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This document discusses various political science topics, including media effects, agenda-setting theory, priming, selective exposure, and corruption, and explains different approaches to studying these topics. It also touches on public opinion regarding immigration.
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POPC FINAL Context: Studying Media Effects 20th & 21st Century Changes: ○ Radio (1920s) ○ Television (1950s) ○ Cable (1980s/90s) ○ Internet (1990s) ○ Social media (2000s) Debate: Do media shape or reinforce pol...
POPC FINAL Context: Studying Media Effects 20th & 21st Century Changes: ○ Radio (1920s) ○ Television (1950s) ○ Cable (1980s/90s) ○ Internet (1990s) ○ Social media (2000s) Debate: Do media shape or reinforce political attitudes? (Minimal vs. maximal effects) Methodological Challenge: Media content preferences are endogenous to opinions Key Study: Iyengar and Kinder (1987) - First experimental study of media effects (broadcast news) Agenda-setting Definition: Ability of media and elites to shape public perception of important issues Quote: “The press…is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen 1963) Aspects: ○ Positive and negative agenda power ○ Status quo and interest group strategy ○ Issue ownership and party/candidate strategy Example: Status quo and interest group strategy Political Institutions: Vary in ease of enacting policy change (parliamentary vs. presidential) Status Quo Bias: More veto points → status quo bias Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Norm is inaction, punctuated by major policy changes Iyengar and Kinder (1987) - Agenda-setting Hypothesis Hypothesis: Problems receiving prominent news attention become viewed as the nation’s most important Experiments: Sequential and assemblage experiments, observational analysis Findings: Media coverage influences public perception of issue importance Priming Concept: Media focus on certain dimensions affects how voters evaluate candidates Hypothesis: Media influences standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates are judged Iyengar and Kinder’s Tests of Priming Experiments: Sequential and assemblage Example: Priming defense & approval of President Reagan Framing vs. Priming Framing: Affects issue attitudes Priming: Affects candidate evaluations Example: Should a hate group (e.g., KKK) be permitted to hold a public demonstration? POPC FINAL Selective Exposure Media Environment Changes: Radio, TV, cable, internet, social media Media Fragmentation: More heterogeneous media, allowing selective content consumption Concerns: ○ Echo chambers ○ Polarization ○ Misinformation ○ Extremism Prior (2005) - “News versus Entertainment” Selective Exposure Types: ○ Political vs. non-political content ○ Partisan/ideological content Main Argument: Increased choice → Polarization in knowledge and participation Key Measure: Relative Entertainment Preference (REP) Selective Exposure to Partisan/Ideological Content Normative Concern: Echo chambers Hypothesis: High choice environments lead to selective consumption reinforcing existing preferences Effects: ○ Ideological polarization ○ Affective polarization ○ Misinformation ○ Decreased tolerance/support for compromise Cardenal et al. (2019) - “Echo-chambers in Online News Consumption” Study: SE in Spain using web tracking data Findings: Evidence of selective exposure, especially among conservatives; strong cross-party exposure Summing Up Selective Exposure: Limited to highly interested/motivated consumers Implications: Media expansion likely increases knowledge/participation gaps; motivation is key to increasing political knowledge POPC FINAL Approaches to Studying Immigration Opinions Observational Studies ○ Correlations: personal economics (n.s.), sociotropic economics (+), cultural/national identities (+), overestimate of immigrants (+), contact (-), social alienation (+) ○ Concern: endogeneity ○ Potential solution: experiments (e.g., Sides and Citrin 2007) Conjoint Experiments ○ Study multidimensional decision-making ○ Randomize a large number of factors before asking participants to choose between two alternatives ○ Estimate the average effect of each attribute on the probability of selecting an alternative Example: Bansak et al. (2016) Design & Results ○ DV: support for refugee admission ○ Attributes and levels: asylum testimony, gender, country of origin, etc. Analyzing Conjoint Experiments Logic: Estimate effect of each attribute-level (X) on the outcome (Y), relative to the baseline Example: Attributes (AGE, RACE, PARTY) with levels (18, 28, 38; white, black, Hispanic; Labour, Conservative, LibDem) Corruption Variation in Rates and Types of Corruption ○ Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index Possible Effects of Corruption on Public Opinion Hypothesis: Corruption → angry voters → electoral backlash Reality: Punishing corrupt politicians is complicated and requires: 1. Accurate 2. Correct causal 3. Logical perceptions of attribution behavioral corruption response Example: De Vries and Solaz (2017) Perceptions of Corruption ○ Info not always available due to lack of media reporting, oversight, low education, etc. ○ Example: Brazil’s municipal audits (Ferraz and Finan 2008) Causal Attributions for Corruption ○ Citizens struggle with causal attributions due to ignorance, bias, complex systems ○ Example: Higher corruption in complex systems (Tavits 2007) Behavioral Responses to Corruption ○ Voters may not punish corrupt politicians due to partisan loyalty, lack of alternatives, vote buying ○ Example: Electoral responses to corruption (Incerti 2020) POPC FINAL Electoral Responses to Corruption Research Question: To what extent do voters punish corrupt politicians? Incerti (2020): Compares field and survey experiments ○ Field Experiment: Arias et al. (2018) in Mexican municipalities ○ Survey Experiment: Breitenstein (2019) in Spain Factors Potentially Affecting Redistribution Attitudes: Economic Self-Interest Elite Rhetoric/Opinion Leadership Ideology, Values, & Other Predispositions (e.g., humanitarianism) Information Nair (2018) Study: Context: Support for international redistribution (from USA) Design: Survey experiment measuring perceptions of relative affluence, randomizing corrective information Outcomes: Support for international redistribution, giving behavior Conditions: Control, Salience, Information Behavioral Outcome: Monetary contributions Findings: Perceptions of Relative Affluence: Many people are unaware of their relative wealth. Effects of Information: Corrective information can influence support for redistribution. Public Opinion on Democracy Democratic Backsliding: Definition: State-led debilitation or elimination of political institutions sustaining an existing democracy. Common Examples: ○ Crackdowns on political opposition ○ Restrictions on free/open elections ○ Suppression of independent press ○ Elimination of term limits ○ Expansion of executive authority ○ Subjugation of judiciary Reasons for Difficulty in Preventing/Stopping Backsliding (Svolik 2019): Paradox of Democratic Backsliding: Many changes are obscure/arcane (e.g., electoral rules, parliamentary/judicial procedures). Cumulative Effect: Many small changes accumulate over time. Polarization: Deep political divisions reduce the costs of anti-democratic actions. POPC FINAL Svolik (2019), “Polarization versus Democracy”: Key Point: Trade-off between democratic interests and partisan interests. Shifting Causes: From violent coups to “executive takeovers.” Measuring Commitment to Democracy: Abstract vs. specific measures. Dealing with Social Desirability Bias: Conjoint experiments, list experiments. Svolik’s Conjoint Experiments: Countries: Turkey, Venezuela, USA Design: Voters choose between two hypothetical candidates described by attributes such as policy platforms, party affiliation, demographic characteristics, and support for measures violating democratic principles. Findings: ○ Candidates supporting undemocratic measures suffer a loss in vote share. ○ The punishment decreases when policy or partisan differences are large or when the electorate is sharply divided. POPC FINAL News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing Media Choice Widens Gaps in Political Knowledge and Turnout Author: Markus Prior Source: American Journal of Political Science, Jul. 2005 Introduction Main Argument: Greater media choice allows people to find preferred content, leading to increased political knowledge and turnout for those who prefer news, and decreased knowledge and turnout for those who prefer entertainment. Study Design: Uses a representative survey of 2,358 U.S. residents to measure media content preferences and their impact on political knowledge and turnout. Theoretical Framework Audience Fragmentation and Selective Exposure: Increased media choice reduces "chance encounters" with political content. Impact of Content Preferences: In a high-choice environment, content preferences become key to understanding political learning and participation. Historical Context: In the low-choice broadcast environment, viewers had limited options and often watched news by default. Hypotheses 1. Knowledge Gap Hypothesis: Greater media choice increases the knowledge gap between those who prefer news and those who prefer entertainment. 2. Turnout Gap Hypothesis: Greater media choice increases the turnout gap between those who prefer news and those who prefer entertainment. Study 1: The News and Entertainment Survey Data and Measures: ○ Panel survey conducted in two waves (2002 and 2003). ○ Measures political knowledge, turnout, cable and Internet access, and content preferences. Relative Entertainment Preference (REP): ○ Scale from 0 to 5 based on respondents' ranking of news among their preferred TV genres. Findings: ○ Political Knowledge: REP has a stronger effect on political knowledge among cable and Internet users. ○ Turnout: REP significantly predicts turnout, with higher REP associated with lower turnout among cable and Internet users. Study 2: NES and Pew Data Data Sources: National Election Studies (NES) and Pew Media Consumption Surveys (MCS). Measures: ○ Political knowledge and turnout. ○ Relative Entertainment Preference (REP) based on reported viewing habits. Findings: ○ Political Knowledge: REP significantly predicts political knowledge among cable users. ○ Turnout: REP significantly predicts turnout among both cable and Internet users. Conclusion Dual Impact of New Media: New media increases political knowledge and involvement for some, while others tune out politics completely. Implications: Content preferences are crucial for understanding the political impact of new media. The study raises questions about how content preferences are formed and how they can be influenced. POPC FINAL Echo-chambers in Online News Consumption: Evidence from Survey and Navigation Data in Spain Authors: Ana S. Cardenal, Carlos Aguilar-Paredes, Camilo Cristancho, Sílvia Majó-Vázquez Abstract Main Focus: Investigates whether people live in echo-chambers when consuming political information online. Methodology: Combines survey and web-tracking data from Spain. Findings: Users spend more time in politically congenial outlets but engage in considerable cross-partisan media exposure, especially those on the left. Major news events affect news consumption patterns and selective exposure. Introduction Echo-chambers: Limit diversity of opinions, affecting democratic debate and public sphere. Digital Technologies: Blamed for increasing echo-chambers due to more choice and content personalization. Evidence: Mixed results on the existence and impact of echo-chambers. Literature Review Partisan Echo-chamber Hypothesis: High-choice media environment = people consume news that they agree with. Algorithmic Curation: Concerns about algorithms creating "filter bubbles." Selective Exposure: People prefer like-minded information to avoid cognitive dissonance or defend their beliefs. Hypotheses: - H1: Individuals spend more time in congenial media than in uncongenial media. - H2: Most people cross partisan lines in online news consumption. - H3: Major news events of a highly salient political character will increase selective exposure. - H4: News events of a non-political character will increase cross-cutting media exposure. Data and Methods Design: Two-wave survey and web-tracking data from 408 respondents in Spain (excluding Catalonia). Major News Events: Jihadist attack in Tunisia, regional elections in Andalucia, Germanwings plane crash. Measurements: - Selective Exposure: Index of Net Partisan Skew (NPS). - News Exposure: Time spent on 42 top news outlets. - Political Leanings: Ideological self-placement on a left-right scale. - Media Slant: Ideological classification of news outlets based on survey responses. Results Selective Exposure (H1 and H2): ○ Users spend 3.7% of online time on news, with 60% on partisan media. ○ Partisans visit media consistent with their political views but also engage in cross-partisan media consumption. ○ Distribution of NPS shows balanced media diet for most users, with considerable overlap between left and right. Selective Exposure under External Shocks (H3 and H4): ○ Major news events increase news consumption. ○ Political events (e.g., elections) increase partisan-media consumption. ○ Non-political events increase cross-cutting exposure initially but lead to more balanced consumption over time. Discussion + Conclusions+ Limatations Echo-chambers: No strong evidence of partisan echo-chambers in online news consumption in Spain. Cross-partisan Exposure: Driven by the polarized nature of the Spanish media system. Selective Exposure: Increases with news consumption, influenced by the nature of news events. Implications: Future studies should consider media system characteristics when studying selective exposure. Navigation Data: Excludes mobile devices, limiting scope. Panel Characteristics: Potential bias due to privacy concerns and openness of participants. Measurement: Focuses on media outlets, not content, which may include non-news consumption. POPC FINAL How Economic, Humanitarian, and Religious Concerns Shape European Attitudes toward Asylum-Seekers Authors: Kirk Bansak, Jens Hainmueller, Dominik Hangartner Source: Science, 2016 Abstract + Introduction Research Question: What types of Context: Europe faces the largest refugee crisis asylum-seekers are Europeans willing to accept? since WWII, with political and social tensions. Methodology: Conjoint experiment with 18,000 Objective: Understand public preferences for eligible voters in 15 European countries evaluating different types of asylum-seekers to inform policy. 180,000 profiles of asylum-seekers. Importance: Public opinion can significantly Key Findings: Higher employability, consistent influence high-profile public policies asylum testimonies, severe vulnerabilities, and being Christian rather than Muslim increase public support for asylum-seekers. Methodology Conjoint Experiment: - Design: 18,000 voters evaluated 180,000 profiles with nine randomly varied attributes. - Attributes: Employability, language skills, age, reason for migrating, asylum testimony consistency, vulnerabilities, religion, country of origin, gender. Data Collection: Online survey in 15 European countries. Analysis: Entropy balancing to match demographic margins; preregistered analysis plan. Key Findings 1. Economic Concerns: ○ Economic ones = less acceptance. ○ Employability increases acceptance. 3. Religious Concerns: ○ Language proficiency affects acceptance. ○ Christians are preferred over Muslims. ○ Younger are preferred over older ones. ○ Anti-Muslim bias is significant and larger 2. Humanitarian Concerns: than the penalty for unemployment. ○ Asylum-seekers fleeing persecution are 4. Country of Origin: more likely to be accepted. ○ Minor role in acceptance; small ○ Consistent asylum testimonies and severe differences between countries of origin. vulnerabilities increase acceptance. Subgroup Analysis + Cross-Country Analysis Political Ideology: ○ Sociotropic economic evaluations rather ○ Left-wing = stronger humanitarian than egocentric concerns concerns and weaker anti-Muslim bias. Consistency: Similar patterns across the 15 ○ Right-wing = stronger anti-Muslim bias. countries. Age, Education, Income: Exceptions: Variations in anti-Muslim bias and ○ Broad consensus across these subgroups economic concerns between rich/ poor countries. on preferred asylum-seeker attributes. Policy Implications Public Preferences vs. International Law: Integration and Support: ○ Differences between public opinion and ○ Addressing anti-Muslim bias is crucial for legal norms Humanitarian concerns align acceptance. with international refugee law. Conclusion ○ Provides systematic evidence on European attitudes toward asylum-seekers. ○ Identifies key factors shaping public preferences: economic, humanitarian, and religious concerns. ○ Offers insights for policymakers to balance public opinion and legal obligations. POPC FINAL Corruption Information and Vote Share: A Meta-Analysis and Lessons for Experimental Design Author: Trevor Incerti Source: American Political Science Review, 2020 Introduction Research Question: Do voters hold politicians accountable for corruption? Main Argument: There is a discrepancy between field and survey experiments on the effect of corruption information on vote share. ○ Field Experiments: Show near-zero effects. ○ Survey Experiments: Show large negative effects (approx. 32 percentage points). Objective: Explore reasons for this discrepancy and provide recommendations for future experimental designs. Corruption Information and Electoral Accountability Theory: Competitive elections should deter politicians from engaging in corruption due to voter accountability. Observation: Well-informed voters often still vote for corrupt politicians. Experimental Evidence: Mixed results on whether informing voters about corruption decreases re-election rates. Meta-Analysis Findings 1. Field Experiments: ○ Effect Size: Approximately zero. ○ Examples: Randomized financial audits, fliers, SMS messages. ○ Challenges: Weak treatments, noncompliance, low salience. 2. Survey Experiments: ○ Effect Size: Approximately -32 percentage points. ○ Examples: Vignettes, conjoint experiments. ○ Challenges: Social desirability bias, hypothetical bias, lower costs of changing vote. Exploring the Discrepancy Publication Bias: No systematic evidence found. Social Desirability Bias: Respondents may underreport socially undesirable behavior. Hypothetical Bias: Costs of changing vote are more abstract in surveys. Treatment Strength and Noncompliance: Field experiments may have weaker treatments and higher noncompliance. Outcome Choice and Complexity: Differences in choice sets and decision complexity between field and survey experiments. Recommendations for Future Experiments 1. Stronger Treatments: Use methods like face-to-face canvassing to increase treatment strength. 2. Measure Noncompliance: Identify and account for noncompliance in field experiments. 3. Repeated Measurements: Capture declining salience over time. 4. Conjoint Experiments: Use to approximate real-world decision-making complexity. ○ Analysis: Focus on predicted probabilities of voting for candidates with specific attribute combinations rather than average marginal component effects (AMCEs). Conclusion Main Findings: ○ Field experiments show minimal effects of corruption information on vote share. ○ Survey experiments show large negative effects, but these may not reflect real-world behavior. Implications: Researchers should be cautious when interpreting survey experiment results as indicative of real-world voting behavior. Field experiments should aim to improve treatment strength and measure noncompliance. POPC FINAL Misperceptions of Relative Affluence and Support for International Redistribution Author: Gautam Nair Source: The Journal of Politics, 2018 Summary The article explores how misperceptions about individuals' relative income on a global scale influence their support for international redistribution. The study, conducted through a real-stakes experiment on a nationally representative survey in the United States, reveals that Americans significantly underestimate their global income rank and overestimate the global median income. These misperceptions lead to lower support for foreign aid and international redistribution policies. When provided with accurate information about the global income distribution, participants showed increased support for foreign aid, reduced trade protections, and higher donations to international charities. Key Points 1. Misperceptions of Global Income: ○ Americans underestimate their percentile rank in the global income distribution by 27 points on average. ○ They overestimate the global median income by a factor of 10. 2. Impact on Policy Preferences: ○ Correcting these misperceptions increases support for international redistribution. ○ Participants informed about the global income distribution showed higher support for foreign aid and cuts in agricultural trade protections. 3. Behavioral Validation: ○ Donations to international charities increased by 55% among informed participants compared to the control group. 4. Theoretical Framework: ○ Individuals use their local experiences to make flawed judgments about global income. ○ Correcting these biases can lead to higher support for policies that transfer resources across borders. 5. Experimental Design: ○ The study used a nationally representative sample of 1,559 US respondents. ○ Participants were divided into control, salience, and information groups to measure the impact of information on their preferences. 6. Findings: ○ Information treatment significantly increased support for foreign aid and reduced trade protections. ○ The effects were more pronounced among politically liberal and cosmopolitan individuals. Important Concepts Relative International Income: Understanding one's income in the context of the global distribution. International Redistribution: Policies aimed at transferring resources from wealthier to poorer countries. Behavioral Economics: The study of how psychological factors affect economic decision-making. Implications Public Awareness: Increasing awareness of global Policy Making: Providing accurate information income inequality can lead to more equitable about global income disparities can influence public support for international redistribution. support for international aid policies. Key Figures and Data 27 Points: Average underestimation of global income rank by Americans. 10 Times: Overestimation of the global median income. 55% Increase: Rise in donations to international charities among informed participants. POPC FINAL Ten Things Political Scientists Know that You Don’t Author: Hans Noel Source: The Forum, 2010 Introduction Context: Political science is often dismissed by journalists and political practitioners. Objective: Highlight ten key insights from political science that challenge conventional wisdom in American politics. 1. It’s The Fundamentals, Stupid Main Point: Political campaigns are less influential than the political environment. Evidence: Presidential elections can be predicted based on economic conditions, war status, and incumbency. Implications: Campaigns matter in connecting to fundamentals, but they are the primary drivers of election outcomes. 2. The Will of the People is Incredibly Hard to Put Your Finger on Main Point: Public opinion is complex and influenced by various factors. Key Insights: - Most people are not very ideological. + Many do not have strong political opinions. - People take cues from parties and leaders. + Polls are useful but: limitations and interpreted carefully. 3. The Will of The People May Not Even Exist Main Point: Aggregating individual preferences into a collective decision is problematic. Concepts: - Arrow’s Theorem: No voting system can fully aggregate preferences and meet all democratic criteria. - Condorcet’s Paradox: Collective preferences can be cyclical and inconsistent. 4. There Is No Such Thing As A Mandate Main Point: Election outcomes do not provide clear mandates for specific policies. Evidence: Economic fundamentals and voter behavior complicate the interpretation of election results as mandates. 5. Duverger: It’s The Law Main Point: Electoral systems influence party systems. Duverger’s Law: Single-member district plurality systems favor two-party systems. Implications: Third-party success is limited without electoral reform. 6. Party On Main Point: Political parties are essential for democracy. Insights: - Parties help organize and simplify political choices. - Responsible Party Government: Parties should campaign on distinct platforms and enact them if elected. 7. Most Independents Are Closet Partisans Main Point: Many self-identified independents lean toward a party and behave like partisans. Evidence: Survey data shows that "leaners" vote and take positions similar to weak partisans. 8. Special Interests Are A Political Fiction Main Point: The distinction between special and general interests is misleading. Key Insights: - All interests are special to someone + Organized interests have more influence than unorganized ones. 9. The Grass Does Not Grow By Itself Main Point: Social movements require organization and leadership. Evidence: Movements like the Tea Party are organized by leaders and groups, not spontaneous grassroots uprisings. 10. We Do Not Know What You Think You Know Main Point: Political science acknowledges the limitations and uncertainties in its findings. Key Insights: - Many commonly held beliefs about politics lack strong evidence. - Political scientists strive to ensure that their findings are accurate and reliable. Conclusion Main Takeaway: Political science provides insights that challenge wisdom and improve our understanding of politics. Implications: Greater awareness of these insights can lead to more informed political discourse and decision-making. POPC FINAL Socioeconomic, Informational, and Attitudinal Predictors of Fake News Belief: Survey Evidence from Four Countries Authors: D.J. Flynn, Nina Wiesehomeier, Gulizar Haciyakupoglu Source: Research Article Research Questions What are the predictors of fake news belief? Are they consistent across countries with different political systems and information environments? Does reliance on social media for political news relate to fake news belief? Does the relationship between social media use and fake news belief vary across countries or types of people? Essay Summary Study Design: Online surveys in Spain (N=8714), Portugal (N=3210), the United States (N=3025), and India (N=2817). Measurement: Respondents' average belief in several randomly selected fake news stories circulating in their country. Key Findings: - Predictors of fake news belief are largely consistent across countries: younger, less educated, less politically knowledgeable respondents, and heavy social media users are more susceptible to fake news. - Increased reliance on social media is associated with more belief in fake news across all four countries. - Relationship between social media use and fake news belief is driven by different subsets of people. Implications Understanding who is most vulnerable to fake news is crucial for developing policy solutions. The study highlights the need for targeted interventions around social media use to combat misinformation. Findings 1. Predictors of Fake News Belief: - Predictors: Age, Education, Political knowledge, reliance on social media. - Cross-national differences: In the United States, university degree holders and those with higher political interest show higher belief in fake news. 2. Social Media Use: - Greater reliance on social media is consistently associated with higher belief in fake news. - Marginal increases in social media use lead to significant jumps in fake news belief. 3. Subgroup Differences: - Relationship between social media use and fake news belief varies by predictors - In the US and India, the relationship is stronger among those with higher political interest. - In all countries, the relationship is driven by respondents with low to moderate levels of conspiratorial predispositions. Methods Survey Data: Collected from Netquest (Spain, Portugal) and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (US, India). Countries Selected: Due to variations in populism elite and mass, political institutions, and resilience to misinformation. Key Predictors + Statistical Results Social Media Use: Frequency of using social Trust in Media: Confidence in the press. media platforms for political news. Political Knowledge: Number of correct answers Regression Models: Predict average belief in fake to factual questions about politics. news based on socioeconomic, informational, and Political Interest: Self-reported interest in politics. attitudinal factors. Conspiratorial Predispositions: Measured using Interaction Models: Examine the relationship a five-item scale. between social media use and fake news belief Left-Right Ideology: Self-placement on a left-right across different levels of education, political political spectrum. interest, and conspiratorial predispositions. Conclusion Main Takeaway: Drivers of fake news belief are consistent across countries, but targeted interventions are needed to address specific subgroups. Future: Experimental/panel designs to establish causal relationship between social media use and fake news belief. POPC FINAL Polarization versus Democracy Author: Milan W. Svolik Source: Journal of Democracy, July 2019 Introduction Main Question: When can ordinary people realistically check the authoritarian ambitions of elected politicians? Context: The subversion of democracy by elected incumbents has become the most common form of democratic breakdown since the end of the Cold War. Key Argument Political Polarization: Undermines the public’s ability to serve as a democratic check. Trade-off: In polarized electorates, voters are willing to trade off democratic principles for partisan interests. Evidence and Analysis 1. Executive Takeovers: ○ Definition: Incumbent-driven subversions of democracy. ○ Trend: Executive takeovers have become the modal form of democratic breakdown over the past 45 years. ○ Examples: Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Vladimir Putin in Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. 2. Public Support for Authoritarian Leaders: ○ Observation: Many incumbents command significant popular support even as they subvert democracy. ○ Examples: Chávez, Orbán, Erdoğan. ○ Analysis: These leaders often enjoy popularity in both absolute and relative terms, leading their competitors by double digits in elections and public opinion surveys. 3. Role of Ordinary People: ○ Puzzle: Why do voters support politicians who undermine democracy? ○ Explanation: Voters in polarized electorates prioritize partisan interests over democratic principles. Implications for Democratic Stability Gradual Subversion: Executive takeovers proceed gradually, often over several election cycles, and through constitutionally mandated processes. Public Awareness: Voters have ample opportunity to observe and reject authoritarian aspirations but often do not. Support for Democracy: Publics in countries experiencing executive takeovers do not necessarily show disregard for democratic principles. Conclusion Main Takeaway: Political polarization significantly undermines the public’s ability to check authoritarian ambitions, leading to democratic backsliding. Future Research: Understanding the role of ordinary people in democratic backsliding is crucial for addressing the challenges posed by political polarization.