Russia's Global Challenges & U.S. Relations PDF

Here is the transcription of the provided document: # CHAPTER 10: GLOBAL CHALLENGES – RUSSIA **Russia's Global Engagement** Since returning to power in 2012, Russian President Putin has sought to reassert Russia as a great power on the global stage and to restructure an international order that...

Here is the transcription of the provided document: # CHAPTER 10: GLOBAL CHALLENGES – RUSSIA **Russia's Global Engagement** Since returning to power in 2012, Russian President Putin has sought to reassert Russia as a great power on the global stage and to restructure an international order that the Kremlin believes is tilted too heavily in favor of the United States at Russia's expense. Russia's foreign policy priorities traditionally have focused primarily on the post Soviet region and the West. However, Russia (like the Soviet Union before it) actively pursues foreign relations on a global scale, and this has included support of the al-Assad regime and military involvement in Syria since 2015. Most notably, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 raises a complex number of geopolitical and economic issues that are still playing out with significant implications for U.S. national security and foreign policy. Russia is one of five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, where it plays a significant role. Until 2014, Russia was a member of the Group of Eight (G8), together with the West's seven leading economies (including Japan). It is also a member of BRICS, an alternative groups of states with large economies that also includes Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. In these and other international fora, Russia has engaged on global issues such as nonproliferation (including combatting the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and North Korea), counterterrorism, counterpiracy, and global health. Russia is a leading oil and gas exporter and the second largest major weapons exporter in the world (its top clients are India, China, and Vietnam). Russia has constructed nuclear power plants in Europe, Iran, India, and China, with more under construction or planned. In addition, Russia has cultivated a variety of bilateral partnerships around the globe. In Asia, Russia’s main partner is China, with which it has close security, economic, and political relations, although Russia has concerns about China’s inexorable rise. In addition, Russia has cultivated good relations with Japan, with which it still has a territorial dispute over islands Russia annexed at the end of World War II. It also has developed good relations with India, Pakistan (more recently), Afghanistan, Vietnam, and across Southeast Asia. In the Middle East, Russia’s Syria intervention is exceptional in scope but reflects a long-standing policy of fruitful relations with regional governments including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. In Latin America, Russia has sought to reengage with Soviet-era partners Cuba and Nicaragua, as well as Venezuela, Brazil, and others. **II. Historical Overview of U.S.-Russia Relations** For more than 25 years, the U.S.-Russian relationship has gone through positive and negative periods. The spirit of U.S.-Russian “strategic partnership" forged by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in the early 1990s was gradually overtaken by increasing tension and mutual recrimination, in large part as a consequence of disagreements over Russian efforts to reestablish a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region and over U.S. promotion of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and military intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin believed they could restore U.S.-Russian relations, particularly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The two countries reshaped their relationship on the basis of cooperation against terrorism and the economic integration of Russia with the West. However, tensions arose again around a number of issues, including the Iraq War; the so-called color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan involving protests against electoral fraud that unseated corrupt regimes; Russian energy and security pressure on its neighbors; and U.S. and NATO plans for missile defense. Cooperation continued in some areas, but the August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict caused bilateral ties to deteriorate to their lowest point since the Cold War. Upon entering office, the Obama Administration believed it could prompt yet another "reset" of relations with Russia's new president, Dimity Medvedev, a relatively liberal Russian political figure who nonetheless remained informally subordinate to Prime Minister Putin. During a July 2009 meeting in Moscow, Presidents Medvedev and Obama established the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission consisting of 21 working groups to address a broad spectrum of issues. The commission's working groups met regularly for more than four years, until their activities were suspended as a result of Russian actions in Ukraine. U.S.-Russian relations worsened with Russia's disputed December 2011 parliamentary elections and Putin's March 2012 return to the presidency. In 2014, U.S. relations with Russia deteriorated further in reaction to Russia's invasion and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region and Russia's sponsorship and support of separatist militants in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (the Donbas). The United States, in coordination with the EU and a number of other states, promised to impose increasing costs on Russia until it "abides by its international obligations and returns its military forces to their original bases and respects Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity." The United States suspended discussions on trade and investment and military--to--military contacts, as well as certain kinds of nonproliferation and energy research cooperation. Russia also was removed from the G8, and the United States, EU, and other allies introduced sanctions on Russia for its actions. Since 2014, the United States has imposed sanctions on more than 520 individuals and entities in response to Russia's aggressive actions in and toward Ukraine. Former President Barack Obama, in issuing decisions to curtail economic relations, declared Russia’s activities in Ukraine as threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbor and, in turn, as constituting a threat to U.S. national security. On January 6, 2017, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released a declassified report on Russian activities and intentions related to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The report states that the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency have "high confidence" that President Putin "ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election" in order to "undermine public faith in the US democratic process." **III. Russian Invasion of Ukraine (As of April 2024)** Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 to commence the deadliest conflict in Europe in decades. After initial gains, Russian forces encountered unexpected levels of Ukrainian resistance. Many analysts assessed that "during this first stage of the war the Russian military performed poorly overall and was hindered by specific tactical choices, poor logistics, ineffective communications, and command-and-control issues. The Ukrainian military, while at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in personnel, equipment, and resources, has proven more resilient and adaptive than Russia appeared to expect, including the effective use of guerilla tactics." Most recent assessments of the situation state that there have been hundreds of thousands of casualities and more than 10 million people displaced (as of January 2024). Military assitance from U.S. and European allies have helped Ukraine continue defensive and counteroffensive operations. The initial global response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and implications for the future world order are complex, significant, and evolving. Of particular note, the U.S. and other U.S. aligned world powers have imposed sanctions on Russia and supported Ukraine with large amounts of monetary aid and modern military equipment (including drones, missiles, anti-armor systems, counter-artillery radars, armored vehicles, transport helicopters, guns, ammunition, and heavy artillery). Forty-seven different countries have provided military equipment and supplies to aid Ukraine since the February 2022 invasion began. While western nations have deployed additional forces in the region around Ukraine, no country has sent troops to aid in the defense of Ukraine within the country itself. The United States alone has committed over $75 billion in aid as of May 2023. In February 2024, The U.S. Senate approved another $60 billion in aid to Ukraine. Additionally, the unified and strong response of NATO seems to have surprised President Putin. Sweden and Finland responded to the invasion of Ukraine by applying to join the NATO alliance, and have since been approved. The image shows a map titled **"Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of April 29, 2024, 3:00 PM ET"** The map details the following: - Assessed Russian advances in Ukraine. - Assessed Russian-Controlled Ukrainian Territory. - Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives. - Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare. - Claims Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory. **IV. Russia's Military** Russia's armed forces surprised most U.S. and European observers with their actions in Ukraine (starting in March 2014 and then with the 2022 invasion) and in Syria starting in September 2015. Since the end of the Cold War, conventional wisdom about the Russian military has tended to indicate a force in relative decline, with aging Soviet--era equipment and with technology and a philosophy of warfare lagging well behind that of the United States and many NATO allies. Analysts noted that the shortcomings of Russia's military appeared to be confirmed by its relatively lackluster performance in the 2008 conflict with Georgia. Over the past several years in particular, many analysts have been struck by the improved capabilities exhibited by the Russian military, as well as the unexpected ways in which Russia has used its military: * Russian special forces, elite airborne troops, and naval infantry effected a swift and bloodless seizure of Crimea in March 2014. * The subsequent Russian involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine highlighted the practice of *hybrid warfare*, centered on the use of irregular "separatist" forces covertly backed by the regular military, along with an information and propaganda campaign orchestrated to create misdirection and spread an alternate international narrative. * The campaign in Syria, in addition to serving a number of broader Russian interests and diplomatic objectives, has allowed Russia to test and display how various components of its military work together in an expeditionary setting. * The Syria operation has demonstrated noteworthy capabilities, such as the launch of long-range cruise missiles from naval vessels in the Caspian Sea and the deployment of Russia’s most modern combat aircraft. It also has highlighted the Russian military's ability to effect "area denial" with an air defense "bubble" of overlapping advanced missile systems. * At the same time, Russia has been upgrading or constructing new facilities in the Arctic and reactivating Soviet bases in the Arctic that fell into disuse with the end of the Cold War. In December 2014, Russia launched a new *Arctic Joint Strategic Command*. In addition, Russia has been forming two new brigades specializing in Arctic warfare. * Over the past several years, Russia also has adopted an increasingly aggressive posture with its air and sea patrols and military exercises. Russia pursued an ambitious modernization program as it steadily increased defense spending, at least until 2016, when the defense budget declined for the first time in years. In 2010, Russia announced a new 10-year State Armaments Program (SAP) for 2011-2020, calling for approximately 20 trillion rubles in new weapons procurement over that period (approximately $328 billion as of December 2016). The procurement goals of the SAP include: * In the coming decade, Russian armed forces will be provided with over 400 modern land and sea-based inter-continental ballistic missiles; * 8 strategic ballistic missile submarines and about 20 multi-purpose submarines; * Over 50 surface warships; * Around 100 military spacecraft; * Over 600 modern aircraft including fifth generation fighter jets, as well as more than 1,000 helicopters; * 28 regimental kits of S-400 air defense systems, 38 battalion kits of Vityaz missile systems, and 10 brigade kits of Iskander-M missile systems; * Over 2,300 modern tanks, about 2,000 self-propelled artillery systems and vehicles, and more than 17,000 military vehicles. Since 2014, the Russian economy has been negatively affected by falling oil prices and international sanctions, with a prolonged recession accompanied by severe currency depreciation, high inflation, and increased capital flight. The downturn has strained public finances and complicated long-term budgetary and planning efforts. Accompanying an overall decline in defense spending from 2016, the approval of a new 30-trillion ruble (approximately $492 billion) SAP for the period 2016-2025 was postponed until 2018 due to the instability of economic conditions. Additionally, some analysts doubt that the Russian defense industry can produce and deliver the full complement of equipment at the pace and scale envisioned by the SAP. The performance of the Russian military in the initial phases of the invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent impacts of sanctions imposed by countries around the globe in response, reinforce the challenges that Russia faces in modernizing its military. Despite some of these fiscal challenges, in November 2023, Russia announced a national budget for 2024-2027 that is an increase by around 25% including Russia's highest defense budget in history. **Major Units of the Russian Navy** ***Russian Navy Organization*** | | | | | | | | :------- | :------------------------------------- | :-------------------------- | :-------------------------------------- | :-------------------------------------- | :-------------------------------------- | | | | | | | | | | Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (OSK) | Eastern Military District/(OSK) | Western Military District/(OSK) | Southern Military District/(OSK) | Southern Military District/(OSK) | | | | | | | | | | Northern Fleet | Pacific Fleet | Baltic Fleet | Black Sea Fleet | Caspian Flotilla | ***Russian Joint Strategic Commands*** The image shows a political map of Russia highlighting the five Joint Strategic Commands. *Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command* *Western Military District* *Southern Military District* *Central Military District* *Eastern Military District* Russia has established five Joint Strategic Commands (Obyedinennoye Strategicheskoye Komandovaniye - OSK) to deal with perceived threats from the west, south, east, and Arctic. **Surface Vessels** ***Admiral Kuznetsov Class Aircraft Carrier*** The image shows the *Admiral Kuznetsov* aircraft carrier: | | | | :---------------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Visual Identification | The ski-jump catapult is the most recognizable visual recognition of the *Kuznetsov*. The carrier sits at 1,00 ft in length. | | Mission | The design of Admiral Kuznetsov-class implies a mission different from that of the United States Navy's carriers. The carrier is intended to support and defend strategic missile-carrying submarines, surface ships, and naval missile-carrying aircraft of the Russian Navy. | | Aircraft | 18x SU-33 fighters, 6x MIG-29K fighters, 4x KA-31 helicopters, 2x KA-27 helicopters | ***Sovremenny Class Destroyer*** The image shows *Sovremenny* Class Destroyer: | | | | :---------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Visual Identification | The two four-cell anti-ship missile launchers installed port and starboard of the forward island and set at an angle about 15° are the most recognizable feature of the *Sovremenny*. | | Mission | The *Sovremenny* class, is a class of anti-ship and anti-aircraft guided missle destoyer, primarily tasked with anti-ship warfare. | | Aircraft | 1x Ka-27 series helicopter | ***Admiral Grigorovich Class Frigate*** The image shows the *Admiral Grigorovich* Class Frigate: | | | | :---------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Visual Identification | The black search radar located behind the main super structure is the most recognizable visual recognition of the *Grigorovich*. The frigate sits at 409 ft in length. | | Mission | The functions of *Admiral Grigorovich* class frigates are air defense, escorting of other warships and anti-submarine warfare. | | Aircraft | 1x Ka-27 anti-submarine warfare helicopter, or 1x Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopter | **Submarines** Russia currently has 65 submarines. Historically the backbone of the Russian Navy, 75% of the 65 operational submarines are over 20 years old and are slowly being replaced with highly capable platforms. Russia will continue production of its fourth-generation DOLGORUKIY-class submarines through 2020. Russia is also planning to construct a fifth-generation strategic missile SSBN between 2031 and 2050. ***Borei Class Strategic Missile Submarine*** The image shows *Borei* Class Strategic Missile: The Borei class, also referred to by Russian designation Project 955 Borei, is a class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines being built for the Russian Navy. The class is intended to replace the Soviet-era Delta III, Delta IV and Typhoon classes in Russian Navy service. *Crew: 107 total * *Propulsion: Nuclear * ***Yasen Class Attack Submarine*** The image shows Yasen Class Attack Submarine: The Yasen class, also referred to by the Russian designation Project 885 Yasen is a seires of newest and most advanced Russian nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines being constructed for the Russian Navy. It projected to replace Russia's Soviet-era nuclear attack submarines. *Crew: 64 total * *Propulsion: Nuclear * ***Akula Class Attack Submarine*** The image shows *Akula* Class Attack Submarine: The Akula class, also referred to by the Russian designation Project 971 are series of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The Akula incorporates a double hull system composed of an inner pressure hull and an outer "light" hull. This allows more freedom in the design of the exterior hull shape, resulting in a submarine with more reserve buoyancy than its western analogs. The distinctive "bulb" or "can" seen on top of the Akula's rudder houses its towed sonar array, when retracted. *Crew: 73 total * *Propulsion: Nuclear * ***Varshavyanka Class Patrol Submarine*** The image shows *Varshavyanka* Class Patrol Submarine: The Varshavyanka class is an improved versioin of the kilo class submarines, featuring advanced stealth technology, extended combact range and ability to strike land, surface and underwater targets. The Project 636 class boats displace 3,100 tons, reach speeds of 20 knots, and can dive to 300 meters. These attack submarines are mainly inteded for anti-shipping and anti-submarine operations in relatively shallow waters. *Crew: 52 total * *Propulsion: Diesel-electric * **Aircraft** ***Su-35 Flanker-E*** The image shows *Flanker-E*: The Su-35 Flanker-E is the designation for two improved derivatives of the Su-27 air-defense fighter. They are single-seat, twin-engine, and supermaneuverable aircraft. The Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker-E is the top Russian air-superiority fighter in service today, and represents the pinnacle of fourth-generation jet fighter design. Distinguished by its unrivaled maneuverability, most of the Su-35’s electronics and weapons capabilities have caught up with those of Western equivalents, like the F-15 Eagle. The Su-35 Flanker-E is the most common Russian fighter to conduct intercepts against U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft conducting operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. **Missiles** ***SS-N-26 Strobile*** The SS-N-26 Strobile missile is a Soviet / Russian supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. Advantages: * Over-the-horizon (OTH) firing range * Full autonomy of combat use ("fire and forget") * A set of flexible ("low-profile sea-skimming", "high-low") trajectories * High supersonic speed in all phases of flight * Full harmonization for a wide range of platforms (surface ships, submarines and land-based launchers) * Possible use of the missile in electronic countermeasures environment and under enemy fire ***SS-N-27 Sizzler*** The SS-N-27 Sizzler missiles are Russian group of surface ship, submarine-launched and airborne anti-ship and coastal anti-ship (AShM), land attack cruise missiles (LACM) and anti-submarine missiles. The missile can be launched from a surface ship using a Vertical Launch System (VLS). It has a booster with thrust vectoring capability. The missile launched from a submarine torpedo tube has no need for such an addition but has a conventional booster instead. The air launched version is held in a container that is dropped as the missile launches, detaching from the container. **V. Notable U.S. and Russia Military Incidents** At the height of the Cold War in the 1960s, there were several incidents between forces of the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy. Incidents included planes of the two nations passing extremely close to one another at high speeds, ships bumping one another, and both ships and aircraft making threatening movements against those of the other side. In 1968, the U.S. proposed talks on preventing such incidents from becoming more serious. These talks eventually led to a formal agreement signed by both sides in Moscow on May 25, 1972 (“Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas"). The Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War began in September 2015, after an official request by the Syrian government for military aid against rebel groups. The intervention initially consisted of air strikes fired by Russian aircraft stationed in the Khmeimim base at targets primarily in north-western Syria, against Syrian opposition militant groups opposed to the Syrian government, including the Syrian National Coalition, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Nusra Front (al-Qaeda in Syria) and the Army of Conquest. In addition, Russian special operations forces and military advisors were stationed in Syria. Prior to the intervention, Russian involvement in the Syrian Civil War had mainly consisted of supplying the Syrian Army with arms and equipment. At the end of December 2017, the Russian government said its troops would be based in Syria permanently. The relevance of this agreement remains today. The importance of understanding the challenge presented by Russia and its military forces is highlighted by many recent incidents at sea that include the following examples (not all inclusive): *April 2016* - A pair of Russian Su-24 fighter jets performed several low-altitude passes on the USS DONALD COOK Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer while the ship was conducting exercises with a Polish helicopter in international waters in the Baltic Sea 70 nautical miles (130 km; 81 mi) off Kaliningrad. *February 2017* – Multiple Russian SU-24 “Fencer" fighter jets and an Il-38 sub-hunting quad-engine aircraft buzzed the U.S. Navy destroyer USS PORTER (DDG 78) in the Black Sea. *January 2018* - A Russian Sukhoi SU-27 “Flanker" fighter jet came within five feet of an EP-3 Aries before crossing through the U.S. aircraft's flight path, forcing the EP-3 to fly through the SU-27's flight wash. *November 2018* – A Russian fighter jet flies dangerously close to a U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane on Monday over the Black Sea. A Navy EP-3E Aries II reconnaissance aircraft was flying in international airspace when it was intercepted by a Russian Su-27 fighter in an interaction that lasted about 25 minutes. *June 2019* – A Russian Sukhoi SU-35 fighter jet harassed a U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon patrol plane over the Mediterranean Sea. *June 2019*-On 7 June 2019 the USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CG 62) came close to a collision with the Russian destroyer Admiral Vinogradov. United States Seventh Fleet stated the Russian destroyer came within 50 to 100 feet of USS CHANCELLORSVILLE and did not adhere to proper "rules of the road". I have omitted the map image as requested, but described it in detail above.