[s 12] Effects of Adoption PDF

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3/25/25, 8:04 PM [s 12] Effects of adoption.— Document: [s 12] Effects of adoption.— Actions   Lexis  Go to  Search this page Advance®  ® India Research  Browse  Client: -None- History Help More Previous Next [s 12] Effects of adoption.— Hide Commentary Mulla: Hindu Law, 24th Edn Sir Dinshaw Fardunji MullaSatyajeet A Desai Mulla: Hindu Law, 24th Edn Mulla Hindu Law (24rth Edn) PART II Chapter II Adoption Mulla Hindu Law (24rth Edn) PART II Chapter II Adoption In the Introductory Note to this commentary, reference has been made to the scheme of this Chapter on adoption and an outline has been given of the principal provisions relating to requisites and conditions of a valid adoption, capacity to take in adoption, persons capable of giving in adoption, and persons who may be adopted. Attention has also been drawn in that note to the result and effect of adoption. [s 12] Effects of adoption.— An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family: Provided that— (a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth; (b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth; (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption. [s 12.1] Result and effects of adoption This section lays down some vital rules relating to the result of adoption. The primary and the principal result of adoption is that of transferring the adopted boy or girl from his or her natural family into the adoptive family. It confers upon the adoptee the same rights and privileges in the family of the adopter as the legitimate natural born son or daughter for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption. The adoptee is to be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes, and from the date of adoption all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth are to be deemed to have been severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family. This postulates that the adoptee loses any rights to property from the natural family of birth, unless there has been a vesting of properties before adoption. The adoptee cannot lay claim to properties upon proof that the adoption had taken place much earlier. 85 Where a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to exist or to have happened or some status shall be deemed to have been lost or acquired on the happening of something, which would not otherwise have been so, effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it must also be carried to its logical conclusion. In such a case, full effect must be given to the putative state of affairs and the status deemed to have been acquired or lost as also to all the inevitable corollaries of the state of affairs and altered status, unless there is something in the statute which prohibits the legal fiction being applied with all its inevitable corollaries and with the consequences and the incidents of the state of affairs and status deemed to have come into existence. 86 Subject to this qualification, that which is deemed to have taken place, is to operate for all purposes. The section is founded on this principle and states that the adoptee is to be deemed to have severed all ties in the family of his or her birth, and similar ties are to be deemed to have been replaced in the adoptive family. There are, however, three qualifications to the logical effect and corollaries to the general rule and they are stated in the provisos to the section. However, they are subject to the same principal rule which applies with all its consequences and incidents. Thus, subject to the rules laid down in provisos (b) and (c), full effect is to be given to the principal rule in all matters of succession ex parte paterna and ex pater materna as also, where the adoptive father or adoptive mother is or was at the time of adoption, a member of a joint Hindu family. The section does not recognise any exception in favour of the form of adoption called dvyamushyayana [§ 483 (Part I)], and there cannot be any valid  adoption in that form after the coming into force of this Act. Reference may be made to “Relative by adoption” in notes under section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ante. Reference may also be made to notes under “Adopted son” ante; “Adopted daughter” ante; “Mother” ante; “Father” ante and other heads under the relevant sections of the Hindu Succession Act (sections 14–15). https://advance-lexis-com-sxuk.knimbus.com/document/?pdmfid=1523890&crid=552f089a-25fc-48a8-8bb9-68d9b7cf4e0f&pddocfullpath=%2Fsha… 1/6 3/25/25, 8:04 PM [s 12] Effects of adoption.— [s 12.2] “...for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption” Document: [s 12] Effects of adoption.— It will be noticed that the adoptee is to be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption, and not to be deemed to have been in womb of the adoptive mother at the time of the death of her deceased husband, in case of adoption by a widow under the old law. In case of any such adoption, the adopted child cannot divest any person of any estate, which vested in him or her before the adoption. Reference may be made to the notes under “Proviso (c)” post. Under the old law, the rule that an adopted son was entitled to succeed as if he were a natural-born son, was subject to certain exceptions mentioned in § 494 (Part I). The effect of the rule laid down in the present section is to abrogate those exceptions, and the adopted son or adopted daughter is for all purposes of succession and partition, to be deemed to be the natural born child of the adoptive parents. In matters of succession, the adopted son or daughter is now entitled to the same share as an after-born natural son or natural daughter of the adoptive parents. [s 12.2.1] “For all purposes” These words must be understood to mean “for all practical purposes” and accordingly, the adoptee would acquire the caste of the adoptive parents without anything more to be done by him or others. 87 [s 12.3] Adoption by widow There was difference of opinion on the question whether after coming into force of this Act, in case of adoption by a widow, the adopted son becomes the son also of the deceased adoptive father. The High Courts of Bombay 88 and Allahabad 89 took the view that the adopted son should be regarded as the son of the widow as well as her deceased husband. A contrary view was taken in a decision of the High Court of Madras. 90 In Sitabai v Ramchandra 91 decided by the Supreme Court, a joint family originally consisted of two brothers D and B and the wife, B. Many years after the death of B, his widow adopted a son S in 1958. Sometime thereafter, D died. The question was raised whether the adoptee could be regarded as the son of the widow as well as her husband B, and whether he became a coparcener with D in the joint family. It was held by the Supreme Court (agreeing with the view taken by the Bombay High Court) that on his adoption, S became a coparcener with D, and after the death of D became entitled to possession of all the joint family property as a sole surviving coparcener. S would, for all purposes, be regarded as the son of B and the adoptive mother. [s 12.4] Proviso (a): Blood ties with natural family not severed in matters of marriage Though adoption has the effect of removing the adopted child from the natural family into the adoptive family, it does not sever the tie of blood in the family of birth in the matter of marriage. This proviso lays down the express and explicit exception to the general rule which applies for all purposes and enacts that the adoptee, despite the severance of all the ties in the natural family, cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married in the family of his or her birth. Clause (iv) of section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, lays down as one of the conditions of valid Hindu marriage that “the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two”. Both these conditions are equally applicable to an adoptee, and the adoptee cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married on the ground of prohibited relationship or sapinda relationship, as if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth. The Explanation to section 3 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, inter alia states that relationship for the purpose of sapinda relationship and prohibited degrees of relationship includes relationship by adoption as well as by blood. (Reference may be made to the notes under clauses (iv) and (v) of section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, ante. Reference may also be made to notes under clauses (f) and (g) of section 3 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, ante. Reference may particularly be made to the diagrams and illustrations given there. Those illustrations are equally applicable to the case of a bride or a bridegroom who has by adoption gone out of the family of her or his birth). An adopted son being entitled to be treated as a natural son, cannot marry within the prohibited degrees of relationship in either his natural or adopted family. 92 [s 12.5] Proviso (b): Divesting of property vested in adoptee Adoption did not have the effect under the Bengal School of Hindu law (Dayabhaga law) of divesting any property which had vested in the adopted son by inheritance, gift, or under any power of self-acquisition prior to his adoption. As regards cases governed by Mitakshara law, there was some divergence of judicial opinion on certain aspects of the matter (§ 491, Part I). The present section lays down the clear rule that any property that might have vested in the adoptee before the adoption, continues to vest in the adoptee, subject, of course, to any obligations attaching to the ownership of such property including the obligation of the adoptee to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth. The adopted person is not, by the fact of adoption, divested of any property already vested in him. It follows as a corollary to that rule that the fact of adoption should not operate to the prejudice of persons related to the adoptee in the natural family who had the right to claim maintenance from such adoptee. This proviso, as aforestated lays down that property vesting in an adoptee before the adoption continues to vest in him post his adoption, subject to certain terms and obligations. There is a controversy as regards the adoptee being divested of the coparcenary property in the family of his birth. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh 93 has held that an adoptee retains his interest in the undivided property of the family of his birth, whereas the High Court of Patna 94 has held that such a right comes to an end. The High Court of Bombay has, in Devgonda Patil v Shamgonda Patil, supra, dissenting from the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, held that an adoptee cannot have a vested interest in the undivided family of his birth. The court observed that the words “vested property” related to property where indefeasible rights were created and thus, held that it would relate to property where full ownership was conferred. Since there was no question of full ownership in case of coparcenary property, such property of the family of his birth could not be said to vest in a coparcener after his adoption. The reasoning does not appear to be appropriate, only limited to the extent that reliance was not required to be placed upon decisions rendered under proviso (c) in order to decide the issue, as proviso (b) is clear in its intention. Attention is also invited to the undermentioned decision 95 of the Karnataka High Court that has held that a child, upon adoption, will not be entitled to claim rights as a coparcener in the family of his birth, the same court also held similarly in another decision, 96 whereas the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken a contrary view. 97 The property which vested in the adoptive child at birth, as a member of the coparcenary would continue to vest in him, by the operation of law contained in the proviso, subject to the obligations and liabilities as indicated, if such property had already vested upon the adoptee. The https://advance-lexis-com-sxuk.knimbus.com/document/?pdmfid=1523890&crid=552f089a-25fc-48a8-8bb9-68d9b7cf4e0f&pddocfullpath=%2Fsha… 2/6 3/25/25, 8:04 PM [s 12] Effects of adoption.— proviso can, as is evident therefore, only operate in case the coparcenary property has been partitioned and the adoptee has got his share of Document: [s 12] Effects of adoption.— the property upon partition. The concept of “vesting” must be understood in the context of the nature of the property. In the case of separate property, it does not present any difficulty, but in the context of peculiar rights under the Hindu Law, it must be understood in context of joint rights. In the case of joint Hindu family property, a person acquires rights to such property by virtue of his birth into the family. Though under the Hindu Law, no person can claim a particular fixed share in joint property, his rights, which fluctuate with births and deaths exist and can be worked out. Attention is invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v Ghamandi Ram, 98 where the incidents of joint family coparcenary were analysed by the Supreme Court and it was held that: The incidents of co-parcenership under the Mitakshara law are: first, the lineal male descendants of a person up to the third generation, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties of such person; secondly that such descendants can at any time work out their rights by asking for partition; thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership extending over the entire property conjointly with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly that no alienation of the property is possible unless it be for necessity, without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly, that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors. It is also worth noting what the Supreme Court stated as regards the effect of adoption: A coparcenary under the Mitakshara school is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of parties except in so far that on adoption the adopted son becomes a co-parcener with his adoptive father as regards the ancestral properties of the latter. Even before the Supreme Court decided the issue as above, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had held in the case of Appovier v Rama Subba Aiyan, 99 that: A member of a joint Mitakshara family cannot predicate at any given moment what his share in the joint family is. His share becomes defined only when a partition takes place. Reference to the Manusmriti would also be apposite here. Even if verse 142 of Chapter 9 of the Manusmriti (which is mentioned in § 491 in Part I of this book) is examined, the translated version reads as follows: 9.142. An adopted son shall never take the family (name) and the estate of his natural father; the funeral cake follows the family (name) and the estate, the funeral offerings of him who gives (his son in adoption) cease (as far as that son is concerned). The words “family name” and “the estate” refer to the family name and the (family) estate as they have to be read in conjunction with each other and in the context that they are used. Therefore, even the Shastric law restricted the rights of an adoptee, as can be seen from the translated text of Manusmruti. Useful reference can also be had to the decision of the Supreme Court in VTS Chandrasekhar Mudaliar v Kulandaivelu Mudaliar, 100 which decision held that the purpose of adoption under Hindu law was that “It may, therefore, safely be held that the validity of an adoption has to be judged by spiritual rather than temporal considerations and that devolution of property is only of secondary importance.” Analysed in this background, section 12(b) can only be held to be applicable in cases where the adopted person had already been conferred rights in the coparcenary property due to “vesting” of property either by inheritance or partition in the natural family prior to adoption. In such circumstances, the share of coparcenary property coming to the share of such adoptee would “vest” upon the adoptee, but not otherwise, where there was no inheritance or partition prior to such adoption. In so far as separate property of such person is concerned, there is no such difficulty as it had already vested upon him or her. It is a well-recognised rule that a statute should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested rights, and such a construction should never be adopted if the words are open to another construction. It is submitted that since the language of proviso (c) speaks of a different eventuality, reliance placed upon the decisions dealing with cases under that proviso is not apposite, while dealing with cases under proviso (b), as proviso (b) is self explanatory. This section protects the rights already vested in the adopted child. After adoption, he is deemed to be the child of his adoptive parents and all ties with the natural family of his birth are severed and replaced with rights in his adoptive family. 101 Where property has already vested in the adoptee prior to adoption, it is absolute property of the adoptee and as such can be dealt with by the adoptee. When the plaintiffs could not prove the agreement as regards the property, they were not entitled to any share from the said property. 102 In the undermentioned decision, it has been held that the adoptee continues to have rights in the family of his birth. 103 The commentary in the 21st edition of this work was also referred to. The emphasis to the commentary was on the words “The adopted person is not, by the fact of adoption, divested of any property already vested in him” which formed part of the commentary, and which were noticed by the High Court. It appears that the above paragraph, namely, “This section protects the rights already vested in the adopted child. After adoption, he is deemed to be the child of his adoptive parents and all ties with the natural family of his birth are severed and replaced with rights in his adoptive family” was not, it seems, brought to the notice of the said High Court. The commentary was expanded as above in the later edition, and it has been clarified, as was always intended, by way of the above italicized comment, that the rights of the adoptive child in the family of his birth are severed. Thus, if no partition of coparcenary property has taken place in the family where the adoptee was born before having been given into adoption, there could be no vesting of property as contemplated by the section. 104 ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A has two sons B and C. A gives C in adoption to X, C, is not entitled to inherit from A as his son. On the death of A1, the mother of B and C, which had taken place prior to the adoption, C had become entitled to a share (along with A and B) in the property left by her. That share which had already vested in C, will continue to vest in him. (b) A and B, are two brothers. A’s sons, C and D and B’s son E, are all members of a Mitakshara coparcenary. A gives his son C in adoption to X. C loses all his rights as a coparcener in his natural family. The coparcenary, which consisted of five members before the adoption, will be reduced after C’s adoption to a coparcenary of four members only. https://advance-lexis-com-sxuk.knimbus.com/document/?pdmfid=1523890&crid=552f089a-25fc-48a8-8bb9-68d9b7cf4e0f&pddocfullpath=%2Fsha… 3/6 3/25/25, 8:04 PM [s 12] Effects of adoption.— (c) A and his sons B and C were members of Mitakshara coparcenary. A died after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Document: [s 12] Effects of adoption.— leaving behind his two sons B and C, his daughter D, and his widow A1, the natural mother of B, C and D. Soon thereafter A1 gave C in adoption to X. By operation of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, A’s interest in the coparcenary property devolved by succession in equal shares among A1, B, C and D. The effect of the adoption will not be to divest C of his aliquot share in the father’s interest in the joint family property which became vested in him on A’s death. C will not, however, be entitled to claim a share along with B and D in the property that may be left by A1 upon the death. [s 12.6] Proviso (c): No divesting of estate vested in any person before the adoption The questions of “vesting and divesting of estate” on adoption by a widow and particularly by a widow in a joint family governed by Mitakshara law; “alienations made prior to adoption” and “surrender prior to adoption” under the old law have been dealt with in §§ 498– 506A (Part I). The law on some aspects of the question of divesting, it has created many difficulties and anomalous situations. The proviso (c) to the present section (which must be read with the relevant provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956), lays down the express and explicit rule that the adoption of a son or a daughter by a male or female Hindu is not to result in the divesting, or any estate vested in any person prior to the adoption. Thus, for instance, where a Hindu widow who inherited her husband’s property as an absolute owner, on the death of the husband after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, came into operation, adopts thereafter, a son, the son cannot challenge an alienation by the widow though made after such adoption. When a Hindu widow is possessed of properties of her husband and father-in-law, before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she is only a limited owner. Once the Act comes into force she becomes full owner of the same, and the adoptee cannot divest her of such property. The sale of such property by the widow is valid. 105 The reason is that the property had already vested in the widow and the adoption does not relate back. 106 The adoptive son cannot claim to be a joint owner along with his adoptive father. 107 Nor can the adoption of a son by the widow of a coparcener, while the family is joint, result in the adoptee divesting the surviving coparceners of property vested in them. 108 Such adoptive child cannot divest the mother of the property already vested in her, since as mentioned, the adoption does not relate back. On the death of the sole surviving coparcener, the property vests in his heirs and a son adopted by the widow of another deceased coparcener will not divest the properties vested in the heirs. The adoptee cannot claim a share in such property. 109 In case where the last male holder dies before the adoption by the widow, there cannot be said to be a coparcenery in existence, as the property vests in the widow and other female heirs. The adopted son would not divest the heirs of property already vested in them. Upon death of the widow, and other female heirs, the adopted son would, however, inherit from her share, with the heirs of her predeceased daughters. 110 The rule laid down in the proviso does not, however, abrogate the incidents of joint family property as will be seen from the Illustrations below. Nor does it have the effect of preventing the adopted son from challenging an alienation made by the adoptive mother prior to 1956 where the alienation was not for legal necessity. 111 The proviso being clear as regards divesting of property, any alienation by the widow prior to the adoption cannot result in divesting the alienee of his possession. 112 A gift of coparcenary property by a member is void and there is nothing in section 13 which detracts from the rule. That section applies only where the property after adoption remains capable of being disposed of by the adoptive parent as his or her property. An adopted son can challenge a gift of coparcenary property by the adoptive father (see Illustration (b) below). 113 It has been held that the brother of an adoptive father can challenge an adoption because it had the effect of affecting his share in the coparcenery property. 114 It appears that the effects of section 12 have not been considered in the decision. ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A, a widow of a deceased coparcener in the joint family adopts a son B, the adopted son can claim his share in the joint family property. In such a case, it cannot be said that there was any “divesting” of any person (any other coparcener) of any estate vested in him, no question of divesting of any person arises for such a case, though introduction of B as a coparcener in the joint family may have the effect of decreasing the shares of the coparceners of the family. 115 (b) In the above illustration, A makes a gift of a coparcenary property to C after the adoption. It is open to B, the adopted son, to challenge the same on the ground that the property belonged to the joint family and A had no power to make a gift of the same. Here, the property could not lawfully vest in C and no question of divesting can be said to arise (see, Mukund Singh v Wazir Singh 116 ). (c) A and his brother B, and B’s son C are members of a joint Hindu family. A adopts a son X. The effect of adoption will be that the coparcenary which consisted of three members will now consist of four members and their rights will be governed by the law relating to joint family and joint family property. (d) A died leaving him surviving his widow A1 and property both, self-acquired and ancestral. On A’s death, A1 had inherited the property as a Hindu widow. On the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she held the property as an absolute owner by operation of section 14 of that Act. A1 adopts a son B after the present Act came into force. The effect of the adoption is not to divest any of the property vested in A1. (e) A died after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, leaving him surviving his widow A1 and two daughters D and D1. On A’s death A1, D and D1 inherited his property in equal shares according to the provisions of sections 8 and 10 of that Act. After A’s death, A1 adopts a son B. The adoption of B will have effect from the date of his adoption and B will not divest A1, D or D1 of the estate which vested in them before his adoption. (f) A died before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, but after the commencement of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, 117 leaving him surviving his widow A1 and his two brothers B and C. At the time of his death, A was a member of a Mitakshara coparcenary, consisting of himself and his two brothers. The effect of section 2 of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, 118 was that A1 took the same interest in the coparcenary property as A himself had but her interest was a limited interest (“Hindu Women’s estate”). There was no partition and the family continued as before. The effect of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, was that the limited interest of A in the joint family property came to be held by her as a full owner, and not as a limited owner. After the commencement of the present Act, A1 adopts a son, S. The adoption of S will have effect only from the date of his adoption and S will not divest A1, B or C of any rights or interest in any property. Nor will the adoption have the effect of introducing S in the coparcenary as one of its members. S will, however, after the date of his adoption, be entitled to a right of succession to the property of A1 as her son in case of intestacy, and also to the property of the relatives of A and A1, in case succession opens and he is one of the heirs of the deceased relatives under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. https://advance-lexis-com-sxuk.knimbus.com/document/?pdmfid=1523890&crid=552f089a-25fc-48a8-8bb9-68d9b7cf4e0f&pddocfullpath=%2Fsha… 4/6 3/25/25, 8:04 PM [s 12] Effects of adoption.— (g) A died after the commencement of this Act, leaving him surviving his widow A1, his separated brother B, and B1 and B2, two minor sons Document: [s 12] Effects of adoption.— of B. A left considerable property, and by his will directed A1 to take B1 in adoption. He expressly stated in his will that A1 was not to be the absolute owner of the property left by him, but to take a restricted estate in the same and was only to enjoy the income of the same and to hand it over to the adopted son on his attaining majority. A1 duly took B1 in adoption. Since only a restricted estate has been prescribed for A1 in the will of her husband, she does not take the property as full owner and B1 on attaining majority will be entitled to take the property. Here, the adoption cannot be said to result in divesting A1 of any property vested in her. On adoption, the ties of B1 in the family of B shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created in the adoptive family. On death of B, his property will devolve by succession upon B2 and any other heir of his mentioned in Class I of the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 85 M Krishna v M Ramachandra, AIR 2019 Kar 188. 86 East End Dwelling Co Ltd v Finsbury Burrow Council, (1952) AC 109 ; State of Bombay v Pandurang, (1953) 4 SCR 773 , pp 778–79. 87 Khazam Singh v UOI, AIR 1980 Del 60 (Scheduled Caste), contra; AS Sailaja v Principal KM College, AIR 1986 AP 209 (reservation—caste, backward class). 88 Ankush v Janabai, AIR 1966 Bom 174. 89 Subhas Misir v Thagi Misir, AIR 1967 All 148. 90 Arumugha v Vallimmal, AIR 1969 Mad 72. 91 Sitabai v Ramchandra, AIR 1970 SC 343 ; Sawan Ram v Kalawanti, AIR 1976 SC 1761 ; Shailappa v Muttaramma, AIR 1982 Kant 334. 92 Diyyala Gopala Krishna Nurthy v Dollagina Dhanalakshamma, (2010) 15 SCC 125. 93 Y Nayudamma v Govt of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 AP 19. 94 Santosh Kumar v Chandra Kishore, AIR 2001 Pat 125. 95 Rangappa v Chanamma, AIR 2008 Kan 47 : (2008) 1 Kar LJ 35. 96 T Rathan v Chikkamutha, AIR 2013 Kar 49. 97 Madala Yathirajulu v Madala China Ananthaiah, AIR 2014 Hyd 32. 98 State Bank of India v Ghamandi Ram, AIR 1969 SC 1330. 99 Appovier v Rama Subba Aiyan, (1866) 11 Moo Ind App 75. 100 V T S Chandrasekhar Mudaliar v Kulandaivelu Mudaliar, AIR 1963 SC 185. 101 Kartar Singh v Gurdial Singh, 2008 (1) Hindu LR 657 (P&H) (respondent adopted by maternal grandfather claiming rights in the family of his birth). 102 Banshidhar Modi v Premsuk alias Premchand Modi Agarwalla, AIR 2019 Gau 137. 103 Re, Purushottam Dass Bangur, AIR 2016 Cal 227. 104 Ranchhod v Ramchandra, AIR 2018 MP 42. 105 MD Gopalaiah v Usha, AIR 2002 Kant 73. 106 Joti v Mankubai, AIR 1988 Bom 348 ; Banabai v Wasudeo, AIR 1979 Bom 181 ; reference may also be made to section 13 below; K Venkata Somiah v Ramasubamma, AIR 1984 AP 313. 107 Dinaji v Daddi, AIR 1990 SC 1153 (section 12(c) read with section 13); Also see HP Veeresh v Channabasamma, AIR 1992 Kant 95. 108 Heera Lal v Board of Revenue, AIR 2001 Raj 318 ; (Saheb Reddy v Sharanappa, AIR 2013 Kar 152 (no divesting but the adoptee would be entitled to succeed with other claimants) (the same decision has expressed a view that adoptee does not have a vested right in the coparcenary property of his birth-this is commented upon in the commentary under section 12(b)). (Overruled in Saheb Reddy v Sharanappa AIR 2016 SC 5253 : 2016 (12) Scale 79 ). 109 Namdev Ghadge v Chandrakant Ghadge, AIR 2003 SC 1735 ; Siddamma v Rayangouda, 2008 (1) Hindu LR 217 (Kant). 110 Saheb Reddy v Sharanappa, AIR 2016 SC 5253 : 2016 (12) Scale 79. 111 Moti Lat v Sardar Mal, AIR 1976 Raj 40 ; reference may also be made to Shrishailappa v Muthamma, AIR 1982 Kant 334 , p 336 where the above proposition was cited with approval. 112 Kisan Memane v Suresh Memane, AIR 1996 Bom 50. 113 Mukund Singh v Wazir Singh, (1972) 4 SCC 178 , also see notes under section 13 below, Housabai v Jijabai, AIR 1972 Bom 98 ; Kiran Bala v Ashok Kumar, AIR 1974 Pat 291. 114 Suryakant Naydu v Amit Kumar, AIR 2016 Chh 126. 115 Vasant v Dattu, AIR 1987 SC 398 ; DS Agalawe v PM Agalawe, AIR 1988 SC 845 ; Devgonda Patil v Shamgonda Patil, AIR 1992 Bom 189 ; Nambi Narayan Rao v Nambi Rajeshwara Rao, 2008 (2) Hindu LR 376. 116 Mukund Singh v Wazir Singh, (1972) 4 SCC 178. https://advance-lexis-com-sxuk.knimbus.com/document/?pdmfid=1523890&crid=552f089a-25fc-48a8-8bb9-68d9b7cf4e0f&pddocfullpath=%2Fsha… 5/6 3/25/25, 8:04 PM [s 12] Effects of adoption.— 117 Repealed byDocument: the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956). [s 12] Effects of adoption.— 118 Repealed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956). Previous Next About Cookie Policy Privacy Policy Terms & Conditions Copyright © 2025 LexisNexis. https://advance-lexis-com-sxuk.knimbus.com/document/?pdmfid=1523890&crid=552f089a-25fc-48a8-8bb9-68d9b7cf4e0f&pddocfullpath=%2Fsha… 6/6