any signi- 2 fier could represent any signified. Saussure observed that ‘there is 3 nothing at all to prevent the association of any idea whatsoever with 4 any sequence of sounds whatsoever’ (ibid., 76); ‘the process which 5 selects one particular sound-sequence to correspond to one particular 6 idea is completely arbitrary’ (ibid., 111). 7 This principle of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign was 8222 not an original conception. In Plato’s dialogue Cratylus this issue is 9 debated. Although Cratylus defends the notion of a natural rela- 10 tionship between words and what they represent, Hermogenes 1 declares that ‘no one is able to persuade me that the correctness of 2 names is determined by anything besides convention and agreement 3... No name belongs to a particular thing by nature’ (Plato 1998, 4 2). While Socrates rejects the absolute arbitrariness of language 5 proposed by Hermogenes, he does acknowledge that convention 6 plays a part in determining meaning. In his work On Interpretation, 7 Aristotle went further, asserting that there can be no natural connec- 8 tion between the sound of any language and the things signified. ‘By 9 a noun [or name] we mean a sound significant by convention... 20 the limitation “by convention” was introduced because nothing is by 1222 nature a noun or name – it is only so when it becomes a symbol’ 2 (Aristotle 2004, 2). The issue even enters into everyday discourse 3 via Shakespeare: ‘That which we call a rose by any other name would 4 smell as sweet’. The notion of the arbitrariness of language was thus 5 not new; indeed, Roman Jakobson notes that Saussure ‘borrowed and 6 expanded’ it from the Yale linguist Dwight Whitney (1827–94) – to 7 whose influence Saussure did allude (Jakobson 1966, 410; Saussure 8 1983, 18, 26, 110). Nevertheless, the emphasis which Saussure gave 9 to arbitrariness can be seen as highly controversial in the context of 30 a theory which bracketed the referent. 1 Saussure illustrated the principle of arbitrariness at the lexical 2 level – in relation to individual words as signs. He did not, for 3 instance, argue that syntax is arbitrary. However, the arbitrariness 4 principle can be applied not only to the individual sign, but to the 5 whole sign-system. The fundamental arbitrariness of language is 6 apparent from the observation that each language involves different 7222 distinctions between one signifier and another (e.g. ‘tree’ and ‘free’) 24 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS and between one signified and another (e.g. ‘tree’ and ‘bush’). The signified is clearly arbitrary if reality is perceived as a seamless continuum (which is how Saussure sees the initially undifferentiated realms of both thought and sound): where, for example, does a ‘corner’ end? Common sense suggests that the existence of things in the world preceded our apparently simple application of ‘labels’ to them (a ‘nomenclaturist’ notion which Saussure rejected and to which we will return in due course). Saussure noted that ‘if words had the job of representing concepts fixed in advance, one would be able to find exact equivalents for them as between one language and another. But this is not the case’ (ibid., 114–15). Reality is divided up into arbitrary categories by every language and the conceptual world with which each of us is familiar could have been divided up very differently. Indeed, no two languages categorize reality in the same way. As John Passmore puts it, ‘Languages differ by differen- tiating differently’ (Passmore 1985, 24). Linguistic categories are not simply a consequence of some predefined structure in the world. There are no natural concepts or categories which are simply reflected in language. Language plays a crucial role in constructing reality. If one accepts the arbitrariness of the relationship between signifier and signified then one may argue counter-intuitively that the signified is determined by the signifier rather than vice versa. Indeed, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, in adapting Saussurean theories, sought to highlight the primacy of the signifier in the psyche by rewriting Saussure’s model of the sign in the form of a quasi-algebraic sign in which a capital ‘S’ (representing the signifier) is placed over a lower-case and italicized ‘s’ (representing the signified), these two signifiers being separated by a horizontal ‘bar’ (Lacan 1977, 149). This suited Lacan’s purpose of emphasizing how the signified inevitably ‘slips beneath’ the signifier, resisting our attempts to delimit it. Lacan poetically refers to Saussure’s illustra- tion of the planes of sound and thought as ‘an image resembling the wavy lines of the upper and lower waters in miniatures from manu- scripts of Genesis; a double flux marked by streaks of rain’, suggesting that this can be seen as illustrating the ‘incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier’ – although he argues that one  MODELS OF THE SIGN 25 1 should regard the dotted vertical lines not as ‘segments of corre- 2 spondence’ but as ‘anchoring points’ (points de capiton – literally, 3 the ‘buttons’ which anchor upholstery to furniture). However, he 4 notes that this model is too linear, since ‘there is in effect no signi- 5 fying chain that does not have, as if attached to the punctuation of 6 each of its units, a whole articulation of relevant contexts suspended 7 “vertically”, as it were, from that point’ (ibid., 154). In the spirit of 8222 the Lacanian critique of Saussure’s model, subsequent theorists have 9 emphasized the temporary nature of the bond between signifier and 10 signified, stressing that the ‘fixing’ of ‘the chain of signifiers’ is 1 socially situated (Coward and Ellis 1977, 6, 13, 17, 67). Note that 2 while the intent of Lacan in placing the signifier over the signified 3 is clear enough, his representational strategy seems a little curious, 4 since in the modelling of society orthodox Marxists routinely repre- 5 sent the fundamental driving force of ‘the [techno-economic] base’ 6 as (logically) below ‘the [ideological] superstructure’. 7 The arbitrariness of the sign is a radical concept because it 8 establishes the autonomy of language in relation to reality. The 9 Saussurean model, with its emphasis on internal structures within a 20 sign-system, can be seen as supporting the notion that language does 1222 not reflect reality but rather constructs it. We can use language ‘to 2 say what isn’t in the world, as well as what is. And since we come 3 to know the world through whatever language we have been born 4 into the midst of, it is legitimate to argue that our language deter- 5 mines reality, rather than reality our language’ (Sturrock 1986, 79). 6 In their book The Meaning of Meaning, Charles Ogden and Ivor 7 Richards criticized Saussure for ‘neglecting entirely the things for 8 which signs stand’ (Ogden and Richards 1923, 8). Later critics have 9 lamented his model’s detachment from social context (Gardiner 1992, 30 11). By ‘bracketing the referent’, the Saussurean model ‘severs text 1 from history’ (Stam 2000, 122). We will return to this theme of the 2 relationship between language and reality in Chapter 2. 3 The arbitrary aspect of signs does help to account for the scope 4 for their interpretation (and the importance of context). There is no 5 one-to-one link between signifier and signified; signs have multiple 6 rather than single meanings. Within a single language, one signifier 7222 may refer to many signifieds (e.g. puns) and one signified may be 26 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS referred to by many signifiers (e.g. synonyms). Some commentators are critical of the stance that the relationship of the signifier to the signified, even in language, is always completely arbitrary (e.g. Jakobson 1963a, 59, and 1966). Onomatopoeic words are often mentioned in this context, though some semioticians retort that this hardly accounts for the variability between different languages in their words for the same sounds (notably the sounds made by familiar animals) (Saussure 1983, 69). Saussure declares that ‘the entire linguistic system is founded upon the irrational principle that the sign is arbitrary’. This provoca- tive declaration is followed immediately by the acknowledgement that ‘applied without restriction, this principle would lead to utter chaos’ (ibid., 131). If linguistic signs were to be totally arbitrary in every way language would not be a system and its communicative function would be destroyed. He concedes that ‘there exists no language in which nothing at all is motivated’ (ibid.). Saussure admits that ‘a language is not completely arbitrary, for the system has a certain rationality’ (ibid., 73). The principle of arbitrariness does not mean that the form of a word is accidental or random, of course. While the sign is not determined extralinguistically it is subject to intralinguistic determination. For instance, signifiers must constitute well-formed combinations of sounds which conform with existing patterns within the language in question. Furthermore, we can recognize that a compound noun such as ‘screwdriver’ is not wholly arbitrary since it is a meaningful combination of two existing signs. Saussure introduces a distinction between degrees of arbi- trariness: The fundamental principle of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign does not prevent us from distinguishing in any language between what is intrinsically arbitrary – that is, unmotivated – and what is only relatively arbitrary. Not all signs are absolutely arbitrary. In some cases, there are factors which allow us to recognize different degrees of arbitrariness, although never to discard the notion entirely. The sign may be motivated to a certain extent. (Saussure 1983, 130)  MODELS OF THE SIGN 27 1 Here, then, Saussure modifies his stance somewhat and refers to signs 2 as being ‘relatively arbitrary’. Some subsequent theorists (echoing 3 Althusserian Marxist terminology) refer to the relationship between 4 the signifier and the signified in terms of ‘relative autonomy’ (e.g. 5 Tagg 1988, 167). The relative conventionality of relationships between 6 signified and signifier is a point to which we will return shortly. 7 It should be noted that, while the relationships between signi- 8222 fiers and their signifieds are ontologically arbitrary (philosophically, 9 it would not make any difference to the status of these entities in 10 ‘the order of things’ if what we call ‘black’ had always been called 1 ‘white’ and vice versa), this is not to suggest that signifying systems 2 are socially or historically arbitrary. Natural languages are not, of 3 course, arbitrarily established, unlike historical inventions such as 4 Morse Code. Nor does the arbitrary nature of the sign make it socially 5 ‘neutral’ – in Western culture ‘white’ has come to be a privileged 6 (but typically ‘invisible’) signifier (Dyer 1997). Even in the case of 7 the ‘arbitrary’ colours of traffic lights, the original choice of red for 8 ‘stop’ was not entirely arbitrary, since it already carried relevant 9 associations with danger. As Lévi-Strauss noted, the sign is arbitrary 20 a priori but ceases to be arbitrary a posteriori – after the sign has 1222 come into historical existence it cannot be arbitrarily changed (Lévi- 2 Strauss 1972, 91). As part of its social use within a sign-system, 3 every sign acquires a history and connotations of its own which are 4 familiar to members of the sign-users’ culture. Saussure remarked 5 that although the signifier ‘may seem to be freely chosen’, from the 6 point of view of the linguistic community it is ‘imposed rather than 7 freely chosen’ because ‘a language is always an inheritance from the 8 past’ which its users have ‘no choice but to accept’ (Saussure 1983, 9 71–2). Indeed, ‘it is because the linguistic sign is arbitrary that it 30 knows no other law than that of tradition, and [it is] because it is 1 founded upon tradition that it can be arbitrary’ (ibid., 74). The arbi- 2 trariness principle does not, of course mean that an individual can 3 arbitrarily choose any signifier for a given signified. The relation 4 between a signifier and its signified is not a matter of individual 5 choice; if it were, then communication would become impossible. 6 ‘The individual has no power to alter a sign in any respect once it 7222 has become established in the linguistic community’ (ibid., 68). From 28 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS the point of view of individual language-users, language is a ‘given’ – we don’t create the system for ourselves. Saussure refers to the language system as a non-negotiable ‘contract’ into which one is born (ibid., 14) – although he later problematizes the term (ibid., 71). The ontological arbitrariness which it involves becomes invis- ible to us as we learn to accept it as natural. As the anthopologist Franz Boas noted, to the native speaker of a language, none of its classifications appear arbitrary (Jakobson 1943, 483). The Saussurean legacy of the arbitrariness of signs leads semio- ticians to stress that the relationship between the signifier and the signified is conventional – dependent on social and cultural conven- tions which have to be learned. This is particularly clear in the case of the linguistic signs with which Saussure was concerned: a word means what it does to us only because we collectively agree to let it do so. Saussure felt that the main concern of semiotics should be ‘the whole group of systems grounded in the arbitrariness of the sign’. He argued that: ‘signs which are entirely arbitrary convey better than others the ideal semiological process. That is why the most complex and the most widespread of all systems of expression, which is the one we find in human languages, is also the most char- acteristic of all. In this sense, linguistics serves as a model for the whole of semiology, even though languages represent only one type of semiological system’ (ibid., 68). He did not in fact offer many examples of sign-systems other than spoken language and writing, mentioning only: the deaf-and-dumb alphabet; social customs; etiquette; religious and other symbolic rites; legal procedures; mili- tary signals and nautical flags (ibid., 15, 17, 68, 74). Saussure added that ‘any means of expression accepted in a society rests in prin- ciple upon a collective habit, or on convention – which comes to the same thing’ (ibid., 68). However, while purely conventional signs such as words are quite independent of their referents, other less conventional forms of signs are often somewhat less independent of them. Nevertheless, since the arbitrary nature of linguistic signs is clear, those who have adopted the Saussurean model have tended to avoid ‘the familiar mistake of assuming that signs which appear natural to those who use them have an intrinsic meaning and require no explanation’ (Culler 1975, 5).  MODELS OF THE SIGN 29 1 THE PEIRCEAN MODEL 2 At around the same time as Saussure was formulating his model of 3 the sign and of ‘semiology’ (and laying the foundations of struc- 4 5 turalist methodology), across the Atlantic closely related theoretical 6 work was also in progress as the pragmatist philosopher and logi- 7 cian Charles Sanders Peirce formulated his own model of the sign, 8222 of ‘semeiotic [sic]’ and of the taxonomies of signs. In contrast to 9 Saussure’s model of the sign in the form of a ‘self-contained dyad’, 10 Peirce offered a triadic (three-part) model consisting of: 1 2 1. The representamen: the form which the sign takes (not 3 necessarily material, though usually interpreted as such) – 4 called by some theorists the ‘sign vehicle’. 5 2. An interpretant: not an interpreter but rather the sense made 6 of the sign. 7 3. An object: something beyond the sign to which it refers 8 (a referent). 9 20 In Peirce’s own words: 1222 2 A sign... [in the form of a representamen] is something which 3 stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. 4 It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that 5 person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. 6 That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. 7 The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that 8 object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, 9 which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. 30 (Peirce 1931–58, 2.228) 1 2 To qualify as a sign, all three elements are essential. The sign is a 3 unity of what is represented (the object), how it is represented 4 (the representamen) and how it is interpreted (the interpretant). The 5 Peircean model is conventionally illustrated as in Figure 1.5 (e.g. 6 Eco 1976, 59), though note that Peirce did not himself offer a visu- 7222 alization of it, and Floyd Merrell (who prefers to use a ‘tripod’ with 30 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS a central node) argues that the triangular form ‘evinces no genuine triadicity, but merely three-way dyadicity’ (Merrell 1997, 133). The broken line at the base of the triangle is intended to indicate that there is not necessarily any observable or direct relationship between the sign vehicle and the referent. Note here that semioticians make a distinction between a sign and a ‘sign vehicle’ (the latter being a ‘signifier’ to Saussureans and a ‘representamen’ to Peirceans). The sign is more than just a sign vehicle. The term ‘sign’ is often used loosely, so that this distinction is not always preserved. In the Saussurean framework, some references to ‘the sign’ should be to the signifier, and similarly, Peirce himself frequently mentions ‘the sign’ when, strictly speaking, he is referring to the representamen. It is easy to be found guilty of such a slippage, perhaps because we are so used to ‘looking beyond’ the form which the sign happens to take. However, to reiterate: the signifier or representamen is the form in which the sign appears (such as the spoken or written form of a word) whereas the sign is the whole meaningful ensemble. The interaction between the representamen, the object and the interpretant is referred to by Peirce as ‘semeiosis’ (ibid., 5.484; alter- natively semiosis). A good explanation of how Peirce’s model works is offered by one of my own students, Roderick Munday: interpretant representamen object F I G U R E 1. 5 Peirce’s semiotic triangle  MODELS OF THE SIGN 31 1 The three elements that make up a sign function like a label on 2 an opaque box that contains an object. At first the mere fact 3 that there is a box with a label on it suggests that it contains 4 something, and then when we read the label we discover what 5 that something is. The process of semiosis, or decoding the 6 sign, is as follows. The first thing that is noticed (the represen- 7 tamen) is the box and label; this prompts the realization that 8222 something is inside the box (the object). This realization, as well 9 as the knowledge of what the box contains, is provided by the 10 interpretant. ‘Reading the label’ is actually just a metaphor for 1 the process of decoding the sign. The important point to be 2 aware of here is that the object of a sign is always hidden. We 3 cannot actually open the box and inspect it directly. The reason 4 for this is simple: if the object could be known directly, there 5 would be no need of a sign to represent it. We only know about 6 the object from noticing the label and the box and then ‘reading 7 the label’ and forming a mental picture of the object in our 8 mind. Therefore the hidden object of a sign is only brought to 9 realization through the interaction of the representamen, the 20 object and the interpretant. 1222 (personal correspondence, 14/4/2005) 2 3 The representamen is similar in meaning to Saussure’s signifier while 4 the interpretant is roughly analogous to the signified. However, the 5 interpretant has a quality unlike that of the signified: it is itself a sign 6 in the mind of the interpreter (see Figure 1.6). Peirce noted that ‘a sign 7... addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an 8 equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. The sign which it 9 creates I call the interpretant of the first sign’ (Peirce 1931–58, 2.228). 30 In Roman Jakobson’s words, for Peirce, ‘the meaning of the sign is 1 the sign it can be translated into’ (Jakobson 1952b, 566). Umberto Eco 2 uses the phrase ‘unlimited semiosis’ to refer to the way in which this 3 could lead (as Peirce was well aware) to a series of successive inter- 4 pretants (potentially) ad infinitum (Eco 1976, 68–9; Peirce 1931–58, 5 1.339, 2.303). Elsewhere Peirce added that ‘the meaning of a repre- 6 sentation can be nothing but a representation’ (ibid., 1.339). Any 7222 initial interpretation can be reinterpreted. That a signified can itself 32 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS play the role of a signifier is familiar from using a dictionary and find- ing oneself going beyond the original definition to look up yet another word which it employs. Peirce’s emphasis on sense-making involves a rejection of the equation of ‘content’ and meaning; the meaning of a sign is not contained within it, but arises in its interpretation. Note that Peirce refers to an ‘interpretant’ (the sense made of a sign) rather than directly to an interpreter, though the interpreter’s presence is implicit – which arguably applies even within Saussure’s model (Thibault 1997, 184). As we have seen, Saussure also emphasized the value of a sign lying in its relation to other signs (within the relatively static structure of the sign system) but the Peircean concept (based on the highly dynamic process of interpretation) has a more radical potential which was later to be developed by poststructuralist theorists. Arising from Peirce’s concept of the interpretant is the notion of dialogical r i r o i r o F I G U R E 1. 6 Peirce’s successive interpretants  MODELS OF THE SIGN 33 1 thought which was absent from Saussure’s model. Peirce argued that 2 ‘all thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to 3 your deeper self for his assent’ (Peirce 1931–58, 6.338). This notion 4 resurfaced in a more developed form in the 1920s in the theories of 5 Mikhail Bakhtin (1981). One important aspect of this is its character- 6 ization even of internal reflection as fundamentally social. Some writ- 7 ers have experienced revision as a process of arguing with themselves 8222 – as I did when I revised this text (Chandler 1995, 53). 9 Variants of Peirce’s triad are often presented as ‘the semiotic 10 triangle’ – as if there were only one version. In fact, prior to Peirce, 1 a triadic model of the sign was employed by Plato (c.400 BC), 2 Aristotle (c.350 BC), the Stoics (c.250 BC), Boethius (c.500), Francis 3 Bacon (1605) and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (c.1700). Triadic 4 models were also adopted by Edmund Husserl (1900), Charles K. 5 Ogden and Ivor A. Richards (1923) and Charles W. Morris (1938). 6 The most obvious difference between the Saussurean and 7 Peircean model is of course that (being triadic rather than dyadic) 8 Peirce’s model of the sign features a third term – an object (or 9 referent) beyond the sign itself. As we have seen, Saussure’s signi- 20 fied is not an external referent but an abstract mental representation. 1222 Although Peirce’s object is not confined to physical things and (like 2 Saussure’s signified) it can include abstract concepts and fictional 3 entities, the Peircean model explicitly allocates a place for materiality 4 and for reality outside the sign system which Saussure’s model did 5 not directly feature (though Peirce was not a naïve realist, and he 6 argued that all experience is mediated by signs). For Peirce the object 7 was not just ‘another variety of “interpretant” ’ (Bruss 1978, 96), but 8 was crucial to the meaning of the sign: ‘meaning’ within his model 9 includes both ‘reference’ and (conceptual) ‘sense’ (or more broadly, 30 representation and interpretation). Furthermore, Peircean semioti- 1 cians argue that the triadic basis of this model enables it to operate 2 as a more general model of the sign than a dyadic model can (ibid., 3 86). Nevetheless, the inclusion of a referent does not make a triadic 4 model inherently less problematic than a dyadic one. John Lyons 5 notes that ‘there is considerable disagreement about the details of 6 the triadic analysis even among those who accept that all three 7222 components... must be taken into account’ (Lyons 1977, 99). 34 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS It is important in this particular account of semiotics to note how one of the foremost post-Saussurean structuralists reacted to the Peircean model of the sign, since his inflection of structuralism had important consequences for the evolution of the European semiotic tradition. Prior to his discovery of Peirce’s work, Roman Jakobson, a consistent exponent of binary structures in language, had clearly adopted the Saussurean sign – despite his critique of Saussure’s analytical priorities: ‘The constitutive mark of any sign in general or of any linguistic sign in particular is its twofold character: every linguistic unit is bipartite and involves both aspects – one sensible (i.e., perceptible) and the other intelligible, or in other words, both the “signifier” and the “signified”’ – his preferred terms (adopted from St Augustine) usually being signans (signifier) and signatum (signified). Jakobson added that the linguistic sign involved ‘the indissoluble dualism of... sound and meaning’ (Jakobson 1949a, 50; cf. 1949b, 396). ‘Meaning’ can be a slippery term in this context, since it can refer either to sense (accommodated in both the Saussurean and Peircean models) or reference (accounted for directly only in Peirce’s model), but Jakobson’s signified at this stage seems much the same as Saussure’s. Jakobson’s increasing emphasis on the importance of meaning represented a reaction against the attempt of ‘reductionist linguists’ in the USA (American structuralists and early transformational grammarians) ‘to analyze linguistic structure without reference to meaning’ whereas he insisted that ‘everything in language is endowed with a certain significative and transmissive value’ (Jakobson 1972, 42). After his encounter with Peirce’s work in the early 1950s, Jakobson became and remained a key adopter and promoter of Peircean ideas, yet in 1958 he still accepted that the signified/signatum ‘belonged to’ linguistics and the referent/ designatum to philosophy (Jakobson 1973, 320). Even when he came to emphasize the importance of context in the interpretation of signs he did not directly incorporate a ‘referent’ into his model of the sign, referring to the term as ‘somewhat ambivalent’ (Jakobson 1960, 353). By 1972 he had granted the referent (in the form of contex- tual and situational meaning) a more explicit status within linguistics (Jakobson 1973, 320), but his model of the sign still remained formally dyadic.  MODELS OF THE SIGN 35 1 Nevertheless, he had come to equate the signified with Peirce’s 2 ‘immediate interpretant’ (Jakobson 1966, 409), and on one occasion 3 he referred to there being ‘two sets of interpretants... to interpret 4 the sign – one [referring] to the code, and the other to the context’ 5 (Jakobson 1956, 75), despite Peirce’s note that the interpretant 6 excluded ‘its context or circumstances of utterance’ (Peirce 1931–58, 7 5.473). Clearly Jakobson sought to incorporate into the dyadic model 8222 the special quality of Peirce’s interpretant, referring to the signified 9 as the ‘translatable’ (or interpretable) part of the sign (e.g. Jakobson 10 1958, 261, 1963b, 111 and 1966, 408). Thus a major semiotician 1 felt able to accommodate reference (indirectly) without abandoning 2 a dyadic model. Indeed, he insisted that ‘in spite of... attempts’ to 3 revise the ‘necessarily twofold structure’ of the sign or its constituent 4 parts (the signifier/signans and the signified/signatum), ‘this more 5 than bimillenary model remains the soundest and safest base for 6 the newly developing and expanding semiotic research’ (Jakobson 7 1968, 699) – though there is some irony in the model he cites being 8 that of the Stoics, who despite having prefigured the Saussurean 9 distinction between signifier and signified, did so as part of a triadic 20 rather than dyadic model (Eco 1984, 29–33). One Peircean scholar 1222 comments that: ‘At base, Jakobson’s semiotics is still more 2 Saussurean than Peircean, committed to the diacritical nature of each 3 aspect and every instance of the sign’ (Bruss 1978, 93). Jakobson 4 was a key propagator of Peircean concepts in the European semiotic 5 tradition (Umberto Eco being the other), and although his struc- 6 turalism was in many ways markedly different from that of Saussure, 7 his stance on the sign model enabled European semiotics to absorb 8 Peircean influences without a fundamental transformation of the 9 dyadic model. 30 1 RELATIVITY 2 3 Whereas Saussure emphasized the arbitrary nature of the (linguistic) 4 sign, most post-Saussurean semioticians stress that signs differ in 5 how arbitrary/conventional (or by contrast ‘transparent’) they are. 6 The relatively arbitrary ‘symbolism’ of the medium of verbal 7222 language reflects only one form of relationship between signifiers 36 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS and their signifieds. In particular, a common-sense distinction between ‘conventional signs’ (the names we give to people and things) and ‘natural signs’ (pictures resembling what they depict) dates back to ancient Greece (Plato’s Cratylus). St Augustine later distinguished ‘natural signs’ (signa naturalia) from conventional signs (signa data) on a different basis. For him, natural signs were those which were interpreted as signs by virtue of an immediate link to what they signified – even though no conscious intention had created them as such (he instanced smoke indicating fire and footprints indicating that an animal had passed by) (On Christian Doctrine, Book II, Chapter 1). Both of these types of ‘natural’ signs (respectively iconic and indexical) as well as ‘conventional’ (symbolic) signs feature in Charles Peirce’s influential tripartite classification. While Saussure did not offer a typology of signs, Peirce offered several (Peirce 1931–58, 1.291, 2.243). What he himself regarded as ‘the most fundamental’ division of signs (first outlined in 1867) has been very widely cited in subsequent semiotic studies (ibid., 2.275). Although it is often referred to as a classification of distinct ‘types of signs’, it is more usefully interpreted in terms of differing ‘modes of relationship’ between sign vehicles and what is signified (Hawkes 1977, 129). In Peircean terms they are relationships between a representamen and its object or its interpretant, but for the pur- pose of continuity I have continued to employ the Saussurean terms signifier and signified (cf. Jakobson 1966). Here then are the three modes: 1. Symbol/symbolic: a mode in which the signifier does not resemble the signified but which is fundamentally arbitrary or purely conventional – so that this relationship must be agreed upon and learned: e.g. language in general (plus specific languages, alphabetical letters, punctuation marks, words, phrases and sentences), numbers, morse code, traffic lights, national flags. 2. Icon/iconic: a mode in which the signifier is perceived as resembling or imitating the signified (recognizably looking, sounding, feeling, tasting or smelling like it) – being similar in possessing some of its qualities: e.g. a portrait, a cartoon,  MODELS OF THE SIGN 37 1 a scale-model, onomatopoeia, metaphors, realistic sounds 2 in ‘programme music’, sound effects in radio drama, a 3 dubbed film soundtrack, imitative gestures. 4 3. Index/indexical: a mode in which the signifier is not arbi- 5 trary but is directly connected in some way (physically or 6 causally) to the signified (regardless of intention) – this link 7 can be observed or inferred: e.g. ‘natural signs’ (smoke, thun- 8222 der, footprints, echoes, non-synthetic odours and flavours), 9 medical symptoms (pain, a rash, pulse-rate), measuring 10 instruments (weathercock, thermometer, clock, spirit-level), 1 ‘signals’ (a knock on a door, a phone ringing), pointers (a 2 pointing ‘index’ finger, a directional signpost), recordings 3 (a photograph, a film, video or television shot, an audio- 4 recorded voice), personal ‘trademarks’ (handwriting, catch- 5 phrases). 6 7 These three modes arose within (and because of) Peirce’s triadic 8 model of the sign, and from a Peircean perspective it is reductive to 9 transform a triadic relation into a dyadic one (Bruss 1978). However, 20 our focus here is on how Peirce has been adopted and adapted within 1222 the European structuralist tradition. The widespread use of these 2 Peircean distinctions in texts which are otherwise primarily within 3 that tradition may suggest either the potential for (indirect) referen- 4 tiality in dyadic models or merely slippage between ‘sense’ and 5 ‘reference’ in defining the ‘meaning’ of the sign. Certainly, as soon 6 as we adopt the Peircean concepts of iconicity and indexicality we 7 need to remind ourselves that we are no longer ‘bracketing the 8 referent’ and are acknowledging not only a systemic frame of refer- 9 ence but also some kind of referential context beyond the sign-system 30 itself. Iconicity is based on (at least perceived) ‘resemblance’ and 1 indexicality is based on (at least perceived) ‘direct connection’. In 2 other words, adopting such concepts means that – even if we are not 3 embracing a wholly Peircean approach – we have moved beyond the 4 formal bounds of the original Saussurean framework (as in Roman 5 Jakobson’s version of structuralism). 6 The three forms of relationship between signifier and signified 7222 are listed here in decreasing order of conventionality. Symbolic signs 38 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS such as language are (at least) highly conventional; iconic signs always involve some degree of conventionality; indexical signs ‘direct the attention to their objects by blind compulsion’ (Peirce 1931–58, 2.306). Indexical and iconic signifiers can be seen as more constrained by referential signifieds whereas in the more conven- tional symbolic signs the signified can be seen as being defined to a greater extent by the signifier. Within each form signs also vary in their degree of conventionality. Other criteria might be applied to rank the three forms differently. For instance, Hodge and Kress suggest that indexicality is based on an act of judgement or infer- ence whereas iconicity is closer to ‘direct perception’, making the highest ‘modality’ that of iconic signs (Hodge and Kress 1988, 26–7). Note that the terms ‘motivation’ (from Saussure) and ‘con- straint’ are sometimes used to describe the extent to which the signified determines the signifier. The more a signifier is constrained by the signified, the more ‘motivated’ the sign is: iconic signs are highly motivated; symbolic signs are unmotivated. The less moti- vated the sign, the more learning of an agreed convention is required. Nevertheless, most semioticians emphasize the role of convention in relation to signs. As we shall see, even photographs and films are built on conventions which we must learn to ‘read’. Such conven- tions are an important social dimension of semiotics. SYMBOLIC MODE What in popular usage are called ‘symbols’ would be regarded by semioticians as ‘signs’ of some kind but many of them would not technically be classified as purely ‘symbolic’. For instance, if we joke that ‘a thing is a phallic symbol if it’s longer than it is wide’, this would allude to resemblance, making it at least partly iconic – Jakobson suggests that such examples may be best classified as ‘sym- bolic icons’ (Jakobson 1968, 702). In the Peircean sense, symbols are based purely on conventional association. Nowadays language is gen- erally regarded as a (predominantly) symbolic sign-system, though Saussure avoided referring to linguistic signs as ‘symbols’ precisely because of the danger of confusion with popular usage. He noted that  MODELS OF THE SIGN 39 1 symbols in the popular sense are ‘never wholly arbitrary’: they ‘show 2 at least a vestige of natural connection’ between the signifier and 3 the signified – a link which he later refers to as ‘rational’ (Saussure 4 1983, 68, 73). While Saussure focused on the arbitrary nature of the 5 linguistic sign, a more obvious example of arbitrary symbolism is 6 mathematics. Mathematics does not need to refer to an external world 7 at all: its signifieds are indisputably concepts and mathematics is a 8222 system of relations (Langer 1951, 28). 9 For Peirce, a symbol is ‘a sign which refers to the object that 10 it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, 1 which operates to cause the symbol to be interpreted as referring to 2 that object’ (Peirce 1931–58, 2.249). We interpret symbols according 3 to ‘a rule’ or ‘a habitual connection’ (ibid., 2.292, 2.297, 1.369). 4 ‘The symbol is connected with its object by virtue of the idea of the 5 symbol-using mind, without which no such connection would exist’ 6 (ibid., 2.299). It ‘is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact 7 that it is used and understood as such’ (ibid., 2.307). A symbol is 8 ‘a conventional sign, or one depending upon habit (acquired or 9 inborn)’ (ibid., 2.297). Symbols are not limited to words, although 20 ‘all words, sentences, books and other conventional signs are 1222 symbols’ (ibid., 2.292). Peirce thus characterizes linguistic signs in 2 terms of their conventionality in a similar way to Saussure. In a rare 3 direct reference to the arbitrariness of symbols (which he then called 4 5 ‘tokens’), he noted that they ‘are, for the most part, conventional or 6 arbitrary’ (ibid., 3.360). A symbol is a sign ‘whose special signifi- 7 cance or fitness to represent just what it does represent lies in nothing 8 but the very fact of there being a habit, disposition, or other effec- 9 tive general rule that it will be so interpreted. Take, for example, the 30 word “man”. These three letters are not in the least like a man; nor 1 is the sound with which they are associated’ (ibid., 4.447). He adds 2 elsewhere that ‘a symbol... fulfils its function regardless of any 3 similarity or analogy with its object and equally regardless of any 4 factual connection therewith’ (ibid., 5.73). ‘A genuine symbol is a 5 symbol that has a general meaning’ (ibid., 2.293), signifying a kind 6 of thing rather than a specific thing (ibid., 2.301). 7222 40 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS ICONIC MODE Unfortunately, as with ‘symbolic’, the terms ‘icon’ and ‘iconic’ are used in a technical sense in semiotics which differs from its everyday meanings. In popular usage there are three key meanings which can lead to confusion with the semiotic terms: to be ‘iconic’ typically means that something or someone would be expected to be instantly recognized as famous by any fully fledged member of a particular culture or sub- culture; an ‘icon’ on the computer screen is a small image intended to signify a particular function to the user (to the semioti- cian these are ‘signs’ which may be variously iconic, sym- bolic or indexical, depending on their form and function); religious ‘icons’ are works of visual art representing sacred figures which may be venerated as holy images by devout believers. In the Peircean sense, the defining feature of iconicity is merely perceived resemblance. Peirce declared that an iconic sign represents its object ‘mainly by its similarity’ (Peirce 1931–58, 2.276). Note that despite the name, icons are not necessarily visual. A sign is an icon ‘insofar as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it’ (ibid., 2.247). Indeed, Peirce originally termed such modes, ‘likenesses’ (e.g. ibid., 1.558). He added that ‘every picture (however conven- tional its method)’ is an icon (ibid., 2.279). Icons have qualities which ‘resemble’ those of the objects they represent, and they ‘excite analogous sensations in the mind’ (ibid., 2.299; cf. 3.362). Unlike the index, ‘the icon has no dynamical connection with the object it represents’ (ibid.). Just because a signifier resembles that which it depicts does not necessarily make it purely iconic. Susanne Langer argues that ‘the picture is essentially a symbol, not a duplicate, of what it represents’ (Langer 1951, 67). Pictures resemble what they represent only in some respects. What we tend to recognize in an image are analogous relations of parts to a whole (ibid., 67–70). For Peirce, icons included ‘every diagram, even although there be no sensuous resemblance between it and its object, but only an analogy  MODELS OF THE SIGN 41 1 between the relations of the parts of each’ (Peirce 1931–58, 2.279). 2 ‘Many diagrams resemble their objects not at all in looks; it is only 3 in respect to the relations of their parts that their likeness consists’ 4 (ibid., 2.282). Even the most realistic image is not a replica or 5 even a copy of what is depicted. It is not often that we mistake a 6 representation for what it represents. 7 Semioticians generally maintain that there are no ‘pure’ icons. 8222 All artists employ stylistic conventions and these are, of course, 9 culturally and historically variable. Peirce stated that although ‘any 10 material image’ (such as a painting) may be perceived as looking 1 like what it represents, it is ‘largely conventional in its mode of 2 representation’ (Peirce 1931–58, 2.276). 3 4 We say that the portrait of a person we have not seen is 5 convincing. So far as, on the ground merely of what I see in it, 6 I am led to form an idea of the person it represents, it is an 7 icon. But, in fact, it is not a pure icon, because I am greatly 8 influenced by knowing that it is an effect, through the artist, 9 caused by the original’s appearance... Besides, I know that 20 portraits have but the slightest resemblance to their originals, 1222 except in certain conventional respects, and after a conventional 2 scale of values, etc. 3 (ibid., 2.92) 4 5 Iconic and indexical signs are more likely to be read as natural than 6 symbolic signs when making the connection between signifier and 7 signified has become habitual. Iconic signifiers can be highly evoca- 8 tive. Such signs do not draw our attention to their mediation, seeming 9 to present reality more directly than symbolic signs. 30 An extended critique of ‘iconism’ can be found in Eco (1976, 1 191ff). The linguist John Lyons notes that iconicity is ‘always depen- 2 dent upon properties of the medium in which the form is manifest’ 3 (Lyons 1977, 105). He offers the example of the onomatopoeic 4 English word cuckoo, noting that it is only (perceived as) iconic in 5 the phonic medium (speech) and not in the graphic medium (writ- 6 ing). While the phonic medium can represent characteristic sounds 7222 (albeit in a relatively conventionalized way), the graphic medium can 42 SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS represent characteristic shapes (as in the case of Egyptian hiero- glyphs) (Lyons 1977, 103). We will return shortly to the importance of the materiality of the sign. INDEXICAL MODE Indexicality is perhaps the most unfamiliar concept, though its links with everyday uses of the word ‘index’ ought to be less misleading than the terms for the other two modes. Indexicality is quite closely related to the way in which the index of a book or an ‘index’ finger point directly to what is being referred to. Peirce offers various cri- teria for what constitutes an index. An index ‘indicates’ something: for example, ‘a sundial or clock indicates the time of day’ (Peirce 1931–58, 2.285). He refers to a ‘genuine relation’ between the ‘sign’ and the object which does not depend purely on ‘the interpreting mind’ (ibid., 2.92, 298). The object is ‘necessarily existent’ (ibid., 2.310). The index is connected to its object ‘as a matter of fact’ (ibid., 4.447). There is ‘a real connection’ (ibid., 5.75) which may be a ‘direct physical connection’ (ibid., 1.372, 2.281, 2.299). An indexi- cal sign is like ‘a fragment torn away from the object’ (ibid., 2.231). Unlike an icon (the object of which may be fictional) an index stands ‘unequivocally for this or that existing thing’ (ibid., 4.531). The rela- tionship is not based on ‘mere resemblance’ (ibid.): ‘indices... have no significant resemblance to their objects’ (ibid., 2.306). ‘Similarity or analogy’ are not what define the index (ibid., 2.305). ‘Anything which focuses the attention is an index. Anything which startles us is an index’ (ibid., 2.285; cf. 3.434). Indexical signs ‘direct the atten- tion to their objects by blind compulsion’ (ibid., 2.306; cf. 2.191, 2.428). Whereas iconicity is characterized by similarity, indexicality is characterized by contiguity. ‘Psychologically, the action of indices depends upon association by contiguity, and not upon association by resemblance or upon intell