PPT Lecture 7.pptx PDF

GLOBAL LEGAL HISTOR Y Module ‘Global Cities in the Early Modern Age’ dr. M. den Hollander Today Law and Governance in Early Modern Amsterdam The Company-State Global Cities: Early Modern Formosa, Batavia, and New Amsterdam Amsterdam’s Governance Structure No separation...

GLOBAL LEGAL HISTOR Y Module ‘Global Cities in the Early Modern Age’ dr. M. den Hollander Today Law and Governance in Early Modern Amsterdam The Company-State Global Cities: Early Modern Formosa, Batavia, and New Amsterdam Amsterdam’s Governance Structure No separation of powers, but division of tasks: Governance: Burgomasters Advice: City Council, (Great) Senior Council Justice: Sheriff and Aldermen + Commissioners Law-making: Magistrate  Amsterdam’s Governance Structure Great Senior City Council Council (36) Senior Council Burgomast Aldermen Sheriff (1) ers (4) (9) Urban Court Magistra Bureaucracy (different te, rolls) ‘Lords of Ca. 3000 the Subaltern urban Courts Court’ officials Bottom-up: Petitions Petitions: bottom-up initiative to create or change local bylaw (keur) Sample 18th century petitions: more than 50% initiated by guilds or guild-members, roughly 2/3 eventually accepted = bylaw, often verbatim reflecting petition! 1801: 51 guilds; 14,000 members Amsterdam’s Legal System Subaltern courts are e.g. Re-audition (5 Chamber of Marital Affairs, aldermen) Chamber of Insolvent and Urban Court (8 Abandoned Estates rolls + mediation) Higher levels = more Subaltern Courts influence Romano-Canonical procedure Informal Conflict Resolution (e.g. Strategic use of law > not brokers at the every party benefits from fast Weighing House) solution Much room for maneuver and out-of-court settlement, many cases do not reach a final verdict The ‘Company-State’ Institution to bridge the gap between rulers’ ambitions and means Hybrid entity: public and private not sharply defined, but blurred – Engine of capitalism > forerunner of modern multinational corporation: legal personality, limited liability, joint-stock ownership – Engine of imperialism > endowed with extensive sovereign powers: administer civil and criminal justice, raise military forces, conduct diplomacy Monopoly-holders in certain geographic areas based upon charter > necessary to pool capital for long-distance trade > risky venture! Principal–Agent problem > autonomy due to slow communication BREAK The ‘Dutch Moment’  How did the Dutch East- (VOC) and West Indies Companies (WIC) differ from both the earlier Spanish or Portuguese colonial empires? New Amsterdam States-General, WIC = Lords XIX 1624 Provisional Regulations > council States- General consisting of director Verhulst, 2 WIC officials (later expanded) and 2 colonists + ship-captains present WIC 1629 Order of Administration > ‘high (Lords XIX) jurisdiction’, i.e. power for corporal punishment granted to the council Patroonships: privatization of colonization Governor Council 1653 2 Burgomasters & 5 Aldermen of New Amsterdam appointed on 2 February Patroonship Local s (after Aldermen’s 1656 council grants criminal cases > 1629) Benches corporal punishment (branding, flogging) to local court (exception: capital crimes) The ‘Dutch Moment’  How did the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) differ from both the earlier Spanish or Portuguese colonial empires?  In what ways did the VOC differ from earlier Dutch pre-companies that were merged into this new corporation?  Trading Companies Early companies VOC  Personal contacts  ‘Public’ organization  Trade  Trade & Colonization  Fixed temporal scope: 3-4  Long term investment: 21 years years  Liquidation  Share trade through bookkeeper The VOC as Company-State:  Corporation that raised capital on the market, yet rules of the game (capital lock-in) were changed ex post  Not entirely redistributive, not entirely profit- maximizing  Zheng He’s voyages: 1405- 1433  ‘Treasure Voyages’ under the Yongle Emperor (r. 1402-1424)  Court Eunuchs versus Bureaucrats  Sima Qian, Shiji 129: three forms of wealth -> agriculture superior to trade! McKay, A History of Western Society, p. 444. Early Modern China  From 1567: 100 to 150 ships annually sail from Fujian to the Nanyang  Dutch colony on Formosa (Taiwan) 1624-1662  1644-1683: Ming-Qing Transition > ‘great pirate’ Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga)  With regards to its own trading subjects, Qing mainly worried about piracy, smuggling in southern China, Fujian: ‘internal security problems’  Foreign trade heavily regulated through emporium Canton from 1680s onwards, ‘tribute’ and system of ‘security merchants’ Chinese Petitions to the Dutch East India Company  What does the author mean by ‘on-the-spot negotiation’, and why is this crucial for our understanding of Dutch colonization in practice?  What was ‘hybrid’ about the structure of government on Formosa in the early seventeenth century?  Why was gambling such a sensitive issue for both the VOC and its Chinese subjects?  What do the described petitions show us about the functioning of politics and law- making in practice in the colonial context? A ‘Chinese’ Merchant Empire? Batavia (1619) quickly half populated by Chinese migrants; by 1644 they farmed 17 out of 21 tolls, dominated economic infrastructure Formal (taxes, institutions) & informal (illegal private trade) ties with VOC officials Flourishing sugar industry 1690-1722, growing tensions until ‘Batavia massacre’ in 1740 Qing Court: rightful punishment for the ‘bandits who, out of personal greed, left behind the graves of their forefathers without imperial permission’! 1761 Batavian Statutes included Chinese lawbooks  NEXT CLASS: COMMON LAW